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Toward a New Edition and Translation of Chapter 13 of the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti

Author(s): Brian Galloway


Source: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Vol. 151, No. 2 (2001),
pp. 321-349
Published by: Harrassowitz Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43380298
Accessed: 07-09-2016 06:18 UTC

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Toward a New Edition and Translation of
Chapter 13 of the
Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti

By Brian Galloway, Berkeley

Introduction

The Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti is the most renowned commentary in the


Indo-Tibetan tradition on Nāgārjuna s Mulamadhyamaka-kãrikã (Nāgār-
juna s title is Prajnā , according to the two other commentators, Bhāvaviveka
and the author of the Akutobhaya , though the work is usually known as
Mulamadhyamaka-kãrikã or as the Madhyamaka-sãstra). The e ditio princeps
of the Prasannapadā is by Louis de la Vallée Poussin and was published in
St. Pétersbourg in the Bibliotheca Buddhica series, in 1903 to 1913. In 1978
J.W. de Jong published his "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā" in
which he gives several hundred corrections, largely based upon the new
manuscript called R that he obtained from G. Tucci. We have used these two
sources and also two others: S. Schayer's German translation of 1931 pub-
lished in Cracow, and the Tibetan translation as published by Sakya college in
Dehra Dun in 1993 (based on the Derge recension?). Both de la Vallée
Poussin and Schayer have given quite a good number of useful comments in
their footnotes; some of this information has been retained in the present new
edition. Almost all of de Jong's corrections are good; once in a great while his
R manuscript gives us a worse reading and we must then stick with de la
Vallée Poussin s text.
The task as we have defined it here was to come up with a text that makes
sense, which we have largely been able to do with the four sources mentioned.
We have also used some subsidiary sources given in the notes of de la Vallée
Poussin and Schayer. Candraklrti's quotations from the Kâsyapaparivarta
can be corrected via the von Staël-Holstein edition (studded with errors,
but at one point superior).
The result, we hope, will be a modest advance on prior work (and of course
is very heavily indebted to that same prior work). We have often broken up
long compounds with the hyphen for ease of reading and even dissolved

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322 Brian Galloway

vowel sandhi for the same reaso


space are a part of the Roman s
marks, which I have occasionally
the original punctuation, consis
and the half-daņda (').
Perhaps the most interesting f
nimpyamãna (ed. n. 2, tr. n. 139)
reconstruction of the badly garb
n. 102), the discussion of drstigata
n. 181) where the von Staël-Ho
Tibetan translation of the Prasa
Prasannapadā , and the change o
(ed. n. 112), applied to the oppon
Tibetans read 'snake', evidently
ing readings not in any extant
confine himself to making a cat
which variant is likely to have b
Candraklrti); and it is possible th
or intended.

Abbreviations

T Tibetan used by de Jong


hT Tibetan used by von Staël-Holstein
pT Tibetan used by LVP
saT Tibetan used by Galloway (Sakya College)
s1 T Tibetan published by Saigusa, first
s2 T Tibetan published by Saigusa, second
LVP Louis de La Vallée Poussin
R Manuscript used by de Jong, not available to
BHSG Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Gram
Schayer Ausgewählte Kapitel der Prasannapadā
Sprung Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapadā of Candraklrti 323

Part I: Text

samskāra-parīksā nama
trayodasam prakaraņam ļ |

y atas ca-evam samanantara-atikrānta-prakaraņa-vidhinā , sva-para-


ubhaya-krtatvam 1 ahetu-samutpannatvam ca nirupyamãnam2 bhãvãnãm
asad , anyas ca-utpādako vidhir asan | utpanna-rüpatvena 3 ca-ete bhãvã
avidyã-timira-upahata-mati-nayanãnâm bāla-prthagjanānām khyãnti* ļ
tasmān nihsvabhāvā èva santo bālānām visamvādakā , māyā-kari5-
turaga-ādivat tad-anabhijnānām na tu vijūānām ļ ata èva sarva-
dharma-svabhãva^-aparoksa-dhl-nayanah samunmülita-asesa-avidyä-
vāsanas catur-viparyāsa-viparyasta-atrāņa-sattva-paritrāņāya-aviparīta-
naihsvãbhãvya-upadesa-tatparo buddho jagad-vibodhako mahākāruņikah ļ

1 LVP adds this tvam , and it is needed for sense because the ca requires two nouns, in this
case ending in tva, thus krtatvam samutpannatvam ca 'made-ness and arising-ness'; there is
no having-been-madeness by self, other, or both, and no having-arisen-without-cause-ness.
The singular verb (in this case participle) asat where we expect a plural is not unknown in
Nāgārjuna himself: VIII.4 has kãryam ca kāraņam ca na vidyate in the first line and kriyã
kārtā karaņam ca na vidyate in the second, de J has kāraņam in this second clause also, but
s 1,2 T has karaņam , distinguished from the kāraņam in the first line, and also makes the dis-
tinction between rgyu yaň hthadpa in the first line and byed in the second (s1,2T). saT has bya
for karanam in the second line (p. 153).
2 saT places nirūpyamāņam before sva-para above, and translates it adverbially as dpyad
par na 'if we investigate'. But if we leave the word where it is, it seems likely to be an adjective
applying to krtatvam samutpannatvam ca. Translate nirüpyamäna as 'being investigated or
supposed, appearing as, specious, angebliche ' (MW s.v. nirüpya 'to be seen or defined or as-
certained; not yet certain, questionable'.
3 Schayer makes this a full sentence: 'Daher, [obwohl es kein Entstehen gibt], erscheinen
ihm die bhãvas als etwas, was dem Entstehen unterworfen ist' (p. 25). Better to see it as 'By
means of the appearance (formed-ness) of something having arisen'. saT translates as skye
bahi ňo bor 'as reality arisen'.
4 khyã 2 P. usually 'declare', here 'appear, manifest (itself)'. Oddly enough the dictionar-
ies of Monier-Williams, Apte, and Macdonell all fail to give this meaning for khyã and
define it (and the related noun khyãti f.) solely in terms of speech. But the meaning 'appear,
manifest' is clearly implied by saT snaň ba. Mylius in his Sanskrit-German dictionary gives
s.v. 'sichtbar werden', which is good. saT and Mylius are confirmed by Maņdanamišra's
Vibhramaviveka , wherein the word khyãti f. is used in this sense; Schmitshausen translates
it as 'Erscheinen', see e.g. his pp. 21, 53, 233. Candraklrti uses the verb khyãnti here (below,
the nouns khyãti and khyãtin ), so Monier-Williams is wrong to write, 'the simple verb oc-
curs only in Pass, and Caus.' s.v. khyã. - Take the genitives nayanãnãm and prthagjanãnãm as
datives.
5 Shorten LVP's a to a (thus reading maya-kari) with R. saT has sgyu mahi rta daň glaň po
che. 'illusory horse and elephant'.
6 Read svabhava with R and saT (LVP had svabhavya.)

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324 Brian Galloway

tan mrsã7 mosadharma 8 y ad,

sarve ca mosadharmāņah samskā

sutra uktam , Ktan mrsā , m


bhiksavah, paramam 13 sat

7 We translate (indec.) as 'false' a


other translations are possible.
' mosa- dharma kann auch "räuberis
gehört "[,] bedeuten und an diese (ak
weiter unten Pr. 233 13 dem Gegner
ydyāpi bhavantam musņanti. - "Mit
noch jetzt deine Einsicht stehlen (= d
mosa mit musņāti nichts zu tun. Den
mrsã9 (p. 27 n.). Thus for Schayer we
one would write this because of the
rive mrsã from mrs 4 P.Ā. 'not heed'.
vain', mosa on the other hand is (pac
distinction exists in Pali also (musãy
edition of 1958 we have tam hi , bh
amosadhammam nibbãnam. But I. B.
same root: 'For that which is liable to
to falsity is nibbāna' (PTS 1959, p. 29
tinues ibidem ] aber musati = musņāti
mosa-dharma als "den Sinn bestehlen
However this may be, the early Budd
for Sanskrit grammar have mosa and
8 Here dharman is n.; in the next lin
ing (m. to agree with samskãra' and
four words as y an mosadharmay tan
tive dharma), that is false'.
9 Understand sarve ca samskãrã mosadharmãh bhavanti 'And all samskãra are mosa-
dharma ' If we consider mosadharman as a bahuvrlhi compound, mosadharmāņah samskārās
are ' samskãra , whose dharmas are deceptive'. The question is whether the samskãras are false
because they have deceptive dharmas or because they are deceptive dharmas. We prefer the
latter interpretation. But see Note 17 below.
10 'And therefore they (the samskãras) are false'. The whole sloka amounts to a syllogism:
If a deceptive dharma, then false; samskãras are deceptive dharmas; therefore samskãras are
false. Some think, not without reason, that the syllogism is clearer if the first two clauses are
reversed, thus samskãras are deceptive dharmas; if a deceptive dharma, then false; therefore
samskãras are false.
11 LVP states concerning the sloka, 'Cité ci-dessus p. 42.10.' The citation differs only in
sandhi: samskãrãh tena. - Saigusa's version of the Skt. is the same.
12 saT understands by this h dus by as bslu bahi chos can gañ yin pa de ni rdsun pa yin
'Whatever is a deceptive dharmin or dharmaka , that is, a samskrtay that is false'. Tib. chos can
suggests dharmin , but a short while later (n. 1 7 below) we shall see chos can for dharmaka.
13 LVP states concerning the following, 'Voir ci-dessus p. 41.4 et suiv.' There we find
paramam satyam yaduta amosadharma nirvānām 1 saw a- samskãrãs ca mrsã mosa-

