Topic - Il Interpretation and Construction eably but the: ion’ is @ y are different. ©, These two words are used interchang term of wider Scop, can be differentiated from the other. ‘Construct than ‘interpretation’. 4 ., tO ascertaj, f in view ie. a Both construction and interpretation has one aim In mits its scope nl the legislative intention of the statute. Interpretatio! on tons ‘Construction’ goes beyond the exploring the written text. “Interpretation” preceeds constructio, take the aid of extrinsic consideration. but stops at the written text. used in Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense ‘of words used the statutes by giving respect to the direct expression of the text or within wing of conclusion after giv the letters of the text. Construction is the dra\ respect to the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text Topic - Ill Literal Rule of Interpretation Or Grammatical Interpretation M3 or ak A verbis legis nonest residendum e or Verbis Standum Ubi Nulla Ambiguitas All rules of interpretation or canons of construction havi view ie., to ascertain the legislative intention of the Statute. ze air 28The literal rule of interpretation is one of the basic rules of construing a statute. The literal rule of interpretation gives much importance to the words and phrases used in the statute. According to this rule, words, phrases and sentences are to be given their ordinary natural meaning. If the language used in the statute is clear, unambiguous and admits only one meaning, the judge should accept it and enforce it eventhough the result is harsh, unjust er absurd. This is the basic rule of construction, The court has to expound the law as it stands. The judge has to give due respect to the /etira legis, the letter of the law, There are two maxims which constitute the basis of literal interpretation. They are: 1. A verbis legis nonest residendum - \t means “ from the words of the law there should not be any departure”. 2. Verbis standum ubi nulla ambiguitas - It means “ one must abide by the words where there is no ambiguity” The following illustrations from Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes elucidate the literal rule. Short v. Mc.Carthy (1820) 3 B& Ald. 626 The Statute of Limitation provided that “an action should not be brought after the lapse of one year from the accrual of the cause of action and actions brought after the time of limit are barred’. The court applied the literal rule for interpreting the above stated provision and dismissed the suit filed after the period of one year from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Actually the injured party could not discover the cause of action because of the fraud ‘on the part of the wrongdoer within the period of one year. Nevertheless court has not entertained the suit. The result was unjust and harsh Kenyon vy. Eastwood ( 1888) 57 L.J.Q.B. 455 An Act provided that orders of committal should be in the open court The Magistrate passed an order of committal in a room next to the actualappelate court applied court room which wae alee, open. to te publies. Te tute and held that the the titeral rule for interpreting the provieion in the 8 order was invalid, Mathews v. Dobbins (1963)1 W.L.R 227 An Act provided that, if a lessee fails to pay rent, the | his right of re-entry and for that purpose lessor can file lessor filed a case against le: for eviction on the groun' ‘of rent. Another provision in the statute stated that if the lessee depo: arrears of rent in the court he is not liable to be evicted. A stranger 's of rent in the court. The court ordered eviction of the applying literal rule of interpretation, since | money. lessor can enforce suit. In this case d of non-payment From these illustrative decisions it is clear that the 7 anything to the provision in the statute. A judge cannot fi gaps in the legislation. Similarly judge cannot delete statute while applying literal rule. In Basavaraj R. Pattil v. State of Karnataka Supreme Court observed that “ where the legislat there is no scope of reading between lines or putting an to the intention of the legislature”. In State of Maharashtra v. Nanded Parbani ZL! (2000) 2 SCC 69, the Supreme Court observed that “the | legislature is required to be gathered from the inguage a construction, which requires for its support an ad words or which results in rejection of words as meanin avoided”. oes in Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash (2001) 8 SCC 61 Supreme Court observed that * the intention of the legislature is prima 30 eeMegas. be gathered from the language used in the statute, paying attention to what has been said and also to what has not been said. When words used are literal meaning has to be applied.” pot ambiguout In Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Supreme Court had stated some basic principles of interpretation of statutes. They are: 1. The Court must proceed on the assumptio did not mistake and it did what it intented to do. 2. The court must adopt a construction which will carry out the n that the legislature obvious intention of the legislature. 3. The court may not add words to a statute or read words which are not there, especially when the plain reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are there. into it Ltd (2001) 1 SCC 207, from In C.1.T v. Plantation Corporation of Ker: the Supreme Court held that the legislative intent has to be found out the words used. In the absence of any ambiguity in the provision, recourse to internal or external aids to interpretation is impermissible. In Gurudevadatta v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 4 SCC 534, the Supreme Court observed thus: “ It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. Itis nota sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances 31jatute. conceivable within the contemplation of thi In Harshad §. Metha v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 8 SCC 257, the Supreme Court held that where language is plain and admits only one construction, that construction must be adopted, whatever be its effect. in Patangrao Kadam v. P. 8.¥. Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, it was held that where language of the provision is plain and unambiguous the same has to be given effect to. It is not open to first create an ambiguity and then look for some principle of interpretation. In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273, a five J - Bench of the Supreme Court observed that it is a cardinal principfe of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical constr on the ground that such construction is more consistent with object and policy of the Act. the Supreme Court held that the grammatical and plain preferred unless that leads to absurdity or anomaly. In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC Supreme Court held that in a case where the statutory provisio plain and unambiguous, the Court shall not interpret the same in ' t only because of harsh consequences arising theref: a Court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the ° it is well known that in a given case the court can iron out cannot change the texture of the fabric, It cannot enlarge legislation or intention when the language of the F unambiguous. It cannot add or substract words to. into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast: 32In Bhaji v, Sub- Divisional Officer (2003) 1 SCC 692, the Supreme Court held that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The legislature may be safely presumed to have intented what the words plainly say. The plain words can be departed from when reading them as they are leads to patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or invalidation of a law. In Madhava v. Pathumabi ( 2005 (3) KLT 369), it was observed by a Division Bench of the the High Court of Kerala that in a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambigous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. It is a well established canon of construction that the court should read the statutory provision as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. In Manoharan Pillai v. State and another (ILR 2005 (2) Ker. 269) it was observed by a Division Bench of the the High Court of Kerala that the court has no power to overlook the specific meaning of the words assigned to a particular word in the definition section. When the words of statute are clear, plain or unambiguous that is, they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh (2005 (10) SCC 437), the Supreme Court observed that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, as construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in 33i id that a stat rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. itis said statute ciple of interpretation o, is an edict of the Legislature. The elementary prin : legis of the legislature construing a statue is to gather the mens or sententia In Raghunath Rai Bareja_v. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230, the Supreme Court held that the court should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the grab of interpretation, which is not permissible Topic -1V Golden Rule of Interpreta or Baron Parke’s Rule The ‘Golden Rule of Interpretation’ is a modification of Literal Rule of Interpretation. The Golden Rule enables the court to modify the language of statute if it is found that the literal interpretation would result in absurdity or inconvenience or injustice. The Golden Rule of Interpretation is also known as Baron Parke’s Rule Baron Parke explained the golden rule of interpretation in Becks v. Smith (1836) 2 M&W 191. According to Baron Parke, “itis a very useful rule in the construction of a statue to adhere to the ordinary meaning of t words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the Legislature to be collected from the statute itself, o leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no furthe The ‘Golden Rule of Interpretation’ was stated by Lord Wensleydale Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61. According to Lord Wensleydale construing statutes, as in construing all other written instruments grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless ' 34ae ee. «a would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistancy with grammatical and the ordinary the rest of the instrument, in which case the absurdity and sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that inconsistancy, but no further” The Golden Rule of Interpretation 6 that, while interpreting statute the court has to adopt literal or grammatical interpretation. If such an approach leads to some absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistancy, the court can modify the words for the purpose of avoiding such absurdity, repugnancy of inconsistancy, but no further. Decided Cases Lee v. Knappi (1967) 2 Q.B. 442 The Road Traffic Act,1960 required the drivers of motor vehicles to stop the vehicle after an accident. In this case the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident had stopped the vehicle for a moment and driven away. The court held that if ‘Literal Rule of Interpretation’ is followed, the driver is not responsible since he has stopped the vehicle after the accident. But following the ‘Literal Rule’ would lead to absurdity and injustice. In order to avoid the absurdity, the court held that ‘the driver of motor vehicle shall stop’ means that ‘the driver of vehicle shall stop and remain there for such time so as to enable authorities who have a right to sufficient period of The court thus adopted collect sufficient information about the accident’. Golden Rule of Interpretation and modified the language of the statute in order to avoid absurdity. Day v. Simpson (1865) 18 C.B (N.S) 680 The Theatres Act,1843 prescribed a penalty for the performance of plays without licence on stage. A group of players performed the play in a chamber below the stage. The figures were reflected by mirrors so that it appeared to the spectators that the players are on the stage. The court held that though the players were not playing on the stage, they were bound to take licence under the Act.rovision In 1963 8C1604),4 PI In State of Punjab v. O.).Begum ip ainet an award should be in the Land Aquisition Act stated that an oe ae eeu n ioral or Preferred within six months from the da ,, because an Grammatical interpretation of words would lead to absurdity, aggreived person who has come to know of the award after six months from the date of award cannot prefer an appeal becau: of the lapse of ee In order to avoid the repugnancy and absurdity, the Supreme Court modified the section and held that the expression six months from the date of award means the date when the award is communicated to the party. 'n Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India (2002) 3 S' the Supreme Court held that the grammatical and plain meaning Preferred unless that leads to absurdity or anomaly. near In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that it is a cardinal prit construction of a statute that when the language of the st unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words: and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothet) on the ground that such construction is more consistent wi object and policy of the Act. If on going through the language of statute it leads to anomalies, injustices and s, then the court may look into the purpose for which the st and try to give a meaning which would adhere to the pury of the statute it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside N a statute as being inapposite surplusage if they can have appropria circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of lute. Th legislature is deemed not to waste its words or say any Wp vain and construction which attributes redundancy to the leg will not 6 accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not issible ' add words to a statute which are not there unless ona —..... being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But betore a words are read to repair an omission in the Act it should be possible to sta with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the drattsn of the 46 fAS and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission pofore the bill has passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilifulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a cituation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as'to make the statute effective. Topic -V Mischief Rule of Interpretation or Rule in Heydon’s Case The Mischief Rule of Interpretation is otherwise known as ‘Rule in Heydons case’. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation was propounded by Lord Coke in 1584 while deciding the Heydon’s case. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation insists that the court should adopt that construction, which would supress the mischief and advance the remedy. While deciding the Heydon’s case, Lord Coke stated the Mischief Rule. According to him, for the interpretation of all statutes, four things are to be considered by the Judge. 1. What was the law before the present Act was passed ? 2. What was the mischief and defect for which there was no law ? 3. What is the remedy provided by the legislature for avoiding the disease or mischief ? 4. The true reason of the mischief. After considering these four aspects, the judge has to make such a construction which would supress the mischief and advance the remedy. Decided Cases Smith v. Hughes (1960) 1 W.L.R 830 The Street Offence Act prohibited by prescribing penalty the practice of Soliciting on streets by prostitutes. Thereafter the prostitutes started to solicit 37liciting from balcony, urt held that the 80 a Je to be punished the a balconies. Th Passers- by from tao they, are WlAb is also a mischief and for that practice @ G 1 Q.B 294 jorman vy. Standen (1964) t for assisting in the The Sexual Offences Act prescribed punishmen| A step-daughter was living in a brothel managed management of a brothel. to what is to be as to B by her step-mother. The step-daughter had a right to say ee happened in the house, The court held that the step-daughter was assisting in the management of brothel and punishable under the Act. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1955 SC 661) if In this case, the Supreme Court held that the mischief rule proj id by Lord Coke in Heydon's case is a sound rule of construction. The Supreme Court applied the mischief rule while interpreting taxing statute. R.M.D.Chamarbaugwalla_ v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 628) In this case Supreme Court held that the Lord Coke’s formula is @ sound rule of construction to arrive at the real meaning of the statute. NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd ( 1999 (2) KL °)) In this case the appellant cumpany issued a cheque in favour of the respondent company for discharging some existing liability. The cheque was returned unpaid with remark “ account cl Then the responden: company filed a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrumen: Act before the Magistrate. According to section 138 of the Negotiab!