r

Le Réseau
Contents I Sommaire
Essay / Essai
The Network
Marc Lits
Emotion at the Heart of Information
CornmLnicalion and Society in [astern Euiope CommtFkation et Societe ai Europe de rEst
•
Articles I Articles
No. 17 2001
Janina Fras
The Media Participation
in the Polish Presidential Elections 2000
Adrian Staii, Valeriu Turcan
Major Trends on the Romanian
Audio-Visual Market in the Last Years
George Popescu
Premiers pas du journalisme
en ligne en Roumanie
Boguslawa Dobek Ostrowska
-
Public Government Communication
in Post-Communist Countries
Valentina Marinescu
Normative Changes
of the Romanian Media after 1990
Andrei G. Richter
‘II
Ideology of Perestroika
and the Soviet Mass Media
Printed at TApe [ith S. R. [. Bucharest
FJSC Marc Lits • Emotion at the Heart of Information
1591 1Z23.5199 Adrian Stall, Valeriu Turcan • Major Trends on the Romanian
Audio-Visual Market in the Ust Years
 The GioD Nes.v,l lie essa
y g/obad
105
Ideolog y o f P e re s t r o i ka
and
the S o v i e t M a s s M edia
By ANDESI G.
Rxcwrrni
Introduction
T here is no an
Soviet Union w
importanc
is not coincident
e of

al
th

ys
e

t
pr
al that glasnost.

