ON CRITIQUE ‘A SOCIOLOGY OF EMANCIPATION LUC BOLTANSK! Translated by Gregory Elliott polity‘ve gor to tell yous me, al my if, I've chought for myself fee, Iwas born diffrent. [am who Iam. Pm diferent from everyone... i don't [Know much. But Pm suspicious of lots of things. T can say, pass 10 se: when itcomes to chiaking ahead, I'm a dog handler release a lide ‘idea in front of me and Tm going to tack i for you into che deepest of all forests, amen! Listen: how things should be would ber gral age, politicians, important elected cepresenraives together and setle the Ssue for good ~ proclaim once and for all, by means of meetings, that there’s na devi, he doesnt exist, cannot. Legally binding! Thats the ‘only way eveyone would get some peace and quiet. Why doesnt the government deal witht? Oh, Tknow very wel isnot possible. Do’ {ake me for an ignocamus. Puting ideas in order is one thing, dealing With a county of real people, chousands and thousands of woes, i {uit another.» So many people is texting o think about it~ and for one of hem at peace: al of them are born, grow up, matty, want food, health, wealth fame, a Secure job, wane ora, want ehings co work Jodo Guimaties Rosa Diadovim CONTENTS Preface ‘Acknowledgements “The Structure of Critical Theories Critical Sociology and Praga: ‘The Power of Institutions i Sociology of Critique The Necessity of Critique Political Regimes of Domination “Emancipation in the Pragmatic Sense Notes Index page ix 18 so 8 16 150 161 188PREFACE “This book originated in thrce talks given atthe Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in November 2008, Professor Axel Honneth, with whom Ihave kept up a very rewarding dialogue for several years ‘now, took the initiative of entrusting me with the task, at once stim lating and intimidating, of making this contribution to the series of Adorno Lectures, [hope ke will accept my warm thanks for having provided me.with the opportunity to present, in synthetic form, some fobservations that have accompanied my thinking over the last thece years. In returning to these lectures with a view to publication, I have been unable to resist reintroducing a number of arguments that I had to eliminate so as not to exceed the time allotted me. In addition, Thave integrated into the body of the text some more up-to-date considerations on contemporary forms of domination, which I had {the opportunity to present in Octaber 2008 at Humbolde University “in Betlin, in the context of a lecture which the Centre Mare Bloch ‘organizes annually to mark the start of the academic year. The three ‘Adorno Lectures have thus, as it were, been opened up, giving ris to the sx segments that make up this work. Nevertheless, conscious of the dificuley presented by the transition from lecture form to book form ~ a task virtually impossible in as much as the two formats involve different methods of argument and stylistic practices! — in ‘writing them up [have sought to preserve, at least t0 some extent, theie inital oral character. They must therefore be read asf they were 4 series of six talks. Consequently, readers should not expect to find a finished work, whose composition would have taken me many more years of labour and whose size would be (will be?) much greater, bur only a series of remarks, whose articulation has certainly not yetreached the desired level of integration and coherence, as if they had been set down on paper in preparation for composing a book. Ox, if you like, at best a sore of précis of critique. “The six segments can be assembled in twos to form three dif ferent parts. The first two concer the issue of che relationship between sociology and social cntique, This is a question that has never stopped haunting sociology since the origins of the discipline. Should sociology, constituted om the model of the sciences, with an essentially descriptive orientation, be placed in the service of 4 critique of society ~ which assumes considering the latter in a normative optic? If so, how should it go about making description stique compatible? Dees an orientation towards critique nec have the effec of corrupting the integrity of sociology and Siverting it from its scientific project? Or, on the contrary, should it be acknowledged that it in_a sense constitutes the purpose [or ‘one of the purposes) of sociology, which, without it, would be a futile activity, remote from the concerns ofthe people who make up society? Questions of ths kind have periodically arisen in the course ofthe history of sociology, hitching up with other pairs of opposi- tions en route - for example, beeween facts and values, eleology and science, determinism and autonomy, structure and action, macro- social and micro-social approaches, explanation and interpretation and so forth Tlaving, in the frst segment (which may be read as an introduc: tion), rapidly presented some concepts that can be used to describe the structure of ertical theories in social science in the second I dwell fon a comparison between twa programmes to which, inthe course of my professional career, [have sought to make a contribution. The fist is the critical sociology of the 1970s, particularly in the form given it in France by Piere Bourdieu, The second is the pragmatic sociology of critique, developed by some of us in the Political and Moral Sociology Group of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in the 1980s and 1990s, which was fashioned ‘both in apposition to the fist and with a view to pursuing its basic intention. In particular, in this chapter readers will find a reciprocal critique of each of these programmes, from the perspective of their contribution to socal critique ‘Segments 3 and 