< Instruments Act if a cheque is returned unpaid for the reason of “insufficienc of funds” the person who has drawn the cheque shall be punishable wit imprisonment of a term which may extend to one year, or with fine whic may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. The accus. contented that if the cheque was dishonored for the reason “ account clos« the criminal liability under section 138 would not arise and thus the crimi: proceedings pending before Magistrate should be quashed, The Supreme Court has applied the rule in Heydon’s case in interpre 38i section 138 of the Act and held that a person who has returned the cheque unpaid for reason account closed also is liable to be punished under section 438 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was held that in the interpretation of penal provisions, any interpretation which withdraws the life and blood of hould be avoided. the provision and makes it ineffective and a dead lett The court should interpret a provision so as to supress the mischief and advance the remedy. In Rural Development Authority v. Anupam Sahkare Gridh Nirmana Samiti (2000)4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court held that whenever there are two possible interpretations, that one subserves to the intent of the legislature is to be accepted. The object of the Town Act is for planned development and thus the interpretation, which upholds any such scheme should be followed. Heydon’s principle is now well recognised in interpreting any enactment. It lays down that courts must see- (a) what was the law before making of the Act; (b) what was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide; (c) what is the remedy that the Act has provided; (d) what is the reason of the remedy. It states that courts must adopt that construction which supresses the mischief and advances the remedy. Topic - VI Purposive Construction The Legislature enacts a statute with certain objects and purposes in mind. The Legislature intends to achieve the objects and purposes contemplated in the statute. In the interpretation of a statute, the court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation. If the application of the plain meaning of the word used in the statute does not result in achieving the object and purpose of the statute, or leads to 39“purposive construction” fo, Id adopt : rt of the Act. if the language used in injustice or absurdity, the court sho! giving full effect to the object and pUrPOr” ©" iewe interpretation, the the statute is unambigous, instead of applying PUrP ing. If the provision words should be given their natural and anne ge ns ws, in the statute has an ambiguity and is capable 0! ive lif than one, the provision should be read so as to 9 eaningless provision lifeless letter. The interpretation that is given to the:m should make it meaningful. ie to an otherwise The rule of purposive construction permits the judge to give life to the lifeless letter in the statute. The meaning that which is attributed to a provision or a word in the statute should result in achievment of the object and purpose of the statute. So the judges should assign the meaning to the provisions keeping in mind the general purpose and object of the statute. A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. The court has to give effect to the true object of the Act by adopting a purposive approach. Merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted so as to defeat its object. In Union of India - v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 27: 7 Court observed : “ It is a cardinal principle of construction © when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguol a must give effect to the words used in the statute. If on ¢ plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to ano s, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for wt ich the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, whiob would adhere t the purpose of the statute. g through the In Easland Combines v. CCE (2003) 3 SCC 410, the Supreme Cou held that merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted a manner so as to defeat its object. The courts are not concerned with th legislative policy or with the result, whether injurious or otherwise, by givir effect to the language used. Where the meaning of a Particular provision clear, it is not the function of the court not to give effect to it m 1 it would lead to some hardship. erely becau It is the duty imposed on the courts 40interpret a particular provision of law to ascertain the meaning and intendment of the legislature and in doing so, they should presume that the provision was designed to effectuate a particular object or to meet a particular requirement. in DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held that the rule of purposive construction would be resorted to only when lite ly read the statue leads to manifest injustice or absurdity. In Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 2303), the Supreme Court held that a statute must be construed having regard to the legislative intent. It has to be meaningful. A construction which leads to manifest absurdity must not be preferred to a construction which would fulfil the object and purport of the legislative intent. Topic - VIl Ut res magis valeat quam pereat The maxim Ut res magis valeat quam pereat means that the thing may have effect rather than be destroyed. There is a presumption that a word or words used in a statute is not unnecessary or without any purpose to serve. In the field of interpretation of statutes, one of the basic rules is that the courts should not consider any word or provision in the statute as redundant or superfluous or unnecessary. It could not be assumed that the legislature had used any word without any purpose. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. _ In the interpretation of statutes, the courts should always presume that the legislature inserted every part of the statute for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the Statute should have an effect. in Sankar Ram&Co. v. Kasi Naieker, (2003) 11 SCC 699, the Su- preme Court observed that it is a cardinal rule of construction that normally No word or provision should be considered redundant or superfluous in in- 4> \ nee Provisions of a statute. In the field of interpretation of statui,, with a pulsars Presume that the legislature inserted every. part ther,,, anetis have ee the legislative intention is that every part of the statu), aotanalee ie It may not be correct to Say that a word or words used ;, there ata Se cctieh unnecessary or without any purpose to serve, unles; and having saan Morons to say so looking to the scheme of the statu, © the object and purpose sought to be achieved by it. Topic vin Ontextual Construction “en When a question arise: Sion in a statute. Provision i 'S as to the meaning of a certain word or provi » it is not only legitimate but proper to read that word o, ° its context. A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchange« It is the skin of tiving th ought and may vary greatly in colour and conter: according to the circumstances and the time in which the same is used. S. the word and provisions are to be interpreted in the context in which it i. used. The contextual construction says that the meaning of a word or prov sion is to be ascertained by - (i) reading the statute as a whole, (ii) ascertaining the previous and existing state of law, (iii) considering other statutes in pari materia, (iv) looking into the general scope of the statute, and (v) examining the mischief that it was intended to remedy. In Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar(20 5 SCC 346. it was held that Statutes should not be construed as theorer Euclid (rule in algebra expressed as a formula) but with some imagination o purposes which lie behind them and to be too literal in the meaning of w« is to see the skin and miss the soul. The method * suggeste adoption, in cases of doubt as to the meaning of the words used is t plore the intention of the legislature through the words, the context s the colour, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequ: 2 give Jw. The general words and collection of or the spirit and reason of the je are to be phrases, howsoever wide or comprehensive