Kinton 1

COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY AND TRANSITIONAL

INTERAGENCY STABILITY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

MAJ Tom Kinton

415th CA BN
S9, PRT Khost, Afghanistan

May 2011
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For if a true survey be taken of counselors and statesmen, there may be found
(though rarely) those which can make a small state great, and yet cannot fiddle; as
on the other side, there will be found a great many that can fiddle very cunningly,
but yet are so far from being able to make a small state great, as their gift lieth the
other way; to bring a great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay. (Bacon)

In echoing the words attributed to Themistocles, Sir Francis Bacon gives voice to what

many have felt intuitively but have not been able to articulate. Stability operations in

both Iraq and Afghanistan have enjoyed costly and limited success. Coalition presence

(uniformed and otherwise) offers targets of opportunity to insurgent forces. Strong

interpersonal relationships (the enablers of trust with indigenous populations and

institutions) are mitigated by civilian and military personnel’s rotation in and out of

theater. Public support of substantial continuation of U.S. military efforts in both

theatres has been on the wane for some time, giving momentum to the current

administration’s desire for a timely exit.

Despite the billions of dollars, millions of man-hours, and thousands of lives lost, Iraq

and Afghanistan remain seemingly intractable issues. Insurgent information operations

(IO), more widely recognized as marketing, routinely reach a far wider audience and with

a much greater ‘stickiness’ than Coalition IO efforts. Western public perception is that

fat-cat contractors, pompous and petulant government officials and rough-edged military

participants slow the process of stabilization instead of speeding it along. The Arab

Street in general reacts to Coalition presence in both theatres as bumbling, deadly,

heretical meddling. The situation could realistically be described as bleak. The casual

observer might well conclude, as did Pogo, that we have met the enemy, and they are us.
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Are they? Writing on the theory of Complex Interdependence (CI), Robert Keohane and

Joseph Nye posit that ‘military force is not used by governments towards other

governments within the region (of cooperation), or on the issues, when complex

interdependence prevails’(Keohane and Nye). Taken further, with the decline of military

presence, states will move toward other forms of interdependence. Additionally, the

absence of military action creates space, increasing state and institutional cooperation.

Seen inversely, military presence can potentially hinder interdependence and cooperation.

Several questions flow from these statements:

• Can a deeper understanding of CI theory support our national interest of

reducing threats to stability in Afghanistan?
• What is the role of promoting democracy in politically instable regions?
• How can interagency and coalition actors responsibly disengage from
stability operations?
• Can a ‘cooperative region’ be developed through external efforts or must
it occur naturally?

The thesis of this effort is that Complex Interdependence Theory (CI) can be used as a

lens through which to focus interagency transitional energies to create conditions that

support the autonomization of the Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPI).

Expressed in two words: responsible disengagement. Nowhere is this desire more clearly

articulated than the words of a recent USG report on stability in Afghanistan:

Our strategy moving forward is to achieve our objectives through three core
elements: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge
that reinforces positive action, and an effective partnership with Pakistan. (U.S.
Department of Defense)

Here we see the essence of complex interdependence: military involvement in the

civilian sector (creating conditions), multiple actors with differing agendas (the civilian

surge), and regional/neighbor-state involvement.

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This paper addresses the questions in groupings of three areas:

• The theory of complex interdependence

• Application of the theory to the current operational environment

• The transitional challenges of harmonizing military and political efforts

towards responsible disengagement

The Theory of Complex Interdependence

Keohane and Nye parse CI into three sections: multiple channels of communication,

absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role of military force. As a lens

through which to view the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan the three parts of

the CI kaleidoscope are familiar. All three bear closer examination.

Multiple Channels

Military jargon lends itself to the description of multiple channels. Strategic, operational

and tactical channels are many. On another plane, diplomatic, informational and

economic avenues enable a further widening of contact between opposing entities. Taken

together these six channels of contact produce nine possible combinations impacting the

outcome of any decision. The number of individual actors involved with each decision

deepens these nine channels. If only three actors are involved within each of the nine

channels the result is twenty-seven possible levels of variance for each decision. But the

equation is not finished: there is a mirror-set of variables on the other side of the issue
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under consideration and, in the case of Afghanistan, usually a second language and the

accompanying translation issues.

Even the most minimalist application of this method results in seven hundred twenty-nine

variances of impact on one issue. Said another way, on any particular issue between two

opposing sides, given three levels of action and three areas of focus (strategic, operational

and tactical; diplomatic, informational and economic), there are seven hundred and

twenty-nine possible points of misunderstanding. Multiple channels, then, have the

potential to impart friction to the decision-making process. But multiple channels are

only one-third of the theory of Complex Interdependence.

Absence of Hierarchy Among Issues

Legacy organizations like the Department of Defense possess operational structure.

Competing agendas and non-state actors, absent any organizing principle, do not. By its

very nature the Department of Defense is currently engaged in an asymmetric fight with

not only enemies of state but also an ever-expanding group of not-quite-enemy-but-not-

quite-friendly fellow travelers. This is not to say that other agencies and NGOs do not

possess structure; far from it. But to speak of DoD and an NGO as having the same level

of structural ‘discipline’ is to do a disservice to both organizations.

Keohane and Nye’s observation is that in a complex environment (such as

interagency/coalition efforts in Afghanistan) there is not any one organizing principle

under which all parties (the licit ones) unite. The temptation to deconstruct this third of
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the triad is great: one could argue that the Millennium Development Goals are the

unifying principle (The United Nations), or that the U.S. Department of State wraps up

Afghan goals within the fascia of policy exported from Washington (U.S. Department of

State). Or, perhaps, the Taliban provides another source for the way forward for the

people of Afghanistan.

Although operating illicitly, the opposition Taliban actors certainly qualify as possessing

their own set of issues, along with an agenda, which do not coincide with other parties’

issues or anticipated outcomes. So from only one point of view there are organizing

principles, issues and agendas. The trouble is, the organizing principles are disparate

and, to date, not reconcilable. It is this lack of a central organizing principle that allows

disparate issues to flourish and receive inordinate attention, drawing resources away from

otherwise central issues.