of
es

th
s

e
ho would not un
an

Go
d

rba
br

ch
oa

ev
dc

’s transformatio
derline the
astin
pa
g in this process.
ra
n of the
m au nt
ft
more visible an openess of the m
d kn ow n to th ed ia , ha s be co me
ing of economy e world than pere
an d so cie ty. stroika, restruct
way process: W e be lieve that gl ur
m as s m ed ia re as no st was a two-
ally eased and rem str ic tio ns and censorship
oved by the co were gradu.
at the sa m e tim mmunist re gi m e
e th e lib erated press itsel in 29 85 -91 , but
and local auth or iti f was pu sh
es in to th e acceleration of re in g K re m lin
At a certain point forms of the socie
, Go rba ch ev ’s po ty.
criticism on licy of using m as
op po ne nt s of th e s m edia to level
ecenorny on previo ru lin g elite, to blame
us leaders, and poor state of
less dict at or ia to present th e So vi
l co un try than it really was, et Un ion as a
the party appa ra tu wont ou t of
s an d ba ck fired at the regim co nt ro l of
basic ideological e itself, its legalit
fo un da tio ns , etc . y,
glasnost, wa s Mikhail Gorbachev
no t sp ar ed by the media which to , initiator of
tributed to his po some degree con
pu la rit y fal l an d political demise in
late 1991.
It is not the po litica l or or ga ni zational guidance
by thc party and of the mass media
th e sta te th at wi
this pro ble ll be discusse d in
—
m ha s ad eq ua te ly th is research
try to trace the subt be en dealt with. We sh
le changes in the all raLher
of the pr es s sto content
rie s in order to find out ho
the official ideolo w
gy while in tra ns iti
oRLt G. Rrwt
still dictating th on bu t
is content was fo is the director
questioned and in rm ulated ,
terpreted in popula of the Moscow Me
pa pe rs an d m r ne ws - dia
ag azines on the back
-
the lib er at io n orop of Law and Pohcy
of sp ee ch in USSR.
Center
 The b?EtiickILe!eflJ&tta 107
its own transforming composition and ideology; Ogonek (Small
Method Flame) and Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News) as the most
—
popular liberal weeklies (the latter being of special interest as
originally it presented the image of Soviet life to the outside
he method used in the research was content analysis. While it
T has been defmed in a number of ways, the most accepted for
junta was suggested by Bernard Berelson: “Content analysis is a
world).
The periods selected for the study were a week around Vladimir
reserch technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative
Lenin’s birthday (April 22) and a week around October Revolution
description of the manifest content of communication” (Bereison, Day (November 7) (with the weeklies we studied two issues per
Content Analysis in Communication Research / The Free Press,
period). The dates were chosen as the greatest Soviet holidays that
New York, 1952, p. 18). “Objective” here means that analyis is
traditionally bore special ideological load on the press (unlike, say.
done according to explicit rules which would enable other May Day, New Year, or Women’s Day). Lenin’s birthday tradition.
researchers to arrive at the same results. “Systematic” consis
—
ally coincided with the peak of an annual campaign for mass par
tent application of the method to the whole text, both in and out
that it deals with what is tinpation in the subbotnik (day of free labor).
side the studied excerpts. ‘Manifest” —
written, not what might be thought s written.
The years of 1985-91, an epoch for the Soviet society, were divided
into the three periods. 1985 was considered as the starting point of
The basic procedures that were involved hi the design and execu
reforms with little or no changes in the press. 1986-88 were the
tion of our content analysis study essentially included the follow
years of unsteady developments with tides of glasnost coming and
hg steps:
leaving the horizon. Finally, 1989-91 witnessed the irreversible
and dramatic changes that have brought about a collapse of the
1. Formation of the research questions and hypothesis. Here we
communist ideology and transformed the face of the Soviet print
wanted to find out the change of the set of ideological notions from
media.
the start (1985) till the end (1991) of perestroika years. The
hypothesis was that the notions have become “market”-oriented,
3. Defining categories to be used in the analysis. The categories
anti-communist, pro-Western, more balanced relating to historic
were selected a prion with the corrections done in the course of the
events and figares. Some of the notions, while being formally
work. They represent the most frequently used in the press pairs
intact. supposcdly have changed their meanings. The results were
of ideological notions and are listed in the final table 2. Since the
of interest as much as the very process of change.
press began to step back from the orthodox interpretation of their
meanings we tried, wherever it was possible, to have the notions
2. Sampling of the data sources. Selected were “central” (national)
defined by the publications themselves,
publications, both weekly and daily, that were of the uniform ideo
logical stand at the start (like the rest of the press in the USSR),
4. Discussion of the selected samples, coding and condensing the
but of different ones at the end of the period. By 1991, they could
relevant content. All the issues stated in Point Two above were
be labeled as “liberal” (Moskovskie novosti, Ogonek,
studied, all the stories, pictures and photoes, layout and other
Komsomolskaya pravda), “conservative” (Sovetskaya Rossia,
accompaning details (ads, non-related materials) included, the
Pravda), and those in-between (Izvestia, Trud). In addition,
purpose being to trace, together with the change and intensity of
Komsomolskaya Pravda (Young Communists’ Truth) and Trud
the notions, trends in the outlook of the the Soviet publications.
(Labor) are of special interest as they had a great popular influ
ence due to the biggest circulation they enjoyed among the dailies
Every time a notion listed was mentioned and evaluated (even in
(see Table 1); Pravda (Truth) and Sovetskaya Rossia (Soviet
the context), it was registered for the quantitative study. All the
Russia) — as official party mouthpieces (Sovetskaya Rossia repre
relevant characteristics of the notions were noted for coding and
senting the most conservative spectrum of the then party leaders);
as the press outlet of the Soviet legislature with discussion.
Izvestia (News) —
WA The QsbI PkM I Le ,ese&j qiot
5. Interpreting the data in the light of our initial hypothesis.
Discussion
Part 1: 1985
isual stereotypes of the communist Soviet type, characteristic
V of any given time in the USSR history, were then firmly in
place in all publications. They were: orders to the left of the mast-
heads, a Karl Marx’s call “Workers of the world, unite!” above it, a
key photo on the front page (Lenin in April, presidiums of the spe
cial meetings of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Russian
Federation (RSFSR) on the occasion of Lenin’s birthday and the
October revolution, Mausoleum’s rostrum during the November 7
military parade and “laborers’ demonstration’, unveiling of yet
another Lenin monument , etc.). Banner headlines in red were
marking the holiday issues of the newspapers. Bold front-page
headlines denoted not the news, but the party calls: e.g.
“Everybody Will Go to the Leninist Communist Subbotnik!” (T;
Here and further on T stands in references for Trud, KP for
Komsomolskaya pravda, P for Pravda MN for Moskovskie novosti,
OG for Ogonek, SR for Sovetskaya Rossia, and IZ for Izvestia),
20.04.).
Visual stereotypes also included page composition with the sec
tions compulsory for all publicatiofls: e.g. “Holiday Marches
Across the Country” (reports on the Revolution Day parades from
the capitals of all Union republics, as well as from Leningrad, “cra
dle of the revolution”, etc.) CT, KP, P, SR. Z: 08.11.). Another
example are the carefully classified and arranged texts of the
greeting cables from foreign leaders to Kremlin that filled the
front and inside pages of Pravda and Izvestia in the following
order: those from “fraternal” Communist parties and states
(Warsaw Pact and Comecon members), below them were cables
from “friendly” leaders (Asian, African and Latin American pro-
Communist or anti-Western regimes). to be followed by messages
from “capitalist countries” and heath of international organiza
tions (an otherwise rare mix of UN, PLO. UNESCO and SWAPO)
IP: 08.11.). Another must for a November issue were the reports on
all kinds of gatherings to commemorate the revolution anniver
sary, parades in the capitals of the socialist countries and rallies in
Western cities, relevant reprints from the foreign press usually
—
under the column “World Progressive Public Celebrates the
159
Great October” (P: 04. and 05.11,).
All publications put on the front pages their editorial comment of
the concurrent party and state decrees: “Control of Practical
Abilities” (SR: 1&043, “Do Not Slow Down, Constructor” (ibid.:
05.11.), “To Approach the Matter Creatively, To Work to Full
Effect” (IZ: 24.04.), “Concrete Program of Actions” CT: 10.11.), “Let
Us Gain Acceleration” (KR 21.04.),
Holiday-related stuff occupied a huge proportion of editorial space.
In Pravda (08.11.) out of the six pages: 1.5 were given to a report
of the Red Square parade, 1.5 to reports on festivities in the
Union republics, and 1.5 more to cables of greetings addressed to
the USSR leaders. In Izvestia (06.11.) out of six pages: 2,25 cov
ered Revolution celebrations, two reported on the annual State
Prize winners; next day (07.11.): out of eight pages: two pages con
tained anniversary report given on the previous night by Politburo
member Viktor Chebrikov, one page presented a story on the State
Prize winners, one reproduced texts of the greetings cables, and
2/3 of a page brought reports from the socialist countries. This tra
thtion of dominance of anniversary texts was somehow disrupted
by Ogoniok that allocated to the Great October just 2.25 pages out
of 32 in November (#45).
The daily press celebrated the holidays in a series of issues. e.g.
articles on Lenin and his birthday occupied in Pravda 2/3 of n page
on 21.04., 2.5 pag on 22.04.. three pages on 23.04., and 114 of a
page on 24,04.
The analysis has shown that the “feedback system”, a stereotype
traditionally used to confirm the mass character of the Soviet
press, was strengthened and nurtured during most of Gorbachev
years. Soviet press has always been considered as the press by the
people (with its tyy-ears old system of “workers/peasants’ corre