in their lite interpreted from the context and scheme underlying in the text of the Act. In Union of India _v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd (2001) 4 SCC 139, the Supreme Court held that when the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context. The context means the stat- ute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in par/ materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter) (2002) 8 SCC 237, the Supreme Court held that it is a settled principle that in interpreting the stat- ute the words used therein cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. The word “context” in its widest sense in- cludes (i) other provisions of the same statute and its preamble, (ii) the ex- isting state of law, (iii) other statutes in pari materia, and (iv) the mischief which the statute intented to remedy. While making such interpretation, the roots of the past, the foilage (all the leaves of a tree) of the present and the seeds of the future cannot be lost sight of. Context would quite often provide the key to the meaning of the word and the sense it should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a clue to the intention of the legislature in using it. In Grasim Industries Ltd . v. Collector of Customs (2002) 4 SCC 297, it is held that every provision and every word in a statute must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used and not in isolation. No word or expression used in any statute can be said to be redundant (unnecessary) or superfluous (not needed). In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.Topic -1x Rule of Beneficial Interpretation or Doctrine of Benevolent Construction or Construction of Beneficent Legislation The Legislature may enact a statute with the object of conferring ben. efit ( welfare) to a weaker section of the community. In the interpretation of Such a welfare statute, the courts should follow the rule of benevolent con. struction. The rule of Beneficial Interpretation says that when the language of the “beneficent or welfare statute is capable of two interpretations, one which would Promote and the other which would defeat the purpose of the Statute; the court must adopt that construction which would Promote its ob- ject‘and avoid that which would defeat it. According to Maxwell, Beneficial Construction is a tendency rather than a rule. The rule of Benevolent Construction is usually applied in the interpre tation of statutes providing for benefit or welfare of the weaker sections o: the community. Thus in the interpretation of labour legislations, land reforms legislations, rent control legislations, insurance Statutes, statutes fixing cor pensation for accidental injury etc., this rule of interpretation is being ap plied by the courts. According to the Rule of Beneficial Construction in inte preting beneficent statutes the court has to give that meaning to the sectio fit to the persons for whose benefit th Act was enacted. 44example The Workmen's Compensation Act,1923 is enacted to confer benefit to an injured workman. By virtue of the provisions of the Act the employer is liable to pay compensation to his workman who sustains personal injury by accident out of and in the course of his employment. By applying the rule of peneficent construction the courts have held that an employer will be liable to pay compensation - (a) When a workman is robbed and murdered while he was (b) When a driver died due to heart attack in the course of his employment . (©) When a factory boy was killed in police action while he was on duty, on duty. Decided Cases Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. The Management (AIR 1973 SC, 1227) The Supreme Court while interpreting section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.1947 observed thus: “this Act is the beneficial piece of legisla- tion enacted in the interest of the employees. It is well settled that in con- struing the provisions of a welfare legislation, the court should adopt what is described as a Beneficial Rule of Construction. If two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the construc- tion which would promote the policy and object of the Act and is more ben- eficial to the employees is to be adopted. The Act is intended to improve the service conditions of the workmen demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve that purpose. Shaym Sunder v. Ram Kumar (2001) 8 SCC 24 A five judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the rules of inter- pretation are meant to assist the court in advancing the ends of justice. It is also true in the case of application of rule of benevolent construction. If on application of the rule of benevolent construction, the court finds that it would be doing justice within the parameters of law the judge can apply the rule. 45court. The courts are NOt just, the . tances: jowing ciroums' i Jogisiation ofa provisio y ords and violence would ‘of But there are limitations on the pow’ fied in applying the rule under the fol! (i) Where the result would be Te" addition, substitution or alteration of w' be done to the epirit of the provision: =, (ii) Where words of provision are capable ° meaning. (iil) Where there is no ambiguity in a provision: en only one Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar ( 2002) 8 SCC 400 The Supreme Court held that in the case of “bread k for the Statutes and the welfare legislations introduced in the statute bool ° Purpose of eradication of social malady, it is the duty incumbent on mel to offer a much broader interpretation ( beneficent construction) keeping | - and - butter view the purpose of legislation. Topic -X Restrictive Interpretation Interpretation of Penal Statutes ff Rule of Strict Construction The words used in the statutes are a medium of ascertaining the in tention of legislature. The words and phrases may have wide and compre hensive meaning in their literal sense. If such a wide meaning is taken it may lead to absurd results, hardships or inconveniences. Some times such an approach may defeat the very purpose or object of the Act. Under such circumstance the court should give a restricted meaning to the words use in the statutes in order to avoid absurd results and hardships. The Rule of Strict Construction says that while interpreting penal st utes the judge should adopt that meaning which confer benefit of doubt the accused 46Mustrations provided by Maxwall ahows the application of the rule of restrictive interpretation oF strict interpretation. 1 A statute made it felony to break from prison. A prisoner broke Out from the prison in order to save his life white there was fire in the pr The prisoner should not be convicted for felony stricted interpretation is warranted. 2 A statute declared that to make revolt in the ship is piracy. The crew in the ship revolted because of the irresistible cruelty from the part of master of the ship. The court held that they are not liable for piracy because the revolt was necessary to restrain the master of the ship from unlawfully killing persons on board. 3 A statute imposed three months imprisonment and forfeiture of wages from a servant who has absented himself from the ser- vice. A workman who has absented himself with justification (due to illness) was not liable to be punished under the statute. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity, there is no need for construction. All penal statutes are to be construed strictly. The rule says that the court must see that the things charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used. If two possible and reasonable construction can be put upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards that construction which ex- empts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. In S.K.D.L.F.W. Industries v. K.V. Sivi ‘ama krishnan (1995) (1) KLT 124, the court observed thus: the rule exhibits the preference for the liberty of the subject. In a case of ambiguity the strict rule enables the court to resolve the doubts in favour of the subject and against the legislature which has failed to express itself clearly. 