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 325

sarvasarņskārās ca mrsā , mosadharmāņa" iti 15 ļ tathā 116 " mosadharmakam17


apy etat 1 pralopan dharmakam 19 apy etad" iti20 | | tad21 anena nyäyena22 yan
mosadharmakam 23 tan mrsä-ity evam yasmäd uktaväms 24 tathāgato
bhagavān 1 ca mosadharmāņah samskārās tasmān mosadharmatvena te
samskārā mrsā bhavanti 1 25citrakara-yantra-dārikāvat 1 laksaņa-upeta-
yantra-matta2(>-vāraņa-vancita-udayana-vatsarājavat27 ' ' tatra visam-
vādakam mosadharmakam vitatha-khyāty2%-ālātacakravat | ļ

a-tat-svabhāvatvena2() mrsā sarvasarņskārā mosadharmakatvāt 1 marīcikādi-


jalavat | | y at tu satyam na tan mosadharmakam 1 tad-yathā nirvānām ekam^ '

dharmãnah. He states also (p. 41 n. 2), 'cité ad Bodhic. IX.2 (p. 244.13) avec d'inadmissibles
lectures.' ... In the same place he states, 'Cf. M. Vyut. 245, 907, 908 mrsā mosadharmiņah .' This
is confirmed on p. 92 of the Bibliotheca Buddhica edition of the Mahãvyutpatti (vol. XIII,
191 1) (confusingly, the number of the word comes after the word and is separated from it by a
daņda). But why dharmin (as above n. 12) pl. dharmiņah and not dharmãh or dharmãnah ?
14 LVP states, y ad uta a °, p. 41.4.
15 The last clause, sarvasamskaraš ca mrsa , mosadharmaņa iti , is lacking in saT. It is indeed
a mere repetition of what was said just previously.
16 LVP adds within brackets, nasty atra tathatã vã avitathatã vã and states, 'Manque dans
les Mss. et dans le tibétain.' This refers not just to the vã but to the whole phrase within
square brackets. If this does not derive from the mss. or the Tibetan, then what is its source?
It is wanting also in saT.
17 saT chos can. Here the idea of having appears.
18 LVP has pralãpa in text but corrects to pralopa in his "Additions et Corrections" p. 602.
In his note ad loc. he states, 'Le tibétain porte hdi ni hjig pahi chos can no = vinãsa-
dharmakam etat' pralopa m. 'destruction' (MW s.v. pra-lup). Schayer emends to pralopa
and translates it: '= der Realität beraubt = annulliert = pralopadharma' (p. 27).
19 saT chos can.
20 saT identifies this as a quotation from some authoritative source by addine ses gsuús so.
21 saT dehiphyir.
22 saT tshul hdis.
23 Adding kam with R and T. Whole word mosadharmakam = saT bslu sin hjig pahi chos
can = mosapralopadharmaka.
24 LVP had uktavan. Correct sandhi with R.
25 Beginning of portion not in Tib. acc. to LVP and saT.
26 matta 'in rut' with R. LVP had maya.
27 End of portion not in Tib. acc. to LVP and saT.
28 See Note 4 above.
29 Reading with T, saT.
LVP says, ' ekam manque dans la version tibétain', confirmed saT.

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326 Brian Galloway

tatas ca vihitayã-upapattyã 31 3
naihsvabhâvyam; 1 "sunyãh sa
prajūāpāramitā-ardhašatikā-pāthā

atrãha 34 | yady evam mosadh


pratipãditam bhavatã 1 nan
sarvapadārtha-apavādino mith
mosadharmakãh sarvasamskārā
bhoh I

tan mrsā mosadharma y ad y adi, kim tatra musyate36 '

yadã-asmãbhis "tan mrsā mosadharmakam " ity uktam tadã kim tatra
musyate 1 kim tatra-abhāvo bhavati ' kašcid37 y adi padãrth o y bhavisyat , syãt
tasya-apavãdãd abhāva-daršanān mithyã-drstih 1 y adā tu padārtham èva
kamein na pasyâmas , tadā kim tatra musyate 1 naiva kirņcid abhāvo
bhavati-ity ayukto ' "yam upālambho bhavatah ' '

31 vihitā upapatti 'formal proof, proof according to prescribed (vihita) procedures; rea-
son. Hpapatti f., so read asmãt with ãgamãt , esp. as saT has bstanpahi rigs pa daň lun hdi las.
Both bstan pahi rigs and bstan rigs are wanting in S. C. Das. vihitayã-uppattyã inst, 'by for-
mal proof'; asmad āgamāt abi. 'from the tradition'.
32 The two sources of knowledge then are secular and sacred, reason and scripture, here
vihitã upapatti 'formal proof' and ãgama '[scriptural] tradition'. Medieval Western theolo-
gians also appealed to 'reason and authority' as their two pramãnas.
33 sunyah sarvadharma nihsvabhava-yogena is indeed from the Ardh a- satika or
Adhyardhasatika-prajnãpãramitã-sutra, in section VII (P. L. Vaidya ed. p. 91, E. Conze tr.
p. 188).
34 atra aha 'Here [the opponent of Nagarjuna and Candraklrti] speaks.'
35 'It is said' in reply by Nagarjuna or Candrakirti.
36 Schayer translates, 'was wird dann überhaupt vom Trug betroffen?' 'what is deceived?'
which seems not quite right because a thing, as distinct from a person, cannot be deceived or
not deceived. Also off the mark is Sprung, who translates, 'what is it that pretends' as if a
thing could pretend and as if the verb were active. But it is passive, with the passive marker
ya. The meaning of the root mus 9 P. is 'to take away, to steal'. Nāgārjuna asks here, 'If a de-
ceptive dharma is false, what then is taken away here' when I point out its falsity? The inter-
pretation 'what is it that deceives' is a question that the opponent might ask, but this does not
correspond to the meaning of the passive verb, and the preceding ucyate (three lines up)
marks what follows as being Nāgārjuna's point of view. Also if the opponent were speaking
here, then Nāgārjuna would have failed to reply to the accusation of nihilism just made. In
fact he is replying to it here, saying in effect, 'I am not taking anything away from anyone
here; for there was nothing to take away in the first place.' Thus translate kim tatra musyate
as 'what is lost' when I declare a deceptive dharma to be false? saT bslu seems to be a mis-
understanding.
37 Tib. hga sig any, some; not in Das.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 327

atrãha | yady abhāva-daršanam api na pratipãdyate 1 kirņ punar


anena-ãgamena pratipãdyata3S iti ' | ucyate '

etat tu-uktarņ bhagavatā sûnyatâ-paridîpakam ' ' 2 ' '

yad etad uktam bhagavatā tan na bhāvānām abhāva-paridīpa-dīpakam 1 kirņ


tarhi? šūnyatā-paridīpakarņ svabhāva-anutpāda-paridīpakam ity arthah '
yathã-uktam anavatapta-hradāpa-samkramaņa-sūtre '

yah pratyayair jãyati sa hy ajãto ;


no 39 tasya utpādu^ sabhãvato 41 'sti '
yah pratyayâdhînu*2 sa sünya 43 ukto
yah sünyatäm jānatiAA so ' }pramattah 45 1 ļ iti ' '

atrāhaA() ' na-ayam àgamo bhāva-svabhāva-anutpādam paridîpayati; kirņ


tarhi? nihsvabhāvatvarņ svabhãvasya-anavasthãyitvam , vināšitvam iti 47 ļ |
kuta etad iti cet ļ

38 With de Jong and R.


39 de Jong and R have na , but read no (same meaning) with LVP metri causa (indravajra).
The four lines are in the indravajra meter provided we refrain from sandhi in tasya utpādu
this line.
40 The u ending is due to the influence of Apabhramša (see Woolner, Introduction to
Prakrit , p. 34; Pischel, Sec. 363, p. 291). It is to be understood as Skt. ah. The u endings are
obviously used metri causa (for instance we need a short vowel here for the meter, and the a
stem ending ah is long when followed by the s of svabhãvato). It is not that the Buddhists
could not write good Sanskrit; rather, this poem may have been first composed by a bard and
sung aloud; then, whoever wrote it down allowed himself to be influenced by the Prakritic
elements in an oral tradition and to take metrical considerations into account. He was trying
to balance the oral tradition, correctness of grammar, and the need to fit the meter.
41 Concerning the first syllable of this word, sa for sva, metri causa so that utpādu can
end on a light syllable; understand svabhãva-. On the last syllable, LVP's mss. have -to ' sti , R
has -to sti ; understand tas adverbial. But LVP in his "Additions et Corrections" wants
svabhāvatā because of Tib. Madh. avat. 1 19.2 which has for this line de la sky e bahi ran bsin
yod ma yin which suggests 'the essence of arising from them is noť.
42 adhina 'resting on, subservient to', saT rag.
Or sunyu with R.
44 Usually janati 'knows' but sometimes janati in epic Sanskrit (cf. Whitney, Roots s.v.
jña). So read iānati here with LVP, metri causa.
45 Rs sa prasamanta makes no sense. Swami Dwarika Das Shastris edition MMK 24.14,
p. 218, also has so 'pramattah.
46 The one who speaks here is an objector to Nagarjuna, but from another point of view,
that of the Vaibhāsikas or Sarvāstivādins. See Note 161 of the translation.
47 This sentence 'définit le nihsvabhavatva (ou sunyata) comme étant le svabhavasya
vināsitva (LVP).