spondents”, a mixture of grass roots stringers and omnipresent
controllers), and for the people (a newspaper could be mass a cir
culation one, or disappear). Therefore, letters to the editors were a
maJor sign of the “positive work” of the papers. At the early stage
of perestroika their importaace has grown up, in part to substanti
ate the legitimacy of the reforms and reformers. Like before, every
publication had a letters’ department, usually the largest one. It
produced the section of readers’ responses with numerous letters,
often fictious, in support of the party line (P: 25.04., 11.11.), or on
 70
other issues These departments were obliged to respond to every
letter from the readers and take other adequate steps to satisfy
citizens’ complaints.
A set of stable ideological notions and social-political terms,
described below, seemed to be stable which indicateed to continu
ing conservation of traditional Communist rhetoric and lexicon:
“USSR is a great power” It was not at all unusua] to read the
—
following passage: “Soviet people are firmly sure: USSR will enter
the third millenium as a more strong power, executing a constant
ly growing progressive influence on the flow of world’s develop
mOnt” lZ: 9.11.). Preservation of great power tbinking was
expressed by reports from the republics under the regular column
“USSR Panorama”: there a story “Who Has Moved into the New
House” reported on apartment construction by all-Union teams in
Turkmenia (MN, 44, p.9), while “Expedition for FoThlore” and
“Russian Epic by Estonian Artist” described common features of
folk art in the different lands of Russia and the Baltics (ibid., pp.
10-11).
“Plan and other principles of socialist economy”. Plan was praised
in the editorial article on the April (1985) Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU
CC which appeared in Pravda (23.04.): “annual plan without cor
rections is part and parcel of perestroika of the economic mecha
nism”. It was taken for ranted in Moskovskie novosti: “As is
known, our economy is a planned one” (#16, p.12), Ogoniokkk (#
17), and other publications. Notion of the plan was bringing a
chain of terms that frequented the press in 1985. They were
“socialist competition” and “social obligations” (T: 25.04., which
had a special two-page pull-out ‘Socialist Competition”: editorial
“Competition at the Year’s Finish”, P: 11.11.), to be complemented
by shock labor”, “udarnik”, and its metaphorc “Stakhanovist of
the SOs”, (e.g.: “By mobilizing the collectives for a shock, high-pro
ductive labour, the party committees must strive for...”, P: 19.04.:
“Let Us Reply by Shock Labour” — workers’ replies to the April
Plenum, on two pages: IZ: 24.04.; “Shock Finish for the Five-Year
Plan”, SR: 10.11.). “Record” was another symbol of socialist work
praised by the press: “Plan is a norm, record is a valour. One can
not, probably, say better. This formula of the competition is exact
in rendering the mood of the collective” (OG: # 18, p. 20). Another
story, “High Milk-Yield at Permafrost”, spoke of “records” in agri
culture (IZ: 18.04.). Due to the All-Union Leninist Communist
777
Subbotnik, traditionally held on the eve of Lenin’s anniversary
(and that day often coincided the Easter Sunday), we see a aiim
ber of relevant cliches: “Red Saturday”, “Holiday of Labour” (PR:
18.04., 19.04., T: 18.04.). Many publications had the front page-
wide banner headline right over the masthead: “Everyone, Go to
Leninist Communist Subbotnik!” (IZ: 20.04.). Ogoniok carried the
following headline: “Red Saturday is Holiday of Labour” (# 18,
p.
4). Frequently used was the Lenin’s description of subbotnths as
a great initiative”: “We are loyal to the traditions of the great ini
tiative” (P: 21.04.).
The press gives its first evaluations of the general trends of
Gorbachev’s campaigns and politics. The first observation to be
noted here is that 1985 was a year of little criticism. The mass
media portrayed the system as a stable one, with small deficien
cies, usually characterised as “certain difficulties of temporary
character” (T: 5.11.). Typical could be the following quotation:
“Unfortunately, we have formalism and bureaucracy, but the
socialist state is not faulty here” (MN: 415. p. 15). The key words
in these evaluations were:
— “acceleration” understood as acceleration of social and economic
urogress of the country (P: 18.04.);
— “glasnost” (openness) (and Pravda started a new department:
Tribune of Glasnost” as early as in the spring of 1985):
— “perestroika” (restructuring), then a less frequently used term
if compared with acceleration and usually understood as a supple
mcntary mechanism to achieve acceleration (“Perestroika of
Economic Mechanism”, P: 24.04.), but sometimes used in a funny
context: “perestroika of the grapevine industry in the Crimea” (TI
10.11.).
The subject of the transformation initiated in the country, accord
ing to the press, was the communist party in general, the commu
nists, with their traditional “avantguarde role” (P: 23.04). They
lead the transformation, as the glorified party of Bolsheviks” (P:
6.11). What was the role of the people is seen in a typical headline
“We Shall Implement Party Plans!” (OG: # 45).
Judging by the press, the main ideological campaign of 1985 pre
sented an attempt of the ideological arid moral reindocrination of
the people in conformity with the new situation in the country. For
example, in its April 18 editorial titled “Effectiveness of Bringing
Up” Pravda used the notion of “ideological conviction” and its syn
-n
112 The Global Notwrxk /Leresea’JgbaJ G1obaiNsiwa’k /lereseaeg)ob.&
713
onyms (“moral toughness”, “political-educational work”, etc.) Associations” (discussed in depth by Otto Lacis, a
twenty times. As the basis for the ideological and moral rein prominent jour
nalist, lZ: 19.04). At the same time, experiments
docrination the press still considered an old-time stereotype of with the new
forms of economical management Agroprom,
“communist up-bringing” (SR: 20.04.). At the same time, new —
RAPO —started
and they were extensively described and praised
notions of social-psychological kind, new qualities and human fea in the press (P:
18.04., 22.04, T: 18.04.). What what unusual,
tures started to appear in the papers, among them: some newspapers
dared to shed some criticism ore these soon to be
“Discipline”, “order” (typical headlines were: “Order at abolished struc
—
tures (IZ: 21.04.).
Production Line”, 12: 21.04.; “Rhythm, Quality, Order’ IZ: 25.04.,
see a]so P: 20.04., 25.04.; 00: #45). New organisational methods of work, in particular: “podriad” (con
— “Responsibility”, usually used to attack the low-level appa tract), brigade (team) contract, “khozraschet ” were initiated within
ratchicks for inefficient and lazy work. In one of such attacks, the old structures same year. Naturally, they
Pravda used the notion seven times (23.04.), while Izvestia in its were presented in
the press as extremely effective ways to accelerate
editorial “Law is One for All” (10.11.) observed that “the higher the economic
development and popularised in numerous stories iP:
position one has, the bigger responsibility he bears”. 4.11.. T:
19.04., OG: # 17, p. 5). The latter noted, for instance:
“Human factor”, approach to the workers as individuals not the “Can one
—
work better? There are reserves at the farm, they are: introduction
elements of “labor collectives” (.1’: 25043. Discussion of the new of brigade contract, strengthening of discipline, a transfer to the
Program of CPSU, which was on at the time, characterised the new technologies.” “Cooperative movement”, a future vehicle
draft as the program “written for concrete people, conscientous of
perestroika, was then in an embrionic state, just a few articles
workers” (P: 10.11.). mentioned it (00: # 45, 12: 10.11). Soon popular notions as “pri
“Conscience”, a term widely used in 1985, e.g. “We, the young vate farm” or “business” were very
—
rarely used in relation to the
people, should be educated in a restless. conscientous manner of USSR realities (“1: 5.11., MN: # 44), public economy being
attitude to work” (from a letter of a 23-year-old reader, P: 4.11.). the dom
inant stereotype.
— “Delovitost” (practical nature) is a record breaker in the usage
numbers. In a Trud article “Leninist Style of Work” (21.043 the PoLitical and economic methods to achieve the aims of acceleration
word was used ten times. Another paper focused on the fact that were:
“the party started the review of its cadres, control of their practical — “struggle for the cadres”, “work with the cadres” (SR: 18.04.,
nature.” (SR: 18.04.). 20.04., P: 20.04.) In the latter we find one of the best characteris
— “Criticism”, an off-spring of the coming campaign that in the tics of what it was: “Among the tasks of cadres work is control over
next couple of years will wipe away many critics of Gorbachev’s the activity of leading administrators, over creation of an atmos
policies from their positions. Similar campaigns were launched by phere of principal evaluation of executive administrative officers”;
the predecessors of the General Secretary in order to blame defi — ‘increase of interest in the results of the work”: the first off
ciencies of economy on previous leaders. A symbolic call to launch spring of a loud campaign in the near future which appeared at
such campaign could be detected in the story “Why Party Buro that time in just a few articles, including one by Academician
Was Against Criticism?” (SR: 10.11.). Pavel Bunich IP: 19.04);
“people’s control”, a pre-war system of overseeing “from below”,
Organisational channels of “acceleration” was yet another topic of became a widely popular topic in 1985 regularly discussed in the
propaganda. The press pointed that basic economic arid political whole page collections of articles in Trud. Sovetskaya Rossia and
structures should continue to exist, they just needed a face-lift. Pravda.
These structures — and we do not mention here the party and — “thrift”, “preservation of resources”, was discussed in several
Soviet system, as mere questioning of their appropriability for the articles (00:417. P. 4.11., 10.11., T: 9.1).) and usually viewed as
reforms were an anathema at that time were: “Komsomol’s
— “a reserve for the progress” (PR: 10.11.).
Shock Construction sites” (SR: 19.04.), “All-Union Students “assistance from the capitalist states”, discussed with concrete
Construction Detachment” (VSO) (KP: 25.04.), “Socialist examples of “turn-key” projects, was described as an auxilary way

