From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts

DOMINIC HYDE

One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to

the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that
if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it
will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value
gaps. Logics of vagueness including many-valued logics, fuzzy logics, and
supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The
thought that an adequate response might require the recognition of cases of
overdetermination and truth-value gluts has few supporters. This imbalance
lacks justification. As it happens, Jaskowski’s paraconsistent discussive
logic—a logic which admits truth-value gluts—can be defended by reflect-
ing on similarities between it and the popular supervaluationist analysis of
vagueness already in the philosophical literature. A simple dualisation of su-
pervaluation semantics results in a paraconsistent logic of vagueness based
on what has been termed subvaluational semantics.

1. Introduction

Let us say that a logical theory is complete if and only if, for any contra-
dictory pair of sentences “A” and “¬A”, one or other must be true in the
theory (i.e. A,¬A).1 A theory will then count as incomplete just in case
it is not complete, that is, for some sentence “A” neither it nor its negation
need be true. Approaches to the problem of vagueness that postulate truth-
value gaps are committed to logics which admit incompleteness since,
given the shared assumption that a sentence is false if and only if its nega-
tion is true, to admit sentences in the theory which are neither true nor
false is to admit sentences which fail to be true whilst their negations also
fail to be true. There is obviously a trivial sense in which a logic might
admit incompleteness, namely, if whenever a sentence and its negation
fail to be true in a theory every sentence and its negation fail to be true.
This is not the sense of incompleteness to which truth-value gap
approaches are committed. Such approaches countenance quarantined
1
“ ” represents the multiple-conclusion consequence relation. “Σ Γ ” is
to be read distributively as: “Whenever all the members of the premise set Σ are
true then some member of the conclusion set Γ is true”. For example (dispensing
with set-brackets for simplicity):
A & B, C A, B iff whenever “A & B” is true and “C ” is true, “A” is true or “B”
is true.

Mind, Vol. 106 . 424 . October 1997 © Oxford University Press 1997
642 Dominic Hyde

gaps. That is, they accept that some sentence “B” can be true whilst not
every sentence or its negation is; gaps do not implode everywhere. So in
addition to the admission of incompleteness (i.e. A,¬A) there is also a
commitment to the non-triviality of the incompleteness (i.e. B A,¬A).
Let us say that a logic which admits non-trivial incomplete theories is
paracomplete. The cornerstone of mainstream responses to the logical and
semantic problems posed by vagueness amounts to the view that vague-
ness necessitates a paracomplete response at worst.
I want to deny this. There are grounds for thinking that vagueness might
be modelled by a paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistency is (standardly)
defined in such a way as to be the dual of paracompleteness. A logical the-
ory is said to be consistent just in case given a contradictory pair of sen-
tences “A” and “¬A” they cannot both be true in the theory (i.e. A,¬A ).
A theory will then count as inconsistent just in case it is not consistent,
that is, for some sentence “A”, both it and its negation can be true together.
On the repeated assumption that a sentence is false if and only if its nega-
tion is true, theories which recognise truth-value gluts are inconsistent
theories. As with incompleteness, however, logics might only admit
inconsistent theories in a trivial sense, so that whenever a sentence and its
negation are both true in a theory every sentence and its negation is true.
Non-trivial truth-value glut approaches will seek to quarantine the gluts so
that a sentence and its negation might be true in a theory without every
sentence and its negation being true. Thus in addition to the admission of
inconsistency (i.e. A,¬A ) there is also a commitment to the non-trivial-
ity of the inconsistency (i.e. A,¬A B). We shall say that a logic which
admits non-trivial inconsistent theories is paraconsistent.
My claim will be that theories which advocate a retreat to paraconsis-
tency as opposed to paracompleteness as a response to the problems posed
by vagueness cannot be dismissed so easily as has been thought.

2. A paracomplete approach to vagueness

Let us begin by considering what is currently perhaps the most popular

logical response to problems posed by vagueness—supervaluationism.2
Van Fraassen’s supervaluation semantics is adapted to the problem of
vagueness as follows. The vague predicate “heap” has some borderline
case a say—it is indeterminate whether a is a heap since a is neither deter-
minately a heap nor determinately not a heap. There are admissible ways
2
For a more comprehensive account of supervaluationism as a response, see
Williamson (1994, Ch. 5).
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 643

