CASE DOCTRINES - CIVPRO
Facts: First Union’s and Linda’s continued failure to settle their debt prompted BPI to file a complaint
PART 1
LORRY 1-7 Completed
MAE 8-14 Completed
MICH 15-18 Completed
JANAH 19-22 Completed
1. Bernabe vs. Alejo 140500 21 January 2002
Fact: The secretary of the late Bernabe filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of the former and be given his share in the latter’s estate. Petitioner
contends that under the provisions of the Family Code (which should be given a retroactive effect),
the death of the putative father had barred the action.
Held/Doctrine: Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair
or take Adrian's right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to
its enactment.
2. Sps. Bergonia vs. Court of Appeals 189151 25 January 2012
Facts: Petitioners failed to file their Appellant’s Brief within the 45-day period granted to them by the
CA. They alleged that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent had no basis considering that
they or their counsel did not receive any resolution from the CA requiring them to file their
Appellants’ Brief within 45 days.
Held/Doctrine: The petitioners were only able to offer their bare assertion that they and their
counsel did not actually receive a copy. The petitioners should be reminded that technical rules may
be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.
3. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals 168313 06 October 2010
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for collection of sum of money with the RTC. The complaint’s verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping were signed by Asis and Ong. However, no Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution
was attached to evidence Asis’ and Ong’s authority to file the complaint.
Held: BPI failed to comply with the procedural requirements on non-forum shopping. Citing Sec. 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the requirement that a petition should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping applies even to corporations since the Rules of Court do not distinguish between natural
and civil persons.
The rule for the submission of a certificate of non forum shopping, proper in form and substance,
remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified by ample and
sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of
the rule. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment
of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
4. CMTC International Marketing Corporation vs. Bhagis International Trading
Corporation 170488 10 December 2012
Facts: In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant's brief on the
petitioner's part. It must be stressed that the petitioner had no participatory negligence in the
dismissal of its appeal.
Held/Doctrine: Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have
recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn
obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.
Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the
interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's
gross or palpable mistake or negligence. Petitioner should be afforded the ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
5. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar 200804 22 January 2014
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases to collect from respondent unpaid water bills. MTCC held that the petitioner unilaterally
charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC which was dismissed due to the
non-appealable nature of small claims cases

Held/Doctrine: Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based
on the facts established by the evidence. The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of
Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. The
decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy
of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available
where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
6. Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp vs. Cullen 181416 11 November 2013
Facts: Respondent Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza
Makati. Petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Dimayuga, demanded from respondent
payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments claimed that respondent's obligation
was a carry-over of that of MLHI.
Held/Doctrine: Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Petitioner is a condominium corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, charged
with the management of the Medical Plaza Makati. Respondent is the registered owner of Unit No.
1201 and is thus a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an
intra-corporate relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member.
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint. Though
denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in his
complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by
petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioner's act in preventing respondent from
participating in the election of the corporation's Board of Directors.
Similar to jurisprudence, the issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is just
incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a
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special commercial court.
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the
SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 (this include intra corporate) of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts.
7. City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, et al 175723 04 February 2014
Facts: Petitioner alleged that payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of
their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay assessment under protest.
Respondents averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of
the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents so petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA.
Held/Doctrine: CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA
9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction.
While there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the strength of the above constitutional
provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.
 8. Cabrera vs. Francisco 172293 28 August 2013
Facts:
1. The respondent agreed to the services of a real estate broker introduced by the
respondents, but then the respondents appointed a different administratrix and terminated
the services of the original one.
2. The petitioner demanded for their 5% commission and compensation, but to no avail.
3. This case is a question of the RTC's jurisdiction on the complaint depending on the claim in
the case being capable of pecuniary estimation; to which the Court held that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the payment of such money claim is the principal relief
sought and not merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action where the subject of
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money.
This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC's outside of Metro Manila was adjusted
to P200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691. Hence, when
petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said increased jurisdictional amount was
already effective. The demand in their Complaint must therefore exceed P200,000.00 in order for it
to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts
of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
9. Platinum Tours and Travel Incorporated vs. Panlilio 133365 16 September 2003
Facts:
1. Platinum filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel
Corporation (PATC) and its president Galvez originating from airline tickets which PATC
bought from it.
2. Among others, the Plaintiff filed a petitioner for certiorari assailing the order of Judge Diokno
to allow the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
3. Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No.
96-365 because when Judge Diokno's July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the
two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62's basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
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Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
Doctrine:
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In general,
jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of
the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. It does not depend upon the regularity of
the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.
Jurisdiction over the nature of action and Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff
subject matter
conferred by law. It is determined by the acquired from the time he files his complaint;
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of while jurisdiction over the person of the
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover defendant is acquired by his voluntary
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. appearance in court and his submission to its
authority, or by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilio's collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently
annulled Judge Diokno's order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case
No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
"Jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a
court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on
all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its
authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
10. People vs. Cawaling 117970 28 July 1998
Facts:
1. Accused-appellants Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan,
Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were convicted of murder by the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon.
2. Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case.
3. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which
was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

Doctrine:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by
any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of
another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at
bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended
to apply to actions pending before its enactment.
Sec. 4 PD 1606 refers to the jurisdiction of the Sanidganbayan for the “other offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office…” “where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper RTC or MTC”
However, former President, Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members
of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952.
“(a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense
cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of
War” The term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen, and jail guards."
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP
129, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder: "Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. —
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter."
PD 1606, according to jurisprudence, provides that murder or homicide may be committed both by
public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said
crime.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily
connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
The Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public
officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony
Supporting jurisprudence: (Aguinaldo v. Domagas)
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"In the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the AntiGraft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over
the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]) Even before considering the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that
offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in
relation to their offices
Note: all of these seem relevant !! LMK IF IT NEEDS TO BE SHORTER.
11. Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission 97381 05 November 1992
Facts:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing Resolution No. 90-962 of the CSC. Said
CSC resolution set aside and modified the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in
MSPB Case No. 449, which ordered the immediate reinstatement in the service of petitioner
Magpale, Jr., without loss of seniority rights and with payment of back salaries and other
emoluments to which he is entitled under the law.
2. The main issue is whether or not the decision of the MSPB is subject to an appeal to the
CSC.After Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, the extent of the authority of respondent
CSC to review the decisions of the MSPB is now a settled matter.
3. The Court, in said case held: "It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of
law.
Doctrine: A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as `The Philippine Civil Service Law'
shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges. Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides: 'The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office . . .' 'Appeals, where allowable, shall be
made by the party adversely affected by the decision . . .'
The phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form
of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant
case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the
respondent in the administrative case below. Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D.
807, the city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality
on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to
one month against erring employees.
Requisites for the exercise of appeal:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
 (b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of
the case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of
the notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of: Cdpr
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office,
rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position. Settled
is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case.
12. Sandoval vs. Cañeba 90503 27 September 1990
Facts:
1. The private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC for the collection of unpaid installments
regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest against petitioner.
2. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint before him notwithstanding that exclusive
and original jurisdiction over the subject-matter is vested with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 and in refusing to vacate his judgment rendered
without jurisdiction and in issuing a writ of execution to implement his void judgment.
Doctrine: Ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows:
“SEC.1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
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buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.”
Exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested not on
the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and
thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
The sum of money sought to be collected by the private respondent from the petitioner represented
unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner purchased. Petitioner alleges that he
suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop the subdivision
pursuant to their agreement. Since the trial court has no jurisdiction, the decision it rendered is null
and void ab initio. It is as if no decision was rendered by the trial court at all. It cannot become final
and executory, much less can it be enforced by a writ of execution.
13. Quesada vs. DOJ 150325 31 August 2006
Facts:
1. Respondent herein filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor an affidavit-complaint
charging Quesada, petitioner herein, Camacho, and Corgado with the crime of estafa.
2. While the RTC was hearing the said Criminal Case, petitioner filed with the Supreme court
this instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his
Petition for Review acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
3. This case is a violation of the rule on the hierarchy of courts for directly filing with the
Supreme Court, and should be dismissed.
Doctrine:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be
filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may then be appealed to Supreme Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules. A direct recourse to the Supreme
court is warranted only where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the
petition to justify such action.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.
Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another
 are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or a RTC, it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
Petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the RTC,
and those against the latter, with the CA. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket
14. Zamora vs. Heirs of Carmen 146195 18 November 2004
FACTS:
1. Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the former
leased to the latter one of her apartment units.
2. After the death of the lessor Carmen, her counsel representing the heirs prepared a new
contract increasing the rentals which the petitioners refused to sign even when the original
lessee Pablo died.
3. The petitioners continued to stay there while refusing to pay for the increased rentals which
led to the respondents filed a complaint with the Office of the Punong Barangay, but the
barangay conciliation proceedings seemed to have failed.
Doctrine:
The primordial objective of PD No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included
under R.A. No. 7160 (the LGC of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts.
To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court,
thus:
"SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.
No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
x x x."
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With this being said it is clear that as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go
through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present
case), or the Pangkat.
15. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor 140954 12 April 2005
FACTS: private respondents filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal
of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo. this petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed
DIRECTLY BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT by petitioners alleging that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after private respondents
paid the docket fee deficiency since the trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the
record and nullified all proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private
respondents and in allowing the case to be filed and denying the manifestation with motion to
dismiss, despite the defect in the complaint which prayed for damages without specifying the
amounts, in violation of SC Circular No. 7
DOCTRINE: present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the petition at bar. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is
not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will
be directed. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts. Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
16. Manchester Dev’t Corp. vs. Court of Appeal 75919 07 May 1987
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for
temporary restraining order, etc. The trial court directed plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by
stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount. Petitioners claim that the filing fee
must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint
 DOCTRINE: The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. It is a well-settled rule "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For any legal
purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. The court acquires jurisdiction over any upon payment of the prescribed docket
fee.
In this case, the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint is frowned upon. This is clearly intended for no other purpose
than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee.
THIS DOCTRINE WILL ONLY APPLY IF THERE’S INTENT TO COMMIT FRAUD.
17. Sun Insurance Ltd. vs. Asuncion 79937-38 13 February 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy against private respondent.
private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner which sought the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. The prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages. However, the
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50,000,000.
Petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid by private respondent is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim.
DOCTRINE: In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or
clerk in-charge should determine and if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same.
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
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of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
18. Ayala Corp. vs. Madayag 88421 30 January 1990
FACTS: Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with
damages. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to
specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and
supplemental complaint.
DOCTRINE:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
CLARIFICATION ON PARAGRAPH 3:
 While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left
to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to
specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims
not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material
defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did
not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the
amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the
exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.
19. Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros 179878
24 December 2008
Facts: Private respondent Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages against
Petitioner NOPA. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full,
but was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses. More than six years after NOPA filed
its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the
correct filing fee.
Held/Doctrine: While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably
also a technicality.
In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by
the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester will apply.
20. Spouses Go vs. Tong 151942 27 November 2003
Facts: Private respondent request for the replacement of the check was not granted, so he filed a
complaint for sum of money, damages and attorney's fees. During the pendency of the case,
petitioners' son filed a criminal complaint against the private respondent for falsification of the check,
but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a supplemental complaint was filed by a private
respondent praying for an increased amount of damages sought to be recovered due to the
damages caused by the filing of a criminal complaint. Considering the huge amount involved, the
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public respondent issued another order allowing private respondent to pay the docket fees on
staggered basis.
Held/Doctrine:
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment
at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
21. Tamano vs. Ortiz 126603 29 June 1998
Facts: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the
case was properly cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married
in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 or the Code
of Muslim Personal laws.
Held/Doctrine: In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws.
Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married
under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned
only in her Motion for Reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to
hear and try the instant case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as
the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action.
22. Villagracia vs. Fifth Shari’a District Court 188832 23 April 2014
Facts: Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot. Vivencio
occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. However, despite
service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte. Respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan‘s
action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
Held/Doctrine: Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction, In this case, the
allegations in Roldan's petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court
should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it
 appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the
pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim

Shari'a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim

Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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PART 2
2. Domagas vs. Jensen 158407 17 January 2005
LORRY 1-5 Completed
Petitioner Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Jansesn alleging that the latter by
MAE 6-10 Completed means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner's property by excavating a
portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. The summons and the complaint were
MICH 11-15 Completed not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed
to the Sheriff by the respondent's brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent's house and
JANAH 16-20 Completed received the same.

GIAN 21-25 Completed Held/Doctrine:

An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
NADAYAG 26-30 Completed distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
GIANT 31-35 Completed against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an
injunctive act in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
TEJADA 36-41 Completed
No valid service of summons
GIA 42-47 Completed Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
CABIGTING 48-52 Completed preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
ALEX 53-58 Completed age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that
the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
1. Spouses Yu vs. Pacleb 172172 24 February 2009
It is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former's dwelling house, residence or place of abode,
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages against Javier, to
as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of
Property. They alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not
the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
tenanted. However, after they already gave the initial payment and entered into an Agreement for
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
the sale of the Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by Ramon.
No showing that ahe house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter's residence or that of
Held/Doctrine:
the respondent herein nor is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence
This is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to
of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessorand
compel performance of the latter's undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the
that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals.
Court of Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and
to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their favor. It does not burden the
Langcaan property. Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case s binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot 3. Go vs. UCPB 156187 11 November 2004
bind the respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy
thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of Petitioner Go and Looyuko are co-owners of various businesses under Noah’s Ark’s name.
sale Petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage on the ground that the approved
omnibus credit line applied for by him and Looyuko did not materialize and was canceled by
respondent bank, so that the pre-signed real estate mortgages were likewise canceled;

