NE- 4101: Chapter 1

Concepts of Reactor Accident

Dr. Afroza Shelley

Professor & Chairman
Department of Nuclear Engineering 1
 Content of Chapter-1
Total Lectures: 4

• Operational States of NPP;

• Concept of Nuclear Accident and Incident;
• Initiating Events;
• Classification of Nuclear Accident;
• INES Scale;
• Design Basis and Beyond Design Basis Accidents in NPP.
Operational Status of NPP, May 2023

Prof Dr. Afroza Shelley 3

 Operable Reactor Type Around the World

Reactor type Main countries Number GWe Fuel Coolant Moderator

USA, France,
Pressurized water Japan, Russia, enriched
307 292.8 water water
reactor (PWR) China, South UO2
Korea
Boiling water reactor USA, Japan, enriched
60 60.9 water water
(BWR) Sweden UO2
Pressurized heavy water natural heavy heavy
Canada, India 47 24.3
reactor (PHWR) UO2 water water
Light water graphite enriched
Russia 11 7.4 water graphite
reactor (LWGR) UO2
natural U
Advanced gas-cooled (metal),
UK 8 4.7 CO2 graphite
reactor (AGR) enriched
UO2
Fast neutron reactor PuO2 and liquid
Russia 2 1.4 none
(FNR) UO2 sodium
High temperature gas- enriched
China 1 0.2 helium graphite
cooled reactor (HTGR) UO2
TOTAL 436 391.7
Prof Dr. Afroza Shelley 4
Nuclear share by country 2021 (source: IAEA PRIS)

Prof Dr. Afroza Shelley 5

 Operational modes of NPP
In a nuclear power reactor, an operational mode
corresponds to any one inclusive combination of
 core reactivity condition,
 power level, and
 average reactor coolant temperature.
Operational modes of NPP

Each plant mode has a set of conditions associated with

the plant state

Safety: temperature, multiplication factor, systems in

service, operable equipment, etc.

Security: access to sensitive areas, screening of personnel

etc…
 Safety, Security and Safeguards
 Safety is aimed at preventing accidents;

 Security is aimed at preventing intentional acts that

might harm the nuclear power plant or result in the theft of
nuclear materials; and

 Safeguards are aimed at preventing the diversion of

nuclear materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

Nuclear safety and nuclear security have a common purpose — the

protection of people, society and the environment. In both cases,
such protection is achieved by preventing a large release of
radioactive material.
 Nuclear Safety
• Nuclear safety ensures the safe operation of nuclear
facilities. It is complemented by radiation protection and
radioactive waste management.
• Nuclear safety covers the whole life cycle of a nuclear
installation, including nuclear reactor safety; fuel safety;
waste management; plant decommissioning; and
emergency preparedness.
• Failure in managing any nuclear safety requirements can
lead to the contamination of extensive areas of land and
bodies of water with consequences on the health of entire
populations not limited to the country of origin of the
contamination.
 Nuclear Safety
• Nuclear installation safety systems are designed with
significant redundancy, such as the duplication of critical
components and functions of the system as a ‘backup’. This
makes the system more reliable.
• These safety systems have ensured that, although
incidents have occurred, the escalation of incidents have
been prevented such that no major accidents have ever
taken place.
• There is an extremely low probability of nuclear accidents
occurring, but they have a high impact if they do occur.
• Nuclear power plants are subject to strict safety,
safeguarding, and security checks.
 Nuclear Safety
• Nuclear emergency situations are not limited to power
plants, they may also relate to Nuclear security deals with
the physical protection and control of nuclear materials and
installations, especially against intentional malicious acts
that include nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation,
combating illicit trafficking, reference materials for nuclear
safeguards, safety, and security.
Security System in Nuclear Power Plants

• Access control.
• Sensor cable in the fence to monitor the perimeter.
• Surface radar systems.
• Seismic sensors.
• Perimeter CCTV with video analysis.
• Thermal cameras.
• Motion sensors.
 Accident and Incident
• Accident is an undesirable or unfortunate event that occurs
unintentionally arising from carelessness, unawareness,
ignorance, system failure or a combination of these
causes which usually leads to harm, injury, loss of life,
livelihood or property or damage to the environment.
• An incident is an event that has unintentionally happened,
but this may not result in damage, harm or injury.
Therefore, every accident can be an incident. However not
all incidents can be termed as an accident.
 Concept of Nuclear Accident and Incident

• An event occurring in a nuclear power plant or anywhere

that radioactive materials are used, stored, or transported
and involving the release of potentially dangerous levels of
radioactive materials into the environment.
• An incident is an event that has unintentionally happened,
but this may not result in damage, harm or injury.
 Concept of Nuclear Accident and Incident

 A nuclear and radiation accident is defined by

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as "an
event that has led to significant consequences to people,
the environment or the facility”.

Examples include lethal effects to individuals,

large radioactivity release to the environment, reactor
core melt.“

The prime example of a "major nuclear accident" is one in

which a reactor core is damaged and significant amounts
of radioactive isotopes are released, such as in the Chernobyl
disaster in 1986 and Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.
 What is the initiating event?
Initiating event is defined as any event either internal or
external to the plant that perturbs the steady state operation
of the plant, if operating, thereby initiating an abnormal event
such as transient or LOCA within the plant.

They can trigger sequences of events that challenge plant

control and safety systems whose failure could
potentially lead to core damage or large early release.
 Example of Initiating event
A major event in the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident on
March 28, 1979, when a high pressure relief valve opened
in reactor number 2 at Pensylvania.

Although the valve opening was the initiating event of the

TMI accident sequence, it does not indicate the
fundamental problem.

As an official investigation revealed, the accident sequence

started because of human error.