The Minor Role of Military Force

States belonging to supra-statal organizations tend to use military force less often than

states outside the group (Keohane and Nye). Conversely, those states outside the aegis of

supra-statal membership are more inclined towards forceful coercion. Examples of

cooperative diplomatic, economic and political organizations range from the Roman

Empire through NATO, the USSR and NAFTA. Although disagreement over the

morality of state behavior may give pause to some, Niccoló would probably just smile

knowingly. His advice to princes reinforces the control measures employed by both

states:
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‘…love (of the prince) is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the
baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves
you by a dread of punishment which never fails’ (Machiavelli Ch. 17)

The four examples in the earlier paragraph are prime examples of supra-statal

organizations reducing intra-member forceful coercion, and can be seen as an evolution.

Rome, with it’s territorial expansion, unified disparate states under it’s military force, or

threat of force, to be sure. The more insidious and enduring unifiers of Roman rule are

the same shared by NATO, the USSR and trade/treaty groups like the North American

Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, namely, standards.

Standards of trade such as weights, measures and coinage are one variety. Legal, moral

and ethical codes are another. On their own these sticks in the bundle are weak;

sheathed in the fascia of state power such as Rome the bundle of sticks becomes

formidably strong. Newly conquered states under Roman rule faced a choice: conform

and adhere to the standards or face the Legion’s fist and phalanx. Conformity, over time,

led to greater prosperity for the conquered states and eventual assimilation. Rome’s

standards, enforced through the constant presence of military garrisons, served as a supra-

statal framework. Although technically part of the Roman Empire, conquered states

continued to find their own way along the various parts of existence, including social,

linguistic, and cultural, to name a few.

But a state’s assimilation was influenced far more deeply by two significant and often

under-valued conditions: Rome’s longevity of rule, and the intermarriage of Roman

soldiers with the local populace. Here we see a lesson in stability operations that is less-
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than-well received by modernity: stability operations take serious, multi-generational

effort in terms of time and resources. Further, serious deviations from Rome’s example

abound with regard to military operations in Afghanistan. Among these are doctrines of

extreme tolerance for religious and cultural aberrations that are anathema to stability,

over-sensitivity to the use of force, amateur efforts at perception management/marketing

clothed in the oft-misunderstood mantle of Information Operations (IO), and

counterproductive and doting efforts to appreciate local language and practice.

Attempting to learn Pashto for a nine-month rotation is a stretch, when local actors have a

nine or ten-year head start on English as a second language. Other examples of this type

of operational friction are doubtless familiar to the audience, and they could be addressed

through a more martial strategic and operational mindset. These examples of the supra-

statal military organization attempting to conform operations to local codes, mores and

customs are exactly what CI theory says is wrong with excessive military involvement

with regard to stability operations. Again, we hear Machiavelli’s words across the

centuries:

For it must be noted that men must either be caressed or else destroyed, because
they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for serious ones.
This, the injury done to a man must be such that there is no need to fear his
vengeance. But by keeping troops there instead of colonists, one will spend a
great deal more, being obliged to consume all the revenues of the state in order to
guard it, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and much greater harm is done,
since the entire state is injured by the army’s having to move its quarters from
place to place. This inconvenience is felt by all, and everyone becomes an
enemy, and these are enemies who can do harm, because, though beaten, they
remain in their own homes. In every way, then, a garrison is as useless as
colonies are useful. (Machiavelli 12) (Italics added)
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There can be no half-hearted measures in combat. At the risk of blaspheming current

doctrine, we are COIN-ing ourselves to death.

Rome’s longevity and the short-lived tenure of the Soviet Union provide us with

bookends here. The force of Roman economic, diplomatic and political efforts provided

conquered territories with attractive supra-statal organizing principles. On the other end

of the bookshelf the Soviet model looked to the now-discredited Hegelian dialectic, in a

vain effort to sacrifice the good (long-term stability at nominal cost) in favor of the

perfect (synthesis).

Application of CI Theory to the Afghan Operational Environment

Distance, both physical and cultural, reduces the quality of the image and information

sought. A neighbor of the same religion and language family far better appreciates

Afghanistan’s issues than an observer 9,000 miles away; the finer distinctions are only

appreciated through proximity and affinity, leading to understanding. Keohane and Nye

recognize this when they say ‘States belonging to supra-statal organizations tend to use

military force less often than states outside the group’ (ibid). And these supra-statal

organizations tend to be characterized by the commonalities of region, language, culture

and religion. These commonalities drive sustainable agenda setting, engendering

regional stability.

Agenda setting in Afghanistan is affected by local, regional, national, multinational and

NGO (non-governmental organization) actors. These actors are (or are-not) subordinate
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to various supra-statal entities such as the World Bank, the United Nations and NATO.

The multiplicity of actors, agendas, languages and cultures creates a corporate cognitive

dissonance so pervasive as to go unnoticed; dissonance is taken as the norm.

In this dissonant environment, issues rise and fall on the strength the voice, and not

always a certain logic of argument. The quantity of actors and their oft-times competing

agendas further reduces efficacy. Although certainly not all-inclusive, a short list of

actors on the Afghan stability stage includes the United States Departments of State,

Defense, Agriculture and Homeland Security; the Drug Enforcement Agency, and several

intelligence organizations. International actors include the NATO member states and

their various military and non-military organs, the United Nations and it’s several

embodiments, and a plethora of non-governmental organizations addressing a variety of

needs. And this list is exclusive of the fractured and fractious Afghan socio-political

reality.

By and large these actors espouse cooperation, but to ask the Afghan government for any

sort of ‘followership’ given the large number of outside influencers is to willingly

suspend disbelief. Given this set of multiple actors, competing agendas and external

military force, any hope for a cogent, national, agreed-upon response from the Afghan

people is unrealistic. There are, quite simply, too many sidebar conversations on the

stage for the drama to reach a substantive conclusion.

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Afghan Conditions and Societal Collapse

Moreover, states that spring up quickly, like all other things in nature which, after
being born, grow rapidly, cannot develop roots and all their branchings, so that
the first bad weather destroys them, unless, as has been said, those who have
become princes have such great ability (virtue) that they are able straightway to
prepare themselves to preserve what Fortune has throw in their laps and afterward
to lay those foundations that others made before becoming princes. (Machiavelli
28)

Jared Diamond’s work1 on why societies weaken and fail is instructive (Diamond). In his

research, Diamond identifies five key parts of a framework on the topic of societal death.