47(1996) (6) SCC 409, the ions strict construction jg necessarily the reason. Nagoty Venkataramana In State of AP v- ; provis S.C held that in the interpretation of penal required to be adopted and if any real doubt arises, able benefit of doubt would be extended to the accused. State of AP (AIR 1996 SC 2184),it was held In $.Gopal Reddy v- penal statute must that “one of the cardinal rules of interpretation is that a be strictly interpreted. They do not ignore the golden thread passing through criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till his guilt is proved. The guilt of an accused must be established beyond a rea- sonable doubt. The judge should adopt strict construction of penal provision and the benefit of doubt should be extented to the accused”. In Bijaya Kumar Agarwal v- State of Orissa (1996) 5 a 1, the Supreme Court held that if two constructions are reasonably possible, one which exempts a person from penalty, it is to be favoured. The following are the main principles of interpretation of penal stat: utes: 5 A penal statute should be interpreted strictly in favour of the accused. if 2. No person shall be punished unless his act comes within the plain meaning of the words creating an offence. 3. If the statute is capable of two constructions, then that which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 4. If there is a reasonable doubt in the statutory provision the ben efit of doubt should go to the accused. 5. It is for the Legislature and not the Court to create an offence 6. Express language is necessary for the creation of an offence 7. Mens rea is required in every criminal act unless excluded © ther expressly or by necessary implication. 48While interpros; re} i ; construction wifey ting fiscal or taxing statutes the court should adopt that ment. In the ‘ig at Prevent persons from evading an Act of Parlia- which Would ne of taxing statutes, the court Should adopt that meaning at ictne one allow the Subjects from evading the Act. The language aI Statute (tax) shall not be i constru: f - Payer, 80 as to permit + led in favour of the tax im to evade from the tax obligation. Taxing statute ‘Onstruction, However, if two vie. 'SS@ssee must be adopted. faxin, must be given Strict o WS are possible, the Hansraj & Sons y, State of J& kK (2002) 6 SCC 227 The Supreme Court held tha: ta taxing statute should be construed strictly. Cemento Corpn. Ltd. v. CCE (2002) 8 SCC 139 s The Supreme Court held that in the case of taxing statute, if two inter- Pretations are possible, the one favourable to the taxpayer should be adopted. Union of India v, Omkar S. Kanwar (2002) 7 SCC 59 The Supreme Court held that if two views are Possible, one in favour of the assessee (tax - payer) must be adopted. Kurian Abraham (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (2004 (1) KLT 498) A Full Bench (three judges) of the Kerala High Court held that a person 49rovides for it. Provisions a cannot be taxed unless the provision clearly P taxing statutes have to be construed strictly. of interpretation of Taxing Statute, The following are the general principl interpret 1 A taxing statute should b strictly 1 2. Noone shall be taxed uniess the liability to pay tax comes with; the letter of the law. vam The benefit of any ambiguity must go to the assessee- 4 No subject can be taxed by inference or analogy. Topic -Xil Rule of Ejusdem Generis The Rule of Ejusdem Generis literally means ‘of the same kind or spe cies’. The rule says that when there is a general word following particula: and specific words, the general word must be confined to the things of the same kind. According to Maxwell, the general word which follows specific words takes its meaning irom them and is presumed to to the same genus of those words. In order to apply the rule of Ejusdern Generis the following condition are to be satisfied: bias 1 The sections should contain an enumeration of specific words 2 The members of the enumeration (specific words) should co stitute a class. 3 The class should not be exhausted by the enumeration. 4 A general term should follow that enumeration. if all the above conditions are satisfied the meaning of the gene term is to be ascertained with respect to the spegific terms, * 50 * e Decidex Clark Ss for rent product: produc and cor produc differen hops, fr cannot family c Ratans s acquire other n F obtainir questi ‘other 5 of ghes a strued Ejusde nature Ghee i as milk Kairbe tion 2(Decideg Ca Clark ye lark oy, mem art Section g oy “Y (1818) 8 Taunt 431 th PE TOM ON all typg, ce Distros felsian et "Act, 1737, authorised the distress Products Whatsoe Sorn ang gra vi hops, root, fruits, Pulses and other Ratansi Hirji v. Emperor (1937) B, 274 Section 912°. ye i A of the Bombay Munici; acquire a licence before he could use any plac other milk Products. pal Act required a Person to @ for the sale of milk, butter or The court held that the words ‘other milk Products’ should be con- strued with reference to what preceded those words. By applying the Rule of Ejusdem Generis the court held that ghee is not of the same kind or in the nature of milk or butter. The milk and butter are liable to speedy decay. Ghee is not liable to speedy decay. Thus it is not of the same kind or nature as milk or butter. Kairbetta Estate v. Raja Manikyam (1960 II LLU 276 (SC ) The Supreme Court interpreted the definition of ‘lay-off’ given in sec- tion 2(kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. 51f the Act, “ay-off’ means the failure, re- nt of shortage of coal, power or down of machine! By virtue of section 2 (kkk) o fusal or inability of the employer on accou! raw materials, accumulation of stock oF the break any other reason to give employment to the workmen. ry or for They claimed that ‘lock-out’ d so they are liable to pay cific words used in the ‘lay-off must be fully refuses to The management declared ‘lock-out’. comes within the expression ‘any other reason’ ani only half the wages. The court held that when the spe section are examined, it is clear that the reasons for the beyond the control of the employer. If the employer purpose give employment, it is only ‘lock-out’ and not ‘lay -off’. f Kerala (1996) (2) K-L.J - lication of the neral word In Nature Lovers Movement v. State 0 804 , K.S.Radhakrishnan.J. held, “it is essential for the app! Ejusdem Generis rule that the enumerated things before the ge! must constitute a category or a genus or a family which admits a number of species or members. If the specified things preceding general words be- longing to different categories this principle of construction will not apply- a 7 In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (2002) 4 SCC 297, it was held that the rule of ejusdem generis has to be applied with care ion. This is not an inviolable rule of law, but it is only permissible and cauti inference, in the absence of any indication to the contrary. Topic -XIill Noscitur a sociis The principle noscitur a sociis means “the meaning of a word can b known by its associates”. When there is coupling of words in a statut« meaning of a particular word is to be understood from the other words. Whe the meaning of a word is obscure or doubtful, the intention of the les i i may be ascertained by looking on the adjoining words. ae 52According to Lor ret. é ‘4 Me Millan, * ar lay pe known by the company & ¢ Noscitur @ sociie” means ‘a word ye : ; fs His Lordship vin, ; ' Krishna lyerJ. expressed the necessity of the maxim: noseitur @ sociig in the following words: W birds of a feather flock together, noscitur a sociis is a common sense guide to construction", His Lordship made this observation while deciding Banglore Water Supply Sewage Boar, dv. Rajappa ( 1978 Lab 1C (SC) 467 ) in this case His Lordship interpreted the Word ‘undertaking’ used in the det: nition of industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act ,1947 by applying the Principle noscitur a sociis. URC. v. Frere (1965 AC 402 ) The Income Tax Act,1952 dealt with the words “interest, annuties or other annual payments’. The expression ‘interest’ was held to mean annual interest only. Pengelly v. Bell Punch Co. Ltd. (1964) | W.L.R 1055 The Factories Act, 1961 provided that, “floor, steps, stairs, passages and gangways are to be kept free from obstruction. The word ‘floor’ would include that part of the factory floor properly used for the Purpose of storage of goods. The court held that the expression ‘floor’ is limited to those parts of the factory floor upon which the workmen are intended to pass and re- pass. In order to arrive at this conclusion the court applied the principle of noscitur a sociis. Rv. Harris (1836) 7 C&P 446 The Offences Against Person Act made it a felony to ‘stab’, ‘cut’ or “wound any person. The court applied the rule of Noscitur A Sociis and held that the word ‘wound’ here means an injury inflicted by an instrument and to 333 ice NGer or causing wound by fire