1

Police Ethics
Seumas Miller

The term “police ethics” typically refers to an area of academic inquiry within
philosophical ethics concerned with ethical issues that arise for police officers
and police organizations (Heffernan and Stroup 1985; Delattre 1994; Kleinig
1996a; Miller and Blackler 2005). Let me describe some of the main ethical or
moral (I use these terms interchangeably here, to avoid unnecessary complication)
issues that arise in policing.
As with other socially important institutions and occupations (see professional
ethics), the role of police officers and police organizations raises various founda-
tional normative questions pertaining to their nature and to the moral purposes
they serve or ought to serve. In response to these questions, a number of normative
theories of policing have been developed, notably a social contract theory (see
social contract; Cohen and Feldberg 1991; Kleinig 1996a) and a teleological
rights‐based theory (see rights; Miller and Blackler 2005: Ch. 1; Miller and Gordon
2014: Ch. 1). Moreover, there are various descriptive theories of policing proffered
by theoretical criminologists, for example that of Egon Bittner, who defines policing
in terms of the use of coercive force (see coercion; also Bittner 1980).
The social contract theory will be familiar to students of political philosophy,
since it is a version of that propounded by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the like.
Roughly speaking, persons in a highly insecure state of nature make an agreement
or contract to provide themselves with security by giving up at least some of the
rights that they enjoy in the state of nature to a government with a monopoly on the
use of force (the police service).
On the teleological rights‐based theory of policing, the protection of moral rights
is the central and most important moral purpose of police work, albeit an end whose
pursuit ought to be constrained by the law (see criminal justice ethics; also
Miller and Blackler 2005: Ch. 1; Miller and Gordon 2014: Ch. 1). So, while police
institutions have other important purposes that might not directly involve the
protection of moral rights – such as to enforce traffic laws, to enforce the adjudications
of courts in relation to disputes between citizens, or indeed themselves to settle
disputes between citizens on the streets or to ensure good order more generally – these
turn out to be purposes derived from the more fundamental purpose of protecting
moral rights; in other words they turn out to be secondary purposes. Thus laws against
speeding derive in part from the moral right to life, and the restoring of order at a
football match ultimately derives in large part from moral rights to the protection of
persons and of property.

International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette.

© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2019 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee215.pub2
2 p olice eth ics

If the central and most important end of policing is the protection of moral rights,
what about the means to it? The achievement of this fundamental end requires
specialized skills, knowledge, and individual judgment (see moral judgment).
However, there is a further defining feature of policing that is crucial, namely the
routine and inescapable use of harmful methods (see harm), including coercive
force, deception, and the infringement of privacy. Some of these methods might not
be regarded as harmful, for example surveillance of people who are unaware that
they are being surveilled and therefore are to that extent unharmed (Kleinig 1996a:
Ch. 7; Miller and Gordon 2014: Ch. 10). However, the methods in question, even if
not directly and immediately harmful, infringe moral rights, for example the right to
privacy (see privacy), or are otherwise in breach of moral principles. Moreover, one
way or another, these methods typically cause harm to someone, for example when
surveillance tapes are produced as evidence. Naturally, sometimes causing minor
harm to those who commit serious offenses is unavoidable, if they are to be brought
to justice; in such cases there is a clear moral justification. Matters are less clear‐cut
when the harm done is substantial or when the suspect turns out to be innocent.
Indeed, in some cases the rights of persons known by the police to be entirely
innocent are foreseeably infringed, for example through intrusive surveillance of a
criminal who frequently interacts with family members who are not criminals. This
combination of good ends and morally problematic means is a distinctive feature of
policing, and one that gives rise to acute moral dilemmas.
In the context of the rise of extremist jihadist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State (see terrorism), electronic intelligence-gathering, surveillance
of suspects, and the like by police have increased, albeit the advent of strong
encryption methods has provided an obstacle to intelligence agencies (see internet
ethics). Moreover, the lines between police intelligence collection and analysis on
the one hand and military intelligence collection and analysis on the other have been
blurred, giving rise to privacy versus security issues in a particularly acute form. The
controversy that has arisen from the disclosures made by Edward Snowden regard-
ing the electronic data collection and analysis processes of the United States’ National
Security Agency (see civil rights) graphically illustrates the problem (Miller and
Gordon 2014: Ch. 10).
There are a number of ethical issues that arise in relation to both the individual
authority of police officers and the independence or sphere of authority of police
organizations vis‐à‐vis government in particular (see authority). These include
the problematic concept of operational autonomy and its importance, for example
in relation to the need for investigatory independence of the police from the
government (a case in point here is the independence of the FBI from Congress
and from the presidency in its investigation of possible collusion between President
Trump’s campaign managers and Russian security agencies during the US presi-
dential election campaign), and the concept of the original authority attached to
the office of constable in the United Kingdom and Australia. Moreover, there is
the related and much discussed concept of police discretion (Davis 1975; Doyle
1985; Kleinig 1996b).
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The law has to be interpreted and applied in concrete circumstances (see