4can beread asa second part, wherein is expounded in its mainlines an analytical framework intended to formulae afresh the question of critique, such as itis given free rein notin the theo: retical space of sociology, butin everyday realty. Bus thie framework also has the aim of providing tools that make i possible to reduce the tension between crital sociology and sociology of eitigue, I thesewilpursors an obpctie of pacifestion. Ths Framework is eSitped From the postulate fof the order of thought experiment) ‘hari onganation of socal ile man confront radical uncertain SSegards the question of how things stand wrt whats Te dwells Sn ihstusions, considered im the fest instance sm their semantic nctons as tremens geared toward the contraction of lity {Mousse intermediary in prea, of operons for lying PQ and defining test formats. the lstiturions iis arrayed agains. Iecan be expressed ithe by owing thatthe tes a conducted fi. a instants or, a analy {xl plosophy puts tas tokens] do no conform to thes format [or ‘Spel or by devin fom the world examples and cases that do not Ren wih scale st established making i possible to challenge ie roity of vey and thereby, change ts contours. The distin flow berwec elt and word suplcs the concepal framework of these analyses Scgments Sand 6 form a thid part, more sharply focused on curent politcal problems, Segment 5 presents some suramary appli Exton of the analytical framework gutined im the two preceding Segments, devoted to. describing different regimes of domination “The erm ‘domination’ = inthe sense in which tis used in ths lite srécie~ certo istorcal stations where the work of ctigue fins fslf particulary impeded in various ways depending onthe pol {al context and also in mare or less apparent or cover fashion, In this segment I pay portcular attention fo a mode of domination = ‘which can be charattertaed as managerial ~ that is inthe proces of ieing established in Western democtaniccapitalist societies, Final, Segment 6 (which may be read aya provisional conclusion ims 19 sketch some ofthe paths critique might tke today in ode o proceed inthe dretion of emancipation ‘Toconelinde,I shall a thatthe fase of ritgue andthe problems posed by the relationship berecen sociology ard critique, 0 which Pie devoted much of my work for many years have not only faptvoted ne by thee theoretical attraction. For me, and so doubt Stee generally Yor sociologists of my generation, who came ito the “Taupin inthe yeas immediately preeaing or following May 1968, they have a quas biographical character, We have gone through Petts when sociey was popsated by powerful ential movements‘and then through periods marked by ther retreat, But today we are perhaps entering 2 phase chat will witness their eturn.? This History ‘with a capital his bound to have an impact on the litle history of sociology. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ‘To thank all those who made a contribution to the development of this work sa task impossible to acquit without omitting or neglecting someone. My thanks go in particular to the members of the Political and Moral Sociology Group (GSPM), to my students at EHESS, and to the numerous researchers who have stimulated my ehinking by intervening either in my doctoral seminar or in that of the GSPM. 1 fam especially indebted to Damien de Blic, Eve Chiapello, Elisabeth Claverie, Bernard Conein, Nicolas Dodier, Armand Esquerre, Brano Karsenti and Cyril Lemieux, who, with great generosity, have read, criticized and commented on earlier stages of this work, Tomaso Vitale of Milan Universiy has also been an exacting reader and fan impassioned (and stirring) interlocutor. | have also benefited from discussions with students or colleagues from history (Ariane Boltanski, Robert Descimon, Simona Cerutti, Nicolas Offenstade), anthropology (Catherine Ales, Frangois Berthomé, Matthew Carey, Philippe Descola), literature (Philippe Roussin, Loic Nicolas), and law (Olivier Cayla, who was generous enough to trust me with the as yet unpublished manuseript of his thesis, Paolo Napoli, and espe ally my dea late friend, lan Thomas). In addition tothe atention of ‘Axel Honneth, at Frankfurt my work benefited greatly from the help given by Mauro Basaure, who was an intermediary of inexhaustible Intelligence and good will between the Institute for Social Research 1nd the GSPM, but also from the observations of other researchers atthe Institute ~in particular, Robin Celikates and Nora Sieverding. Tam grateful to Sudonia Blacter, Eva Buddeberg and to the two dis- tinguished translators who rendered these lectures ~ written and delivered in French ~ into the language of Adorno: Bernd Schwibs land Achim Russet, lam also grateful to Gregory Elliott who, having‘worked on eight hundred pages of The New Spirit of Capitalism, has, ‘once again, brought his elegant style to this English translation, Imust finally add that this text could not have been finished without the vigilane skill of my brother, the linguist Jean-Flie Botanski, who has followed every step ofits preparation. Bue in order for it to become book, friendly attention was once again required from my editor Eric Vigne, who perseveres against the current in publishing writings which, without his stubborn efforts, would simply be condemned to disappear in the incessant low of messages saturating oue computers. rafts of this work have been presented and discussed in various seminars or conferences and, in particular, in the conference in Frankfure that assembled researchers from the GSPM and the Institute for Social Research in November 2006; in the conference on common sense organized by Sandra Laugier at Amiens University in