Professional Documents
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Week 11 - Non-Impairment of Obligations, Ex-Post Facto Law, Non-Imprisonment For Debt and Involuntary Servitude
Week 11 - Non-Impairment of Obligations, Ex-Post Facto Law, Non-Imprisonment For Debt and Involuntary Servitude
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2. Contract differentiated from License
1. Contract:
• A contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that
creates mutual obligations enforceable by law.
• In a contract, there is typically an exchange of promises, consideration
(something of value exchanged), and an intention to create legal relations.
• Contracts can cover a wide range of agreements, including the sale of goods,
provision of services, employment relationships, and lease agreements.
• Parties to a contract have both rights and obligations under the terms of the
agreement, and failure to fulfill these obligations can result in legal
consequences such as breach of contract.
2. License:
• A license, on the other hand, is a permission or authority granted by one party
(licensor) to another party (licensee) to do something that would otherwise be
restricted or prohibited.
• Unlike contracts, licenses do not typically involve mutual obligations between
parties. Instead, they involve a unilateral grant of permission or privilege by the
licensor to the licensee.
• Licenses are often revocable and can be subject to specific terms and conditions
set by the licensor. They are commonly used in intellectual property rights, such
as software licenses or patents, where the licensor grants the licensee certain
rights to use the intellectual property.
In summary, while both contracts and licenses are legal agreements, contracts involve
mutual obligations between parties and cover a broader range of agreements, while licenses
are unilateral grants of permission or authority and are often revocable with specific terms and
conditions set by the licensor.
3. Limitations
1. Modification or Invalidation by Subsequent Law:
• Despite the impairment clause protecting contracts at the time of their
execution, a contract may still be legally modified or invalidated by a subsequent
law.
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• If the subsequent law is deemed a proper exercise of the state's police power, it
will take precedence over the terms of the contract.
2. Reservation of Police Power:
• Every contract is subject to the provisions of existing laws and includes a
reservation of the state's police power, particularly when the agreement
involves matters affecting public welfare.
• Contracts dealing with public welfare issues are inherently susceptible to
legislative changes, as they are considered to have a "congenital infirmity" due
to their susceptibility to modification by the legislature.
3. Legislative Authority:
• The legislature cannot relinquish or bargain away its police power through
contracts. Similarly, private parties cannot restrict or limit the legislative
authority by entering into contracts on matters that fall within the jurisdiction of
the lawmaking body to regulate.
In summary, while the impairment clause protects contracts from impairment or
interference by subsequent laws, there are limitations to this protection, particularly when it
comes to matters affecting public welfare and the exercise of the state's police power.
Contracts dealing with such matters are inherently subject to legislative changes and cannot
fetter the legislative authority through contractual agreements.
4. Cases:
a. Tan vs Director of Forestry, 1983
Facts: In April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry advertised a tract of public forest land in Olongapo,
Zambales for public bidding. Wenceslao Tan and others applied for it, and Tan was granted the
area comprising 6,420 hectares. Later, a memorandum authorized the Director of Forestry to
grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to certain conditions. However, this authority
was revoked in December 1963. Despite this, an OTL was signed by the Acting Director of
Forestry in Tan's name without the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources' approval.
When the license was released in January 1964, it was challenged by Ravago Commercial
Company, leading to the Secretary of ANR declaring Tan's OTL null and void. Tan appealed, but
the Secretary denied the motion.
Issues:
1. Whether Tan's timber license is valid.
2. Whether Tan exhausted available administrative remedies.
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Ruling:
1. Tan's timber license is void ab initio because it was signed and released without proper
authority. The Director of Forestry was only authorized to grant new OTLs for areas not
exceeding 3,000 hectares, whereas Tan's area was 6,420 hectares. Additionally, by the
time the license was released, the Director's authority had been revoked. Hence, the
license was void from the beginning.
2. Even if Tan's license were valid, it could still be revoked by the authorities. A timber
license is not a contract or property right; it is a permit or privilege. The government has
the power to revoke licenses in the interest of public welfare, as licenses do not create
vested rights.
Tan failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing to the President of the
Philippines, who had the power to review such decisions. Failure to pursue this appeal
constituted a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Key Principle:
• Licenses are revocable privileges, not contracts or property rights, and can be revoked in
the public interest.
• Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, such as appealing to higher authorities, can
result in the dismissal of legal claims.
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Ruling:
The court upholds the validity of Act No. 4122 and rules in favor of Manila Trading & Supplying
Co. The court absolves Reyes from the complaint and orders the costs of the case to be taxed
against the losing party.
Key Principle: The court emphasizes the constitutional principles of liberty of contract, class
legislation, and equal protection of the laws. It acknowledges that while parties have no vested
rights in particular remedies or modes of procedure, the legislature has the power to change
existing remedies and modes of procedure without impairing the obligation of contracts.
However, the court also emphasizes that changes in remedies should not unduly diminish the
security of a mortgage without moderation or reason. The court finds that Act No. 4122 aims to
correct social and economic abuses related to the foreclosure of chattel mortgages, preventing
mortgagees from unjustly seizing mortgaged property and pursuing deficiency judgments. Thus,
the law does not unduly interfere with contractual obligations, sanction class legislation, or
deny equal protection of the laws.
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Held:
Statutes imposing a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not recent
enactments. They have been adopted during times of financial distress, especially during or
resulting from a war. The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise of the State's police power, being
an emergency measure. While recognizing that the obligations under the contract were
impaired, the impairment falls within the scope of the State's power exercised by the legislative
authority during economic emergencies, as the legislature found to exist. Legislation
appropriating such enactments before their passage is a legitimate exercise of the State's
power to protect its people's vital interests. The law's constitutionality is not affected by the
fact that it retroactively applies to contracts entered into before its passage and remains in
effect indefinitely or unreasonably, as long as the suspension of remedies is definite and
reasonable. The continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at present are
unreasonable and oppressive, and it should not be prolonged a minute longer and declared
unconstitutional, null, and void.
Key Principle:
The court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342, the Moratorium Law, as a valid
exercise of the State's police power during economic emergencies. While recognizing that the
law impairs contractual obligations, such impairment falls within the state's legitimate power to
protect its people's vital interests. However, the court found that the continued enforcement of
the law at the present time was unreasonable and oppressive, rendering it unconstitutional.
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harmful to public welfare, even if they are not inherently wrong. The issuance of a worthless
check is considered a public nuisance and is subject to penal sanctions under BP 22. The court
emphasized that BP 22 addresses a matter of public policy and aims to curb the harmful effects
of issuing worthless checks on the community at large. Additionally, the court rejected the
argument that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract, stating that contracts contrary to public
policy are not lawful. Checks, being commercial instruments, are subject to regulation by the
state and do not enjoy absolute freedom from state intervention.
Rulling:
• The police power of the state is described as essential, insistent, and illimitable, enabling
it to prohibit things harmful to society's comfort, safety, and welfare.
• Police power is inherent in the state and is not conferred by the constitution. It allows
the state to enact measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.
• Police power is dynamic and allows the state to respond to changing times and
exigencies.
This case underscores the broad scope of the state's police power and its authority to enact
laws for the general welfare, even if they restrict individual freedoms or rights to some extent.
B. Ex Post Facto Law: “ex post facto law is one that would make a previous act criminal
although it was not so at the time it was committed”.
1. Definition, Kinds
(1) Every law that makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act.
Example: A law passed in 2000 raising the age of seduction from eighteen to twenty-five
years, effective 1990.
(2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it Greater than it was when committed.
Example: A law passed in 2000 designating the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence as murder, effective 1990.
(3) Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed.
Example: A law passed in 2000 increasing the penalty for libel from prision correccional
to prision mayor, effective 1990.
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(4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in
order to convict the offender.
Example: A law passed in 2000 requiring for conviction mere preponderance of evidence
instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt, effective 1990.
(5) Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful.
Example: A law passed in 2000 depriving professionals of the right to practice for failure
or refusal to vote, effective 1990.
(6) Every law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or of a proclamation of amnesty.
Example: A law passed in 2000 lengthening the period for prescription of blackmail from
five to ten years, effective 1990.
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new law that retroactively changes the legal standards for proving guilt in similar
cases. As a result, the individual's conviction is now based on a legal standard
that is more stringent or difficult to meet. This change in the law prejudices the
accused because they were convicted under different legal standards than those
in place at the time of their actions.
3. Bill of attainder: “A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without
trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt”.