Although certainly not dead, current conditions in Afghanistan fit neatly into his model:

1. Human impacts on the environment

2. Climate change

3. Relations with neighboring friendly societies

4. Relations with hostile societies

5. Political, economic, social and cultural factors

As a result of the confluence of these five variables, Diamond holds that societies (the

Maya in Mexico and Central America and the USSR, to name two) rapidly collapse after

a societal peak. This rapid collapse, he holds, occurs at the point of a mismatch between

available resources and resource consumption. He recommends that the observer of

current unstable conditions (in an observed society such as Afghanistan) should not be

looking the value of the resources or population of the society (the mathematical

1
The majority of the work in the following section is taken directly from Diamond’s talk
on www.ted.com.
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function), but at the first and second derivatives of it. The real trouble occurs further

along, at the point of the mismatch between needs and resources. For stability to self-

sustain, planners and practitioners must look farther ahead.

International involvement in Afghanistan runs wide and deep: ten years from 2001 to

date and contributions in excess of 2/3rds of the Afghan budget2. The mismatch, then,

between available resources (external assistance) and needs (increasing birth rates and

lowered rates of infant mortality) becomes clear: at some point in the future there will be

a reckoning of accounts in Afghanistan and the populace will suffer out of proportion to

it’s baseline existence pre-2001. Why, then, doesn’t Afghan society realize this and

make course corrections?

Diamond asked the same question: Why do these societies fail to solve their own

problems? His answers resonate with CI theory and Afghan society in particular:

• In societies where there is a conflict of interest of the decision making elites and

the society as a whole, especially when the elites are insulated from the

consequences of those decisions, the elites are allowed to advance their own self-

interests more easily (centralized government and a culture of patronage and

nepotism)

• It is particularly hard for societies to make good decisions where there is a

conflict involving strongly held values that are good in many circumstances but

2
In fact: ‘Currently, weak revenue collection prolongs Afghan dependence on donors.
Collected revenues cover only one-third of the core budget.’ Ronna Afghan Web,
"Afghanistan's National Budget," 2010, 21 December 2010 <https://ronna-
afghan.harmonieweb.org/.../Afghanistan%20National%20Budget.doc>.
 Kinton 13

are poor in others, specifically where there is a shared commitment to religion and

social cohesion (the theocratic nature of Islam and the strong tribal unit)

• He further points out the difficulty in making course changes where the things

that get you in trouble are also the source of your strength

If we can agree that the above is valid, we certainly must consider the second and third

order effects of stability operations in Afghanistan and re-evaluate and perhaps re-

prioritize our efforts. In order to chart the course to Afghan stability, here is a brief look

at the how the current Lines of Effort3 relate with Professor Diamond’s framework:

Note: lines represent first order connections; data are subjective.

3
Coalition lines of effort (LOEs) in Afghanistan as of May 2011: Governance,
development, information operations, security, agriculture, and negative influencers.
LOE’s are prioritized differently for different operational units; for example, a battle
space owners’ highest priority might be security, while a Provincial Reconstruction Team
will take the lead on governance and development.
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Oft quoted and equally often used to guide civil military operations, Maslow’s hierarchy
of needs is superimposed here over the previous graphic.

This graphic represents the focus in Afghanistan as it relates to Maslow’s hierarchy and
the coalition lines of effort. What it reveals is the inequity between effort spent on
Agriculture, Security and Negative Influencers, and the realization of greater self-
sustainment through a hybridization of Diamond’s five areas and established lines of
effort.

Although not available at the time of publication, a data set showing coalition spending to
include the real cost of DoD lethal operations on negative influencers and security would
be revealing. This chart is offered as a starting point for future discussion. The utility of
such a study could lead to a re-prioritization of efforts as they apply to long-term
sustainability, as opposed to the moving target of stability.
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Can a deeper understanding of CI theory support our national interests of reducing

threats to stability in Afghanistan?

The temptation to idealize one theory over another is as great here as it was for the

Soviets vis-à-vis the Hegelian dialectic. CI theory is only one way to make sense of

events, and does not replace the Realist view. Power brokers and observers are tempted

to apply Realism to Afghanistan and they would not be entirely wrong.

Realism holds that in an anarchic world, power is the most sought-after commodity and,

in some sense, the view is not incorrect. The difference here is that with the rise of

multiple actors and their competing agendas anarchy is reduced, and those actors and

agendas create dissonance and produce friction in much greater volume than in the past.

Instantaneous communication of events also conveys views and opinions that drive

change in those agendas at a pace often too quick to address by conventional

(legacy/military) systems. The friction of agenda change is leveraged by the multiplicity

of agenda-setters, creating conditions for multiple and changing end states or goals.

Lastly, the span of time from 2001 (the beginning of the most recent intervention in

Afghanistan) and current operations in some ways holds practitioners hostage to their

own recent past. This long time-span engenders in some the tendency to view our

intervention in Afghanistan as ‘normal’, contributing to resistance to change. Nowhere is

this more clearly demonstrated than in the use of money as a weapons system

(MAAWS). The concept, begun in previous conflict and formalized in Iraq in 2006-2009
 Kinton 16

holds that injecting capital (and it’s concomitant capital improvements) serves as an

efficient adjunct to lethal operations.

The combination of over a decade of good intentions in Afghanistan, coupled with the

bandwagon mentality of U.S. military officers and congressmen has solidified the

MAAWS doctrine at the ground level through the Commander’s Emergency Response

Program (CERP)4. Through the CERP program, governed by MAAWS, battle space

owner’s and PRT’s leverage their proximity and affinity for local conditions into

significant gains in governance, development and other lines of effort. The ability to

quickly address pressing needs based on an understanding of current conditions produces

measureable results on local conditions. CERP and the MAAWS doctrine are a critical

part of Complex Interdependence, but their continued success is critically dependent on

external inputs of cash.