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 Held/Doctrine:
Real action - the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4,
20 a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These
include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real
actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts — the court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
The cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action,
considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action for
cancellation of a real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is a
real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject
property lies.
Note: If the mortgagee has NOT foreclosed the mortgage, the plaintiffs' title is not in question. They
are still in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs' personal action is the
place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by petitioner was primarily
an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the properties. The prime objective is to
recover said real properties.
4. Cabutihan vs. Landcenter 146594 10 June 2002
Petitioner filed an action for specific performance with damages against the respondent before the
RTC of Pasig City praying that the respondent be ordered to execute the appropriate document
assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor. The lots, situated in
Paranaque, represented compensation for the undertakings she performed and accomplished, as
embodied in the Agreement.
Respondents argue that the case should have been filed in Paranaque where the lot is situated.
Ruling/Doctrine:
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and
tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
Prayers for the execution of a Deed of Sale were not in any way connected to a contract, like the
Undertaking in this case. Hence, even if there were prayers for the execution of a deed of sale, the
actions filed in the said cases were not for specific performance.
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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In the present case, the petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking
the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for
rescission. Had petitioner filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of
the case would have been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action.
5. Gochan vs. Gochan 146089 13 December 2001
Ruling/Doctrine:
ON VENUE
The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately,
the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the
provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a
real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
Where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance
of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of
land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the proper
court where the property is located.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action,
although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for
determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated
value thereof as alleged by the claimant.
ON FORUM SHOPPING
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a person who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.
In the case at bar, the two petitions did not seek the same relief. The first petition, which is now the
subject of the instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by
petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second petition raised the issue of whether or not
public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from
further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854
6. Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum 88075-77 20 December 1989
This involves a petition demanding the defendants to vacate the property of Pineda. The complaint
 was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant in the complaint, alleging that it did
not specify the amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the
property, that being a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case.
Doctrine:
BP 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter
alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies regardless of the
value of the real property involved, or where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of
damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases (e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of
personal property, or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction) in which the amount claimed,
or the value of the personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction; (i.e., the value of the
personal property or the amount claimed should exceed P20,000.00 in order to be cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court).
Under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed,"
on the one hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate," on the other.
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on
the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall
be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related
damages sought.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading,
as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless,
of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where — as in the case at bar — the fees
prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of
the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may
not be dismissed.
The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. It is not divested of that
authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying
claims or damages because of lack of specification thereof.
7. Redeña vs. Court of Appeals 146611 06 February 2007
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This was an action for partition filed by petitioner Tancredo against his older half-brother, herein
private respondent Leocadio. The petitioner failed to submit their Appellant's Brief in spite of a grant
to extend the period, causing the Appeal to be considered abandoned and subsequently
dismissed.The petition for relief from denial of appeal is not among the remedies available before the
CA, and the subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
Doctrine:
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Courts are
not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.The [Supreme] Court, unlike courts below, has the
power not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of substantive law or
substantial rights.
Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. Hence, a petition for
relief may NOT be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is
either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not
prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal.
The Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel's negligence and allowed a litigant
another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of
the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of these
exceptions obtains here. (The omission in this case does not amount to fraud).
The Rules allow a petition for relief only when there is no other available remedy, and not when
litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence.
RULE 2 (SECTIONS 1 TO 6)
8. Juana Complex Homeowners vs. Fil-Estate Land 152272 and 152397 05 March
2012
Two consolidated petitions are involved in this case filed as a class suit wherein Juana Complex I
Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and
other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for damages against Fil-Estate. In 1998,
 Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al.,
would not be able to pass through the said road.
Doctrine:
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains 3 essential
elements:
1. the legal right of the plaintiff,
2. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters
aliunde are not considered.
Test of sufficiency. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
asserted by the defendant.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
1. the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2. the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3. the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
9. Samson vs. Sps. Gabor 182970 23 July 2014
The respondent spouses executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the petitioner. However, an
action for legal redemption was filed by the respondent spouses upon learning that the petitioner
executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same undivided portion in favor of Ramos. The RTC
of Pasig dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and that the
complaint states no cause of action. It held that the suit is a real action which should be filed in the
RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject of the case is situated.
Doctrine:
While the complaint was denominated as one for "Recovery of Property or its Value", the alternative
claim in this case is dependent on the determination of ownership, which is an action affecting title to
or possession of real property or an interest therein. Therefore, this is a real action which should
have been filed in the court where the property lies.
Case Cited: Spouses Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
CIVPRO - DRQ - 2022
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain and
Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal"
Test for cause of action: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer? (take into account material allegations)
Res Judicata applies
Requisites:
1. the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2. the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
3. the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
causes of action as are present in the civil cases below.
Reason: Conclusive upon the parties - bars litigation on the same issues.
As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or
nature of the two actions are different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the
two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.
10. Del Rosario vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company 150134 31 October 2007
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondent for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of
contract and damages originating from a loan agreement between them; the decision of which
rendered the stipulation between the parties void. Later on, the Petitioners filed a Complaint for a
sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC (FEBTC as assignee of receivables from a deed of
assignment executed) to recover excess payment. The court ordered the PDCP to pay the
petitioners but dismissed the complaint against FEBTC for lack of cause of action. The Petitioners
then filed before the RTC of Makati to recover the balance of the excess payment, but this was
 dismissed on the basis of res judicata and splitting of the cause of action.
Doctrine:
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine of res judicata, reads:
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppel by judgment," which states that the judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar
to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal.
"Bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the
subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received
to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and
which could have been adjudged therein. It is in this concept that the term res judicata is more
commonly and generally used as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of
judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again
be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or which were necessarily
included therein.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment,"
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
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(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the rule of
res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second action would suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms or
nature of the two actions are different. Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence would sustain
both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar
to the subsequent action.
Splitting of a single cause of action
Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or
claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the
grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them piecemeal in
successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury.
Purpose: Unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
11. Progressive Dev’t Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 123555 22 January 1999
Petitioner leased to private respondent a parcel of land to which the latter failed to pay rentals
despite several demands so petitioner repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable
properties found within and owned by private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale
of the movables. Private respondent filed with the MTC of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner
for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. While the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent
instituted another action for damages against petitioner with RTC which was granted by RTC
prompting petitioner to file with CA (did not first file an MR) a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago committed grave abuse of discretion
DOCTRINE: The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is
not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the error is patent or the
disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely
presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
 In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground that
another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same parties involving the
same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by
petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any
motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise.
12. Joseph vs. Bautista L-41423 23 February 1989
Petitioner sustained injury due to a vehicular accident so he filed a complaint for damages against
respondent Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
against respondents Sioson and Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck,
based on quasi-delict. Insurer of Sioson. paid petitioner’s claims while respondents Villanueva paid
respondent Perez’ claim for damage. Respondent judge dismissed the petition holding that there is
only one cause of action and release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other
respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez.
DOCTRINE: A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or
wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated belonging to one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts
only one cause of action arises. In the present case, the petitioner sustained a single injury on his
person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against
the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
A recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
13. Flores vs. Mallare-Philipps L-66620 24 September 1986
Petitioner in his complaint states that the first cause of action against respondent Binongcal was for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires and the second cause of
action was against respondent Fernando Calion for refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20,000. Petitioner has appealed by
certiorari from the order of respondent judge claiming that lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim
Rules.
DOCTRINE: Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more
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plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as
to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a
single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the
two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. If instead of joining or being
joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in
each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held
that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2
and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct
and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
14. Lourdes Suites vs. Binaro 204729 06 August 2014
Petitioner filed a Statement of Claim for collection of sum of money plus damages before the MeTC
against respondent claiming that the latter was not able to pay in full the amount for room
accommodations for 2 groups of students to which the MeTC and RTC upon appeal, both ruled in
favor of respondent. Petitioner argues that even after the presentation of evidence by both parties, a
complaint cannot be dismissed with prejudice based on lack of cause of action because: (1) this
ground is not expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases; and (2) if there was a
failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy would be a demurrer filed by the
defendant.
DOCTRINE: FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION and LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION are
really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On
the other hand, lack of cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged inthe pleading. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to
prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the
remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence. The procedure would consequently be to require
the pleading to state· a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a
demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a
case for lack of cause of action (i.e. insufficiency of evidence). In civil cases, courts must determine if
the plaintiff was able to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence which is evidence that is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
RULE 3 (SECTIONS 1 TO 2)
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
15. Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply 168979 2 December 2013
 Petitioners, children of lourdes pacana, who are known to be engaged in the water supply business,
filed the present case against respondents for accounting and damages for using fraud in obtaining
the former’s water business. The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie
was authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and SPA. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes
and Luciano and the petitioners are not the real parties in interest so they have no valid cause of
action against the respondents.
DOCTRINE: "A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. If a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails
an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the
litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter
query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in
discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are
considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment of the suit."
At the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as
parties-plaintiffs however they are considered as indispensable parties to the case as the alleged
owners of Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination
of the present case. The proper remedy in the present case is to implead the indispensable parties
especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. To do so would serve proper
administration of justice and prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits. Pursuant to Section 9,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with a lawful court order.
16. Golangco vs. Fung 157952 8 September 2009
Facts: The Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had
been issued to and served on him for the purpose. Consequently, the RTC judge issued an order
terminating the Prosecution’s presentation of evidence.
Petitioner assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the order dated May 23, 2001, claiming that
the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion. He contended that his prior request for the
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subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing request for
the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena
again should it not be served in the first time.
Held/Doctrine:
The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the
CA. He ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective
being to set aside the trial court’s order that concerned the public aspect of the criminal case. The
omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for
certiorari.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law is not available.
17. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Heirs of Tiu 178529 4 September 2009
Facts: Antonio executed an Amendment to the Real Estate Mortgage (AREM) increasing the
amount secured by the mortgage to ₱26M, above the words "With my Marital Consent" appearing in
the AREM is a signature attributed to Antonio’s wife Matilde. Petitioners that the said AREM is
without force and effect since it was executed without the valid consent of the wife of mortgagor
Antonio who at the time of the execution of instrument was already suffering from advanced
Alzheimer’s Disease,incapable of giving consent. RTC then issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondents are not real parties in
interest so they have no cause of action and even if there is, it has already prescribed and the venue
was improperly laid.
Held/Doctrine:
The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally
or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom
they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed
fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
18. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila 122846 20 January 2009
Facts: Mayor Lim signed into law the Ordinance entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
 Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila." Petitioners filed
a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
Held/Doctrine:
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance.
They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be
threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case.
19. Rayo vs. Metrobank 165142 10 December 2007
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondnet for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage
Contract(s) and Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, in the RTC. Petitioner then filed with CA a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment on the ground of "absolute lack of due process” alleging that his
predecessor, Louisville, was not notified of the proceedings and that Section 7 (ex parte motion or
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession) of Act No. 3135 is unconstitutional. CA denied the
petition holding that petitioner is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in-interest of the
registered owner; hence, not a real party-in-interest.
Held/Doctrine:
Petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and
nullify the order granting the writ of possession. there was no violation of petitioner’s right to
constitutional due process.
A real party-in-interest is one with "a present substantial interest" which means such interest
of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to
recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.
20. Sps. Oco vs. Limbaring 161298 31 January 2006
Facts: Percita Oco(petitioner), the daughter of Sabas Limbaring, filed a case of perjury and
falsification of documents against the respondent, her uncle. Respondent filed against petitioners a
Complaint for the rescission of the sales contracts, with recovery of possession and ownership of the
2 parcels of land claiming that that he was the actual buyer of the lots, but the vendees whose
names appeared on the Deeds were his daughters and that the agreement was not implemented,
because Percita had failed to cooperate. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
respondent was not the real party in interest.
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Held/Doctrine:
Respondent is not a real party in interest.
"RULE 3 Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Basic in procedural law is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
21. Domingo vs. Carague 161065 15 April 2005
Brief facts:
1. Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S. Banaria are retired
Chairman, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA.
All claim to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,"3 especially in its
Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.
2. These petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks
as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon implementation of the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in violation of
Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective Representation and
Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.
3. Petitioners invoke that they have legal standing to institute the assailed petition since the
subject matter of the case is imbued with public interest.
Doctrine:
- In Agan, Jr., we held that petitioners have legal standing as they have a direct and
substantial interest to protect. By the implementation of the PIATCO contracts, they stand
to lose their source of livelihood, a property right zealously protected by the Constitution.
Such financial prejudice on their part is sufficient to confer upon them the requisite locus
standi.
- IN THE PRESENT CASE:
- petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they
admitted that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident
act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief
from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Clearly,
they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
22. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor 140954 12 April 2005
 BRIEF FACTS:
1. Private respondents all surnamed Balane filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Removal or Construction and Damages against Bertuldo
2. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the
amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees
3. Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the ground thatAtty. Petalcorin has
not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of
the original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal
personality to represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any
specific party whom he is representing.
DOCTRINE:
No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo, as
required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the
rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure
that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on
substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the
court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be
effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by
any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him. The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted sixteen
months after the death of Bertuldo and only when the trial court directed Atty. Petalcorin to comply
with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Strictly speaking therefore, before
said compliance, Atty. Petalcorin had no standing in the court a quo when he filed his pleadings. Be
that as it may, the matter has been duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated October 15,
1999.
23. Comm. Domingo vs. Scheer 154745 29 January 2004
BRIEF FACTS:
1. Scheer, herein respondent was wanted by the German police.
2. When respondent Scheer was informed of the deportation order, he aired his side to then
BID Commissioner Verceles. The Commissioner allowed respondent Scheer to remain in the
Philippines, giving the latter time to secure clearance and a new passport from the German
Embassy. Respondent Scheer filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however, the BOC did not
resolve the respondent’s motion. Respondent Scheer was neither arrested nor deported.
3. The CA issued an order restraining petitioner Commissioner from deporting respondent
Scheer on a bond of Php 100,000.00. The BOC issued a resolution denying respondent
Scheer’s urgent motion for reconsideration and motion for bail/recognizance. The CA then
rendered a decision in favor of respondent Scheer granting his petition for certiorari and
prohibition, permanently enjoining petitioner Commissioner from deporting respondent
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Scheer.
DOCTRINE: THE BOC IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the ROC requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to
the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act, not only of the absent party, but also as to
those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be
added by the order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative. If the petitioner refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the petition
for the petitioner’s failure to comply.
24. Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals 102976 25 October 1995
BRIEF FACTS:
1. Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by P.D. No. 272 for a term of 5 years
in order to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. When ISA's
original term expired, its term was extended for another 10 years by Executive Order No.
555.
2. Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly, petitioner
ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the RTC
Br. 1, of Iligan City, praying that it (ISA) be placed in possession of the property involved.
The PNB, as mortgagee of the plant facilities and improvements involved in the
expropriation proceedings, was also impleaded as party-defendant.
3. petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest,
should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. In this connection, ISA referred to a
letter from the Office of the President which especially directed the Solicitor General to
continue the expropriation case.
The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s
term.
HELD/DOCTRINE:
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action. Under this
provision, it will be seen that those who can be parties to a civil action may be broadly categorized
into two (2) groups: (a) those who are recognized as persons under the law whether natural, i.e.,
biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical persons such as corporations, on the other hand;
and (b) entities authorized by law to institute actions. The Republic itself is a body corporate and
juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as "legal personality."
It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic
are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes
with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality
 distinct from the personality of the Republic.
the non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon the expiration of ISA's statutory term, was not a
ground for dismissal of such proceedings since a party may be dropped or added by order of the
court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. In the instant case, the Republic has precisely moved to take over the proceedings
as party-plaintiff.
25. Air Transportation Office vs. Sps. Ramos 159402 23 February 2011
FACTS
1. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records
with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and
running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO)
2. The respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the
RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels
of land that included the respondents' affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport
3. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State's
consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of
governmental functions
HELD/ DOCTRINE:
- Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
- Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private
or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for
public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state.
The latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging
in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character,
and by implication consents to suits against the corporation.
26. Department of Health vs. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. 182358 20 February 2013
Facts: DOH suspended PPI’s accreditation for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No.
171-C. PPI questioned the suspension of its accreditation claiming that the suspension was patently
illegal and null and void because it arrogated unto the DOH Accreditation Committee powers and
functions which were granted to the BFAD under RA No. 3720 and EO No. 175. RTC ruled in favor
of the petitioner and dismissed the case, declaring that the principle of state immunity is applicable.
PPI appealed to CA and the CA reversed the RTC ruling stating that petitioners were being sued in
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their individual and personal capacities.
Held/Doctrine: The case should be dismissed for being a suit against the state. As a general rule, a
state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the
subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the
other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver
may be implied." Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.
RULE 3 (SECTION 3 TO 12)
27. Gochan vs. Young 131889 12 March 2001
Facts: Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty) was registered with the SEC
where Felix Gochan Sr.'s daughter, Alice, inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the
former. When Alice died, she left the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr which the latter
requested Gochan Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in
his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of the Youngs when all the
children had reached the age of majority. Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first
refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation. fter Young Sr. died,
leaving the shares to the Youngs, Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC
for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance
of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages against
Virginia Gochan, et. al. (Gochans). The Gochans moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1)
the SEC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the the Youngs were not the real
parties-in-interest and had no capacity to sue; and (3) the Youngs' causes of action were barred by
the Statute of Limitations.
The SEC granted the motion to dismiss holding that the Youngs never been stockholders of record
of Gochan Realty to confer them with the legal capacity to bring and maintain their action, and thus,
the case cannot be considered as an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Held/Doctrine: Rule 3, Section 3 of Rules of Court and Rule 87, Section 2 of ROC, while permitting
an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit
the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of
an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a
suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the
 rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
28. Chua vs. Torres 151900 30 August 2005
Facts: While Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the
second paragraph of the complaint that he was being "impleaded here-in as a necessary
party-plaintiff". There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by
Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents
were sought to recompense. Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against
forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as "the
principal plaintiff".
Held/Doctrine: Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Neither misjoinder
nor non-joinder of parties are grounds for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately. Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a
suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties.
Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the
court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule
3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through
amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit. It should then follow that any act
or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the
prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have
been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of
the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an
indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the
misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is
inconsequential. The blame may in the final analysis lie with petitioner, yet we should not construe
the rules of procedure to quench an unnecessary thirst to punish at the expense of the intellectual
integrity of the rules. For our ROC do not regard the misjoinder of parties as an error of fatal
consequence, and the logical extension of this principle is to consider those procedural acts or
omissions of misjoined parties as of similar import.
29. Lotte Phils. vs. dela Cruz 166302 28 July 2005
Facts: Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. is a domestic corporation while the
petitioners (respondents herein), are among those who were hired and assigned to the confectionery
facility operated by private respondent. 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services entered into a
contract with private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial and
other services to the latter. In compliance with the terms and conditions of the service contract, and
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to accommodate the needs of private respondent for personnel/workers to do and perform "piece
works," petitioners, among others, were hired and assigned to private respondent as repackers or
sealers. However, private respondent dispensed with their services allegedly due to the
expiration/termination of the service contract by respondent with 7J and were never called back to
work again.
Held/Doctrine: An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a
case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a
court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by
the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the
employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable
with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents.
Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J. In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.
30. National Power Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Bataan 180654 21 April
2014
Facts: Petitioner National Power Corp (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the
respondent Provincial Government of Bataan for ₱45.9 million covering the years 2001-2003 in
which the latter based its assessment on the NPC’s sale of electricity that it generated from two
power plants in Bataan. Rather than pay the tax or reject it, the NPC chose to reserve its right to
contest the computation pending the SC decision in NPC v. City of Cabanatuan, a case where the
issue of the NPC’s exemption from the payment of local franchise tax was then pending. Despite the
notices sent by the respondent of tax due to the NPC, calling its attention to the Court’s Decision in
NPC v. City of Cabanatuan that held the NPC liable for the payment of local franchise tax, which the
NPC replied that it had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted RA
9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26,
2001. The new law relieved the NPC of the function of generating and supplying electricity beginning
that year and that the Province has no right to further assess it for the 2001-2003 local franchise tax.
Held/Doctrine: An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject
 matter and in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before
the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Here, since the subject properties belong to
PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO, they are certainly indispensable parties to the case that must be
necessarily included before it may properly go forward. For this reason, the proceedings below that
held the NPC liable for the local franchise tax is a nullity. It did not matter where the RTC Decision
was appealed, whether before the CA or the CTA.
31. Bulawan vs. Aquende 182819 22 June 2011
Facts: Petitioner Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages
against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the Register of Deeds before the trial court. She claimed that she is
the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733
having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco (Yaptengco
brothers), who claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged that Yap
claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 in Yap’s name
In her Answer, Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of , which she claimed is the controlling
subdivision survey for . Yap also mentioned that the trial court already declared in a civil case that
Psd-153847 was simulated by the Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was
void. The trial court likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap
also stated that Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the Aquende family.
Doctrine: Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment may be
availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is one whose interest
will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation.33 As such, they must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course,
the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present
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32. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque vs. Ebio 178411 23 June 2010
Facts: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek, and that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land
was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro
Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In
1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a
tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then, respondents have been religiously
paying real property taxes for the said property. Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married
Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding
his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations
under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08,
series of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an
access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay and would be traversing the lot
occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate
the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto.
Doctrine: Rule 3; Necessary and Indispensable parties: The State is not a necessary party to an
action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it,
and neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its
rights infringed
Since the petitioners argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of
the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be
considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an
indispensable party to the action.
33. Oposa vs. Factoran 101083 30 July 1993
Facts: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran
Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to Cancel all existing Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing,
or appraising new TLAs;
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes
a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
 benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.The petitioners allege that the continued
refusal by the defendant to cancel the TLAs is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, esp plaintiff
minors, who may be left with a country that is DESERTIFIED, BARE, BARREN, AND DEVOID OF
THE WONDERFUL flora, fauna, and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly
blessed with
Doctrine: One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.
34. Newsweek vs. IAC L-63559 30 May 1986
Facts: The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them
by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's
weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
with impunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate
and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to
put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation
here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their
agricultural workers and of the public in general.
November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state,
much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which
the motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid
cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is
a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982
Doctrine/ruling: This court ruled tha in order to maintain in a libel suit in its essential that the
victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named.
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The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all or
where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to
make each member of the class an actual party. This is a case where each of the plaintiffs has a
separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy
35. Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank L-23136 26 August 1974
RULE 3 (SECTIONS 13 TO 17)
36. Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals 58028 18 April 1989
Facts:
An unpleasant surprise awaited Fausta F. Oh when she reported for work at the Chiang Kai Shek
School in Sorsogon on the first week of July, 1968. She was told she had no assignment for the next
semester. Oh was shocked. She had been teaching in the school since 1932 for a continuous period
of almost 33 years. And now, out of the blue, and for no apparent or given reason, this abrupt
dismissal. Oh sued. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials,
maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the Chiang Kai
Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the
complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily
liable with the school. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
its decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable while
absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, the school then
came to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
Doctrine:
1. Only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action. We hold against the
petitioner on the first question. It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that “only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action.” It is also not
denied that the school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not
prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school.
2. As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section
15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be
sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the
board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent’s
dismissal.
Rule 3 talks about parties to a civil action in the following provisions:
 ● Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party
plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant.
● Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. When two or more persons not
organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued
under the name by which they are generally or commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the persons composing said
entity must all be revealed.
37. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda. De Te 175910 30 July 2009
Facts:
On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-11-07-00608-93 entitled,
Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed
and ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in the amount of P43,606.47. After the Writ of
Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ of
Execution on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff II of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez,
accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck
bearing License Plate No. LBR-514, which at that time was in the possession of Gasing. On July 30,
1996, the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.
Doctrine:
1. Rule 3, Section 16 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies pending hearing of
the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the heirs will still continue to engage the
services of the Attorney-in-fact is another matter, which lies within the sole discretion of the
heirs.
2. In the case of Vergara Sr. vs Suelto, the court rules that the Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with
the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another
are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is
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and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
38. Judge Sumaljag vs. Sps. Diosdidit 149787 18 June 2008
Facts:
On November 16, 1993, Josefa D. Maglasang (“Josefa”) filed with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”),
Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte a complaint for the nullity of the deed of sale of real property purportedly
executed between her as vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the respondent
spouses) as vendees. The complaint alleged that this deed of sale dated October 15, 1971 of Lot
1220-D is spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato (“Menendez”). They
were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal parts of a 6.3906-hectare property (Lot 1220)
passed on to them by their parents Cristito and Inecita Diano Maglasang.
The respondent spouses’ response to the complaint was an amended answer with counterclaim
denying that the deed of sale was falsified. They impleaded the petitioner with Josefa as
counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at the instance of Josefa, occupied Lot
1220-D and Lot 1220-E without their (the respondent spouses’) authority; Lot 1220-E is theirs by
inheritance while 1220-D had been sold to them by Josefa.
Doctrine:
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel.
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
39. Dela Cruz vs. Joaquin 162788 28 July 2005
Facts:
Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in the amount of P9,000 on June 29,
1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation,
he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of land in
Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-111802. The parties also executed
another document entitled “Kasunduan.” Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed
of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was
merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right he
failed to exercise. On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his favor. The trial court declared
 that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. It further held that respondent had
made a valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase.
Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his payment.
Doctrine:
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which
reads thus:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
40. O. Ventanilla Enterprises vs. Tan 180325 20 February 2013
Facts:
Petitioner leased out two of its properties in Cabanatuan City to Alfredo S. Tan and herein private
respondent Adelina S. Tan (the Tans). Due to the failure of the Tans to comply with the terms of the
lease, petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans for cancellation and termination of contract of
lease with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (RTC). On December 10, 1996, the RTC
rendered a Decision in favor of O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation.
Doctrine:
In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the
party’s duty to inform the court of its counsel’s demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact
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shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further, the Court stated: It is
not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or
partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still
alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. They cannot pass the blame to the
court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their
counsel.
41. Torres vs. Rodellas 177836 4 September 2009
Facts:
This case is rooted on a decision of the Office of the President, granting the appeal filed by Balligi
Rodellas. Who was the owner of the subject property which was the subject of the claim herein. The
Office of the President held that the sales application between Ballagi Rodellas and Edwin torres be
rejected and that all persons occupying the subject property by virtue of the sales application of
Edwino be ordered to vacate said property. Atty. Alexander Restor, Edwino’s counsel, filed an MR
and, at the same time, manifested that his client had since passed away, but without actually
intimating the exact date of the latter’s death extinguished his agency relationship with Atty. Restor.
Also, the letter of appointment appended by the petitioners to the Petition for Review cannot cure
Atty. Restor’s lack of authority in filing the Motion for Reconsideration before the Office of the
President.
Doctrine:
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court only provides that, in case of failure of the counsel
to comply with his duty as stated in the first paragraph thereof, it would be a ground for disciplinary
action against said counsel, not that he/she would already be without personality to appear as
counsel in the proceedings for the benefit of his/her client or the latter’s heirs.
Application of Rule 3 in the case:
Nowhere is it mentioned in the instant case when exactly Edwino died. Atty. Restor just informed the
Office of the President of the fact of Edwino’s death in the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5
August 2003 Decision, which he filed on 15 September 2003 on behalf of his deceased client. With
no exact date of Edwino’s death, we have no basis for determining whether Atty. Restor was able to
inform the Office of the President of such fact within the requisite period of 30 days. Nevertheless,
even assuming that Atty. Restor belatedly notified the Office of the President of Edwino’s death,
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court only provided that, in case of failure of the counsel
to comply with his duty as stated in the first paragraph thereof, it would be a ground for disciplinary
action against said counsel, not that he/she would already be without personality to appear as
counsel in the proceedings for the benefit of his/her client or the latter’s heirs.
42. Dagadag vs. Tongnawa 161166-67 3 February 2005
Facts:
 This case is a petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the joint Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals. Rhustom Dagadag was formerly the mayor of the municipality of Tanudan,
Province of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the municipal
engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator, respectively, of the said municipality.
Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent respondents a memorandum ordering them to
explain within 72 hours why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of
public servants and failure to perform their duties. Respondents submitted to petitioner their
respective explanations. The Municipal Grievance Committee found respondents liable for
insubordination, non-performance of duties and absences without official leaves. Petitioner issued an
order suspending respondents from their respective positions for 2 months.
Doctrine:
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules,
means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule
refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.
43. Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals L-58028 18 April 1989
FACTS:
Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a
continuous period of almost 33 years. She was told she had no assignment for the next
semester. For no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed from her work. As a result, shesued
and demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits
and moral and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the Chiang Kai ShekSchool but
when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint
was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily
liable with the school. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, its decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable
while absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
school then came to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
DOCTRINE:
PARTIES IN A CIVIL ACTION; FAILURE OF SCHOOL TO INCORPORATE DOES NOT EXEMPT IT
FROM SUIT AS A JURIDICAL ENTITY. It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied
that the school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private
respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school. As a school, the petitioner was
governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: Unless
exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any private school or college
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recognized by the government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as
the Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of
Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws. Having been recognized by the
government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from
such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed
notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now
invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent's complaint.
RULE 3 (SECTIONS 18 TO 22)
44. Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption From Legal and Filing Fees of the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. AM No. 09-6-9-SC 19 August 2009
FACTS:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote that it be granted the same exemption
from paying docket fees as that of poor litigants.
DOCTRINE:
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to
the litigant’s affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice
to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. The clear intent and precise language of the
aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested
by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and
filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
45. Spouse Algura vs. City of Naga 150135 30 October 2006
FACTS:
Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S. J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint for damages against
the Naga City government and its officers. They alleged that the defendants had caused the illegal
demolition of their residence, thus depriving them of income in the form of monthly rentals amounting
to P7,000 paid by their borders. Accompanying the Complaint was petitioners’ ex parte Motion to
institute action as indigent litigants. To this Motion was appended Antonio Algura’s pay slip showing
a gross monthly income of P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for the month of July 1999. Also
 attached was a certification by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, stating that petitioners
had no property declared in their names for taxation purposes. The city government filed a Motion to
Disqualify the spouses for nonpayment of filing fees. Respondents had asserted that in addition to
the net income of Antonio, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, Lorencita had a
ministore and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence. Allegedly, petitioners were not
indigent litigants, as they also derived additional income from several boarders who paid them
rentals, according to respondents.
Doctrine:
Recapulating the rules in indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary
and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead the court should apply the “indigency test”
under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption
RULE 4 (SECTIONS 1 TO 4)
46. Sps. Ang vs. Sps. Ang 186993 22 August 2012
Facts:
Petitioner and respondents (both surnamed Ang) entered into a contract of loan with respondents as
debtors. Respondents executed a promissory note with a stipulated interest of 10%. However,
despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners. A complaint for collection
of sum of money was filed with the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of improper venue. They asserted that the complaint against them may
only be filed in the court of the place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that
they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA.
Doctrine:
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an
action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’
complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily
seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file
his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is
commenced.However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case
may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.
47. Marcos-Araneta vs. Court of Appeals 154096 22 August 2008
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FACTS:
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business
associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and
Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively. Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both
corporations were organized pursuant to a contract whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his
name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with
the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of
65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
Doctrine:
Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest
convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must
be raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived.
48. Universal Robina Corporation vs. Lim 154338 5 October 2007
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of sale where Universal Robina sold to Lim
grocery products.
It was allegedly stipulated in that contract that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the
transaction is Quezon City.
Lim tendered partial payments, but refused to pay the balance despite petitioner’s repeated
demands.
Held/Doctrine:
In personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her residence
or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which
could be in a place where neither of them resides.
Improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived.
The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription.
49. United Overseas Bank vs. Rosemoore Mining and Development 159669 12 March
 2007
51. Spouses Lantin vs. Lantion 160053 28 August 2006
Facts:
Facts:
Rosemoore executed a mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank Phils. (Hereon Bank)
which covered six (6) parcels of land all registered under Rosemoor. Petitioners took several peso and dollar loans from respondent Bank and executed several real
estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. Petitioners defaulted on the payments so
Rosemoor defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. the respondent bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties. Petitoners filed a case in RTC Lipa but
PR moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue since the loan agreements
Rosemoor filed 2 cases before the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing of 2 restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.
actions in 2 different courts)
Doctrine:

Doctrine:
The Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the
title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or part thereof lies.
The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a
contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is
in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
50. San Luis vs. San Luis 133743 6 February 2007
Facts:
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo's estate which she then filed a letters of administration in RTC Makati.
However, petitioners, children of feliscimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Under Section 4(b) or the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall
not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed
as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
52. Saludo vs. American Express International, Inc. 159507 19 April 2006
Facts:
Saludo filed a complaint for damages against AMEX. Respondents specifically denied the
allegations in the complaint and they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and
improper venue because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte.
Doctrine:
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also... personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."

They aver that letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because
53. Hyatt Elevators vs. Goldstar Elevators 161026 24 October 2005
this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death.
Facts: Hyatt filed a case for unfair trade practices and damages against LG industrial systems Co.
Doctrine:
Ltd, and LG International Corporation, alleging that it was appointed as the exclusive distributor of
Under rules of court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
LG elevators and escalators in the Philippines under Distributorship Agreement. LG then filed a
filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
motion to dismiss alleging that lack of jurisdiction over the persons of defendant, improper venue
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
and failure to state a cause of action.
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
Doctrine: The place where the principal office of a corporation is located, as stated in the articles of
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 incorporation, establishes its residence. The requirement to state in the articles the place where the
principal office of the corporation is to be located is not a meaningless requirement. To insist that the
proper venue is the actual principal office and not that stated in the Articles of Incorporation would
create a confusion.
54. Diaz vs. Adiong 106847 5 March 1993
Facts: This is a simple civil action for damages arising from libel against a public officer, and the
issue was whether venue was improperly laid.
Doctrine: An action for libel against public officers may only be prosecuted in either:
(1) place where he holds office; or
(2) where the libelous article was 1st published and printed.
However, when a defendant files his answer, he submits jurisdiction to the court. The proper defense
is to timely challenge the venue in a motion to dismiss.
55. Nocum vs. Tan 145022 23 September 2005
Facts: Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo
Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with
the RTC of Makati, for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
The defendants alleged that the venue was improperly laid. It appeared that the complaint failed to
state the residence of the defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and the
place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Doctrine: The question of venue only involves where the article was published, but jurisdiction is
dictated by the facts alleged in the complaint.
56. Phil. Banking Corp. vs. Tensuan 106920 10 December 1993
Facts: Petitioners fled complaint with RTC Makati. However, private respondents are saying the
promissory notes which the complaint is based on says they submit to jurisdiction of RTC Manila so
improper venue laid.
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Doctrine: Venue may be agreed upon by the parties. A stipulation as to laying of venue must be
made in writing, and is determined by the intent of the parties manifesting the words employed by
them and where such words are less than clear, in order recognized indicators of the will of the
contracting parties. A stipulation requiring or compelling the parties to lay venue of an action in a
specified place, refers to that particular place only – it must clearly indicate, through qualifying and
restrictive words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from the
operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, and that they intended contractually to
designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other court. The only limitation to stipulation on
venue is reasonableness and public policy
57. Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals 125027 12 August 2002
Facts: summons was not served on the petitioner Mangila as the latter had transferred her residence
and left the Philippines for Guam. This was taken as a means of defrauding her creditors, so the trial
court rendered an adverse decision against her.
Doctrine: When the stipulation to venue fails to indicate exclusivity, the general rule applies. The
general rule is venue in personal actions is “where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” A
sole proprietorship does not have the separate juridical entity which a corporation possesses and
entitling it to residence. With this, a case filed against a sole proprietorship must be filed against the
proprietor – so his residence governs.
58. Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 119657 7 February 1997
Facts: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines and Unimasters Conglomeration entered into a Dealership
Agreement which contained a stipulation that all suits arising out of this agreement shall be filed with
the proper Courts of Quezon City. Later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against
Kubota, etc. Kubota filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue.
Doctrine: Parties may, by stipulation, waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective
being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third
persons. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed
only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in
the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
PART 3
Held/Ruling:
LORRY 1-7 Completed The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling
how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
MAE 8-14 Completed application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is
MICH 15-20 Completed not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.
JANAH 21-27 Completed
The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing only
GIAN 28-33 Completed after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.
NADAYAG 34-39 Completed

GIANT 40-45 Completed 2. Pascual vs. Jovellanos AM No. MTJ-02-1429 4 October 2002

TEJADA 46-51 Completed Pascual filed a complaint for forcible entry but it was dismissed without prejudice for being
insufficient in some material allegations. She filed another civil case. Instead of filing an answer,
GIA 52-57 Completed defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in the complaint are false.
After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for
CABIGTING 58-63 Completed Summary Judgment. She alleges that Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to
Strike Out. Inspite, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing and the respondent
ALEX 64-69 Completed Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant.

UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS (Rule 5, Sections 1 and 2)
Section 1. Uniform procedure. - The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in
the Regional Trial Courts, except:
(a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or
(b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Section 2. Meaning of terms. - The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
1. De Lima vs. Gatdula 204528 19 February 2013
Respondent Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo against De Lima, et al. "to
cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of
Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident.”
Ruling/Doctrine:
Municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. They are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judicial competence requires no less.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a judgment
subjects the defaulting judge to administrative sanctions. The Rule frowns upon delays and
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension.
Judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence
presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of 10 days from
the service of the summons. Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, even
motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. Under
Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within 30 days from
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them. He has
not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 15, 1999, filed in accordance
with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Does the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo? 3. Lucas vs. Fabros AM No. MTJ-99-1266 31 January 2000