4. Cases:
a. Nunez vs Sandiganbayan, 1982
Fact:
Rufino V. Nunez and several co-accused, all public officials, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan for estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. Nunez
filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the
Sandiganbayan, violated constitutional provisions, particularly the due process and equal
protection clauses. He contended that the procedural differences, especially in the appellate
process, between cases tried in the Sandiganbayan and regular courts, discriminated against
the accused.
Issue:
Whether the trial of the accused by the Sandiganbayan, with its differing procedural rules
compared to regular courts, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The court upheld the constitutionality of the Sandiganbayan and its procedures. It reasoned
that the creation of the Sandiganbayan, as a specialized court to handle corruption cases
involving public officials, was a response to an urgent societal problem. The court emphasized
that the Constitution expressly provided for the establishment of the Sandiganbayan, indicating
a recognition of the need for different procedures to address corruption in public service. Thus,
the procedural differences in trials before the Sandiganbayan did not contravene the equal
protection clause.
Regarding the appellate process, the court explained that the omission of the Court of Appeals
as an intermediate tribunal did not deprive the accused of their rights. The Sandiganbayan
operates with a three-judge division and, if necessary, forms a five-justice division to ensure a
fair trial. Additionally, the Sandiganbayan en banc reviews cases for errors of law. The court
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emphasized that specific provisions addressing urgent societal issues take precedence over
general guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Key Principle:
Specific provisions addressing urgent societal issues take precedence over general guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, such as due process and equal protection clauses. The creation of
specialized courts, like the Sandiganbayan, to address specific societal problems, such as
corruption in public service, is constitutional as long as it is based on substantial distinctions
necessary to combat the identified issue.
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like the Anti-Money Laundering Act, must be narrowly construed and strictly applied. The
general principle of bank secrecy prevails unless expressly repealed or amended by legislation.
Facts:
Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal were accused of murdering Rogelio Llona in April 1994.
They allegedly barged into a house and shot Llona with their guns before fleeing. Atizado and
Monreal claimed they were at their family residence drinking gin during the time of the
incident. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted them of murder, and the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction in 2005. Monreal was a minor at the time of the crime.
Issue:
1. Whether the lower courts erred in finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder.
2. What penalty should be imposed on Monreal, who was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime?
Ruling:
1. The conviction is affirmed. The positive identification of the petitioners as the killers,
along with the testimony regarding their actions during the assault, left no doubt that
they conspired to kill Llona with treachery.
2. The penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended. While reclusion perpetua is the penalty
for murder, Monreal's minority at the time of the crime was not properly considered by
the RTC and the CA. Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, Monreal should be
presumed a minor until proven otherwise. Since Monreal has been detained for over 16
years, his entire detention period should be credited towards his sentence, warranting
his immediate release from prison.
Key Principle:
This case underscores the importance of properly considering the age of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime, especially in cases involving minors. It also highlights the
presumption of minority under Republic Act No. 9344, which protects the rights of children in
conflict with the law and ensures that their age is accurately determined before imposing
penalties.
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d. People vs Ferrer, 1972
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer, sitting as the trial court judge in Tarlac, declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Consequently, he dismissed the information of
subversion against Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag. Co was charged as an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) for various offenses, while Tayag and others were
accused of being members/leaders of the NPA and inciting the overthrow of the government.
The trial court held that the Act was unconstitutional, as it violated several fundamental
principles, including the separation of powers and due process.
Issues:
Whether RA1700 constitutes a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that RA1700, the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957, is not a bill of attainder
or an ex post facto law. A bill of attainder is a legislative act that punishes individuals without
trial, while an ex post facto law applies retroactively to past conduct. For a statute to be
considered a bill of attainder, it must specify individuals or groups and apply retroactively. In
this case, RA1700 merely declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
government and penalizes membership in such organizations based on conduct, not individual
identity. Membership is deemed unlawful only if acquired with the intent to further the
organization's goals through overt acts.
The Act is prospective in nature, as it prohibits acts committed after its approval. Moreover,
individuals who were members of subversive organizations before the Act's passage are given
the opportunity to escape liability by renouncing their membership. Therefore, the statute does
not violate constitutional principles and is a valid exercise of legislative power.