would not amount to ‘wound’ Within, Ning of the Act. bite off a §j the Stat i Tai Vv. Sripal Jain (AIR 1963 S.C 1323) removing or Bo a oe of business required that proposal for dismissing, Nor. The elieation bat ly retiring an officer should be referred to the Gover. On attaining tne efore the court was whether the compulsorily retirement age of superannuation need to be sent to the Governor The court h st oe eld: compulsorily retirement in the form of punishment need only ‘ent to the Governor, For decidin: im 8 Ssociis’ 1g So the court applied the maxim ‘noscitur Topic-XIv Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius The maxim means express words in the statute shut the door to fur- ther implication. If legislature has expressly mentioned one thing, we cannot consider that those items excluded are there. If the legislature expressly mentions one or more things of a particular class, then it may be regarded that the legislature has purposefully excluded all other members of that class. Illustration A statute empowers a Magistrate to issue summons or warrant for the purpose of compelling a person to attend before the court. In such a case the Magistrate cannot attach the properties of the person whose attendanc: is required for the purpose of compelling him to attend before the court. Taylor v. Taylor (1975 1 Ch. D. 426 ) The court observed that when a statutory power is conferred on court for the first time, and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, then other mode is to be adopted. This maxim is an auxiliary rule of construction. It is neither a unive a conclusive rule. This rule is to be applied with caution. 54 norAccording to Ho dangerous mast, things is often ie {0 follow in the construction of statutes. The exclusion of Bae be app @ result of inadvertence or accident and the maxim ought plied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice. Pes.C.J, “this rule is often a valuable servant but a Topic-xXv Construction of Words in Bonam Partem This rule says that words used in the statute are to be taken in their lawful and rightful Sense. If a statute requires a person to answer questions, the meaning is that he shall answer them truly to the best of his knowledge. So also if an Act gives a freedom to do a thing, it is to be taken as a thing which is lawfully done, Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or busi- ness. This Article is to be interpreted in the sense that citizen shall have a right to practice any /awful profession or to carry on any lawful occupation, trade or business. Topic-XVI Reddendo Singula Singulis This rule of construction means, ‘referring each to each’. When there are phrases or expressions and objects in a section each phrase or expres- sion should be used along with the appropriate object. When a sentence in a statute contains several antecedents and consequences they are to be read distributively. Illustrations 1. Article 304 of the Constitution of India contains a proviso. It says that “No bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (B) shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of the state without previous sanction of the Presi- 55dene, This Provi S8Nction ot ‘Sion should be i the President no leg Interpreted as follows:- Without the previous bill. shall be introduced or an amendment be Moved in 4 h e ‘ature of a state tor the Purpose of clause(B) of Art. 304. 2 Ss tien ction 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follow: scribed Period for any suit, a urt is closed, the suit, r made on the day wh \s referred to s) and the expression ‘mad “Where Ppeal or application expires on a day Rreferreg ‘instituted? en the court reopens’. The expression uit, the expression ‘preferred’ is referred to appeal le’ is referred to application. 3. Order to cai The word A statute says if any one shall draw or load any_sword or gun in ‘Use apprehension in the mind of another, he is liable for assault. ‘draw’ refers to sword and the expression load refers to gun, it is because to load a Sword or to draw a gun is impossible. Topic - XVII Harmonious Construction 5 When there are two provisions in an enactment which are apparently conflicting, they should be so interpreted as to give effect to both. One provi- sion in a statute should not be construed to defeat another provision. This i= called the Rule of Harmonious Construction. When there is conflict betwocr two provisions, the court should adopt that construction 1 d pro duce greatest harmony and the least inconsistency between sions Mlustration Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 lows. “A accomplice shall be a competent witness against an ¢ on, and testimony of an accomplice”.ON 0 section 4 SUM® that an Material par 14 of the Evidence Act reads as follows. “The “coomplioe i@ unworthy of credit, unless he is toulara*, Wustray court may pre, The 8PParont reduced by the court Harmonious Construct SONtTAdiction belwaon these4wo dectarations ie to be "0d for that purpose the court has to apply the rule of lon. The court should state the rule as follows: “Though ‘Scused on the testimony of an accomplice is not illegal, ‘Oboration in material particulars and in the absence of Ne accused should be acquitted”. were should be corn such Sorroboration ¢ Bhiva Douler Pati y, State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1963 SC 599) In this case the Supreme Court ha: applied the doctrine of Harmoni- ®us Construction in interpreting section 133 and iflustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the accused was acquitted for the reason that there was NO corroboration for the testimony of accomplice. The court observed, “the combined effect of section 133 and 114 illustration (b) is that, though the conviction of an accused on the ti stimony of an accom- plice cannot be said to be illegal yet the court as a matter of Practice not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material par- ticulars”. Sultana Begum vy. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 S.c.c 373 The Supreme Court observed thus: “this rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent or obviously repugnant or conflicting Provisions of an Act the court should make an effort to interpret these Provi- sions in order to harmonise them. Both the provisions should be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose (serving no Purpose) The court should avoid a head-on collision between two sections of the Act. The provisions of one section of a Statute should not be used to defeat the other provision. The court should adopt ail efforts in order to effect reconciliation between the conflicting provisions. An interpretation Which reduces one of the provisions as a ‘dead letter’ or ‘useless lumber is s7| NOt harmoni, that when y Preted in 3 lous Construction. The ence of harmonious construction j, here are Sentiicting provisions in an Act they should be inter eh a way that both 1e given effect to.” moun ca, aoa Union of india (2002) 2 SCC 95, the Supreme © Principle of harmonious construction is that an effort to give effect to all the provisions of a statute and for that F he statute should be construed with reference to the other Provisions as to make preted "t workable. A particular provision cannot be inter- «te defeat the another provision made in that behalf under the Should be Made ®NY Provision of 1 tute, Topic - XVII eneralia Specialibus Non Derogant If the legislature enacts a special statute dealing with a particular sub- ject and thereafter enacts a general Act which by its terms would include the subject of the special Act and is in conflict with the special statute, the rule to be adopted in such a case is that the provisions of the general Act shai! not over-ride the special Act. The rule is that when there general statute and special statute, the Provisions of special statute shall prevail. The justification for this rule is that the legislature | special Act when they made the general Act and If there are general words in an Act capable of ext ject specially dealt with by earlier legislature the judge the earlier and special legislation is indirectly repealed cation. Example There is a statute which deals with leasing o a ture thereafter enacted a new statute to deal : immovable property, which includes building, 58provisions of new Statute and the old one, In such a case the provisions of Piers L* Will be given ettect to In the cane cef leasing of buildings. Topic -X1x Construction of Acts in Pari Materia The words Parj