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 Petitioner was a defendant in a civil case. She alleged that Judge Fabros issued an Order granting
the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of a previous, which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff
and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference. It is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of
the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent
judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration
Ruling/Doctrine:
a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
"SECTION 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule. xxx xxx xxx (c) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial.”
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on
the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15,
1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment
rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously
not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such
order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she
guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the
present complaint.
KINDS OF PLEADINGS (Rule 6, Sections 1 to 13)
4. Mongao vs. Pryce Properties 156474 16 August 2005
The parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Mongao agreed to sell to the
responden a parcel of land but the latter continuously refused to heed petitioners' written and oral
demands to pay the balance solely to petitioner Mongao. The complaint by petitioner Mongao denied
the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent. Petitioners pray for the
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale and the forfeiture of the
earnest money.
Ruling/Doctrine:
The records reveal that respondent corporation did not file any formal complaint for consignation but
merely deposited the check with the Clerk of Court. A formal complaint must be commenced with the
trial court to provide the proper venue for the determination if there is a valid tender of payment.
Strictly speaking, without the institution of an action for tender of payment and consignation, the trial
court cannot rule on whether or not respondent was justified in not effecting payment solely to
petitioner Mongao.
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Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer "fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading." The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if
it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of
Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings not only where it
expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all.
If an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in the manner
indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter
which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6,
a judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper. Thus, there is joinder of issues when the
answer makes a specific denial of the material allegations in the complaint or asserts affirmative
defenses which would bar recovery by the plaintiff. Where there is proper joinder of issues, the trial
court is barred from rendering judgment based only on the pleadings filed by the parties and must
conduct proceedings for the reception of evidence.
On the other hand, an answer fails to tender an issue where the allegations admit the allegations in
support of the plaintiff's cause of action or fail to address them at all. In either case, there is no
genuine issue and judgment on the pleadings is proper. Petitioners' action for rescission is mainly
based on the alleged breach by respondent corporation of its contractual obligation under the
Memorandum of Agreement when respondent refused to effect payment of the purchase price solely
to petitioner Mongao. (Note: do not contest execution of said contract and no specific denial in the
answer)
Note: An answer may allege affirmative defenses which may strike down the plaintiff's cause of
action. It is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but
one which, if established, will be a good defense. Affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
5. Dio vs. SBMA 189532 11 June 2014
SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute before the RTC against petitioners HSE and Dio. SBME
alleged that HSE unjustly refused to pay the balance of its unpaid subscription effectively
jeopardizing the company's expansion project and dissuading local investors and financial
institutions from putting in capital to SBME by imputing defamatory acts against Desmond. CA
dismissed the case for failure of respondents to file an answer. Petitioners went back to the RTC to
file a motion to set their counterclaims for hearing which was opposed by the respondents on the
ground that the filing of the compulsory counterclaims was not accompanied by payment of the
required docket fees precluding the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
 Ruling/Doctrine:
Petitioners here raise the solitary issue of the propriety of the dismissal of their counterclaim on the
basis of the reasoning of the lower court that the counterclaim derives its jurisdictional support from
the complaint which has already been dismissed. The dismissal of the complaint resulted from
respondents' failure to append to the complaint a copy of the board resolution authorizing Desmond
to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of SBME. The subsequent dismissal of the
counterclaim, in turn, erroneously proceeded from the ratio that since the main action has already
been dismissed with finality by the appellate court, the lower court has lost its jurisdiction to grant
any relief under the counterclaim.
The nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure
result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of
the court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor
under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the
court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief
thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court's authority to proceed with
the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the
counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based
on its own merits and evidentiary support.
6. Padilla vs. Globe Asiatique 207376 6 August 2014
Note: The relevant facts are explained in the ruling.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. In the
nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and independent cause of action which, though alleged in the
answer, is not part of the answer.
(Section 7, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides) A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature
thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
In this case, petitioner's counterclaim for damages raised in her answer before the Pasig City RTC is
compulsory, alleging suffering and injury caused to her as a consequence of the unwarranted filing of
the baseless complaint filed by respondents. Said court, however, dismissed her counterclaim upon
the same ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution supposedly would entail passing upon the
validity of orders and processes still pending before the Pasay City RTC.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the
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complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action".
To simplify, if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then
the counterclaim cannot survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of
action then it should stand independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having
been directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by reason of the
unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed, we rule in the
affirmative.
While respondent's Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well
already incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to
engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of
the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause of
action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of respondent's complaint.
Petitioner, already burdened by the damages and attorney's fees it may have incurred in the present
case, must again incur more damages and attorney's fees in pursuing a separate action, when, in
the first place, it should not have been involved in any case at all. Since petitioner's counterclaim is
compulsory in nature and its cause of action survives that of the dismissal of respondent's complaint,
then it should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
7. Bungcayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Properties 170483 19 April 2010
Petitioner, alleging undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, filed an action for declaration of nullity of
contract before the RTC, alleging that his son had no authority to represent him, hence the deed was
void & not binding. Respondent alleged that petitioner's sons, Manuel, Jr. and Romel, attended the
luncheon meeting on their own volition and they were able to talk to their parents through a cellular
phone before they accepted respondent's offer. Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the
case submitted for resolution on summary judgment.
Ruling/Doctrine:
No compulsory counterclaim
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim, absent the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's
counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
Test of compulsoriness: if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the
counterclaim.
 There exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the
multiple claims involve the same factu
On summary judgement
Requisites for summary judgment to be proper:
(1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. No genuine issue to material fact.
A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine. Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary
judgment has been properly rendered in this case.
8. Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.
20 January 2016
The petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money in the RTC against the respondent in connection
with the former's delivery and installation of medical equipment and supplies to the latter, which the
respondent moved to dismiss, but such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioner filed its
"Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings", stating that the respondent had admitted the
material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The
respondent opposed motion, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the
complaint. The RTC denied the motion for judgment based on the pleadings, and the CA ruled that
a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the
petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for
rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.
Doctrine:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are
considered. It is an error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because
the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court:
Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading.
. certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
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9. Vallacar Transit Inc vs. Jocelyn Catubig 175512 30 May 2011
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus
driven by Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla), employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner. Following
a collision between the bus, driven by Cabanilla, and the motorcycle that respondent's husband
(Catubig) and his employee (Emperado) were riding which resulted in the latter two people's death, a
charge of reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide was filed against the former. The
petitioner moved to dismiss the respondent's complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to
state a cause of action, as there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or
supervision of its employee driver.
DOCTRINE: Verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it
and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
207970
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, a party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is
different from the party’s failure to personally sign the verification. The certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the
petition defective.
10. Chua vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 182311 19 August 2009
After obtaining a P4M loan secured by REM on parcels of land, the petitioners were given an open
credit line by respondent Metrobank, and thus the petitioners obtained other loans from them, bu
unfortunately eventually failed to pay off, prompting Respondent Metrobank to extrajudicially
foreclose the REM constituted on the lands. In this case, the petitioners eventually committed forum
shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different prayers.
DOCTRINE: Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
 grounds for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.
Note: in this case, the court did not consider the filing of the second case as deliberate commission
of forum shopping because the petitioners moved for the consolidation of both cases.
11. Zarsona Medical vs. PHIC 191225 13 October 2014
A complaint was filed against petitioner Zarsona Medical Clinic (ZMC) for violation of Section 149 of
the Revised IRR of RA 7875 or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. When the CA directed
petitioner to rectify within 5 days of notice the deficiencies in the petition, ZMC filed its compliance
and attached the required documents including the SPA executed by Dr. Leandro Zarsona, Jr. (Dr.
Zarsona) in favor of Dr. Bragat and William Bragat. The CA dismissed the petition for failure on the
part of ZMC to attach a valid SPA. The CA found the SPA defective on the ground that it does not
explicitly authorize Dr. Bragat to sign and execute the required verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in this case.
DOCTRINE: Take note that in this case, the SPA was deemed sufficient as The Court chose to apply
liberality because of the substantial merit of the petition and ruled in favor of DMC despite the defect
in the SPA. It agreed on the dissent by the CA Associate Justice when he suggested that ZMC
should be given the opportunity to rectify the defects in the petition, and that ZMC complied in good
faith
Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance
that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith orare true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there
is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons." Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of the Court, requires that the
certification should be signed by the "petitioner or principal party" himself. The rationale behind this
is "because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies."
12. Anderson vs. Ho 172590 7 January 2013
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Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho (Ho) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, Anderson’s counsel filed the Petition but the certification against
forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him on Anderson’s behalf without any
accompanying authority to do so. The petition for review was dismissed because of this, and so
Anderson filed a Motion for reconsideration, explaining in the Affidavit that at the time the petition
was filed, her health condition hindered her from going to the proper authority to execute the
necessary SPA so she just verbally instructed her lawyer to draft the petition and cause the filing of
the same. The issue was whether or not the relaxation of the rules on certification against forum
shopping should be granted
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its
subsequent correction.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the
principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. However, if a petitioner is
unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA
designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by
counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal
of the petition.
13. Vda. De Formoso vs. PNB 154704 1 June 2011
The Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties in this case to Malcaba through a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Malcaba (person granted SPA) and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan
obligation of Nellie Formoso's late husband to PNB. PNB refused to accept the tender of payment,
so a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB was filed by the petitioners. The RTC denied
the petition, and when it reached the CA, it was likewise dismissed because the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr. Primitivo Macalba) of the many
petitioners.
DOCTRINE: Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as
 a cause for administrative sanctions
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act
on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
14. Metrobank vs. Santos 157867 15 December 2009
Metrobank foreclosed and purchased a condominium unit owned by De Koning after the latter failed
to pay for a loan to the former. After De Koning’s refusal to turn over possession of the condo unit,
Metrobank filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the property. De Koning filed an
MTD on the ground that Metrobank did not attach a certification against non forum shopping to its
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petition.
Doctrine: A certification against non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or in any other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is neither of the two - it is merely a motion. Therefore, it does not require such a
certification.
15. Argallon-Jocson and Tusing vs. Court of Appeals 162836 30 July 2009
Petitioner filed a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel Corporation and
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), where the court ruled in favor of petitioner and issued
a writ of execution which provides that properties of MSC were levied in full satisfaction of the
judgment debt. Midas Corp filed a third-party claim, alleging that some of the levied properties were
previously mortgaged to Midas Corp. However, the sheriffs proceeded with the execution of sale and
sold the properties of MSC in favor of petitioner Tuising who was the highest bidder which prompted
Jocson to file a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Break-Open Order and Petition for
Contempt of Court and MSC to file an Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion, praying for the annulment
of the execution sale and for the issuance of an order directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the
properties sold to Tuising pending resolution of Marcelo Steel Corporation’s motion where trial court
issued an order declaring the execution sale of the properties null and void and the Certificate of
Sale set aside and cancelled.
DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Efvery pleading must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect.—The Court
notes that the petition supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and Tuising was not signed by Jocson’s
counsel. It was Tuising’s counsel who signed in behalf of Jocson’s counsel. Tuising’s counsel had no
authority to sign the petition in behalf of Jocson.
The lack of a certification against forum shopping or a defective certification is generally not curable
by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special
circumstances or for compelling reasons.—Only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for
Non-Forum Shopping. Jocson did not sign the Verification and Certification. A pleading required to
be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct to his knowledge and belief.
Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athena’s
duly authorized representative.
16. Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 149660 20 January 2009
 Private respondent was hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant by Manila Resource
Development Corporation (MRDC). She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed
on the ground that private respondent is merely a project employee, petition was then dismissed
upon appeal before the CA on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution
authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
invokes substantial justice as justification for a reversal of the resolution of the CA and contends that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum shopping attached
constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement.
DOCTRINE: Certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance
applies only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its presence in the pleading
wherein it is required. Petitioner’s contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an
appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely
specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required:
to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve
similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.
17. Cagayan Valley vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 151413 13 February 2008
Petitioner, Cagayan Valley, is a Philippine corporation duly licensed as a retailer of medicine and
other pharmaceutical products. petitioner filed with the BIR a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full
amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995. Upon dismissal by
CTA, CA likewise dismissed the petition holding that the person who signed the verification and
certification of absence of forum shopping failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the
board of directors to do so.
DOCTRINE: With respect to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5, Rule 7 on
certification against forum shopping are silent as to who the authorized signatory should be as the
rules do not indicate if the submission of a board resolution authorizing the officer or representative
is necessary.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that petitioner substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board resolution has been
submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in Lepanto with the rationale
that the President of the petitioner is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition. Third, the President of petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA
at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax credit
18. Fuentebella vs. Castro 150865 30 June 2006
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Respondent engaged the funeral services of petitioner for the interment of the remains of her
husband however, the latter did not do its obligation properly when it incorrectly measured the casket
which resulted to humiliation on the part respondent so respondent filed a complaint for damages
against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge, Art Fuentebella before the MTC. RTC and CA
dismissed the petitioner’s petition on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements on
certification and verification on forum shopping. MR was filed by petitioner attaching secretary
certificate signed by Corporate Secretary of petitioner corporation, affirming therein the authority of
Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the aforementioned petition.
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 7, Sec. 5 of ROC mandates that the petitioner
or the principal party must execute the certification against forum shopping for the reason that it is
the principal party who has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving
the same case or substantially the same issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the
petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. The Supreme Court
enunciated that this requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a
distinction between natural and juridical persons. Where the petitioner is a corporation, the
certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or
representative. where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that only one of them executes
the certification, absent a showing that he was so authorized by the others for the certification
requires personal knowledge and it cannot be presumed that the signatory knew that his
co-petitioners had the same or similar actions filed or pending. Hence, a certification which had been
signed without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of
the petition as in the case at bar
19. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Santos 152579 4 August 2009
Private respondents to file complaints with NLRC against petitioner for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized salary deductions. Petitioner then filed a third
party-complaint against private respondent ASBT International Management Service Inc where
NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. ASBT filed a a petition for certiorari with CA which was denied on
the ground that the attached Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by
Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without any proof of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in
the proceedings but upon filing MR with CA, it ruled in favor of ASBT.
DOCTRINE: Rule 7, Section 3 of the Amended Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. An unsigned pleading produces no
legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.
 In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration on its
behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBT’s
Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings
cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect. This is without regard to whether or not
Mildred R. Santos was a standing member of the Philippine Bar.
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS (Rule 8, Sections 1 to 13)
20. Eliza Zuniga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran 197380 8 October 2014
Petitioner, through her authorized representative, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and
revocation of title against respondents. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the
Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to
be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth. RTC granted it and
dismissed the Complaint for its failure to state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale
sought to be nullified is an “essential and indispensable part of Zuñiga-Santos’ cause of action”
which was not attached.
DOCTRINE: Rule 8, Section 1, of the Rules of Court states that every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the
evidence on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be.
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
21. Lazaro vs. Brewmaster International 182779 23 August 2010
Facts: Photocopies of sales invoices indicating the amount of the goods purchased showed that
they were sold to “TOTAL” and received by a certain Daniel Limuco.
RTC agreed with the MeTC that respondent failed to submit any evidence proving that petitioner and
her husband were liable for the obligation. The RTC disregarded the documents attached to the
memorandum on the ground that admission of such additional evidence would be offensive to the
basic rule of fair play and would violate the other party’s right to due process.
Held/Doctrine:
The sales invoices are not actionable documents.
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As it is with a petitioner in a civil action, no relief can likewise be awarded to a respondent if his
complaint does not state a cause of action. The basic requirement under the rules of procedure
is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the plaintiff relies for his claim.
Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the
plaintiff’s primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.
22. Vda. de Daffon vs. CA 129017 20 August 2002
Facts: Respondent Lourdes, together with her six children, instituted an action for partition against
petitioner over the properties left by Amado which formed part of his conjugal partnership with
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of Osmeña’s failure to state a cause of
action in her complaint which was denied.
Held/Doctrine:
It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of
action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the
ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their
claim.
23. Canete vs. Genuino Ice Co. 154080 22 January 2008
Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title to property. They alleged that said titles
are spurious, fictitious and were issued “under mysterious circumstances.” Petitioners filed a
“Second Amended Complaint.” Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on
the ground, among others, that the complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the
allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in interest who may bring suit to cancel
defendants’ (including respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer of the complaint,
no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted.
Held/Doctrine:
 Rule 8, Section 5 of the Amended Rules of Court provide that in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better
established than that which requires the complaint to contain a statement of all the facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
24. Steelcase vs. Design International 171995 18 April 2012
Facts: Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted
DISI the right to market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user customers within
the Philippines. Steelcase filed a complaint for a sum of money against DISI alleging that DISI had
an unpaid account of US$600,000. DISI alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
and to contain the required allegations on Steelcase’s capacity to sue in the Philippines despite the
fact that it (Steelcase) was doing business in the Philippines without the required license to do so.
Held/Doctrine:
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license may still sue before
the Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their
contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging
the personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering
into a contract with it.
25. Luistro vs. CA 158819 16 April 2009
Facts: Respondent entered into a Contract of Easement of Right-of-Way with petitioner Antero
Luistro. Petitioner’s counsel wrote a letter to respondent’s president asking for a temporary stoppage
of all kinds of work within the vicinity of petitioner’s residential house. Luistro alleged that he entered
into the Contract under misrepresentation, promises, false and fraudulent assurances, and tricks of
respondent First Gas Power Corporation.
Held/Doctrine:
Fraud must be stated with particularity. Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states:
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
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26. Titan Construction vs. David 169548 15 March 2010
Facts: Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan before
the, alleging that the sale was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void. Titan claimed
that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney, which
authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Titan thus prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.
Held/Doctrine:
The failure of Manuel to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the notarized SPA is
NOT an implied agreement to the veracity of the document. Titan is deemed to have waived the
mantle of protection given by Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8.
Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8, of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a
written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in
the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading.
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed
to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation
should be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a
just determination of the disputed issues.
27. Consolidated Bank vs. Del Monte Motor Works 143338 29 July 2005
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents, alleging that it
extended in favor of respondents a loan. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the
full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.
Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed by the
defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of
 petitioner’s complaint.
Held/Doctrine:
Effect of failure to make specific denials General rule: Material averments in a pleading asserting a
claim or claims shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
Rule 8, Section 8, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. – When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
28. Guevarra vs. Eala 7136 1 August 2007
BRIEF FACTS:
1. Guevara filed a complaint for Disbarment against Eala for grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath
2. Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th
Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with the respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
3. Eala specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and
low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment
DOCTRINE/ HELD:
● a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments
it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
● A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of
Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate,
Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
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denied being the father of the child.
29. Halimao vs. Villanueva A.C. 3825 1 February 1996
BRIEF FACTS:
1. a complaint for disbarment against Attorneys Daniel Villanueva and Inocencio Ferrer, Jr., for
serious misconduct which originated from a letter that complainant Reynaldo Halimao wrote
to the Chief Justice, alleging that respondents, without lawful authority and armed with
armalites and handguns, forcibly entered the Oo Kian Tiok Compound in Cainta, Rizal, of
which complainant was caretaker.
2. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors. His motion was referred to the Court in view of the fact that the records of the
case had earlier been forwarded to the Court.
3. In his aforesaid motion, complainant contends that by filing a motion to dismiss the
complaint in this case, private respondents must be deemed to have hypothetically admitted
the material allegations in the complaint and, therefore, private respondents must be
deemed to have confessed to the charge of serious misconduct. Hence, it was error for the
IBP to dismiss his complaint.
DOCTRINE/ HELD:
The rule that a motion to dismiss is to be considered as a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the complaint applies more particularly to cases in which the ground for dismissal is the failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action. When it appears on the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under the facts alleged, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint. By filing such a motion, the defendant in
effect says that even assuming the facts to be as alleged by the plaintiff, the latter has failed to prove
that he has a right which the former has violated. The rule does not unqualifiedly apply to a case
where the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction of the court or tribunal
over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter or over the nature of the action; or on
improper venue; or on lack of capacity to sue of the plaintiff or on litis pendentia, res judicata,
prescription, unenforceability, or on the allegation that the suit is between members of the same
family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
30. Pacsport Inc Phils vs. Niccolo Sports 141602 22 November 2001
BRIEF FACTS:
Pacsports Phils., Inc. (PPI), petitioner, is the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of sports
products manufactured by Bridgestone Sports Company of Japan and Cross Creek International of
the United States.
Petitioner PPI and Niccolo Sports, Inc. (NSI), respondent, entered into two (2) separate Exclusive
Retail Agreements by virtue of which petitioner supplied respondent, on consignment basis, assorted
 Bridgestone and Cross Creek golf products to be sold by the latter in its outlet situated at Shangri-La
Plaza.
Petitioner PPI claimed that after months of operation, respondent's obligations to it amounted to
about P1.5 Million. Despite demand, respondent failed to pay, and eventually it pre-terminated the
contracts.
The appellate court granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
99-221 pending before the Makati RTC on the ground that the Quezon City case involves a broader
scope of inquiry as it goes to the pith of the controversy, which is the pre-termination of the
agreement. Hence, the present Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals
DOCTRINE/ DECISION
The case in quezon City should be dismissed by reason of litis pendentia
The firmly established rule is that one of two actions will be dismissed on ground of litis pendentia if
the following requisites concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that judgment in one
would amount to res judicata in the other.
In this case, the parties concede that the Makati City case and the Quezon City case involve the
same parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, being founded on the same facts (all based on
the validity of the pre-termination of the Exclusive Retail Agreement).; and that judgment in one
would constitute res judicata on the other. Because of the concurrence of these similarities,
petitioner and respondent sought the abatement of each other's suit on the ground of litis pendentia.
This Court held that when the elements of litis pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated
to avoid multiplicity of suits. This is based on the maxim Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure (He
who is before in time is the better in right). This is the general rule.
31. Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Corp. 131471 22 January 2003
BRIEF FACTS;
Petitioner Carmelita Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with
respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Through the SLDA, private respondent subleased
to petitioner a gasoline station located in Caloocan City. In a letter dated June 14, 1995, respondent
notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring on July 31, 1995
The Court, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the order of the trial court
dismissing the petition for declaratory relief on the ground of litis pendentia. Hence, the present
petition
DOCTRINE/ HELD:
The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for filing the answer is not
absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the
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following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, and (4)
discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. Litis pendentia is also
one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of actions and that the second
action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. We have set the relevant factors that a court must
consider when it has to determine which case should be dismissed given the pendency of two
actions. These are: "(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be
retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter action
or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties." The mere fact that the action for
declaratory relief was filed earlier than the case for unlawful detainer does not necessarily mean that
the first case will be given preference.
32. Sunville Timber Products Inc vs. Abad 85502 24 February 1992
BRIEF FACTS:
The petitioner Sunville Timber Products Inc was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA),
authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares
of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur
The petitioner moved to dismiss on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied both the motion to dismiss on and the motion for reconsideration.
DOCTRINE/HELD:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in
lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal
of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the
objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the
doctrine had been observed. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments
33. Hacienda Bigaa Inc. vs. Chavez 174160 20 April 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas a
complaint for ejectment (forcible entry) and damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction
against respondent Epifanio V. Chavez
 The MTC rendered a decision dismissing Hacienda Bigaa's complaint, citing that the elements of
res judicata are present. It recognized that under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, res
judicata merely requires an identity of issue, not an absolute identity of causes of action.
DOCTRINE/HELD:
This provision on res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata absolutely bars
any subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (a) the former judgment or order was
final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was rendered by a court that
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first and the second
actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the
second concept — i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule bars the
re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different
claims or causes of action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question
has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to
that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely
motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in
any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the
same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former
judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising
in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the
ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order
becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and
successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability
of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been
resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.
34. Chu vs. Sps. Cunanan 156185 12 September 2011
Facts: Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage involving their five parcels of land in Pampanga, in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan
(Cunanan) for the consideration of P5,161,090.00. They also executed a side agreement, whereby
they clarified that Cunanan had paid only P1,000,000.00 to the Chus despite the Chus having
acknowledged receiving P5,161,090.00 and further stipulated that the ownership of the lots would
remain with the Chus until payment is complete and terms of the deed of sale with assumption of
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mortgage is complied. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the
knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of
the purchase price to the Chus.
Held/Doctrine: If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and
then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis-à-vis the five lots were all defined and governed
by the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was
single and indivisible, as far as they were concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly
proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the silence of the compromise
agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and
damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single
cause of action the basis of several suits
35. Galindo vs. Heirs of Roxas 147969 17 January 2005
Facts: Gregorio was the owner of the lot and still paid for it through installments to the government,
which his heirs thereafter sold the lot to Marciano A. Roxas after he died.. Urbano Galindo, being
then a minor, did not sign the document. In the said document, the signatories thereto obligated
themselves to transfer the land to Marciano A. Roxas as soon as it would become feasible to do so,
and as security that Urbano Galindo would ratify the same upon reaching the age of majority. To
guarantee that Urbano will sign, the Galindo heirs also gave Lot 833 as security but the possession
will remain with the Galindos. In 1931, Urbano executed an affidavit signifying his conformity to the
sale executed by his brother and sisters of lot 1048.
Held/Doctrine: In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual
legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as
either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that
person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative
character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but
who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
36. Swedish Match vs. CA 128120 20 October 2004
Facts: Respondents' failure to submit their final bid on the deadline set by petitioners prevented the
 perfection of the contract of sale. It was not perfected due to the absence of one essential element
which was the price certain in money or its equivalent. Respondents insist that even on the
assumption that the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this case, the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint altogether and pointed out that the complaint presents several causes of action.
Held/Doctrine: A close examination of the complaint reveals that it alleges two distinct causes of
action, the first is for specific performance premised on the existence of the contract of sale, while
the other is solely for damages, predicated on the purported dilatory maneuvers executed by the
Phimco management.
With respect to the first cause of action for specific performance, Respondents claimed that
petitioners were guilty of promissory estoppel, warranty breaches and tortious conduct in refusing to
honor the alleged contract of sale. These averments are predicated on or at least interwoven with
the existence or perfection of the contract of sale. As there was no such perfected contract, the trial
court properly rejected the averments in conjunction with the dismissal of the complaint for specific
performance. However, respondents' second cause of action due to the alleged malicious and
deliberate delay of the Phimco management in the delivery of documents necessary for the
completion of the audit on time, not being based on the existence of the contract of sale, could stand
independently of the action for specific performance and should not be deemed barred by the
dismissal of the cause of action predicated on the failed contract. If substantiated, this cause of
action would entitle respondents to the recovery of damages against the officers of the corporation
responsible for the acts complained of.
Thus, the Court cannot forthwith order dismissal of the complaint without affording respondents an
opportunity to substantiate their allegations with respect to its cause of action for damages against
the officers of Phimco based on the latter's alleged self-serving dilatory maneuvers.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD (Rule 9, Sections 1 to 3) AND WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE
PLEADINGS (Rule 11, Sections 1 to 11)
• Sections 5, 6 and 9 of The 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
• Sections 9, 11,12, 13 and 14 of the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
37. Heirs of Favis Sr. vs. Gonzales 185922 15 January 2014
Facts: Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven children and took Juana as his
common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano) after Capitolina died.
When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging
Mariano as one of his legitimate children, who had four children. Dr. Favis died intestate leaving his
properties, however, on October 1994, Dr. Favis allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring
and conveying two of his properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Held/Doctrine: The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the
statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
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failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure
assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the
rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to
respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer
to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts
at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu
propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
38. Carniyan vs. Home Guaranty Corporation 228516 14 August 2019
Facts: Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Edilberto, Ricardo, and Sherly, all surnamed Carniyan (the petitioners), seeking their eviction from a
portion of a 7,113-square meter parcel of land situated in Constitution Hills, Quezon City. Instead of
filing an answer, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and subsequently, a Motion to Archive the
Case as May Be Possible in Lieu of Dismissal. In the former, the petitioners argued that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to resolve the complaint (1) due to the fact that HGC has not yet acquired ownership
over the contested property; and (2) because the assessed value thereof fell below P400,000.00, the
alleged jurisdictional amount of civil actions filed in Metro Manila.
Held/Doctrine: An order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory, as opposed to
a final, order. This classification is vital because it is determinative of the remedy available to the
aggrieved party. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
"interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Resort may be had to a petition for
certiorari only in the absence of an appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that no judgment had yet been rendered a quo, the petitioners,
pursuant to Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, should have filed a motion to lift the order
declaring them in default.
39. Otero vs. Tan 200134 15 August 2012
Facts: A Complaint for collection of sum of money and damages was filed by Roger Tan (Tan) with
against Roberto Otero (Otero) alleging that on several occasions from February 2000 to May 2001,
Otero purchased on credit petroleum products from his Petron outlet in Bukidnon and further claimed
that despite several verbal demands, Otero failed to settle his obligation. Despite receipt of the
summons and a copy of the said complaint, which per the records of the case below were served
through his wife Grace R. Otero, Otero failed to file his answer with the MTCC which then prompted
Tan to file a motion with the MTCC to declare Otero in default for his failure to file his answer. Otero
opposed Tan’s motion, claiming that he did not receive a copy of the summons and a copy of Tan’s
complaint. Hearing on the said motion was set on January 25, 2006, but was later reset to March 8,
2006, Otero manifesting that he only received the notice therefor on January 23, 2006. The hearing
on March 8, 2006 was further reset to April 26, 2006 since the presiding judge was attending a
 convention, however, Otero failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing and the MTCC issued an
order declaring him in default, which copy of the said order was sent to Otero on May 9, 2006 and
Tan was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Held/Doctrine: A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court
in default. Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary, is the consequence of an order of default.
A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or
cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the
court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him. Indeed, a defending party
declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default. However, the grounds
that may be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, the failure of the
plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law;
and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. In these
cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of evidence that were presented by the
plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of his evidence
40. David vs. Gutierrez-Fruelda 170427 30 January 2009
Service of summons failed because the petitioner was abroad. The RTC ordered service by
publication. Thereafter, private respondents moved that petitioner be declared in default since he
failed to answer within 60 days from date of last publication. Petitioner filed a motion for extension of
15 days within which to file Answer, with opposition to the motion to declare him in default, arguing
that declarations of default are frowned upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present
evidence in the interest of substantial justice, and that he has meritorious defenses.
Ruling/Doctrine:
Petitioner’s voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of summons. It has cured any alleged
defect in the service of summons. The petitioner's motions were not motions to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. On the contrary, the motions invoked
the RTC's jurisdiction while seeking the following affirmative reliefs: to grant extension, deny the
motion to declare petitioner in default and lift the order of default. Thus, petitioner waived any defect
in the service of summons by publication or even want of process because for the RTC to validly act
on his motions, it necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Default orders are not viewed with favor. But in this case, the petitioner failed to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The motion was not under oath.
There was no allegation that petitioner's failure to file an Answer or any responsive pleading was due
to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Petitioner merely stated that declarations of
default are frowned upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in the interest
of substantial justice, and that he has meritorious defenses. Unfortunately, his claim that he has
meritorious defenses is unsubstantiated. He did not even state what evidence he intends to present
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if his motion is granted.
41. Monzon vs. Spouses Relova 171827 17 April 2008
Facts: Respondents filed a petition for injunction against (1) Monzon to find the latter liable for her
loan acquired from the respondents and against (2) Atty. Luna, the Clerk of Court of RTC Tagaytay,
compelling her to deliver to respondents the remaining proceeds from the sale of Monzon’s
foreclosed property.
Monzon filed her Answer stating that she can no longer be held liable for the loan because her
obligation was terminated by virtue of dacion en pago. She claimed that she already sold the
properties to respondents. Foreclosed by another entity and not by the respondents, Monzon also
argued that the subject properties or the proceeds thereof could be recovered only by filing the
proper cases.
Neither Monzon nor her counsel did attend the hearing before the trial court. As such, the RTC found
Monzon liable for the loan and ordered Atty. Luna to deliver the remaining proceeds of the foreclosed
properties to the Respondents. Technically, although the RTC did not declare Monzon in default, it
did apply the effect of the same by rendering judgment in favor of the claimant such relief as her
pleading may warrant.
Doctrine/Ruling: Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and NOT the
failure to appear at the hearing, is the proper ground to declare a party in default.
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the
hearing, is the proper ground to declare a party in default. (The other two grounds would be failure to
appear in the pre-trial conference and refusal to comply with the modes of discovery under the
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29).
The requisites of the first ground are:
(1) jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by service of summons or voluntary
appearance;
(2) failure to file an Answer within the reglementary period;
(3) motion to declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter.
In this case, it was clear that Monzon did file her Answer. Furthermore, there was no showing that a
notice was given to Monzon that she was going to be declared in default or that the effects of the
same would be imposed upon her.
42. Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank 151098 21 March 2006
Petitioners filed an amended complaint which reproduced the allegations of the original complaint.
 But petitioners this time impleaded as additional defendants. Summons were served on the
respondent bank. Supposing that all the defendants had filed their answer, petitioners filed a motion
to set a case for pre-trial, which motion was, however, denied by the RTC, on the ground that
Respondent bank has not yet filed its answer. RTC issued an order of default against respondents.
Ruling/Doctrine:
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the
prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would
be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights,
except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does
not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant
may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
Section 3, Rule 9 provides for the procedure when a defendant is declared in default while Section 1,
Rule 133 talks about preponderance of evidence. In reconciling the two provisions, it must be
remembered that in civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving his case by a preponderance of evidence. Even if the defendant TRB is declared in default,
it does not automatically entitle the complainants to the reliefs prayed for. Not in every case of
default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically. Evidence should still be
presented and the facts must first be proven before the court renders judgment. Being declared in
default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence
in court. While complainants were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9,
they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof
under Section 1 of Rule 133.
43. Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank 151098 21 March 2006
Same case. ^ Na-double pala
44. Indiana Aerospace vs. Commission on Higher Education 139371 4 April 2001
Facts: Dr. Vera, Chairman, Technical Panel for Engineering, Architecture, and Maritime Education
(TPRAM) of [CHED], received a letter from Douglas R. Macias, Chairman, Board of Aeronautical
Engineering, (PRC) and Chairman, Technical Committee for Aeronautical Engineering (TPRAME)
inquiring whether petitioner had already acquired university status in view of the latter’s
advertisement in the Manila Bulletin.
Dr. Vera formally referred the aforesaid letter to Chairman Alcala with a request that the concerned
Regional Office of CHED be directed to conduct appropriate investigation on the alleged
misrepresentation.The respondent's Legal Affairs Service was requested to take legal action against
petitioner. Subsequently, respondent directed petitioner to desist from using the term University,
including the use of the same in any of its alleged branches.
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Thereafter, [CHED] referred the matter to its Regional Director in Cebu City, requesting said office to
conduct an investigation and submit its report.The report stated that: Director Ma. Lilia Gaduyon met
the school president in the regional office and verbally talked [with] and advised them to use
University when it first came out in an advertisement column of a local daily newspaper in Cebu City.
It was explained that there was a violation committed when it used the term university unless the
school had complied with the basic requirement of being a university as prescribed in CHED
Memorandum Order No. 48,
Doctrine: The remedies that are available to a defendant declared in default, are as follows:
(1) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the
default was discovered before judgment could be rendered;
(2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment
but while appeal is still available;
(3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and
(4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order
of default has been resorted to.
These remedies, however, are available only to a defendant who has been validly declared in
default. Such defendant irreparably loses the right to participate in the trial. Such defendant
irreparably loses the right to participate in the trial. On the other hand, a defendant improvidently
declared in default may retain and exercise such right after the order of default and the subsequent
judgment by default are annulled, and the case remanded to the court of origin.
45. De Guia vs. De Guia 135384 4 April 2001
Facts: On October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia, Tomasa De Guia and
Irene Manuel filed with the court a complaint for partition against defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina
and Pablo De Guia.
They alleged that they inherited real properties from their predecessors-in-interest, and that the
defendants unjustly refused to have the properties subdivided among them. After the defendants
filed their traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff Tomasa
De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an unwilling
co-plaintiff.
Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference. Both defendants and
counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference, thus, upon plaintiffs’ motion, defendants were
declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex- parte