of precisifying “heap” so that a is a clear counter-instance and there are

other admissible ways of precisifying “heap” so that a is a clear instance.
Truth simpliciter, according to the supervaluationist, applies to a sentence
just in case that sentence is true no matter how one admissibly precisifies
any vague constituents of the sentence. So, since a is a borderline case of
a heap, the sentence “a is a heap” is neither true nor false but lacks a truth-
value and is counted indeterminate, as does its negation “a is not a heap”.
However an evaluation which leaves “a is a heap” indeterminate or truth-
valueless might nonetheless ascribe the value “true” to another sentence,
say, “b is a heap”. The logic is clearly paracomplete.
What makes this approach so appealing to so many is its apparent log-
ical conservatism. Whilst rejecting the metatheoretic principle of biva-
lence it nonetheless recognizes as logical truths all those sentences
recognised as classical logical (CL) truths. Supervaluational (SpV) validity
is standardly defined as preservation of truth simpliciter. An argument is
SpV-valid just in case whenever the premises are true in all admissible pre-
cisifications the conclusion is true in all admissible precisifications.3
As a consequence, one can easily establish that:
A iff SpV A.
CL
So, for example, though the principle of bivalence is rejected the law of
excluded middle is preserved:
A ∨ ¬A.
SpV
More generally, it is easily shown that:
(I) A1,…An CL B iff A1,…An SpV B.4
How might such a paracomplete approach to vagueness resolve the
most pressing of logical problems, the sorites paradox? Consider the fol-
lowing form of the paradox:
A pile of 100,000 grains of sand is a heap
For any n, if a pile of n grains of sand is a heap then a pile of n–1
grains is a heap
3
This definition characterizes what Williamson identifies as the property of
global validity. (See Williamson 1994, pp. 147–8.) It is the account of supervalu-
ation-validity endorsed by Fine. (See Fine 1975, pp. 283–4.) An alternative prop-
erty, local validity (according to which an argument is SpV-valid just in case, in
all admissible precisifications, whenever the premises are true the conclusion is
true) is endorsed by Dummett. (See Dummett 1975, p. 311.)
Problems attend the local account (see Williamson 1994, pp. 147–8) and I shall
assume the global account throughout what follows. As it happens, though the
local account of validity is strictly stronger than the latter, both accounts validate
all and only those single-conclusion inferences validated by the classical account
of consequence. (Again, see Williamson 1994, pp. 147–8.) Principle (I) below is
blind to the distinction.
4
See Williamson 1994, p. 148.
644 Dominic Hyde

∴ A pile of 1 grain of sand is a heap.

Since the argument can be cast as a series of applications of the classically
valid inference modus ponens, it must—by (I) above—be supervaluation-
ally valid. If it is to count as unsound then some premise must be rejected.
Unlike other paracomplete approaches which might exploit their ability to
distinguish between the absence of truth and the presence of falsity to
reject a premise without endorsing its negation, the supervaluationist’s
response involves biting the bullet and rejecting one of the premises as
false—the quantified conditional premise. Regardless of how one (admis-
sibly) precisifies the vague predicate “heap” there will always be some
sharp cut-off point between being a heap and not being a heap, thus it is
true simpliciter that, for some n, a pile of n grains is a heap and yet a pile
of n–1 grains is not. The cut-off point varies from precisification to pre-
cisification so there is no point of which it is true simpliciter that it is the
cut-off point, but it is true none the less that there is some such point. So
even though the logic invalidates:
(1) For some n, it is true that a pile of n grains of sand is a heap yet
one of n–1 is not (i.e.∃n T “Heap(n) & ¬Heap(n–1)”)
it validates:
(2) It is true that for some n, a pile of n grains of sand is a heap yet
one of n–1 is not (i.e.T “∃n (Heap(n) & ¬Heap(n–1))”).
Consequently, it validates:
(3) It is false that if a pile of n grains is a heap then one of n–1 is (i.e.
F “∀n (Heap(n) → Heap(n–1))”).
In other words, the quantified conditional premise is false. Our prior will-
ingness to endorse this premise (or, alternatively, our unwillingness to
reject it) arises from the obvious absurdity of (1), in conjunction with our
failure to distinguish (1) from (2).5
Responses to such a solution vary. The major criticism focuses on the
inability to infer (1) from (2). It is seen as evidence that “∃” is not used in
its ordinary sense, thus it is suggested that supervaluationism does not
give a true description of the truth-conditions of the English phrase “there
exists”. Whilst I think that the supervaluation theorist can rebut this charge
on the condition that they claim only to be modelling semantic vagueness
(as opposed to epistemic or ontological analyses), an attempt to justify
this belief would distract from the aims of this paper.6 What is relevant to
current concerns is the fact that many (perhaps the majority of) theorists
5
In Kit Fine’s terms the failure amounts to our not paying due attention to what
he calls “the truth value shift”(Fine 1975, p. 286). More on this in §4.
6
The counter–response is suggested by Fine’s remarks (1975, p. 285) when
defending against the analogous charge concerning the non–truth-functional
nature of disjunction in SpV.
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 645

in the area find the supervaluation approach convincing and, as such, they
must be prepared to rebut this charge. Closer examination of the defence
is not yet necessary and will be dealt with in §4 below.
What does the existence of such a popular paracomplete logic of vague-
ness have to do with paraconsistent approaches? It is to this we now turn.

2. A paraconsistent approach to vagueness

2.1 Precedents
In spite of the fact that paraconsistent approaches to vagueness have not
been considered real contenders in the search for a solution to the prob-
lems vagueness poses, it has been suggested by workers outside of the
main research program that one might, or perhaps should, approach
vagueness from a paraconsistent perspective.7
In Marxist philosophy, key examples of dialectical situations are pro-
vided by focussing on what to say about the application of vague predi-
cates border-line cases. A seedling in a process of becoming a tree is said
to be both a seedling (by virtue of what it was) and not a seedling (by vir-
tue of what it will become); a man growing a beard is at some stage both
bearded and not bearded. Terms involved like “seedling” and “bearded”
are vague predicates in the modern analytical philosopher’s sense, yet for
classical Marxists they are characteristically dialectical, issuing in contra-
dictions. Plekhanov (1941, pp. 114 ff.) cites the rejection of the traditional
principle of non-contradiction as the means to a solution of “the riddle of
the bald man”, that is, the sorites paradox. This solution was no curio in
the far-reaches of Marxist scholarship but a commonly and popularly
cited virtue of Marxist dialectics and evidence of the inadequacy of clas-
sical logic (see Milosz 1980, p. 50). Of course this approach, as it stands,
is far from worked out but it does strongly suggest a paraconsistent
approach.
In a more illuminating and recent discussion, McGill and Parry (1948,
p. 428) explicitly affirm that vagueness is a ground for a paraconsistent
dialectical logic, claiming that “[i]n any concrete continuum there is a
stretch where something is both A and ¬A. …There is a sense in which the
ranges of application of red and non-red [in so far as “red” is vague] over-
7
It is true that some many-valued logics proffered can be presented as paracon-
sistent but suggestions along these lines have generally been met with incredulity.
What is more commonly acknowledged is the (weaker) suggestion that contradic-
tory statements “A” and “¬A” might both fail to be false (as opposed to both being
true). Many-valued proposals of this kind that abandon the law of non-contradic-
tion include: Goguen (1969), Machina (1976), and Zadeh (1975).
646 Dominic Hyde

