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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA) initially granted Meridien a license to conduct gaming
operations, including jai alai, within the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and Freeport (CSEZFP).
However, CEZA later revoked this license upon realizing it lacked the authority to license jai alai without
an express legislative franchise. Meridien contested the revocation in court, leading to a writ of
mandamus directing CEZA to allow Meridien to continue its gaming operations. This judgment lapsed
into finality. Thus, CEZA sought relief from judgment, which was initially denied but recourse through an
appeal on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 194962, was filed before the Supreme Court. Meantime, DOJ and
DILG issued a joint memorandum instructing public officers to deny Meridien's business permits and
prosecute violators of RA No. 954. Meridien filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 to annul this memorandum, obtaining a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) pending the resolution of related issues
before the Supreme Court. Is the CA's application of principle of judicial courtesy in issuing the WPI to
provisionally restrain implementation of the joint memorandum erroneous?
Yes. The principle of judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher
court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.
Here, the resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 could not have mooted or preempted the disposition in G.R. No.
194962. The issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 involves the validity of the Joint Memorandum that was issued
based on RA No. 954. Thus, any ruling on the propriety of the issuance of the Joint Memorandum could not have
affected any disposition on CEZA's authority to grant a license to operate jai alai activities then raised in G.R. No.
194962. Since the issues in these pending cases are not related, the CA's adherence to the principle of judicial
courtesy was plainly improper. (De Lima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 199972, August 15, 2022).

II. JURISDICTION

2. Perfecto Velasquez and Lisondra Land Incorporated entered into a joint venture agreement to develop a
memorial park. However, Lisondra Land failed to obtain necessary permits from the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Perfecto filed a breach of contract complaint against Lisondra Land in
the RTC. Lisondra Land argued lack of jurisdiction, citing HLURB's exclusive authority over real estate
trade and business practices. RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction while CA held HLURB's jurisdiction under
PD No. 1344 over the case. Subsequently, Perfecto filed a complaint with the HLURB, which ultimately
ruled in favor of Perfecto. Lisondra Land appealed to the CA, arguing that the court of general jurisdiction
has jurisdiction. Perfecto contends that Lisondra Land is now estopped from assailing the HLURB’s
jurisdiction. Is the contention correct?
Yes. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The operation of the principle
of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If
it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the
lower court had jurisdiction. In this case, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the
RTC which has jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that the
case is within the HLURB's exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before the CA which eventually ordered
the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, Perfecto relied on the final and executory decision of the appellate
court and refiled the action against Lisondra Land with the HLURB. Lisondra Land actively participated in the
proceedings before the HLURB. After receiving an adverse decision, Lisondra Land questioned the jurisdiction of
the HLURB and claimed that the RTC has the authority to hear the case. This bars Lisondra Land from assailing
the HLURB's jurisdiction. (Velasquez, Jr. v. Lisondra Land Incorporated, G.R. No. 231290, August 27, 2020)

3. Mike, Murphy, Simon, and Ryan are construction workers hired by UREIC for deployment to Kota
Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia for the principal, The W Construction (TWC). They filed a complaint before the
POEA against their employer, UREIC, for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
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Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers. The complainants also filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and money claims against UREIC before the Labor Arbiter alleging the same facts
and submitting the same affidavits submitted before POEA. Does the filing of the complaints before two
different tribunals or agencies violate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
No. Primary jurisdiction, or the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by
statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of the issues to the
administrative body for its review. In some instances, an administrative body is granted primary jurisdiction,
concurrent with another government agency or the regular court. While the complainants alleged the same set of
facts and the same affidavits were submitted before the LA and the POEA, the complaints raised different causes
of action. The LA complaint involved the issue of illegal dismissal and various money claims, while the POEA
complaint involved administrative disciplinary liability for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-­Based Overseas Workers. (U R Employed International Corporation
et al vs. Pinmiliw, et al., G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE

4. Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title against Concepcion. The complaint is grounded upon
their claims of ownership over the disputed properties and insistence that the latter’s acts of instituting
tenants and receiving a share from the produce of the land cloud their title. The averments show that the
remedy sought constitutes an accion reivindicatoria. Can the court determine the ownership over the
disputed properties in an action for quieting of title where such is not included in the reliefs prayed for?
Yes. The true nature of the action is not determined by the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations it
contains. The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations, substantiated by proof, even if no such
relief or a different relief is prayed for. As the allegations in this case constitute an accion reivindicatoria, the court
should determine ownership of the properties and award possession to the lawful owner, even if the complaint
prayed for the quieting of title. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022)

5. Is the failure of all the petitioners to sign the Verification and Certificate against Forum Shopping merit
the dismissal of the petition?
No. The requirement on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition signs the verification. Similarly, when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action, the signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October
17, 2022)

6. Is the CIR guilty of forum shopping when it posted for a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review with the Supreme Court under Rule 45, while having sought reconsideration before the CTA En
Banc for the decision rendered by the BIR’s Litigation Division?
No. There is forum shopping when there exist: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other case. Here, there
is an identity of parties in both cases. However, there is no identity of rights asserted. The first is a request for
more time to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, while the other is a motion filed with the
CTA En Banc for reconsideration of the Decision. Moreover, a “judgment” rendered in first will not amount to res
judicata as the Resolution will be limited to the granting or denying the motion for time. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. East Asia Utilities Corporation, G.R. No. 225266, November 16, 2020)

7. Vitarich Corporation filed an action for sum of money against Femina before the RTC Branch 11 of
Malolos City. Upon receipt of summons, Femina's counsel, Atty. Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case on
ground of improper venue. On August 17, 2010, the RTC denied the motion and directed Femina to
answer the complaint. Atty. Solilapsi received the Order on November 3, 2010 but Femina did not submit
any responsive pleading. On January 5, 2011, Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default. Meantime,
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Femina's new counsel, Atty. Emilio Quianzon, Jr, entered his appearance and filed on January 31, 2011 a
motion to admit answer. On February 8, 2011, RTC declared Fermina in default thereby allowing Vitarich
to present its evidence ex parte and ruled in favor of Vitarich. Was the RTC correct in declaring Fermina in
default?
No, the RTC should have considered Femina’s answer since it was filed before the declaration of default. The
rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no
prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the
defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer
should be admitted. Femina moved to admit her answer before she was declared in default. Femina filed her
motion through registered mail on January 31, 2011 while the order of default was issued on February 8, 2011.
Also, there is no showing that Femina intended to delay the proceedings. Thus, this circumstance must be fully
appreciated in favor of Femina. The RTC should have considered Femina's answer since it was filed before the
declaration of default. (Vitarich Corporation v. Femina R. Dagmil, G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020)

8. Myrna initiated a Complaint for Quieting of Title against respondents, asserting that their father had sold
the disputed parcel of land to a beach resort and subsequently to her. Respondents countered with an
answer seeking dismissal, alleging that the deeds of sale were falsified due to forged signatures. The
case was initially scheduled for pre-trial on September 28, 2016, but was postponed several times,
eventually happening on June 28, 2017. RTC set the trial to commence on October 25, 2017, but it was
repeatedly postponed at the instance of Myrna or her counsel. Instead of proceeding to trial, the RTC
ordered the case to undergo mediation on June 27, 2018, leading respondents to file a Motion for Leave
for an Amended Answer. RTC denied the motion, citing that the case had already undergone preliminary
and pre-trial conferences. Is the RTC correct?
No. Bona fide amendments to pleadings are allowed at any stage of the proceedings so that every case may, as
much as possible, be determined on its real facts, affording complete relief to all the parties involved in the case.
The Motion for Leave and the Amended Answer should be examined with circumspection, keeping in mind the
purpose of the rules in allowing amendments to pleadings, and the general policy that rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The only limitation under the rules was that the leave to
amend the pleading may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Here,
the RTC denied the Motion for Leave essentially because the case had already gone through pre-trial conference,
and a Pre-Trial Order had already been issued. This constitutes grave abuse of discretion as the facts show that
the delay is attributable to several postponements of trial at the instance of the complainant. (Heirs of Pio Tejada v.
Hay, in substitution of Myrna L. Hay, G.R. No. 250542, October 10, 2022)