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328 Brian Galloway

bhãvãnãm nihsvabhãvatvam any

vicãryamãnãnãmb0 any athãtv am


uktam bhavati ' yadi bhãvãnãm
anyathãtvam upalabhyeta | u
svabhãva-anavasthãyitvam eva su
yasmãt '

na-asvabhãvas ca bhãvo J sti 56 bhãvãnãm sunyatã yatah ' ' 3 | |

y o hy asvabhãvo bhãvah sa nãsti 1 bhãvãnãm ca sunyatã nãma dharma isyate '


na cãsati dharmiņi tad-ãsrito dharma upapadyate ' na hy asati vandhyã-
tanaye tacchyãmatã-upapadyata iti ' tasmãd asty eva bhãvãnãm svabhãva
iti I I
api ca I

48 anyathãbhãva or 'other-becoming' or 'change' is the only real meaning of


nihsvabhãvatva according to this (Vai./Sarv.) point of view. Things lack an essence in that
they change; it is not that they are unreal. saT osan du hgyur ba.
49 saT has dňos mams ño bo ñid med de ļ gsan du hgyur ba snaň phyir ro 'That entities are
without essence is [taught] for showing or illuminating (gnañ) [their] changeability'. LVP
states, 'On dit que les êtres n'ont pas de svabhãva parce qu'on voit que leur svabhãva est
sujet au changement. - Par le fait, le changement prouve l'existence du svabhãva .'
50 This word, as LVP states, not in the Tibetan (saT). It seems to mean 'of the things being
considered here' i.e. of the entities, bhãva.
51 saT gsan du hgyur ba.
52 As LVP states, the Tibetan (saT) is yoñs su hgyur ba.
53 ity arthah = saT ses by a bahi tha tshig go. Das does not have this meaning under tha
tshig. Jäschke gives ahi tha tshig as 'what signifies?' tha tshig = arthah.
54 Mss. nihsvabhavo , but LVP right to follow the Tibetan. saT dňos po mams la raň bsin
med na. Schayer: 'Wenn der svabhãva der bhãvas irreal wäre'.
55 Adding vi with T and R.
56 This pāda as R. The LVP mss. had nãsvabhãvas ca bhavo nãsti , with triple negation,
wrong length in bhavo , and violation of the meter. LVP changed to asvabhãvo bhãvo nãsti in
accordance with a passage by Candraklrti on LVP's p. 245.9. But Candraklrti probably in-
tended paraphrase rather than quotation, and generally we should not change the root text to
the exact wording of the commentary, which usually paraphrases. Besides, in this case LVP's
version also violates the meter. Saigusa's Sanskrit holds to LVP's version. - LVP: 'Notre
commentaire au troisième pāda ňo bo ñid med de = bhãvasvabhãvo nãsti. ' This seems not
quite right; it is not what the opponent, who is here speaking, would say. The Tibetan of the
sloka third pāda is dňos po ňo bo ñid med med (s1^ actually Saigusa has erroneously dňos
bo) or, with the same meaning, ño bo ñid med dňos po med (s2T). saT has erroneously dňos po
ño bo ñid med de (as if Nāgārjuna were speaking), but the commentary in saT reads dňos po
gaň sig ňo bo ñid med pa de ni yod pa ma yin te (saT) = bhãvah kascit asvabhãvo nãsti , as one
would expect the opponent to say.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 329

kasy a syãd anyathã-bhãvah svabhāvaš cen na vidy ate '

yadi bhāvānām svabhāvo na syãd , yo ' yam vipariņāma-laksaņo 'nyathã-


bhãvah sa kasy a syãd iti '
atra-ucyate | evam api parikalpy amane |

kasya syãd anyathã-bhãvah svabhāvo yadi vidyate ļ | 4 | ļ

iha yo dharmo yam padãrtham na vyabhicarati sa tasya svabhãva iti


vyapadišyate 1 apara-pratibaddhatvãt 57 ļ agner ausnyam hi loke tad-
avyabhicãritvãt svabhãva ity ucyate | tad eva-ausnyam apsu-upa-
labhyamãnam para-pratyaya-sambhutatvãt krtrimatvãn na svabhãva iti '
yadã ca-evam avyabhicãrinã svabhãvena bhavitavyam , tadã-asya-
avyabhicãritvãd anyathãbhãvah syãd abhãvah 1 na hy agneh saityam
pratipadyate 1 evam bhãvãnãm sati svabhãva-abhyupagame ' nyathãtvam
eva na sambhavet ' upalabhyate ca-esãm anyathãtvam ato nãsti svabhãvah | |
api ca-ayam anyathãbhãvo bhãvãnãm na-eva sambhavati yad-darsanãt
sasvabhãvatã syãt ' yathã ca na sambhavati tathã pratipãdayann ãha '

tasya-eva na-anyathãbhãvo na-apy anyasya-eva yujyate |


yuvã na jîryate yasmãd yasmãj jīrņo na jîryate ' ' 5 | |

tasya-eva tãvat5S prãg-avasthãyãm vartamãnasya bhãvasya-anyathãtvam


na-upapadyate ' tathã hi yüno yuva-avasthãyãm eva vartamãnasya nãsty
anyathãtvam ' ' atha-apy avasthã-antara-prãptasya-eva-anyathãtvam
parikalpy ate 1 tad api na-upapadyate ' anyathãtvam nãma jarãyãh paryãyah ļ
tad yadi yüno na-isyate ' nyasya-eva jîrnasya bhavati-iti 1 tad api na yujyate 1
yasmãn na hi jîrnasya punar jarayã sambandho nihprayojanatvãt ' kirn hi
jîrnasya punar jarayã sambandhah kuryãt 1 tad-antareņa 59 jīrņatā-bhāvāj 60
jīrņo jîryata iti na yujyate ' atha yüna eva-anyathãbhãvas 61 tad ayuktam 1

57 T has translated a wrong reading as de Jong notes: gsan gyis gegs-byar medpahiphyir
ro for wrong aparapratibandhatvãt. So also saT (p. 207).
58 Deleting pragvat per T and R.
59 'Without that' connection; or tam antareņa 'Without that' old age.
60 With T, saT: rgaspa ñid yod pas. 'Because there is old-man-ness' (immediately we have
said 'old man', this without any 'old age' or any 'connection with old age' as separate
dharmas from 'old man'). R reads jīrņņatvābhāvāt i.e. jīrņatva-abhāvāt 'because there to is
no old-man-ness' so this if accepted should be emended to iīrņatva-bhāvāt.
61 The other-becoming is of the youth i.e. is is the youth that becomes old. Tib. has trans-
lated gson nu ñid gsan du hgyur ro 'just the youth becomes other'.

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330 Brian Galloway

a-prāpta-jarā-avasthāyārņ 62
paraspara-viruddhatvãt ' '
api ca

tasya ced anyathãbhãvah ksīram èva bhaved dadhi '

atha^ 1 ksīra-avasthā-parityāgena dadhy-avasthã bhavati 1 ato na ksīram èva


dadhi bhavati-iti | | ucyate ' yadi ksīram dadhi bhavati-iti na-isyate
paraspara-virodhãt
ksīrād anyasya kasy acid dadhi-bhāvo bhavisyati 1 1 6 1 1

kim udakasya dadhi-bhāvo bhavatu | tasmãd asambaddham eva tad-anyasya


dadhi-bhāvo bhavisyati-iti ' tad evam anyathâtva-asambhavât kutas tad-
darsanāt sasvabhāvatā bhāvānām prasetsyati64-iti na yuktam etat | |
yathä-uktam ārya-ratnākara-mahāyāna-sūtre

yo na pi 65 jäyati no cupapadyf3 6
no cyavate na pi jîryati dharmah |67
tam jinu desayatì M narasimhas
tatra nidesayi sattva-maharsf 9 1 | (1)

yasya sabhāvu70 na vidyati 71 kasei 72


no parabhāva tu kenaci labdhah | |73

62 Mss. have avasthasya but this is ungrammatical. saT has rgaspahi gnas skabs ma thob pa
la gson nu ses ťa youth is [someone] in the non-attainment of the state of old age' As there is a
locative particle, emend the Sanskrit to provide a locative case as above, though one could
also change the position of the word for state as in the saT and translate literally into Sanskrit
and write jarã-avasthã-aprãpte.
63 Mss. have athasya , athasya , R, atha syat ; but saT has nothing like syatě. ci ste = atha. syat
does not fit the context which demands rather the opposite. Take atha as 'buť.
64 Monier-Williams 3. sidh (fut.).
65 Y or apl.
66 Obviously for ca-upapadyi and should be copapadyi , but a short syllable is needed
metri causa.
67 The meter is dodhaka , in which each pada has three dactyls and a spondee: - ww|-««|

68 LVP emended to darsayatl , but mss. and R have it as above; so also saT (bstan sin).
Should be dešayati , but vowel lengthened metri causa. Lengthening of ti to tt and si to sī metri
causa noted in Edgerton, BHSG 3.16, 26.2. Also many times in following pādas.
69 Tib. has as if sattva-satani 'hundreds of beings' (saT sems can brgya phrag dag) (inter-
pret as acc., the objects of teaching).
70 For svabhavo , metri causa. The u is from R.
71 For vidy ate, metri causa. LVP had nidyati but corrected the error in his "Additions et
Corrections " in the back of the book.
72 Should be kascid.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 331

na-antar ato na pi bāhir ato vā |


labhyati tatra nivesayi nāthah ' | (2) | |

santa 74 gati 75 kathitā sugatena '


no ca gati upapadyati kàci |
tatra ca voharasī7(> gati-mukto '
muktāku mocayasî bahusattvãn 77 1 | (3) | |

sarvi vadāsi 78 nirātmaka-dharmā;


satvatu grābātu 79 mocasi lokam '
mukta svayam gatito, gati-mukto ,80
tèna siSÌ pāragato naS2 ca tīrņos 3 ļ | (4) | ļ

73 This line is given in saT by gsan yaň ma yin sus kyaň mi med pa. Understand as no
parabhāvah tu kenacil labdhah.
74 Should be santa to agree with the following noun gati , but a shortened metri causa.
75 Course, path, state, motion. Should be gati f. but vowel lengthened metri causa.
76 This word vyoharasî should be vyoharasi 'you live' but takes its form metri causa. It is a
Prakrit version of vyavaharasi , which (with ī) is the reading of R. gati-mukto 'freed from
[every worldly] state'. The saT of this line is different: de dag hgro las grol bar mam par gsuňs
'they will be liberated from going, it is said', evidently not reading vyoharasi , and taking the
end of the line as ukto; it is not clear how the line read in the version used by the Tibetan
translators. - The change from third person in the previous line to second person address in
this one is a commonplace in Buddhist poetry (or oral chant, taken down in writing by some-
one other than the original writer).
77 The saT is grol nas sems can maň po grol bar mdsad 'After liberation you will cause the
liberation of many beings'
78 Understand sarvi with dharma(n). vadasi R; vadesi LVP; vadami LVP's mss.
79 Tib. understands sattva-grahāt (sattvān-grahāt) 'after grasping (taking up?) beings';
but R has sarvata grãhatu ; sarvatu grāhatu LVP's mss. Understand satvatu grābātu (satvato
grab atas ?) with saT: sems can hdsin las.
80 This gati-mukto straightforwardly rendered in Tibetan (saT) by hgro grol bas.
Understand as asi.
82 ta R; na LVP, saT (see next note).
83 na ca tīrņah = Tib. brgal bahaň med 'cannot be fathomed, cannot be compassed, cannot
be surpassed, cannot be crossed'. See Das, p. 340a, brgal dkah ba 'the ocean, that which is
difficult to cross', from (p. 302 a) rgal ba 'cross, ford, surmount (a pass)'. So brgal bahaň med
must mean 'he who cannot be crossed over, like the ocean'. - Schayer translates as if the text
said that the Buddha is 'not a tīrņa ': '... nicht hinübergeschifft, bist du ein Jenseits-Gelang-
ter', implying perhaps that he has attained the beyond without being brought there by any-
one else. Sprung translates pāragato na ca tīrņo in accordance with the idea that the Buddha
is both transcendent and immanent, or in Buddhist terms that he attains the absolute without
passing into nirvāna , the blessed rest; he is thus still available in his salvific power and bless-
ing: 'you have reached the other shore without leaving this one' (na ca tīrņa). This is a good
idea, but the text does not appear to say it. The very next line, indeed, states that the Buddha
is a tīrņa.

