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Elinor Ostrom, Et Al. (1999)
Elinor Ostrom, Et Al. (1999)
Elinor Ostrom, Et Al. (1999)
REVIEW: S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y
truction of the resources on which they 1 scales. These resources continue to be impor-
bout such problems and the conditions 1 tant as sources of sustained biodiversity and
mon-pool resources. Some of the most human well-being. Some of the most difficult
of largescale resources that depend on future problems, however, will involve re-
r in international basins or large marine , sources that are difficult to manage at the
cosystems. lmtituti~laldiversity may be as important as biologicaldiversity
/ scale of a village, a large watershei or even
a single country. Some of these resources-
j
for example, fresh water in an international
basin or large marine ecosystems-become
'hirty years have passed since Garrett a reassessment of the generality of the theory effectively depletable only in an international
Hardin's influential article "The Trag- that has grown out of Hardin's original paper. context (10). Management of these resources
edy of the Commons" (I). At first, Here, we describe the advances in under- depends on the cooperation of appropriate
many people agreed with Hardin's metaphor standing and managing commons problems international institutions and national, region-
that the users of a commons are caught in an that have been made since 1968. We also al, and local institutions. Resources that are
inevitable process that leads to the destruc- describe research challenges, especially those intrinsically difficult to measure or that re-
tion of the very resource on which they de- related to expanding our understanding of quire measurement with advanced technolo-
pend. The "rational" user of a commons, global commons problems. gy, such as stocks of ocean fishes or petro-
Hardin argued, makes demands on a resource An important lesson from the empirical leum reserves, are difficult to manage no
until the expected benefits of his or her ac- studies of sustainable resources is that more matter what the scale of the resource. Others,
tions equal the expected costs. Because each solutions exist than Hardin proposed. Both for example global climate, are largely self-
user ignores costs imposed on others, individ- government ownership and privatization are healing in response to a broad range of hu-
ual decisions cumulate to a tragic overuse and themselves subject to failure in some instanc- man actions, until these actions exceed some
the potential destruction of an open-access es. For example, Sneath shows great differ- threshold ( I I).
commons. Hardin's proposed solution was ences in grassland degradation under a tradi- Although the number and importance of
"either socialism or the privatism of free tional, self-organized group-property regime commons problems at local or regional scales
enterprise" (2). versus central government management. A will not decrease, the need for effective ap-
The starkness of Hardin's original state- satellite image of northern China, Mongolia, proaches to commons problems that are glob-
ment has been used by many scholars and and southern Siberia (8) shows marked deg- al in scale will certainly increase. Here, we
policy-makers to rationalize central govern- radation in the Russian part of the image, examine this need in the context of an anal-
ment control of all common-pool resources whereas the Mongolian half of the image ysis of the nature of common-pool resources
(3) and to paint a disempowering, pessimistic shows much less degradation. In this in- and the history of successful and unsuccess-
vision of the human prospect (4). Users are stance, Mongolia has allowed pastoralists to ful institutions for ensuring fair access and
pictured as trapped in a situation they cannot continue their traditional group-property in- sustained availability to them. Some experi-
change. Thus, it is argued that solutions must stitutions, which involve large-scale move- ence from smaller systems transfers directly
be imposed on users by external authorities. ments between seasonal pastures, while both to global systems, but global commons intro-
Although tragedies have undoubtedly oc- Russia and China have imposed state-owned duce a range of new issues, due largely to
curred, it is also obvious that for thousands of agricultural collectives that involve perma- extreme size and complexity (12).