to achieve the aims of re-forms.
The above mixture of sometimes controversial methods reflected
inconsistency of Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the communist
economy from wIthin. The combination of moral and material
incentives together with a campaign for stronger discipline and
control has brought only temporary relief and mcrease in produc
tivity. The majority of the population did not seem to believe in
communist ideals or possibilities to earn wealth by honest work.
Neither did it new purges. Still, the propaganda machine was at
work as if everything went well.
A topic that will turn over world view of the nation in a matter of
years was attitude to the 20th century history, ideology and its
prophets. Then, in 1985, marxism-leninism and communism
remained correspondingly the basis and the goal of the social
progress. Marxism “is a powerful weapon of struggle for the happi
ness of mankind” wrote Pravda in the editorial “Banner of Our
Victories” (22.04). In this article, leninism was mentioned nine
times, socialism — three, social-political activity
— five times.
Leninism was typically characterised as “our main and the only
theoretical foundation” (P: 25.04), “a force of revolutionary con
struction” (IZ: 10.11.). The latter article said in particular: “Today,
while developing methods of acceleration of social-economic devel
opment, the CPSU relies on the profound marxist-lenimst analysis
of real processes of the construction of the new society.” In a not
unusual way “socialism” was a value that was being modernised
(let us recall here “the final victory of socialism” under Stalin,
“advanced socialism” of Brezhnev, etc.). “We modernize socialism,
socialism modernizes us”(IZ: 10.11.), was a popular although not
quite clear slogan of the times. In 1985, modernization of socialism
began with modernization of the inter-party democracy and disci
pline. What was meant under it, is seen in a story on the discus
sion of Moskovskie novosti editors with foreign students on the
nature of democracy, concluded by the moderator in the following
‘cay: “We are aware of the deficiencies of the burgeous democracy,
therefore we need the dictatorship of proletariat. The Soviet people
has a joint political platform, therefore there is no need in a plu
ralism” (MN: # 15, p. 12). Frequently used were the notions of
“democratic centralism” (MN: # 45; 00: N 46) and “proletarian
internationalism” (MN, 45). Speaking of the priority of historical
figures we should note here that Vladimir Lenin remained the
most popular figure in the press. “The contemporary times consult
115
with Lenin” — this was probably the mast popular metaphore (IZ:
20.04., editorial “Read Lenin”; KP: 21.04.). In the historical con
text, Lenin personified the October revolution with its eternal
importance. The features of his image that were especially
stressed were Lenin’s humanity and vigor. Press was covering lit
tle known facts from his biography (T: 20.04., OG: 4 45, SR: 21.04).
Stressed was Lenin’s attitude towards common people (“human
factor”) (SR: 21.04., KP: 20.04,). An example of the latter is an arti
cle “Personal Example” by Yevgenia Losoto, a famous liberal corre
spondent of late glasnost, who wrote: “A Bolshevik behaves accord
ing td the demands of the interests of the dictatorship of proletari
at. Lenin’s course was neither soft, nor kind. That was the only
right Bolshevik line.” Other historical personalities that would be
discussed during Gorbachev times, Stalin and the “stagnation”
leaders, were practically ignored or described in the “round”,
although negative way: “Let us remember the personality cult. Let
us remember more close times when the non-restricted praise
addressed to some leaders have got a frill swing” (PR; 10.11.). The
unquestionably positive figures we found were those of Kirov,
Voroshilov, and Kalinin (OG: # 17).
There was no revision of the social-political developments in the
history of Russia and USSR in the 20th century. On the eve of the
40th anniversary of the victory in World War II, a number of
authors analysed the war and its Western “falsifications” like the
idea that Hitler’s attack had been in fact a “preventive war” IZ:
24.04.). Pravda’s remark that “in the social character of the sec
ond world war, the opposition of socialism and fascism, progress
and reaction has been expressed in all its fullness” was a typical
description (22.04).
Foreign policy matters is another subject that will characterise the
shift of the ideology reflected by the press. In 1985, stability of
relations with the socialist countries (“camp of fraternal socialist
states”. “economic integration”, “socialist community” being typical
descriptions) was a frequent topic (P: 24.04.. 811, 9.11.; IZ: 18.04.;
00: 4 45). Regularly printed were speeches by the leaders of the
socialist states, statements of the Warsaw Treaty bodies (T:
24.04.; MN: 4 44). The math notion here was the ‘peace-loving
nature” of the USSR with its synonyms: “disarmament”, “struggle
for peace”, etc. Out of five letters from its foreign readers pub
lished by Moskovskie novosti in No. 16, three were about peace; in
No- 15: out of seven letters, two were on the horrors of war, two —
116 (he Global Nek,’sk / 10 reseau qiobal
on necessity of stable peace, three — on the Moscow Youth Peace
Festival. The dominant attitude to the opposition of capitalism
and socialism was described by Ogonek (# 45) in the following way:
“Ja the eternal opposition of good and evil, under the conditions of
struggle between the forces of progress and those of reaction, the
Soviet Union remains a bulwark of peace, arid the whole progres
sive mankind rests on it its hopes for the happy future”. Clear was
an anti-American mood of the press, in particular expressed by the
following newspaper headlines: “Godfathers of Terrorists” (IZ:
23.04.). “Your Enemies. Youth:” (a column in KP, 18.04.). “While
the Heart Beats” (about a US communist, SR: 6.11), “Inhuman
Action” (ibid., about CIA conspiracy), “Human Rights American
Way” (column in KP: 25.04). Critisized was also the American life
style: “Every day human tragedies happen in the USA. Millions of
hungry, weak-willed people without legal rights wander the
streets and squares, perish in neglected homes and subway sta
tions.” COG: *1 45). Anti-American character was evident even in
the stories on pop music (ICP: 20.04).
PART 2: 1986-88
Aggregation of the the press stories within these three years is
caused by the following reasons:
1) this was a central period in the context of 1985-91, when the
real process of perestroika started to gain force;
2) within this phase the changes were not homogeneous, the new
phenomena were taking place of the old ones not in an automatic
way, there were tides of glasnost coming and going back, therefore
the trends can be better checked when the time span is taken as a
whole.
Visual stereotypes: masthead orders, calls to the workers of the
world, traditional layout of the front page Cleft column editorials,
Politburo press releases, reports from meetings and rallies) started
to decompose. By 1988. the front page has stopped to be exclusive
ly a carrier of official political news and comment. There we could
find a long report on a fashion show ‘KP: 24.04.88), or an adver
tisement “Do you want to travel?”, right below a governmental
release (IZ: 11.11.88). Ads, innovation of the time, first appeared on a
regular basis in Moskovslde novosti in 1987 with two percent of the news
paper space, their amount increased to five per cent in 1988.
The GJi,bal Nelwork / to Iseav global 117
The transition in the lay-out was very slow. For example, Izvestia
on November 6, 1986 carried a red color front page call ‘Long Live
USSR Motherland of Great Octoberl” Or take Pravda (22.4.87.)
—
which had a Lenin’s portrait on the front page next to the editorial
“To Learn from Leni.i” (headline typed in red); another issue of
Pravda (7.11-87.) was also decorated with red paint and displayed
Lenin’s photo, as well as editorial “Loyality to Revolution Banner”
which said in particular: “We march towards the new world —
world of communism. And we shall never turn from this path.”
Peculiar here as the way Ogonek was then decorated under its
chief editor (from June 1986) Vitaly Korotich who became known
as the most liberal editor of perestroika. Even this publication had
stereotype outlook: we find here headline “70 Years of October” on
the cover accompanied by a quote from Lenin (1* 45, 1987), another
cover (4 17, 1988) had a call “Comrade& Give All Your Efforts to
Perestroika, Democratization of Society and Radical Economic
Reform” taken from the CPSU CC “Calls”, while cover of yet
another issue (It 45, 1988) carried a reprint of painting “Lenin at
Demonstration”.
‘While still in force, this system of stereotypes started to decom
pose. We have found that less number of stories were devoted to
Lenin’s birthday, both in absolute figures and in the duration of
the campaigns. The amount of anniversary materials in Pravda,
for example, was just 20 percent on the 22nd of April in 1986, 18
percent in 1987 and 26 per cent in 1988. If in 1985, the campaigns
lasted for as minimum a week, in 1987-88 the first stories appear
on the 21st, or even 22nd of April. We also noted the process of
omitting (beginning in 1988; of official unsigned editorials in
Pravda that used to serve as a directive for every party member.
The “feedback system” was still in place as a stereotype of the
mass character of the Soviet press, its popular nature. From the
day-to-day affairs and praising the CPSU the focus of the mail pre
sented by the press was shifting to controversial political issues.
For example, Pravda’s “maIlbox” (20.4.87.) brought the issues of
responsibility for the success of perestroika (S letters), struggle
with formalism (7), democratic elections of the directors of enter
prises (5). The widest spectrum of free discussion was then pre
sented in the two-paged “mailbox” of Ogonek. A random issue (It
17, 1988) gave readers’ opinions on destalinization (1 letter),
necessity of the state ruled by law (1), people’s diplomacy (1). coop-
778 (be Global lletwrk / to reseas global
oration with the USA (1), bureaucratism (1), young family prob
lens (1), bad operation of the post office (1).
Polls became a part of the press materiaL”, they were usually used
by the editors tojusti’ their position on hot issues by popular sup
port. Izvestia (7.11.87) put the results of the first Soviet-French
poll on a variety of issues: pull back of Soviet Army from
Afghanistan, cooperatives. drugs; Komsomolskaya pravda
(7.11.88) makes a poi1 of its readers by asking in this way:
Reader of the anniversary issue! Imagine a time machine that
can take you to any of the past 70 years. Which year you will go
to?”
Usage of the t.radit,onal Soviet communist notions reached its cli
max in November of 1987 due to the 70th anniversary of the
October revolution with another peak in 1986 because of the cen
tennial anniversary of the May Day. The stable ideological notions
of the time were: “Subbotnik” — Pravda (19.04.86.), for instance.
presented a whole page collection of reports headlined “Red
Saturday — Hot Work.” — and “Socialist emulation”, that also
involved notions: “udarnik”, “shock labor”, ‘labor report”. It was
characterised in the following way (SR: 22.04.88.): “Essence of
competition is seen not in the crowds and special dates, but in the
life and work with full force. What Lenin called as a great initia
tive were not the repaired locomotives [during the first subbotnik
in 19191, but the new attitude to work.”
— “Plan” (“planned economy”, “five-year plan”), viewed as the
main economic method for the years to come (12: 8.11.86.), a “spe
cial step forward” (P: 10.11.88.).
— ‘Society of social justice” (“Soviet life-style”). The press viewed
it as a must for the nation (“we should provide construction of the
society of “social justice”, 12: 18.04.86.) and hinted at displease of
its violations. “1 am irritated by the stratification of the society. I
believe, that as a result of the on-going transformation, much will
change for the better,” said Puppet Theater Director Sergei
Obraztsov in an Ogonek (# 45, 1987) interview.
-— “Commumst party”, “korusomol”, “communists”, old subjects of
activity in the society, were in place although with a new role.
Komsomol members, for example, became “young guards of pere
stroika” (P: 20.04.86). The new role of the communist party which
“can become the real leader of perestroika” was stressed in a story
by Gavrill Popov. a future leader of anti-communist opposition and
mayor of Moscow (MN: 4 17, 1988).
The Global Newark / he reseau global 779
— “Deputy’s mandate” started to gain a new importance as a sym
bol of the coming elections and the shift of a number of party func
tions to the Soviets. “Till when the planning and supply bodies will
spit on the mandate given by the electorate?” inquired Sovetskaya
Rossia (22.04.88).
— Jnternationalism” This notion is worth a special discussion. It
was one of the first completely dropped by the Soviet press. In
1986-87, “internationalism” and its synonims “international
Motherland”, “fraternal nations of the Union republics” were sta
ble, but later in the eni of 1987 and in 1988 we saw their
—
crush. Let us examine the transition. A poll of foreign students
studying in Soviet universities (OG: 4 18, 1987, p. 10) confirmed
that “internationalism is a basic feature of the Soviet people” The
press was full of reports on the lasting friendship of nations in the
USSR, many of the stories were reprinted from the national news
papers of the Union republics (KP: 5.11.86.; IZ: 20.04.87.; T:
7.11.87.). In the latter Chingiz Aitmatov. national writer of
Kirgizia, wrote, “among the credits of socialism are equal rights of
nations, strengthening of internationalism”. In 1987 we saw first
materials on the existence of nationalism and ethnic conflicts.
One paper (KP: 11.11.87.) wrote on nationalist mood among
Estonian youth overlooked by republican komsomol. In another (P:
24.04.88., “Internationalism Must be Brought Up) Viktor Kolbin,
the new leader of Kazakh’s CP CC, stated that internationalism
must be put to the service of perestroika. The press covers
pogroms in Sumgait (MN: # 16, 1988), where national strife turned
to be stronger than internationalism. Secretary Shepetis of
Lithuanian CP CC explains worsening of national relations in
Lithuania by poor teaching of its history (MN #16, 88). Russian
nationalism, namely “Pamiat” society, becomes an object of criti
cism as well (MN: #45, 1988). The discussion of the international
ism issue brought the following conclusions:
a) “we do not have “nationalism” as a stable ideology, but we
have a certain sharpening of national relations, distortions of
national upbringing” (P: 18.04.88.);
b) “We do not soothe ourselves with words on eternal friendship
of nations. Practice of interethnic relations means overcoming of
inevitable for any process contradictions” (12: 20.04.88.);
ci• “Contradictions are present in any process, national process
es in USSR are not deprived of them. Further harmonic progress