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332 Brian Galloway

pāragato 3 si bhave 'py avatīrņahu


p dragato na ca labhyati kascit 85 1
pāru na vidyatiu nãpi apāru%1
pāragato : smi vadesi** ca vãkyam 8

vāra?0 na vidyati jo91 ca vadesi


yam pi vadesi na vidyati tam pi '
yasya vadesi na vidyati so 'pi
yo pi vijānatP 2 so 'pi asanto^ ' | (6
94
tatra praņastu jagam imu sarvaņv
vitatha-vikalpa-nivesa-vašena :95 1
šānta 96 vijānati yo nāru?7 dharmāms
te9S hi tathāgatu drsta 99 svayambhü ' | (7) ļ |

84 Here we interpret tīrņa as active, hence avatīrņa = 'you who have crossed over'.
bhavārņavatīrņah LVP; bhavārņņavatīrņņah. pT and saT have draň sroň chen po srid pahi
pha rolphyin = pāragato 5 si maharsi bhavasya ' - LVP p. 244 n. 5. Translate as 'A Great Seer,
thou art transcendent over existence' The Sanskrit above, on the other hand, means 'Having
crossed over, you have surpassed existence.'
85 kascit R; kasci LVP. saT understands, probably rightly, passive labhyate ( ti only metri
causa)', pha rol gšegspa gaú yaň mi rñed hgyur 'no transcendent can be apprehended'.
86 saT consistent with passive vidyate.
87 nãvidyu pãram R. With this the line means 'No other side is seen and the other side is
not not seen', which is not as good as above: 'No other side is seen and the not-other side is
not'; confirmed by saT, pha rol yod ma yin sin tshul rol med 'there is no other shore and no
this shore'.
88 For vadasi. Influenced by Prakrit, wherein aya becomes e. Thus we postulate a form
vadayasi perhaps derived from causative vãdayasi through vowel shortening. Also in next
verse.

89 Schayer and Sprung treat this word as if it meant 'mere conven


('Redensart', 'manner of speaking'). Again the idea is good, but the text app
Generally vãkya is straightforwardly 'sentence'. saT has tshig tu gsuňs
vadesi vãkyam. gsuňs does not imply any qualification or sandhyãbhãsa.
might, but not necessarily.
90 For varam, metri causa , according to all mss. LVP emended to vaca
91 Mss. have yam LVP, ya R. But saT has gaň gis implying yah 'who' (n
with a passive verb, but here the Sanskrit verb is active).
92 Should be vijanati but shortening metri causa.
93 Should be asan' pl. metri causa.
94 Understand tatra praņastam jagam (- jagat) idam sarvam 'there this wh
95 R has vasena , obviously an error. The first vi in this line is extramet
96 For santa understand santo.
97 For naro but avoiding the (long) o and substituting the Prakntic «,
98 Understand tena.
99 Understand tathagato drstah.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 333

santa prajānati dharma-praņītān 100


prīti sa vindati 101 tosati satvān '
so bhavatī jinu, jitvana klesān
ãtma-jino ca anātma-sthitas ca 102 1 ļ (8) ļ |

tena vijānita bodhi jinānām 103


buddhiya bodhayate sa jagam pi ' | (9) | ļ ity ādi ' '

yac ca-uktam asvabhāvo bhāvo na-eva-asti sünyatä ca bhāvānām isyate 1


tasmād asti sünyatä-äsrayo bhāva-svabhāva iti ' etad api na yujyata ity āha |

yady104 ašunyam bhavet kimcit , syãc chünyam api 105 kimcana '
na kimcid asty asünyam ca, kutah sünyam bhavisyati | | 7 | |

y adi sünyatä nama kācit syãt, tad-ãsrayo bhāva-svabhāvah syãt ' na tv evarņ '
iha hi sünyatä- anātmatā sarva-dharmāņām sãmãnya-laksanam ity
abhyupagamãd asünya-dharma-abhäväd asünyatä-eva na-asti | y adā ca-
asünyäh padārthā na santi 1 asünyatä ca na-asti 1 tadā pratipaksa-
nirapeksatvāc , chünyatä-api kha-puspa-mālāvan na-asti-ity avasîyatâm '
yadä ca sünyatä na-asti tadā tad-āsrayā api padārthā na santi-iti sthitam
avikalpam 106 1 ļ

100 "Additions et Corrections" pranîtan. R praņītān. LVP right the first time. Schayer
translates dharma-praņītān as 'die höchsten dharmas' Sprung as 'the subtlest elements of ex-
istence' saT has chos mchog 'supreme dharmas. But could it not mean 'those things that have
been brought forth as dharmas , protrayed as dharmas ?
101 samvindati R does not fit the meter.
102 Conjectural reconstruction of this line, of which LVP gives only ãtma followed by a se-
ries of dots. In his footnote he gives from his mss. v(t)ãma jino ca arã(o)ma(e) sthitas ca. R has
nama jino ca arama sthitas ca. pT bdag ñid rgyal bar hgyur siň gnas pa med; saT has gyur. We
take LVPs v(t)āma in accordance with saT bdag ñid as ãtma-jino with Tibetan rgyal ba , and
read the compound as 'who has conquered the self' (Schayer 'Sieger über das eigene Selbst'
Sprung does not translate this line at all. anātma is conjectural here but fits the meter and the
sense: anãtma-sthita 'who stands in selflessness'. The Tibetan on the other hand has 'who has
no standing-place' which also fits the sense, though it does not translate arã(o)ma(e). Schayer
has 'ist er in keinem ksetra befindlich', taking the continuative sin as 'field' - ingenious but not
convincing. Perhaps he sees arā(o)ma(e) as ãrãmei But an ārāma is a pleasure garden or plea-
sure grove, not usually a ksetra. - In our version hiatus needed between ca and a , metri causa.
103 Understand tena vijñato bodhir iinanam.
104 If there were anything nonempty, like a tree, there would be something empty, like a
mirage, but there is no nonempty thing like a tree, in ultimate reality, so how will there be any
empty thing like a mirage in ultimate reality? gal te ston min cuň zad y od' stoňpahaň cuň zad
yod par hgyur 1 1 mi ston cuň zad yod min na ' stoňpahaň yod par ga la hgyur (saT) (Tibetan of
Madh. avat. has stoňpa in second line) 'If there were at all a nonempty, then there would be
some empty as well; since there is no nonempty at all, how will there be an empty as well?'
105 iti LVP: but api R; stoň pahaň T, saT. Saigusa retains iti.
106 saT does not translate iti sthitam avikalpam. avast (two lines up) is from ava-so 4 P.

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334 Brian Galloway

atra-ãha |107 trīņi vimoksamukhā


vimuktaye vineyebhyo bhagav
asādhāraņāni ,110 saugata ev
upadesa-artham eva , buddh
moha-andhakāra-anugata-jagat
avicchinna-sikhā utpadyan
vyākhyāna-vyājena-idānīrņ tām
ity alam bhavatã svarga-apavar

ucyate | aho bata!nx bhavãn aty


pura-gãminam sivam rjum p
abhinivesa-vyãkulitah ,nl samsã
pura-gãmitvena samāšrito nir
sadbhir upãlabhya eva sann ab
eva-upãlabhate | nanu bho ni
vaidya-rãjaih |

107 Here saT adds gaň bstanpar by a bahiphyir saňs rgyas bcom Idan hdas' hgro ba mu stegs
pahi smra ba ma rigpahi smag chenpohi rjes su son pa la' hgro bahi sgron me gcigpur gyur ba'
bdag med pa ñe bar ston pahi me Ice rgyun mi h chad pa mňah ba mams h by uň ba.
108 These three 'gates of liberation' are given frequently in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist liter-
ature. LVP gives a number of citations from Pali literature and we can add here the
Astasāhasrikā and the Dharmasamgraha. LVP also refers us to p. 43 of his Prasannapadã ,
where we find a reference to Mahãvytpatti 73.
109 Omitting mar a with T, saT, and pT, which suggest simply tirthika-mata , mu stegs pahi
gsuň lugs, for which LVP suggests tîrthika-samaya ; but mata could also be translated as gsuň
lugs.
110 Tib. thun mon ma yin pa dag confirms the first a of asadharaņani , as does the neuter
gender of mata.
111 Schayer translates 'Das ist aber wunderlich!' with a sarcastic tone; Sprung has 'good
gracious!' But^o bata is clearly 'alas!' aho is ambiguous, but bata is not; confirmed by saT e
ma kye hud in which e ma is expressive of compassion (ruling out sarcasm) and kye hud is
unambiguously 'alas!'
112 All mss. have -am, but context suggests -ah to apply to the opponent ('you, Sir ... are
confused by inclination towards existents') (the road can hardly have been confused). Tib.
however has another reading entirely; for bhãva-abhinivesa-vyãkulita it has dňospo la mňon
par sen pahi sbrulgyis dkrispa 'surrounded by the snakes of the inclination to existents' as if
the Tibetan translators read bhãva-abhinivesa-vyãla-parivrta or some such.
113 R has anugamam but as de Jong rightly says, read with LVP's mss.
114 Reading with R instead of LVP's -ah. The words nirmumuksuh san samsara-atavi-
kãntãrãt (or -ah) are not in pT or saT.
115 Omitting para with saT: ma gyal sen pas bzuň pa.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 335