criminal law). There is a need for the exercise of discretion by police in the
interpretation and application of the law. And the law does not exhaustively
prescribe. Accordingly, a number of police responses might be possible in a
given situation, and all of them might be consistent with the law. Further,
upholding and enforcing the law is only one of the ends of policing; others are
the maintenance of social calm and the preservation of life. When these various
ends come into conflict, there is a need for the exercise of police discretion, and
in particular a need for the exercise of discretionary ethical judgment. The
judgments in question are typically ethical judgments, since they involve a con-
flict between ethical or moral ends, or between such ends and harmful means.
For example, deciding to arrest a youth in a volatile ghetto area who is commit-
ting an offense may be the wrong decision if such an attempt would lead to a
situation of uncontainable public disorder. There is a clear moral duty to arrest
offenders. But there is also a clear moral duty not to cause public disorder (see
duty and obligation).
The unavoidability of the exercise of discretionary ethical judgment in policing
means that it will never be sufficient for police simply to learn the legally enshrined
ethical principles that govern the use of harmful methods and to act in accordance
with them.
Police culture is another much discussed phenomenon in the literature on police
ethics and, indeed, in academic and other literature more generally (Skolnick 1975).
Police culture is characterized by a high degree of solidarity among police officers.
This is in part due to the trust that individual police officers need to be able to place
in one another, given the dangers they face in their work.
The morally problematic features of police culture have often been noted, for exam-
ple feelings of loyalty on the part of fellow officers that protect criminal actions of the
police (Kleinig 2004; Miller 2016a: Ch. 5). However, loyalty and other elements of
police culture also serve to further legitimate purposes, for example by ensuring that
fellow officers cooperate effectively in stressful and even life‐threatening situations.
Historically, corruption has been a feature of police organizations in many, if not most
jurisdictions (see corruption; Sherman 1974; Prenzler 2009; Miller 2016a). Corruption
takes many forms in policing, including theft, bribe‐taking, “testilying’,” and fabricating
or withholding evidence. Notoriously, the use of coercive force by police is, on occasion,
not only morally unjustified – indeed a violation of the rights of suspects; it is also an act
of corruption – it corrupts morally and legally legitimate processes and purposes.
Consider in this connection the use of the so‐called third degree to extract a confession
from suspects. Here it is important to distinguish common or garden-variety corruption,
for example greedy police officers helping themselves to drug money, from so‐called
noble‐cause corruption, for example fabricating evidence against a heroin dealer. The
latter is corruption in the service of a good end and is typically believed to be morally
justified by those engaged in it (Klockars 1980; Delattre 1994; Miller 2016a: Ch. 3).
There are a number of factors that contribute to the moral vulnerability of police
officers and, as a consequence, to police corruption. These include (a) the necessity,
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at times, for police officers to deploy harmful methods, such as coercion and
deception, which are normally regarded as immoral; (b) the high levels of discre-
tionary authority and power (see power) exercised by police officers in circum-
stances in which close supervision is not possible; (c) the fact that police have
ongoing interaction with corrupt persons who have an interest in compromising
and corrupting police; (d) the fact that police confront morally ambiguous or
loose situations, which call for discretionary ethical judgments; (e) the circum-
stance that, in contemporary times, police officers operate in an environment in
which there is widespread use of illegal drugs, large amounts of drug money, and
little evidence that the drugs problem is being adequately addressed.
The term “integrity system” has recently come into vogue in relation to the
problem of corruption, whether it be in organizations, in occupational groups, or
indeed in whole polities and communities (Alexandra and Miller 2010; Prenzler
2009; Miller 2016a: Ch. 4). However, integrity systems are not simply concerned
with corruption; rather they are focused more generally on the problem of promoting
ethical behavior and eliminating or reducing unethical behavior. Nevertheless,
corruption reduction is a key priority.
Here the term “system” is somewhat misleading in that it implies a clear and distinct
set of integrated institutional mechanisms that operate in unison and in accordance
with determinate mechanical – or at least quasi‐mechanical – principles. In practice,
however, integrity systems are a messy assemblage of formal and informal devices and
processes and operate in often indeterminate and unpredictable ways.
Integrity systems for police organizations can and do vary; however, such systems
ought to have at least the following components or aspects:

● an effective, streamlined complaints and discipline system;

● a comprehensive suite of stringent vetting and induction processes reflective of
the different levels of risk in different areas of the organization;
● a basic code of ethics and specialized codes of practice, for example in relation to
the use of firearms, supported by an ethics education in recruitment training and
by ongoing professional development programs;
● adequate welfare support systems, for example in relation to drug and alcohol
abuse and psychological injury;
● intelligence-gathering, risk management, and early warning systems for at‐risk
officers, for example officers with high levels of complaints;
● internal investigations, that is, the police organization should take a high degree
of responsibility for its own unethical officers;
● proactive anticorruption intervention systems, for example through the integrity‐
testing of officers suspected of corruption (by setting traps for them);
● ethical leadership, for example police leaders who give priority to collective ends
definitive of the organization rather than to their own career ambitions should be
the ones promoted;
● external oversight by an independent, well‐resourced body with investigative
powers.
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Naturally, the use of coercive and especially of lethal force is a very important
ethical issue in police work (see killing; Waddington 1991; Kleinig 2014). There are
a number of justifications offered for police use of deadly force, including those
available to ordinary citizens, namely self‐defense and defense of the rights of others
(see self‐defense). These justifications presuppose compliance with the principles
of necessity and proportionality. If containment and negotiation are a viable option
in relation to an armed offender, then they should be preferred to the use of deadly
force; it is not necessary to use deadly force. Fleeing pickpockets should not be shot
dead by police, since deadly force is a disproportionate response to minor theft.
In addition to self‐defense and defense of the rights of others, there is a justifica-
tion for police use of deadly force that is normally not available to ordinary citizens,
namely the use of deadly force to enforce the law. Arguably, this justification is not
simply a special case of one of the other two justifications (Miller 2016b: Ch. 4).
Consider the possible moral justifications for the use of deadly force in cases
in which police confront a choice of either letting an offender go free or shoot-
ing him/her. In these sorts of case, the police are not necessarily engaged in
self‐defense. In many of these cases, the best thing for police officers – if they
were interested in self‐defense – would be for them to get back into their patrol
cars and return to the police station. Nor are these necessarily cases of killing in
defense of others. The lives of ordinary citizens might not be at risk. For exam-
ple, an offender – say, an armed burglar – might simply want to be left alone to
spend his ill‐gotten gains.
It might be argued against this that the police are engaged in self‐defense, since
they are doing their moral duty in trying to apprehend the suspect; he ought not
resist them, and if he does resist them, then their action of killing him is in self‐
defense. After all, it might be claimed, he would have killed them if they had not
killed him first.
This response is flawed. It is simply false that he would have killed them if they
had not killed him. The police had the option of not killing the suspect, or of retreat-
ing after they had begun the pursuit. What is true is that they have a duty to appre-
hend the suspect, and they cannot avoid shooting him on pain of failing to discharge
this duty. But while the existence of this duty may render their killing of the suspect
morally legitimate, it does not transform the killing into a case of self‐defense, or of
defense of others. Indeed, to claim that it does is to obscure the moral considerations
in play here – to make it appear that the moral predicament of the police is simply
one of choosing between their lives and the life of the suspect, as would be so in a
genuine case of self‐defense.
As was mentioned above in relation to electronic data collection and analysis, the