720 TheGidialkerwccklieresenuØbai
of the nations depends on the revolutionary renovation of society
conducted now by the CPSIJ.” CR: 22.0488.);
d) “in our country, internationalist education has been substi
tuted by demagogy with an undercover process of transformation
of internationalism into nationalism going on” (00: # 45, 1988).
Criticism, as a form of evaluation of political process, unheard of
prior to 1986, started to find its way in the press. First of all, we
see criticism of perestroika pace. Originally, it was more a criti
cism from the readers presented in letters or interviews.
“Perestroika goes slower than one wants” (MN #17, 87). “Situation
when people with initiative are in coastant defence remains the
These private opinions nurtured by the
same” (IZ: 25.04.86.).
journalists stedily become visible in editorial columns (Sit
21.04.87.) Significantly they are visible in official materials and
reports, like those from the 20th congress of komsomol and the
19th Party conference.
At first, this criticism touches separate issues and spheres: execu
tion of the laws and party decisions, old thinking of local leaders,
mistakes in planning, etc. (MN: # 45, 1987, p. 12; IZ: 24.04.86.,
SR: 24.04.87.). Step by step, though, the object of criticism gets the
name of “mechanism of braking” of perestroika, the roots of this
“mechanism” seen in “the struggle of two approaches to managing:
administratve and economic” COG: * 18, 1987, p. 1) The press
campaigned in accordance with the CPSU CC’s press release
which stated that “sharp edge of glasnost should be pointed to
break the mechanism of braking.” (SR 11.11.87.).
A synonim of this mechanism” appears to be a “conservative
camp” symbolised then by Nina Andreeva with her notorious “I
Cannot Betray My Principles” letter (SR: 10.03.88.) featuring
anguish for the past time.
New social and political notions were then concentrated around
not
the main aim of perestroika, that is renovation of socialism,
comeback to capitalism” (the name of an article in MN: # 16,
1988). “We renovate Leninist vision and the essence of socialism”,
echoed Izvestia (11.11.88., “Socialism Without Dogmas”).
The yearl98B is the last one of “acceleration” described by a beau
g
tiful metaphor: “the country is a powerful plane, which is runnin
ihG/cbalNework/ieresagiob& 727
the runway and entering the trajectory of acceleration” (P:
19.04.86.). The dominant economic term in 1985 gave way in late
1986 to “perestroika”. A random Pravda editorial (21.04.86.) used
“perestroika” seven times, while “acceleration” just three.
A new notion, “democracy”, was treated both in wide conceptual
sense and in concrete meaning. In the first case “democracy” was
meant as a general slogan, and everyone was to learn it: “to learn
democracy is party’s slogan of today” (P: 22.04.88). Of interest here
is the view of Anatoly Lukiainov, future head of the Soviet legisla
ture, (F: 25.04.86.): “Communism, which we head to, will mark
transition of socialist democracy to a communist self-government
of the people the highest form of organization of society”. He is
echoed by the head of the Leningrad Soviet Ithodyrev (00: # 45,
1987): “Democracy is not an anarchy, it is responsibility, it is an
issue of high discipline. Socialist democracy is realised in the unity
of rights and responsibilities. Soviet power is a new type of democ
rahsm, power not of just words, but also of deeds”. These formulas
are somewhat complicated by Academician Zaslavskaya:
“Democracy as people’s power is a stereotype, what we need is a
real, actually realised, not just formally acknowledged by law
democracy.” (IZ: 20.04.87.)
In practical terms under the “democracy”, the press viewed democ
ratic election of managers and mandatory replacement of elected
persons after serving their terms. “Democracy begins from the
democratic elections of managers, democratic economy cannot
exist without democratic planning,” pointed future leader of the
oppositional Democratic party Nikolai Travkin CT: 7.11.87).
Concrete realisation of “democracy” was seen in the creation of
numerous “informal associations”. In answer to some worried
questions on their necessity, Pravda replied: “Democratic flow is a
river of popular initiative which can and must be directed into the
bed of common interests.” (11/11/88)
The peak of materials on “democracy’” came in 1985-87, with a cer
tain decline thereafter, This observation was confirmed by Izvestia
“Tn the first year [of perestroikal, there was a lot of talk on neces
sity to learn democracy. Now there is by far less talk. Maybe this
problem is closed? No, the latest facts say the opposite.” (4.11.8S
New notions of social-psychological kind used by the press in 1986-
88 on the background of fewer references to the “ideological-moral