lap, and the law of non-contradiction does not hold”. In agreeing with
McGill and Parry that vagueness constitutes a case for the failure of the
law of non-contradiction, Newton da Costa and Robert Wolf (1980, p.
194) suggest that one requirement of a paraconsistent dialectical logic “is
that the proposed logic be interpretable as a logic of vagueness”.
Da Costa’s view that vagueness be treated paraconsistently can be
traced to an earlier suggestion by Jaskowski (1969), a student of
Lukasiewicz. He described a paraconsistent “discussive logic”, one of
whose main applications was to serve as a logic of vague concepts—con-
cepts which he saw as giving rise to contradictions. Within the pioneering
Brazilian tradition of research into paraconsistent logics this work was
picked up and subsequently elaborated on by Arruda and Alves (1979),
and Da Costa and Doria (1995). They persisted with Jaskowski’s claim
that discussive logic be looked on as a logic of vagueness.
Some idea of the extent to which Jaskowski’s work, and more particu-
larly his view on vagueness, has influenced the development of paracon-
sistent logic in Brazil can be gleaned from Arruda (1989).
This explicit interest in vagueness from a paraconsistent perspective is
not restricted to the Brazilian school. A paraconsistent approach to vague-
ness has been pursued within analytic philosophy by other non-classical
logicians and philosophers (see Peña 1989, and Priest and Routley
1989a).
The main problem with suggested paraconsistent analyses is that while
they have pointed in a paraconsistent direction they have not explained in
any detail how vagueness is to be analysed from a philosophical point of
view. Vagueness is noted as an area for the application of paraconsistency
but the centre of attention has remained squarely on the paraconsistent
logics themselves and their detail. It is little wonder then that an emerging
research program centering on vagueness itself has paid little attention to
bold claims by logicians in another field.
2.2 Subvaluationism
As it happens a paraconsistent logic of some interest can be developed
from analyses of vagueness already in the philosophical literature—
supervaluationist analyses. A simple dualisation of supervaluational
semantics results in a paraconsistent logic based on what has been termed
subvaluational semantics. The duality between supervaluationism and
subvaluationism, so central to the discussion in this paper, has been exam-
ined in detail in Varzi (1994) and Varzi (1995). Most of the formal results
which follow are to be found in his work.
Subvaluational semantics begins from the agreed view that when a
vague predicate “heap” has some borderline case a, say, it is indeterminate
whether a is a heap since a is neither determinately a heap nor determi-
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 647

nately not a heap. There are admissible ways of precisifying “heap” so

that a is a clear counter-instance and there are other admissible ways of
precisifying “heap” so that a is a clear instance. The difference is that sub-
valuational semantics treat borderline cases for a vague predicate like
“heap” as cases to which the predicate both applies and does not apply.
That is, if a is a borderline case for “heap” then “a is a heap” is true and
“a is not a heap” is true (i.e. “a is a heap” is false).
Where supervaluational semantics defined “truth simpliciter” as apply-
ing to a sentence just in case that sentence was true no matter how one
admissibly precisified any vague constituents of the sentence, that is, just
in case the sentence was true for all admissible precisifications, subvalua-
tional semantics defines “truth simpliciter” as applying to a sentence just
in case that sentence is true for some admissible precisification. Whilst
determinate truths are still those sentences which remain true for all
admissible precisifications, determinate falsehoods are still those which
are false for all admissible precisifications, and indeterminate (vague)
sentences still those which are true on some but not all admissible precisi-
fications, this third class now consists of those sentences that are both true
simpliciter and false simpliciter (as opposed to neither true nor false sim-
pliciter). Indeterminate sentences take on both truth-values. It is easy to
show that for such sentences, for example, “a is a heap”, both it and its
negation are true. None the less, an evaluation which ascribes both truth-
values to “a is a heap” might, say, ascribe just the value “false” to another
sentence “b is a heap” . The logic is clearly paraconsistent.
Like supervaluationism, however, all classical tautologies are preserved
in subvaluation logic (SbV) if one retains a standard definition of validity
in terms of preservation of truth simpliciter. An argument is then SbV-valid
just in case whenever the premises are true in some admissible precisifi-
cation the conclusion is true in some admissible precisification.8 As a con-
sequence of the definition one can easily establish that:
CL A iff SbV A.
So, for example, though the principle governing the exclusivity of truth-
values is rejected the law of non-contradiction is preserved:
SbV ¬(A &¬A) alternatively
A & ¬A S b V.
Unlike supervaluationism however, subvaluationism only preserves clas-
sical consequence in a slightly restricted sense. Namely:
8
As with SpV-validity, a rival account of local validity could be given analo-
gous to that described in footnote 3. An argument is SbV(-locally)-valid just in
case for some admissible precisification, whenever the premises are true the con-
clusion is true. Again however, I shall retain the global account described.
648 Dominic Hyde