rise of extremist jihadist terrorism has impacted on police practice in relation to the
use of lethal force. Suicide bombers are now a threat in well‐ordered jurisdictions
such as London and seem to require a less restrictive set of guidelines for police use
of lethal force; for example, police warnings need not be issued since they would
alert a would‐be suicide bomber to a police presence and would cause the terrorist
to trigger her device (Miller 2016b: Ch. 5).
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Suspects have moral (and legal) rights that are infringed by some of the harmful
methods deployed by police, such as deception and surveillance (Skolnick 1982;
Marx 1982).
Some of these police methods are less harmful than others, and some are morally
justified in some circumstances but not other circumstances. Thus an intrusive
bodily search can not only be an invasion of privacy but also have a psychologically
damaging effect. And this can be so even if the search was morally justified. Again,
police deception at the investigative stage might be morally justifiable, but not at the
testimonial stage in the courtroom (Miller and Gordon 2014).
The use of undercover operatives by police – including in order to trap offenders –
gives rise to a range of complex ethical issues (Dworkin 1985; Kleinig 1996a: Ch. 8;
Miller and Gordon 2014: Ch. 11). In some undercover operations, police in effect act
as observers, albeit inside observers. The offenders commit the offenses they commit
independently of the actions of the undercover operatives. However, often undercover
operatives interact with offenders in such a way as to make a difference to whether or
not or when, where, or how an offense is committed. The police actually set a trap for
the suspected offenders. Given the deception and infringement of privacy involved in
such traps, they should be used sparingly. Moreover, there is a danger that such traps
will actually create crime by causing suspects to engage in crimes that they would not
otherwise have committed (see overcriminalization).
The conditions under which the trapping of suspected offenders by police might
be morally permissible are as follows.
First, there are a number of such general conditions, such as the condition that
trapping is the only feasible method available to law enforcement agencies in a cer-
tain type of offense and that the offense type in question is a serious one.
Second, the trap should be targeted trapping of a person (or group) suspected
on reasonable grounds of engaging in crimes of the relevant kind; it should not be
random trapping of citizens for the purpose of testing their virtue.
Third, the suspect is ordinarily presented with, or typically creates, the kind of
opportunity that she is to be afforded in the trapping scenario.
Fourth, the inducement offered to the suspect is (a) of a kind that is typically
available to the suspect and (b) such that an ordinary citizen would reasonably be
expected to resist it. This condition rules out excessive inducements, and therefore
one way in which crime might be created by the police.
Fifth, the person has not only a disposition to commit the type of crime in relation
to which he is to be trapped, but also a standing intention to commit a crime of that
type. This condition protects not only those with inoperative inclinations to crime
but also those with a fleeting intention to commit a one‐off crime – an intention not
underpinned by any disposition to criminal activity. Evidence of a disposition to
commit crime of a certain type might consist of an uninterrupted pattern of past
crimes of that type, coupled with no evidence of change in attitude or circumstance.
Evidence of a standing intention to commit a crime of that type might be verbal, or
evidence of current detailed planning activities, or attempts to provide the means to
commit such crimes, or all of these together.
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See also: authority; civil rights; coercion; corruption; criminal justice

ethics; criminal law; duty and obligation; harm; internet ethics; killing;
moral judgment; overcriminalization; power; privacy; professional ethics;
rights; self‐defense; social contract; terrorism

