G.R. No.

172804 January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a realty.

The Facts

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents, spouses Froilan and
Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-
meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from
Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it.

In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from
Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of
donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool,
municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say:

That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA,
SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty which I suffered while our
children were still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated us
[sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his family; and because of that one
EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the
works in our house, and because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at
Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give
(devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the
improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as follows:

1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It
has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an
assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the
concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise.

That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land
will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;

That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much
grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to
Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4

Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to surrender
possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce since 1982 until petitioner’s
repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a
donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Deed as a
testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that the "language of the
[Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different interpretations,"7 the CA found the following
factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the
Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s
consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter
rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion
in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate
donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and,
conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of
title.

In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership
over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.9

Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.

The Issue

The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’. The resolution of
this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property
from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the
execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.

The Ruling of the Court

We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.

Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation

We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective
only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically
–

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive;

(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10

Further –

[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that
the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]

[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be
construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;]
[and]

(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa,
in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.11

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor,
but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s
estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in
futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full
title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may
transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect.
Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it,
contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The
question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By
treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by
which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or
part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the import of the
contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s
undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s
stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-
reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v.
Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none
shall question or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee]
during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the
disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:

Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and
her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the
right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right;
otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which
the appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass
title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor
meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of
land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial
usufructuary right over it.20

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and affection to the
donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express
irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s
statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.

It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the
ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory
stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring
deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually
considered the transfers inter vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis
causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are not
controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the
real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers
"to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed."24

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be
visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers
of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property
dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25

Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation
sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than
him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they
may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.

Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property

Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s combined
possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in
1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February 1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an
unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real
property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There
is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30

Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither
was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed
the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s
donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against
interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started paying taxes, finds
no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in
possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.

Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is
to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to
meet this requirement. 1avv phil

Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant

Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never passed
ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the
Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the
Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the
contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as
Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax
payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had
nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation in
obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from
Rodrigo under the Deed.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May
2006 of the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965

REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,

vs.
The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The COURT of TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Hilado and Hilado for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

PAREDES, J.:

Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of
the return.

Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among
others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or
juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church,
would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are quoted below:
 ... . Parish priests of the Roman Catholic Church under canon laws are similarly situated as its Archbishops
and Bishops with respect to the properties of the church within their parish. They are the guardians,
superintendents or administrators of these properties, with the right of succession and may sue and be
sued.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner impugns the, fairness of the assessment with the argument that he should not be held liable
for gift taxes on donation which he did not receive personally since he was not yet the parish priest of
Victorias in the year 1957 when said donation was given. It is intimated that if someone has to pay at all, it
should be petitioner's predecessor, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, who received the donation in behalf of the
Catholic parish of Victorias or the Roman Catholic Church. Following petitioner's line of thinking, we should
be equally unfair to hold that the assessment now in question should have been addressed to, and collected
from, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz to be paid from income derived from his present parish where ever it may be.
It does not seem right to indirectly burden the present parishioners of Rev. Fr. Ruiz for donee's gift tax on a
donation to which they were not benefited.

xxx xxx xxx

We saw no legal basis then as we see none now, to include within the Constitutional exemption, taxes which
partake of the nature of an excise upon the use made of the properties or upon the exercise of the privilege
of receiving the properties. (Phipps vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91 F [2d] 627; 1938, 302 U.S.
742.)

It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof are highly disfavored by law, and the
party claiming exemption must justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege by law.
(Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club, G.R. No. L-8755, March 23, 1956; 53 O.G. 3762.)

The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3), Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes exempting
charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly though strictly and in such manner
as to give effect to the main intent of the lawmakers. (Roman Catholic Church vs. Hastrings 5 Phil. 701.)

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue appealed from, is hereby affirmed except with regard to the imposition of the compromise
penalty in the amount of P20.00 (Collector of Internal Revenue v. U.S.T., G.R. No. L-11274, Nov. 28, 1958);
..., and the petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amount of
P900.00 as donee's gift tax, plus the surcharge of five per centum (5%) as ad valorem penalty under Section
119 (c) of the Tax Code, and one per centum (1%) monthly interest from May 15, 1958 to the date of actual
payment. The surcharge of 25% provided in Section 120 for failure to file a return may not be imposed as
the failure to file a return was not due to willful neglect.( ... ) No costs.

The above judgment is now before us on appeal, petitioner assigning two (2) errors allegedly committed by the Tax
Court, all of which converge on the singular issue of whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed
donee's gift tax on the P10,000.00 donated for the construction of the Victorias Parish Church.

Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a
donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it
was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties
(Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section
just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from
taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.

The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of petitioner's thesis, and Our finding that a tax liability exists, is,
who should be called upon to pay the gift tax? Petitioner postulates that he should not be liable, because at the time
of the donation he was not the priest of Victorias. We note the merit of the above claim, and in order to put things in
their proper light, this Court, in its Resolution of March 15, 1965, ordered the parties to show cause why the Head of
the Diocese to which the parish of Victorias pertains, should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such Diocese is the real party in interest. The Solicitor General, in
representation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, interposed no objection to such a substitution. Counsel for
the petitioner did not also offer objection thereto.