sünyatä sarvadrstīnārņ proktā nihsaraņamU6 jinaih '


yesãm tu sünyatä drstis tãn asãdhyãn 117 babhãsire | | 8 | |118

iha sarvesãm èva drsti-gatãnãm 119 sarva-graha-abhinivesãnãm y an


nihsaraņam apravrttih sã sünyatä ' na ca drsti-gatãnãm120 nivrtti-mãtram
bhãvo ļ ye tu tasyãm api sünyatäyäm bhãvã-abhinivesinas , tãn pratyavãcakã
vayam121 iti kuto 3 smad-upadesãt sakala-kalpanã-vyãvrttyã mokso bhavis-
yati I y o "na kimcid api te pany am dãsyãmi" ity uktah san ,122 "dehi bhos tad
èva mahyam na kimcin nãma panyam" iti brüyät , sa kena-upãyena saky ah
panya-abhãvam grãhayitum ? ' evarņ yesãm sünyatäyäm api bhãvãbhinivesah
kena-idānīm sa tesãm tasyãm bhãvãbhiniveso nisidhyatãm iti ' ato mahã-
bhaisajye 3pi dosa-samjmtvãt parama-cikitsakaih mahãvaidyais tathãgataih
pratyãkhyãtã 123 èva te '

116 pT, saT ries par hbyuň ba. According to LVP, Bcp. [Bodhicaryãvatãrapanjikã] IX.33
translates nihsaraņa by ňespar hbyin pa. f hbyinpa - to emit, to remove (nihsãrayati), est le
"transitif" de hbyuň ba' Confirmed in Das. Thus hbyin ba 'pull out' and hbyuň ba ťgo out,
be pulled out'.
117 pT bsgrub tu med par, saT, Madh. avatãra 1 19.8 sgrub tu med par. 'notre commentaire,
sgrub tu medpar' 'Bcp. IX.33 qui traduit ... asãdhya par gso-bya-min-pa.' In "Additions et
Corrections" he refers to (prob. Tibetan) Abhdh. k. v. fol. 256b as translating asãdhya by gso
by a min pa.
118 Verse 'Cité Subhāsitas., Muséon , IV, 397.23 et Bcp. IX. 33 ...' LVP. From LVP "Addi-
tions et Corrections", see Madh. avatãra 1 19.6. pT = saT, but Tib. of Madh. avatãra 1 19.6 is a
different translation with same meaning. It gives ňes par hbyin pa for nihsaraņa.
119 LVPs mss. have krtãnãm 'of things made by views', but it is not clear whether a view
can make anything, and pT and saT have Ita bar gyur pa i.e. drsti-gatãnãm. Candraklrtis
probable source for this word is Ratnakuta/Kãsyapaparivarta , which he quotes in the next
paragraph. See Note 136 below.
120 See previous note.
121 With R. LVPs mss. had rayam and LVP rightly emended it. Confirmed by pT and saT,
which have de dag la ni kho bo cag mi smra ste.
122 With R. LVPs mss. have sarva dehi and sa ca dehi , but sarva is not in saT and sa ca
makes less sense than san 'being'.
123 Schayer interprets as if ãkhyãta 'called' and adds 'als unheilbar' in brackets. But with
praty the word has the sense of 'repudiate' (Sprung: 'do not attend to', closer to the mark
than Schayer here). Confirmed by saT bor (s.v. hbor in Das).

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336 Brian Galloway

yathã-uktam bhagavad-ärya-ra
dharmān sunyãn karoti 126 1 dha
animittān karoti 1 dharmā eva
apraņihitān karoti 1 dharmā eva
iyam ucyate , kãsyapa , madhyam
I [•••] 129 ye hi , kãsyapa, sunyatã-u
aham nasta-pranastãn 132 ¿íz v
kãsyapa , sumeru-mãtrã pudg
sya135 sünyatä-drstih ' tat kasy a

124 This whole quotation from the Kãs


sions. LVP: 'Voir p. 45, n. 1' where we
233.15 (235, n. 1); cp. 261.4; Bodhi
Ratnaküta-sütra meant Kãsy ap a-p a
the Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese ver
125 Instrumental case, therefore emen
there is an instrumental particle. LVP
aval. 1 18.1 (i.e. the Tibetan translation
p. 1 18) where there is in fact kyis at th
too.

126 Omitting here LVP's api íu and the two following api íu (de Jong). They are
or the Tibetan tr. of Madh. avai. (loc. cit.)
127 Passage in Sūtra omitted by Candraklrti (von Staël-Holstein 63, p. 94).
128 saT translates bhuia as yaň dag pav.
129 Passage in Sūtra omitted by Candrakirti (von Staël-Holstein 64, p. 95).
130 pT, saT stoñ pa ñid du dmigspas 'imagining emptiness'.
131 Go against, attack. But pT, saT have vtog 'understand'.
132 saT ñams vab tu ñams.
133 Reading as R. saT puts this before nasta-pvanasta , and translates it as gsuňs v
'in this tradition of teaching'; pT and saT have gsuns ; de Jong and Das have gsun
134 After drsti , neither ašritā nor the Tib. gnas seems necessary to this sentence. T
ing instance of the word drsti does not have it.
135 This is LVP's reading, and it is consistent with Candraklrti's thought: 'than
ness-view of someone (-ka) who inclines to nonexistence'. Dwarika Das Shas
adopts this reading. saT, T mñonpahi na rgyal ( abhimãnikasya ) 'of someone who
himself', von Staël-Holstein has adbimãnikasya 'of someone who is angry-m
the first interpretation the Buddha of the Kasy ap a-p ariv arta criticizes intellectua
the other cases moral failing.
136 LVP and R have drsti- krtãnãm 'of things made by views' or possibly 'of things
been made into views or made as views (see below)', but the von Staël-Holste
script of the Kãsy apap ariv arta , usually so much worse, here (Section 64) presents
reading gatãnãm that is confirmed by the hT gyurpa. gata here need not be tran
sense of drsti-gata is 'something that has gone to, become, a view', i.e. a v
Kãsy apap ariv arta has the word drsti-krtãnãm in Section 109 in the verse, but
sponding prose in the same section has drsti- gatãnãm. In Section 1 12 it has krta b
In Section 1 8 it has krta in the prose, gata in the verse. But in all six instances t
translation has gyur for gata or understands krta as meaning the same as gata in th

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 337

sünyatä nihsaraņarņ ' yasya khalu punah sunyatã-eva drstis , tam aham
acikitsyam iti vadāmi ' tadyathã , kasy apa, glãnah pur usah syãt , tasmai vaidyo
bhaisajyam dadyãt , tad bhaisajyam , sarva-dosãn uccãlya™ svayam
kostha-gatam na nihsaret ' tat kirņ manyase , kãsyapa , ¿pí «^138 purusas tato
glãnyãn mukto bhavet ?" ' ' "no hi-idam , bhagavan , gādataram tasya
purusasya glãnyam bhavet , 3/^53/^ ta*/ bhaisajyam , sarva-dosãn uccãlya ,
kostha-gatam na nihsaret 39 ' bhagavãn ãha ' (Cevam eva , kãsyapa ,
sarva-drsti-krtãnãm sunyatã nihsaraņam ' yasya khalu punah sunyatã-eva
drstis , aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi " |

Part II: Translation

Chapter 13
Investigation of the Samskāras

And so thus by the method of the immediately preceding chapter, there being
no supposed (nirūpyamāņa)m production (/¿i. having-been-made-ness) by

('what has been made a view'). - The index to de la Vallée Poussin's French translation of
the Abhidharmakosa has no drstikrta , but it does have a drstigata referring to v, 40, i.e. Tome
IV, p. 40 (Chapter v is in Tome IV) where we find drstigata precisely in the sense of drsti. The
Buddha is quoted as mentioning the highest of non-Buddhist views. In the bhãsya we have,
within s7o&rf 19 (and not after it as in the French translation), in the Dwārikādās Šastri edi-
tion, eta evoktam [sic] bhagavatā - "etad agram drstigatānām yaduta no ca syãm no ca me
syãt na bhavisyãmi na me bhavisyati" (vol. 2, p. 794) This is the highest of views ...' What
follows yaduta is clearly a view (here drstigata). One ms. has bãhyakãnãm drstigatānām ťof
the views of the outsiders'. The commentator Yasomitra writes, etad agram drstigatānām iti '
etad visistam drsti-prakârebhyah ' nâtisâvadyam ity arthah ' mokso mārgopanisat , ucchedas
tu nirhetuko y bhipreta iti , bhrānteh sãvadyam uccheda-daršanam iti višesah ' {loc. cit., n.;
punctuation by Dwārikādās Šastri, final visarga by Wogihara p. 463) '"this is the highest of
views", this is a particular among kinds of views, means that it is not too objectionable; it is
intended as [a way of] liberation, a secret doctrine (upanisad) of the path, though it is annihi-
lationist and [teaches a doctrine of] causelessness. It is a kind of annihilationist view that is
[after all] objectionable for someone who has gone astray.'
137 With R. Certainly a better reading than LVP's uccârya. True, neither MW nor Apte,
Pract. Diet., have uccãlya s.v. ud-cal , but Whitney, Roots , has -cãlya as a derivative s.v. cal.
With ud we have the sense of 'move out, drive out'. saTib. has bskyed for bskyod. von
Staël-Holstein has ucãlya.
138 LVP tu, but no 'but' needed here; de Jong writes, 'Read as R, cf. von Staël-Holstein and
Wogihara p. 557.' von Staël-Holstein has nu.
139 saT translates this word as mam par dpyadpa na i.e. adverbially: 'if we investigate'. But
in the Skt. it appears as an adjective modifying the two nouns in tvam. Moreover Monier-
Williams gives nirupya s.v. ni-rūp ('consider' inter alia) as 'to be seen or defined or ascer-
tained, not yet certain, questionable' (p. 554, col. 2). Thus we translate nirupya as 'supposed';