:a:ktaatzaan
122 The Global Neft-eork / to Ieseau global
upbringing” continued to be those born in 1985:
— “Human factor”. Pravda once again stressed that “Marxist-
Leninist concept of a man is the pivot of the rperestroikal pro
gram: activation of the human factor, humanism.” (18.04.86);
— “Responsibility” Here we noticed a transfer from the previous
concept of the responsibility of leaders to a responsibility of “every
one, who participates in perestroika”. A good proof of it are the
articles headlined: “Now We Should Act” (00: # 16, 1987), “None
Will Do It But Us” (SR: 18.04.87.), “Lenin: We Should Start From
Ourselves” (T: 22.04.87), “Perestroika: What Depends On Me?”
(i{P: 18.04.87), “Guarantee of Success Are Our Own Actions” (IZ:
20.04.87). The latter article — by Academician Zaslavskaya is
interesting as it presented a new view of the class structure of the
society under perestroika. “Soviet people” are understood as “a
multitude of groupings with different interests”, while perestroika
is being performed in the interests of the “major part of the labour
ers”. For the first time in the press the 2+1 formula (classes of
workers and peasants plus the layer of intellectuals) was consid
ered as false.
— “Initiative” (predprinimatelstvo, delovitost), “business people”
(managers). The newspapers start special departments for the new
class of young enterprising socialist capitalists (“MN for Business
People” section, MN: # 16, 1987). “Delovitost” is praised: “More
initiative, more democratism, then we shall set perestroika at the
full speed.” (SR: 10.11.87). At the same time, “excesses” of”deiovi
tost” came under criticism: “In a strange way the notion of delovi
tost has turned upside down in the republic [of Kazakhstanl. It is
no more professional knowledge and principal behaviour, but per
sonal business connections with the motto: ‘you do for me, I do for
you’.” (OG: # 16, 1987, p. 6).
— “Religion”, and its non-atheist discussion for first time in 70
years appeared in the press, first in the stories on major religious
holidays (MN: # 16, 1988, on Easter), millenium of Russian
Orthodox Church,
“Unemployment”, and the press was ready to present it as
something that should not be afraid of: if you are upset by the
“.
word ‘the unemployed’ you can name it as you like. Let it be ‘a
group of people temporarily waiting for a job.” (00: #45, 1988).
The press “discovered” evils usually never related to a socialist
country: terrorism (P: 23.04.88), drugs (KP: 5.11.86), suicides (P:
9.11.86), etc. Channels of perestroika continue to be studied and
discussed by the press. Among the ways to realise reform goals we
Jr
The Global Nelworn / Le reseac global 723
found a number of unheard of in the Soviet history. They had spe
cial names and characteristics so as not to harm the still existing
ideal of socialism:
— “individual labor activity” (read: small family business) charac
tensed as a “way to better material life, to open creative possibili
ties for the people” (P: 24.04.87);
— “joint ventures, viewed as a way to import Western technology
(P: 18.04.88.);
— “joint stock companies” compared with similar enterprises of
the NEP years (P: 8.11.88);
— “special economic zones’, described as “zones of active contacts
—
with abroad” (MN: #45, 1988);
— “conversion of military industries”, a means of producing more
consumer goods (IZ: 8.11.88.);
“price reform”, and here the press prepares the public to the
idea that without a price reform (i.e., their sharp raise) one cannot
“set order in the sphere of distribution and provide social justice”
COG: # 16, 1988);
— “polny khozraschet” (complete self-accounting) viewed then as
the major way out of economic hardships. In its editorial
(19.04.88.) Pravda stated that “khozraschet is not a slogan or a
campaign. It is the essence of the new economic mechanizm.”
When we took the look at the attitude to the history of the 20th
century as reflected in the press, we found “Marxism-Leninism”
very much in its usual place (“untouchable basis”, “revolutionary
thinking”, P: 6.11.86), although it is not as “agressively” used as
before. More is written on the “renovation of the ‘Leninist concept
of socialism”. “The Soviet people have the happiness to construct
the society of laborers, to pave the path to communism. On this
path they derive strength from the clear spring of Leninism,” said
Pravda’s editorial (22.04.86.).
The October Revolution is considered as both the start of the revo
luticnary processes in the country and the compass of the society’s
movement. “Perestroika is not wandering, but returns to the path
which we started in October of 1917. It is a return to the just
democratic peace, transfer of the land, to workers’ control.” (MN: #
45, 1988). “We are back on the trail of the revolution, its name
today is perestroika,” believed Marshal Yazov (SR: 7.11.88).
Real revision of the history was first blessed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his
report on the 70th anniversary of October revolution. Without legal rehabil
itation he pothtively characterised, for example, Bukharin.
124 The Global Network / to resesu global [he Global Network / La reseau global
125
Stalin became the focal point in the revision of history. The 20th on the success of the “days of Soviet trade unions” in
Poland. ‘By
CPSU Congress (when Khruschev first blamed Stalin for the the Victory Road” (1w: 20.04.86) glorified the 25 years of Cuban
purges) was again in the stories: “The 20th Congress has opened revolution, “Guiding Star for Patriots” (11 7.11.87) portrayed the
doors and windows wide. Belief in our party was unshakable, the image of “the land of October revolutiorf in the socialist
countries
cult of personality was negatively treated.” (SR 711.87). Pravda The newspapers had special columns: News from the Socialist
(18.04.86) put Stalin among the “anti-heroes” alongside Beria, States” (Izvestia), “Commonwealth” (Pravda). Editor
Korotich
Khvat (interrogator during the purges), Lysenko (agriculture acknowledged: “We could not write the truth about our “friends’.
Academician who purged genetics), Rashidov and Adylov (corrupt We could not write the truth about Ceausescu before
his fall, for
L’zbekh leaders of the &ezhnev time). Andrei Sakharov, in a rare example... After Ogonek referred to “a short period of stagnation”
then interview, said: “Stalin is not a demi-God, but a person with in the German Democratic Republic, Honnecker sent a note of
his deficiencies,” (MN: It 45, 1987). At the same time, Ogonek protest, and we had to make apologies.” (Beyond the
Cold
printed the unpublished excerpts from memoirs of Marshal War.158-9)
Zhukov with the passages like these: “It is wrong that nobody
could object to Stalin At the start of the war Stalin was a weak Opposition “socialism/capitalism” was another popular theme. “In
strategist, but wisdom, logic, grasp served him well and by the end the competition of two systems capitalism and
—
socialism — vic
of the Great Patriotic War he was in his place as the Commander- tory will be on the side of socialism” predicted Pravda
(23.04.86g.
in-Chief” (# 16, 1988). Articles placed under regular column “World of Capitalism” were
full of stories on anti-labor regulation, poor living conditions,
The revision has caused theoretical rethinking of perestroioka’s Mexican season workers in the US plantations, sale of kids
in
character. “Perestroika is a revolution from above, it reflects Latin America to the US secret laboratories, etc. Peace-lovingness
Russian peculiarities (small bourgeoisity and strong power of the of the USSR foreign policy was to combat agressiveness of Western
state). Revclution is a radical break-up. A successful option is imperialism. Moskovske novosti in a story “Acceleration Strategy
NEP, a black option is Stalin.” (OG: # 44. 1988). Is Leninism In Action” (It 17, 1986) analysed a speech by Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze with the following passage: “the new polit
While the majority of stories were in the streamline of 1985, i.e. ical philosophy of peace, set by the USSR opposes the policy of mil
continued to canonise Lenin with more touches on the humane itarism, neoglobalist concepts.”
side of the person. some new tendencies were betrayed, like in the