Materia mean of the same subject or matter. If two or more Acts deal with Same persons or things, or have the same purpose or subject, the statutes are called in pari materia. When the meaning of a word used in one enactment is doubtful, the meaning of that word can be ascer- tained by looking into the other statute dealing with the same subject. This principle is called construction of Acts in pari materia. The ambiguous provi- sions of a subsequent statute can be interpreted in the light of an earlier enactment on the same branch of law, though repealed. In Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1921 2 KB 403) it was held that a subsequent legislation can be referred in order to ascertain the proper construction to be put up on an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. If the legislature has defined same word in different enactments in different senses, one cannot be used to interpret the other, eventhough the Acts are in pari materia. Topic - XX Casus Omissus ‘Casus omissus’ means “a case omitted". Casus omissus refers to a Matter which the legislature ought to have provided but omitted to provide in the statute. The settled principle of interpretation is that a ca us omissus (a Matter which the legislature should have, but has not been provided for ina 59tin the case of clear neces ners of the statute itself. A d for that purpo' statute) cannot be supplied by the court excep! sity and when reason for it is found in the four co casus omissus should not be readily inferred an parts of a statute or section must be construed togetner: se all the something, the court cannot supply t read anything into a justification for this ourt a If the legislature omits to incorporate the lacuna or remedy the defect. The court canno! uous. The statutory provision which is plain and unambig nd not for the court. The © rule is that it is for the legislature to legislate ai can only interpret and cannot legislate. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533, the Su- preme Court held that a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court by judicial interpretative process, except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. Acasus omissus should not be readily inferred. A casus omissus shou! Il parts of a statute or Id be inferred only in case of clear necessity and only after construing a section together. Topic -XXI Presumptions in the field of Interpretation 7 In the field of interpretation of statutes, there are some well know presumptions. The presumptions in the field of interpretation are nothing b. some fundamental principles which every judge has to bear in mind wh: interpreting the statutory provisions. The Judges, while interpreting a sta‘ tory provision, will be guided by the presumptions, The presumption in (! field of interpretation are presumptions of law. si The following are the well known presumptions in the field of interp tation of statutes. i 8 & 4) The Court should presume that the legislature inserted ev bert ec tute for a purpose and the legislative intentio a ry part of the statute should have an effect. | « 4 - fi ‘10. 11. 12. 1. cused. 2. 3. 4. : of the © Interpreted in its ordi inary sens “njust oF harsh, 2 eventhough the result is If th © Language of a Statute is ambiguous, the court is free to mua Modity the language in order to avoid any manifest absurdity, injustice or repugnance. Judges cannot legis! but only interpret. fH the language of an enactment is susceptible of two interpretations, one which would promote the object and the other which would defeat the very object of the statute, the court should adopt that construction which would promote the object and Purpose of the legislation. The Indian statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid, unless otherwise established. Legislature does not make omissions or commit mistakes. Acts of legislature are intended to apply only within the territory of the country, unless provided otherwise. Enacting a new statute will not result in repeal of an old statute unless expressly stated in the new Act, In other words there is no repeal by implication. Vested rights are not taken away without express words or necessary implication. Legislature is aware of existing law and does not intend to alter it except by express enactment. Presumptions in the field of interpretation of Penal Statutes A penal statute should be interpreted strictly in favour of the ac- No person shall be punished unless his act comes within the plain meaning of the words creating an offence. If the statute is capable of two constructions, then that which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. If there is a reasonable doubt in the statutory provision the ben- 61fit of doubt should go to the accused. it to create an offence, 5. It is for the Legislature and not the Cou! an offence. seary for the creation of 6. Express language is nece excluded eiths, 7. Mens rea is required in every criminal act, unless e expressly or by necessary implication Presumptions in the field of interpretation of Taxing Statutes 1. A taxing statute should be strictly interpreted. 2. No one shall be taxed unless the liability to pay tax comes within the letter of the law. 3. The benefit of any ambiguity must go to the assessee- 4. No subject can be taxed by inference or analogy. Topic XXII De minimus non curat lex The maxim “de minimus non curat lex" means that ‘the law does not concern with offences of a trivial character’. The principle contained in the maxim operates as a defence in a criminal case. During the trial of the criminal case, the judge may find chat the act alleged to have been commit- ted by the accused would fall within the definition of offence. However the consequence of the offence may not be very serious but only trivial. In such a case the accused should not be punished for the offence. He should be acquitted for the sole reason that the alleged offence is trivial in character. Exainple It would be theft, if a person dips his pen and takes ink from another ink-bottle without his consent. But the nature of offence is trivial in charac ter and hence he should not be punished for the offence of theft. By virtue of section 95 of the Indian Penal Code trifles is a defence a criminal charge. Trifles means negligible wrongs or Offences of a triv character. ‘ 62aCe gk Ne a co Menezes v Yusut Khan (AIR 1966 Thu y °nd of a heated quarrel the accused threw a file of "caused a scratch to the appellant. i m nen The lower court acquitted the accused since the harm is trivial. The Supreme court Confirmed this finding. Narayanan v. state of Kerala (1987 Cr L. J 741) 'n this case Sarvodaya workers conducted a campaign to educate People about the evil of alcohol and during the campaign liquor shops were picketed to prevent people from going there. They were prosecuted for caus- ing wrongful restraint punishable under section 341 IPC. The Kerala High Court quashed the Prosecution on the ground that the harm is only trivial. Anoop Krishan Sharma vv. State of Maharashtra (1992 Cr L.J 1861 (Bom) The accused locked the complainant inside the factory by pulling down the shutter. He was prosecuted for wrongful confinement punishable under section 342 IPC. The accused was acquitted since the complainant regains his freedom within a very short time and only a minimal harm was caused. 63Topic-XXill Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation judge to as- There are several aids to construction which assist the judg certain the legislative intention. Alds to construction can be classified into two heads. Tne o 1 Internal or Intrinsic Aids 2 External or Extrinsic Aids Internal aids refer to the different parts of the statute. The external aids are those foreign aids which the courts take into consideration in order to ascertain the legislative intention. is Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation = In a statute there will be different parts. The main parts of statute are 2. Preamble 1. Long title 3. Enacting Clause 4. Short Title 5. Extent and Commencement Clause 6. Definition Clause 7. Main Provisions 8. Illustrations 9. Explanations 10. Proviso 141 Headings (chapter heading and section heading) 12 Saving Clause . 13, Repeal Provision 14 Schedule The parts of statute are treated as intrinsic aids to interpretation. T! Court refer one part to find out meaning of another part of the statute. 