Doctrine: Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served
separately on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly
direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference.
The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein
cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule 20 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the parties and their lawyers. Hence, before
being considered in default, parties and their counsel must be shown to have been served with
notice of the pretrial conference. Moreover, if served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly
direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference.
The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein
cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or after the pretrial
scheduled on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sent to their counsel,
it did not contain any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the pretrial conference. The
Notice merely stated: "You are hereby notified that the above-entitled case will be heard before this
court on the 18th day of June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial."
46. Luna vs. Mirafuente A.M. No. MTJ-05-1610 26 September 2005
Facts:
Judge Eduardo H. Mirafuente of the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista, Marinduque, respondent, is
charged with Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Violation
of the Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases and Gross Ignorance of the Law by Dr. Jose
S. Luna (Dr. Luna) arising from respondent’s act of giving due course to the belatedly filed and
unverified answer of the defendants in a complaint for unlawful detainer. In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. Y2K3-01, against Florencio Sadiwa
and Alex Sadiwa (the defendants) with the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista, Marinduque presided
by respondent.
Doctrine:
The word “shall” in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert
the nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered
thereby. To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers—the very mischief that
the Rule seeks to redress.
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In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said Rule. Liberal
interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that may be
availed of in all instances under the cloak of rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and
application of Rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
47. Ponciano vs. Parentela 133284 9 May 2000
Facts:
Private respondents Ildefonso and Leonora Clamosa filed a complaint for a sum of money and
damages with the Regional Trial Court against petitioners Claro and Glaria Ponciano for unpaid cost
of labor and materials incurred by them in repairing petitioner’s house in San Roque, Cavite.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but the same
was denied by the trial court. Petitioners filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim, claiming
that they have paid the total contract price agreed upon, that despite this, the work of private
respondents was defective; and that private respondents abandoned the renovation before it was
completed. Petitioners asserted that they are entitled to be paid P250,000 to complete the
renovation, and damages.
Doctrine:
Petitioners need not file a certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not initiatory in
character. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the counterclaims pleaded by petitioners in their
answers are compulsory in nature. The filing of a separate action by petitioners would only result in
the presentation of the same evidence as in Civil Case No. TM-601. Proceeding from our ruling in
Santo Tomas University Hospital, petitioners need not file a certification of non-forum shopping since
their claims are not initiatory in character, and therefore, are not covered by the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
48. Sps. Barraza vs. Campos, Jr. L-50437 28 February 1983
Facts:
On October 3, 1978, private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants’
(petitioners herein) use of plaintiff’s (now private respondent) trade name and style of
“Gatchalian—The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant”, with prayer for preliminary injunction.
On October 30, 1978, petitioners as defendants therein filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion” for
extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its Order
dated November 2, 1978. Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days,
defendants filed through their counsel, Atty. Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a “Motion to Dismiss
Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction” which was filed with the Court on
 November 17, 1978. \
Private respondents’ argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period
within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is without
merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the
running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed
and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the
extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of
Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall
file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of
the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
Doctrine:
Under the facts of the case at bar, the respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of
fifteen (15) days to file their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing the answer,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before the
expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16,
Rules of Court. A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. The issue raised by a motion to dismiss is similar to that formerly raised
by a demurrer under the Code of Civil Procedure. (Zobel vs. Abreu, 98 Phil. 343). A motion to
dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules
of Court, must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS (Rule 10, Sections 1 to 8)
49. Spouses Dionisio vs. Linsangan 178159 2 March 2011
Facts:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands in San Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo
San Mateo (Romualdo) cultivated. Upon Romualdo’s death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruz’s
permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon demand. In September 1989
spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002, the
Dionisios found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already Wilfredo Linsangan
(Wilfredo) who occupied pied it under the strength of a “Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan” dated
April 7, 1977. The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo on April 22, 2002, demanding that he vacate the land but
the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit against him before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he
declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally
asked leave to amend their complaint. Despite initial misgivings over the amended complaint,
Wilfredo asked for time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5,
2003; Wilfredo maintained his original answer.
Doctrine:
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An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new
complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended
pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its
run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that
an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the
facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint.
The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing
of the original complaint.
50. Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. S.R Farms, Inc. 161849 9 July 2010
Facts:
On March 25, 1992, Continental Enterprises, Ltd. loaded on board the vessel M/V “Hui Yang,” at
Bedi Bunder, India, a shipment of Indian Soya Bean Meal, for transportation and delivery to Manila,
with plaintiff [herein respondent] as consignee/notify party. The said shipment is said to weigh 1,100
metric tons and covered by Bill of Lading dated March 25, 1992. The vessel is owned and operated
by defendant Conti-Feed, with defendant [herein petitioner] Wallem as its ship agent. On April 11,
1992, the said vessel, M/V “Hui Yang” arrived at the port of Manila, Pier 7 South Harbor. Thereafter,
the shipment was discharged and transferred into the custody of the receiving barges, the
NorthFront-333 and NorthFront-444. The offloading of the shipment went on until April 15, 1992 and
was handled by [Ocean Terminal Services, Inc.] OTSI using its own manpower and equipment and
without the participation of the crew members of the vessel. All throughout the entire period of
unloading operation, good and fair weather conditions prevailed. At the instance of the plaintiff, a
cargo check of the subject shipment was made by Lorenzo Bituin of Erne Maritime and Allied
Services, Co. Inc., who noted a shortage in the shipment which was placed at 80.467 metric tons
based on draft survey made on the NorthFront-333 and NorthFront-444 showing that the quantity of
cargo unloaded from the vessel was only 1019.53 metric tons. Thus, per the bill of lading, there was
an estimated shortage of 80.467.
Doctrine:
1. Under Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), notice of loss or
damages must be filled within three days of delivery; A failure to file a notice of claim within
three days will not bar recovery of a suit is nonetheless filed within one year from delivery of
the goods or from the date when the goods should have been delivered. Admittedly,
respondent did not comply with this provision. Under the same provision, however, a failure
to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if a suit is nonetheless filed
within one year from delivery of the goods or from the date when the goods should have
been delivered.
2. The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the
filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which
merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which
 expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply
to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint.
51. Philippine Ports Authority vs. Gothong 158401 28 January 2008
Facts:
Petitioner William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A for brevity), is a duly organized domestic
corporation engaged in the shipping industry. Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for
brevity), upon the other hand, is a government-owned and controlled company created and existing
by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No. 87 and mandated under its charter to operate and administer
the country’s sea port and port facilities. After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans
Shipping Corporation over the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor on December 31, 2000,
petitioner WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said facility.
Thereafter, then President Estrada issued a memorandum dated December 18, 2000 addressed to
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the General
Manager of PPA, stating to the effect that in its meeting held on December 13, 2000, the Economic
Coordinating Council (ECC) has approved the request of petitioner WG&A to lease the Marine Slip
Way from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that respondent PPA turns over its
operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project. The said contract was
eventually conformed to and signed by the petitioner company, through its President/Chief Executive
Officer Endika Aboitiz, Jr. Thereafter, in accordance with the stipulations made in the lease
agreement, PPA surrendered possession of the Marine Slip Way in favor of the petitioner.
However, believing that the said lease already expired on June 30, 2001, respondent PPA
subsequently sent a letter to petitioner WG&A dated November 12, 2001 directing the latter to
vacate the contested premises not later than November 30, 2001 and to turnover the improvements
made therein pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract. In response,
petitioner WG&A wrote PPA on November 27, 2001 urging the latter to reconsider its decision to
eject the former. Said request was denied by the PPA via a letter dated November 29, 2001.
Doctrine:
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or
defense is substantially altered” was stricken off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import
of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote
the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.”
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52. Sps. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge 169551 24 January 2007
Facts:
Sps. Lambino secured a housing loan from BPI (600k) secured by the Sps’ property as mortgage.
Sps. Lambino failed to pay the monthly amortizations hence a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
was filed by BPI which was subsequently halted by the RTC considering Sps. Lambino’s complaint
that the whole balance of the loan has not even been released yet and that BPI was asking for a
higher amortization. Later on, Sps. Lambino filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint
due to the very high interest charges which was denied. The RTC ruled for BPI finding that the
alleged escalating rate of interest and other charges imposed by BPI had accrued long before the
complaint was filed. CA affirmed RTC. SC for BPI.their existence until after he has filed his pleading,
he may file a supplemental pleading.
Doctrine:
A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the
original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such a complaint.
The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint
related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
However, although the facts occur before the commencement of the suit, if a party does not learn of.
53. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz 157107 24 November 2006
Facts:
A complaint for replevin was filed with the court by Estrella Corpuz, respondent, against Alpine
Lending Investors (Alpine), one of the petitioners herein, and Zenaida Lipata, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-20124. The complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondent’s former neighbor. Pretending to
help respondent in securing a Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Zenaida
took from her the original registration papers of her vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No.
UMR 660. Zenaida, using respondent’s registration papers in representing herself as the owner of
the vehicle, was able to retrieve it from Richmond Auto Center where it was being repaired.
Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. Respondent then reported the incident to the LTO
Muntinlupa City Branch. There, she was informed that Zenaida mortgaged her vehicle with petitioner
Alpine. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel Mortgage Contract bearing her forged signature.
Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and demanded the release of
her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on condition that Zenaida should first be
charged criminally.
Doctrine:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 1. Amendments in general. – Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking an allegation or
the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate
 allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within
ten (10) days after it is served.
It is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus
would lie against it. In other words, the trial court’s duty to admit the amended complaint was purely
ministerial.
54. Azolla Farms vs. CA 138085 11 November 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Yuseco, Jr., is the Chairman, President and CEO of Azolla Farms a corporation duly
organized in the sale of natural, organic minerals, including its by-products, with the ultimate
objective of utilizing said products for the promotion of food production. Sometime after, Azolla
Farms undertook to participate in the National Azolla Production Program where it will purchase all
the Azolla produced by the Azolla beneficiaries in the amount not exceeding the peso value of all the
inputs provided to them. For this reason, the Board of Directors of Azolla Farms passed a board
resolution authorizing Yuseco to borrow from Savings Bank in an amount not exceeding
P2,200,000.00. The loan having been approved, Yuseco executed a promissory note promising to
pay Savings Bank the sum of P1,400,000. However, the Azolla Farms project collapsed. Blaming
Savings Bank, petitioners Yuseco and Azolla Farms filed with the RTC a complaint for damages.
They allege that Savings Bank unjustifiably refused to promptly release the remaining P300,000.00
which impaired the timetable of the project and inevitably affected the viability of the project resulting
in its collapse, and resulted in their failure to pay off the loan. Respondent Savings Bank denied the
allegations in the complaint. It contends that Yuseco was using the loan proceeds for expenses
totally unrelated to the project and they decided to withhold the remaining amount until Yuseco gave
the assurance that the diversion of the funds will be stopped.
Doctrines:
It should be noted that courts are given the discretion to allow amendments of pleadings to conform
to the evidence presented during the trial.
55. Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. vs. CA 161135 8 April 2005
FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty.
Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained
from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7
August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
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US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every
three months. In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that
he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of
US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13,500, then filed a cause of action for
sum of money against the petitioner. Petitioner argued that respondents had no cause of action
because the promissory notes were not yet due and demandable when the complaint was filed.
DOCTRINE: The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
For example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the
cause of action depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the
complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be
amended thereafter.
56. Young vs. Spouses Sy 157745 & 157955 26 September 2006
FACTS: The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both
petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial
Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D.
Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by her mother that
adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is unenforceable, since at the
time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval had been
procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a
loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property;
that the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a
Certificate of Sale for this purpose had been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that,
thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the property in question.
DOCTRINE: Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata.
57. Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Manalo 174433 24 February 2014
FACTS: This is an action for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and damages.
Respondent Spouses Enrique Manalo and Rosalinda Jacinto (Spouses Manalo) applied for an
All-Purpose Credit Facility in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
finance the construction of their house. After PNB granted their application, they executed a Real
 Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB over their property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title as
security for the loan. On September 20, 1996, the credit facility was again renewed for
P7,000,000.00. As a consequence, the parties executed a Supplement to and Amendment of
Existing Real Estate Mortgage whereby the property was added as security for the loan. Security
was added and registered in the names of respondents, Manalo heirs. It was agreed upon that the
Spouses Manalo would make monthly payments on the interest. However, PNB claimed that their
last recorded payment was made in December, 1997. Thus, PNB sent a demand letter to them on
their overdue account and required them to settle the account. PNB sent another demand letter
because they failed to heed the first demand.
DOCTRINE: It is settled that even if the complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon,
and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of
action which it intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces
witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively
as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
58. Ching vs. Court of Appeals 110844 27 April 2000
Ching was charged before the RTC, with four counts of estafa. Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion
to Strike Out Information, or in the Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary
Investigation, and to Suspend in the Meantime Further Proceedings in these Cases." RTC ordered a
preliminary investigation and suspended further proceedings in the criminal cases. Ching, together
with Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., filed a case before the RTC 53, for declaration of nullity of
documents and for damages. Then Ching filed a petition before the RTC-Makati, Branch 58, for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action. The
RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition for suspension and scheduled the
arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal cases. As a result, petitioner moved to reconsider the order
to which the prosecution filed an opposition which was denied.
Held/Ruling:
Petitioner tried to turn the case around and filed a motion to admit the amended complaint before the
RTC-Manila, which was admitted. In effect, the judicial admission made in the original complaint was
superseded.
The original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would
have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the
original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record.
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Ching amended complaint only after the promulgation of the decision of the CA. Almost 8 months
lapsed from the filing of the original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint, raising
suspicion on the intention of the petitioner.
In certain instances we ruled that amendments are not proper and should be denied when delay
would arise (Lerma v Reyes), or when the amendments would result in a change of cause of action
or defense or change the theory of the case (Torres v. Tomacruz), or would be inconsistent with the
allegations in the original complaint (Guzman-Castillo vs. Court of Appeals).
BILL OF PARTICULARS (Rule 12, Sections 1 to 6)
59. Guy vs. Guy 189486 5 September 2012
Five years after the redistribution of the GoodGold's shares of stock., Gilbert filed a complaint for
"Declaration of Nullity of Transfers of Shares in GoodGold and of General Information Sheets and
Minutes of Meeting, and for Damages with Application for a Preliminary Injunctive Relief," against his
mother and his sisters. However, after the NBI reported that the signature was authenticated, the
complaint was withdrawn. 3 years after the withdrawal of the complaint, a new one was filed with the
RTC of Mandaluyong. It was captioned as "Intra-Corporate Controversy against his mother and
sisters (again).
Issue: whether or not the failure of the petitioner to specifically allege the fraudulent acts in
intra-corporate controversies is indicative of a harassment or nuisance suit and may be dismissed
motu proprio
Held/Ruling:
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground
for dismissal since such a defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. Thus: Failure to allege fraud or
mistake with as much particularity as is desirable is not fatal if the general purport of the claim or
defense is clear, since all pleadings should be so construed as to do substantial justice. Doubt as to
the meaning of the pleading may be resolved by seeking a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may
be ordered as to a defense of fraud or mistake if the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake are
not stated with the particularity required by the rule.
the above rule, however, does not apply to intra-corporate controversies. This is because fraud in
intra-corporate controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of,
the board of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders,
partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1,
Section 1 (a) (1) of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes
a criterion in determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of
special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit.
In this case, Gilbert failed to describe the fraudulent acts he complained of, and just made a
 sweeping denial of the existence of stock certificates by claiming that they were not necessary since
GoodGold was a mere family corporation. Furthermore, when he questioned the authenticity of the
signatures, he did not issue as doubtful the signature of his father which also appeared in the
certificate as President of the corporation. He failed to rebut the NBI Report authenticating all the
signatures in the stock certificates.
60. Salita vs. Magtolis 106429 13 June 1994
Edwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. In his
Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that: “ to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession —
that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother. However, Joselita is still not
contented with the bill of particulars and argued that the allegations therein is a statement of legal
conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the
Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred.
Ruling/Doctrine:
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of
action." Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support.” It
refers to the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts. A motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the
complaint already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for
matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be
obtained by other means.
In this case, the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action,
and to require more details would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. It is evident that
Joselita, petitioner, can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has
already alleged that "she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession
upon his time and efforts " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would
indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or
ultimate facts. For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for
bill of particulars.
61. Baritua vs. Mercader 136048 23 January 2001
The original complaint was filed against Petitioner JB Lines, Inc. The latter filed a motion to dismiss
complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on the
primary grounds that respondents failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and that
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the cause of action is a suit against a wrong and non-existent party.
Petitioner impleaded in the amended complaint that JB Line is merely a business name and sole
proprietorship of defendant Baritua. As such, JB Line is not a juridical person, nor an entity
authorized by law to sue and be sued, hence, it cannot legally be a party to any action.
Held/Ruling:
Petitioners’ counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The
RTC gave him 10 days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. However, he filed it 11 days past
the deadline. Moreover, the motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing,
petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint.
Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court provides: "SECTION 1. When applied for; purpose. —
Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable
him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed
within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the
paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired."
62. Estardante vs. People 156851-55 18 February 2008
Complainants, sent an undated letter attaching a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by the
petitioner (principal), which the former requested to be investigated. The Ombudsman-Visayas
forwarded the complaint to the City Prosecutor for preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor
served the petitioner with a subpoena requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit. Instead of filing a
counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion for Bill of Particulars with Motion
for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligently
prepare her counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges and the laws she violated are specified.
The City Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the private complainants’ Bill of Particulars.
Held/Ruling:
The act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioner’s Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to
the express mandate of A.O. No. 7 entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman. Sec
4(d) of said law provides that “No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.
Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If the respondent desires any matter in
the complainant’s affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of
clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.” Section 31 of R.A.
No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that those designated or deputized to
assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City
Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the "supervision and
control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to
direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor’s decision.
 In this case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-Visayas must be bound
by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioner’s Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws
and jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of
the prosecutor pursuant to its power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. It was
within the prerogative of the Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by
the private complainants.
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges
should be filed against herein petitioner, it behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her
basic rights to due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS (Rule 13, Sections 1
to 19)
63. Bracero vs. Arcelo 212496 18 March 2015
The heirs of Monisit filed a Complaint for Quieting of Titles/Ownership, Recovery of Possession with
Damages against Arcelo and petitioner. Arcelo claimed that he was only impleaded as respondent to
help the heirs oust petitioner while Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing prematurity, res
judicata, and lack of jurisdiction. RTC declared petitioner in default for failure to file an answer and
ruled in favor of the heirs of Victoriano Monisit and served the petitioner with a copy of its Decision.
Petitioner’s counsel contended he never received the copy of motion for execution, that Respondent
heirs did not present a post office certification to prove they furnished counsel with a copy, that since
petitioner was declared in default and had lost standing to file any motion and that RTC's Clerk of
Court departed from usual procedure by sending a copy of the Decision directly to petitioner.
Held/Ruling:
Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that "if any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court." Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this
rule admits exceptions. Petitioner's counsel was furnished a copy of the motion for execution on
September 11, 2009. This motion categorically states that RTC rendered its Decision on April 16,
2009, yet petitioner's counsel filed no opposition. At that time, he did not file any motion asserting
that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. It was only when his client informed him of the Writ
of Execution did petitioner's counsel file an Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the
ground that he did not receive a copy. The explanation of petitioner's counsel that his client only
finished Grade 6 and lives in a remote mountain barangay is not tenable since petitioner immediately
informed his counsel about the Notice to Vacate on Execution on the same day he was served a
copy. This contradicts counsel's explanation implying difficulty in communicating with his client.
Counsels have the duty to serve their clients with competence and diligence. The distance from
counsel's office to the court should not be used as an excuse by counsel from keeping himself
updated with the status of the cases he is handling.
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Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their cases. Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
A party should "periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check with the court, and inquire about
the status of the case." Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. Petitioner, through
his counsel, did not file an answer to the Complaint. Petitioner, through his counsel had several
opportunities to argue his position before the courts but failed to take them. Petitioner should now be
considered in estoppel from assailing the RTC order.
64. UP vs. Dizon 171182 23 August 2012
Facts: UP failed to pay in a contract it entered with Stern Builders Corporation. UP questioned the
RTC’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment since UP’s funds are government funds and
therefore cannot be seized.
Doctrine: Where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel.
65. Heirs of Numeriano vs. Miranda 179638 8 July 2013
Facts: Petitioners belatedly filed their Notice of Appeal thru LBC because of a typhoon. However,
work was apparently not suspended that day.
Doctrine: The date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be
considered as the date of filing thereof in court. Instead, the date of actual receipt by the court is
deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
66. Villalongha, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 227222 20 August 2019
Facts: Decision was sent to plaintiffs Villalongha's counsel with and was received by a certain Ariel
Hernandez. However, the lawyer informed the CA that he did not receive said notice; and that Ariel
Hernandez is not his staff or employee, and not personally known to him or to his associate.
Therefore, the decision should not have become final and executory.
Doctrine: Service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney.
67. Aguilar vs. Benlot, et al. 232806 21 January 2019
Facts: On his failure to explain why the petition was not personally filed and served, petitioner merely
 invoked an honest mistake. Counsel's office messenger allegedly ran out of time, so the petitions
were mailed, even though the affidavit accompanying the petition averred personal filing and service.

