Global Communications

EDITED BY CAROLA RICHTER AND CLAUDIA KOZMAN

Arab Media
Systems
 https://www.openbookpublishers.com
© 2021 Carola Richter and Claudia Kozman. Copyright of individual chapters is
maintained by the chapters’ authors.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
(CC BY 4.0). This license allows you to share, copy, distribute and transmit the text; to
adapt the text and to make commercial use of the text providing attribution is made to the
authors (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
Attribution should include the following information:
Carola Richter and Claudia Kozman (eds), Arab Media Systems. Cambridge, UK: Open
Book Publishers, 2021, https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0238
In order to access detailed and updated information on the license, please visit https://
doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0238#copyright
Further details about CC BY licenses are available at https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/
All external links were active at the time of publication unless otherwise stated and have
been archived via the Internet Archive Wayback Machine at https://archive.org/web
Updated digital material and resources associated with this volume are available at
https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0238#resources
Every effort has been made to identify and contact copyright holders and any omission or
error will be corrected if notification is made to the publisher.

This project received support from the Arab-German Young Academy of Sciences and
Humanities (AGYA) that has been funded under the German Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF) grant 01DL20003.
This publication was financed in part by the open access fund for monographs and edited
volumes of the Freie Universität Berlin.
ISBN Paperback: 9781800640597
ISBN Hardback: 9781800640603
ISBN Digital (PDF): 9781800640610
ISBN Digital ebook (epub): 9781800640627
ISBN Digital ebook (mobi): 9781800640634
ISBN XML: 9781800640641
DOI: 10.11647/OBP.0238
Cover design by Anna Gatti based on a photo by Duangphorn Wiriya on Unsplash at
https://unsplash.com/photos/KiMpFTtuuAk
 8. Qatar: A Small Country with a
Global Outlook1
Ehab Galal

The State of Qatar is a new, small, and extremely rich country,

ruled by the Al-Thani family and with a population of which
a majority are non-Qatari nationals. It is also a country mostly
known for the satellite channel Al-Jazeera. This cocktail of small
size, royal rule, and money is crucial for understanding the
media landscape in Qatar, which in basic terms must be divided
between the national media and the global satellite consortium
of Al-Jazeera. Despite their different audiences, both media types
are used and managed to consolidate and strengthen the rule and
influence of Qatar and the Al-Thani family.

Background
Qatar is a peninsula of 11,500 square kilometers, located on the east coast
of the Arabian Peninsula. Surrounded by the Arabian Gulf to the north,
east, and west, the coastline makes up most of the country’s borders
in addition to its southern border with Saudi Arabia. The country has
been an independent state since 1971, when Great Britain renounced
the protectorate of Qatar that had existed since the First World War.
Previously, the country had been part of the Ottoman Empire for
about 400 years. However, the local power has been in the hands of the

1 The research for this article formed part of the research project Mediatized Diaspora
(MEDIASP)—Contentious Politics among Arab Media Users in Europe, which is
financed by the Independent Research Fund Denmark (funding ID: 8018–00038B).

© Ehab Galal, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0238.08

128 Arab Media Systems

Al-Thani family since the mid-1800s, and when Great Britain decided
to withdraw, negotiating with several Gulf countries, Qatar—together
with Bahrain—insisted on independence instead of becoming part of a
union of smaller Gulf emirates. Thus, while the UAE became the union
of seven emirates, Great Britain handed over the sovereign power to the
Al-Thani family in 1971 to form the independent state of Qatar. Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani has been the Emir of Qatar since 2013 after
he replaced his father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who ruled
from 1995 until his abdication.
As in other Gulf countries, the majority of inhabitants are non-
nationals. Out of a population of 2.8 million people in Qatar, only about
12% are Qatari. While the total number of people fluctuates because of
seasonal work, the fact that the number of men is almost three times
the number of women further reflects the country’s large foreign labor
force, which is employed by the oil and gas, construction, and related
industries. The majority of labor immigrants are from Southeast Asia
with smaller numbers from Arab countries, mainly Palestine, Syria,
Lebanon, and Egypt. The official language is Arabic, but due to its oil
and gas industry, its huge non-Qatari and non-Arab population, and
the country’s attempt to play a role in the international scene, English
is a widely used second language.
Islam is the official religion of Qatar, and the national law is based
on secular principles as well as Shar’ia law. Because of the high number
of immigrants, other religions also exist. Statistics from 2010 estimate
that 67.7% of the population are Muslims, 13.8% are Christians, 13.8%
are Hindus, and 3.1% are Buddhists, whereas the rest belong to other
religions or are unaffiliated (Pew Research Center, 2012). Most Qataris are
Sunni Muslims who follow the Wahhabism tradition, while from 5% to
15% are Shi’a Muslims. Qatar allows non-Muslims to worship in specially
designated locations, but they are not allowed to proselytize. Public
worship is restricted, and religious groups have to formally register.
Once a poor British protectorate with its main income coming
from pearling, Qatar became an affluent state with oil and natural gas
resources after gaining independence. Although the oil production took
off in the 1950s, and the high oil prices in the 1970s changed Qatar’s
economy significantly, it was the natural gas that, according to the latest
Human Development Index figures by UNDP, placed Qatar as the richest
 8. Qatar  129