(II) A1,… An CL B iff A1 &… & An SbV B.9

Before discussing this apparent dissimilarity further let us see how such
a paraconsistent approach to vagueness resolves the sorites paradox. Con-
sider the form of the paradox cited earlier. As just pointed out, unlike SpV,
SbV does not preserve classical consequence unrestrictedly, so the possi-
bility arises of the paradox being discounted by virtue of its invalidity.
This is the diagnosis that SbV prescribes. Modus ponens is not unrestrict-
edly valid.
Consider the sentence “A pile of n grains of sand is a heap” where a pile
of n grains counts as a borderline case for “heap”. The sentence is true and
false, so it is true. Since it is also false then the material conditional “If a
pile of n grains of sand is a heap then a pile of n–1 grains is a heap” is true
by virtue of the falsity of its antecedent. Nonetheless, a pile of n–1 grains
of sand might be determinately not a heap thus making the sentence “A
pile of n–1 grains of sand is a heap” false.10 So:
Heap(n), Heap(n) → Heap(n–1) Sb V Heap (n–1)for some n.
Modus ponens is not valid for material implication in SbV.
In fact, by the foregoing simple paraconsistent reinterpretation of
supervaluation semantics we have reproduced the first formal system of
paraconsistent logic—discussive logic—developed by Jaskowski nearly
fifty years ago, which already at the time was claimed to be applicable to
vagueness. Jaskowski suggested that:
[L]ogical researchers so far have been taking into consideration
such deductive systems which are symbolic interpretations of
consistent theories, so that theses in each such systems are theo-
rems in a theory formulated in a single symbolic language free
from terms whose meanings are vague. But suppose that theses
which do not satisfy those conditions are included into a deduc-
tive system. It suffices, for example, to deduce consequences
from several hypotheses that are inconsistent with one another in
order to change the nature of the theses, which thus no longer re-
9
Proof. Assume an argument “A1,… An / B” is classically valid. Suppose also
that “A1 &… & An” is true for some admissible precisification. Admissible pre-
cisifications are classical, and since “A1,… An / B” is classically valid so too is
“A1 &… & An / B” consequently “B” is true on that admissible precisification so
true on some. Thus “A1 &… & An / B” is SbV-valid. Conversely, assume “A1,…
An / B” is not classically valid. Then there is some classical model M which makes
the premises true and conclusion false. So the conjunction of the premises “A1
&… & An” is true in the model. The only admissible precisification of a classical
model is the model itself, so the conjunction is true in some admissible precisifi-
cation (M itself), yet “B” is false in some (again, M itself). So “A1 &… & An / B”
is not SbV-valid.
10
For the purposes of comparing and contrasting supervaluationism and sub-
valuationism, complications arising from higher-order vagueness are being
ignored.
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 649

flect a uniform opinion. The same happens if the theses ad-

vanced by several participants in a discussion are combined into
a single system, or if one person’s opinions are so pooled into
one system although that person is not sure whether the terms
occurring in his various theses are not slightly differentiated in
their meanings. Let such a system which cannot be said to in-
clude theses that express opinions in agreement with one anoth-
er, be termed a discursive [or discussive] system. To bring out
the nature of the theses of such a system it would be proper to
precede each thesis by the reservation: “in accordance with the
opinion of one of the participants in the discourse [discussion]”
or “for a certain admissible meaning of the terms used”. Hence,
the joining of a thesis to a discussive system has a different intu-
itive meaning than has the assertion in an ordinary system. A
discursive assertion includes an implicit reservation of the kind
specified above, which … has its equivalent in possibility Pos
[or ◊]. Accordingly, if a thesis α is recorded in a discussive sys-
tem, its intuitive meaning ought to be interpreted so as if it were
preceded by the symbol Pos [◊], that is, the sense: “it is possible
that α”. That is how an impartial arbiter might understand the
theses of the various participants in the discussion. (Jaskowski
1969, p. 149)
The subvaluation semantics outlined above clearly describes a discussive
system in Jaskowski’s sense. Instead of some thesis being counted true
simpliciter just if it is true “in accordance with the opinion of one of the
participants in the discourse” or true “for a certain admissible meaning of
the terms used”, we have defined a thesis as true simpliciter if true for a
certain admissible precisification of the terms used.
This presentation of Jaskowski’s discussive logic as a dualised variant
of supervaluation semantics fills an explanatory gap which (as I have
said) I take to be largely responsible for the neglect of paraconsistent
approaches from within the main research tradition on vagueness. We
can now begin to see how Jaskowski’s and others’ claim on behalf of a
paraconsistent approach might be cashed out. For example, having cho-
sen to treat vagueness as giving rise to truth-value gluts as opposed to
truth-value gaps, we can now see exactly how such gluts arise. When a
vague predicate is applied to a borderline case we are confronted by a
sentence which is neither determinately true (i.e. is not true for all
admissible precisifications, not true only) nor determinately false (i.e.
not false for all admissible precisifications, not false only) but indetermi-
nate, which now amounts to the claim that the sentence is both true and
false. It is true since true on some admissible precisifications and false
since false on some. Given the view of vagueness commonly associated
with supervaluation semantics—vagueness as a species of ambiguity
(see Lewis 1982, p. 439 and Williamson 1994, p. 187)—this paraconsis-
tent approach simply amounts to treating ambiguity as giving rise to
650 Dominic Hyde