Doctrine: Whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time,
place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.

68. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. NAPOCOR 161219 6 October 2008

Facts: Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR violated Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because
NAPOCOR filed and served the notice of appeal by registered mail. Petitioners claim that
NAPOCOR had all the vehicles and manpower to personally serve and file the notice of appeal.
NAPOCOR opposed petitioner’s motion and alleged that its legal office is severely undermanned
and added that it was highly irregular for petitioners to question its mode of service and filing at this
stage of the proceedings since NAPOCOR resorted to registered mail instead of personal service
from the inception of the case.

Doctrine: Personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule, while resort to the other
modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other modes, a written
explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation
is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the
pleading comes into play.

69. Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines 138500 16 September 2005

Facts: The petitioner was served a copy of the decision thru registered mail. However, the same was
returned unclaimed despite the postmaster's three successive notices.

Doctrine: service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if
the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first
notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom. In such a case,
there arises a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period.

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PART 4
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally on the defendant.
LORRY 1-5 Completed However, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to. When the defendant cannot be
served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, the rules allow
MAE 6-10 Completed summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
MICH 11-15 Completed therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
JANAH 16-20 Completed
When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by publication.
(Applies also if not only unknown but cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.) The diligence
GIAN 21-25 Completed requirement means that there must be prior resort to personal service under Sec. 7 and substituted
service under Sec. 8, and proof that these modes were ineffective before summons by publication
NADAYAG 26-29 Completed may be allowed.

GIANT 30-33 Completed In the present case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service upon Ocampo through her uncle, who
was the caretaker of Ocampo's old family residence in Tanauan, Batangas. Substituted service
TEJADA 34-37 Completed presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant's current residence
or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor holds office in the
GIA 38-41 Completed address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.

CHRISTINE 42-45 Completed Based on the sheriff's report, it is clear that Ocampo no longer resides in San Bernardo Village,
Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. The report categorically stated that "defendant Helen M. Ocampo and
CABIGTING 46-49 Completed her family were already in Italy," without, however, identifying any specific address. Even BDO
Remittance itself admitted in its petition for recognition that Ocampo's "whereabouts in Italy are no
AZUL 50-53 Completed longer certain." Not being a resident of the address where the summons was served, the substituted
service of summons is ineffective

1. Express Padala (Italia), S.P.A. vs. Ocampo 202505 6 September 2017

2. Cathay Metal Corp. vs. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative 172204 10 July
2014
Facts: BDO Remittance filed a criminal complaint against Ocampo for falsification and
misappropriation before the Court of Turin. Ocampo was convicted and sentenced therein but
Petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of
granted her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of sentence on account of her guilty plea
title with the RTC of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to respondent's
(Court of Turin Decision). BDO Remittance filed a petition with the RTC of Mandaluyong, praying for
alleged official address at "Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna." Upon learning that a case
the recognition of Turin’s foreign judgment.
involving its adverse claim was pending, respondent alleged that he never received a copy of the
summons and the petition and prayed that summons be sent to 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba,
The sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons on Ocampo in her local address alleged in
Laguna.
the petition located in San Bernardo Village, Batangas. However, since the address was incomplete,
the sheriff sought the help of barangay officials, who pointed him to the house belonging to
Ruling/Doctrine:
Ocampo's father, Nicasio Ocampo. Macahia, uncle of Ocampo and present occupant, informed the
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
sheriff that Ocampo and her family were already in Italy, and that he was only a caretaker of the
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
house. The sheriff served the summons to Macahia. After Ocampo failed to file an answer, BDO
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
Remittance filed a motion to declare Ocampo in default.
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Ruling/Doctrine:
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 This enumeration is exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons.It does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If summons may not
be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served
upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.
In this case, no summons or notice was ever sent to any of the enumerated officers.
3. Spouses Manuel vs. Ong 205249 15 October 2014
The Spouses Manuel requested that service of summons be made at another time considering that
petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. On another attempt, r refused to sign and
receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely tender
the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their answer within
(15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they
be declared in default.
Spouse Manuel alleged that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower
Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. Thus, summons
could not have been properly served on them in the former address.
Ruling/Doctrine:
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant
refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the
person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
A sheriff's return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence,
taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken
by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of
maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular about the
sheriff's return or that it was otherwise incomplete.
Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel
to adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their self-serving allegation of an alternative
address.
4. People’s General Insurance Corporation vs. Guansing 204759 14 November 2018
Lizaso, Guansing's employee, was driving Guansing's truck along Legarda Street, Sampaloc, Manila
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when he hit the rear portion of Yokohama’s Crosswind. The sheriff served the summons on
Guansing's brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff's return did not explain why summons was
served on his brother instead of Guansing..
Held/Doctrine:
As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons. Substituted service
is the exception to this general rule. For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a
detailed enumeration of the sheriffs’ actions showing that a defendant cannot be served despite
diligent and reasonable efforts. These details are contained in the sheriff's return. Thus, the sheriff's
return is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Courts may allow substituted service based on what
the sheriffs return contains.
Failure to serve summons means that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Absent proper service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant unless there is voluntary appearance. The filing of an answer and other subsequent
pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance
In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent Guansing's brother is not
provided for in the Sheriffs Return. Presumption of regularity does not apply.
5. Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. vs. RCBC 183370 17 August 2015
Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to
violations of the Trust Receipts Law. Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the
summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent’s affidavit and bond, and the order and
writ of attachment. Petitioners argue that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
corporation since the summons was improperly served upon Abante, who is a mere liaison officer
and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.
Held/Doctrine:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, Abante proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after
receiving instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner
corporation’s corporate secretary. y. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons,
did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under
the Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be
true that there was no direct, physical handling of the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be
charged with having constructively received the same, which in Our view, amounts to a valid service
of summons.

6. Orion Security Corp. vs. Kaifam Enterprises Inc. 163287 27 April 2007
Petitioner provided security service to its client, the respondent, who was unable to pay for the
services rendered, prompting the petitioner to file a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. There
was an improper service of summons by the sheriff who tried to serve the summons and a copy of
the complaint on the secretary of respondent’s manager, but the respondent’s representatives
allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt. The summons and the copy of the complaint were
left at respondent’s office through the respondent's security guard who allegedly refused to
acknowledge their receipt.
Doctrine:
If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. Rule
14, Section 7 provides that when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
7. Robinsons vs. Millares 163584 12 December 2006
Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a complaint for a sum of money against Remelita
Robinson. The sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security guard, assigned at the gate
of the subdivision where Robinson lived, refused to let the sheriff go inside the subdivision. The
same thing happened the second time, and so the sheriff returned a third time to serve the summons
by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name
of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the one
to give the same to the defendant.
Doctrine: The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and
fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective.
However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter
of the procedural rules, that governs.
Note: In this case, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of
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summons upon the petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did
she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction
to the security guard, she must bear its consequences.
8. Green Star Express, Inc. vs. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp. 181517 6 July 2015
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons.
NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss and ruled that there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt
of the summons by NURC.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic
private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized. The rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasure" instead of "cashier." It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all
others, or expression unions est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the
person expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
9. Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp. 170943 23 September 2008
The petitioner used to be a member of the board of directors of Respondent PNOC. A car loan was
advanced to him by the respondent while the petitioner was still a member, but a balance was
eventually unpaid and so PNOC filed a complaint for a sum of money against Santos. The personal
service of summons to the petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known
address despite earnest efforts to do so. On respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication.
Doctrine:
The service of summons via publication in a newspaper of general circulation, when the defendant’s
whereabouts is unknown, applies to any action whether it be in rem or in personam. With regard to
the affidavit of service, under Sec. 19, Rule 14 of the ROC, the rules do not require that the affidavit
of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
 10. Montefalcon vs. Vasquez 165016 17 June 2008
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on respondent for acknowledgment and support
against respondent in Camarines Sur where respondent’s grandfather received them as respondent
was in Manila. Respondent's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the
court of the non-service of summons. RTC issued an alias summons on Vasquez at the given
address upon petitioners' motion. A Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on
respondent's caretaker Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly stated respondent’s last name and so
another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer.
Doctrine:
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if
this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that
overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. And it is common knowledge that a Filipino
seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the
manning agencies hold offices. In this case, respondent hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in
Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a
residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at
the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an
overseas seafarer, respondent was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service
of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. ─ When any action is commenced against
a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service.─ When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not
be less than 60 days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-seaman. In this case, the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because
previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts
were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs.
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11. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corp. 172242 14 August 2007
Respondent entered into a Distribution Agreement with petitioner however, the latter unilaterally
terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent to file a complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Attachment against petitioner.
Respondent filed Motion for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent’s
General Manager Richard Tee to Serve Summons outside of the PH. Petitioner filed motion to
dismiss claiming that there was no proper service of summons hence it did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner.
DOCTRINE: For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the defendants either through service of
summons as required by law or through voluntary appearance and submission to authority of the
courts. Proper service of summons depends on the nature of the civil case: whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem
When the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action
involves in personam, Philippine courts cannot try the case against them because of impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court Rule 14.15 requires not
mere allegation of existence of personal property belonging to non-resident defendant but that the
personal property located in the PH must have been actually attached. Respondent’s allegation that
petitioner had personal property in the PH in the form of shares of stock in PEIP does not convert
the case from in personam to in rem.
Respondent’s prayer in its amended complaint for issuance of writ of attachment over shares of
stock in PEIP was DENIED, shares of stock in PEIP had NOT been attached Extraterritorial service
of summons is not valid because the case involves collection of sum of money and damages, action
in personam which is neither related nor connected to any property of petitioner to which it claims
lien or interest.
12. NM Rothschild & Sons vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company 175799 28
November 2011
Respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner praying for a judgment declaring the loan and
hedging contracts between the parties void and for damages. Upon respondent’s motion, the trial
court authorized respondent’s counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the
Philippine Consulate General Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:the court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against
petitioner, and the action is barred by estoppel.
 DOCTRINE: Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in
rem, but not if an action is in personam. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the
parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its
obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the
plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the
plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the
action will be converted to one quasi in rem. Since the action involved in the case at bar is in
personam and since the defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in court.
13. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation 194751 26 November 2014
separate complaints were filed by respondent for nullification of free patent and original certificates
of title, filed against several defendants, one of which was petitioner. Attempts to personally serve
summons on De Pedro failed so respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by
publication which was granted by RTC.
DOCTRINE: Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed
when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts
are "unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." It may only be effected after
unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the
defendant's or respondent's whereabouts. A look into the content of the sheriff's return will determine
if the circumstances warranted the deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons
over other modes of service. The sheriff's return must contain a narration of the circumstances
showing efforts to personally serve summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility
of personal service of summons. A sheriff's return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
issuance if it contains (1) the details of the circumstances surrounding the sheriff's attempt to serve
the summons personally upon the defendants or respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the
impossibility of serving the summons within reasonable time. It does not enjoy the presumption of
regularity if the return was merely pro forma. Failure to state the facts and circumstances that
rendered service of summons impossible renders service of summons and the return ineffective.
In that case, no substituted service or service by publication can be valid. This return shows no detail
of the sheriff's efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved
only because the post office messenger stated that there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service
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address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner's whereabouts.
14. Reicon vs. Diamond 204796 4 February 2015
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of lease and the latter sublet portions of the
subject property to Jollibee and Maybunga. Due to respondnet’s failure to pay the accrued rentals,
petitioner terminated its contract with respondent and entered into a separate contracts with Jollibee
and Maybunga over the portions of the subject property they respectively occupy which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for breach of contract with damages before the RTC. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: Lack of jurisdiction over its person (considering that the
summons was not served upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by the ROC-sec 12 rule 14), Lack of legal
capacity to sue as a juridical person and lack of cause of action.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person of Respondent had already been acquired Through its
voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation. Respondnet cannot escape this conclusion by
invoking the convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere "special appearance,"
considering that it affirmatively sought therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and
to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's
jurisdiction.
15. Rapid Realty and Development Corp. vs. Villa 184197 11 February 2010
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans mandamus and damages
against several defendants including respondnet. After one failed attempt at personal service of
summons, Zapanta, court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon
respondents' househelp who did not acknowledge receipt and refused to divulge their names and
when respondnets failed to file their Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare respondents in
Default and to be allowed to present their evidence ex parte which was granted by RTC.
Respondents filed a motion to lift the order of default and prayed to vacate the proceedings since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons.
DOCTRINE: It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.
Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
 16. PCIB vs. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, et. al 171137 5 June 2009
Facts: Petitioner discovered that about a month before the due date, the Amadeo spouses sold 3 of
real properties to respondents, Spouses Dy and Spouses Chuyaco. Believing that the transfers were
done in fraud of creditors, petitioner instituted an action for rescission and damages. Upon service of
summons, the Amadeo spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication. However, this was
denied on the ground that summons by publication cannot be availed of in an action in personam.
Held/Doctrine:
What changed in the Rules: If a motion is filed, whatever kind it is, it need no longer be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court because the motion
may raise myriad issues in that one motion of special appearance as long as the objection to
the jurisdiction of the court is included.
MOTIONS (Rule 15, Sections 1 to 13)
17. Sarmiento vs. Zaratan 167471 5 February 2007
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan.
Respondent's counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within
which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time
of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded
by the grounding of the computers.
Held/Doctrine:
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. The three- day notice required by law is intended not for
the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion.
18. Vette Industrial vs. Cheng 170232-170301 5 December 2006
Facts: Sui Cheng filed an action for specific performance and damages against Vette Industrial
Sales Co. for breaching their obligation. Vette Industrial claims that the motion was procedurally
defective because: (1) Sui did not comply with the three-day notice rule which is mandatory under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
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Held/Doctrine:
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, there are exceptions to the strict application
of this rule:
1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice;
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
3. Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court;
4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."
19. Boiser vs. Aguirre A.M. RTJ-04-1886 16 May 2005
Facts: Complainant alleged in an administrative complaint that the issuance by respondent judge of
the Order is indicative of his ignorance of the law considering that the motion did not state that he
was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Held/Doctrine:
The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except
those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and
date of the hearing, with proof of service.
A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
question which the court could decide. Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a
motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. The rule
mandates that the same shall not be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is mandatory.
20. De los Reyes vs. Ramnani 169135 18 June 2010
Facts: Respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to
execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the
subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11,
1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription.
Held/Doctrine:
While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which
 may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the
prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.