Realism vs. Complex Interdependence

The tendency to dismiss the value of CI theory by associating it with Realism is

seductive. Realism and it’s doppelganger, Realpolitik, views events and behaviors as

power-based5; CI theory acknowledges that power and refines it, identifying other players

and acknowledging their role as increasingly empowered influencers. Realism looks at

the system and, in the parlance of our time, says, ‘it is what it is’. Liberalism looks at the

4
Formalized early in the U.S. involvement in Iraq, CERP provides cash to U.S. ground
forces commanders to support five of the six lines of effort: governance, development,
negative influencers (bad actors), information operations, and agriculture. The sixth,
security, is not within the scope of CERP.
5
For an excellent treatise on power politics see John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001).
 Kinton 17

system and says, ‘it should be what it could be’; CI theory expands the view and gains

granularity, acknowledging previously ignored outliers. Keohane and Nye broke ground

on this distinction forty years ago, and showed us the distinction in this simple format:

Realism Complex Interdependence

Goals of Actors Military security will be Goals of states will vary by issue area. Transgovern-
dominant goal. mental politics will make goals difficult to define.
Transnational actors will pursue their own goals.

Instruments of State Policy Military force will be most Power resources specific to issue areas will be most
effective, although economic relevant. Manipulation of interdependence, inter-
and other instruments will national organizations, and transnational actors
be used. will be major instruments.

Agenda formation
Potential shifts in the balance
of power and security threats
will set the agenda in high
politics, and will strongly
influence other agendas.
Agenda will be affected by changes in the
distribution of power resources within issue
areas; the status of international regimes;
changes in the importance of transnational
actors; linkages from other issues and
politicization as a result of rising sensitivity
interdependence.

Linkages of Issues Linkages will reduce differences Linkages by strong states will be more difficult to
In outcomes among issue areas make since force will be ineffective. Linkages by
reinforcing international weak states through international organizations will
hierarchy. erode rather than reinforce hierarchy.

Roles of international
organizations
Roles are minor, limited by
the importance of military force
Organizations will set agendas, induce coalitions and
act as arenas for political action by weak states.
Ability to choose the organizational forum for an
issue and to mobilize votes will be an important
political resource. (Keohane and Nye)

Complex interdependence theory does not replace realism; in fact, Mearsheimer’s five

assumptions of the international system are apropos to Afghanistan:

…1) states are the key actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic
system, 2) great powers invariably have some offensive military capability, 3)
states can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions toward
them, 4) great powers place a high premium on survival, and 5) states are rational
actors who are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their
chances of survival.(Mearsheimer 363-363)

Applying this set of assumptions to Afghanistan merely requires one to replace the word

‘states’ with ‘Afghans’ and ‘great powers’ with ‘tribes’. Were Afghanistan to be left to

it’s own devices, absent external (extra-regional) influence, power politics would play out
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according to Realist theory. There are, however, other actors involved in Afghanistan,

and they bring another set of assumptions (and friction) to the problem set. CI theory

begins with Realism and acknowledges the impact and friction of these extra-regional

actors and their assumptions.

Legacy (Realist) Assumptions in Stability Operations

‘You go to war with the assumptions you’ve got’.6 Organizational skills and institutional

memory are only as deep and wide as the experience of their members’. Casual

observation of DoS, DoD and interagency activities reveals basic assumptions with

regard to stability operations:

• The military is the best game in town

• Interagency involvement will remain flat or grow slowly7
• Military involvement will remain flat or decline slowly
• Threats to stability operations practitioners will fluctuate for several reasons
o Efficacy of threat operations
o Efficacy of threat disrupt/deter/deny operations
• Availability of resources to both parties:
o Cash
o Human capital
o Political support
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the assumptions listed here are easily
recognized as legacy, organizational and insulated from the realities of the political and

6
With apologies to Donald Rumsfeld.
7
‘As of April 1, 2010, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside of Kabul has more than
quadrupled, from 67 to over 350’. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan , Periodic, United States Congress
(Washington: US GPO, 210).
 Kinton 19

cultural situation in Afghanistan. The first, that ‘the military is the best game in town’, is
a misstatement; better said, at present, the military is the ‘only’ game in town. 8

Increasing interagency presence in Afghanistan might be a reality on the large bases like
Baghram, Kabul and Kandahar, but the hinterlands suffer from a dearth of talented DoS
staffing (Kinder). Coupled with recent funding constraints9, the inadequate staffing of
stability practitioners denies battle space owners the coin of COIN.10

Application of CI to Afghanistan/COIN

In the following section I address some of the issues surrounding COIN as practiced in

Afghanistan: stability operations as an extracted resource, money as a weapons system,

functional corruption, and the role of Pakistan and India vis-à-vis United States foreign

policy in the region.

Stability operations as an extracted resource

As part of an analysis of oil-rich states, Karl (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz) posit that

They are ‘rentier states’ par excellence-states that rely to an unusually great extent
on externally generated revenues. This has two broad developmental effects. On
the one hand, the exceptional value of their leading commodity has meant
unusually high levels of external intervention in shaping their affairs and
capturing their resources by dominant states and foreign private interests. On the
other hand, petro-states are even less subject to the types of internal
countervailing pressures that helped to produce bureaucratically efficacious,

8
For a cogent discussion of what stability operations could be, see Thomas Barnett,
www.ted.com, June 2007, 1 November 2009
<http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html
>.
9
As of 01MAY2011, the obligation of funds under CERP in Afghanistan was stopped,
awaiting Congress’ passage of the budget continuation act.
10
The ratio of DoS staffers to Afghans as of April 2010 was 0.35:29,000. The same ratio
of DoS staffers in Paris to total Frenchmen was 1.060:66,000, making France the better
ratio of DoS staffers (data extrapolated from www.dos.gov, based on 53 offices in France
with an estimated average of 10 staffers per office. The number is likely far higher.
 Kinton 20

authoritative, liberal, and ultimately democratic states elsewhere precisely

because they are relieved of the burden of having to tax their own subjects
(Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz). (Italics in the original)

Humphreys, et al. are speaking here of the affect of unexpectedly large revenues from

extracted resources: specifically, the discovery of oil. In the case of Afghanistan, the

rents paid to the state take shape in the form of foreign aid. The net effect is the same. In

fact, Coalition spending makes up the majority of Afghan revenues (Special Inspector

General for Afghan Reconstruction).