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338 Brian Galloway

self or other or both nor any


cause-ness) of entities ( bhãva ), a
arising, by the appearance (rüpa
ordinary fools whose minds' e
disease.140 Therefore just those t
are deceiving (visam-vādaka)141
horse, etc. to those who do not
Buddha] whose intellect-eye h
whose unconscious tendencies (
by the roots, whose highest aim
for saving unsaved beings wh
( viparyãsa J, the teacher of the w

What are deceptive (mosa) dharm


All the samskāras are deceptive

In a Sūtra it is said, That is false, t


indeed, monks, is the supreme tr
all the samskāras are false, the d
nature (dharma) has a destructiv
logism, what has a deceptive natu
and all samskāras are deceptive
ůvz-dharma-ntss those samskār
craftsman, or like King Udayana
the characteristics of an elephant1

then the passage appears grammati


( nirüpyamäna = nirüpya ) made-ness of
arising-without-cause-ness [of them].
140 Their minds have been struck by
disease-struck minds' eyes, a sort of
with 'minds' and 'eye-disease' with 'e
141 Lit. 'breaking their word'.
142 saT has 'the illusory horse, elephan
rta daň glaň po che la sogs pas ' de mi ses
143 The four deceptions are, as Sch
Beharrlichen das Beharrliche, in dem
Leidvolle und in dem Nicht-Ich das Ich
144 laksaņa-upeta-yantra-matta-vār
laksana-upeta-yantra 'machine provi
citrakara ... rãiavat 'Like a robot-girl
145 LVP states, 'Mahāsena s'empara
Kathā., XII, init.; Harsacarita, VI sub
Pradyota, pp. 36-37 ( mãyãmãtanga ,

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 339

( mosa ) dharma manifests not in accordance with reality ( vitathã-khyãtin ),


like a fire-wheel.147 That all samskāras are false because of their deceptive
character (mosa-dharmatva) is to be taken in the sense that they are without
essence ( svabhãva ), like a fata morgana.148 What is true is not of a deceptive
nature (mosadharmaka), which is nirvāna alone. So the lack of essence of all
entities ( bhāva ) is demonstrated (siddha) by both formal proof and the
authority of scripture (agama) , since we read in the Ardhasatikā Prajūā-
pãramitãy 'Empty are all dharmas by their lack of essence (svabhãva). 9149

Here [an opponent of Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti] speaks: 'If thus the falsity
of all samskāras because of their deceptive character is maintained by you,
then just for this reason, all entities are [by your thesis] not, and this would be
the wrong view ( mithyädrsti ) of the one who denies [the existence of] all ob-
jects (word-meanings).
We reply: Truly of a deceptive nature are all samskāras , which deceive you
even now. For, Sir,

If what is a deceptive dharma is false, what there is lost?150

Communiqué par M.F. W. Thomas.' - Schayer states, 'Die wohlbekannte Geschichte


von der Uberlistung des Königs Vatsa mit Hilfe eines künstlichen Elefanten ist in der
indischen Literatur oft bearbeitet worden: Bhāsas Pratijnãyaugandharãyana , Somadevas
Kathãsaritsãgara II, 12 usw. Über die automatischen Puppen in der Gestalt von Menschen,
Vögeln usw. vgl. das XXXI. Kapitel des Samarãrigana , Gaekwad Oriental Series 25, 32.'
146 saT has here hdrid bar by ed for visarņvadaka , whereas before it had slu bar by e d pa. But
the meaning is the same.
147 Wheel made by swinging a blazing torch rapidly in a circle. The appearance of a circular
structure is there, but there is no wheel there. (Persistence of vision results in the appearance
of a fixed circular structure, a burning wheel.)
148 marīcikā-ādi-jala , smig rgyuhi chu , mirage-water. Skt. has also ãdi 'etc.'. Schme-
hausen: ' marīcikā , Auffassung von Sonnenstrahlen als Wasser'. 'Wenn auch Irrtümer mit
Substrat herangezogen wurden ... so ist dabei die Existenz des Substrates aus dem Vergleich
auszuklammern' (p. 149). The Mädhyamika does not admit the ultimate reality of the sub-
strate of the illusion.
149 LVP states, 'Voir l'édition de Rājendralāl, p. 405.' Also see Conze, The Short Prajnã-
pāramitā Texts, p. 188; PL. Vaidya, ed., Mahãyãna-Sutra-Samgraha , Part I. Buddhist
Sanskrit Texts - No. 17. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961, p. 91, 1. 16. sunyãh sarvadharmã,
nihsvabhãvayogena; nirnimittãh sarvadharmã, nirnimittatãm upãdãya ; apranihitãh sarva-
dharmã , apranidhãnayogena;prakrti-prabhãsvarãh,prajnãpãramitã-parisuddhyã iti 'empty are
all dharmas , by their lack of essence; signless are all dharmas , considering signlessness;
wishless are all dharmas , by their not having wishes; naturally radiant [they are], by the com-
plete purity of the prajnãpãramitã .' Emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness constitute a
triad (the Three Gates of Liberation) found in Pāli also.
150 He is not denying the reality of any real thing, because there was never any real thing
whose reality could be denied. The falsity of the deceptive samskāras means that denying
them is no error; it is not denying the reality of what exists, because there is no existence in

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340 Brian Galloway

When it is said by us that a dece


How is there a nonexistence there?
nying it, by seeing it as non-exis
when we see no existent, then w
istent153 [that could be taken a
proach is unjustified.
Here [an opponent] speaks: If t
then what is maintained by you

the deceptive things. - Weber-Bros


betrogen' and add 'Auch die eigene,
setzungen gebildet, also ebenfalls unw
interpretation or mention a deceived p
151 How could I be preaching nonexis
posited of something (potentially) exi
there is no 'nonexistence' here nor am
152 SaT dňos po = bhava.
153 Schayer: 'Wir aber sehen nirgen
vom Trug betroffen wird? [Wir me
(p. 29). - To 'take away' or 'lose' somethi
be called nihilism. Schayer states (p. 2
pielle Mißverständnis ab: die Mīmāms
das astitva , die Nāstikas (Cārvāka) leh
nihsrita , die behaupten weder das ast
137.7). Die Nāstikas leugnen die Möglic
der Metaphysik, sondern vor allem ir
Nicht-Zweiheit, welcher zu der Burg
Mystiker, bekämpfen den Realismus
keine Sophisten und keine Negativiste
call the via negativa , which is not the
Pr. 368.4-369.4: Die Mädhyamikas le
und des paraloka , im Sinne des pratî
pratyayas entsteht, deshalb hat es kein
'Die Realität des ihaloka wird nicht ge
nung resultiert nicht aus der Erkennt
auf das triviale Argument' that we cann
mikas das astitva im Sinne des samv
Irrealität des samsãra und des karm
Anklage gegen einen Dieb bestätigt, o
wahr, der Zeuge ist aber trotzdem ein
Giuseppe Tucci], Studi M ah ãy anici, R
vista di Nāgārjuna non è forse proprio
abhāva , chè allora lo sünyavädin dive
concettuale, la soppressione di tutti i co
sünya è anche tathatā che non è il nul

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 341

This was said by the Lord as an illumination154 of emptiness. 2.

What was said by the Lord was not an illumination155 of the [supposed] non-
existence of entities. What then [was it] ? It was an illumination156 of emptiness
and an illumination157 of the nonarising of the essences [of entities]. As it is
said in the Anavatapta-hradāpa-samkramaņa-sūtra ,158
That of conditions born is thus unborn;
Th' arising's not from them, in essence-mode;159
What from conditions comes is empty called;
Who knows this emptiness is madness-free.160

Here [an opponent]161 speaks: This passage does not mean the non-arising of
an essence in existents ( bhãva-svabhãva ). What then? Not possessing an

154 Or illustration, teaching. SaT yoňs su bstanpa. Nāgārjuna maintains that the Buddhas
reference to dharmas1 being false and deceptive means not that they are nonexistent but that
they are empty, which is not the same thing. Cf. Schmithausen: 'Nāgārjuna ... lehnt für die
Wahrheit alle ontologischen Prädikate - Sein, Nichtsein, beides zugleich und keines von
beiden - ab. Wenn er von Nichtsein spricht, so meint er nur: Inadäquatheit des ontologischen
Prädikates "Sein".' (p. 235). Nāgārjuna here glosses the Hlnayäna terms 'deceptive' (mosa)
and 'false' (mrsā) by the term 'empty' (sünya) (a term mostly Mahäyäna though also some-
times Hlnayäna).
155 SaT ston pa.
156 SaT yoňs su ston pa.
157 SaT yoňs su gsal bar by e d pa.
158 LVP states correctly (saT), 'Le tibétain a simplement mdo las = sutrãt .' He suggests that
the sūtra in question is the Anavataptanāgarājapariprcchāsūtra , Nanjio 437, T. 635, K. 407,
'qui est nommé par Wassiliefï, Bouddhisme p. 327, comme un des sūtras "des ausschliesslich
echten Sinnes" au point de vue des Mädhy arnikas. - Sur Anavatapta, lac ou naga , voir
notamment Burn., Intr. 171, 330, 396 et Lotus 3; Fujishima, Bouddh. japonais , 55. - Notre
stance est cité (sans indication de source et avec variantes) Bodhicaryâv. p. IX. 2 (Bibl. Ind.
p. 355.10 et Bouddhisme p. 241, n. 1), Suhhãs. sgr. ( Museon , N.S. IV, 395.22), et ci-dessous,
trois fois, au. chap. XXIV.'
159 Or following saT and the Tibetan as quoted in Madh. avat. (229.3), the essence of aris-
ing is not from them (the conditions).
160 saT and the Tibetan as quoted in Madh. avat. (229.4), bag yod yin 'is someone who has
attention'.
161 This objector is of the Vaibhāsika or Sarvāstivāda persuasion. Schayer: 'Das absolute
An-Sich-Sein der dharmas ist transzendent und hinter dem samtāna verborgen. Die Be-
unruhigung dieses absoluten Substrats (= duhkha, vgl. Anm. 9 [he refers here to his first note
on Ch. 12 of the Prasannapada ]) beruht darauf, daß die dharmas aus der Existenzphase der
Zukunft durch den Moment des Jetzt hindurch in die Existenzphase der Vergangenheit
übergehen. Das nihsvabhãvatva ist ein Synonym der anityatä und bezieht sich nur auf die
momentane Manifestation im samtāna , auf das laksaņa , nicht auf das laksya. Die Lehre
Buddhas, daß alle dharmas nihsvabhäva sind, bedeutet danach das Nicht-Beharren der
dharmas in ihrem svabhãva , nicht aber die Irrealität des svabhāva. Dem Werden und der
Veränderung muß ein reales Sein an sich zugrunde liegen, wenn es auch unmöglich ist, mit