Key Principle:
The case establishes the principle that a statute is not considered a bill of attainder or an ex
post facto law if it does not punish individuals without trial and applies prospectively based on
conduct rather than personal identity. It underscores the importance of legislative power in
addressing threats to national security while upholding constitutional rights such as due process
and freedom of association.
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e. BOC Employees Asso. Vs Teves, 2011
Facts:
President Arroyo signed into law RA 9335 on February 11, 2005, which aimed to enhance the
revenue-generation capabilities and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law established a system of rewards and sanctions for BIR and
BOC officials and employees to incentivize them to exceed revenue targets. BOCEA,
representing the employees, filed a petition asserting that RA 9335 was unconstitutional, as it
violated fundamental rights. They argued that the revenue targets set were impossible to meet
due to government policies and economic factors. They also alleged that some employees were
coerced and forced to sign performance contracts under threat of reassignment or termination.
Issue:
Whether RA 9335 constitutes a bill of attainder.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that RA 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of
attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment on individuals or groups without a judicial
trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are specification of individuals or groups, imposition of
punishment, and lack of judicial trial. RA 9335 does not possess these elements. It merely lays
down grounds for the termination of BIR and BOC officials or employees and provides for the
consequences thereof. The law follows democratic processes, and the constitutional rights of
the concerned employees are protected. Moreover, there is a presumption of constitutionality
in favor of laws, and to justify their nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
Key Principle:
The case emphasizes that for a statute to be considered a bill of attainder, it must inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. RA 9335, which establishes a system of rewards and
sanctions for government officials and employees, does not meet these criteria. The decision
underscores the presumption of constitutionality of laws and requires clear evidence of
constitutional violation to justify nullification.
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C. Non-imprisonment for Debt: "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax."
1. Meaning of debt
1. Definition of Debt:
• In this provision, "debt" refers to any civil obligation that arises from a contract,
whether the contract is explicitly stated or implied by the circumstances.
• The excerpt cites Ganaway v. Quillen to emphasize that the term "debt" includes
obligations obtained through fraud. It highlights that the Constitution makes no
distinction in this regard, as long as the obligation to pay arises from a contract.
2. Nature of Civil Debt:
• The obligation to pay a debt is considered a private matter between the creditor
and the debtor. The State's punitive arm cannot be employed through criminal
action to enforce the creditor's right. Instead, the remedy for unpaid debt lies in
civil action for the recovery of the debt.
3. Prohibition Against Imprisonment for Debt:
• The excerpt illustrates the prohibition against imprisonment for debt, as stated
in the Constitution. It refers to the case of Serafin v. Lindayag, where a judge
issued a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for failure to pay a debt, despite
no criminal offense being committed. The Supreme Court annulled the judge's
action, declaring it violative of the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
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3. Treatment under the Law: The legal treatment of debts arising from fraud may vary
depending on the jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case. In some cases,
courts may be more lenient towards debtors who were victims of fraud, especially if
they were unaware of the fraudulent nature of the transaction. However, individuals
who knowingly engage in fraudulent behavior to incur debt may face severe legal
consequences, including civil liability, criminal charges, and potential imprisonment.
3. Non-payment of tax
1. Nature of Taxes:
• Taxes are financial obligations imposed by the government on individuals or
entities to contribute to the expenses of running the government and providing
public services. They are not considered debts but rather obligations of citizens
to contribute their fair share towards the maintenance of the government.
2. Exception for Poll Tax:
• A poll tax is a specific fixed sum levied upon every person belonging to a certain
class, typically without regard to their property or occupation. Unlike other
taxes, failure to pay a poll tax cannot be punished with imprisonment.
3. Reason for the Exception:
• The exception for poll tax reflects a social justice policy aimed at protecting the
impoverished masses who may not afford even the nominal cost of a poll tax,
such as the basic community tax certificate. It demonstrates the law's
compassion towards those who are economically disadvantaged.
4. Application of the Exception:
• The excerpt mentions the case of People v. Linsangan, where the exception for
poll tax was applied in favor of an individual convicted of non-payment of the old
cedula tax. Despite the individual's pending appeal, the exception under the
1935 Constitution was already in effect, preventing imprisonment for non-
payment of the poll tax.