years people have self-organized to manage nent settlements. More recently, the Chinese
common-pool resources, and users often do solution has involved privatization by divid- The Nature of Common-Pool
devise long-term, sustainable institutions for ing the "pasture land into individual alloca- Resources
governing these resources (5-7). It is time for tions for each herding household" (8). About To better understand common-pool resource
three-quarters of the pasture land in the Rus- problems, we must separate concepts related
sian section of this ecological zone has been to resource systems and those concerning
'Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and degraded and more than one-third of the Chi- property rights. We use the term common-
EnvironmentalChange and Workshop in PoliticalThe-
ory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Blooming-
nese section has been degraded, while only pool resources (CPRs) to refer to resource
ton, IN 47408, USA ZEnvironmentaland Occupation- one-tenth of the Mongolian section has suf- systems regardless of the property rights in-
al Health Sciences Institute, Rutgers University, 170 fered equivalent loss (8, 9). Here, socialism volved. CPRs include natural and human-
Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA and privatization are both associated with constructed resources in which (i) exclusion
3Carnegie Institution of Washington, Stanford, CA
94305. USA. 4Energy and Resources Croup, University
more degradation than resulted from a tradi- of beneficiaries through physical and institu-
of California. Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. 5National tional group-property regime. tional means is especially costly, and (ii)
Research Council, Washington, DC 20418, USA. Most of the theory and practice of suc- exploitation by one user reduces resource
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E- cessful management involves resources that availability for others (13). These two char-
mail: ostrorn@indiana.edu are effectively managed by small to relatively acteristics-difficulty of exclusion and sub-
ment, capital and labor mobility, and techno- Systems (Research Report 4, World Resources Insti- The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Prince-
tute, Washington, DC, 1986). ton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995). The model is
logical change push us past environmental
4. D. Ludwig, R. Hilborn, C. Walters, Science 260, 17 also not as robust in explaining exchange behavior
thresholds before we know it. "Learning by (1993). in traditional societies where evolved norms still
doing" is increasingly difficult, as past les- 5. B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson, The Question of the strongly affect behavior.
sons are less and less applicable to current Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal 22. L Cosmides and J. Tooby, in The Adapted Mind:
Resources (Univ. of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ, 1987); Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Cul-
problems. F. Berkes, D. Feeny, B. J. McCay, J. M. Acheson, Nature ture, J. H. Barkow, L Cosmides, J. Tooby, Eds. (Oxford
Requirement of unanimous agreement as 340, 91 (1989); F. Berkes, Common Property Resourc- Univ. Press, New York, 1992), pp. 163-228; L Cos-
a collective-choice rule. The basic collective- es: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Devel- mides and J. Tooby, Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 327 (1994); E.
opment (Belhaven, London, 1989); D. W. Bromley et Hoffman, K. McCabe, V. Smith, ibid. 86, 653 (1996).
choice rule for global resource management ai, Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and 23. R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books,
is voluntary assent to negotiated treaties (36). Policy (ICS Press, San Francisco, 1992); S. Y. Tang, New York, 1984); Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 80, 1095 (1986).
This allows some national governments to Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in 24. M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Nature 355, 250
Irrigation (ICS Press, San Francisco, 1992); E. Pinker- (1992); D. M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, R. Wilson,
hold out for special privileges before they
ton, Ed., Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: J. Econ. Theory 27, 245 (1982).
join others in order to achieve regulation, New Directions for Improved Management and Com- 25. H. Demsetz, Am. Econ. Rev. 62, 347 (1967); D. North,
thus strongly affecting the kinds of resource munity Development (Univ. of British Columbia Press, ibid. 84, 359 (1994); C. M. Rose, Property &• Persua-
management policies that can be adopted at Vancouver, Canada, 1989); C. Hess, Common-Pool sion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of
Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, Vol. Ownership (Westview, Boulder, CO, 1994); J. E. Krier,
this.-level. 3, and Forest Resources and Institutions: A Bibliogra- Harvard J. Law Pub. Policy 15, 325 (1992); F. Mich-
We have only one globe with which to phy (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analy- elman, in Liberty, Property, and the Future of Consti-
experiment. Historically, people could mi- sis, Indiana Univ., Bloomington, IN, 1996) (www. tutional Development, E. F. Paul and H. Dickman, Eds.