gluts as opposed to gaps.11 Sentences attributing vague predicates to

their borderline cases are ambiguous; there is a range of distinct admissi-
ble disambiguations, each corresponding to a precise proposition which
the vague sentence might be used to express. The existence of gluts
arises from this ambiguity by way of the fact that ambiguous sentences
are now counted as true just if true on some disambiguation (as opposed
to the supervaluationist’s decision to treat ambiguous sentences as true
just if true on all disambiguations).
The paraconsistent resolution of the sorites paradox outlined above is
now also explicable. It is nothing more nor less than a fallacy of equivo-
cation. The rule of modus ponens is only valid if both the conditional
premise and the separate supposition of its antecedent can be established
as true with uniform disambiguation throughout the premise set. Yet all
that is required for their truth in SbV is that each premise be true on some
(not necessarily the same) disambiguation, and this is not enough to guar-
antee the truth of the conditional’s consequent. In the case to hand, the
sorites paradox, it is precisely because one equivocates on the disambig-
uation of the vague predicate (e.g. “heap”) involved in the predication to
borderline cases that one can claim both premises of the contested infer-
ence as true. Modus ponens applied to equivocal premises fails to be truth-
preserving, but this is hardly news.
Invoking Jaskowski’s means for interpreting discussive logic by way of
◊-prefixing, modus ponens in SbV corresponds to the classical modal
inference:
◊A, ◊(A → B) / ◊B.
This inference is obviously invalid since each premise might be made true
by different possible “worlds”. To assume its validity is to assume the
same “world” makes true each premise (i.e. the sentence “A” is used to
express the same proposition in each of its occurrences), yet the premises
of the sorites inference are only made jointly true by equivocating on
worlds.
With vagueness subsumed under the broader phenomenon of ambiguity
the sorites paradox can now be seen as arising from the ambiguity of key
terms involved, and its solution lies in the recognition of equivocation.
The fact that we are here countenancing a logic for ambiguous language
instead of demanding terms be disambiguated prior to logical formalisa-
tion simply reflects the pervasive and ineliminable nature of this particular
11
Lewis (1982) considers a paraconsistent treatment along the lines I am sug-
gesting, however Lewis (1970, appendix) opts instead for a supervaluation seman-
tics of vagueness. Fine (1975, p. 284–5) is wary of such a view, but sees ambiguity
as a fruitful analogy.
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 651

species of ambiguity—a point on which both supervaluationists and sub-

valuationists agree.

3. Defending paraconsistency

Even supposing the above explanation of a paraconsistent approach is

deemed plausible, there still appear to be grounds for preferring a para-
complete supervaluational approach over a paraconsistent subvaluational
one.
Consider the noted failure of SbV to preserve classical consequence.
More particularly, consider the failure of adjunction:
A, B SbV A & B
well-known in discussive logic. (The non-adjunctive nature of Jas-
kowski’s system has often been remarked upon and is frequently consid-
ered a major obstacle to the fruitful application of his paraconsistent
approach.) The most obvious SbV-counterexample to adjunction is the fol-
lowing:
A, ¬A SbV A & ¬A.
Simply consider a vague sentence “A”, true on some precisifications and
false on others. In SbV the sentence is true simpliciter, as is its negation. So:
A, ¬A SbV
recalling the fact that SbV admits of inconsistency. Furthermore “A & ¬A”
is never true (consequently its negation always is, as dictated by the pres-
ervation of the law of non-contradiction in SbV) since it is not true on any
precisification.
It is interesting to note that in putting paid to the validity of adjunction,
the foregoing counterexample also formally establishes the paraconsistent
nature of SbV. The consistency of classical logic (A, ¬A CL) ensures the
validity of the spread-principle:
A, ¬A CL B.
(If a contradictory pair of sentences are true then any sentence is; if there
are truth-value gluts anywhere then they are everywhere.) This in turn val-
idates the following particular instance:
A, ¬A CL A & ¬A.
With its demise in SbV, paraconsistency is established:
A, ¬A SbV B.
Not only is S b V non-adjunctive, but the particular counterexample
described establishes the paraconsistent nature of SbV.
652 Dominic Hyde

Returning to the particular problem under consideration however:

surely, it is claimed, the failure of conjunction to satisfy this most basic of
rules counts against it being counted as a natural language conjunction.
According to Priest and Routley (1989b, p. 158), the failure of adjunction
in discussive logic in general “casts doubt upon whether conjunction
really is conjunction in discursive [discussive] logic”. Doubt, yes. But
limited relief, at least, comes from noticing a dual anomaly with regard to
supervaluation semantics.
Whilst it is true that principle (I) holds so that all and any multi-
premise, single conclusion arguments that are valid by classical standards
are valid by supervaluational (SpV) standards (which is not true of SbV),
classical consequence is not preserved when the consequence relation is
generalized to admit of multiple conclusions. It is precisely with such a
generalization that a crucial hidden aspect of SpV becomes most apparent,
previously obscured by the restrictive nature of single-conclusion conse-
quence.12 Consider the classically valid argument:
A ∨ B / A, B
Classical logic is truth-functional, unlike both SpV and SbV, and as such a
disjunction is true if and only if one disjunct is true or the other is. As a
consequence:
A∨B CL A, B.
However:
A∨B SpV A, B.
That is to say, SpV is non-subjunctive. From the truth of a disjunction one
cannot validly infer the truth of one of the disjuncts any more than one
could infer the truth of a conjunction from the truth of each of the con-
juncts separately in SbV. Advocates of the paracomplete approach have a
response to this concern which will be of interest to anyone seeking to
defend a paraconsistent SbV approach, but before looking into this it is
worth noting that the counterexample to subjunction is the very dual of
that in SbV to adjunction and, moreover, that this counterexample formally
establishes the paracomplete nature of SpV.
Evidence of the failure of subjunction to be truth-preserving in SpV
comes from the following fact:
A ∨ ¬A SpV A, ¬A.
A vague sentence “A”, true on some precisifications and false on others,
is not true simpliciter and neither is its negation “¬A”. As a consequence:
12
Van Fraassen (1969, pp. 79–86) points to the fact that, in spite of (I), super-
valuation semantics employs a consequence relation which deviates from the
classical one. These limitations become even more apparent in multiple-conclu-
sion logic.
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 653

SpV A, ¬A
recalling the fact that SpV admits of incompleteness. Nonetheless “A ∨ ¬A”
is always true (as dictated by the preservation of the law of excluded middle
in SpV) since it is true on any precisification. Thus we have a counterexample
to subjunction in SpV which is the dual of that to adjunction in SbV.
As indicated, this counterexample also formally establishes SpV as a
paracomplete logic. The completeness of classical logic ( CL A,¬A)
ensures the validity of the spread-principle:
B CL A, ¬A.
(If any sentence is true then one or other of a contradictory pair must be;
if there are truth-value gaps anywhere then they are everywhere.) This in
turn validates the particular instance:
A ∨ ¬A CL A, ¬A.
With its demise in SpV, paracompleteness is established:
B SpV A, ¬A.
Given the increasingly apparent duality between SbV and SpV, a line of
defence for SbV in the face its use of a non-standard conjunction might be
developed from noticing how SpV explains its use of a non-standard dis-
junction.
Fine’s explanation rests on a particular conception of vagueness. It is
plain that once we understand the formal supervaluation semantics we
understand how the sentence “A ∨ ¬A” can be SpV-true even though nei-
ther disjunct is SpV-true, but the point then requiring explanation is why
we should consider supervaluation semantics appropriate to modelling
reasoning with vague language. Having accepted to go paracomplete in
developing a logic of vagueness, admitting the possibility that neither
“A” nor “¬A” are true, why should we nonetheless admit their disjunc-
tion as true? Fine’s answer is that the law of excluded middle (LEM)
must be retained, if we are to suppose vagueness is merely semantic.
Suppose I press my hand against my eyes and “see stars”. Then
LEM should hold for the sentence S = “I see many stars”, if it is
taken as a vague description of a precise experience.
If vagueness is merely semantic, and in no way reflects any underlying
ontological vagueness, then LEM is prescribed and so defensible. Fine
goes further, saying that:
[t]here is however, a good ontological reason for disputing LEM.
… LEM should fail for S if it is taken as a precise description of
an intrinsically vague experience. (Fine 1975, p. 285)
Ontological vagueness would impugn LEM but mere semantic vagueness
does not.
654 Dominic Hyde

Again, seeing the semantic account of vagueness as a kind of ambigu-

ity is helpful here. Supposing vague sentences are counted as ambigu-
ous, capable of being used to express a number of distinct (precise)
propositions, and that they count as true just if true on all disambigua-
tions (i.e. precisifications), it is easy to see how a vague sentence “A”
and its negation might both fail to be true. Each sentence might have true
and false disambiguations, depending on where each disambiguation
draws the limits of application of the vague term involved. However,
their disjunction “A ∨ ¬A” will always be true since every disambigua-
tion of this sentence is true.
As was suggested in §2, supervaluation theorists must also offer some
explanation of the non-standard behaviour of “∃”—behaviour which fol-
lows from their resolution of the sorites paradox. This explanation can be
seen to follow straightforwardly from the explanation offered of the non-
standard behaviour of “∨”, given the analogy between the two logical
constants. In fact the sorites paradox of §2 involves only quantification
over a finite domain so existential quantification is equivalent to a long
but finite disjunction. In this case the behaviour of “∃” is directly reduc-
ible to that of “∨”. More generally, just as disjunctions can be true with-
out any disjunct being true, so too existentially quantified sentences can
be true without any instance being true.
Now, the foregoing may or may not be considered an adequate
defence of SpV as a logic of vagueness (for example, as presented, it
depends on argument for the purely semantic nature of vagueness);
however, if it is considered adequate at least to defend it as a logic of
semantic vagueness (as many seem to think), then it is clear how to
defend SbV. A conjunction can fail to be true though both conjuncts are
true (i.e. adjunction can fail) since on the paraconsistent approach, the
merely semantic nature of vagueness does not impugn the law of non-
contradiction (LNC). We have already seen how viewing vagueness as a
kind of ambiguity serves to explain the failure of modus ponens in SbV.
So too with adjunction. In the context of SbV, ambiguous sentences are
to be counted as true just if true on some disambiguation. A vague sen-
tence “A” and its negation might both be true (since they each have
some true disambiguation—i.e. the sentence “A” itself has some true
and some false disambiguation) but their conjunction can never be. “A
& ¬A” has only false disambiguations; LNC is retained.13
13
David Lewis, though advocating supervaluationism as a semantics of vague-
ness, refuses to countenance a paraconsistent discussive logic for inconsistent fic-
tions precisely because adjunction fails. This criticism would now seem to be
toothless by his own lights. See Lewis (1983, Ch. 15—“Truth in Fiction”, Post-
script B).
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 655