country in the world measured by gross national income per capita in

2018. Today, Qatar is the largest exporter of natural gas accounting for
a third of the world trade. Due to its wealth, there is no income tax, and
the state heavily supports Qatari nationals financially.
When leaving its protectorates in the Gulf, Great Britain also left
border conflicts to be resolved by the countries themselves. For Qatar,
there were two conflicts to solve: one with Saudi Arabia about the Khafo
area and one with Bahrain about the Zabaarah area. While the latter
was resolved in 2001, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly claimed its right
to the Khafo area. This border conflict has recurred as soon as other
conflicts in the area have broken out, and in 1992, the two countries also
went through a short-term armed conflict. In this continuous conflict
with Saudi Arabia, Qatar realized it was falling behind when it came
to media coverage. The Saudis had strong media that were available
outside Saudi Arabia, while media in Qatar were weak. It was on this
premise that Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani founded the satellite
television channel Al-Jazeera in 1996. However, he also initiated and
facilitated international involvement including more active participation
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Al-Hawik, 2013). Both Al-Jazeera and
Qatar’s international involvement would later cause new conflicts.

Historical Developments
The media development in Qatar can be divided into three periods.
In the first period, which extended from 1961 to 1995, the media were
a tool for nation-building, while the second period from 1995 to 2011
was characterized by liberalization. Starting in 2011, the third period
expanded Qatar’s use of and investments in media as part of its soft
power policy, which referred to a country’s reliance on “resources of
culture, values, and policies” (Nye, 2008, p. 94).
Operating in a young nation, the media in the first period came to
serve as a channel for communicating national and political imaginaries.
To ensure that these imaginaries were in accordance with the ideas of
the ruling family, the media were either owned or subsidized by the
state. The first radio was Mosque Radio, which started broadcasting
in the beginning of the 1960s. Also, in 1961, the print media were
established, and the state launched an official gazette announcing new
130 Arab Media Systems

laws and decrees. The development of both radio and press sped up as
the country moved closer to independence. On 25 June 1968, the state-
run Qatar Broadcasting Service started transmission, and Mosque Radio
continued transmitting for only a few months after that point. In 1969,
Qatar Radio joined the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) under the
Arab League. Starting with five hours daily transmission in 1968, Qatar
Radio gradually increased the hours of transmission, reaching 13 hours
in 1969, 19 hours in 1982, and 24 hours on 27 June 2003 (Al-Mua’ssasah
Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018). In 1971, transmission in English followed,
Urdu in 1980, and French in 1983 (Al-Jaber, 2012, p. 56). In 1992, Qur’an
Radio was established with programs on the Qur’an and Hadith, Islamic
science, and debate of modern issues. From its inception until today,
the role of radio has been to communicate the identity and heritage of
Qatar. Consequently, around 85% of the programs are locally produced.
The rest are imported programs that include documentaries, religious
programs, songs, and plays (Al-Mua’ssasah Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018).
Compared with other Arab countries, the print media emerged in
Qatar rather late. The reasons were the lack of printing presses and
high illiteracy, among others (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011,
p. 53). Starting in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the state launched a
number of magazines covering different issues. In the 1970s, the transfer
of professional foreign workers, among them journalists, to the new,
rich Qatar, established a basis for setting up professional media. In 1969,
Al-Mash’al magazine, which focused on oil and energy, was released
together with Al-Doha magazine, which focused on culture and arts
and was issued by the newly established Department of Information. In
1970, Education magazine was published by the Ministry of Education. In
1977, the sports magazine Al-Saqr was issued by the Ministry of Defense,
and in 1980, the monthly Al-Umma began publication, which focused on
Islamic matters and was issued by the Presidency of Shar’ia Courts and
Religious Affairs in the State of Qatar. In 1986, the state decided to close
down all the Qatari state’s magazines as a result of declining oil prices.
In addition to the state press, the private press also appeared in
the 1970s. Though media outlets were entitled to be private, the state
ensured their loyalty by providing financial support to local newspapers
until the early 1990s, when the funding was suspended. The first private
magazines were Al-Urooba and Gulf News, launched in 1970. The latter
 8. Qatar  131

