IEEE - 56998
Cyber-Physical Security System in Smart Grid-A
Review
2023 14th International Conference on Computing Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT) | 979-8-3503-3509-5/23/$31.00 ©2023 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/ICCCNT56998.2023.10307396
Akshatha Y
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Siddaganga Institute of Technology
Tumakuru, India
Email: akshathay@sit.ac.in
Abstract— The Smart Grid System (SGS) is a smart
technology that is a combination of advanced technology and
physical aspects that facilitates bidirectional communication of
information exchange, power generation, and power
distribution. The communication technology development in
traditional power systems is by deploying cyber-physical
systems in smart grid. SGS has a compound architecture
consisting of several critical devices and infrastructure of the
Internet of Things (IoT). The deployment of the devices is
vulnerable to many cyber-attacks. Hence, it is required to do
much research to secure the devices from attacks and
environmental damage. So, this paper comprehensively reviews
cyber-physical, cyber-security, and key components of cyber-
attacks. Then we present each section in detail and thoroughly
the standards and principles of cyber-physical and cyber-
security attacks in smart grid systems. This paper gives a deep
understanding of cyber-security systems in smart grid system
applications.
Keywords—Smart Grid System, Cyber-Physical attack, Cyber-
security attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
This era is an internet revolt. Almost the whole world
population depends on the internet. Internet of Things (IoT)
is the channel for communication between human to machine
(H2M) and machine to machine (M2M)[1]. Different devices
are connected through IP address using the internet. The
home appliance like fridge, laptop, mobile and motorcycle
and car have used non-IP based results that aims to connect
all kind of devices that can communicate directly using IP
address through internet [2][3][4]. IoT is used to make things
easy monitoring; smart house, smart building, smart city,
smart agriculture, smart health [2]. One of the most important
significance in application like Smart Grid(SG) [5]. Smart
Grid consists of power and communication lines between
demand sides and generation. Hence the interconnection is
important in SG for communication between generation side
and consumer side [6][7]. SG is bi-directional
communication devices like smart meters and sensors to
measure energy and consumption of power at customer end
[8][9]. This kind of communication simplifies the delivery of
real time data monitoring, which helps to control and balance
everywhere at high accuracy [10]. Because of significance of
IoT, it is more suitable for SG [11]. Since the devices
communicate through internet in IoT, it is vulnerable to
attacks by attacker. In SG, electronic devices undergo
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Dr. A. S Poornima
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Siddaganga Institute of Technology
Tumakuru, India
Email: aspoornima@sit.ac.in
different types of attacks like tuning energy consumption data
and unbalancing at the energy generation side. As SG is
significant application in IoT, it is vulnerable to several
cyber-attacks to crumble the power grid infrastructure [12].
Implementing information and communication technology
(ICT) into cyber physical system enhancement gives
favorable stage for cyber components.
Security and sustainability of cyber physical system
pressurized by cyber-attack [13]. According to the research,
the smart grid control and system function of cyber physical
system are distributed by cyber-attack. False data Injection
(FDI) mislead estimated data. A Denial of Service (DoS)
effects on SG CPS’s performance [14][15]. Before
implementing any algorithm into device or to application, and
any other settings into the CPS, it is important to evaluate. In
case of relay malfunctioning in SG-CPS, it may cause
cascade, damage, or false circuit break tripping [15][16].
Some of the electronic devices like intelligence electronic
devices (IED’s), Phaser Measurement Units (PMU), AMI,
SCADA, power system stabilizer (PSS), electric vehicles
(EVs), Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) connection are
vulnerable to cyber-attacks in CPS [15][17].
Cyber-attacks such as DoS, FDI, MITM attacks in cyber
power system impacts on security of current system and ICT
infrastructure. The power grid resilience can be improved by
integrating the both CP and cyber security [15][18][19].
Adopting ICT into SG will have illusion that they never cause
malfunctions, and it will nolow the attackers or hacker etc, it
is important to understand the effect of cyber-attacks on SG
system. Several attacks on SG may produce blackouts.
