Principle of Treason (Art.

114): Treason, as defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) of the
Philippines, involves acts committed by a person who owes allegiance to the government of the
Philippines and engages in activities such as levying war against the government or adhering to its
enemies, providing them aid or comfort, either within the Philippines or elsewhere.

Key Words:

1. Allegiance: The individual must owe loyalty and fidelity to the government of the Philippines.

2. Levies War: Engaging in armed conflict or initiating war against the government.

3. Adheres to Enemies: Forming alliances, supporting, or giving allegiance to entities or nations

hostile to the Philippines.

4. Aid or Comfort: Providing assistance, support, or any form of help to the enemies of the
Philippines.

5. Within or Elsewhere: The acts can occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines or in
any other location outside its borders.

1. Rep. Act No. 7659:

 This is the law that reintroduced the death penalty in the Philippines. It was enacted on
December 13, 1993. It amended the Revised Penal Code and other special laws.

2. Rep. Act No. 9346:

 This is the law that abolished the death penalty in the Philippines. It was signed into law
on June 24, 2006. The full title is "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines."

In the case of U.S. v. Maximo Abad (GR No. 976, October 22, 1902), the court dealt with issues related
to the proclamation of amnesty and the scope of offenses covered, particularly treason and sedition.
Here's a summary of the case:

Facts:

 Maximo Abad, a former insurgent officer, was entitled to the benefit of amnesty if the offense
fell under its scope.

 The specific act in question was Abad's denial of the existence of certain rifles to a U.S. Army
officer. This act, if considered a violation of the oath, might be seen as an act of treason by
adhering to the enemies of the United States.

Issues:

 Whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of amnesty for treason and sedition.

Ruling:
  The court noted that various offenses in criminal codes are directed against the state,
government authority, or public tranquility.

 The offenses defined in Act No. 292 include treason, misprision of treason, insurrection,
conspiracy to commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious
words and libels, and the offense in question (violation of oaths of allegiance).

 The court interpreted the proclamation broadly, stating that when using the words "treason and
sedition," the framer intended to include all political offenses defined in Act No. 292.

 Violation of oaths of allegiance, being a political offense, was considered included in the general
words "treason and sedition."

 The defendant was entitled to the benefits of the amnesty, and the court directed his discharge
upon filing the prescribed oath.

Principles:

 Treason is defined in Act No. 292 as levying war against the United States or the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
Philippine Islands or elsewhere.

 Sedition, according to section 5 of the same act, involves rising publicly and tumultuously to
obtain political objectives by force or outside of legal methods.

 Treason involves the violation of allegiance to the sovereign or supreme authority of the state.

 Sedition involves the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.

 In construing an executive act like a proclamation of amnesty, a court may apply a more liberal
rule of construction to effectuate the intended beneficent purpose.

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

77 PHIL 856
JANUARY 30, 1947

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US
Army and was interned, under a commitment order ―for his active collaboration with the Japanese
during the Japanese occupation. He was charged with treason as defined and penalized by Art. 114 of
the Penal Code. However, in September 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth government
and since then he has been under the custody of the Director of Prisons. Petitioner then filed a petition
for habeas corpus mainly asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens were suspended during the Japanese occupation.

2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of treason by giving aid and support to
the enemy during the Japanese occupation.

HELD:

1. NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy‘s
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government must
be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor
thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied
by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; x x x and that as a corollary of the conclusion
that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the
allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy‘s occupation. Just as a citizen
or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfor

G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.

J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee.
HILADO, J.:

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime
of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been apprehended, only
Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of
(1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the crime,
he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision
to this Court.

On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan,
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing
the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan,
said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the
residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy,
the residents thus assembled included men, women and children — mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd
C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).

The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women — the prosecution star
witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently, the
Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t.s.n.),
and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing, among
others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta, Sana,
Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31,
32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).

Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to
death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31,
32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he
gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas (pp.
10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).

Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had
been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed to kill
them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of the matter (pp.
15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be wives of
guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.).

The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita Paulino,
Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence
of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant
— such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly states (p.
3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of the testimony
of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and saw them
testify, had the following to say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple barrio girls,
only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any
desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in their testimony and
did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could not have been mistaken
as to the presence and identity of the accused for they know him so well that they referred to him by his
pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the
salient phases of the tragic events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses
to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the massacre committed by
the accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a
fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a trustworthy mental
picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.

Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing
that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred
residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one made on August 28,
1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp.
75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the
Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was
therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of
the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese
Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino
traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely
untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
providing:

. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

xxx xxx xxx

(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he
was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the
Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched
deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely
aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese constitution
and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National
Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the war ended
before this could be done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws
of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a
proposition which seems self-evident.

Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or
air service" of Japan.

Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.

Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said
constitution ordains:

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.).

This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his
loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under
the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him even when
his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in
the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps.