9. Teresita Salinas obtained a favorable decision from the RTC Manila regarding a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, dated May 13, 2015. Republic of the Philippines’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on July 27, 2015, received by the Republic on August 4, 2015. Republic had until August 19, 2015,
to file an appeal. However, the RTC received a Notice of Appeal via registered email, postmarked with the
date "October 5, 2015," thus deeming it late. Republic contends the Notice of Appeal was timely,
supported by a photocopy of the OSG Inner Registered Sack Bill dated August 18, 2015, and a
Certification dated January 6, 2016, from the Postmaster of the Ermita Post Office, affirming that
registered letters with numbers 3495 and 3496 from the OSG were posted on August 18, 2015. Was the
Notice of Appeal filed timely?
No. Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules provides for the manner of filing - either through personal filing or registered
mail. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, and other court submissions, and
payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of
the case. The pleading's filing date can be proved either by: (1) the post stamp on the envelope, which is
considered part of the records; or (2) the registry receipt. Thus, the photocopy of the OSG Inner Registered Sack
Bill cannot be equated to a registry receipt nor given probative value as it was not issued or signed by the
postmaster or any authorized receiving personnel of the concerned post office; hence, unverified to be authentic.
Even if the authenticity of the OSG Inner Sack Bill is admitted, it cannot be a sufficient basis to conclude that the
mail matter pertaining to the Notice of Appeal listed on it was actually dispatched and received by the Ermita Post
Office on August 18, 2015. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Teresita Salinas, G.R. No. 238308. October 12, 2022).
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10. Antonio and Remedios formed Metro Isuzu Corporation (MIC) and secured loans from Westmont Bank
through signed promissory notes. Remedios later filed a complaint alleging forgery of her signatures on
loan documents, seeking to nullify the Real Estate Mortgage (REM) and amendment. At the trial,
Westmont Bank presented witnesses and documentary evidence, and during rebuttal, Remedios
identified checks and receipts as proof of her genuine signature. She also resubmitted the previously
expunged NBI QDR and PNP Crime Laboratory Report as part of her rebuttal evidence, which the trial
court admitted despite objections from Westmont Bank. Is the admission in evidence of the BPI checks
showing Remedios' sample signatures, and the various promissory notes containing her forged
signatures during the rebuttal stage proper?
No. The admission in evidence of the BPI checks and various promissory notes during the rebuttal stage is not
justified. Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides that the parties may respectively adduce rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce
evidence upon their original case. Thus, a plaintiff is bound to introduce all evidence that supports his case during
the presentation of his evidence in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of
rebuttal. The circumstances in which additional evidence may be allowed at the rebuttal stage are: a) when it is
newly discovered; b) where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake; or c) where the purpose of the
evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. Here, Remedios failed to justify the presentation of the
promissory notes and the BPI checks containing her forged and genuine signatures as rebuttal evidence. These
documents constitute direct proof of forgery, which is the main issue of the case, hence, these should have been
presented as evidence in chief. It was an error on the part of the trial court to allow these evidence on rebuttal.
(Strong Fort Warehousing Corporation vs. Banta, G.R. Nos. 222369 and 222502, November 16, 2020)

11. What is the doctrine of immutability of judgments?

Under the doctrine, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment
becomes final. No other action can be taken on the decision except to order its execution. The decision becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. (U R Employed International Corporation et al vs. Pinmiliw et al.,, G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)

12. What are the exceptions of immutability of judgments?

The principle of immutability of judgment admits several exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The Court
has further allowed the relaxation of the rule on finality of judgments in order to serve substantial justice, taking
into account: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Estrella et al vs. COA, G.R. No. 252079,
September 14, 2021)