was an English-language magazine that was published twice a month.

In 1972, the Al-Arab newspaper started publishing as the first political
daily, and in 1974, Al-‘Ahd became the first political weekly. The first
women’s magazine, Mijalit Al-Johara, and the first sports newspaper,
Al-Dawri, both appeared in 1977. Al-Arab was closed in 1996 after the
death of its founder Abdullah Hussein Nema when the heirs sold the
license of the newspaper, which did not reappear until 2007.
As for television broadcasting, Qatar TV began broadcasting in black
and white in 1970 and color in 1974. Starting with a few hours in Arabic,
it extended its transmission to nine daily hours when introducing color
television. Similar to other Arab countries, a foreign language channel
was soon introduced. Channel 2 in English started broadcasting in 1982
with programs on culture, sports, and entertainment, including those of
foreign production (Al-Jaber, 2012, p. 58).
The second period of media development was initiated in 1995
when the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, introduced
his reform program. Due to new freedom from interference by the
government, international newspapers such as The New York Times, Time
Magazine, The Financial Times and Al-Quds Al-Arabi became available
in Qatar (Al-Jaber, 2012, pp. 49–50). Also, Qatari media appeared
nationally, for example, with Al-Watan newspaper which offered more
critical coverage of national issues in Qatar, and transnationally with the
launch of Al-Jazeera.
Qatar opened up to the world and this was the beginning of a third
period starting in 2011, when Qatar expanded the Al-Jazeera network by
launching several new international channels, allowed private television
in Qatar, and increasingly backed and/or financed media based in or
outside Qatar. Strongly induced by the Arab uprisings, Al-Jazeera now
openly supported Arab oppositions such as the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and the Islamist opposition in Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya.
Thus, during the Libyan Civil War in 2011, Libya Al-Ahrar TV, a Libyan
television channel, started broadcasting by satellite from Doha. Its focus
was Libya’s revolution and its political future. In 2012, the first private
television channel Al-Rayyan TV was launched to specifically target the
Qatari community. Its support for the Qatar National Vision 2030 and
emphasis on Qatari history and tradition illustrates its loyalty towards
the regime. In 2016, it launched its second channel. Another example
132 Arab Media Systems

is the Qatari online and print newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and the
Al-Araby television network, both based in London (Roberts, 2014). This
multidirectional media strategy reflects Qatar’s soft power policy, which
includes the support of not only Islamist oppositions but also liberal
voices, such as the Egyptians Alaa Al-Aswany, Iman Nour, and others,
who continuously have been allowed speaking time at Al-Jazeera.
A study of media use from 2010 to 2012 showed that Qataris still
preferred daily newspapers as a source of local news in contrast to
expatriates that increasingly preferred online media (Meeds, 2015). As
of 2019, Qatar had four daily newspapers in Arabic: Al-Arab, established
in 1972, Al-Raya (1979), Al-Sharq (1987), and Al-Watan (1995), and three
in English: Gulf Times (1978), Peninsula (1996), and Qatar Tribune (2006).
All papers are pro-government with regular headlines about and links to
the ruling family and offer little criticism of domestic or foreign policy.
With regard to television, the population in Qatar prefer different types of
programming. Whereas Qatari nationals and Arab expats primarily watch
television programming on free television (72% and 64%, respectively),
Asian and Western expats prefer to watch subscription television (44% and
57%). The reason is probably that subscription television offers another
kind of programming that is more attractive to non-Arabs (Meeds, 2015).