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342 Brian Galloway

essence ( nibsvabhāvatva ) is not-a


this [point of view, we reply],

The essencelessness of entities


becoming.162

Of the things considered, an other-becoming, from the seeing of change; this


is the meaning. Thus it is said, If there were no essence in entities, there would
be also no change that could be perceived in them. But change is perceived.
Therefore it should be understood that the meaning of the sūtra163 is non-
permanence of essence. This is right, because

There is no entity without an essence, because of the emptiness of entities. 3.

An entity without an essence there is not. We maintain a dharma called empti-


ness [that is predicated] of entities.164 In a nonexisting dharmin 165, no dharma
based on it is tenable. For in a nonexisting son of a barren woman no darkness
[or lightness of skin color] of his is tenable.166 Therefore there is an essence of
entities [which is sunyata].
Moreover,

Of what [prior existing entity] would the changed entity (anyathã-bhãva) be


[a changed version] if there were [previously] no self-entity ( svabhãva J?167

unseren Erkenntnismitteln irgend etwas [PJositives über seine Beschaffenheit auszusagen.


Eine Darstellung der Ontologie der Vaibhāsikas gibt Vasubandhu Abh. K. V, 50 ff/
162 This means, The only sense in which things can be said to have no essence is that they
have a changeable nature. In another sense they really do have an essence = sünyatä. Other-
becoming, becoming other = anyathãbhãva = change.
163 The sūtra cited just after the first sloka of this chapter (LVP). Or perhaps the sutra just
cited above?
164 That entities have. SaT dňospo mams kyi chos ston pa ñid ces bya ba ni hdodpa yin no.
The dharma is the essence.
165 An entity or bhāva is called a dharmin 'possessor of a dharma' because it is held to be
the possessor of the dharma 'thing possessed' sünyatä 'emptiness'. This is its svabhãva (ac-
cording to the opponent, who is speaking now. Weber-Brosamer and Back seem to inter-
pret this as Nāgārjuna's speech: '... steht Nāgārjuna vor dem offenkundigen Dilemma,
beides, Eigensein und Nicht-Eigensein der Dinge, nachgewiesen zu haben' (n. 68). It is really
the opponent's dilemma.
166 The son is the dharmin and his darkness is the dharma. So for all things sunyata is the
dharma and all b h āvas are the dharmins.
167 Self-existing = svabhãva. Other-becoming = anyathã-bhãva = change or changed en-
tity. The sense of the question is, What would be the thing that becomes other if there were
no original 'self' of a thing? There must be a thing in the first place before we can speak of its
changing ( anyathã-bhãva ), and this must be an essence = self-existence (sva-bhãva). How
could there be change if there were no definite entity in the first place that could undergo

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 343

If there were no self-entity of entities, whose [i.e. of what] would be this


changed version [i.e. from what would it have changed, of what would it be a
changed version], since [the changed entity's] quality is to have changed?
We reply, even if we accept the imaginary [entity],

Whose changed entity would it be if there were a self-entity? 4.

Here168 a certain dharma that does not occur without a certain object is called
its essence, because it is not bound to anything else. Of fire, heat is the essence,
for in the world [fire] is not found without [heat]. The same heat, found in wa-
ter because of the presence of other causes, because of [artificial] activity, is
not the essence [of water]. If there is an essence that constantly accompanies
(its entity), then the changed entity must not be real, because of constant ac-
companiment of [the essence]; for coolness does not occur in fire. Therefore if
we admit that there is an essence in entities, the changed things are impossi-
ble.169 But changes of them are seen. Therefore there is no essence.
Moreover there is no changed entity in view of which there might be the
fact of having an essence (sasvabhāvatā). How it does not occur he explains
by saying,

There is no other-becoming of the [original entity], nor of the other [that has re-
sulted] either. A youth does not become old and an oldster does not either.170 5.

A change (otherness, anyathãtva ) of an entity that continues from its former


state is untenable. There is no other-becoming of a youth who continues [to be
such] in the state of youthfulness. And if you imagine an otherness that is of
something that has obtained another state, this too is untenable. For otherness
is a synonym of old age. Then 'if there is no [other-becoming] of a youth, there
must be [other-becoming] of an old man, i.e. an other' is not logical,171 so again

change? How could there be other-becoming if there were no prior self-existing? bhava can
mean both 'existing' and 'becoming'.
168 'In der realistischen Logik' - so Schayer (p. 32).
169 The opponent has argued that the fact of change proves that things have own-being,
svabhāva. Nāgārjuna replies that svabhãva would actually make change impossible. A
svabhãva always is what it is. Next he is going to argue that in any case there is no real
change. Supposedly A changes to B, but actually A is always A and never becomes B; while B
was always B and cannot change into B because it already is B. Change occurs neither in A
nor in B.
170 A youth does not become old because he is what he is, a youth, and because the change
is never perceived; an oldster does not become old because he already is old. So no entity
changes into another.
171 Because other-becoming of an old man is his becoming aged (since other-becoming is in
this context a synonym of age), but he cannot become aged since he already is aged.

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344 Brian Galloway

thereis no connection of an old


purpose.172 For what would th
Without that [(connection wi
soon as we say the words 'old m
becomes old. Now the becoming
for a youth is [precisely] someone
said, and the two states [youth
Furthermore,

If [yogurt]173 is the changed v


would become yogurt.

But when the state of milk is r


does not become yogurt. If you
of their mutual exclusivity, the
changes into B, A and B being dif
change into B. Thus]

The becoming (bhāva) of yogurt w

But is water the basis of yogurt?


basis of yogurt should be some
[We sum up:]175 Thus since ther
a proof of the possession of essen
As is said in the Ârya-Ratnãk

No dharma is there born, arises


This the Conqu'ror states, the
The Pointer-Out, the Great See

172 Because an old man is what he is


'old age'. To give him one would be g
173 dadhi , usually translated as cur
thick sour milk (regarded as a remedy
from it)' s.v.
174 Translating as SaT: ho ma las gsan gaň sig ni | so yi dúos po yin par hgyur. The Skt. says
'The basis will be of what thing . . .' (gen. of material?).
175 If milk and yogurt are the same, there is no change; if they are different, there is still no
change, because two things that are different are absolutely different, and therefore one can-
not become the other, or if so then anything could become anything, which is not observed.
176 According to the opponent, change (anyathãhhva) shows that there is a svabhãva. But
Nāgārjuna has shown that there is no change; therefore there need not be any svabhãva on
this account.
177 SaT hphagspa dkon mchog hbyuñ gnas ses bya ba theg pa chenpo mdo (Mine of Jewels
Sūtra).

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 345

Of whom no essence (svabhāva) is there seen at all,


Nor is his changeling (parabhãva) grasped by anyone,
Nor is he in this or outside of this
To be perceived, the Pointer-Out, the Savior. (2)

Pacified is the course ( gati ), the Sugata hath said;


And no course, motion, state, or path (all gati ) appears.
There thou conductest life from every state (gati) divorced;
And freed thyself, thou many beings freest. (3)

Thou say'st that selfless dharmas are; and having taken


Beings up, thou free st the world; having arrived (gatita)
At freedom (mukta) from the self (svayam), and freed from state;
Thou art transcendent, cannot fathomed be. (4)

Thou art transcendent, hast descended to the world;


And no transcendent can be apprehended here;
There is no other side and no this side;
And yet you state, ťI am transcendent' here. (5)

And truly, thou who speak st art not perceived,


And what thou sayest too is not perceived;178
And he with whom thou speakest also not;
And he that understandeth also not. (6)
Lost is this world entire
Under the power of construction wrong;
Who sees that dharmas are quiescent here
By him the Self-Existent is perceived. (7)

He knows that so-called dharmas are quiescent;


He findeth joy and bringeth joy to beings;
Conquering faults, he is the Conquerer;
Conquering the self, he stands in selflessness. (8)

By him the Awakened state of the Conquerors


Is known; Awake, he awakens all the world. (9)

You have stated [Candrakirti says to the opponent] that there is no existent
without an essence; you maintain that emptiness is of existents and therefore

178 For these two lines, Schayer and after him Sprung have in effect, 'The words thou
usest are not, nor the things the words stand for'. But the SaT has a 'who' in the first line and
just a word for 'words' in the second.