13. LCL Capital, Inc. obtained a loan from Bank of Philippine Islands secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
its two condominium units. Due to LCL’s failure to pay, BPI applied for extrajudicial foreclosure. LCL filed
an action against BPI for the annulment of the certificates of title alleging that the consolidation of
ownership is premature having been made before the lapse of the redemption period. The RTC, in its
November 14, 2008 decision, declared the consolidation void and directed the Register of Deeds of Pasig
City to reinstate the certificates of title of LCL subject to the exercise of its right of redemption, but did
not mention the actual amount of the redemption price. CA considered the RTC Decision is already final
and executory. Later, LCL asked the RTC to determine the cost of redemption. The RTC ruled the total
amount due with legal interest of 6%. BPI sought reconsideration then elevated the case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari. Did the recomputation of the redemption price violate the doctrine of
immutability of judgment in light of the November 14, 2008 decision of the RTC?
No. It is undisputed that the RTC Decision dated November 14, 2008 declaring void the consolidation of the
condominium certificates of title in BPI's name and directing the Register of Deeds of Pasig City to reinstate the
certificates of title of LCL subject to the exercise of its right of redemption, already lapsed into finality. The
recomputation of the redemption price will not violate the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment. The RTC
Decision dated November 14, 2008, did not mention the actual amount of the redemption price. The CA and the
 6

RTC have conflicting findings as to the applicable interest rate. Thus, there is no final determination yet on the
correct computation of the redemption price. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. LCL Capital, Inc., G.R. No. 243396, September 14,
2021)

14. Differentiate question of law from question of fact.

Question of Law Question of Fact
Arises when there is doubt as to the applicable law and jurisprudence on a certain set of Exists when there is
facts. It must not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence.Thus, controversy as to the truth or
when the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the falsity of the alleged facts.
evidence, it is a question of law.
(Sugar Regulatory Administration vs. Central Azucarera de Bais, G.R. No. 253821, March 6, 2023)

15. What are the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Court?
The first mode is through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 where the decision
assailed was rendered in the exercise of the RTC's original jurisdiction. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The second mode is through a petition for review before the CA
under Rule 42 where the decision assailed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In
petitions for review, questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The third mode is
through an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be
raised. (Sugar Regulatory Administration vs. Central Azucarera de Bais, G.R. No. 253821, March 6, 2023)xxx

16. May the Supreme Court review the factual findings made by NLRC?
Yes, but it is only when the factual findings of the NLRC and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will
review the records to determine which finding should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary
facts. Where the CA affirms the findings of the labor agencies and there is no showing whatsoever that said
findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by those findings. (U R Employed International Corporation et al vs.
Pinmiliw, et al., G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)

17. Is a motion for reconsideration required when filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45?
No. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration for this Court to take
cognizance of appeals through petitions for review on certiorari. The use of the word "or" in Section 2 indicates an
alternative or choice, as opposed to being mandatory. Verily, the petitioner has an option to file a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or directly file an appeal or a petition for
review to the appellate court without filing a motion for reconsideration. (Zonio v. 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency, G.R.
No. 224944, May 5, 2021)

18. After a robbery incident, the Adjudication and Settlement Board found Estelita's estate liable to pay
P1,300,000.00 payroll money. Estelita elevated the case to the COA through a petition for review but COA
denied Estelita's petition on April 13, 2015. Estelita sought reconsideration, however, on June 6, 2016,
COA denied the motion for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. Estrelita averred that she received
the decision on August 18, 2016. Hence, on September 19, 2016, she filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Was the petition for certiorari timely filed?
No. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari
within 30 days from notice of the COA's judgment. The reglementary period includes the time taken to file the
motion for reconsideration, and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party may
file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of judgment. The aggrieved party is not granted a
fresh period of 30 days. In this case, Estelita's Petition for Certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Estelita sought for a reconsideration before the COA, which would no longer entitle her to the full 30-day period to
file a petition for certiorari unless such motion was filed on the same day that she received the decision denying
her appeal, which did not happen in this case. To be sure, COA denied Estelita's motion for reconsideration
because it was belatedly filed and has no merit. (Estelita A. Angeles v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 228795, December 01,
2020)

19. Is the BIR’s Litigation Division the proper party to represent the CIR in a motion for extension of time to
file a petition with the Supreme Court?
No. The Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to represent the Republic in appeals before the Court.
Based on jurisprudence and from the historical and statutory perspectives, the Solicitor General is the “principal
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law officer and legal defender of the government.” From the foregoing, the Office of the Solicitor General is the
proper party to represent the interests of the government through the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. East Asia Utilities Corporation, G.R. No. 225266, November 16, 2020)