What is the upshot of all this? The charge against the paraconsistent
approach described—SbV—was that it failed to preserve classical conse-
quence. It now turns out that the apparently conservative nature of SpV in
this regard is illusory. Though principle (I) holds, classical consequence
is not preserved in a more general setting. The conjecture:
A1,… An CL B1,… Bn iff A1,… An Sp V B1,… Bn.
fails. What does hold is the more limited:
(III) A1,… An CL B1,… Bn iff A1,… An SpV B1 ∨ … ∨ Bn.14
On the other hand, though (II) only establishes the limited case according
to which classical single-conclusion argument validity is preserved, this
result does generalize:
(IV) A1,… An CL B1,… Bn iff A1 & … & An SbV B1,… Bn.15
Neither logic is superior as regards preservation of classical conse-
quence.
Moreover each logic has, for all that has been said so far, an equally
plausible defence of its own peculiar non-standard features. In fact, a
very general duality between the two logics underlies this—a duality
which has its source in the differing, though dual, conceptions of truth
employed by each. In SpV truth is a matter of truth-on-all-admissible-
precisifications (True∀), whereas in SbV truth is weaker, being a matter
of truth-on-some-admissible-precisification (True∃). Let Σ and Γ be sets
of sentences of the shared language of SpV and SbV, and let ¬Σ = df {¬A:
for all A ∈ Σ}. It is easy to show that:

14
Proof. Assume A1,… An CL B1,… Bn
iff A1,… An CL B1 ∨ … ∨ Bn
iff A1,… An SpV B1 ∨ … ∨ Bn by principle (I).
15
Lemma A CL B1,… Bn iff A SbV B1,… Bn.
Proof. Assume an argument “A / B1,… Bn” is classically valid. Suppose also
that “A” is true for some admissible precisification. Admissible precisifications
are classical so that precisification is a classical model which makes true “A”,
and consequently one of “B1”, … “Bn”. So one of “B1”, … “Bn” is true on some
admissible precisification (namely, that one). Thus “A / B1,… Bn” is SbV-valid.
Conversely, assume “A / B1,… Bn” is not classically valid. Then there is some
classical model M which makes “A” true and each of “B1”, …“Bn” false. The
only admissible precisification of a classical model is the model itself, so “A” is
true in some admissible precisification (M itself), yet each of “B1”, … “Bn” is
false in some (again, M itself). So “A / B1,… Bn” is not SbV-valid.
Proof of (IV). Assume A1, … An CL B1,… Bn.
iff A1 & … & An CL B1,… Bn.
iff A1 & … & An SbV B1,… Bn by lemma.
656 Dominic Hyde

Σ SpV Γ iff ¬Γ SbV ¬Σ.16

That is, an inference is SpV-valid if and only if the set-contraposed infer-
ence is SbV-valid.17 Thus it is of little wonder that the discussed virtues
and vices of each logic dualise. For example:
A∨B Sp V A, B iff ¬A, ¬B SbV ¬A & ¬B
iff A, B SbV A & B
(since A, B are arbitrarily chosen).
Also:
B SpV A, ¬A iff ¬A, ¬¬A SbV ¬B
iff A, ¬A SbV B
(since A, B are arbitrarily chosen).
The semantic deviance each logic displays to accommodate the phenom-
enon of vagueness ultimately has its source and its explanation in the dif-
fering conceptions of truth employed.

4. Concluding remarks

Given that the weight of evidence considered so far supports each

approach equally, how is one to choose between these rivals?
Fine considers the matter briefly and, not surprisingly, rejects the para-
consistent approach.
Some have thought that a vague sentence is both true and false
and that a vague predicate is both true and false of some [border-
16
Proof. Assume Σ SpV Γ
iff for any model M, either for some A ∈ Σ, A is not True∀-in-M or for some
B ∈ Γ, B is True∀-in-M.
iff for any model M, either for some A ∈ Σ, ¬A is True∃-in-M or for some
B ∈ Γ, B is True∀-in-M.
iff for any model M, either for some A ∈ ¬Σ, A is True∃-in-M or for some
B ∈ Γ, ¬B is False∀-in-M.
iff for any model M, either for some A ∈ ¬Σ, A is True∃-in-M or for some
B ∈ Γ, ¬B is not True∃-in-M.
iff for any model M, either for some A ∈ ¬Σ, A is True∃-in-M or for some
B ∈ ¬Γ, B is not True∃-in-M.
iff for any model M, either for some B ∈ ¬Γ, B is not True∃-in-M or for
some A ∈ ¬Σ, A is True∃-in-M.
iff ¬Γ SbV ¬Σ.
17
Since the logical-consequence relations are extensionally distinct it follows
that set-contraposition, though validity-preserving classically, does not preserve
validity in either SpV or SbV. By (III) and (IV), however, the rule does do so when
the premise- and conclusion-set have one or less members.
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 657