December 2006; in the seminar organized in May 2007 at the Ecole normale supérieure (Lyon, literature and social science) by the direc: tots of the journal Tracés, Arnaud Fossier and Eric Monnet, and, in the same month, during the important day school on ‘Anthropology and Pragmatics organized by Carlo Sever! at the Musée de Quat de [Branly in Paris, in the Hannah Arendt symposium at the New School for Social Research in New York in December 2007, on the initiative ‘of Nancy Fraser; and then, atthe sime institution, during a work: shop organized by Janet Roitman and Anne Stoler in May 2008; in Antonio Negr’s seminar in January 2008; and in the conference on individualism organized by Philippe Corcuff, whose comments were very useful to me, at Cersy in June 2008, 1 THE STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL THEORIES. Power or Domination. Society or Social Order | shall approach critical saciologies starting from the concept of social domination, a polemical notion if ever there was one, because it has ‘been a major axis of critical theories while having often been rejected by other currents in sociology, atleast when the term domination is used not only to refer to different ways of placing power in the service ‘of politics, whatever it might be ~ as is more of les the case with “modes of domination’ in Mx Weber ~but also serves to identity and condemn manifestations of power deemed extreme and abusive. As ‘ve shall sein the next tall, critical sociology has made abundant use ‘of it inthis sense and the pragmatic sociology of eriique has simply ‘ignored it. However, do not expect me to outline a conceptual history ‘of this notion, which would take me far beyond aot only the time in which I shall address you but also, alas, my competence. I shall instead base myself on this problematic notion in order to seck t0 clarify the relationship between sociology and critique, and examine the ways in which they might converge in compromise formations that are never free of tensions. ‘An initial characteristic of sociologies of domination is that they fashion a synthetic object, in the sense that it cannot give rise (0 dlirece observation, so that revealing it is necessarily the result of a reconstruction on the part of the analyst All sociology can observe ‘is power relations, For standard sociology, reference to power goes hand-in-hand with the identification of asymmetries, but they are diverse partial, local or transitory. The existence of diferent sources fnd sites of power creates a web in which these powers can become entangled, contradict and even neutralize one another. The fact ofexercising power or of being subjected to power docs not ecape the Consciousness of actors and pover relations ae invariably rise to the eyes of an observer. Power can therefore eal orm the object of an empiccal sociology, on the one hand because social relations are Shot through with forms of power that are fairly realy observable ft least in certain situations; and on the other hand because power felations are many cases inscribed in pre-established formats that are themselves stable in the form of custom or registered in texts = for example, juridical texts and other form of regulations. At Max Weber shoved, power thus tds to be rationalized, whatever its modalities sm the sense that its traces and exercise ae subject, at least formally to requirement of asiftation dha impart a =tain robustness to them. Iris by invoking these requirements that those ‘who hold power can claim it to be legitimate’, thereby compeling those who challenge i 0 rem generality in such a way a8 to subject the very principles they invoke to ertigue! By contrast, to cha tevize a form of povrce as “arbitary sighfes chat iis impossible to {ake is measure by referring itt a pre-established format ensuring {is exerciae a certain consistency and thereby to stcs the dificlis facing those who endure i in forming predictable expectations of Because it must be both asserted and justified, power speaks of power. “The sme snot tue of domination, Cita eheoie of damnation posit the existence of profound, enduring asymmetries which, se summing different forms in diferent contexts, are constantly duph- ‘ated to the point of colonizing realty as whole. They adope the point of view ofthe totality.” The dominated and the dominant are Everywhere whether the later are identified as dominant class, dom nant ocx o, for example, dominant ethnicity, What i involved is not only not ditectiy observable, but also invariably cus the conscious nest of actors. Domination mast be unmasked. It dors not speak of itself and is concealed in systems whose patent forms of power are therly their most superficial dimension. Thus, fo example, contrast ing with the demand o get done, rendered manifest by an order given tina bierarchical relationship, are manoeuves or even, in still more tack fashion, socal conditions deposited in an envirohment, which Combine to determine an actor t0 do something for the Benet of Snother as if he were doing tof her own accord an for erst eis therefore a if ators suffered the domination exerieedovee them aot only unwittingly, bur sometimes even by aiding ts exercise [Ava result, theories of domination must select an object slightly diferent from that of sociologis which, for convenience sake we shall ell standard, This disceepancy isthe cele of different forms 2 ake of acl etn let fom of power) without ere omg ea Seer helen Contrast, theories of domination unmask the rations between these them sly the es, for example, im Durkin theres of igre a emiueatlfectsiccnsm ted retat rihitn reh st ae ryan see Sh el ett Se ae keane Compared with the so-called