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346 Brian Galloway

that the basis of emptiness is t


[Nāgārjuna] states,

If there were anything nonempt


is nothing nonempty, so whence

If there were anything to be called


essence of entities. But it is not
selflessness is the common qualit
tence of any nonempty things
ness. [To repeat,] When there ar
ness. Then, because the lack of
sky-flowers, is not, we must ins
that are its basis are not; this is
Here it is said, The Three Gates
the wishless, as they are called,
for [their] liberation; they are
learnt [only] in the Buddhist ver
teaching them, the Buddhas, the
der the great darkness of delusi
[the Buddhas who are] the sole l
of the nairãtmya teaching. You,
doctrine, have now undertaken t
destroyer of the path to heaven
We reply, alas! you, Sir, with f
road], as it were, because of extr
auspicious path that goes to the
tion to existents and have resort
of samsāra, as if it went to the cit
the forest of the wandering in s
wise, but because of the power
pride, you criticize them. Never
the illness of all defilements say,

The Conquerers have called emp


But those for whom emptiness i

Here emptiness is defined as the


inclinations to grasping,181 as the

179 Meaning that none of the non-Bu


180 This seems to be the meaning: m

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 347

cessation of views is not an entity (bhäva). To those who cling to entities even
in that emptiness we have no wish to reply, because in our teaching salvation
is obtained182 by deliverance from all discursive thought.183 Who, being told,
'I shall give you no ware,' should reply, 'Give me, Sir, just that no ware,' he by
what method is capable of grasping the nonexistence of that ware? Thus the
inclination to existence in emptiness of those people - by what can this incli-
nation to existence in it of them be prevented? Thus because they understand
the [possibility of] abuse even of the Great Medicine, the foremost healers, the
great physicians, the Tathāgatas, do not attend such people.
So it is said in the Lord's Noble Heap of Jewels Sūtra, "'Nothing184 makes
dharmas empty by means of emptiness; dharmas are just empty. Nothing
makes dharmas signless by signlessness; dharmas are just signless. Nothing
makes dharmas wishless by wishlessness; dharmas are just wishless. ... Just
this analysis, Kasyapa, is the the Middle Way and the reality-analysis of
dharmas. ... Those, Kasyapa, who go against emptiness while being depend-
ent on emptiness I call ruined and thoroughly ruined, speaking from my tra-
dition of teaching. Better, Kasyapa, a person-view as big as Mount Sumeru
than an emptiness-view of someone who inclines toward nonexistence. Why?
Emptiness, Kasyapa, is the expelling of all views. But him for whom empti-
ness is itself a view I call incurable.185 Thus, Kasyapa, suppose there is a sick

181 saT Ita bar gyur pa> Skt. drsti-gata 'what are become views' i.e. views. LVP has drsti-
krta; but see the Sanskrit, nn. 119, 136. saT has 'inclination' mrion par se pa without any
'grasping'.
182 Lit. 'will come about', bhavisyati.
183 Schayer's Begriff sconstructionen is perhaps a good rendition of kalpana.
yan na ... karoti 'whatever there may be (yad) does not make ...'
185 Schayer correctly writes, 'Daß unwissende Individuen, welche die sünyatä als eine
drsti auffassen, verloren ( praņasta ) und unheilbar (acikitsya, asãdhya) sind, ist ein dictum,
das man wohl nicht à la lettre verstehen muss. "Ewig Verdammte" kann es im Buddhismus
prinzipiell nicht geben; vielmehr wird jeder samtäna früher oder später zur Ruhe gelangen
und diese These ist in der Tat eine notwendige Konsequenz der Lehre von dem duhkha als
dem überpersönlichen Weltleiden: eben deshalb, weil sich in jedem individuellen Erlösungs-
prozeß die fortschreitende Beruhigung des transzendenten Substrats vollzieht, muß die Heils-
garantie absolut sein. Anders gesagt: der samsara hat keinen Anfang, aber wohl ein Ende.'
In what follows, however, he is not quite so correct: 'Der Gedanke, daß alle Wesen die
Erlösung erreichen werden, ist im Mahã-Parinibbãna-Sutta deutlich ausgesprochen.' In fact
the Pāli Sutta here referred to does not have the doctrine of universal salvation; Schayer here
is obviously thinking of the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāņa-Sūtra translated into Chinese by
Dharmaksema in 414-421. It states that all beings have the Buddha-nature, which should
mean that it is possible that all beings will achieve Buddhahood. See K. Chen: Buddhism in
China (Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 113-116. Again Schayer: 'Auch Vasubandhu stellt
im AbhK I, 12 ausdrücklich fest, daß alle samskrta- dharmas erlöschen werden (= daß sie
sa-nihsära sind) ...' This is correct (see below). Schayer: '... und Milindapañha 69

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348 Brian Galloway

person to whom a physician give


out allthe illnesses, itself does
Kašyapa, will that person then b

widerspricht nicht dieser Lehre, wie


nicht, daß es Wesen gibt, die nie erlöst
die nötigen Vorbedingungen erfüllt zu
seems that Nāgasena opposes the doctr
clearly. Schayer: 'Bedenklicher ist die
Wesen sein wird, welche die Lehre des
daß diese Behauptung vom Standpunk
muß in Betracht gezogen werden, daß
populär-religiösen Literatur lassen s
nachweisen.
'Im Mahãyãna steht der Grundsatz de
lehre; alle Kreaturen sind Embryonen
Schayer refers to Volume I, p. 12 of th
indeed states ' nihsãra signifie "sortie
(nirupadhišesanirvāņa) de tout conditi
qualifie "munis de sortie"/ The edit
Bharati Nos. 5, 6, 1981) has p. 27 nihsa
esām astīti sanihsārāh. The commentat
nirvāņam).
Schayer refers to Mahãvastu p. 149 in the Basar edition: šrņvatām purusavarasya
šāsanam bahunām kutah ' paryanto bhesyati satvānām iti uktam maharsiņā 'Whence will
there be (reading bhavisyati) a limit to the many beings who hear the teaching of the Supreme
Person?' This is p. 99 in the Jones translation: 'Whence, then, can there be a limit to the
countless beings who listen to the teaching of the Supreme of men?' The doctrine of the
infinitude of beings is not necessarily heretical, however. It is present in Asanga's
Mahãyãnasamgraha (which is a philosophical treatise), at least by implication: khams gcig na
ni gñis med phyir ' dpag med lhan cig tshogs bsags phyir ' rim gyis hbyuň bar mi rigs phyir '
saňs rgyas maň por rab tu grags ļ 'Although there are not two Buddhas in a dhãtu , because an
unlimited number of them (dpag med , aprameya) accumulate their equipment (sarņbhāra) at
the same time {lhan cig), and because an arising in succession (krama) is impossible, the
Buddhas are renowned as many' (Lamotte, text p. 96, translation pp. 328-329). This seems
to imply that there is an infinite number of beings, because an infinite number of Bodhisatt-
vas become enlightened at the same time (a 'smaller* infinity, of course). If there are N0 beings,
there can be N0 Bodhisattvas among them while leaving K0 non-Bodhisattvas, just as there are
N0 positive integers and N0 integers divisible by 4 among them, leaving while leaving N0 num-
bers not divisible by 4. Moreover if N0 beings become enlightened at every moment, all beings
could become enlightened in a finite time, even though there is an infinity of beings: if there
are beings numbered 1, 2, . . . , N0 , then the diagonal method well known to mathematicians,
which shows that N0 cannot embrace all the points in a finite line segment, also shows a way in
which N0 points can be distributed on the finite line segment (which contains N, points). If the
line is seen as a time line, we can have N0 beings becoming Buddhas in a finite time. The time
distance between the enlightenment of one and the next will be in general of the order of an
infinitesimal of the N, kind, which leaves a succession, but an arbitrarily small one, so that for
practical purposes it could be argued that the enlightenments are lhan cig.

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Chapter 13 of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti 349

illness of this person will become more severe, in whom that medicine, after
driving out all the illnesses, does not exit the body.' The Lord said, 'In just this
way, Kãsyapa, emptiness is the expelling of all views. But him for whom emp-
tiness is itself a view I call incurable.'"187

Bibliography

K. Chen: Buddhism in China. Princeton 1964.


F. Edgerton: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary . New Haven 1953.
J.W. de Jong: "Textcritical notes on the Prasannapada." In: IIJ 20 (1978), 25-59; 20
(1978), 217-252.
R. Pischel: A Grammar of the Prakrit Languages. Translated from German by
Subhadra Jhā. 2d ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1981.
Lambert Schmithausen: Maņdanamišra's Vibhramavivekah , Mit einer Studie zur
Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre. Wien 1965 (Österreichische Akademie
der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. KL, Sitzungsberichte 247, 1, 1965).
A. von Staël-Holstein: The Kasy apapariv arta: A Mahayanasutra of the Ratnakuta
Class. Shanghai 1926.
Mitsuyoshi Saigusa: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakarika-s: Texts and Translations.
Tokyo 1985.
Stanislaw Schayer: Ausgewählte Kapitel der Prasannapada (V, XI Iy XIII , XIV, XV,
XVI) ... W Krakowie: Polska akademja umiejçtnosci ... 1931 ... Polska
akademja umiejçtnosci, Cracow. - Komisja orientalistyczna. Prace. Nr. 14.
M. Sprung: Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way. The Essential Chapters from the
Prasannapada of Candrakīrti. Boulder, CO 1979.
L. de la Vallee Poussin: Mülamadhyamaka-kärikäs (Mädhyamikasütras) de
Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakīrti. St.-Pétersbourg
1913. (Published in several fascicles in the years 1903-1913.)
Bernhard Weber-Brosamer and Dieter M. Back: Die Philosophie der Leere ,
Nāgārjunas Mülamadhyamaka-Kärikäs: Übersetzung des buddhistischen Basis-
textes mit kommentierenden Einführungen. Wiesbaden 1997.

186 According to traditional Indian medical theory, not inconsistent with modern findings, a
medicine for the sick is a poison for the well. So it must leave the body after curing the illness; if
it remains, it will cause further sickness. Modern studies show that medicines do indeed leave
the body, e.g. in the urine, in a measurable amount of time (at least most of a dose does).
187 LVP writes p. 249 n., 'La théorie de la durgrahītatā , des dangers que présente une fausse
conception des doctrines bouddhiques, et en particulier de la sunyatã , est développé dans un
grand nombre de textes. (Voir Dogmatique Bouddhique, I, p. 26 = J. As. 1 902, II, p. 258.) - La
sunyatã est couramment comparée à un serpent, qu'il faut saisir au bon endroit. Cette méta-
phore (alagarda = alagadda) est développé dans un sūtra que cite Buddhaghosa, Sum. Vil. p. 21;
mais il s'agit de la doctrine bouddhique en général, duggahītattā bhikkhave dhammāņam .'
Chapter 24 also refers to this idea.

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