As noted earlier, corruption in Afghanistan actually mirrored the increase in Coalition

spending and activity from 2007-2009. Paul Collier11 illustrates this phenomenon vis-à-

vis the deleterious affect that occurs when instable states discover previously hidden

natural resources. In speaking of a State Minister’s efforts to manage the sudden wealth

that accrues from these large capital inputs, Collier says they (contracts for extracted

resources) are ‘…good for the country, and quite often very good for the minister’

(Collier, TED). Commonly referred to as Dutch Disease12, where sudden influxes of

capital (not unlike Coalition spending in Afghanistan) follow a curve, with the first few

years’ cash inputs are more beneficial, and the following years’ tend to consolidate in the

hands of a few insiders. The corollary to Diamond’s statement that ‘…when the elites are

11
Taken together, Collier’s two latest books are indispensable in gaining a greater
understanding of the net negative effect of large capital inputs on instable states. Paul
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be
Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and
Votes (New York: Harper Collins, 2009). Collier is the former Chief Economist at the
International Monetary Fund.
12
After the discovery of oil in the North Sea, the Dutch economy spiked for the years
immediately following the discovery, and then fell for many more years as a result of an
initial increase of dependence on the oil revenues.
 Kinton 21

insulated from the consequences of those decisions, the elites are allowed to advance

their own self-interests more easily’ is not lost on even the most casual of observers of

events in Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan’s socio-political infrastructure pre-2001

could never have prepared it for the capital inputs it has received since.

Countries begin from different baselines. In speaking of Dependency Theory (a close

cousin to CI) Theotonio Dos Santos posited that developed states prey on less-developed

countries (LDCs) through resource extraction, hindering the ability of the LDC to

develop any part of itself. This is part and parcel of the dilemma: in order to develop,

LDCs must trade; because they are less developed, they first enter into trade from a

position of relative weakness. In Dos Santos’ view, exploitation of LDCs will continue

into the distant future unless changes in the inequity of relative gains can be made

(Ferraro).13 Again we see the friction caused by deficient capacity assumptions with

regard to stability operations in Afghanistan. Our own (U.S. Army) doctrine cautions us

thus:

…(The) challenges facing the commander in operations often can be understood

only in the context of other factors influencing the population. These other
factors often include, but are not limited to, economic development, governance,
information, tribal influence, religion, history and culture (U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command 3-4)

A fuller appreciation of CI theory provides a much better ‘structure’ on which to hang the

‘texture’ of lethal and non-lethal operations. This increased appreciation could serve to

better manage expectations, allowing practitioners and commanders to tailor their

13
See also Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K.T. Fann and
Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971, p.
226
 Kinton 22

operations and, most importantly, their desired effects14. Understanding that Coalition

spending is analogous to an extracted resource, with its potential for fomenting a

‘resource curse’ condition, will better position decision makers in future stability

operations.

Money as a Weapons System

“It is a simple question of policy,” said Nott. “The country, whatever

McNaghten15 may think, is hostile, and we have to treat it as such. We do this in
three ways—through influence which Sujah16 exerts on his unwilling subjects,
which is little enough; through the force of our army here, which with respect is
not as all-powerful as McNaghten imagines, since you’re outnumbered fifty to
one by one of the fiercest warrior nations in the world; and thirdly, by buying the
good will of important chiefs with money. Am I right?” (Fraser)

At the writing of this paper the United States alone has spent over (number here with

citation) in an attempt to drag Afghanistan out of it’s past and position it as a stable

regional ally. Flashman, in Fraser’s work of the same name, lays bare the British position

in Afghanistan at the time and accurately describes the pickle we are in now. In Kabul,

President Karzai rules his desk with an iron pen and our money. His reach into the areas

outside Kabul is as long as the series of zeros in his country’s checkbook. Without

incomes taxes, in an environment where even the various United States entities recognize

the current value of functional corruption (citation), Karzai is hamstrung. Even if he

were the zealous reformer we wish he were, his ability to raise revenues is subject to

14
Although ‘killed’ by GEN (RET) Mattis, the U.S. Army has retained the best parts of
Effects-Based Operations (EBO). J.N. Mattis, Assessment of Effects Based Operations,
Memorandum, U.S. Department of Defense (Norfolk: Joint Forces Command, 2008).
15
Sir William McNaghten, Envoy of the British government to Kabul. He held the
equivalent rank of ambassador.
16
Shaw Sujah, Afghan political leader of the time. He took control of Kabul on August
th
7 , 1839, with the help of the British army.
 Kinton 23

constitutional limitation. Further, neither the Provinces nor Districts (states and counties)

have any constitutional authority to tax or spend. Any revenues sent to Kabul (and they

are few, mostly from recently transparentized border-revenue collection centers) are

retained in Kabul at the disposal (pun intended) of the various Ministries. Should a

Province request money for projects or initiatives, they are long in coming if they come at

all (citation needed).

Enter Money as a Weapons System, otherwise known as MAAWS. As a construct,

MAAWS evolved from the CERP program in Iraq in an effort to codify spending by

ground commanders, aligning dollars spent with established LOE’s and keeping

commanders and money handlers from running afoul of DoD/USG contracting

regulations. The codification of MAAWS, as well as giving it an acronymic, gave life to

the program and mainstreamed it from its earlier humble beginnings as just one tool in a

commander’s rucksack. While USG spending in Afghanistan has unquestionably yielded

positive results (citation/footnote needed), Afghanistan’s post-monarchical system of

patronage coupled with a pervasive culture of functional corruption has skewed the local

and national economy (citation needed) to the point of chronic dependency on external

inputs of cash. This dependency occurs between Kabul and it’s benefactors, Karzai and

his Ministers and Provincial Governors, and Ministries and the supplicants for funds

crying out for assistance in the districts.

 Kinton 24

Functional corruption

He who creates a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and he who establishes a free
state and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will not last long. (Machiavelli 196)

The sons of Brutus are everywhere. They work in District Centers (the equivalent of a

U.S. county courthouse), issuing identification cards; they wear uniforms, in the role of

army recruit, border patroller or beat cop, paying back half their salary to their local

commander in exchange for keeping their jobs; they drive trucks and lay bricks for U.S.

construction projects. On the best of days they come to work on time and interact with

Coalition forces; on the worst of days, they watch as the convoy leaves, then follow our

tracks to plant bombs for us to encounter the next day as we return to monitor their

progress.

Although in an environment such as this hard data on corruption are hard to come by and

perhaps suspect, earning a ranking by Transparency International as just one notch above

Somalia in the Corrupt Practices Index lends credence to this hypothesis (Transparency

International). Further, the effects of a landlocked and mountainous country continue to

subject Afghanistan’s licit actors to the influences of their neighbors.