On April 30, 1965, in a resolution, We ordered the Head of the Diocese to present whatever legal issues and/or
defenses he might wish to raise, to which resolution counsel for petitioner, who also appeared as counsel for the
Head of the Diocese, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bacolod, manifested that it was submitting itself to the
jurisdiction and orders of this Court and that it was presenting, by reference, the brief of petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc as its own and for all purposes.

In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated, the assessment at bar had been properly made and the
imposition of the tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting churches, parsonages or convents,
etc. (Art VI, sec. 22 [3], Constitution), the Head of the Diocese, to which the parish Victorias Pertains, is liable for the
payment thereof.

The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified, in
the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein
substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without special, pronouncement
as to costs.

G.R. No. 111904 October 5, 2000

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38266, which reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 5.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three
deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor
of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.4 The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 with Tax Declaration Nos.
11345 and 11347, respectively. The second deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The last deed
pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to
amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties
donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.

On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of
donation inter vivos5 covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. 11351 and
11343, respectively, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the
Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell
or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes
caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.

On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr.
and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation6 recovering the six
parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.

On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas
and the Danlags, for quieting of title7 over the above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate
daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother,
Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of
Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the same
instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer
of the tax declarations to her name. Through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the
husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied
with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis
in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas.

In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was
null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it
was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor. Further, the
donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.

On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff:

1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as revoked, and, therefore, has (sic) no legal effect
and force of law.

2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land mentioned in the
Deed of revocation (Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant Diego Danlag).

3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel
Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979
(Exh. T plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated
June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as valid and enforceable duly
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law.

4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes Danlag Y Pilapil covering the parcel of land
donated cancelled and further restoring all the tax declarations previously cancelled, except parcels nos. 1
and 5 described, in the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2") executed by
defendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband.

[5.] With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of land, vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or
their estate have the alternative remedies of demanding the balance of the agreed price with legal interest,
or rescission of the contract of sale.

SO ORDERED."8

In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that the reservation clause in all the deeds of donation
indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that the purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land
covered by the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed to rebut the allegations
of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in
preparing all the deeds of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.

Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred in (1) declaring the donation dated
January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that the same was already revoked on the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding
that Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered by the above donation and
that she was only able to pay three thousand pesos, out of the total amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to
declare that Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag.

On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. It ruled:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16, 1973 as not having been revoked and
consequently the same remains in full force and effect;

2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be null and void and therefore of no force
and effect;

3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land
specified in the above-cited deed of donation inter vivos;

4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa
dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19), Deed
of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale
dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated December 27,
1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have been validly executed;
 5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void and therefore of no force and effect;

6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silerio Gestopa to reconvey within thirty (30) days from
the finality of the instant judgment to Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the parcels of land above-specified, regarding
which titles have been subsequently fraudulently secured, namely those covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and
O.C.T. No. 17523.

7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to
effect such reconveyance of the parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and 17523.

SO ORDERED."9

The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to
Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's
right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties
already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated
properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of
land donated to her.

Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses, asserting that:

"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO."10

Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the donor did not only reserve the right
to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the
consent and approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and ownership over the
donated properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem.

Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.11

In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together.12 The deed of donation
dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as an act of
liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation unto the herein
Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land;

That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his
lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without the prior
consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.

xxx

That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for himself
sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent livelihood in consonance
with his standing in society.

That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness and
generosity of the Donor."13

Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee.
This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.14 Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was
the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the
donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.15 Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case
of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation
is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to
the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro,
we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the
donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor
to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution.16 Prior to the execution of donation inter
vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to
donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter
argument that this proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed their intention with the
deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to
show the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case.

Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name can not be a basis in determining the donor's intent.
They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations from the government offices such that tax declarations are not
considered proofs of ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.17 We find that petitioners did not overcome this presumption of regularity in the
issuance of the tax declarations. We also note that the Court of Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as
proofs of ownership but only as evidence of the intent by the donor to transfer ownership.

Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six parcels of land from the donor, she herself
did not believe the donation was inter vivos. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was private
respondent's husband who purchased the two parcels of land.

As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is supported by evidence on record, is binding
on us.18 On the alleged purchase by her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was
without private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make the properties conjugal to her own
disadvantage. That the purchase is against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credence to her
claim that her husband was manipulated and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in the first place. 1âwphi1

Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.19 The donor-
spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated:

"WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos, our intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as
we could be sure that in case of our death, the above-described properties will be inherited and/or succeeded by
Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and that said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said donation to the effect that
the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the properties donated during our life-time, and that we are the one enjoying
all the fruits thereof."20

Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the donor to gather coconut trees and her filing of instant
petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on record, however, showing that private respondent prohibited the
donors from gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from gathering coconuts, this
could hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code.21 Nor does this Article cover respondent's
filing of the petition for quieting of title, where she merely asserted what she believed was her right under the law.

Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation in accordance
with Article 769 of the Civil Code.22 Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal
effect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.