natural sciences the specificity of the social sciences is that they take as their object human beings grasped not in their biological dimensions, but in so far as they are capable ‘of reflexivity (that is why itis appropriate to distinguish between the Social and the human sciences). Considered in this respect, 7 review their own actions or those of others in order to make judge- ‘ments on them, often hinging on the issue of good and evil ~ that is, ‘moral judgements. This rellexive capacity means that they also react to the representations given of their properties or actions, including when the latter derive from sociology’ or ertical theories.” ‘The moral judgements formulated by actors in the course of their everyday activities often take the form of critiques. Moral activity 3isa predominantly critical activity. The sociological daxa taught to first-year students (often invoking a popularized form of Weberian epistemology) consists in making a sharp (if not always clear) dis tinction between, on the one hand, critical judgements delivered by so-called ‘ordinary’ people and sustained by ‘moraltis' or ‘cultures’ ‘which form part of the legitimate objects of description, and, on the other hand, critical judgements made by sociologists themselves (renamed ‘value judgements), which are to be banished (axiological ‘neutrality). This distinction is based on the Weberian separation of facts from values Critical theories of domination necessarily rely fon descriptive social scence to paint a picture of the reality subject to critique, But compared with sociological descriptions that seek to conform to the vulgate of neutrality, the specificity of critical theories is that they contain critical judgements on the social order which the analyst assumes responsibility for in her own name, thus abandoning. Any peetention to neutrality. Ordinary Critiques and Metacritical Positions ‘The fact tha they are backed up by the discourse of rth he social scenes endows ta thereof domination witha etn bus tear in deeribng the salty called tno question but complicates the atl operation ily which cn s them Tht confronts them wh lemon ‘On the one hands it prevents tem making judgements tha rely directly on the resources, invariably exploted by erdinary crue represented by spiital and/or moral sources of local character etscrtal theaves cannot judge the chy atte by comparing wit the Cty of God, or even by introducing a scolarined but spe ihe moral dal that ie meta heretannavey agape on fer om account in onder to ode and enema society 25 525 ifr inveeed noc one moral conception among tery bu he mesa ‘ican al which would contac the cmparativ requirement to place the moral del poset i all own sce om a ua footing). Tati why ert hereof domination are catty di tinged from the vexy many telecua movements hich Basing thumeler on moral andor raigius exigency, have deiloped Faia cigues and demanded fom tht followers ay asone ange in Mayle (eg primitive Chestanity,” Manichacsnisn, tills te (nthe othr band however, rita heres of domination are 4 rot abstract organs suspended inthe heaven of metaphysics. The existence of a concrete relationship with a set of people [defined 435 public, class, group, sex or whatever) forms part of their sl definition Unlike "traditional theory, citicl theory” possesses the objective of reflexivity. Ie ean or even mut (according to Raymond GGeuss) grasp the diacontents of actor, explicitly consider them in the very labour of theorzation, in such a way as to ake thee ra onship to social reality and, therehy, that socal reality tls the direction of emancipation. Asa consequence, the kind of extique they make possible must enable the disclosure of aspects of reality in ln immedate relationship with che preoccupations of actors ~ thats also with ordinary ertigues, Critical theories feed off these ordinary Critiques, even if they develop them diferetly, reformlate them, fd are destined to rts to them, since thie aim eto render reality tnacceptable, and thereby engage the people to whom they are Addresed in action whose result should fe to change ss contours “he idea of a critica theory tha is aot backed by the experience ofa collective, and which in some sense exists for ie own sake ~ that is, forna one ~is incoherent. “This dual requirement places a very stong constrsint on the stractare of critcal theories. On the one hand they must provide themselves with normative support that are suficently autonomous of the particular moral corpses formed fom already tented ee sous or political approsches, and identified with as uch by specie froups whose ertcal stances they arm In fact, were his nor the case, the opponents ofthese theories (even those who might initally have teen favourable o them) are bound to reduce them to these pos tions and, consequently, to denounce thie local character, bound up with particular interest. Thy wil then dissolve into the aca of ord ary critgues that accompany relations between groups and form the fabri of everyday political fe, in the broad sense. But, on the ‘other hand, they must ty to mect these ordinary ertgues asf they derived from them and were merely unveling them to themselves, by inducing actors to acknowledge what they aleady knew but 2 2 sense, without knowing iy t0 realize what thie reality consist Sand, trough this revelation, to take their distance from this reali), rift was possible to ext from i ~ to remove themaclves from Sin sucha way as to conceive the possiblity of actions intend to changeit When tht second condition isnot fle, critical theories an be reject by consiging them to the sphere of utopias" or, a8 Michael Walzer more of lest docs (in connection with the work