Security evaluation procedure ensures grid security and
reliability [15][18][19]. Distribution stations will distribute
electricity through distributed substation to the customers.
Energy meters are used to count energy consumption. Any
devices having their own IP address can be common using
internet. A control unit included with all system in one
domain. Customer side domain and energy distribution
domain are interconnected, and both are attached to
distributed energy resource (DER) and storage energy system
(SES). The central control unit look after and calculate the
electricity that consumers uses resource [20]. Fig 1. Shows
the diagram for giving review on accomplishing this paper.
 IEEE - 56998

Figure 1: The Schematic diagram of the review paper

The paper is organized into seven sections, section 2
discusses the cyber physical system in smart grid. Smart grid
communication technology presented in section 3. Cyber
security principles are discussed in section 4. Section 5 gives
representation of key components of cyber-attack. Cyber-
attacks are described in section 6. Finally, the conclusions are
discussed in section 7.
II. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM IN SMART GRID
The smart grid system influences the power of electronic
converter. This is to hold the energy, interface the electric
power in between side of generation and on customer side. In
CPS, the power electronic components are interconnected to
communicate between communication devices and
information technologies to execute the task.
The CPS are classified into four groups.
 Physical Power System Unit
 Sensors, Devices, and actuators Unit
 Communication system Unit
 Control and Management Unit
Physical Power Unit (PPU): PPU consists of power
generations, power transformer, circuit breaker, converter
and other loads that run as microgrid system.
Sensors, Devices, and actuators: These consists of
sensors and devices which are interconnected mighty and
sensor status, exchange the data via internet. Sensors are used
to calculate the voltage, power supply, breakers, and
frequency rank. The both devices and actuators are used to
monitor generators, power distributors, storage the data and
circuit breaking system [21][22].
The communication system in SG can be wired or
wireless based on requirements. Communication system unit
consists of several communication appliances such as routers,
medium like broadbands, Wi-Fi, and switches.
Communication systems work as data exchangers in IoT.

Figure 2: Cyber Physical system in Smart Grid

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In CPS, measurement units control SG operations at
different conditions. Based on communication unit signal,
measurement units send commands through IoT to utilize SG
operation. According to several studies, the basic approach of
CPS is design, simulation validation of hardware and real
time execution which are necessary for SG application. The
different fields like various domains, cloud computing, social
network and game network, air traffic were used CPS hence
it is not a new concept [23][24][25]. Fig 2 represents the
cyber-physical system in smart grid. According to this above
negotiation, SGS expects a safe and source communication
system to execute operation. As well as the security required
for transmitting information and distributing information
along with computing technologies in SG.
III. SMART GRID COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
The SG-CPS depends on network or cyber infrastructure.
This is different for convectional communication system.
SG-CPS expects resilience, high availability, reliability,
minor packet drops and good scalability. Apart from this, SG-
CPS may require typical commercial cellular based
application [26]. SG-CPS communication technology is
divided into two categories such as wired and wireless as
shown in below fig 3.
Figure 3: Smart Grid Communication Technologies
Some of example for wired communication technology
are power line, ethernet, optical fiber, whereas in wireless
communication technology, cellular, ZigBee, satellite and RF
mesh were used.
A. Wired Communication
Power Line Communication System (PLC) system
utilizes conventional power line transmission data between
control centers and substations. This kind of technology
requires less cost because of using existing infrastructure.
This kind of PLC consists of broadband PLC and narrow
band PLC. Higher data rated applications are allowed from
broadband whereas narrowband support lower rated
applications. PLC is limitedly used in SG-CPS because huge
noise do the PLC based on one way analysis model also more
difficult. In SGS, the data rate is 2-3 Mbps broadband PLC
which is selected as good support [27][28].
Optical Fiber Communication (FOP) gives the high rate of
data transmission furthermore the secure data exchange for
long distance communication. Based on research, it is proved
that FOC decreased the amount of operation. And it also
proved that signal noise ratio (SNR) has significantly
improved. Hence, adopting FOC in SG-CPS is going to be a
better choice for critical application. Several fields that are
supported by FOC are substation protection, Automation and
tele control. There are some issues in FOC that are scalability,
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more installation cost, installation time, wired nature, even
though SG-CPS selected FOS infrastructure [18] [24] [29].