REFERENCES
Alexandra, Andrew, and Seumas Miller 2010. Integrity Systems for Occupations. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Bittner, Egon 1980. “The Capacity to Use Coercive Force as the Core of the Police Role,” in
Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. Cambridge, MA:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, pp. 36–47.
Cohen, Howard, and Michael Feldberg 1991. “A Social Contract Perspective on the Police
Role,” in Howard Cohen and Michael Feldberg, Power and Restraint: The Moral
Dimension of Policework. New York: Praeger, pp. 23–38.
Davis, K. C. 1975. “The Pervasive False Pretense of Full Enforcement,” in K. C. Davis, Police
Discretion. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, pp. 52–77.
Delattre, E. J. 1994. “Tragedy and ‘Noble Cause’ Corruption,” in E. J. Delattre, Character and
Cops. Washington, DC: AEI Press, pp. 190–214.
Doyle, James F. 1985. “Police Discretion, Legality and Morality,” in W. C. Heffernan and T.
Stroup (eds.), Police Ethics: Hard Choices for Law Enforcement. New York: John Jay, pp.
47–68.
Dworkin, Gerald 1985. “The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the
Creation of Crime,” Law and Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 17–39.
Heffernan, William C., and Timothy Stroup (eds.) 1985. Police Ethics: Hard Choices for Law
Enforcement. New York: John Jay.
Kleinig, John 1996a. The Ethics of Policing. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kleinig, John (ed.) 1996b. Handled with Discretion. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kleinig, John 2004. “The Problematic Virtue of Loyalty,” in Peter Villiers and Robert Adlam
(eds.), Policing a Safe, Just and Tolerant Society. Winchester: Waterside Press, pp. 78–87.
Kleinig, John 2014. “Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of Police Force,” Criminal Justice Ethics,
vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 83–103.
Klockars, Karl 1980. “The Dirty Harry Problem,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, vol. 451, pp. 33–47.
Marx, Gary T. 1982. “Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police
Undercover Work,” Crime and Delinquency, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 165–93.
Miller, Seumas 2016a. Corruption and Anti‐Corruption in Policing: Philosophical and Ethical
Issues. Dordrecht: Springer.
Miller, Seumas 2016b. Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller, Seumas, and John Blackler 2005. Ethical Issues in Policing. London: Routledge.
Miller, Seumas, and Ian Gordon 2014. Investigative Ethics: Ethics for Police Detectives and
Criminal Investigators. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Prenzler, Tim 2009. Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity.
London: CRC Press.
Sherman, Lawrence 1974. “Becoming Bent,” in Lawrence Sherman, Police Corruption: A
Sociological Perspective. New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, pp. 191–208.
8 p olice eth ics

Skolnick, Jerome 1975. “A Sketch of the Policeman’s ‘Working Personality,’” in Jerome

Skolnick, Justice without Trial, 2nd edn. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 42–70.
Skolnick, Jerome 1982. “Deception by Police,” Criminal Justice Ethics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 40–54.
Waddington, P. A. 1991. “Deadly Force,” in P. A. Waddington, The Strong Arm of the Law.
Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 75–120.

FURTHER READINGS
Bittner, Egon 1972. The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background
Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Hain.
Cohen, Howard, and Michael Feldberg 1991. Power and Restraint: The Moral Dimension of
Policework. New York: Praeger.
Neyroud, Peter, and Alan Beckley 2001. Policing, Ethics and Human Rights. Uffculme: Willan
Publishing.
Waddington, P. A. 1991. The Strong Arm of the Law. Oxford: Clarendon.