Political System and Legal Framework

The political system in Qatar is based on the acknowledgement of the
Emir’s sovereign authority. The Emir is not only the head of state, but
also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The power is based on
the separation of the legislative powers held by the Al-Shura Council,
the executive powers headed by the Emir, and the juridical powers
in the hands of the courts. Political parties are not permitted, and the
only elections for direct representation are for the Central Municipal
Council that has 29 elected members and an advisory role (Freedom
House, 2019). The council was founded in the 1950s, but free elections
took place for the first time in 1999. In that election, women were able
to participate for the first time, both as voters and candidates. On the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ English website, the election is highlighted
as “a historic event” that “represented the first steps of the country
towards democracy in its civil sense,” also highlighting the new role
 8. Qatar  133

of women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar, 2019). As such, the

elections are still used as a showcase for the democratic intentions of the
country. In 2003, a referendum took place giving the Qataris the right
to vote for the country’s first constitution. This happened, however,
without mobilizing the citizens or fostering any wider public discussion
(Al-Hawik, 2013, pp. 236–37).
When Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani came to power through a
coup removing his father from the throne in June 1995, he inherited an
autocratic country built on tribal structure. His ambition was to build a
civil society by introducing a number of legal reforms, including more
freedom for national media. Looking closely, however, it appears that
he, and later his son, had endorsed a policy that carefully navigated
a balance between transformation and status quo or, in other words,
between liberalization and control.
Qatar’s first official censorship law was issued in 1979 with the aim
to regulate and control the press, publishing houses, bookstores, artistic
production, and advertising agencies. Based on the law, many non-
Qatari newspapers and books were forbidden to be imported because
they were not in accordance with the government’s political, economic,
or religious perspectives adopted as the basis for nation-building. The
responsibility of regulating media, particularly radio and television,
has been ceded to different institutions. Starting with the Media
Department that was established in 1969, the Ministry of Information
followed in 1974, which later became the Ministry of Information and
Culture in 1990 (Al-Mua’ssasah Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018). In 1998, the
new Emir abolished the Ministry as the controlling body of all media
activities, including media censorship, thereby sending a strong signal
of his wish to create freer media. As an alternative, the National Council
for Culture, Arts and Heritage and the Qatar General Broadcasting
and Television Corporation were founded as independent bodies to
promote free public debate. In 2009, the Qatar Media Corporation was
established as the official broadcasting authority for the state of Qatar.
It carries on its dual role of pursuing the newest updates of media and
technology while “maintaining and enforcing broadcast standards and
content guidelines and developing programming that promotes Qatar’s
interests” (Government of Qatar, 2020).
134 Arab Media Systems

In the new constitution from 2003, Article 48 states: “Freedom of

the press, printing and publication shall be guaranteed in accordance
to the law.” According to Anas (2012–2013), the old press law from
1979 continued to be in force, even after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa
Al-Thani announced his visions for a new Qatar, as no other law was
drafted before 2011. By referring to the 1979 law, it was possible to
practice censorship of both domestic and foreign publications, as well
as broadcast media, “for religious, political, and sexual content prior to
distribution” (Anas, 2012–2013, p. 37). Furthermore, according to Anas,
similar to cases in other Arab countries, one could be prosecuted for
criticizing the government, the ruling family, or Islam. Although the
Advisory Council had drafted a new press law in 2011, it had still not
been approved by the Emir in 2016. The law was particularly intended
to protect journalists against prosecution, while regulating the online
media (Freedom House, 2019). Finally, in September 2018, a new
draft law was approved by the government to regulate and organize
the circulation of publications, publishing, media activities, and arts.
In the Qatari daily Gulf Times, this law was presented as an answer to
the technological development and protection of freedom of opinion,
freedom of expression, and human rights. It abolishes prison sentences
for publishing with reference to freedom of expression, but it also
incorporates the publications and Publishing Law of 1979 and the Decree
Law of 1993 on regulating the practice of advertising, public relations,
artistic production, and artistic works. The freedom of journalists is
assured, but the law also emphasizes the general obligation to abide by
the code of ethics of the press (Gulf Times, 2019). Importantly, other laws
such as the anti-terrorism legislation and the cybercrime law also restrict
media and freedom of expression. The cybercrime law criminalizes the
distribution of “false news” the violation of “social values or principles”
online behavior that threatens state security, and online defamation.
Violation may lead to either imprisonment or huge fines (Freedom
House, 2019).
This development of press and media freedom is two-sided. On
one hand, a number of reforms have been introduced to strengthen the
presence of free media in Qatar. On the other hand, restrictions by the
state are still more the rule than the exception, although they might have
become more subtle. The many changes of laws and bodies involved in
 8. Qatar  135