Ethernet is generally suitable for wide area network (WAN)
which communicates between control center and substations.
The pros of ethernet are high reliability and availability. In
SGS, it is used to exchange the data between home center and
smart meter [30][31].
B. Wireless Communication
Cellular Communication: Cellular Communication
technology is another system of communication in SG-CPS.
In these systems, the high data rate is achieved on an average
of 100Gbps. From last few years, cellular technology has
been more desired in different application because of high
data rate exchanged through minimum delay [6][16].
Microwave Communication (MWC) supports wireless
communication applications for critical applications. This
technique reached a high rate to meet the SG-CPS
requirements. These technologies have a high data rate
compared to wired communication. This also has less
installation cost with lower time in remote areas. It is
concerned with high data security and reliability [32][33].
Zigbee technologies are mainly created for sensor network
and control system. This is by depending on IEEE 802.15.4
standard for LAN by MAC and Physical layers. It works on
bidirectional communication between network and control
system by exchanging basic sensor data. This technology is
organized by involving coordinators, routers, and end
devices. Smart sensors are used for monitoring SG, and it is
used as medium of communication for electronic current
transformers (ECT) for overhead after LAN connection fails.
It is easier to connect than WSN and Bluetooth. The ZigBee
network can be expanded using routers to create large
significant area network [6][34].
Radio Frequency (RF) is a communication technology in
network system, which gives the platform for deploying AMI
to retire daily meter reading in large scale area. Basically, RF
is a mesh network which are strong and cost effective for
establishing distributed network in large distance area.
Electric network demands can be changed using RF. RF mesh
helps the nodes in the network to self-heal when it fails. RF
is stated as self-forming network because it allows signal to
identify ideal path to go back to front end system even
though, in the place of hurdles like high risk buildings or
mountains. Whereas in rural areas, RF uses additional
infrastructures if it is needed to deploy in large distances. But
if RF is unlicensed, then it may create interference [35][36].
At last satellite communication (SC), is better monitoring and
gives solution for accessing remotely. From past few years,
SC shown its highest growth in the context of data rate, delay
in communication, and transmission. This kind of technology
is cost effective and suitable for monitoring power generation
and substation distribution in remote areas. SC gives some
application demands. But it is not suitable for SG-CPS critical
application [37][38].
IV. CYBER SECURITY PRINCIPLES
Information and communication technology (ICT) is
required to revolutionize the earlier power grid system to
smart grid system. There is disadvantage in SG system that is
 IEEE - 56998
cyber security problems (CS). For optimizing the operation,
SG system must give attention to the CS issues. SG system is
improving experimentally day by day. CS guarantees control
system as well as CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Authentication) where CIA is ensures energy management.
Operation, protection, and the necessary infrastructure. Fig 4
shows the cyber security objectives and requirements in smart
grid.
Figure 4: Cyber Security Objectives and Requirements in
Smart Grid
A. Cyber Security Objective
In SG, the CS objectives secure the data from CIA. The
SG system accomplishes the key principles of issues which
occur in CS, that is, the obtained data must be protected from
unauthorized access by CS. Confidentiality allows authorized
people to access the data in SGS. In real time scenario, SG is
bidirectional communication where customer devices are
connected to power grid. It is important to maintain privacy
in SGS for user data which are more scathing and important
issues. In this case, attackers can hack user information and
data by misusing communication system information, trace
the lifestyle, mismatch the electric power flow [39][40].
Smart Grid system data should be correct, and it must be non-
tamped. To achieve data authenticity, integrity is needed. It
prevents the data from being altered or changed in an
unauthorized or undeleted way. The power system expected
uninterrupted supply of energy which guarantees reliable and
timely use and using the system data so that the control
system assures systems reliability and availability. The
availability keeps power system information and safeguard
from damage[41][42]. Unauthorized parties investigate
attacks that is confidentiality to attract the data and also
integrity attacks by adding false data and altering primary
data. The target of an attacker is the CIA and attack on every
object of SGS. Some of the common attacks are to insert to
the SGS. The attack affects data to breakout and delays in
communication system and disturbs the electric power
delivery to harm others or to take benefits for themselves.
