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3 Intl Peacekeeping 64
3 Intl Peacekeeping 64
3 Intl Peacekeeping 64
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Assessing the Success of
UN Peacekeeping Operations
DUANE BRATT
Despite the growth in the study of UN peacekeeping, one crucial aspect has been
neglected: how to judge whether a peacekeeping operation has been successful or not.
There are four ways that operational success can be measured: mandate performance,
facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limitation of casualties.
Each of these indicators is explored to determine its validity and relative importance.
Then, using these criteria, an assessment is made of the success of the 39 UN
peacekeeping operations conducted from 1945 to 1996, judging each operation as
either a complete success, a moderate success, or a failure. Following this assessment,
selected cases illustrate how the indicators have been applied. Thus a set of criteria is
developed which can be used to assess the success of future peacekeeping operations,
and an evaluation is made of the historical record of peacekeeping.
Since 1988, there has been an extraordinary growth in the number and size
of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the period 1945-87, the UN
undertook 13 operations, but in the last nine years, 28 new operations have
been created. In addition, the scope of peacekeeping has also increased
dramatically. Traditionally, UN peacekeeping referred to the interposition of
a neutral force between two warring states once a ceasefire had been agreed
to. However, since 1988, the UN has shifted its focus towards addressing
intra-state conflicts. To meet this new challenge, peacekeepers have been
assigned such new tasks as varied as conducting elections, civil
administration, repatriating refugees and protecting humanitarian convoys.
Matching this tremendous growth in peacekeeping has been a growth in
the literature dedicated to explaining and understanding the expansion of
peacekeeping. However, in the litany of peacekeeping studies one subject is
strangely neglected: how to judge whether a peacekeeping operation has
been successful or not. With the exception of brief sections in Marjorie
Brown's 'United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current
Issues" and Paul Diehl's International Peacekeeping,2 writers have
neglected to specify what exactly constitutes a successful operation.
Instead, they choose to use 'face validity" to determine operational success.
It was obvious to most observers that the operation in Somalia failed and
Duane Bratt recently received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, University of
Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 65
This study uses three of the indicators deployed by Brown and Diehl,
namely: mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, and containing
the conflict. However, the present analysis offers significant improvements on
the work of Brown and Diehl. First, it amends Diehl's criterion concerning the
limitation of armed conflict by considering whether operations were able to
limit casualties. This change is made because Diehl only took into account
combatant deaths, and a more encompassing assessment would also include
civilian deaths. In addition, Diehl's indicator does not include deaths that were
indirectly caused by conflict; for example, civilians who died of natural
causes that could have been prevented had humanitarian aid shipments not
been blocked because of the fighting. The approach here is more
comprehensive, counting not only deaths directly caused by armed conflict,
such as victims of sniper fire, land mines and terrorist bombings, but also
indirect causes such as famine and disease. Second, the present analysis
critically challenges the validity and relative importance of each of the four
indicators of operational success. This was neglected by Brown and only
partially accomplished by Diehl. Third, by combining the different criteria
identified by Brown and Diehl, a common frame of reference for assessing
success is developed. Fourth, the criteria will be used to systematically assess
the success of every UN peacekeeping operation. This allows for a greater
evaluation of the overall record of UN peacekeeping than the selected case
study approach utilized by Brown and Diehl.'
In the decision to use the indicators of mandate performance, facilitation
of conflict resolution, conflict containment and casualty limitation, some
potential indicators are dismissed. For example, in a review of Diehl's book,
Robert C. Johansen suggested two additional criteria: 'assess the effect of
peacekeeping forces on local people affected by their work'; and 'compare
the degree of misunderstanding, tension, or violence that occurs in the
presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance-of-power
activity without peacekeeping'.' Although both these indicators may offer
some insights into how we conceive of peacekeeping success, they will not
be used in this study. The first indicator - an operation's effect on the local
people - will not be used because it remains conceptually unclear. In
particular, there are many variables which could be used to determine an
operation's effects on the target country's population. Among them are
which people should be examined (the population as a whole, or selected on
the basis of factors such as age, gender, class, or political affiliation); and
which factors to take into account (living conditions, economic standing,
type of political system and so forth). Although there is a definite utility in
assessing the success of a peacekeeping operation on the basis of its effects
on the host population, there is still much methodological work that needs
to be done. The second criteria was not used because it would have relied
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 67
on speculation about what would have happened had the peacekeepers not
been deployed. It is difficult to assess what would have been the result in
Bosnia if the international community had conducted a Desert Storm
operation, or if nothing at all had been done. The performance of an
operation that has occurred can be objectively assessed, but to estimate the
results of an unchosen option is to delve into the realm of psychic
prediction.