21. Preysler vs. Manila Southcoast Dev. Corp. 171872 28 June 2010 In requesting for a 30-day extension or until June 11, 2006 to file answer, petitioner apparently
reckoned the date from which the extension would start on May 12, 2006, which was not the last day
BRIEF FACTS of the 15-day period sought to be extended, it being May 5, 2006. By computation, petitioner actually
Petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. (petitioner) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batangas a sought more than 30 days, contrary to the period of extension it purportedly requested. The counting
complaint for forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation of the period was erroneous, even if one uses the material dates alleged by petitioner. Petitioner
(respondent). clearly disregarded elementary rules and jurisprudence on the matter.
During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing to 2
April 2004 because the court's calendar could not accommodate the hearing of the motion. All the
parties were notified of the schedule for the next hearing.
Rule 16 - Motion to Dismiss [provision deleted – relevant cases transferred to Rule 8]
The Court of Appeals held that the three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro
forma. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS (Rule 17, Sections 1 to 4)
DOCTRINE/DECISION
23. O.B. Jovenir Construction Development Corp. vs. Macamir Realty and Court of
Sec. 4, Rule 15 “Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
Appeals 135803 28 March 2006
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.” • The
BRIEF FACTS:
three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where
petitioners filed their motion to dismiss. Madeja, a defendant, alleged that the respondent spouses
the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and
Miranda, who initiated the complaint on behalf of Macamir Realty (the real party-in-interest), failed to
has not deprived the court of its authority.
attach any Board Resolution authorizing them to file the suit on behalf of the corporation. 10 days
• Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally
after the filing of the complaint, the private respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint,
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
alleging that their counsel detected a technical defect in the complaint which may be a ground for
of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
dismissal, and so they pray the court allows them to withdraw without prejudice. Herein petitioners
justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that
oppose this motion to withdraw the complaint.
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
However, just one day earlier, private respondents filed another complaint against the same
defendants save for Madeja, and seeking the same reliefs as the first complaint.
This time, a Board Resolution authorizing the respondent spouses Miranda to file the Complaint on
22. PNB vs. Deang Marketing Corp. 177931 8 December 2008 behalf of Macamir Realty was attached to the complaint. This second complaint was also filed with
the Makati RTC.
BRIEF FACTS:
Respondents Deang Marketing Corporation and Berlita Deang filed before the RTC a Complaint DOCTRINE/DECISION
against petitioner for reformation of contract and specific performance.
Summons was served on petitioner on April 20, 2006. On May 15, 2006, respondents filed a Motion The provision ordained the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right at any time
to Declare Defendant (herein petitioner) in Default, which they set for hearing on May 24, 2006 before service of the answer. The plaintiff was accorded the right to dismiss the complaint without
eight days prior to the slated hearing of respondents' Motion to Declare (Petitioner) in Default, the the necessity of alleging in the notice of dismissal any ground nor of making any reservation.
trial court issued an Order denying said motion and granting petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer. The Court declared that the right of the plaintiff to cause the dismissal of the complaint by mere
DECISION/DOCTRINE: notice is lost not by the filing of the answer with the trial court, but upon the actual service to the
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed plaintiff of the answer.
before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. The court's discretion to grant a motion for
extension is conditioned upon such motion's timeliness, the passing of which renders the court The plaintiff's notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila
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 Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected
without regard to whatever reasons or motives [plaintiff] might have had for bringing it about, and
was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, 'without prejudice,' the contrary not being otherwise
'stated in the notice' and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed.
Under Section 1, Rule 17 of the old Rules, the dismissal contemplated therein could be
accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to
approval by the Court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise
stated in the notice. It is due to these considerations that the petition should be denied.
The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under
Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the
most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint
as dismissed, since
24. Ching vs. Cheng 175507 8 October 2014
FIRST CASE: Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against petitioner
before RTC (Civil Case No. 98-91046)
SECOND CASE: Respondents filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver,
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Petitioners
RESPONDENTS FILED MOTION TO DISMISS their complaint in the 2ND CASE, praying that it be
dismissed without prejudice
DECISION/DOCTRINE
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the
second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal.
For a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the
same claim, the following requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the
ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only new
defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A
motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial
court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants.
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When it allowed Atty. Obias a period of 15 days to file an appropriate pleading, it was merely
acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiffs counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal of the
case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does
not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was
already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction to file the appropriate
pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial
court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands
25. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 164797 13 February 2006
BRIEF FACTS:
There are four (4) cases involved in this controversy.
The first case that was filed between the parties is Civil Case No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer
litigated before the Municipal Trial Court. This case was decided on 6 November 1998 by the
Municipal Trial Court in favor of herein petitioner Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion.
The second case is Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title, filed before the Regional Trial Court.
This case was dismissed for failure to prosecute as evidenced by the Regional Trial Court Order.
The third case is Civil Case No. 2573-02 for Injunction which was filed before the Regional Trial
Court dismissed on ground of res judicata.
The fourth case is the instant controversy for Annulment of Title With Damages .
DOCTRINE/DECISION
The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional
party to the first and second action. Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application
of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. There is
substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case
and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
The rule enumerates the instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (1)
if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court.
Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits
and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the
order of dismissal.
 It is clear from the afore-mentioned order that Civil Case No. 1600 was dismissed, upon petitioners'
motion, for failure of private respondents and their counsel to attend several scheduled hearings for
the presentation of their evidence.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
26. Quintos vs. Nicolas 210252 16 June 2014
Facts: The parents of petitioners and respondents were the owners of the subject property, a 281
sqm. parcel of land in Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717, leaving to their 10 Children
ownership over the subject property after they passed away. Respondent siblings brought an action
for partition against petitioners, which the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the parties, as
well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice and the ruling of the trial court became final, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Finality. Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition,
respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication and as a result, TCT No.
318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses. Subsequently, respondent
siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents and stated that
during their parent’s lifetime, the property was distributed to the 10 children. They averred that they
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They likewise
averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny
any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication respondents
countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006,
one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out
that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition,
they claimed that their parents mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints,
respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been repaid
by their parents, the Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject
property as payment
Held/Doctrine: The general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded
as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only
exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is
without prejudice. In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say
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that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits
is present.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the
right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise
would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There
can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter
once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent
court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not
or no longer exists.
27. Eloisa Merchandising Inc. vs. Trebel International Inc. 192716 13 June 2012
Facts: Petitioner Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. (EMI) executed in favor of respondent Banco de Oro
Universal Bank (BDO) a real estate mortgage (REM) over its properties and said REM was further
amended to secure the principal obligation drawn from the Credit Line Agreement of EMI and Term
Loan Agreement of Trebel International, Inc. (Trebel) and likewise executed a Continuing Suretyship
in favor of BDO to secure the credit accommodation extended by BDO to petitioner’s affiliate, Trebel.
BDO initiated foreclosure proceedings by filing an application for extrajudicial foreclosure before the
Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which respondent
Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr. issued a notice setting the auction sale of the mortgaged property on
March 7, 2002. On March 1, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for “annulment of Real Estate
Mortgage, Injunction & Damages With Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order,” which BDO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action which can be determined from the facts alleged in the complaint and considering all annexes,
motions and evidence on record.
On May 7, 2002, petitioners filed an amended complaint which impleaded the Register of Deeds and
alleged that the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction on March 7, 2002. On July 18,
2002, petitioners filed a “Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Second Amended Complaint,” which
averred that the Register of Deeds of Makati City has consolidated the titles over the foreclosed
properties and issued new titles in the name of BDO.
Held/Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the
failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court
or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the
dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. The failure of a plaintiff
to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise
 to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his
complaint; hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion or
on motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff,
on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause
for such failure. The burden to show that there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal
of the case unjustified is on the petitioners.
Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is the duty of the
plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be
set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be
Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that:
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the
case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the
Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
When the above guidelines took effect, the case was already at the pre-trial stage and it was the
failure of petitioners to set the case anew for pre-trial conference which prompted the trial court to
dismiss their complaint.
28. Martinez vs. Republic 160895 30 October 2006
Facts: Martinez filed a petition for registration of three parcels of land in his name and alleged that
he had purchased lots in 1952 from his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to
the 1870s and claimed that he had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had
remained unencumbered; and that they became private property through prescription pursuant to
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained
to initiate the proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed to do
so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur. The OSG, in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellee's possession was
not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141; that his muniments of title were
insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject parcels; and that the
properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to private appropriation.
Held/Doctrine: The SC held that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal
from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion
to set aside the order of default. It was reaffirmed that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to
appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this jurisdiction
upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
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29. Ko vs. PNB 169131-32 28 January 2006
Facts: The case stemmed from an action filed by petitioners in the trial court for Annulment of
Mortgage, Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Titles and Deed of
Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The complaint alleged that the
assailed mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings were null and void since the written consent of
petitioners, as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not secured, which the respondent bank
denied and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage, petitioners in fact gave their consent.
During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend a scheduled trial
and upon motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.
Held/Doctrine: Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of
plaintiff . — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of
his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon the
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Petitioners' failure to prosecute their case and proceed with the trial during the span of three years
leads to no other conclusion than that petitioners have no interest in seeing their case terminated at
the earliest possible time; or that petitioners' case is unmeritorious from inception. Whichever the
case may be, the dismissal order of the trial court stands and is now immutable. The opportunity to
be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its
side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due process. What the law
proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. Petitioners had the opportunity to present their case
and claim the relief they seek. But their inadvertence and lack of circumspect renders the trial court's
order dismissing their case final and executory.
30. Laurel vs. Vardeleon 202967 5 August 2015
Petitioner was granted 3 scheduled hearings within which to present her evidence.. During the
scheduled hearing, petitioner was present, together with substitute counsel and her first witness.
Petitioner moved in open court to postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that
have to be resolved. The trial court denied petitioner's motion to postpone trial. It likewise dismissed
the Civil Case on the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner's part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling/Doctrine:
The delay or failure to prosecute contemplated under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules must be
for an "unreasonable length of time." In petitioner's case, the continuance she sought was not for an
unreasonable length of time. It was within the period expected by and made known. To constitute
failure to prosecute, his non-appearance must be equated with unwillingness to proceed with the trial
 as when both plaintiff and counsel made: no appearance at all, or with the assumption that plaintiff
has already lost interest in prosecuting his action, in the same way that should the ground for
dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed must be for an unreasonable length of time
beyond the reasonable allowance which by judicial leniency litigant is normally entitled.
While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion, such discretion must be exercised soundly
with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case especially where the suit appears
to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant
PRE-TRIAL (Rule 18, Section 1 to 10)
31. LCK Industries Inc vs. Planters Development Bank 170606 23 November 2007
Facts: The petitioner LCK obtained a loan from the respondent bank in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 as evidenced by two promissory notes. As a security for the loan obligation,
petitioners-spouses Chiko and Elizabeth Lim executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
registered under their names and located at Quezon City. Later on, to secure the same obligation,
another Real Estate Mortgage was executed over another parcel of land also registered under the
names of the petitioner-spouses located at Baguio City.
Subsequently, petitioner LCK incurred default in its payment. Several demands were made by the
respondent bank to no avail. A final letter-demand was sent by respondent bank to petitioner asking
for the payment of its obligation of P2,962,500.00. However, petitioner LCK failed or refused to pay
its obligation
​
Doctrine: A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to
be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable
therefrom by necessary implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are
expressly stipulated.
Ruling: The conduct of pre-trial in civil actions has been mandatory as early as January 1, 1964
upon the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Court. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify
and limit the basic issues between the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of
surprise and maneuvering.
The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the
court as well of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which
can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite
the trial, or totally dispense with it.
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32. Paranaque Kings Enterprises vs. Santos 194638 2 July 2014
Facts: Respondent Santos entered into a Contract of Lease with Chua over eight (8) parcels of land
located in Parañaque City,, specifically giving the latter the "first option or priority to buy" the same in
case of sale. Chua then caused the construction of a 6-door commercial complex on the leased
premises but, by reason of business reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights thereon to
Lee, who likewise assumed all obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn,
executed a Deed of Assignment over the leased premises, including all improvements thereon, in
favor of petitioner
Doctrine: RULE 17, SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order
of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in
a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court
Ruling: Petitioner clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural
device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases
out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized
as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.
In this case, seven (7) years later, or in 1998, no pre-trial had been conducted as yet. Hence, the
cancellation of the pre-trial on 'the ground of the impending filing of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, as there was no proof at the time of the hearing that said petition was in fact filed, was
obviously a dilatory tactic designed for petitioner to control the proceedings of the court. The Court
finds nothing improper, irregular or jaundiced with the trial court's course of action.
33. Alarcon vs. CA 126802 28 January 2000
Roberto Alarcon filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale with damages against
Bienvenido Juani, Edgardo Sulit and Virginia Baluyot as defendants. After all the issues were joined,
the trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on June 3, 1986 which was continued on August
1, 1986. During the pre-trial conference, the parties, represented by their counsel, made some
admissions of facts – with the truth of the forged deed of sale being one of them.
Ruling/Doctrine:
 The admissions were clearly made during the pre-trial conference and, therefore, conclusive upon
the parties making it.
The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts or admissions of facts is to expedite trial and to
relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on
trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.—From the foregoing, the
admissions were clearly made during the pre-trial conference and, therefore, conclusive upon the
parties making it. The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts or admissions of facts is to
expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will
not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
The rules have made mandatory that a pre-trial should first be conducted before hearing any case.
The parties themselves are required to attend or their representative with written authority from them
in order to arrive at a possible amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents. All of the matters
taken up during the pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts and the admissions made by the
parties are required to be recorded in a pre-trial order.
34. Corpuz vs Citybank 175677 31 July 2009
Facts:
Azucena Corpuz (Azucena) was a cardholder of Citibank Mastercard No. 5423-3925-5788-2007 and
Citibank VISA Card No. 4539-7105-2572-2001 both issued by Citibank, N.A. (Citibank). Each card
had a credit limit of P40,000.00. In view of her then impending official business trip to Europe,
Azucena paid in full on December 7, 1998 her monthly charges on both credit cards via checks and
also made advance check payments of P20,000.00 on December 8, 1998 for her VISA Card, and
another P20,000.00 for her Mastercard on December 14, 1998, to cover future transactions. While in
Italy on December 9, 1998, Azucena dined at a restaurant. To settle her bill of 46,000 liras, she
presented her VISA Card, but to her surprise and embarrassment, the restaurant did not honor it.
She then brought out her Mastercard which the restaurant honored. On even date, Azucena incurred
a bill of 378,000 liras at a shop which she intended to charge to her credit cards. This time, both her
VISA and Mastercard were not honored, drawing her to pay the bill in cash. Informed of the incidents
via overseas telephone calls to Manila, Azucena’s husband Renato Corpuz (Renato) inquired why
his wife’s credit cards were not honored, to which Citibank explained that her check-payments had
not yet been cleared at the time. Upon her return to the country, Azucena wrote Citibank on January
13, 1999 informing it that her credit cards had not been honored and demanding the refund of her
overseas call expenses amounting to 132,000 liras or P3,175.00 at the time. Citibank did not
respond to the letter, however, drawing Azucena to write Citibank for the cancellation of the cards.
Azucena and Renato (hereafter the spouses) later filed on November 12, 1999 a complaint for
damages against Citibank at the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.
Doctrine:
Section 5, Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of an action due to the plaintiff’s failure to
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appear at the pre-trial shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In this
case, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs-herein spouses as non-suited and ordered the dismissal of
their Complaint. As the dismissal was a final order, the proper remedy was to file an ordinary appeal
and not a petition for certiorari. The spouses’ petition for certiorari was thus properly dismissed by
the appellate court.
35. Paredes vs. Verano 164375 12 October 2006
Facts:
The protracted legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the establishment of a
right of way filed by petitioners herein as plaintiffs against respondents as defendants. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2767 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, Branch 24, culminated in a judgment by compromise dated 26 April 1994. In the
Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a two (2) meter-wide right of way
in favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount of P6,000.00 which petitioners agreed to pay. In
their answer, the petitioners denied having violated the Compromise Agreement. Subsequent to the
answer, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Doctrine:
Under Section 5, Rule 18, the failure of the plaintiff or defendant to appear during pre-trial authorizes
the court to either dismiss the complaint, if the plaintiff were absent; or to allow the plaintiff to present
evidence ex parte, if the defendant were absent.
The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
One manner by which due process is assured is through the faithful adherence to the procedural
rules that govern the behavior of the party-litigants. The Rules of Court do sanction, on several
instances, penalties for violation of the Rules that causes the termination of an action without a ruling
on the merits, or bars one party from litigating the same while permitting the other to do so. We
noted earlier that Section 3, Rule 46 authorizes the dismissal of an original petition before the Court
of Appeals for failure to append material portions of the record. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 17, the
failure of the plaintiff to appear on the date of the presentation of his/her evidence in chief on the
complaint is ground for the court to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. And under Section 5,
Rule 18, the failure of the plaintiff or defendant to appear during pre-trial authorizes the court to
either dismiss the complaint, if the plaintiff were absent; or to allow the plaintiff to present evidence
ex parte, if the defendant were absent.
36. Sps. Salvador vs. Sps. Rabaja 199990 4 February 2015
Facts:
This case stemmed from a dispute involving the sellers, petitioner spouses Rolando and Herminia
Salvador (Spouses Salvador); the sellers’ agent, Rosario Gonzales (Gonzales); and the buyers,
 respondent Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja (Spouses Rabaja), over a parcel of land situated
at No. 25, Merryland Village, 375 Jose Rizal Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in the names of Spouses Salvador. From 1994 until 2002,
Spouses Rabaja were leasing an apartment in the subject lot. Sometime in July 1998, Spouses
Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a buyer of the subject property. Petitioner
Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced Gonzales to them as the administrator of the
said property. Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owner’s duplicate certificate of title
over the subject property. On July, 3, 1998, Spouses Rabaja made an initial payment of P48,000.00
to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia. Gonzales then presented the Special Power of Attorney3
(SPA), executed by Rolando Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the same day, the
parties executed the Contract to Sell4 which stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00,
Spouses Salvador sold, transferred and conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property.
Spouses Rabaja made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales
pursuant to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers signed by Gonzales and
the improvised receipts signed by Herminia. Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador
complained to Spouses Rabaja that they did not receive any payment from Gonzales. This prompted
Spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment of the purchase price; and as a consequence, they
received a notice to vacate the subject property from Spouses Salvador for nonpayment of rentals.
Thereafter, Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In turn,
Spouses Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales,
the subject matter of the present petition.
Doctrine:
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pretrial
conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the
reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pretrial conference, the
plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.—It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the
pretrial. The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents. Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by
the court.
37. Aguilar vs. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative 209605 12 January 2015
Facts:
This case stemmed from the three (3) complaints for sum of money separately filed by respondent
Lightbringers Credit Cooperative (respondent) on July 14, 2008 against petitioners Aguilar and
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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Calimbas, and one Perlita Tantiangco (Tan­tiangco) which were consolidated before the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dinalupihan, Bataan (MCTC). The complaints alleged that Tantiangco,
Aguilar and Calimbas were members of the cooperative who loaned.
On the scheduled pretrial conference, only respondent and its counsel appeared. The MCTC then
issued the Order,8 dated August 25, 2009, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent later presented Fernando Manalili (Manalili), its incumbent General Manager, as its sole
witness. In his testimony, Manalili explained that the discrepancy between the amounts of the loan
reflected in the checks and those in the cash disbursement vouchers were due to the accumulated
interests from previous outstanding obligations, withheld share capital, as well as the service and
miscellaneous fees. He stated, however, that it was their bookkeeper who could best explain the
details. Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right to cross-examine the witness
of respondent, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were being heard ex parte. In the interest of
justice, the MCTC directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the issue of whether or not a party who had been declared “as in default” might still participate in the
trial of the case. Only respondent, however, complied with the directive. In its Order,9 dated April 27,
2011, the MCTC held that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, the petitioners who had
been declared “as in default” had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses.
Thereafter, respondent filed its formal offer of evidence.
The MCTC denied that only Calimbas and Aguilar are liable to respondent for their respective debts.
RTC affirmed the decision, Calimbas and Aguilar liable to respondent for their respective debts.
Petition for review and MR was filed but it was denied by the CA.
Doctrine:
Failure to attend the pretrial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the failure of
the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence presented by respondent in the MCTC
because the petitioners failed to attend the pretrial conference on August 25, 2009 pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The Court, however, clarifies that failure to attend the
pretrial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment
on the basis thereof.
38. Tolentino vs. Laurel 181368 22 February 2012
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Petitioners have occupied a portion of
the said property and developed it into fishponds. Petitioners continued to develop the area and
refused to vacate the same. Respondents then filed an action for reconveyance of property against
 petitioners. Petitioners were initially declared in default by the RTC. The RTC however, set aside the
Order of default and reset the pre-trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial
conference, petitioners still failed to appear. Hence, RTC allowed respondents to present evidence
ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering them to vacate the said property and pay
rentals. CA affirmed RTC decision. Petitioners argued before the SC that they were denied of due
process as they were not allowed to present their evidence before the trial court. Nonetheless, the
SC ruled that they were not denied of due process. The trial court gave petitioners every chance to
air their side and even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding,
petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal
processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause.
Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte, it did so in
accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the
constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial
amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial
court was essentially due to their fault.
DOCTRINE:
If the party who failed to appear at the pre- trial is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it
is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following: (a) The
possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary
reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h)
The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid
in the prompt disposition of the action.
39. Saguid vs. CA 150611 10 June 2003
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and
wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. Their cohabitation was not blessed with any
children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from when her
relationship with Jacinto’s relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away
the conflict with Jacinto’s relatives. Soon, the couple decided to separate and end their 9-year
cohabitation. Later on, Gina Rey filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property
with Receivership against the Jacinto Saguid with the RTC Marinduque alleging her contribution in
the construction of their house, her ownership of personal properties therein and her portion in their
savings account. Jacinto Saguid believed otherwise. The RTC declared the Jacinto Saguid as in
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required. His MRs were denied. CA affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.
40. Tiu vs. Middleton 134998 19 July 1999
FACTS: The Middletons filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, accounting and
damages against Tiu before the RTC of Oroquieta City. Before the commencement of the trial, the
court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial Conference stating in part: The parties are warned that
witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to
testify at the trial x x x. In his Pre-Trial Brief, Tiu averred that he would be presenting six witnesses,
but he did not name them.
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted
or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that the defendant (Tiu) will present six witnesses.
It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named.
Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however naming them.
Trial ensued, and the Middletons presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, Tiu
called a certain Antonia as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the
Middletons objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because Tiu had failed
to name her in his pre-trial brief. Sustaining the Middletons, the lower court then issued the assailed
orders. Hence, the present recourse.
DOCTRINE: Pre-trial is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties
cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of
witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court,
through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the
presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial, without the consent
of the parties affected.
41. Kent vs. Micarez 185758 9 March 2011
FACTS: Linda Kent, through her younger sister and representative Rosita Manalang, filed a
complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title before the RTC of Panabo City. Kent
alleged that the residential lot she purchased in said location was clandestinely and fraudulently
 conveyed and transferred by her parents in favor of her youngest brother (herein respondents) to her
prejudice and detriment. Kent prayed to be declared as the true and real owner of the subject lot,
and the TCT in favor of Dionesio be cancelled, and that a new one be issued in her name.
Respondents’ counsel, Atty. Miguel, was granted a special power of attorney which allowed him to
represent the former during the pre-trial conference and all subsequent hearings with power to enter
into a compromise agreement. After the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs, and the
issues in the case had been joined, the RTC explored the possibility of an amicable settlement
among the parties by ordering the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). On
March 1, 2008, Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao, Sr. (Padao) issued a Mediator’s Report and returned
Civil Case No. 13-2007 to the RTC allegedly due to the non-appearance of the respondents on the
scheduled conferences before him. Later, Padao clarified, through a Manifestation, July 15, 2008,
that it was petitioner, represented by Atty. Benjamin Utulle (Atty. Utulle), who did not attend the
mediation proceedings set on March 1, 2008, and not Atty. Miguel, counsel for the respondents and
their authorized representative.
DOCTRINE: Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory
as for non- appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider
lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has written “inconsiderate
dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of
court dockets, while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the individual judges, they
merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties.
42. Citibank N.A. vs. Chua 102300 17 March 1993
Facts:
● Sps. Velez were good clients of Citibanks Cebu branch wherein he Allege that Citibank
extended them credit lines sufficiently secured with real estate and chattel mortgages on
equipment. Offering them a special additional accommodation of 5M, he tried to exchange
with Citibank the 6 checks amounting to 3.095M, but Citibank refused, even after repeated
demands. Citibank suggested that the amount arrangement should be restructured to
30mos with a prevailing interest on the diminishing value. Spouses agreed, they issued and
delivered a check in which was refused by Citibank, demanding instead the entire amount.
● Citibank states that prior to depositing the checks Velez would present his personal checks
to a bank officer asking the latter to have his personal checks immediately credited as if it
were a cash deposit and at the same time assure the bank officer that his personal checks
were fully funded. They never discovered that his personal check deposits were unfunded.
Citibank filed a case for BP 22 against Velez.
● Sps Velez filed a case for specific performance with damages against Citibank. During the
pre-trial conference, counsel for Citibank appeared, presenting a special power of attorney
executed by Citibank officer Tarriela in favor of bank's counsel, the J.P. Garcia & Associates,
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to represent and bind the bank at the pre-trial conference. The counsel for the Sps Velez
orally moved to declare Citibank in default on the ground that the special power of attorney
was not executed by the Board of Directors of Citibank.
Doctrine: Although the power of attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of
petitioners counsel to appear and bind petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power
of attorney are comprehensive enough as to include the authority to appear for the Citibank at the
pre-trial conference. In the same manner, the power of attorney granted to Citibank's employees
should be considered a special power of attorney.
Ruling: It is an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to state that the power of attorney given to
the four (4) Citibank employees is not a special power of attorney as required in paragraph 3, Article
1878 of the Civil Code and Section 1 (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.
Corporate powers may be directly conferred upon corporate officers or agents by statute, the articles
of incorporation, the by laws or by resolution or other act of the board of directors. In addition, an
officer who is not a director may also appoint other agents when so authorized by the by laws or by
the board of directors. Since the by-laws are a source of authority for corporate officers and agents
of the corporation, a resolution of the Board of Directors of Citibank appointing an attorney in
fact to represent and bind it during the pre-trial conference of the case at bar is not necessary
because its by-laws allow its officers, the Executing Officer and the Secretary Pro-Tem, to execute a
power of attorney to a designated bank officer, Ferguson in this case, clothing him with authority to
direct and manage corporate affairs.
Since the general power of attorney granted to Ferguson allows him to delegate his powers in whole
or in part, there can be no doubt that the special power of attorney in favor, first, of J.P. Garcia &
Associates and later, of the bank's employees, constitutes a valid delegation of Ferguson's
express power to represent Citibank in the pre-trial conference in the lower court.
43. Calalang vs. Court of Appeals 103185 22 January 1993
Facts:
● Respondent Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against petitioner Conrado Calalang and 3 other defendants. Petitioner, after having been
served with summons, filed a Motion to Dismiss. The other summoned defendant, Hugo
Arca, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars. The two other defendants namely, the Acropolis
Trading Corporation and Rio Salceda were also summoned but only a clerk-employee of the
Acropolis Trading Corporation received the summons while Rio Salceda was no longer
residing at his given address.
● Over a year later, the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted.The Motion to Dismiss filed
by petitioner Calalang was left unresolved. The last pleading filed regarding the Motion to
Dismiss was the reply of petitioner Calalang to the opposition to the motion to dismiss by
respondent bank.
● This case has been set several times for pre-trial. Petitioner Calalang moved to dismiss the
 complaint on the ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time.
Doctrine: Dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. That discretion, however, must not be abused. Thus, courts may not enter a dismissal
which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case. The availability of this recourse must be
determined according to each case's procedural history, situation at the time of the dismissal
and whether, and under the circumstances of the particular case, the plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
Ruling: To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also
unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes. In Marahay vs. Melicor, the
Court set forth the test for dismissal of a case due to failure to prosecute, to wit: While a court can
dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition
of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority
to dismiss.
INTERVENTION (Rule 19, Sections 1 to 4)
44. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Heirs of Miñoza 186045 2 February 2011
Facts:
● The intervenors claimed to be the true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao
Miñoza. The intervenors alleged in their complaint: 1.) that the plaintiffs in the main case are
not related to the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono whose true and
legitimate children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and Florencia, all surnamed Miñoza; 2.) that, on
January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia
Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses; and 3.) that,
on February 15, 1958, the same Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently, deceitfully,
and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A to the NAC.
RTC denied the Motion for Intervention.
● Respondent Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) filed a complaint for reconveyance and
cancellation of title against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority(MCIAA).
The MCIAA, through the OSG, filed an Answer with Counterclaim.
● After the parties filed their respective pleadings, trial ensued. However, before the MCIAA
could present evidence in support of its case, a Motion for Intervention, with an attached
Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed before the RTC of Cebu City by the heirs of Filomeno
T. Miñoza, represented by Laureano M. Miñoza; the heirs of Pedro T, Miñoza, represented
by Leoncio J. Miñoza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Miñoza, represented by Antonio M.
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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Urbiztondo (Intervenors).
● CA reversed the decision of the RTC
Doctrine: The court must take into consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s
right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding.
Ruling: Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may
be affected by such proceedings. It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the
complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something
adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some
right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. adequately pursued and
protected in a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza
and Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. True, if their
allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest in
the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest contemplated by law must
be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. It
must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were
allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable.
45. Pulgar vs. RT of Mauban 157583 10 September 2014
Facts:
● Quezon Power (Philippines) Limited, Co. (QPL) field a complaint for consignation when the
Municipal Assessor rejected QPL’s payment of its realty taxes. The Municipal Assessor
claims that the taxes are higher as the valuation of the 26 billion.
● In 2002, Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-inIntervention claiming that as a
resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an interest in the aggressive collection of
realty taxes against QPL. He prayed for the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees,
anchoring the same on the "mindless disturbance of the forest and marine environment
whereon the power plant of [QPL] stands.
● The case was eventually dismissed together with the motion for intervention of Pulgar, as
the court had no jurisdiction over the case. QPL’s complaint essentially challenged the
amount of the taxes assessed, the RTC ruled that it is the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals that had jurisdiction over the complaint.