641. All th ~title ana ® Mod, °F Statutes have both the jong title and short title. Long Tithe The ton HUll description «t" °" 8" Act le eetSUt At the hbael br a clasienie le gives a °Y 81 the gong al purpose of the Act. consolidate Of the Limitation Act, 1963 runs as follows : « An Act to and .amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceed- ing and 9 804 for purposes Connected therewith". The long title of a statute is an important part of the Act. It may be fefered for the Purpose of ascert laining the general. scope of the Act. 'n Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab (AIR 1961 SC 418), the Supreme Sought the aid of the wording in the long title to’ know the object and Purpose of the legislation. Court | Short title Short title is given to an Act for the purpose of reference. it's object is clarification and not description. The authorities suggest that the short title may not be taken into account in construing a statute. In modern statutes section 1 Provides the short title. Section 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963 Provides the short title in these words: “This Act may be called the Limitation Act, 1963. The main purpose of short title is easy iden- tification . 2. Preamble In an Act, preamble is given next to the long title. The preamble to the Workmen's Compensation Act,1923, reads as follows: “Whereas it.is expe- dient to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident” 65itis a legitimate m . f . tin the Pre rinsic aid to fing fe Act is setou an int The main object of th he preambl aid in construing the main provision. ul out the purpose of the Act dis an admissible aid ct an The preamble of a statute is a part of the A\ to construction he Court held d F. 85), * be s of the Act In Sussex Peerage Claim (1844) 11 Cl rage ( vot the maker that a preamble to an Act is a key to open the min and the mischief which they intended to redress: in 1962 SC 660) ae In Motipu Zamindari Co. v. State of Bihar (A' and should court held that preamble is a key to the construction of a statute, be resorted to, “to unlock the mind of its makers”. In Re Berrubury Case ( AIR 1960 SC 845) the supreme Court held that the preamble to an Act is a key to open the mind of the legislature. When the language of an Act is clear and plain, the preamble has no use. If the meaning of a word used in the statute is doubtful, the court car refer the preamble in order to interpret it properly. When two interpretations are possible, the court must adopt that which is in accordance with the pur pose set out in the preamble. Janardhana_ v. Union of India (1976) Lab. I. C 868 A division bench of the Mysore High Court discussed the use and th scope of preamble as follows: “The preamble of an Act is intended to ind cate the main purpose of the Act. It does not cover the entire ambit of tt ‘Act. The preamble cannot control the plain meaning of any section i : Act. When there is a conflict between the preamble and th F sion, the latter shall prevail”. eo Pre Re Kerala Education Bill (AIR 1967 SC 1643) In this case the Supreme Court held that the poli icy and fe Purpose £given statute m: ay b, © deduced from the long title and preamble thereof. Arnit Das v. Stat qT ° of Bihar (2000) § SCC 486 he was intendoa ns Coun observed: “ The preamble suggests what the Act ambiguous the coy &l with, If the language used by the Parliament is the Provisions of oe Permitted to look into the Preamble for construing intent. If the a an Act. The Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative meaning, it wo, oe ©mployed in an enactment spell a doubt as to thelr with the obj ald pe Useful to so interpret the enactment as to harmonise it ect which the legislature had in its view”. 3. Marginal notes are often found printed at the side of sections in an pct It’summarises aie effect of the section. They are not part of the ©. They are not inserted by the Parliament. They are inserted by irre- sponsible persons, : statut In Indian Aluminium Co. v. K.S.E Board (AIR 1975 SC 1967), the Supreme Court observed thus: “it is true that marginal notes cannot afford any legitimate aid to the construction of a section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift (gist) of the section or to show what the section was dealing with’. 'n Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra ( 2002) 2 SCC 135, the Supreme Court held that the marginal note cannot restrict the meaning of the section when the language is clear and unambiguous. The marginal notes cannot control the interpretation of words, if the language of the section is clear and unambiguous. Where there is ambigu- ity in the language of the section, the marginal notes may be used to under- stand it. 4. Headings The headings of a group of section will be an useful aid. The headings 67ections- Head- inserted after pe used to Headings t use such those o considered as preamble Y y jed by the Parliament. Act of parliament may pre -fixed to section: ings are not voted on or pi the bill has become law. The heading in an resolve any doubt when the words in the section are mbiguovs: cannot contro! the plain meaning of the section: The headings to give a different effect to the clear words court canno in the section 01) 5 scc 175, ai (20 nsrajbhi a used to In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hal cann the Supreme Court held the language of the heading control the operation of the section. But in case 0! be referred to as an aid in interpreting the section. clues as to the meaning and purpose of the section. 5. _ Definition Clause or Interpretation Clause ; In modern statutes, a section is provided In defining some words US* tatute is the statutory dic- tionary. When a word or phrase is defined as having 2 particular meaning in s that meaning and that meaning alone which must be Act. In interpreting statutes, t ding all the provisions in the statute. The definition clause used in the $s an enactment, it i n to it in interpreting a section of the d by rea the definition clause- If f the legislative defi tive definition. givel legislative intent has to be gathere ute including the interpretation or tent cannot be given effect to because 0! lative intent must prevail over the legisla! In S.K.Gupta v- K.P.Jain (1979) 3 SCC 54, t that, if in a definition section of a statut wherever that word is used in the finition unless the context o' r pointed ou! mean a certain thing, what is stated in the de! Example In section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, it is without consideration is void. The word ‘considet 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act. The word ci stated in section 2(d) of the Act. what6. ine Acco: 5 rding to Maxwoit pretation of a legis) » Punet i ‘uation is not a fe guide in the inter- ative very safe le regard to punctuar enactme, ON. In the i Nt. A statute must be interpreted without ing & PAT Of the statute, ; Merpretation of statutes punctuation, not be- eeely Punctuated a, Nota determining factor. However when a statute should undoubtedly be Nd there is no doubt about its meaning, a weight Siven to the punctuation. In interpreti tion. If the ae a Act, the court should first read it without punctu: punctuation. Bia Nctuated leads to a conflict, the court can ignore the section. Punct ations cannot be used to curtail the plain meaning of a ‘Uation marks should not be treated as forming part of the Be court ‘ata Neral rule, punctuations are to be disregarded. However, if ‘S that the punctuations are correctly placed, then they can be used as a proper guide for understanding the sense of the section. 7. Mlustrations Illustrations appended to a section are treated as part of a statute. They are given to make clear the intention of the legislature. They are useful in finding out the intention of the legislature. They should be disregarded if they are repugnant to the section. In construing a section, an illustration to it is not to be ignored or brushed aside. An illustration in an enactment provided by the legislature is a valuable aid in understanding the real scope of the section. If the section is clear and an illustration is beyond it, the illustration cannot be taken as extending or limiting the scope of the section. But in all other cases illustra- tion shall be taken as explanatory to the section. 8. Explanation The object of an explanation is to make the meaning of the section more clear and beyond dispute. The section and explanation are two in- separable parts. They move in a body if they move at all Explanation attached to a section explains what is said in the substantive provision. Ex- 69