Mandate Performance
The first indicator, whether the peacekeeping operation successfully
completed its mandate, can be determined by examining the stated mandate
in Security Council resolutions, and judging whether it was adequately
completed. This is a relatively straightforward procedure. For example, if
the peacekeepers were mandated to disarm the combatants, the analyst
simply determines the extent to which the stated tasks have been completed.
This is why mandate assessment has been the predominant tool for
assessing operational success.
However, many critics argue that the singular use of mandate
performance is inadequate. As Diehl noted: 'the mandate's given operations
are frequently vague, and there is much room for debate on the scope and
detail of the operation's missions; this alone makes it difficult to assess
whether the designs of the mandate have been achieved."' Second, as one
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) official stated, 'you can
get a completely unrealistic mandate that was cooked up to satisfy the
Security Council member's domestic political interests. Nobody on the
Council in their wildest dreams thought the mandate would ever be
implemented'." For example, UNIFIL's mandate was to restore the authority
of the disintegrated Lebanese government, but as one commentator noted,
the Security Council was, in effect, asking UNIFIL to 'raise a Lazarus'. 2
Further, as the DPKO official remarked: 'there is still the possibility of
having a useful and constructive international presence, and doing good
things and improving the situation. Even though there's no real
approximation of the mandate, and nobody ever expected there would be'."
Is it fair to judge an operation as a failure because the peacekeepers did not
complete an impossible mandate, despite the fact that much was
accomplished? Nevertheless an operation's mandate cannot be ignored - for
it does represent the wishes of the Security Council. In addition, of the four
indicators, only an operation's mandate is a unique measurement of its
objectives. Thus, while it may require some effort to value an operation's
mandate, it is a valid assessment of peacekeeping success.
68 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE
FacilitatingConflict Resolution
The second indicator of success is whether the operation was able to
facilitate the resolution of the underlying causes of a conflict. Conflict
resolution requires a formal agreement between the warring parties, either a
peace treaty or, for internal conflicts, some type of power-sharing
arrangement. The reason for using this indicator is because it should be the
ultimate aim of all UN efforts. In fact, the Security Council has, in recent
cases, determined that a condition for continuing with the peacekeeping
operation is the level of progress towards conflict resolution which has been
made. When UNOMIG was established, the Security Council noted that its
mandate would be extended 'based on a report from the Secretary-General
whether or not substantive progress had been made towards implementing
measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace'. 4 Even when it is not
explicitly stated in its mandate, the deployment of a peacekeeping force
may put the fighting in a holding pattern, thus allowing peace negotiations
to occur. UNEF II did not have a mandate for conflict resolution, but its
presence helped prevent further fighting and aided the political negotiations
that led to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. UNFICYP is an
even better example of why conflict resolution is an integral part of
operational success. UNFICYP may have been successful in separating
Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus, but the conflict has been raging for
more than 30 years. In fact, as Birgisson has noted: 'UNFICYP has
managed to foster a semblance of calm and normalcy about the current
situation that may indeed discourage dialogue between the two communities
and, thus, a lasting political settlement'." In short, peacekeeping operations
should be judged on the basis of conflict resolution because the peace-
keepers have the ability to either facilitate, or hinder, conflict resolution.
However, there are also disadvantages to using conflict resolution as the
sole indicator of operational success. Principally, it places events beyond the
control of the peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers can facilitate conflict
resolution, but in the end it is the responsibility of the combatants to 'kiss
and make up'. In addition, the operation may not even be mandated to
attempt conflict resolution, as was the case in the UN's operation in
Afghanistan. UNGOMAP successfully supervised the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, but it 'did not affect the situation in Afghanistan or the
surrounding region significantly', as the 'civil war continued unabated'. 6
Moreover, if the conflict re-ignites following the withdrawal of the
peacekeepers, does that mean that the operation, which may have formerly
been deemed a success, is now relegated to the failed operation pile? How
long is a peacekeeping force supposed to be responsible for the outcome of
the conflict? Five years? Ten years? Conflict resolution ultimately lies with
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 69
the parties to the conflict, nevertheless the peacekeepers must make every
effort to achieve a lasting political settlement. This is because the
maintenance of international peace and security can only be ensured
through the resolution, not simply the mitigation of conflicts. Thus, despite
some difficulties in measurement, facilitating conflict resolution is an
appropriate way to assess the succes of peacekeeping operations.
Conflict Containment
The third indicator of operational success is conflict containment. This is
determined by whether the operation prevented major powers or
neighbouring states from intervening in the conflict. In addition, an
operation can be considered to have failed to contain the conflict even if the
intervention is authorized by the UN. UNOSOM I must be considered a
failure at conflict containment when the UN Security Council felt it
necessary to authorize UNITAF to intervene into Somalia.
Assessing an operation's ability to contain the conflict is important
because sometimes the sole rationale for deploying UN peacekeepers is to
prevent the conflict from escalating. UNEF I was deployed because of fears
that the crisis in Suez might draw in the Soviet Union and the United States.