managing media reflect the ambivalent policies that the Qatari regime
adopts when simultaneously promoting freedom and restricting access
to power. The overall result of this media climate is that most outlets
adopt a government-friendly approach and perform considerable self-
censorship (Freedom House, 2019).
The most famous result of the attempts of liberalization was
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s establishment of Al-Jazeera TV
in 1996. In contrast to the national media that work to strengthen the
Qatari regime within the national framework, Al-Jazeera was directed
towards a transnational audience and enhancing the position of Qatar
transnationally. The channel quickly became a tool to amplify the
influence and visibility of a small country, becoming an instrument for
Qatar’s soft power strategy.

Excursus: Al-Jazeera
Al-Jazeera TV, later known as Al-Jazeera Arabic, has become the most
influential Arab television station internationally. The local presence of
its correspondents during the US-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and later the Arab uprisings, has especially made the coverage of the
station into a reference for international media. The network is viewed
as an exception, both in Qatar and the Arab world, due to its critical
outlook and global reach. From the beginning, it was organized as a
private satellite television station, regardless of being established and
financed by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Al-Jazeera became an
element in his strategy of reaching out globally to constitute a new and
stronger position of the country, while at the same time promoting new
ideas of Arab democracy and critical thinking. Internationally, the Emir
tried to create better relations with a number of countries such as Israel
and Iran, and Qatar came to act as a mediator in Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
UAE, Sudan, Eritrea, and Pakistan (Miles, 2010).
Since its establishment, Al-Jazeera has grown gradually from a small
studio in a small Arab capital to a large transnational network of various
thematic television channels that offers a multi-channel, multi-platform,
and multilingual package addressing a global audience. It has offices
around the world as well as online platforms. Al-Jazeera Mubasher/
Live was launched in 2005 and transmits live events and debates on
136 Arab Media Systems

current issues 24/7. Al-Jazeera English was launched as a news channel

on 15 November 2006. In 2011, Al-Jazeera Balkan started transmitting
international news from its headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr covered the Egyptian uprisings
in the period from 2011 to 2013, when the President Morsi, aligned with
the Muslim Brotherhood, was removed from power. In the period from
2013 to 2016, Al-Jazeera America was offering the Americans a perspective
on the Middle East while prioritizing American news with the ambition
to create a mix between CNN America and CNN International. Also
in 2013, Al-Jazeera Sport was rebranded under the name beIN Sports.
In addition to its many news channels, the network added Al-Jazeera
Children’s Channel (2005) and Al-Jazeera Documentary (2007). In 2014, the
Al-Jazeera media network launched the online news site Al-Jazeera Turk
in Turkish. The aim was later to establish a television channel, Al-Jazeera
Turk, in Turkey. This never became a reality, because the online version
did not succeed and was shut down in 2017.
Al-Jazeera has its own training center and a media research institute.
The staff is international, comprising journalists educated in Western
countries, and has a broad network of correspondents worldwide.
Similar to CNN and BBC, Al-Jazeera Arabic transmits around the clock,
but the programs are more varied, combining news coverage with
political and cultural programming. From the very start, the network
adopted a confrontational style, addressing issues considered taboo in
the Arab world, thereby indirectly challenging Arab national media’s
ability to control the coverage of a story. However, it has been criticized
for its uncritical coverage of Qatar’s ruling family.
In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Al-Jazeera Arabic started to
become an important player in the coverage of conflicts inside and
outside of the Arab world, where its strength—and vulnerability—have
been its physical presence in conflict areas. The channel’s critical coverage
of global conflict has since then stirred up controversy and conflict
inside and outside of the Arab world. Its unpopularity among Arab
regimes has triggered several attempts to restrict the channel by closing
down Al-Jazeera’s local or regional offices periodically or permanently.
In particular, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of and presence in the epicenter of
global conflicts, including the American invasion of Afghanistan in the
wake of 9/11, the Gulf Wars, and the Arab uprisings, have triggered
 8. Qatar  137

such responses. In any conflict it has covered, the network has been
accused of being biased and has therefore been given numerous and
often contradictory labels such as pro-Iraqi, pro-Israeli, pro-American,
pro-Taliban, etc. (Sakr, 2006). During the Arab uprisings of 2010–2011,
the channel played a significant role by providing the Arab and global
audiences with live coverage of street protests, while clearly siding with
the protesters against dictatorships. This univocal positioning once
again made Qatar unpopular among Arab regimes.