Doctrine: Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the
existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the
machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest
in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right
or interests.
Ruling:
The Court held that jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.
Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, but
oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject
realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack
of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention. In other
words, the cessation of the principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds at that — means that
Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that:
“Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor . . . unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the
machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest
in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right
or interests.”
Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party.
Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of
intervention ceases.
CALENDAR OF CASES (Rule 20, Sections 1 and 2)
46. Ang Kek Chen vs. Bello L-76344-46 30 June 1988
Facts:
Petitioner, alleged that he received the corresponding order only on August 23, 1984, or AFTER the
cases had already been actually "re-raffled" and assigned to respondent judge on August 16, 1984.
Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.
Doctrine:
When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question, apparently
in violation of the Court’s Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that he had some
ulterior motive for doing so, but he violated the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done
above board. We consider the procedure of raffling cases to be an important element of judicial
proceedings, designed precisely to give assurance to the parties that the court hearing their case
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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would be impartial. On this point, we found the petition meritorious.
SUBPOENA (Rule 21, Sections 1 to 10)
47. Collado vs. Bravo A.M. No. P-99-1307 10 April 2001
Facts:
Complainant received a subpoena from the MTC duly signed by respondent in her capacity as Clerk
of Court. Upon arriving at the MTC, complainant talked to respondent and asked for copies of the
complaint and other details of the case but respondent replied that no complaint had been filed and
her intention in issuing the subpoena was to allow a certain Perla Baterina, the labor recruiter of
complainant’s son, Emmanuel Collado, to talk to complainant.
Doctrine:
Respondent as Clerk of Court is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes
issuing from the court. She should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is. “A subpoena is
a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an
action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition.”
She should have known that a process is “the means whereby a court compels the appearance of
the defendant before it, or a compliance with its demands.” Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or
action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, respondent
knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had complainant commenced any
proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Respondent, then,
had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the
complainant.
48. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA L-30266 29 June 1984
Facts:
Records disclose that the two respondent corporations herein sued the present petitioner before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for unfair competition with damages and attorney’s fees. In due time
herein petitioner, who was the defendant in that court suit, answered the complaint and joined issues
with the plaintiffs therein, forthwith respondent Judge, to whom that lawsuit was assigned, proceeded
with the trial thereof.
Doctrine:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a “subpoena
duces tecum”, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to
 be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the
precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described
that it may be identified. A “subpoena duces tecum” once issued by the court may be quashed upon
motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails
to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
49. Roco vs. Contreras 158275 28 June 2005
COMPUTATION OF TIME (Rule 22, Sections 1 and 2)
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal's Corporation or
their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain
documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. The prosecution filed its
opposition on the ground that the production of the documents was inappropriate because they are
immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted. The MTCC,
RTC and CA all denied the motions of the petitioner.
Doctrine:
Petitioner must prove the relevancy and the definiteness of the books and the documents he seeks
to be brought before it.
The books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and
described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore,
is satisfied in this case. It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to
the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden.
50. People of the Philippines vs. Montejo L-24154 31 October 1967
Facts: A material witness in a criminal case in Zamboanga was arrested for contempt of court for his
failure to appear in court to testify. However, it appears that the reason for such failure was that he
now lives in Montalban, Rizal.
Doctrine: The provisions of sections 8 and 9 of this Rule shall not apply to a witness who resides
more than one hundred (100) kilometers from his residence to the place where he is to testify by the
ordinary course of travel, or to a detention prisoner if no permission of the court in which his case is
pending was obtained.
Antonio, Azul, Bautista, Cabigting, Delos Santos, Gianan, Lisaca, Librojo, Nadayag, Romano, Santos, Tejada
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51. Genorga vs. Quintain Adm. Matter No. 981-CFI 29 July 1977
Facts: Dr. Geñorga was a former municipal health officer in Masbate. He was later assigned to
Negros Oriental. A warrant of arrest was issued against him for his failure to appear as government
medico-legal witness in a pending murder case before respondent Judge Quitain of the CFI of
Masbate.
Doctrine: The rule that a witness is not bound to attend a hearing if held outside the province he
resides unless the distance be less than 50 (now 100) kilometers from his residence to the place of
trial only applies to civil cases, not criminal.
52. Neypes vs. CA 141524 14 September 2005
Facts: Petitioners filed their notice of appeal five days from receipt of the order denying their motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.
Doctrine: A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order the final order
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
53. Luz vs. National Amnesty Commission 159708 24 September 2004
Facts: The petitioner belatedly filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that, since the last day to
file his petition was a Saturday, and the next day, was a Sunday, the last day for filing the petition
should be on the following day which is Monday. He reasoned that since he filed his motion for
extension of time to file his petition for review on the said date, the said motion was timely filed
Doctrine: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of
time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. The CA has no discretion to reckon the
commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the expiration of such period,
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
PART 5
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
LORRY 1 Completed examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during
trial, that is, through question and answer.
MAE 2 Completed
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 119 of the present
MICH 3 Completed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a
member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made
by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination
JANAH 4 Completed
of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court where the case is pending.
GIAN 5 Completed

NADAYAG 6 Completed 2. Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. vs. Sps. Mangudadatu 155010 16 August
2004
GIANT 7 Completed
JLI filed a motion to quash/recall writ of execution since they were not able to receive a copy of an
TEJADA 8 Completed order resolving their motion for new trial, and that and their original counsels withdrew and were thus
replaced. The petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement
GIA 9 Completed of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. Counsel for JLI personally served counsel for
the Mangudadatus (herein respondents) a Notice to Take Deposition upon Oral Examination of
CHRISTINE 10-13 Completed Attys. Mario and Peligro (the replacement counsel of JLI), intended to prove that JLI had not
received a copy of the Order denying the Motion for New Trial.
CABIGTING 14 Completed
Doctrine: A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over
AZUL 15 Completed any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an
answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is
to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTIONS (Rule 23, Sections 1 to 29) parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by the Trial Court Judges and Clerk of
Court in the conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-discovery measures
1. Vda. de Manguerra vs. Risos 152643 28 August 2008
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of
Cebu City. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition due to her weak
physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC of Cebu granted the
motion and directed that Concepcion's deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati. After
several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally
taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.
Ruling/Doctrine:
Rule 119 applies. It is required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the
case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand. Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial.”
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an
answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).The Rules of Court vest in the trial court the discretion to order
whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from
those the proponents have intended. However, it is well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It
must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner and in

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 consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.
Note: in thise case, JLI can avail of the depositions of their former counsels despite the case being
terminated. The depositions involved a circumstance that fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23. The
witnesses of JLI in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of
hearing. JLI offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for
the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final.
3. Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 108119 19 January 1994
An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner against respondent Inter-Merchants
Corporation and after respondent corp filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with written
interrogatories which was then answered by the respondent corporation through its board chairman,
Juanito A. Teope. Petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination which prompted private respondent to file its opposition. The court issued an order that
the requested deposition shall not be taken due to the fact that the proposed deponent has signified
his availability to testify in court.
DOCTRINE: Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause
shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to
be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial
reason—one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to
determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the
term “for good cause shown.”
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute “good cause” to
justify the court’s order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or
testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial.
But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The
utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result,
there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before
the trial
DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL (Rule 24, Sections 1 to 7)
4. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals 143561 6 June 2001
Facts: Petitioner was charged with qualified theft. Petitioner was an employee of DLPC; that he had
access to the electrical supplies of said company; and that with grave abuse of confidence, he stole
electrical materials belonging to DLPC.
Held/Doctrine:
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Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
The preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness
out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in
the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115. More importantly, said provision is an implementing translation
of the constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face."
5. Dasmarinas Garments Inc. vs. Reyes 108229 24 August 1993
1. APL sued Dasmariñas Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its
witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan
nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in compliance with the rules on
taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.
DECISION/DOCTRINE
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the
Philippines in view of its ‘one-China policy.’" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the
deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action
is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court
pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the
adverse party.
Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed
of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution
of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only
to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.
Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken
from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of
further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of
execution of a final and executory judgment
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves
of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.
6. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 90478 21 November 1991
 Facts: Private respondents are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case
was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS
OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS". The PCGG
filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. The Sandiganbayan, in order
to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to
expand its complaint to make more specific allegations. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a
“motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court” while the PCGG
responded by filing a motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent,
"queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper,
impertinent and irrelevant under any guise." However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal
and factual basis.
Held/Doctrine: Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in
the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties, and production and inspection of document and things.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential
function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the
facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may
be settled authoritatively and finally. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the
facts in issue — fully and fairly, i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known
to him, suppressing, or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within
his knowledge. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a
plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." The truth is
that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. it is the
purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial
— should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known
to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the
pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. In line with this principle of according
liberal treatment to the deposition discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions
(whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties
under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of
court, and generally, without court intervention. As regards the private respondents "Motion for
Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 — that it was correct for them to seek leave to
serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In
such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to
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Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court."
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance
at them disproves the argument.
The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint
and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to
object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that
the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. The Court finally finds
that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the
documents subject of the motion. Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the
amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is
precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for
pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the
allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." The taking of depositions in accordance with
Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories)
7. Caguiat vs. Torres L-25481 31 October 1969
For the second time, petitioners served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his
deposition upon oral examination, to prevent which, the latter filed an urgent motion on the same
month. The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of respondent Caguiat is to get
the latter to lay his cards on the table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the proceedings. Respondent
Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms that he has already revealed practically his entire defense, even
to the extent of naming his witnesses, during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition has
been obviated.
Ruling/Doctrine:
The right of a party to take depositions as a means of discovery is not exactly absolute under
Sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court for these rules are precisely designed to protect
the parties and their witnesses. The Court can either prevent the taking of a deposition, or stop one
that is already being taken whenever, in its opinion, the move to take their depositions is actually
intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them.
In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-trial, appellee
expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants rejected.
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES (Rule 25, Sections 1 to 6)
 8. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan 156605 28 August 2007
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed for a suit for the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth with damages against Edward Marcelo in his capacity as the President of
Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation for taking advantage of his relationship with the Marcoses to
obtain a preferred contract. The contract involved a construction of 55 units of fiberglass speed
boats for the use of the Philippine Navy. The PCGG filed the suit with the Sandiganbayan to which
the latter filed a complaint on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines against Marcelo in his capacity
as the president of MFC. This prompted Marcelo to submit his own pre-trial brief with written
interrogatories. The Republic of the Philippines then filed its answer to the written interrogatories
submitted by Marcelo. In 1997, the petitioners filed three separate motions for summary
judgment. MFC’s motion, on the other hand, alleged that there was no genuine issue of fact and
there was no cause of action and that the Republic of the Philippines continued to refuse to answer
the written interrogatories and reply to the request for admission on certain facts set forth in its
pre-trial brief. Sandiganbayan denied these motions of Marcelo and MFC because the answers of
the Republic of the Philippines to the written interrogatories given by Marcelo and company shows
the existence of genuine factual issues between the parties through the alleged favored contract
mention in the complaint. Sandiganbayan wanted to know whether MFC was used as a conduit by
Marcelo to amass ill-gotten wealth through his influence with the Marcoses. The issue is, however,
whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for summary judgment of Marcelo, MFC and the other
petitioner corporations.
Doctrine:
The Republic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written
interrogatories and requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the
interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can
justify such failure or refusal. To be sure, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedures and defines
all the consequence/s for refusing to comply with the different modes of discovery. The case of
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 213 (1991), a case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth where the
defendants served upon the PCGG written interrogatories but the latter refused to make a discovery,
is relevant.
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY (Rule 26, Sections 1 to 5)
9. Development Bank of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals 153034 20 September 2005
FACTS:
Rosalinda Canadalla-Go filed a Supplemental Complaint for the Exercise of Right of Redemption
and Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with
Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. After the DBP filed its Answer but
before the parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party.
Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment. Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under
oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons
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for the admission or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP
manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained in the Request for
Admission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had
already been either specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons
for the denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein.
DOCTRINE:
A party cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for
Admission for the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath. That the Comment was not
under oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in the interest of
justice. DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for
Admission for the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath. That the Comment was not
under oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in the interest of
justice conformably to the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed
as to do substantial justice. The filing of such Comment substantially complied with Rule 26.
PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS (Rule 27)
10. Eagleridge Developmet Corp. vs. Naval 204700 24 November 2014
Facts:
● Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Supreme Court
which reversed and set aside the Court of Appeal’s resolutions and ordered respondent to
produce the LPSA (Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement) including its annexes and/or
attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.
Doctrine:
● The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to
the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery
mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave
of court “upon due application and a showing of due cause.”
Ruling:
● The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to
the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery
mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The Court have determined
that the LSPA is relevant and material to the issue on the validity of the deed of
assignment raised by petitioners in the court a quo, and allowing its production and
inspection by petitioners would be more in keeping with the objectives of the
discovery rules.
 11. Solid Bank Corp. vs. Gateway Electronics Corp. 164805 30 April 2008
Facts:
● Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway) obtained from Solidbank Corporation
(Solidbank) four loans to be used as working capital for its manufacturing operations. To
secure the loans Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services
Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance). However, Gateway failed to
comply with its loan obligations.
● Solidbank filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money against Gateway and filed a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents on the basis that Gateway has already
received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Back-end Services Agreement.
● The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for production and inspection of
documents. Gateway filed a manifestation that they appeared before the trial court to
present the documents in their possession, however, Solidbank's counsel failed to appear on
the said date.
● Solidbank filed a motion to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their
refusal to produce the documents subject of the January 30, 2001 Order. However, trial
court denied motion to cite Gateway for contempt and chastised Gateway for exerting no
diligent efforts to produce the documents evidencing the payments
Doctrine: A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving
inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those
documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can
easily identify the documents he is required to produce.
Ruling:
● Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbank's
motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received from
Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement. Solidbank's motion was
fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to specify with particularity
the documents it required Gateway to produce.
● Solidbank's motion for production and inspection of documents called for a blanket
inspection Solidbank's request for inspection of "all documents pertaining to, arising from,
was simply too broad and too generalized in scope. The inspection should be limited to
those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse
party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce.
● Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end
Services Agreement were already received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the
instant case. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is
imposed until he shall have discharged the same.
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12. Air Philippines Corp. vs. Pennswell Inc. 172835 13 December 2007
Facts:
● On a number of occasions, Penswell, Inc. delivered and sold to Air Philippines Corporation
sundry goods in trade leading to an outstanding obligatio n by Air Philippines. Air Philippines
failed to pay the obligation which prompted the respondent to file a complaint for a sum of
money.
● Air Philippines alleged that the respondent defrauded Penswell’s misrepresentation of the
goods in trade as belonging to a new line, but identical with the products previously
purchased by Air Philippines which eventually resulted to their non-payment.
● During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a
detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components to some of their sundry goods.
● Trial court ordered Penswell to give the detailed list but upon consideration, it reversed it
contending that Penswell cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought
because the matter was confidential and what was injured upon constituted a trade secret
which Pennswell cannot be forced to divulge.
Doctrine:
● Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be
privileged.
Ruling:
● Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents or
things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. It sets
an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action; and which
are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.
● The Court therefore rules against the petitioner. The SC affirms the ruling of the Court of
Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to
seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of
its products.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATIONS OF PERSONS (Rule 28, Sections 1 to 4)
Rule on DNA Evidence A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY (Rule 29, Sections 1 to 6)
Rule on Writ of Amparo 07-9-12-SC, Sections 14b and e
13. Spouses Zepeda vs. China Bank Corp. 172175 9 October 2006
 Facts: failed to file a responsive pleading to it within five (5) days upon receipt, his complaint will be
● A Complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages dismissed. Beretta was not heard of. The court granted the dismissal. Motion to Set Aside Orders
against respondent Chinabank was filed by Sps. Expedito and Alice Zepeda before the Dismissing Complaint was filed by Baretta after 1 and a half years.
Regional Trial Court and alleged that they obtained a loan from respondent secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. However, Petitioners subsequently encountered Doctrine:
difficulties in paying their loan obligations. Hence, they were surprised when respondent The purpose of discovery procedure is to provide means by which both parties in an action may
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it emerged as the highest bidder. acquire, without waiting for the trial, knowledge of material facts and evidence which otherwise
● The petitioners claimed that they signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note in would be peculiarly within the knowledge only of the other. In that way, surprises and deceptions are
blank and were not given a copy and the interest rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by the avoided and the litigants must have to depend no longer on the techniques and tactics of trial
respondent. Respondent banks motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer with lawyers but must win or lose on the basis of the bare facts constituting their causes.
special affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written interrogatories
with 20 questions.
● CA held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the two assailed Orders. It 15. Lopez vs. Maceren L-7424 31 August 1954
ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners complaint because they
acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the Facts: Petitioner filed a notice for the taking of her deposition. However, upon an urgent motion of
veracity of Chinabanks affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabanks written the defendants, Judge Maceren prohibiting the taking of said deposition.
interrogatories; and the complaint states no cause of action. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Doctrine: Deposition pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has
Doctrine: The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
still refuses to obey the order. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 29.
Deposition shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in
Ruling:
prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. If the deposition
● The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party
upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in were taken, the court could not observe the behaviour of the deponents.
the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the
particular question, still refuses to obey the order. Under the case of Arellano v. Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only
apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a
particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him
to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.
● In this case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a
particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on
Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.
● Due to respondent bank’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for
ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel
compliance based on Section 3.

14. Raul Arellano vs. CFI of Sorsogon L-34897 15 July 1975

Facts: Arellano dispatched written interrogatories to Barreta which provided that should Barreta

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