It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of
committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of
record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment.

But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the
character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an
illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for
instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country.
(Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)

696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms
against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe
this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)

As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to
separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men
and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the same
opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
"whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a
band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the
aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.

As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant acted
in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because he
allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a member of
the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance
with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The
construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this
Republic.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under pain
of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the impulse of
an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this is
not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually
acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more cruelty
than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very ones who saved the little
girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on
the day of reckoning.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of
treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of
"armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A
majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty,
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each
of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the
dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be
inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision,
and the costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the result because I am convinced that the appellant is guilty of multiple murder and he even
deserves the maximum penalty.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The main facts in this case upon which the prosecution relies are based on the testimonies of three
witnesses, two ten-year-old girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, and Policarpio Tigas.

From the testimony of Maria Paulino we quote:

Q. You said that you are ten years old, do you know what is the meaning of telling a lie? — A. I do not
know.

Q. Do you know the difference between falsity and truth? — A. I do not know.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Do you know how to read? — What, Sir?

Q. How to read. — A. No, Sir.

Q. Do you know how to pray? — A. I forgot how to pray."(Pages 44 and 45, t.s.n.)

From the testimony of Clarita Perez, we quote:

Q. Please state your name and your personal circumstances. — A. Clarita Perez, 10 years of age, and
resident of the Sitio of Banaban.

Q. What town? — A. I do not know.

JUDGE NEPOMUCENO:

Q. Is Banaban a sitio in the town of Malolos, or Quiñgua, or Bigaa? — A. I do not know, sir.

Q. You do not know? — A. I do not know, sir.

JUDGE ABAD SANTOS:

Q. What province? — A. I do not know, sir. (Page 4, t.s.n.)

Witness Policarpio Tigas, municipal policeman, testified that about sixty persons, including his sister
Eufemia, were killed in Banaban, but he was not killed "because I was with my guerrilla outfit then." He
saw the killing "because on the 29th day of January, I came down from the mountains and went to the
barrio to see my family to take them away from the place, but upon arriving there I saw that the people
were being gathered and placed behind the chapel. After placing the people behind the chapel I saw the
massacre of the group begun. In my interest to ascertain the fate of my sister and so that I would not be
seen, I crept to a creek and stayed there to find out what would be the end of it all. While I was thus
hiding in that creek I saw my sister killed by Pedro Manayao, the painter. After that, convinced of the
fate of my sister and knowing the one who killed her was Pedro Manayao, and because I was afraid that
if I stayed there longer I might be caught by the people and knowing that if I would be caught I would
also be killed, I left the place." (Page 102, t.s.n.) He was fifty meters away from the place of the
massacre. "The dead bodies were burned. I left to go to the mountains. I first put my mother in a safe
place, and after that I joined my companions and together we returned to the town." Eufemia "was
buried by my father" on the "second day after the killing". (P. 103, t.s.n.)

The above are the facts testified in the direct testimony of the witness. That he should come from the
mountains and arrive at the place at the very instant when the massacre was about to be executed; that
he should have remained hidden in a creek, fifty meters away, to find out the final fate of his sister; that,
instead of remaining to witness the gory scene, he did not depart to call his co-guerrilleros who,
according to him, were well armed, in order to attack the mass killers and try to save those who were
gathered to be killed; that he left precisely after he saw his sister decapitated, notwithstanding which he
testified that the corpses were burned but that the body of his sister was buried by his father the day
after the killing, — these, besides other details, are things that lead us to doubt the veracity of the
testimony of this witness, thus leaving to be considered only the testimonies of the two girls.

Although we are inclined to believe that the appellant must have been seen by the two girls at the place
of the massacre in the company of the Japanese, we cannot reconcile ourselves in believing all the
details as narrated by them, so as to justify the inflicting of the supreme penalty upon appellant.
Although we are constrained to believe in the substantial truthfulness of the two grills, considering their
tender age which makes them highly susceptible to suggestions, and the additional significant fact that
Maria Paulino does not know "the meaning of telling a lie" nor "the difference between falsity and
truth," and history and experience have time and again shown that human fallibility is more pronounced
in children of tender age, we vote for the modification of the appealed decision in the sense that
appellant be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-856. April 18, 1949. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), Defendant-
Appellant.

Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; ADHERENCE TO THE ENEMY, EXTENT AND SCOPE OF. — In a broad sense,
the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation
of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives.
What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature, degree and purpose. To draw
a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to
the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and, in addition,
be directly in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give
money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal
necessities is to assist him as an individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend
or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver’s
country enhances his strength and by the same count injuries the interest of the government of the
giver. That is treason.

3. ID.; ID.; COMMANDEERING OF WOMAN TO SATISFY THE LUST OF THE ENEMY IS NOT TREASON. —
"Commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers of men or to enliven the
entertainments held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainments
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more
than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrender their bodies
or organized the entertainments. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and
materially tend to improve their was efforts or to weaken the power of the United States. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or
to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence
of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstance of each particular case.

4. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; TREASON; CONVICTION OF ACCUSED FOR CRIME OF RAPE ALLEGED
AND INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION. — Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 requires that the
private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information and
sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he
might be found guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to
prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In fact, under the general
law of criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from that designated in the complaint or
information is allowed and practised, provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body
of the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial."
DECISION

TUASON, J.:

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People’s Court sitting in
Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.

Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2,
4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial
court found as follows.

"As regards count No. 1 —

"Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact
they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such
unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia
Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.

"It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it is sufficient to
reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the
accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but
instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontañosas; that she escaped
and returned to Baclayon her hometown that the accused came again and told bar that Colonel Mini
wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job that a week later, the accused
came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls to Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontañosas; that Governor Hontañosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when
she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a ’G’ string; that he, Colonel Mini
threatened her with a sword, tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with her; that on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped;
that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the
hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.

"As regards count No. 2 —

"Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That the accused in company with some Japs and
Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a
banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontañosas in
order that said Japanese Colonel might select those girls who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal
appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sisters were
brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where
Eriberta Ramo was forced to live a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to
by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo and her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite
once more their testimony in support of the allegations in count No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that
the allegations in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.

"As regards count No. 4 —

"Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduarda S. Daohog and
Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion
named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal
appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before
delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust the accused Susano Perez raping
Eduarda S. Daohog, and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S.
Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused through force and
intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against the desire of
the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer
named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his
companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the
house; that the accused threatened her with a revolver if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car
where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car,
and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and
Eduarda returned to the car, the latter, Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda
were taken to the Governor’s house; that on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor
Hontañosas, the Governor exclaimed: ’I did not call for these girls’; but the accused replied saying:
’These girls talked bad against the Japs, and that is why we arrested them’; that the said Governor
Hontañosas then, said: ’Take them to the Japs’; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to
the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr.
Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another Japanese living in that
house; that she was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
"In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the
allegations in Count No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 5 —

"Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos
and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to be taken as witnesses before a
Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and upon arriving
at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini,
Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence, threat and intimidation,
said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused
subsequently brought Flaviana Bonalos to a small house near the headquarters of Colonel Mini and
through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her
will; that about two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, the
said accused brought the other girl Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the
darkness, by means of threat and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.

"Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared: that the accused came to get her on the pretext that
she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her
younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; that they were brought to the
house of Colonel Mini; that her sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after remaining in the
same for about an hour, she came out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her
immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the
residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and
intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana
was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana)
was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.

"Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as follows: That on June 15,
1942, the accused came and told her that the Japs needed her daughters to be witnesses; that
accordingly, her daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran, that later, she went to
Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on
seeing her, both daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the Japs and raped them;
that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japs had raped her the accused also
raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two daughters to
return home on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they
stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughters returned to her house ultimately,
they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they would have preferred
death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had
raped her.

"The information given by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae
regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the information. In the
manner these two witnesses testified in Court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the
absolute truth. It is hard to conceive that these girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have
gone through if they were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in
Count No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 6 —

"Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companions, apprehended Natividad
Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having
attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other
Japs high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being
brought before the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8,
1942, again said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers
Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girl would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose
behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for
immoral purposes.

"Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P. A., testified at length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942,
she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a
car to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not
attending the dance held on June 25, 1942; that the real purpose in compelling them to attend said
dances and receptions was to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel
Mini for immoral purposes; that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez
whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving the approach
of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on her bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused,
not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered
her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she was sick.

"The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said
testimony need not be reproduced here."cralaw virtua1aw library

In a carefully written brief for the appellant, these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that
the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the
opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morals of the soldiers has always been,
and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of an army rests not
only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of
the Chief of Staff, United States Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).

If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women’s company kept
up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks,
and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general
result. Yet by common agreement those and similar manifestations of sympathy and attachment are not
the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature
of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the
invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature,
degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always
easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate, as was
said in Cramer v. United States, 89 Law. ed., 1441.

As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to
render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and, in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an
enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist
him as an individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to
enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver’s country enhances his
strength and by the same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See
United States v. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C. J., 816, 817.)

Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant’s first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainments held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainments
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more
than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainments. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly
and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or
to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence
of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and
Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above
stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense
(treason) charged, the People’s Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any
crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence."cralaw virtua1aw
library

All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.

Counsel assails the constitutionality of this provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of
the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in question requires that
the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information
and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that
he might be found guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to
prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In fact, under the general
law of criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from that designated in the complaint or
information is allowed and practised, provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body
of the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial." (People v. Perez,
45 Phil., 599.)

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not
charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and found on count No. 6
need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000,
and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty
years.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.