following confession by columnist Dmitry Kazutin (MN: It 16, 1987, PART 3: 1959-91
p. 8): “...the editors ordered me to write an article for the Lenin’s
anniversary. Just two years ago that was easy, there was a set of Analysis of the Soviet press in 1989, 1990 and 1991 speaks of the
canons. Now it has become more difficult due to the break of situation of the cul-de-sac for the reforms. Many papers start to
stereotypes.” Kazutin admitted in the story he eventually wrote speak of the end of perestroika: “August of 1991 is not the end of
that by 1987 quotes from Lenin became less frequent in the press. totalitarism, but that of perestroika with its strategy of democratic
renovation. The forces that turn us onto the path of capitalism
Khrushchev was given credit for the overcoming of Stalinism, (neoliberals) have come to power,” said Pravda, thus showing its
much was written about his role in the Carribean crisis, a lot of departure from the past loyality to the Kremlin (7.11.91). “The
sympathy was caused by the popular then (in 1987) memoirs of his word perestroika Ls no more appropriate to use, it is almost not
son Sergei “Pensioner of the Union Grade” in Ogonek. used by Gorbachev, the countn’ is now governed by a total crisis.”
tIZ: 24.04.91).
Foreign poliDy matters typically invoked old notions in the press.
Socialist system continued to be praised in the articles. “Loyality Till the August coup almost all papers SR. T, KP, TZ kept ele
to Socialist :deals” (Il 19.04.86) described economic achievements ments of the stereotype layout: the traditional orders and call to
in the East Germany, “From Heart to Heart” (T: 9.11.86) reported the workers of the world. The first to break the tradition was
126 The Global Neiwvk/ to reseau global The Global Network / to mseau global 127
Moskovskie novosti, which removed the Order of Peoples’ des on subbotnik were preserved only in Pravda (20.04.91.)
Frienship on January 1, Th89. It was followed by Pravda and Socialism, its nature and role, continue to be a notion in the center
Ogonek which did the same one year later. of press attention. “Socialism shows its contradictions, but a “capi
talisation” of the society cannot be permitted,” said Mikhail
Pravda remained the only paper that insistently carried all the Gorbachev willingly quoted by Pravda (5.11.89). A concept of “ren
traditional revolutionary and Leninist stories and pictures: calls of ovated, humane socialism” l:ecomes an ideal in 1990. “Renovation,
the CPSU CC (18.04.90), front page reports on the anniversary or Collapsel”, cries out Izvestia (23.04.90). Marxism-Leninism
occasions (23.04.90), etc. In comparison, Moskovskie novosti (# 16, founders cannot be responsible for deformations of socialism dur
17, 1991) had NO materials on Lenin, and the cover of its corre ing the cult of personality asid stagnation years, tries to substanti
sponding issue (# 17, 1991) carried not the traditionalal portrait of ate its position Pravda (20.04.91). “Renovation of socialism” is still
Lenin but a photo of a mutant kid, a victim of the Chernobyl on the agenda in the 1989-91 in the press: “the matter of honour of
tragedy. Others (SR. T, 1(P) made a compromise. For example, the peoples of the USSR is to fill socialism with Leninist contents”
Komsomolskaya pravda (8.11.90) carried pictures from both the (IZ: 20,04.90).
official and oppositional demonstrations.
Of interest are the results of the poi1s in different papers but with
Proportion of official materials on the anniversary days is still a similar question: “Are you for or against socialism?” Izvestia
high, e.g.: on the Revolution days (percentage) in 1989: gave the following result.s: “for socialism” —29, “for capitalism” —
.3, “for a mixed (Swedish) model” — 56 percent (24.04.91), while
11 5.11—40 6.11. —50 7.11. —64 Pravda. half a year later ga’e these data: “for capitalism — 3, “for
— 32 — 32 — 64, socialism” —58, “for a mixed model’ —33 percent (5,11.91.),
in 1991
lZ: 4.11.— 16 6.11. —32 7.11.— 8 9.11—iS Evaluation of perestroika, especially the hature of the communist
7.11. —32 9.11. —24, party, now differs on the various political color the publications
start to take. Pravda became the most conservative publication in
Lenin’s anniversary: 1991. It stated, in particular. that “However multisemantic and
P: 1990: 20.04. —5, 21.04. —32, 22.04. —32, 23.04. —0 controversial the process of tab1ishing political pluralism is here,
P: 1991: 20.04. — 8, 22.04. 24, 23.04. —0
—
one thing is clear: the CPSU still remains the leading party in the
country.” (P: 24,04.91).
What would be a ‘typical Lenin’s” issue of Ogonek (N 17, 1991) had
the following ratio (in percents): Lenin — 0, official state informa Liberal press (OG, MN), on the contrary, spoke on the collapse of
tion (Chenaobyl) —24, history — 12, art —15, poetry 3, crime
—
the communist structures, e.g. “One may not present salvation of
story — 18, sports —12, ads —12. CPSU as a national task, not to say a compulsory one,” (Nikolai
—
Travkin in OG: # 16, 1990). Moskovskie novosti published (# 17,
Advertisements increased the space occupied: since 1990 Ogonek 1991) results of a poll “Can the CPSU lead us out of the crisis?”:
gives to them all the cover pages, exept the front one. Moskovskae ‘yes’ —28, ‘no’ 60 percent; and thus commented on the results
—
novosti started an supplement of ads and classifieds in 1989. of the 21st Congress of Koinsomol: “division of the property of
Izvestia in 1989 used to give to them up to 24 percent, and Pravda the All-Union Young Communist League resembles a visit to a
— up to 8 percent of their space. gravely ill person of his relatives who look for his death” (It 16,
1990). On the crisis of communist ideology characteristic is an
Some of the traditional notions are still preserved in the press of interview of “L’Unita” Moscow correspondent put by Ogonek: “I
that time. They are: “workers control” (T: 19.04.89), “plan” (KP: have not met a single real Communist in Moscow. We, in Italy,
18.04.91. T: 18.04.89), “subbotnik” (especially in 1989, when the have a different meaning under the word ‘communism’.” (#17,
70th anniversary of the first subbotnik was marked). In 1991. arti 1991, title: “Communist in Bolsheviks’ Country”)
128 Tue Global Network / to ,eseau global
While in 1989 the press was naming the year as “the crucial
moment of perestroika”, and viewed “economic reform at the
(mountaiñi pass”, in 1991 it was openly writing on the “crisis” in
the country.
The results of perestroika were somehow summed up on the fourth
anniversary of the April (1985) CPSU CC Plenum, which inaugu
rated the reforms, by Izvestia: “..perestroika goes on, it was
planned and realised by the party, The party itself has moved from
dogmatic socialism to Leninist creative approach”. This article
stated the “landmarks” of perestroika: the 27th Congress of OPSU,
khozraschet, adoption of laws on state enterprises and on coopera
tion, the 19th party conference, amendments to the Constitution
that led to the first free elections in 1989-90, and the pull off of the
Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Among the “reverse” elements
mentioned were “nationalism, Chernobyl, sinking of the
“Nakhimov”, landng of (German pilot Mathias! Rust on the Red
Square, strikes.” (2304.89)
The main result of perestroika, according to Moskovskie novosti
was ‘spiritual emancipation’ while the drawbacks were sepa
ratism and economic crisis (# 16, 1990). Next year it made a
stronger point of the growing crisis: “obvious is the crisis of our
society and the state system in general. The way out of the crisis
should be dictated by the very character of the crisis itself. There
can be no other anticrisis program except the break of totali
tarism”. (MN: # 17, 1991):
New social-political notions. Here the coming collapse of the Union
and spreading ethnic conflicts prompt a high level of attention to
the issue of nationalism. “National rebirth”, the term used at the
original stage of perestroika became replaced by “national libera
tion” (MN: # 17, 1990). As early as in the spring of 1991,
Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk described the situation with
the economy and the inter-USSR relations as a crisis, that leads
the country to a catastrophe- “Not accepting a Union, Ukraine,