of Marcus in The Company of Cries) by eegarding them as nothing 5‘more than the lamentations of rootless intellectuals, cut off fom the Sense of reality that comes from belonging to a community and, as 2 result, having abandoned even the desire of acting to teansform it." The kind of critical jdgement built into theories of domination therefore has complex relations with the critiques formulated by people in the course of everyday life. It never coincides with them And subjects them to more or less sustained attention depending on ‘the case, ranging fom rejection (critiques Formulated by actors derive from illusions, particularly moral ilsions) to partial acknowledge ‘ment (there is something in these ordinary critiques that can pave the ‘way for Critique with a capital ‘c). Buc in any event, a distinction is maintained between the partial critiques developed ‘by the actors ‘on the basis of their experiences and the systematic critique of a particular social order. Tor this reason we shall sy that critical theories of domination are ‘metacritcal in order. The position adopted, geared eo the critique ff a social order in its generality, distinguishes metacritical posi tons from occasional crteal interventions which, érom a position of scholarly experts, call into question, with a view to reparation oF Improvement, some particular dimension of social relations without challenging the framework in which they are inscribed, But meta cal constructions must also be distinguished from the multiple eriical stances adopted by ordinary people who, in the course of political action and/or the disputes of daily life, denounce people, systems or ‘events that are characterized as unjust by reference to particular situa tions or contexts. In the rest of these talks, when we speak of critique, it is to these socially rooted, contextual forms of criticism that we shall be referring, while reserving the term metacrtique to refer to theoretical constructions that aim to unmask, in their most general dimensions, oppression, exploitation or domination, whatever the forms in which they occur rity iple Exteriority and Complex Ext ‘The two operations whose ideal type I have tried so trace - the sociological operation of describing society andthe critical operation dressed toa social order ~ share the common feature that they need to situate themselves in a position of exteriorty, But the kind of exte- ority to he adopted is not the same in both cases. We shall speak of simple exterorty inthe case of description and complex exteriorty in the ease of value judgements that are based on metacitical theories. 6 ‘The project of taking society as an object and describing the ‘components of social lite off you like, ts framework, appeals to a thought experiment that consists in positioning oneself outside this framework in order to consider it as'a whole, Infact, a framework ‘cannot be grasped from within, From an internal perspective, the framework coincides with reality in its imperious necessity. ‘This engineering perspective i the one often adopted by sociologists when they are attuned to the officials in charge of large organizations (be it fis or organizations dependent on the state) and prove open and attentive to the problems facing these officials and the issues they pose. This postion is one of expertise. The expert is asked to examine the problematic relationship between elements (eg. between women's acess to wagelabour and the birth rate), which have already been subject to formatting in a language of administrative or economic Aescription used by those in charge to govern, Sociological work answering to this kind of demand, which devel ‘oped in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s, today makes up the bulk of the output identified with sociology the world over. It hat two key objectives, which are complementary. The fst isto increase the rationality of organizations and enhance their productivity, ‘which subordinates sociology to management, The second is also to limit the costs, but this time the so-called “human” corts, entailed by ‘managerial policies geared to profit, In the second case, sociology is called on to help putin place “paliative care’, as one sayin medicine ~ tha i, either to sketch the shape of ‘social policies’ or to provide justifications to those who implement them on the ground (i.e ‘social ‘workers!) and sustain theie morale. However, in both eases this work. by experts identifying with sociology can be realized (it would be Detter to say must be) without problematizing the general framework. ‘upon which the ‘variabler considered depend “The social sciences fre themselves from expertise and hence define themselves as such, by positing the possibilty of a project of descrip ton which is that of a general social anthropology (in a number of ‘cases appealing to comparativism) from a position of exteriority. In the care of ethnology of history, adoption ofa positon of extrioity is favoured by the distance ~ geographical in one instance, temporal in the other ~ that separates the observer from her object. Because it derives in a sense from constraints that are independent of the ‘observer's will the move towards exteiority has been able to remain ‘ore oles implicit in the ease ofthese discipline, Tn the case of sociology, which at this level of generality can be regarded a5 a history of the present, withthe result that the observer 7is part of what she intends to deseribe, adopting a postion of exter ‘ort far from self-evident. The fact thats posit even poses a problem ina sense leads the move to exteralzation to become sl Eonscous. Thi imaginary ext fom the viscosity ofthe real intlly assumes