Economy and Ownership Patterns

In Qatar, there is a tendency for the media to be either state-owned,
owned by prominent members of the ruling family and/or government,
or by businessmen with close connections to the ruling elite. Thus, all
radio stations in Qatar are government-owned, whereas the Al-Raya
and Gulf Times newspapers are owned by a private company led by a
board that includes the oil minister, a former senior official, and several
prominent businessmen. The Al-Watan newspaper, launched after the
Emir’s abolishment of censorship in 1995, introduced a more critical
approach to local issues, but was owned by the foreign minister in
association with a leading businessperson (Rugh, 2004). The paper
adopted a relatively critical policy, which got it into trouble vis-à-vis
with a number of ministries and institutions, and a court case was
initiated against its editor Ahmad Ali (KUNA, 2001). Also, both existing
Al-Sharq and Peninsula newspapers were owned or co-owned by the
Qatari foreign minister (Rugh, 2004).
A characteristic of the third period, starting in 2011, has been the
investment in media in all forms as part of Qatar’s soft power policy and
a strategic direction in its relationships with regional and international
allies and enemies. Most of Qatar’s new media ventures are, however,
based outside Qatar, perhaps to avoid any escalation of conflict with
its neighboring countries or to be relieved from the pressure they
exert in the region. Whereas Qatar TV is state-owned, Al-Rayyan TV
was launched in 2012 by Al-Rayyan Media and Marketing Company
that also had produced programs for Qatar TV. The Libya Al-Ahrar
TV is mostly funded by Libyan expatriate businessmen, while Qatar
provides facilities and technical staff through Al-Rayyan TV. A
138 Arab Media Systems

Qatari-owned private holding company, Fadaat Media, owns Al-Araby

TV and the Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, but both were initiated by
Azmi Bishara. Bishara is a prominent Christian Israeli Palestinian,
who is a secularist and pan-Arabist. He is the chairman of Fadaat Media
and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed network, also functions as advisor to the Emir,
and is the director of the Doha Institute (Roberts, 2014). Fadaat Media
also owns Syria TV, a satellite channel that has been broadcasting
from Istanbul. Over concern that the diversity of digital media outlets
has been limited, there are allegations that they are being financed
by Qatari media companies, but it is difficult to get a confirmation of
exact ownership. Furthermore, in 2017, a media city was established in
Doha in order to make Qatar attractive to international and regional
media outlets. To further this effort, the city advertises that it offers the
newest technologies and provides no editorial limits except for a code
of ethics.
Regarding Al-Jazeera’s funding, the intention from the outset was
transferring it to pure private financing after five years of operation.
While part of its financing comes from advertising, it is rather unclear
how it is financed today, with no doubt that Qatar still supports the
channel and its offspring financially. In 2014, beIN Sports was separated
from Al-Jazeera and now operates 60 channels across 34 countries. In
2016, it also bought Turkey’s largest pay-television operator, Digitürk,
profiting from the rapid growth of pay-television in the Middle East
(Oxford Business Group, 2018).
Regionally, Qatar is one of the biggest spenders on advertising.
Newspapers are the most important platform, with online channels
being a new platform. Advertisers have changed over time, not the least
due to lower oil and gas revenues, but the state remains the dominant
advertiser and spends “on advertising for major projects, such as
infrastructure improvements and initiatives under the framework of
Qatar Vision 2030” (Oxford Business Group, 2018).

Technology and Infrastructure

With the access to satellite technology, Qatar followed the trend
practiced by other Arab countries and transformed its ground television
station to satellite television in 1998, transmitting via the satellites
 8. Qatar  139