20. On December 29, 1998, Warren sold a parcel of land on installment basis to Spouses Ricardo and Ligaya
Ang. Spouses Ang refused to settle the balance of the purchase price despite repeated demands. Warren
filed an action for unlawful detainer against the spouses before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Spouses Ang
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. MeTC ruled in favor of
Warren and ordered Spouses Ang to vacate the lot as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. Ligaya
appealed to the CA through a motion for extension of time to file a Petition for Review under Rule 42. CA
denied the motion for non-payment of docket fees. Does the non-payment of docket fees warrant the
dismissal of the appeal?
Yes. The grant of any extension for the filing of a Petition for Review under Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to
the condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementary
period. Indeed, the full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory and necessary to perfect
the appeal. Corollarily, the non-payment of docket lees is a ground to dismiss the appeal. It is only when
persuasive reasons exist that the rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. In this case, Ligaya is under no threat of suffering an injustice
if her prayer is not granted and it will be unfair if the Court would reinstate Ligaya's appeal as this would mean
further waiting on the part of the private respondent who has long been deprived of the right to possess the
property he owns. (Ang vs.Court of Appeals et al, G.R. No. 238203, September 03, 2020)

21. Leonila Octaviano, the registered owner of a land, filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses
Cordero before the MCTC who ordered Spouses Cordero to vacate the premises. Spouses Cordero
appealed to the RTC which affirmed the findings of the MTC on December 7, 2016. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied on June 22, 2017. Spouses Cordero filed with CA a petition for
review stating that they received the June 22, 2017 RTC Order denying their motion for reconsideration
but without mentioning when the December 7, 2016 RTC decision was received. CA dismissed the
petition. Is the failure to state the material dates in the petition fatal?
No. The rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates is to determine whether the petition is
timely filed. Accordingly, the petition must show when notice of the assailed judgment or order or resolution was
received; when the motion for reconsideration was filed; and, when notice of its denial was received. However, the
Supreme Court may relax strict observance of the rules to advance substantial justice. In this case, the Spouses
Cordero clearly stated in the petition for review before the CA the date they received the June 22, 2017 RTC
Order denying their motion for reconsideration. Thus, the petition is timely filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. As such, the Spouses Cordero are deemed to have substantially complied with the rules. The failure to
indicate the date when they received the other orders and resolutions may be dispensed with in the interest of
justice. (Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020)

22. In their petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Spouses Cordero only attached copies of the
judgments and orders of the trial courts. CA dismissed Spouses Cordero's petition because the Spouses
Cordero failed to append to the petition a legible duplicate original or true copy of the assailed decision,
as well as other pertinent portions of the records necessary for a thorough evaluation of the case. Was
the dismissal of CA proper?
No. Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies of the judgments and orders of the trial
courts. These attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon the assigned errors and to resolve
the appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records since the assailed decisions of the trial
courts substantially summarized the contents of the omitted records. Likewise, the CA can resolve the issues by
relying on the principle that the factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight. It can also direct
Spouses Cordero to submit additional documents or the clerk of court of the RTC and MCTC to elevate the
original records of the case. Thus, the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. (Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020)

23. Is denial of due process of law a ground for annulment of judgment under Rule 47?
Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for annulment
 8

of judgment are: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes a third ground –
denial of due process of law. Thus, a decision which is patently void may be set aside on grounds of want of
jurisdiction or non­compliance with due process of law, where mere inspection of assailed judgment is enough to
demonstrate its nullity. (Charnnel Shane Thomas v. Rachel Trono, G.R. No. 241032, March 15, 2021)