B. Cyber Security Requirements
In the applications of SG, CS expects little more security
instants to CIA. These approaches are co-related to one other.
CS ensured the available objectives and important
requirements. To guarantee legitimacy. The specification of
CS requirements and its objectives are shown in Fig 4. The
SGS uses some of the secret processes to identify and
authenticate the devices and users from being accessed by
unauthorized users. This kind of process ensures the valid
objects. The object can be the components that are connected
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to the network, smart devices or users. The method used for
identification is a password. The SG systems can adapt the
identification methods for authenticating purposes. This may
also fail if the authentication process cannot give attention to
achieving the security. To achieve secure data integrity and
confidentiality, encryption and authentication are mandatory
cryptographic approaches in SGS. It is also considered as an
efficient identification procedure to avoid data integrity
attacks [43]. Authentication is to prove that the users or
devices involved in SGS applications are genuine. An
example of authentication is digital signatures, which are
used to authenticate the data that is to be transmitted. A
exchange secret key or else public key infrastructure should
be exchanged to transmit within the interwork. In this kind of
authentication. The concerned authority will distribute the
certificate to the users [44][45]. Therefore, it ensure only
genuine device or users can approach the device.
Authorization classifies the legitimate and illegitimate users
or devices for all CS requirements based on authentication.
Access control identify the users or devices accurately, while
using the resources. The strict access control mechanism
prevents the data from being accessed by unauthorized users.
There are many methods for access control, such as
mandatory access control, discretionary access control, and
role based access control. These methods prevent security
issues and improve reliability of the system. Generally, in the
entire network, it is compulsory to involve access control to
control devices and users. This is easily recorded and
traceable. It can be further given for audit [46][47]. The
recorded and traceable data helps to identify illegitimate users
by asking for evidence. If illegitimate users fail to give
evidence, it is confirmed that the user is illegitimate.
Whenever the user or devices refuse to accept the data or if it
receives misinformation, it is called non-repudiation. In
addition to this, non-repudiation enables accountability. In
applications of SG, accountability expects better privacy, and
a system security so that when the security system starts,
accountability detects the responsible users or the devices.
Since accountability keeps the information in the network,
based on the information evidence, further actions will be
taken so that users cannot escape from their activities. In
SGS, accountability does surveys on customers’ electricity
bills. Even though smart meters used to count the energy
consumption and in real-time, smart meter generates the bill,
customers still doubt the correctness of billing from the smart
meter. If an attacker has some personal advantage or other
issues, he will alter the exchanged data, then the meter
generates the incorrect bill. It can conclude as, the meter or
the system is abused [12][48][46]. The customer doesn’t want
to give data related to power consumption patterns, usage of
power or any other power-related information to
unauthorized people. This kind of data requires personal
privacy for customers that unauthorized access cannot occur
without the permission of the customer. And security is given
to defining the permission. The structure of the network
securely makes use of heterogeneous security technology.
Additionally, safety is considered an important security
requirement for cyber security in SGS.
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V. KEY COMPONENETS OF CYBER ATTACK
In the smart grid system, more cyber-attacks happen in
entire world, which leads to severe damage to power and
energy resources. Hence, the cyber requirements and
objectives become inconclusive. The possible attacks cannot
be the reason because of extending the network and rigidity
of SG. Therefore, all CA in SGS is divided into three types
represented in Fig 5.
Figure 5: Cyber Security Strategy in Smart Grid
The probable solution for security threats in SGS is using
single security solutions ie, encryption and cryptographic
techniques, which couldn’t deal with real threats, but it gives
impact on improvising confidentiality and integrity in smart
grid data communication system. In cryptography,
encryption is a basic step for providing security to the
communication network. Anyhow, the encryption process is
complex, and SG expects confidentiality and integrity data
balance. Encryption also deals with eavesdropping and replay
attack. The SGS is involved with several encryption and
authentication methods. Here, there exist two types of
encryptions, they are symmetric an asymmetric encryption.