line] object. However, this is a part of the general confusion of

under- and over-determinacy. A vague sentence can be made
more precise; and this operation should preserve truth-value. But
a vague sentence can be made to be either true or false, and there-
fore the original sentence can be neither. (Fine 1975, pp. 266–7)
The argument, however, is not convincing. All parties to the debate can
agree that precisification should resolve any vagueness surrounding the
sentence in question, and this resolution should preserve any determinate
truths (i.e. cases of truth only) or determinate falsehoods (i.e. cases of
falsehood only) involving the sentence irrespective of its vagueness, but
why must truth-value per se be preserved? After all, ambiguous sentences
can be taken as giving rise to truth-value gluts yet disambiguation will
only preserve determinate truth and falsity. At worst this observation will,
as an analogy, explain how precisification might fail to preserve truth-
value; at best, viewing vagueness as a species of ambiguity, it will estab-
lish that precisification is not always truth-preserving.
Perhaps then, as Fine (1975, p. 267) speculates, “this battle of gluts and
gaps may be innocuous, purely verbal”. There is, one might think, no real
choice to be made here since when advocates of the rival approaches dis-
agree as to whether or not some inference is truth-preserving they each
have in mind a different conception of truth and the disagreement is, in
fact, purely nominal. However, there is a substantive issue here about the
nature of truth in natural language. The question of which, if any, of the
two ensuing accounts of logical consequence is correct is far from innoc-
uous. The validity of modus ponens, for example, depends upon it. In
describing a logic of vagueness one is attempting to provide an account of
non-fallacious reasoning in natural language. Does the natural language
conditional satisfy modus ponens? Is natural language conjunction
adjunctive? Is natural language disjunction subjunctive? These are sub-
stantial questions on which the two approaches disagree. Whilst the dis-
agreement arises by virtue of differing conceptions of truth, the debate is
non-verbal since each party is to be understood as providing an unequiv-
ocal account of the central semantic notion of truth.
Fine (1975, p. 267) does not think the matter is merely verbal either,
deciding in favour of a paracomplete approach. “[i]t is the gap-inducing
notion [of truth] that is important for philosophy”. His defence of this
claim is too brief to be illuminating in itself and further investigation must
be left for another day. Suffice to say, there are many philosophers who
consider the glut-inducing notion of truth philosophically important.
What I have sought to show is not that the paraconsistent approach is
the approach one ought to take to vagueness, but rather the weaker claim
that many have pointed to its possibility and that with a dualisation of the
very popular supervaluational semantics one can see exactly how such an
658 Dominic Hyde

approach can plausibly proceed. SbV provides a semantics and logic of

vagueness as good as SpV and, in the absence of conclusive grounds for
rejecting truth-value gluts out of hand, there is no justification for the
obscurity of the former approach in light of the latter’s status as a pre-
ferred theory.
One might resolve the choice between the rival theories by rejecting
both. They each have features which, though not constituting grounds for
differential choice between them, might be taken as grounds for their col-
lective rejection. In particular, the already discussed failures of adjunction
and subjunction in SbV and SpV respectively are just such features. It is
important to note however that rejecting these particular paraconsistent
and paracomplete approaches does not rule out other variants.
For example, modifying SbV by restoring truth-functionality and, with
it, adjunction will simply result in the acceptance of the truth of some con-
tradictions. To retain the non-triviality of the logic, thus retaining its para-
consistent nature, one still requires that:
A, ¬A B
yet the logic will now validate the inference:
A, ¬A / A & ¬A.
Consequently, the logic must now be such that:
A & ¬A B.
The logic must, in other words, be strongly paraconsistent as opposed to
the weakly paraconsistent nature of SbV (i.e. the weaker point that: A,¬A
B).18
Similar remarks apply to SpV. Restoring truth-functionality while
retaining a non-trivial paracomplete logic will result in a strongly para-
complete logic according to which:
B A ∨ ¬A.
The restoration of adjunction and/or subjunction to a logic that admits
of truth-value gluts and/or gaps simply results in strong paraconsistency
and/or paracompleteness.
To the extent that such changes entail a rejection of the law of non-con-
tradiction and/or the law of excluded middle, Fine’s argument in their
favour (if valid) would show that the merely semantic conception of
vagueness must be rejected.19 To those, like myself, who see vagueness
18
For this distinction, see Arruda (1989, p. 126).
19
As it happens, accepting the truth of some contradictions does not itself
entail the rejection of the law of non-contradiction. The law can be retained with
sentences of the form “¬(A&¬A)” always true, it is just that such an adjunctive
paraconsistent system will also admit such sentences as sometimes false. Priest’s
paraconsistent logic LP is of this type. See Priest and Routley (1989b, sc. 2.3).
 From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts 659

as applicable to the world and not just language this will cause little con-
cern. In fact, if Fine’s argument is valid then dissatisfaction over the non-
standard treatment of the two-place connectives in either system is evi-
dence of the ontological nature of vagueness. Whatever the upshot of this
debate, it does not swing the weight of evidence against a paraconsistent
approach to vagueness.20

Department of Philosophy DOMINIC HYDE

University of Queensland
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia
dhyde@lingua.cltr.uq.edu.au

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I would like to thank the late Richard Sylvan, Roy Sorensen and an anony-
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