24. The Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment ordering Traders Royal Bank to pay actual damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees to Radio Philippines Network (RPN), Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation (IBC), and Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The judgment became final and
executory. Thereafter, the RTC granted the motions of RPN, IBC, and BBC for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Meantime, Traders Royal and Bank of Commerce entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement
while the case was pending. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the agreement on the condition
that the parties must set up a P50,000,000.00 escrow fund to be kept for fifteen (15) years. Accordingly,
Traders Royal deposited the required amount with the Metrobank as its escrow agent. The RTC granted
the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on all of Traders Royal's assets, the escrow fund with
Metrobank, and the properties included in the PSA. Did the RTC correctly apply the rules on the order of
execution of judgments for money?
No. Under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the execution of a money judgment requires the
executing officer to first demand from the judgment debtors the immediate payment of the full amount stated in
the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The executing officer shall demand the payment either in cash, certified
bank check or any other mode of payment that is acceptable to the judgment creditor. If the judgment debtors
cannot pay the judgment obligation using these methods, they can opt to choose which among their personal
properties can be levied upon. If the judgment debtors do not exercise this option immediately or when they are
absent or cannot be located, they then waive such right and the executing officer can levy the judgment debtors'
personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment. The executing officer may also levy personal property by garnishment by reaching credits belonging to
the judgment debtors and owing to them from a stranger to the litigation. In this case, the RTC directed the
enforcement of the money judgment against all of Traders Royal's assets, the escrow fund with Metrobank, and
the properties included in the PSA but the execution of a money judgment requires the sheriff to first make a
demand on the judgment debtor Traders Royal for the immediate payment of the judgment obligation in cash,
certified bank check or any other mode of payment that is acceptable to the judgment creditors RPN, IBC, and
BBC. It is only when Traders Royal cannot pay all or part of the obligation may the sheriff resort to the levy of its
properties including the escrow fund with Metrobank. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp, G.R. No. 190517, July 27, 2022)

25. When can the sheriff resort to the levy of the property of the judgment debtor?
It is only when the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the obligation may the sheriff resort to the levy of its
properties. In this circumstance, the executing officer must serve a notice upon the third person which is then
obliged to deliver judgment debtor’s credits to the proper officer issuing the writ. It is through the service of the writ
of garnishment that the trial court acquires jurisdiction to bind the third person or garnishee to compliance with all
its orders and processes. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp, G.R.
No. 190517, July 27, 2022)

26. What is garnishment?

Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor
and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under this rule, the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to
deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having
in his possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, if such
property be delivered or transferred to the clerk, sheriff or other officer of the court in which the action is pending."
(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp, G.R. No. 190517, July 27, 2022)

27. Is the court required to serve summons to the garnishee?

No. The court is not required to serve summons on the garnishee, nor is it necessary to implead the garnishee in
the case in order to hold him liable. All that is necessary for the trial court to lawfully bind the person of the
garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him
of the writ of garnishment. Through service of this writ, the garnishee becomes a "virtual party" to or a "forced
intervenor" in the case, and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with all orders
 9

and processes of the trial court, with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment of the court. (Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp, G.R. No. 190517, July 27, 2022)

28. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a judgment ordering Traders Royal Bank and Security Bank to
pay actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees to Radio Philippines Network (RPN),
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), and Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Traders
Royal and Security Bank appealed to the CA who absolved Security Bank from any liability and held
Traders Royal solely liable. After some time, the CA affirmed and the judgment became final and
executory. Thereafter, the RTC granted the motions of RPN, IBC, and BBC for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Is the issuance of the writ of execution by the RTC correct?
Yes. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final. No
other action can be taken on the decision, except to order its execution. Here, it is undisputed that the RTC's
judgment in the Civil Case declaring Traders Royal liable to pay actual damages and attorney's fees to RPN, IBC
and BBC had attained finality. Corollarily, the RTC is correct in issuing a writ of execution. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp, G.R. No. 190517, July 27, 2022)

29. What must be established for the court to issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: 1)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts
either for a limited period or perpetually; 2) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or 3) That a party, court,
agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (De Lima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 199972, August 15, 2022)

IV. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

30. What is the nature of an action to quiet title?

An action to quiet title or remove clouds over the title is a special civil action specifically governed by Rule 63 of
the Rules on declaratory relief and similar remedies. Distinguished from ordinary civil actions, the subject matter
in special civil actions under Rule 63 is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of documents; and the relief sought is the
declaration of the parties' rights or duties vis-à-vis, the questioned documents. Thus, generally, judgments in
remedies of such nature do not entail any executional process as the only relief to be properly granted is a
declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under an instrument. Two indispensable requisites must concur
for an action for quieting of title to prosper, namely: (1) the plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on their title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022)