Division of employment security (DES), advanced
encryption standard (AES)[12].
VI. CYBER ATTACK IN SMART GRID
The survey of cyber-attacks in smart grid system mainly rely
on false data injection attacks (FDIAs), denial of service
(DoS) attacks, man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, data
framing attacks (DFA), load redistribution attack (LRA),
false command injection attack (FCIA), replay attack so on.,
integration of power system into information system faces
many attacks like malware attack etc. Some of such attacks
are represented in the section below.
A. False Data Injection Attack
False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) is one of the most
dangerous attacks in SGS. In FDIA, an intruder attacks the
system and alters the sensor reading in such a manner that
unidentifiable errors are deployed into the estimation and
scheduling decisions. Accessing the physical network is
difficult when compared to acquiring the communication
channel. The attacker focuses on physical network and
communication channel to alter the readings of sensor. The
impact of FDIA is identified in SG at both static and Dynamic
location. To collect the ideal measurements in state
estimation against FDIA, data model based on generative
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adversarial network (GAN). But it is not possible to recognize
the particular sensor at which FDIA is attacked.
B. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
In DoS attack, the intruder makes the device inaccessible for
authorized user by flooding the large, unexpected data traffic.
The flooding and crashing the attacker focuses on physical
network and communication channel to alter the readings of
sensor. The impact of FDIA is identified in SG at both static
and Dynamic location. To collect the ideal measurements in
state estimation against FDIA, data model based on
generative adversarial network (GAN). But it is not possible
to recognize the particular sensor at which FDIA is attacked.
C. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
In DoS attack, by flooding the large and unexpected data
traffic intruder makes the devices inaccessible for authorized
users. Flooding and crashing the services are binary methods
in DoS attacks. In pouring the services, there are three major
attacks: buffer overflow attack, synchronization and ICMP
attacks. The updated form of DoS is Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack. The DDoS instead of flooding the
services, it crashes the target system by compromising the
system with multiple host rather than single source. In context
of smart grid, DoS attacks on network topology then after it
exploits all possible attacks, but DDoS attack make use of
compromised hosts to deploy DoS attack to several target
system.
D. Spoofing Attack
The attacker concentrates on the connection links in
spoofing attack. In smart grid system, GPS spoofing attack is
majorly used as an attack. The GPS spoofing attack is
illustrated in. The communication link between devices and
control center which are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. In
order to switch the real time control system of smart grid with
less cost and elevated precision GPS devices are attached into
the high number of grid sensors, like phasor measurement
units. The nearby attackers can spoof the GPS receivers that
transmit high power as well as false signals with the GPS
frequency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smart Grid System (SGS) that gathers and issues the
several devices and power system which integrates the power
generation side and customer side. This paper gives the
overview on cyber physical attack (CP) and cyber security
attack (CS) of smart grid (SGs). Though SG expects
communication network and cyber security systems, it is
revealed to cyber-attacks. In this article we outlined the CS
system objectives, requirements as well as key components.
The paper gives review on cyber-attacks which includes false
data injection attacks, denial of service, distributed denial of
service and GPS spoofing attacks in smart grids. This paper
reviews all the possible cyber-attacks that occur in smart grid,
further it can be expanded individually on the attacks in smart
grid area, which is the serious issue in the vicinity.
At this end, this paper aims to showcase the review on the
cyber physical attack schemes in smart grid. Instead of listing
all potential schemes, the paper enlight on the critical
 IEEE - 56998
schemes, where attackers can potentially disturb or destroy
power operation. The victims are generated from the critical
benefits and transmission system and also with customers. As
exhibited in the paper, the attacks are real time and frequent
we made it understand the existing and upcoming
vulnerabilities and to motivate for innovating and giving
solutions for securing ad resilience of smart grid as well as
other cyber physical system infrastructure.
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