stripping realty of its character of implicit necessity and proceeding a8 1 were arbitrary asf could be other than Wis or Een not be and then sn second phase restoring tothe necen, sity it had inially been divested of, but on which this operation of displacement has conferred elev general character, nthe sense that the forms of neces identified locally ate related fo a universe ‘of posites. In sociology the posility of this externalization ‘es on the existence ofa lsborstory~ thats tos, the employment Of protocols and instructions respect for wich mast conseatnthe Soctologist to control her desires conscious or unconscious) It thus that desrptive social sence an lim that they sustain discourse of truth, Te must be added that this truth elaim, which s bound up with a description carried out by occupying a more or less extra Territorial post vieduws the society ein described, generally gies the social scjencen whatever they area ential edge and this Sree allt in highly limited fashion, nthe case of expertise). Fr ifthe ‘ery substance oftheir objet was constant in fal view of everyone the social sciences would smply have no reason to exist In ths sense swe can therefore say that socology ss aleady in ite ery conception, least poentally eet Inthe case of theories of domination, che exteriority on which ex- tigueis based ea be called comps, nthe sense that ts established a v0 diferent levels moet frst of all be based on an exterioty of the fst kind to equip itself withthe requis data to create the pictoreof the socal order tht wil be sobmtted to erties A mea Eriical theory iin fat neces iat on» descpevesocology forarthropeogy Bato be critical such a theory also eels to furmgh itl, mays that ea be expe to very diferent depres withthe ‘means of pasing a Judgement onthe value ofthe socal onder being desribe The Semantic Dimension of Critique of Domination. Domination vs. Exploitation Metacriticl theories of domination are often combined with theories ‘of exploitation, The term exploitation has an economic orientation. Exploitation refers to the way that a small number of people make 8 {THE STRUCTURG OF CRITICAL THEORIES use of differentials (which can be very diverse in kind) in order to extract a profit at the expense of the great majority. In theories of ‘domination, reference to exploitation serves to indicate the purpose (of domination (as if domination in the pure state, which would have ‘no rationale but itself, was difficult to conceive). On the other hand that is, considered fcom the perspective of acrtique of exploitation = domination also possesses a character of necessity. I is difficult to Conceive exploitation that is not dependent on some form or other of ‘domination [if they were not dominated, why woold human beings lee themselves be exploited? However, it must be stressed that the concept of domination docs not havea strictly economic orientation, bu ather (if can put i ike this) a semantic one. Iris directed at the Feld ofthe determination of what is~ that isto say, the field in which the relationship between what (borrowing terms from Wittgenstein) can be called symbolic forms and states of affairs is established, We can also say in a differ ent language inspired by lav, thatthe critique of domination concerns the establishment of qualifications ~ that is (as we shall sce in more detail later), the operations which indivisbly fix the properties of beings and determine their worth. This work of qualification generally relies on formats or types, invariably combined with descriptions and! ‘or definitions, which are themselves stored in various forms (such as ‘regulations, codes, customs, rituals, narratives, emblematic examples, te). These formats incorporate classfcations (and, in particular, clasfictions making it posible to distribute people between groups ‘or categories) and combine them with rules that exercise a constraint fonaccess to goods and their use. They thereby play a major roe in the formation and stabilization of asymmetries “Metacritical theories of domination tackle these asymmetries from 1 particular angle ~ that of the miscognition by the actors themselves fof the exploitation to which they are subject and, above all, of the Social conditions that make this exploitation possible and. also, asa result, of the means by which they could stop it. That is why they present themselves indivisibly as theories of power, theories of exploitation and sheories of knowledge. By this token, they encounter in an especially vexed fashion the issue of the relationship between the knowledge of social reality which is that of ordinary actors, reflexively engaged in practice, and the knowledge of social reality conceived from a reflexivity reliant on forms and instruments of totalization’* ~ an issue which isiself atthe heart of the tensions out ‘of which the possibilty of a social science must be createdSome Examples of Compromise between Sociology and reer Social Critique Y A re-eading ofthe sociological traditions which, to various degrees, incorporate critical dimension, undertaken with the two constraints thar have just been mentioned in mind, would doubrless make it possible to identify the main compromises that have been forged to Combine the requirement of descriptive neutrality (simple exteriority) and the search for bases paving the way for critique (complex exte Flority). AS is the ease everytime we find ourselves in the presence of theoretical corpuses, subject as such to internal consistency ~ at least felative- while being haunted by a structural tension, the possibilities are certainly not unlimited. Without any pretention to exhaustive ress, but simply with the aim of exhibiting the