31. What are the rules that should be observed with respect to the legal standing of private complainants in
assailing judgments or orders in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals?
(1) The private complainant has the legal personality to appeal the civil liability of the accused or file a petition for
certiorari to preserve his or her interest in the civil aspect of the criminal case. The appeal or petition for certiorari
must allege the specific pecuniary interest of the private offended party. The failure to comply with this
requirement may result in the denial or dismissal of the remedy. The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file
comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice if it appears that the resolution of the
private complainant's appeal or petition for certiorari will necessarily affect the criminal aspect of the case or the
right to prosecute. The comment of the OSG must state whether it conforms or concurs with the remedy of the
private offended party. The judgment or order of the reviewing court granting the private complainant's relief may
be set aside if rendered without affording the People, through the OSG, the opportunity to file a comment.
(2) The private complainant has no legal personality to appeal or file a petition for certiorari to question the
judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the
OSG's conformity. The private complainant must request the OSG's conformity within the reglementary period to
 10

appeal or file a petition for certiorari. The private complainant must attach the original copy of the OSG's
conformity as proof in case the request is granted within the reglementary period. Otherwise, the private
complainant must allege in the appeal or petition for certiorari the fact of pendency of the request. If the OSG
denied the request for conformity, the Court shall dismiss the appeal or petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality of the private complainant.
(3) The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from notice on the private complainant's petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused, the
dismissal of the criminal case, and the interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion or denial of due process. (Mamerto Austria v. AAA and BBB, G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022)

32. In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Renato against Puregold, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in
Renato's favor. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case due to LA’s failure
to acquire jurisdiction over Puregold for improper service of summons. Despite denial of Renato’s Motion
for Reconsideration on October 28, 2016 which resolution was received by his counsel on December 29,
2016 and Renato himself on February 12, 2017, Renato filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). Puregold claimed that Renato filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Renato argued
that the reglementary period should be reckoned on February 12, 2017 when he received the assailed
resolution. Is Puregold’s contention meritorious?
Yes. Petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. There can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari save in exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons.
Contrary to Renato’s contention, the reglementary period to avail the remedy of certiorari must be reckoned on
December 29, 2016 or the date his counsel received the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
and not on February 12, 2017 when he received the assailed resolution. When a party is represented by counsel
of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Notice to the client or to any other
lawyer other than the counsel of record, is not notice in law. Moreover, while decisions, resolutions, or orders are
served on both parties and their counsel/representative, for purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from
receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel representative of record. Thus, Renato had 60
days counted from the date his counsel received the NLRC resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, or
until February 27, 2017, within which to avail of a petition for certiorari. (Puregold Price Club, Inc v. Court of Appeals and
Renato M. Cruz, G.R. No. 244374, February 15, 2022)

33. What is grave abuse of discretion?

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. (Hon. Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252007, December 07, 2021; Macasil vs.
FAIO et al., G.R. No. 226898, May 11, 2021)

34. Gloria died testate and named Salvio as executor. Salvio then filed a petition for the probate of the will
and the issuance of letters testamentary to himself. Norma, the legitimate child of Gloria, filed an
opposition. The lower court initially ruled in favor of Salvio due to Norma’s American citizenship. For the
failure of Salvio to comply with his duties, the lower court finds that Norma is the most suitable person to
replace Salvio. Salvio moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied. Norma then filed an omnibus motion
against Salvio and Diana (who claimed to be a legitimate child), to revoke the letters of special
administration issued to Salvio for Gloria's estate, to issue new letters of special administration to her.
Does Diana have legal standing to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order?
Yes. Diana may be considered a person aggrieved, permitted to initiate the special civil action for certiorari
against the assailed RTC Orders. A person aggrieved refers to one who was a party in the proceedings before the
lower court. To have the legal standing to avail of the remedy of certiorari, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the assailed
act. She is an heir of the decedent and has a material interest to the administration of their estate. Thus, it cannot
be denied that she would suffer or sustain direct injury in the event the estate is dissipated. (In the Matter of the Petition
to Approve the Will of Gloria Novelo Vda. De Cea, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)
 11