ArabSat, NileSat, and Hot Bird. In 1993, Qataris already had access
to 31 satellite channels via the Qatari cable system network known
as Qatar Cablevision (QCV), challenging the monopoly of Qatar TV
by offering channels such CNN, BBC, Fox Sports, and Arab satellite
channels (Miles, 2013, p. 43). With the rapidly increasing number of
Arab satellite channels, Qatar TV in 2000 changed the format of the
channel in response to the growing competition. It changed its logo,
style of programs, intervals, and announcements, and new young faces
appeared on the screen. Despite the competition from outside, Qatar
TV is still popular among viewers in Qatar, whereas many Qataris feel
alienated by Al-Jazeera, according to Miles (2013, pp. 44–45). The Qatari
satellite company Es’hailSat launched the country’s first satellite in 2013
to support beIN Sports and the Al-Jazeera network. In 2018, it launched
its second satellite and began offering commercial services in the region.
In the telecommunications realm, the only provider of Internet in Qatar
is the government-owned Qatar Public Telecommunications Corporation
(Q-Tel). Owning the entire IT infrastructure, it provides a list of banned
websites and blocks material that is deemed as being against Qatari
values. An example is Doha News, which was blocked in November 2016.
As a private initiative, it had developed from a Twitter account, then a
Tumblr blog, to a popular English-language website that was not afraid
of criticizing Qatari politics. In the end, the owners sold Doha News to
a foreign company due to problems with getting licensed (Napieralski,
2018). When raising a case, the authorities typically warn the local
journalists, while non-Qataris employed by Qatari media outlets risk
being deported or imprisoned.
With regard to Internet use, a six-country (Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) study by Northwestern
University in Qatar found that Qataris are “among the most digitally
connected citizens in the Arab Region” (Dennis, Martin & Wood, 2017).
According to this study, 95% of the population has access to the Internet,
and they spend 60% more time online than the populations from the
other five Arab countries of the survey. They also found that, while
the most popular social networks are Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and
Instagram, the users in Qatar spend less time playing video games or
using Facebook in comparison with the other five countries. Instead, they
use the Internet to watch news, comedy, sport, and religious/spiritual
140 Arab Media Systems

programs online. The study also showed that watching television online,
either by streaming or download, is practiced by a third of Internet users
in Qatar. Arab expats seem to especially prefer this option. The Internet
appears to have become the most preferred form of media for users who
are interested in political news (Meeds, 2015).

Challenges
Qatar’s transnational media expansion has created a major source of
conflict in recent years. In 2014, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt,
the only non-member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), accused
Qatar of supporting or financing terrorist groups in Egypt and Yemen.
As a result, Qatar entered into a deal with the Gulf states not to support
hostile media that function as a platform for opposition groups in other
countries in the region. Later, another deal followed where Bahrain,
UAE, and Qatar agreed to support the stability in Egypt and to prevent
Al-Jazeera from working as a platform for opposition groups. These
agreements seemed to have postponed the conflict from escalating after
it broke out in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain demanded
that Qatar close down Al-Jazeera. The new Emir, Tamim bin Hamad
Al-Thani, refused. This led Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE to
break off all diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017. Shortly after,
Yemen, the Maldives, Mauritania, and Senegal also severed their relations
with Qatar. Jointly, the countries would later present 13 demands that
had to be met before contact could be resumed. Among these demands
were to minimize contact with Iran and associated groups (a not very
subtle reference to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza), to shut
down the Turkish military base in Qatar, to stop financing terrorism, to
stop all relations with terrorist organizations and individuals, and to
shut down Al-Jazeera. Qatar rejected all accusations, demanded proof of
the allegations, and refused to close down Al-Jazeera with reference to
the need for freedom of the press (Naheem, 2017). This incident clearly
illustrates how media are used to legitimize a political conflict, which in
this case, according to Naheem (2017), has been a media war between
UAE and Qatar. The conflict also underlines how Al-Jazeera plays a
particular role as a transnational tool of Qatar’s foreign policy. Where
local national media in Qatar risk repercussions should they forget
 8. Qatar  141

their loyalty towards the Qatari rulers, the same rulers use Al-Jazeera to
position themselves within a conflictive international political field with
no intention of restricting their activities.