Therefore, even if UNEF I could not find a solution to the Egyptian-Israeli
conflict, it was successful in preventing a greater war. An operation's
success in containing the conflict is just as important as its mandate
performance.
Nevertheless, conflict containment should not be the sole objective of a
peacekeeping operation. In some cases there is little threat of the conflict
expanding. Although the Security Council defined the situation in Somalia
as a 'threat to international peace and security', no real threat existed for
UNOSOM II to defend against." In addition, since the 1974 Turkish
invasion of Cyprus, UNFICYP has strongly aided efforts at keeping Greece
and Turkey from going to war. But must it remain in Cyprus indefinitely?
Thus, containment is not enough; eventually resolution must take place.
Limiting Casualties
The final indicator of success for a UN peacekeeping operation is whether
it limited casualties. This is determined by comparing the number of
casualties in the conflict (both military and civilian) prior to, and after, the
deployment of the peacekeeping operation. In general, a complete success
requires a significant reduction in casualties from the beginning of the
operation. Meanwhile, a moderate success occurs when the operation, after
some periodic flare-ups, is eventually able to limit casualties. Finally, an
operation is considered to have failed at limiting casualties if it has had little
or no effect on the overall rate of casualties.
70 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE
Mandate Performance
Using the first indicator of operational success, mandate performance, UN
peacekeeping has, in general, been marginally successful (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
MANDATE SUCCESS
Conflict Containment
Of all the indicators of operational success, conflict containment has shown
to have the greatest degree of success (see Table 3). One example of
completely successful conflict containment was UNTAC. As Findlay stated,
an 'outspoken strategic aim of the Paris Accords' was 'the de-
internationalization of the Cambodian conflict'." This was achieved
through UNTAC's implementation of the Paris Accords. Vietnam has
withdrawn its troops from Cambodia, and China has stopped supporting the
Khmer Rouge. In fact, rather than hindering UNTAC's efforts, the five
permanent members of the Security Council and other regional states
provided great support through their participation in the Core Group for
Cambodia. Even the Thai military, which has aided and abetted the Khmer
Rouge, has not given any indications that it would intervene into
Cambodia's domestic affairs. Thus, Cambodia, through the efforts of
UNTAC, has ceased to be a source of regional tensions.
TABLE 3
SUCCESS AT CONTAINING THE CONFLICT
Limiting Casualties
UN peacekeepers have been moderately successful in limiting casualties in
the conflicts where they have been deployed (see Table 4).
ONUSAL, which was created in 1991 to verify the implementation of
the peace agreement between the El Salvador government and the FMLN,
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 77
TABLE 4
SUCCESS AT LIMITING CASUALTIES
Conclusion
This study has dealt with two main tasks. First, it has developed a set of
criteria which can be used to assess the success of UN peacekeeping
operations. These criteria include four indicators of operational success:
mandate, conflict resolution, containing the conflict, and limiting casualties.
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 79
TABLE 5
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to thank Tom Keating, Juris Lejnieks, Paul Diehl, Wolfgang Biermann, as well as
the anonymous referees, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
NOTES
1 Marjorie Ann Brown, 'United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current
Issues', Reportfor Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1993.
2. Paul F. Diehl, InternationalPeacekeeping,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993.
3. Ibid., p.36.
4. Thomas G. Weiss, 'The United Nations and Civil Wars', in Weiss (ed.), The United Nations
197
and Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.
.
5. This study has made a few changes in how it totals the number of peacekeeping operations.
First, the operations in Haiti and Rwanda have been split into two (UNMIH I, UNMIH II,
UNAMIR I, UNAMIR II) with the dividing line being the UN-authorized military
intervention which occurred in both countries. Second, UNAVEM III (created in February
1995) and UNTAES (created in January 1996) have been excluded because the operations
have just been established.
6. Brown (see n.l above), pp.20-9.
7. Diehl (n.2 above), p.36.
8. Brown examined UNTSO, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNEF I, UNEF II, and UNDOF, while Diehl
examined UNEF I, UNEF II, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, and the non-UN Multinational
Force (MNF) in the Lebanon.
9. Robert C. Johansen, 'U.N. Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?', Mershon
InternationalStudies Review, Vol.38, 1994, pp.309-10. The suggestion that peacekeeping
success should be determined by assessing 'the effect of the operation on the people in those
countries in which the missions are deployed' was also made in Sandra Whitworth, 'Where
is the Politics in Peacekeeping?', InternationalJournal, Vol.50, No.2, spring 1995, p. 4 2 8
.
.
31. S/1995/342, 1 May 1995.
32. S/1996/5, 2 Jan. 1996.
33. S/1996/5, 2 Jan. 1996.
34. SC Res. 912, 21 April 1994.
35. S/1995/297, 9 April 1995.
36. Confidential interview, New York, 9 Nov. 1994.