 Kinton 25

Pakistan and India

What is the role of promoting democracy in politically instable regions?

Although only one line of effort (LOE) among six, Governance is commonly assumed to

manifest as the transparent democratic process. Conventional wisdom with regard to

stability operations holds that transparency engenders public trust in governance, leading

to efficacy of service provision for an electorate. Efforts supporting good governance,

then, are those that support of the desire of the demos. Effective measurement of the

public’s (demos’) desire is reflected in voter turnout and solidification of electoral

processes.

The organizing principle here is the democratic process. Inordinate and sometimes

heroic efforts have been made in support of the democratic solution, yet statistics

(International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance) reflect a tepid response at

best to democracy. In speaking to the notion that democracy (as an exported product) is

fallacious, Carothers parses the subject in fifths:

The Five Assumptions of Democratic Transition

1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a

country in transition toward democracy
2. Democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
a. The opening
b. The breakthrough
c. Consolidation
3. The belief in the determinative importance of elections
 Kinton 26

4. The underlying conditions in transitional countries-their economic level,

political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, socio-cultural
traditions, or other ‘structural’ features-will not be major factors in either
the onset or the outcome of the transition process
5. That democratic transitions making up the ‘third wave’(Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order) are
being built on coherent, functioning states. (Carothers 168-171)

With regard to Afghanistan and Iraq, these five statements are truly, as posited by

Carothers, assumptions. Definition of a viable end state in stability operations requires a

clear understanding of the desire of the demos, if demos there may be. Moving from

‘demos’ to ‘democratic process’ is to be seduced by a trick of grammar. This seduction

is amplified by one’s baseline: in the case of U.S. policy, democracy. The validity of

Carothers’ five arguments is more clearly realized when illustrated through his term,

‘assumption’.

Assumption One

That “democracy is desirable” is as fallacious an argument as “onions are desirable”.

Anyone who has a child under the age of twenty can relate to the non-desirability of

onions. Children, given an option of onions or hot dogs, will choose hot dogs. The

onions come much later in life, and no amount of suasion will engender a genuine desire

for onions.

Democracy is no different: it may be true that democracy is a higher form of governance

than other types; it may be true that collective action by the demos will reduce and

advance thorny issues; it may by true that the art of compromise is the surest way to

advance agendas. But: in complex interdependence, agendas are many and varied; in
 Kinton 27

complex interdependence, compromise depends on an organizing principle; in complex

interdependence, issues are not organized in hierarchical fashion and, as such, compete

for prominence in such a way as to sap the strength necessary to advance any of them.

Quite simply, democracy, like onions, is an acquired taste.

Assumption Two

Democracy is acquired in three stages: the opening, the breakthrough, and consolidation.

U.S. history provides the casual observer with validation here. Democracy took root in

the post-Columbus environment, enabling the independence and maturation of the

modern United States. On further examination, democracy in the pre-United States

occurred in the glaring absence of any opposition: Britain was an ocean away and the

Native Americans were practically exterminated in the name of Manifest Destiny.17

Further, the level of voter fraud in Afghanistan skews the data set so as to render it non-

viable18. (expand on breakthrough, etc…)

Assumption Three

17
In recollecting his time as President, Harry Truman spoke of the damage done to the
American Indian: “We murdered as many as we could, and took their land away from
them. I have always felt that the Indians should have been allowed to maintain
themselves on the lands and improve their position, and eventually they would have
become friendly to us. They have the same sort of brains and body as we have, and they
are a brave people”. Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Bernard Geis Associates,
1960).
18
Begun in 2007, Transparency International’s Corrupt Practices Index ranked
Afghanistan as follows: 2007:172/178; 2008: 176/179; 2009:179/180; 2010: 176/180.
Transparency International, "2009 Global Corruption Barometer," 2009, Publications, 30
June 2009 <http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/gcb2009>.
 Kinton 28

The occurrence of elections is proof of the democratic concept. Supporters of this

assumption point to process participation. As a metric, voter turnout is tangible: of a

given population, a certain percentage voted. If we pursue this line of reasoning, we

could assign a value to each percentage point, with zero signifying absence of democracy

and one hundred (percent voter turnout) being complete democracy. In modern terms,

then, the United States would be only slightly more “democratic” than Switzerland, and

only half as democratic as Afghanistan. Australia would be almost completely

democratic, owing to the fact that the democratically elected government of Australia

requires voter participation by law (Hill and Louth).

Assumption Four

To hold that
…the underlying conditions in transitional countries-their economic level,
political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, socio-cultural
traditions, or other ‘structural’ features-will not be major factors in either
the onset or the outcome of the transition process (Carothers)

…is to believe that a fractured and fractious electorate, suffering from the lack of the

many benefits of democracy will somehow coalesce into a unified, compromise-seeking

entity striving for a common good while putting aside their own individual identities. In

truth, these weak systems, lacking a long period of incremental movement away from

autocracy and towards democracy have little chance of achieving functional democratic

maturity.

Assumption Five
 Kinton 29

The experience of the purveyors of democracy in the Western hemisphere assumes a

baseline of governance that is receptive to being taken to the next step: democracy.

Iconoclasts such as Morales in Bolivia and Chavez in Venezuela have successfully

challenged this notion. Other Western (democratic) strictures put democracy to the test

with mixed results. World Bank funds are dependent on the requisite straightjacket of

public fiscal behavior (Friedman) and challenge the most resilient of democratic systems.

The fickle nature of economics in a globalized market punishes licit governments when

public policy fails to keep pace with economic reality. The urge, then, to protect the

demos from increasingly unsupportable rates of change is great (see: Argentina, Bolivia,

Russia, Myanmar, Venezuela, et al.).