In summary, while failure to pay taxes can generally lead to imprisonment, there is an
exception for poll taxes, reflecting a social justice policy aimed at protecting the impoverished
masses who may struggle to afford even nominal tax payments. This exception demonstrates
the law's sensitivity to the economic circumstances of certain individuals and ensures that they
are not unduly punished for their inability to pay poll taxes.
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4. Cases:
a. People vs Merillo, 1951
Facts:
The accused was charged with violating a law requiring employers to pay the salaries of their
employees at least once every two weeks. The law also provided that failure to do so would be
considered prima facie evidence of fraud committed through false pretenses. The accused
challenged the law, arguing that it violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt.
Issues:
Whether the law requiring employers to pay their employees' salaries and penalizing failure to
do so violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the law is valid and does not violate the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. The Court reasoned that the law does not punish the mere
failure to pay a debt but targets the fraud or deceit of the employer who, despite being able to
make payment, abstains or refuses to do so without justification. Therefore, the law aims to
penalize fraudulent behavior rather than mere debt.
Additionally, the Court clarified that the suspension of a civil servant for failure to pay a just and
admitted debt constitutes an administrative sanction and does not violate the prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. This administrative action is distinct from imprisonment and
serves as a disciplinary measure for failure to meet financial obligations.
Principles:
The case highlights the distinction between penalizing fraudulent behavior and imprisoning
individuals for debt. Laws aimed at addressing fraudulent conduct, such as failure to pay
employees' salaries without justification, are considered valid even if they involve financial
obligations. Administrative sanctions, such as suspension from public office for failure to pay
debts, are also distinct from imprisonment and serve as disciplinary measures.
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to her detention for three days. Serafin filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Lindayag for wrongful arrest and detention, arguing that the complaint lacked the essential
elements of estafa and was merely a civil matter of non-payment of debt.
Issue:
Was Respondent Judge Lindayag correct in ordering the arrest and detention of Plaintiff
Serafin?
Ruling:
No, Respondent Judge Lindayag was not correct in ordering the arrest and detention of Plaintiff
Serafin. The court found that the criminal complaint for estafa lacked essential elements and
merely alleged non-payment of a debt, which is not a criminal act. Judge Lindayag failed to
perform his duties properly by admitting the baseless complaint and issuing a warrant of arrest
without sufficient grounds. Therefore, Judge Lindayag's actions were deemed improper.
Key Principle:
Non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, and individuals cannot be criminally
charged for failure to repay a loan. Judges must ensure that complaints filed before them meet
the essential elements of the alleged offense before issuing warrants of arrest. Failure to do so
constitutes a failure to perform judicial duties properly and may lead to disciplinary action.
D. Involuntary Servitude
1. Definition
1. Definition:
• Involuntary servitude is described as a condition where an individual is
compelled to perform labor against their will, through force, coercion, or
imprisonment, for another party. This labor may be unpaid and can include
various forms of work, such as domestic service, farm labor, or other types of
employment.
• The concept of involuntary servitude encompasses practices such as slavery,
where one person exercises absolute power over another's life, fortune, and
liberty. It also includes peonage, which involves enforced servitude to work off a
debt or obligation, whether real or pretended.
2. Scope:
• The definition emphasizes that involuntary servitude violates the fundamental
principle of liberty and human rights, as individuals are deprived of their
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freedom to choose whether to engage in labor and are instead coerced into
working against their will.
• This definition highlights the various forms and circumstances under which
involuntary servitude may occur, including situations where individuals are
unlawfully detained or compelled to work through threats or other forms of
duress.
In summary, the definition of involuntary servitude provided in the excerpt encompasses the
coercive and exploitative nature of forced labor, emphasizing the deprivation of individual
liberty and the violation of fundamental human rights.
2. Exceptions
1. Punishment for a Convicted Crime:
• One of the exceptions to the prohibition against involuntary servitude is when it
is imposed as a punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly
convicted. This means that individuals who have been lawfully convicted of a
crime may be subjected to involuntary servitude as part of their punishment.
2. Military and Civil Service for Defense of the State:
• The Constitution allows for compulsory military or civil service under conditions
provided by law for the defense of the state. This exception permits the
government to require citizens to render personal military or civil service in
times of national defense or emergency.
3. Naval Enlistment:
• Naval enlistment is not covered by the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. Individuals who voluntarily enlist in the service of a
merchant vessel may be compelled to fulfill their contractual obligations, such as
remaining in service until the end of the voyage for which they contracted.