nevertheless, does not want a categorical exit from it.” (MN #16,
91) Some publications saw a way out in the new Union Treaty. For
example, lzvestia wrote: “A negative stereotype of the “centre” has
established itself in the mass conscience- But it is clear that with
out coordinated efforts we cannot survive.” (20.04.91, titled:
‘Union of Sovereign States? Possible”. Social-psycological reper
cussions of the reforms brought a discussion of issues new for the
The Global Network / Ie iaseau global 729
press. It showed a transition of the public mood to a gloomy condi
tion, as seen, for example, in the reviews of the letters still regu
larly published by the publications. An editorial comment to the
letters says: “...the barometer of the readers’ opinion points to
‘cloudy”, the letters are full of irritation, bewilderement, perplexi
ty and malice” (1W: 19.04.89) One of the letters says: our choice
is not a big one: either to emigrate, or to steal. There is no idea to
unite the nation.” (lZ: 19.04.91) This lack of ideology was noted by
the journalists. A round-table discussion “Are the people tired of
ideology?”, though, gave the following answers to the question: yes,
they are tired from the lack of ideology, as Marxism-Leninism was
not a set of dogms, but was supporting a certain order of things:
no, we are tired not from ideology as such, but from totalitarian
ideology. (MN: # 16. 1990)
aSocial uneveaess became a new subject reflecting the new condi’
dons of the population. Money became the new ideology, especially
for the youth: “..the young have no ideals, the old ones turned out
to be bankrupt.” (KP: 10.11.91, also 00: # 16, 1991, MN: # 17,
1989). The papers try to explain: “Although poverty is morally
good, in a civilised society everyone must be fed, equalizing
uravniovkaj is a horror for our life. The real wealth is the free
dom of option.” (IZ: 24.04.89).
Channels of reforms are discussed with the key words “crisis” and
‘stabilisation”, A random editorial in Izvestia (24.0491, “On the
Urgent Steps to Stabilise Society’s Life and Overcoming Crisis”)
had “crisis” (acute problems, etc) used nine, and “stabilization” —
six times.
The discussion in the press of the ways of leading the country out
of the crisis usually comes to a discussion on the ways to go on
with perestroika (especially in 1989-90) wit the pathos of the pre
vious years still in place (“revolutionary bell of perestroika has
raised the nation for decisive efforts.” T: 7.11.89).
Much is said on the conversion”, “rent”, “joint ventures” and coop
eration with the West, “share holders”, “sponsorship” as new and
positive features of reforms. Evaluation of the notion “private
property” became a hot issue. The communist press spoke against
it, although it supported “destatisation” (denationalisation) and
“pluralism of property” (F: 9.11.89). The liberal press insisted that
“only by giving to the peasants the widest rights to own land we
130 The Global Network / to reseau global
shall return a master to the land.” (IZ: 10.11.89). Several years of
press criticism of “kolkhoz/sovkhoz” sabouteurs of private farming
leg.. 11 18.04.91), resulted in this confession: “just two years ago
the words “privatization”, private property” were sacriligeous,
belonged to the world of capitalism, now they enter our daily
language.” cOG: * 16, 1991).
The overall strategy taken by the press was that the country must
turn to the path to a market society. All we must take from today
are the values of religion, and — from economics the market,
—
said Moskovskie novosti (ft 16, 1990).
The fall of 1991 brings “the Yeltsin program”, the last in the chain
of unrealised ways to save the Soviet economy. Critisized from one
side by Pravda (5.11.91) as “a free fall to poverty’, and from the
other by Moskovskie novosti (ft 45, 1991) for a “too rigid admin.is
trational vertical to execute the radical reform”, it received some
support from Izvestia, that began then to take a more pro-govern
mental approach: “It [the programl has given real contours to the
ghost of the market. Not a light in the end of the tunnel, but at
least a lamp at its entrance.” (12.11.91)
A study of the newspapers’ attitude to history also gave different
views on the basic events of the 20th century, The October revolu
tion remained in the focus of debates. Of interest were the results
of a poli in Moskovskie novosti: “Was the revolution an option
taken by the people?” “Yes” said 39, “no” — 36 percent of the
polled. “What would you do during the Revolution?” “Support the
Bolsheviks” 22, “wait for the results without interference” 13,
act against the Bolsheviks: 6 percent. The most sympathetic revo
lutionary figures turned out to be Lenin — 64, Dzerzhinsky 41
percent, most antipathetic — Stalin, 54 percent. (MN: # 44, 1990)
One year after, the Great October seemed to be supported by just
Pravda and Sovetskaya Rossia, while a characteristic quotation
for the liberal press was the one taken from Ogonek: “The August
coup draw a line under the great counter-revolution. Vandee, that
started in October of 1917.” (#45. 1991)
Lenin is probably most revised among the historic figures. Pravda
remains one of the few to continue his glorification, as seen from
its editorials devoted to Lenin’s birthday: “To Study from Lenin”
(21.04.89), “Leninism and Perestroika” (22.04.90), “Grasping
Lenin’s Vision” (2204.91). The latter said: “Lenin has left us a
great ideological heritage.” Other papers were critical of his image:
The Global Network / to ,eseau global 137
“Icon was made out of Lenin. One can pray to it but nothing else.”
(KP: 8.11.89), “Lenin’s brothers-in-arms loved Lenin but they
needed him dead and embalmed” (MN: ft 16, 1990).
Stalin was widely discussed in the press: “Stalinism is not a politi
cal, but a religious phenomenon. It is a neopagan religion of a
“rough kind”, when a refusal to bend in front of the leader is equal
to death.” (MN #44. 90).
Khrushchev, on the contrary, remained a positive figure:
“Ithruschev has done a colossal deed for the country, he decided to
reveal the cult of Stalin.” (KP: 23.0489)
Brezhnev is described as an ignorant in economy person who was
happy only at a feast at the dinner table (l: 2304.89).
Gorbachev. while still popular in 1989 and early 1990 t”initiator of
the great turn”, MN: # 16, 1990), went under severe criticism later
on for “inconsistance in conducting the market course, slow tempo
of the reforms.” (IZ: 23.04.91).
Yeltsin was portrayed as “a man of the people, who supports pere
stroika but is indignant of its slow tempo.” (Vitaly Tretiakov,
future editor of Nezavisimaya gazeta in MN: ft 16, 1989)
The interest to the foreign policy affairs is generally falling (see
‘Beyond the Cold War”).
—
Socialist regimes, till their collapse in late 1989, were widely por
trayed as stable and democratic states. Columnss “In Brotherly
—
Countries of Socialism” were present in Pravda, Sovetskaya
Rossia, and Komsomolskaya pravda till the last days of 1989.
Typical headlines were “The Leading Force”, devoted to the 70th
anniversary of the Yugoslav Communist party, (P: 20.0489),
“Glasnost: Yugoslav Experience” (MN: # 17, 1991), “When Thought
is Working”, on the experience of the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary
in constructing socialist economy IP: 21.04.89). The autumn (1989)
articles presented the changes in the East Europe as a turn to
reforms: “Agony is being experienced not by the socialism, but by
the totalitarism” (Yevgeny Ambartsumov, future head of the for
eign affairs committee of the Russian parliament, MN: #45, 1989).
“Our allies in Eastern Europe live in a hard, breaking moment.
They also need a new model of the democratic, human socialism.”
lie Global Network I to reseau global 132
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(P: 20.04.90)
provides a forum of scientific
Western countries are generally posifively viewed with an empha
sis on a “common European house”. in this context, the stress on discussion that includes
market refcrms inside the USSR were presented as a necessary
condition to enter this “house” (Iz. 25.04.90).
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manuscripts to I Envoycz manuscrits a:
iS
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