Without a period of democratic experimentation spanning generations, the validity of

democracy is open to revisionist questioning. External pressures, be they economic,

diplomatic or military, easily call a weak system into question. That the demos seek a

protector from the democratic nature of modern economics is telling, at times delivering a

Pyrrhic victory in the form of a return to more centralized forms of governance. Putin’s

continued popularity in Russia is modern proof of this revisionist tendency. Russia,

Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela all cast doubt on the notion that democratic

governance will take firm root in the soil of ‘coherent, functioning states’ (Ibid). 19

19
A recent news item lays bare the myth of the rising capitalist tide in Russia. In
speaking of a recent trip to Moscow after a fifteen-year absence, Rupert Wingfield Hayes
compares: ‘…(I)nstead, Russia has remained sullen and hostile, and re-embraced
autocratic leadership in the shape of Vladimir Putin-and we wonder why. What you
realize, when you live in Russia, is that so many of our assumptions are wrong. While
we were celebrating Russia’s release from Bolshevik tyranny, most Russians were being
plunged into poverty, unemployment and misery, as unbridled capitalism was let loose
 Kinton 30

The expectation that a), there is a demos, and b), the demos will coalesce and c), man’s

baser needs will take a back seat to higher political goals is too much in many cases. To

continue moving towards the goal of democracy in these unready regions is to display a

blissful ignorance of history and to cling to the idea that expenditure of the right amounts

of blood and treasure will induce behavioral change, and negation of the various

established individual needs.

Carothers’ observations ring harsh but true: adoption of and adaptation to the democratic

model of governance rest on five fragile assumptions. Close examination of these five

assumptions reveals that fragility to be dependent on factors not yet present in

Afghanistan.

Adherents to the promotion of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq point to the levels of

Maslow’s pyramid. Themistocles’ fiddlers at all levels intone policy and conduct

operations focusing on security, all the time unaware that the tip of one man’s pyramid is

not the same as the tip of another’s. Self-actualization is a moving target, based on a

plethora of variable conditions no organization can hope to set. Indeed, recent trends in

governance reflect the interdependent nature of a more fully globalized world in a pull

away from the democratic model:

upon an unprepared populace. Rupert Wingfield Hayes, "BBC News," 11 November

2010, Capitalism's tough reality for many Russians, 11 November 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/h/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9184718.stm>. Author’s italics.
 Kinton 31

In the West and in the Americas we thus seem to face a choice between a flawed
free-market American model (of economic life) and a good old European one,
warts and all. Today, Europe looks a bit more attractive to many. But to many
more around the world, authoritarian statism looks ever more appealing.
(Orenstein)

The concept of the battle space owner in Afghanistan (U.S. military forces) being

simultaneously responsible for security, governance, and development is a stretch and

forces the military into a role it is ill-prepared to assume. From the point of view of the

Afghan polity, the ‘board of directors’ concept (U.S. Department of State) is as

transparent as Afghan elections: everyone knows who is cheating, and no one can do

anything about it. While U.S. military forces are not cheating, per se, they are indeed

placed in a position not unlike a traditional Afghan warlord.

Theoretically placed on equal terms with both the U.S. Department of State and Afghan

government representatives, battle space owners continue to be the primary source of

action, results, and blame. Holding primary accountability, along with holding the

majority of lethal force and critical transportation assets puts U.S. commanders in the

same position as an Afghan warlord. The Golden Rule is just as applicable in

Afghanistan as anywhere else: he who has the gold (and guns) makes the rules. As long

as the Afghans see a weak institution (GIRoA) propped up via American forces, they will

look to U.S. forces for decisions.

How can interagency and coalition actors responsibly disengage from stability
operations?

The military alone cannot solve all the problems faced in this environment.
Unified action-involving joint and multinational forces, and interagency,
 Kinton 32

nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations-now reaches to the

tactical level (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 1-2)

Transitional challenges: harmonizing military and political efforts towards

responsible disengagement.

Rumors of effects-based operation’s (EBO) demise are premature. Although GEN

Mattis’ memorandum (ibid) has slowed the accretion of EBO into the staff officers’

lexicon, the ‘effect’ of effects based thinking on operations in the Army has taken root.

Railing against the ‘long assessment cycle’ (ibid), Mattis goes on to say that ‘…system of

systems analysis has (sic) not delivered on their (sic) benefits’ (ibid).

Why discuss the demise of EBO in a paper on CI theory? Simply put, to use Mattis’ own

words, ‘…we will continue to emphasize the art of command, the importance of

collaborative proactive action with interagency and multinational partners, and

comprehensive whole-of-government approaches to achieving our objectives’ (ibid).

Certainly we can agree with this last statement, in terms of harmonizing military and

political efforts in stability operations.

Redundancies notwithstanding, ‘proactive action’ must have a purpose. Whether that

purpose is defined as an ‘end-state’, ‘intent’ or ‘effect’, any effort focused on stability

 Kinton 33

operations must recognize the import of systems analysis. The interconnected nature

multiple (non-lethal) actors, differing agendas and (to the dismay of military planners

everywhere) the absence of a hierarchy demands a renewed focus on System of Systems

Analysis (SoSA).

There is no question that military planning processes and problem solving doctrine (the

military decision making process, MDMP20) reaches an ‘objective’. The problem is that

in the messy CI world (where folks don’t always play ball), the most desirable ‘objective’

is usually better defined as a condition. In no way am I suggesting here that doctrinal

planning processes be abandoned; rather, abandoning SoSA and EBO completely, as

GEN Mattis instructed in 2008, precludes operations personnel from considering the

effect of military operations on systems other than those in the cross-hairs.

Harmonizing military and political efforts in stability operations requires more than a

dismissal of a concept based on one documented bad experience21 or, to put it more

simply, because it’s too hard. If the United States continues to put the DoD into the role

of conducting stability operations, all the stakeholders should have a voice. Here, then, is

the heart of harmony: giving voice to the voiceless.

When DoD, with its assets and checkbook is in the lead role, whether by design or

chance, the voiceless are at a distinct disadvantage. One way towards harmonizing the

20
The MDMP has six parts and seventeen steps in one abbreviated version.
21
Mattis cites Israeli General Avi Kovar’s bad experience based on an over-reliance on
the concept of EBO during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli Conflict.
 Kinton 34

cacophony of dissonance is to truly place other agencies on a more equal footing with

DoD actors. Although anathema to Unity of Command22, stability operations in a CI

environment demand a broader ‘ear’ and a more fully empowered board of directors who

are co-equal at the table. Perhaps harmonization means a complete re-thinking of the

military’s role in stability operations; more of ‘enabler’ than ‘actor of first resort’23, for as

long as the ratio of DoD to DoS remains skewed (DoD:DoS in Afghanistan is

approximately 130:1) the resources and efforts will remain equally skewed in favor of the

DoD.