4. Pressing into Service under Posse Comitatus:
• In certain circumstances, individuals may be pressed into service under the posse
comitatus for the apprehension of criminals. This exception allows authorities to
command individuals, particularly male inhabitants of a certain age, to assist in
the pursuit of persons who have violated the law.
5. Compelling Striking Workers to Return to Work:
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• Workers involved in labor disputes in industries affecting public interest, such as
public utilities or essential services, may be compelled to return to work pending
settlement of the labor dispute. This exception aims to prevent disruptions to
essential services that may negatively impact the public.
6. Obligation of Minors to Obey Parents:
• Unemancipated minors come under the authority of their parents, who may
require them to obey and render certain services. This exception is based on the
principle of patria potestas, which obliges minors to obey their parents as long as
they are under parental power.
These exceptions to the prohibition against involuntary servitude provide legal grounds for
compelling individuals to perform certain types of labor or service in specific circumstances,
such as punishment for crimes, national defense, or maintaining public order and essential
services.
3. Cases:
a. US vs Pompeya, 1915
Facts:
On June 1, 1914, the acting prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo filed a complaint
against Silvestre Pompeya for violating the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, Executive Order No. 1,
series of 1914, based on section 40(m) of the Municipal Code. The complaint alleged that
Pompeya failed to render service on patrol duty, which constituted a violation of the law. Upon
arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, arguing that the municipal ordinance was
unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Organic Act of the Philippines, guaranteeing the
liberty of citizens. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
1. Whether the ordinance, based on section 40(m) of the Municipal Code, is constitutional.
2. Whether the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under
the law and whether the law violates the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving
citizens of their guaranteed rights.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the ordinance is constitutional. The amendment (Act No. 1309) conferring power
upon municipal councils falls within the police power of the state, aimed at maintaining
peace and order by apprehending lawbreakers. The exercise of police power
encompasses regulations for public welfare and protection against impositions. As long
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as laws enacted under police power do not violate individual rights, they are
constitutional.
2. The complaint fails to demonstrate a cause of action under the law. It does not explicitly
show that the accused belonged to the class of persons to which the law applied or that
the necessary conditions existed for the law's enforcement. Consequently, the court
affirms the dismissal of the complaint.
Key Principle:
Laws enacted under the police power of the state must aim to promote public welfare and
protect against impositions, without violating individual rights. Complaints in criminal cases
must explicitly state every fact necessary to constitute an offense and demonstrate the
applicability of the law to the accused. Failure to meet these criteria may result in the dismissal
of the complaint.
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Key Principle:
Individuals are entitled to protection against any form of coercion or psychological
manipulation that restricts their freedom of movement or choice. This protection extends to
situations where an individual's freedom is curtailed through external moral compulsion, fear,
or psychological coercion, entitling them to legal relief through the courts.
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• The Court finds that an actual case or controversy exists, making the issue ripe for
judicial determination, especially considering that the RH Law is already in effect and
budgetary measures have been passed to implement it.
• The petitioners have standing to challenge the law, as it significantly affects
constitutional rights, including the right to life and health, religious freedom, and others.
• The RH Law, while promoting reproductive health and responsible parenthood, does not
legalize abortion. It explicitly prohibits abortion and recognizes the protection of life
from conception.
• The Court upholds the constitutionality of the RH Law in providing access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient reproductive healthcare services. However, certain provisions of
the law are declared unconstitutional, particularly those related to coercion and
involuntary servitude.
• Despite the law's healthful intentions, the Court acknowledges concerns regarding its
coercive measures and its focus on addressing poverty and unemployment.
• The Court emphasizes the protection of life from conception, consistent with the
Constitution's recognition of the unborn's right to life.
Key Principles:
1. Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is a
type of legal challenge that aims to assess the validity of statutes concerning protected
rights, including free speech.
2. Conception and Life: The traditional meaning of the word "conception" refers to the
beginning of life at fertilization. Life begins at conception, and the State must protect
the life of the unborn equally with that of the mother, as recognized by the Constitution.
3. Protection of Constitutional Rights: Constitutional rights, including the right to life,
health, and religious freedom, are paramount and must be upheld, even in the context
of legislation promoting public health and welfare.
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