indiana.edu/~workshop/wsl/wsl.html). (State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1990),
grate to other resources if they made a major 6. R. Wade, Village Republics: Economic Conditions for pp. 127-171; V. Ostrom, Brigham Young Univ. Law
error in managing a local CPR. Today, we Collective Action in South India (ICS Press, San Fran- Rev. 3, 857 (1990).
have less leeway for mistakes at the local cisco, 1994). 26. E. Ostrom, in The Commons Revisited: An Americas
7. D. Feeny, F. Berkes, B. J. McCay, J. M. Acheson, Hum. Perspective, J. Burger, R. B. Norgaard, E. Ostrom, D.
level, while at the global level there is no Ecol. 18, 1 (1990). Policansky, B. Goldstein, Eds. (Island, Washington, DC,
place to move. 8. D. Sneath, Science 2 8 1 , 1147 (1998). in press).
These new challenges clearly erode the 9. C. Humphrey and D. Sneath, Eds., Culture and Envi- 27. W. F. Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal:
ronment in Inner Asia (White Horse Press, Cambridge,
confidence with which we can build from 1996), vol. 1.
Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (ICS
Press, Oakland, CA, 1998).
past and current examples of successful man- 10. R. Costanza et ai, Science 2 8 1 , 198 (1998). 28. World Dev. 24, 1301 (1996).
agement to tackle the CPR problems of the 11. W. S. Broecker, ibid. 278, 1582 (1997).
29. G. D. LibecapJ. Instl. Theor. Econ. 145, 6 (1989).
12. M. McGinnis and E. Ostrom, in The International
future. Still, the lessons from successful ex- 30. J. Burger, Condor 100, 528 (1998); in {26); L White-
Political Economy and International Institutions, O. R.
amples of CPR management provide start- man, National Parks 71, 22 (1997).
Young, Ed. (Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 1996), vol. 2, pp.
31. F. G. Speck and W. S. Hadlock, Am. Anthropol. AS,
ing points for addressing future challenges. 465-493; R. O. Keohane and E. Ostrom, Eds., Local
355 (1946); C. Safina, Issues Sci. Technol. 10, 37
Some of these will be institutional, such as Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogene-
(1994).
ity and Cooperation in Two Domains (Sage, London,
multilevel institutions that build on and 1995); S. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction 32. J.-M. Baland and J.-P. Platteau, Halting Degradation of
complement local and regional institutions (Island, Washington, DC, 1998). Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Commu-
nities? (Clarendon, Oxford, 1996); M. A. McKean, J.
to focus on truly global problems. Others 13. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, J. Walker, Rules, Games, and
Theor. Pol. 4, 247 (1992).
Common-Pool Resources (Univ. of Michigan Press,
will build from improved technology. For Ann Arbor, Ml, 1994). 33. J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
example, more accurate long-range weather 14. E. Schlager, W. Blomquist, S. Y. Tang, Land Econ. 70, (Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Ml, 1962); J. B.
Wiener, Yale Law J. 108, 677 (1999).
forecasts could facilitate improvements in 294 (1994).
15. W. Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing 34. C. W. Clark and G. R. Munro, in Investing in Natural
irrigation management, or advances in fish Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sus-
Groundwater in Southern California (ICS Press, San
tracking could allow more accurate popu- Francisco, 1992). tainability, A. M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, R.
lation estimates and harvest management. 16. R. Norgaard, Adv. Hum. Ecol. 4, 141 (1995); C. Gib- Costanza, Eds. (Island, Washington, DC, 1994), pp.
son, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy 343-361.
And broad dissemination of widely be- 35. See O. Young, Ed., Science Plan for Institutional Di-
of Wildlife Policy in Africa (Cambridge Univ. Press,
lieved data could be a major contributor to New York, 1999); A. Agrawal, Greener Pastures: Pol- mensions of Global Environmental Change (Interna-
the trust that is so central to effective CPR itics, Markets, and Community Among a Migrant Pas- tional Human Dimensions Programme on Global En-
vironmental Change, Bonn, Germany, 1999); Global
management. toral People (Duke Univ. Press, Durham, NC, 1999).
17. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental
In the end, building from the lessons of opment (OECD), Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Eco- Experience (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997); P.
past successes will require forms of commu- nomic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine Haas, R. Keohane, M. Levy, Institutions for the Earth:
Resources (OECD, Paris, 1997); National Research Sources of Effective Environmental Protection (MIT
nication, information, and trust that are broad Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993).
Council, Sustaining Marine Fisheries (National Acad-
and deep beyond precedent, but not beyond emy Press, Washington, DC, 1999). 36. J. B. Wiener, Georgetown Law J., in press.
possibility. Protecting institutional diversity 18. H. S. Gordon, J. Pol. Econ. 62, 124 (1954); B. J. 37. R. M. Hilton, / Theor. Pol. 4, 283 (1992).
related to how diverse peoples cope with McCay, Coastal Ocean Manage. 28, 3 (1995). 38. This paper profited from ideas discussed at a sympo-
19. E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of sium on "The Commons Revisited: An Americas Per-
CPRs may be as important for our long-run Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge Univ. spective" held in conjunction with the X General
survival as the protection of biological diver- Press, New York, 1990). Assembly of the Scientific Committee on Problems of
sity. There is much to learn from successful 20. C. R. Plott, Science 232, 732 (1986); K. A. McCabe, the Environment (SCOPE), June 1998. We thank the
S. J. Rassenti, V. L Smith, ibid. 254, 534 (1991). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NSF, and
efforts as well as from failures. 21. See S. Bowles, R. Boyd, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, Homo NASA for supporting the U.S. National Committee
reciprocans: A Research Initiative on the Origins, Di- for SCOPE, where this effort began. We thank F.
References and Notes mensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fair- Berkes, A. Blomqvist, P. Dalecki, D. Dodds, K. Dough-
1. G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243 (1968). ness (working paper, University of Massachusetts, erty, D. Feeny, T. Hargis-Young, C. Hess, B. J. McCay,
2. ibid. 280, 682 (1998). 1997); E. Ostrom and J. M. Walker, in Perspectives on M. McGinnis, M. Polski, E. Schlager, N. Sengupta, J.
3. J. E. M. Arnold, Managing Forests as Common Property Public Choice: A Handbook, D. C. Mueller, Ed. (Cam- Unruh, O. Young, and anonymous reviewers for their
(FAO Forestry Paper 136, Rome, 1998); D. Feeny, S. bridge Univ. Press, New York, 1997), pp. 35-72; J. M. useful comments. Supported by NSF grant
Hanna, A. F. McEvoy, Land Econ. 72, 187 (1996); F. Orbell, A. van de Kragt, R. M. Dawes, J. Personality SBR-9521918, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Orga-
Berkes and C. Folke, Eds., Linking Social and Ecological Soc. Psych. 54, 811 (1988); E. Ostrom, Am. Pol. Sci. nization (FAO), the Ford Foundation, and the
Systems: Management Practices and Social Mecha- Rev. 92, 1 (1998). In these experiments, the formal MacArthur Foundation (E.O.) and by U.S. Department
nisms for Building Resilience (Cambridge Univ. Press, structure of a dilemma is converted into a set of of Energy grant AI DE-FC01-95EW55084 to the Con-
New York," 1998); A. C. Finlayson and B. J. McCay, decisions made by subjects who are financially sortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Partici-
ibid., pp. 311-337; R. Repetto, Skimming the Water: rewarded as a result of their own and others' pation and National Institute of Environmental
Rent-seeking and the Performance of Public Irrigation decisions. See also J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Eds., Health Sciences grant ESO 5022 (J.B.).