Outlook
In the young nation of Qatar, with its history of around 50 years of
national media, media play a key role in the construction of a modern
Qatari state. Whereas the national media are restricted by regulations
that assure their loyalty to the Qatari nation and its conservative values,
the investments in and/or support of transnational media, including
Al-Jazeera, play the role of strengthening the sovereignty—and more
liberal values—of Qatar in an Arab region haunted by conflict. By
concentrating media ownership among the ruling family and loyal
businesspeople and setting up restrictions for obtaining media licenses,
the Qatari rulers manage to control the national narrative and their own
power. To control the international responses to Al-Jazeera appears more
of a challenge, but until now, the Qatari rulers have not given in to threats
and demands from outside. Two key issues will be crucial to the future
media landscape of Qatar. One is how the continuous struggle with other
Arab countries concerning Al-Jazeera evolves. As a small country, Qatar
is dependent on international collaboration, and therefore, one likely
scenario is that the countries will find a compromise where Al-Jazeera
moderates the critique of other Arab regimes or turns its attention to
other countries. However, if political changes in neighboring countries,
such as Saudi Arabia, do in fact occur, Qatar may need to find new allies,
which potentially could strengthen the role of Al-Jazeera. Another key
issue concerns the advancement of new technologies wherein Qatar has
invested heavily. This applies to technology itself but also to investments
in Arab and English online news media globally, which have particularly
provided Qatar with new platforms for influencing Arab perceptions of
national and regional politics and identities. Although it is difficult to
predict the future, Qatar will still be a small country with a majority of
non-Qatari inhabitants, which makes it essential for the rulers to protect
and control the symbolic (and physical) borders internally as well as
externally.
142 Arab Media Systems

References

Al-Hawik, H. (2013). The Arab News satellites between two globalizations [in
Arabic]. Beirut: Al-Maaref Forum.
Al-Jaber, K. (2012). Audiences’ perceptions of news media services in three Arab
countries (doctoral thesis). University of Leicester.
Al-Mu‘assasah al-Qatariya lili’laam [Qatar Media Corporation] (2018). Qatar
Radio: Golden Jubilee 1968–2018 [in Arabic]. http://www.qmc.qa/
Anas, O. (2012–2013). The changing profile of media in the Arab State. Global
Media Journal–Arabian Edition, 2(1–2), 28–46.
Dennis, E. E., Martin, J. D., & Wood, R. (2017). Media use in the Middle East, 2017:
A six-nation survey. http://www.mideastmedia.org/survey/2017/
Freedom House (2019). Country report: Qatar. https://freedomhouse.org/
country/qatar/freedom-world/2019
Government of Qatar (2020). Media. https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/
topics/Culture+Arts+and+Media/Media
Gulf Times (2019, February 6). Qatar consolidates freedom of media with draft law.
https://www.gulf-times.com/story/621369/Qatar-consolidates-freedom-of-
media-with-draft-law
KUNA (2001). Qatari newspapers request police protection since the al-Watan
newspaper incident last June [in Arabic]. https://www.kuna.net.kw/
ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1186747&language=ar
Meeds, R. (2015). Changing roles of traditional and online media as trusted
news sources in Qatar and their relationships with perceived important
issues and interest in politics. Journal of Middle East Media, 11, 34–61. https://
doi.org/10.12816/0023481
Mellor, N., Ayish, M., Dajani, N., & Rinnawi, K. (2011). Arab media: Globalization
and emerging media industries. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miles, H. (2010). Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV news challenged the world. London:
Abacus.
——. (2013). The other face of Qatari TV broadcasting. In T. Guaaybess (Ed.),
National broadcasting and state policy in Arab countries (pp. 42–48). Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137301932_4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar (2019). Political system. https://www.mofa.
gov.qa/en/qatar/political-system/general-information
Naheem, M. A. (2017). The dramatic rift and crisis between Qatar and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) of June 2017. International Journal of Disclosure
and Governance, 14(4), 265–77.
 8. Qatar  143

Napieralski, M. (2018). The rise and fall of Doha News. Qatarexpats. https://
medium.com/qatarexpats/the-rise-and-fall-of-doha-news-d191130f417c
Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0002716207311699
Oxford Business Group (2018). Qatar maintains strong standing in regional and
international media markets. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/
tuned-country-maintains-strong-standing-both-regional-and-international-
markets
Pew Research Center (2012). Table: Religious composition by country. https://assets.
pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2012/12/globalReligion-
tables.pdf
Roberts, D. (2014). Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or
preference? Middle East Policy, 21(3), 84–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/
mepo.12084
Rugh, W. A. (2004). Arab mass media: Newspapers, radio, and television in Arab
politics. Westport: Praeger.
Sakr, N. (2006). Challenger or lackey? The politics of news on Al-Jazeera. In D.
K. Thussu (Ed.), Media on the move: Global flow and contra-flow (pp. 104–18).
London, New York: Routledge.