kind of arrangements sociology resorts to in order to link itself to critique, we cam very Schematically indicate some of the compromises that seem to have bboen most frequently forged, and which can combine several of the possibilities we shall now describe.” ‘A fest set of possiblities consist in taking sociological and norm: tive advantage ofa philosophical anthropology (which can be made ore of ess explicit). The ability of human beings to live in society will be associated with the existence in all human beings of proper. ‘ies and characteristics that can he specified differently depending on the anthropology in question (cationalty, che capacity to exchange ood; che eapacity to communicate by conforming to requicements of relevance: sympathy forthe suffering of others, recognition et. Critique will chen consist in showing how the existing social order dloes not allow members, or some of them, fully to realize the poten: tialites constitutive of their humanity. These constructions owe ‘much of ther eritical power to the fact that they bank on a common Jhumanity and therewith contain exigencies of equality of treatment berween members of the same society. A satisfactory society is one veithout leftovers and the existing socal order can be criticized in as such as it excludes, oppresses, corns and so on, a greater or lesser ‘number ofits members, or simply prevents chem from realizing what they are capable of as human beings Bar this kind of construction must confront twa tricky problems in particular. The fist consist either in criticizing any difference - which {ight seem unrealistic and consequently unconvincing ~ or justify ing the distinction between acceptable differences and unacceptable differences, from the standpoint of the philosophical anthropology adopted. The second stems from the fact that the philosophical 10 anthropology which serves as a basis for critique must be both suf- ficiently robust and sufficiently general co resist critiques that aim to redace tto.a particular moral of religious tradition (asin the case of the accusation of ethnocentrism); and, at the same time, sufficiently precise to be declined in diferent forms in such a way as to enable the condemnation of specific social orders. We ean add that this kind of normative support can either be teated in an a-temporal fashion fr historicized, paving the way for an evolutionism o progress ism, but increasing the constraints of justification required to achieve recognition in the framework of the social sciences, by demanding recourse to @ philasophy of history compatible withthe longitudinal descriptions facnished by historians. ‘A differen set of possibilities, less ambitious on act the previous ones but better placed to take advantage of the specific resources supplied by sociological description, consists in extracting the normative position serving as a bass for the critique to which 2 certain social order is subjected from the description of that order itself and, asa result, giving less weight to a normative anthropology placed in'a quast-transcendental situation. A first mode of this type an consist in playing on the differential between the offical andthe lwnoffcial. Iewill then be shown thatthe ideal this order lays claim ro does not correspond to its actual outcomes and, consequently, to the real condition ofits membérs or some of them. Critique then takes fas its main target the fact thatthe order in question docs not i fact Conform to the values it assigns tel n proncple Asecond mode paves the way fora critique of law from an analysis ‘of the condition of customs. A certain condition ofthe social order will then be open to being criticized a5 ‘pathological’ (as Durkheim put it) when the ules posited in an established form (i.e. most often, fn modern societies “legal” form), whose transgression is accompa nied by sanctions, do not — or no longer ~ have their guarantor in constraining norms “immanent in the social’, which by this token fre recognized or even internalized by actors. This eriical position is rendered more cobust when it can enter into a compromise with a historical perspective, asi the case when analysis intends eo empha: size that the law has remained nchanged whereas customs have changed (or ‘evolved’, so that the condition of the law lags bebind the condition of customs Tn these fist two modes of internal critique, the normative basis (which can remain implicit) is tha ofa transparent, authentic society ‘A good society is one where all, and especialy the political elites in power, agree on the effective implementation of the officially n evel thanproclaimed ideals ~ especially those inscribed in lw ~ and/or where legal norms, on which sanctions of state origin ely, ae the rllecion inthe legal onder of the sllesive consiusnes and, therewith the moral norms acknowledged by all members (or majority of them) inthe social orden, (ora majonty of ‘A thied mode among the critical operations open to sociology, ‘while remaining very close to the descriptive requirements its intent fon submitting to gua science’, consists in taking hol to make n0%- mative use of them, ofthe moral expectations which actors dislose in the course of thei ations in the Belief that they attest to the cocstence of moral sense in actors Conteary to interpretations of Scton in esentilly opportunistic terms, tis credited with sufficient Petmancnce and cburtness for sociology to undertake is modelling. In this case, the metacritical orientation wll therefore be developed by collecting and synthesizing the cntiques developed by “people themscivs in the course of their everyday activites Te will prtea larly eely on moments of dispute, when