A major feedwater valve had been left closed

erroneously at the end of routine maintenance the day
before.
 Plant States for Design Basis

Operational states Accident conditions

Normal Anticipated Design Design extension conditions
operation operational basis Without significant With core
occurrences accidents fuel degradation melting
 Plant States for Design Basis
Normal operation – The plant is operating as intended, with all
plant parameters (temperature, pressure, etc.) within the design
ranges for normal operation, and is considered for the
development of design measures for Defence-in-Depth Level 1.

Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO) – Include events,

which disrupt plant conditions from their normal state and are
expected to occur during the lifetime of a plant, and which are
typically caused by a failure or an inadvertent operation of a
single SSC, accommodated by the safety systems.

Since such events may occur during the lifetime of a plant, the
frequency of occurrence of AOOs is as low as approximately 1 x
10-2 per reactor year.
Plant conditions, expected as a result of an AOO, are
considered for the development of design measures for
Defence-in-Depth Level 2.

Any significant consequences of an AOO should be prevented

(no clad or fuel damage and no significant release of radioactive
materials).
Anticipated operational occurrences (AOO) in NPP
An AOO results from a deviation of an operational process from
normal operation that is expected to occur at least once during
the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of
appropriate design provisions, does not cause any significant
damage to items important to safety or lead to accident
conditions. These anomalies may lead to the following events:
• Increase in reactor heat removal;
• Decrease in reactor heat removal;
• Decrease in reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate;
• Reactivity initiated events;
• Increase in reactor coolant inventory;
• Decrease in reactor coolant inventory: very small LOCA due to the
failure of an instrument line;
• Release of radioactive material from a subsystem or component:
minor leakage from a radioactive waste system or fuel fail
• Loss of normal electrical power.
Design Basis Accidents

The term “design basis accidents” means that their

prevention or mitigation has to be covered by design and
demonstrated during the licensing procedure of a specific
plant.

Design-basis accident
A postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be
designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems,
structures, and components necessary to ensure public
health and safety.
Design Basis Accident (DBA) – Include events, which are
typically caused by the failure of a single SSC with
consequences of greater severity than those considered for
AOOs and which are not expected to occur during the lifetime of
a plant.
The frequency of occurrence of DBAs is less than 1 x 10-2 per
reactor year, and as low as approximately 1 x 10-5 per reactor
year or less, consistent with global probabilistic objectives
assigned to core damage frequencies.

Plant conditions, expected as a result of a DBA, are considered

for the development of safety systems for Defence-in-Depth
Level 3.
Reactor and plant systems should respond to prevent any
significant core damage or radioactive release exceeding
acceptable limits, although a limited number of fuel pin failures
may occur.
Initiating Events for Design Basis Accidents
The categories of postulated initiating events for design
basis accidents typically include the following transients:
(a) Increase or decrease of the removal of heat from the
reactor coolant system;
(b) Increase or decrease of the flow rate for the reactor
coolant system;
(c) Anomalies in reactivity and power distribution;
(d) Increase or decrease of the reactor coolant inventory;
(e) Release of radioactive material from a subsystem or
component.
 Initiating event (cont…)
Several initiating event can happen on design basis
accidents (DBAs) that typically include the following
transient categories:
• Reactivity and power distribution anomalies;
• Release of radioactive material from a sub-system or
component;
• Increase or decrease in heat removal from the reactor
coolant system;
• Increase or decrease in the flow rate of the reactor coolant
system;
• Increase or decrease in the inventory of the reactor
coolant.
Design Extension Condition (DEC) – Accident conditions that
are of lower probability than design basis accidents and involve
the failure of more than one SSC important to safety or part of a
safety system.
Design extension conditions should include initiators that result
in severe accident conditions and are considered for design
measures to prevent or mitigate core damage.
Plant conditions, expected as a result of such events, are
considered for the development of design measures for
Defence-in-Depth Level 4.
Objective provision tree for Anticipated Operational Occurrence
(AOO) and Design Basis Accident (DBA)
 Beyond design-basis (BDB)

Beyond design-basis events are difficult to predict either

because they have never occurred or have a low probability
of occurring. This is closely related to the idea of black swan
theory.

Events that occur due to human error, poor design and

negligence in construction are not considered beyond basis-
design events, since these are predictable and preventable.
 Fukushima Daiichi 2011

• Design Basis Specifications: Plant was built to

withstand tsunamis with a maximum height of 5.7m and
earthquakes with a maximum magnitude of 7.5.

• Beyond Design Basis Accident: The plant was subject

to a 10m tall tsunami and 9.0 magnitude earthquake, it
was unable to remain safe resulting in substantial
radiation leakage into the Pacific Ocean
 International Nuclear and Radiological
Event Scale (INES)
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
was introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in 1990 as a tool for promptly communicating the safety
significance of reported nuclear and radiological incidents and
accidents.

Incidents and accidents at nuclear facilities are divided into

seven categories according to their severity. Each country
determines the severity of incidents or accidents using this scale
and announces the results.

Use of INES serves to promote a common understanding of

the significance of reported events among governments, the
nuclear community, the media and the public.
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
 Nuclear Safety
Nuclear safety covers the actions taken to prevent nuclear
and radiation accidents or to limit their consequences.
This covers nuclear power plants as well as all other nuclear
facilities, the transportation of nuclear materials, and the use
and storage of nuclear materials for medical, power, industry,
and military uses.
The nuclear power industry has improved the safety and
performance of reactors, and has proposed new safer (but
generally untested) reactor designs but there is no guarantee
that the reactors will be designed, built and operated
correctly.
Mistakes do occur and the designers of reactors at
Fukushima in Japan did not anticipate that a tsunami
generated by an earthquake would disable the backup
systems that were supposed to stabilize the reactor after the
earth-quake.
According to UBS AG, the Fukushima nuclear accidents