Of course, harmonization of DoD, interagency and multinational actors requires more

than a tailoring of our lexicon or a broadening of our doctrine. To responsibly disengage

means, quite simply, to leave Afghanistan better off than when we began in 2001. CI

theory supports harmonization by recognizing the importance of entities other than

DoD/DoS, and allowing for the increased activity and natural progression of the acts of

local and regional participants.

Can a ‘cooperative region’ be developed through external efforts or must it occur

naturally?

From a historical point of view, all end-states fixed in time were arrived at naturally; in

other words, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a function of all activities preceding it; the

Soviet involvement in Cuba was a function of all preceding events, ad infinitum.

Although these historical end-states were a function of their aggregate inputs, they were

22
One of the Nine Principles of War first articulated by (need citation here)
23
For a thorough and prescient look forward in the timeline of U.S. stability operations
structure, see (Barnett Pentagon’s New Map citation needed).
 Kinton 35

also a function of conditions more or less organic and sustainable, until those inputs were

withdrawn. Cuba served as a proxy to a much larger political struggle and received

external inputs as long as it served those interests; when the dénouement came to pass,

the external inputs changed, changing the local and regional dynamic. Likewise Berlin’s

role in international politics was forever altered by the removal of critical external

attentions. ‘Naturally’ occurring inputs are more aptly described as renewable and

sustainable. The removal of external assistance, whether it be money for aid programs or

fertilizer for increased crop yields returns the system to the status quo ante.

For a region to enter into cooperative and mutually beneficial agreements, there must be

some level of internal (state) trust in the external (regional) level of commitment over

time. Here is the rub: people and states are not stupid. Temporary external inputs,

whether economic, military, diplomatic or some other form, are known by all to be just

that: temporary. Further, there is a general expectation of quid pro quo that no amount of

pandering can mitigate. Public trust in extra-regional support is as fickle as the extra-

regional players’ agenda: there is no such thing as a free lunch and everyone knows it.

Successful, enduring systems arrive at that status through natural progression and are

self-sustaining. Neighboring states, with the myriad of cross-border trade interests,

common languages, cultural and religious affinities are vested in the successful outcome

of regional cooperation. Extra-regional actors can never achieve the same level of

intrinsic trust as inter-regional actors, and will always be seen as suspect by an

increasingly well-informed polity. No amount of diplomatic suasion can affect internal

 Kinton 36

change at the individual level: people are too smart. Our greatest policy victory would be

to recognize that only through a natural progression of internal struggle will the hearts

and minds of voters half a world away be really and truly changed.

Summary

Operations in Afghanistan are subject to the same friction of competing agendas, lack of

overarching hierarchical principals, and the un-natural presence of a large military force.

Complex Interdependence theory is not Realism in the strictest sense, nor is it merely

recognition of the obvious. Appreciating stability operations and transition in

Afghanistan is enhanced through an understanding of CI theory. As in any twelve-step

addiction program, U.S. policymakers and doctrinal adherents need to move from denial

to acceptance; from co-dependence to inter-dependence. Accepting that the deleterious

effect of foreign military presence on desired outcomes in Afghanistan prohibits natural

democratic progression is a start. Realizing that rational expectations are Afghan/internal

instead of U.S./external is a solid next step. History shows us that setting conditions for

democracy best occurs in the absence of denial and co-dependence, and takes a longer

time to accomplish in the presence of outside forces that interfere with the give and take

of internal struggles leading to a solid, sustainable and harmonious political outcome.

CI theory requires harmonizing responsible disengagement with some actors, and

disengagement with others. This is easier said than done, and requires a force of

character and strength of will on the part of some actors, while others may be asked to

play a lesser role. Unpalatable as it may be to some, military operations in Afghanistan

 Kinton 37

are creating dissonance. To paraphrase Keohane and Nye: If complex interdependence

causes a reduction in military force by governments towards other governments within

the region (of cooperation), or on the issues, will military presence by outside actors

prolong instability? The short answer is yes.

Conclusion

Complex Interdependence theory is not just a lens through which to view the current

problem of COIN in Afghanistan; it is systems analysis at the macro-level in every sense:

diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The U.S. military, under the acronym

SOSA (System of Systems Analysis) poked its nose under the tent of International

Relations theory and is shouldering under the canvas. The recent addition of Stability

Operations as a core function of the Joint Chiefs represents the camel creeping fully into

the big tent of IR theory. Getting COIN right requires rigorous academic training in the

science of analysis and the art of suasion and a patience of effort for which the modern

voting public has very little stomach. A major part of patience of effort in Afghanistan

rests with the military’s stepping away from the quest for total operational control and

information dominance: the U.S. military needs to include the relinquishment of control

as a metric, be at peace with less-than optimal end states, and reward commanders on the

ground as they reduce their efforts as Afghan forces take over. A complete revision of the

current Lines of Effort and a clear-eyed look at the real effect of MAAWS’ tendency to

create unsustainable dependencies in Afghanistan would contribute tangibly to getting

COIN right as we move forward.

 Kinton 38

The minor role of military force as the acme of success in stability operations is violated

daily in Afghanistan. Adhering to outdated treaties, practitioners of stability operations

appear as military actors: uniformed, armed and restricted by force protection measures

that severely limit freedom of movement and act as a barrier between provider and

customer.

Competing needs, absent a coherent hierarchy, and absent any agreed-upon supra-statal

organizing principles, will act on the military stability provider as ‘death by a thousand

cuts’, leading not to positive closure for all parties but, far more likely, a compromise of

principles over time leading to far less end-state improvement than was ever imagined.

Structured organizations, military and civilian alike, are involved in an asymmetric

organizational struggle with regard to Complex Interdependence. Non-military actors,

Afghan and regional, must be allowed to find their own way, within certain limits and

under the eye of an empowered but non-interventionist organization.

Responsible disengagement in Afghanistan requires the harmonization of competing

agendas, a reduction of external military influence, and increased inputs from

neighborhood states. Focusing interagency transitional energies to create these

conditions will improve conditions in Afghanistan and contribute to regional stability.

Keohane and Nye’s theory of Complex Interdependence illuminates our path; it remains

up to all of us to follow it.

 Kinton 39

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