actors express their moral claims, and also om collective interaction inthe course of which they ngage in experiments and when, employing the “erestivty of ston they “perform” the social in an inaovative way. From a position of this kind, one ofthe dificlties encountered i constricting xtc thar can feist the accusation of expressing nothing fut the particule ‘iewpoin of the particular group or groupe of actors on which obser. ‘ation has focused. Thats why the metacriial postion adapted wl rely les on a sustansve normatiity than a procedural oe. ts main ‘objective will be to sketch the contours of # socal order where di {erent points of view can be expressed opposed and eelized through experiments By contrast, a social order where the conduct of sich Experiments is impeded by the exercie of authoritarian power wll ome under fire from exitgue. "The metacritical postions we have just schematically described share the common feature that they incorporate moral judgements, ‘whether these are formed from an anthropology or derived fom the Social order submitted to crigue. However, here is another path leading to cotique which, bracketing moral references (or claiming to); i based in the main on the unmasking of immanent contradic: Hons, be these specie toa determinate socal order oF presenti 3 larger set of social orders. In this case, critique not taken on by the sociologist i a personal capacity, im the manner of ao individoal aging the state of realty on the bass of vals. Te derives from the observation (or prediction) thatthe order in question cannot (or will note able to} survive, Because R cannot find the rgunite 2 rescurcesto resol thes contradictions in itl To vatios deg Shs asmes the adoption ofa historical perspective To expo this posi, is ecesaty co pure the ocological and hss! desrprion and atalye of the case onder cone tation sulBiny far to enti hese contacts, contact a neslogy of ther, cay ter fue andy above al toca them isco ha Counter pon group orcas in which thes con tradicions ar embodied. A common characteristic of constructions Sneed on 4 etacital portion ofthis ype i fjection of the den fs common goods or cten that ofa spate of dabate were differ chp of fe confront one anor, ad te placement by Sesion of sgl, power, donation aid power relations between Sntgonsbe groups, Dilfent cial erenstions ean be developed Ghia basis depending in particular on whether hese tual sce cnvisaged above all negations far they ental the destruction Sor only ofa particular order but of any socal order, or posit, SSnuch a they enable the emergence of new ponte sod the ia inca spersceson ofthe conttadicione whore expression they ate. in che Rr casey these contadcions and anegonime ate as ciated with conflict between values (andlor interest) which te Tepe at bringin exsnce, witha general justifiable solution ‘ker inthe sem that thee ues no vac of apeio logea evel ‘ling it pose to can them or case no historical alec ‘ovisged. The posites fora compromie between sociology and Crigu are the athe hinted snd excnally debuted between ‘vo optons The frst can conse streng the dsocition etreen ‘ocolgial analysand poll acon, garded ax being inabed by logis that aze not merely differnt but largely incompatible. Ae 2 scole, the ecologies to understand the meating stort Confer on what osute and to deploy probable chains of aus at 4 man of ston, the "poltiian’ makes choices The sociologist can do noting ut ealighten the polican onthe likly consequence of diteem ponible choles andor ete political deions deemed “mesponuble’, but ony inthe smu that those who ake them have refed to face the contequences of tr choices and thus acted a fe faith ‘Another, moral radical option asaciates sociology withthe pres ervaton of order. The scilogi wil then asign htt the task of Cticiing poll scone of arangemente that tnderine ord twesken authority, lar he values that give members of society moral "Teferencepoatsand so om This cam Ie to placing sociology — inci sepecs that wartant being called ical, even if they 13are orientated towards the ‘right rather than the ‘lef’ —inthe service ff strengthening the authority ofthe state ~ chat is, atthe service of fan authoritarian state “Thenuimerous critical ociologies which identify, to varying degrees, with the Marxist tradition are no doubt those where the issues of ‘ruth, power and exploitation are most clearly articulated. This atic- llation takes shape around a central contradiction that derives from the separation between theoretical activity, intended to be purely ‘intellectual’, and practical and productive activity. This separation, is placed in 4 causal relationship with the formation of social classes = that isto say, both with the development of exploitation and with ‘the monopolizing of power by certain groups (the dominant classes), atthe expense of other groups (the dominated classes). At the level of ‘sociology of knowledge, these critical positions make it possible ro ‘denounce the supremacy accorded speclations developed in theoreti ‘al fashion (ideological in the sense that they state reality from the standpoint ofthe dominant interests, over modes of access to knowl ‘edge that go to the root of things because they derive directly from practice, particulary in ts productive dimensions, [By comparison with sociologies which (often in the tradition of Hobbes) foreground struggle and contradiction, 2 particularity of critical sociologies geared to emancipation is that they see to render two kinds of sociological description compatible. The frst unmasks the social forces and instances of exploitation and domination andy a= result, locates violence at the heart of social life, But this frst kind of