35. When can a petition for mandamus be availed?

Mandamus is a command requiring the performance of a specific duty resulting from the party's official station to
whom the writ is directed or from the operation of law. It is available when a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office. The remedy
lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot direct the exercise of judgment unless there is grave
abuse of discretion. The following requirements must be present to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
to wit: (1) the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act demanded; (2) it is the duty of the
respondent to perform the act because it is required by law; (3) the respondent unlawfully neglects the duty
enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of the right or office; (4) the act to
be performed is ministerial; and (5) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(AES Watch et. al v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246332, December 9, 2020)

36. What must be alleged in a complaint for unlawful detainer?

A complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove (1) initially, the possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4)
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. (Galacgac v. Bautista, G.R. No. 221384, November 09, 2020)

V. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

37. Do the rules in the selection or removal of regular administrators apply to special administrators?
No. A special administrator is a representative of the decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve the estate until the appointment of the executor or administrator. He is considered an officer of the court
who is in charge of the estate, and thus, he is subject to the probate court's supervision and control and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, particularly towards its smooth administration and
earliest settlement. The appointment of a special administrator is warranted when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.
In appointing a special administrator, the probate court is not limited to the grounds for incompetence laid down in
Rule 78, Section 1 and the order of preference provided in Rule 78, Section 6 pertinent to regular administrators.
The appointment of a special administrator rests on the sound discretion of the probate court. This discretion must
be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. (In the Matter of the Petition to
Approve the Will of Gloria Novelo Vda. De Cea, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)

38. Is Filipino citizenship a requirement to be appointed as a special administrator?

No. Foreign citizenship is not an obstacle for the appointment as a special administrator of a decedent’s estate.
The Rules of Court does not mention foreign citizenship as a ground for incompetence to be an administrator.
WRule 78, Section 1, which may be applied to special administrators, requires residency in the Philippines, not
Filipino citizenship. (In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Gloria Novelo Vda. De Cea, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)

39. Merly Maligaya filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court before the RTC. In her petition, Merly prayed to change her first name from “MERLE” to
“MERLY.” As supporting evidence, Merly presented the original and certified original copies of her SSS
Member’s Data E-4 Form, Voter’s Registration Record, Voter’s Certification, Voter’s Identification Card,
Police Clearance and NBI Clearance. After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC
ordered the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After trial, RTC granted the petition to reflect Merly’s accurate personal
circumstances and to avoid confusion on her public and private documents. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) moved for a reconsideration and argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to rectify the
error in Merly’s first name because the mistake is clerical that must be corrected through administrative
proceedings under RA No. 9048, as amended by RA No. 10172. Is the contention of the OSG correct?
Yes. RA No. 9048 amended Rule 108 and authorized the local civil registrars, or the Consul General, as the case
may be, to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
 12

nickname, without need of a judicial order. The law provided an administrative recourse for the correction of
clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving substantial corrections to Rule 108. The correction of Merly’s
first name from “MERLE” to “MERLY” refers to a clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous
spelling through the substitution of the second letter “E” in “MERLE” with the letter “Y,” so it will read as “MERLY.”
The correction will neither affect nor prejudice any substantial rights. The innocuous errors in Merly’s first name
may be corrected or changed under RA No. 9048 by referring to related documents. (Republic of the Philippines v. Merle
M. Maligaya, G.R. No. 233068, November 9, 2020)

40. Merly Maligaya filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court before the RTC. In her petition, Merly prayed to change her date of birth from “February 15, 1959”
to “November 26, 1958.” As supporting evidence, she presented the original and certified original copies
of her SSS Member’s Data E-4 Form, Voter’s Registration Record, Voter’s Certification, Voter’s
Identification Card, Police Clearance and NBI Clearance. After finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC ordered the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation once a
week for three consecutive weeks. After trial, RTC granted the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) moved for a reconsideration and argued that for the petition for the change of date of birth, Merly
properly filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, but she failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 3, Rule 108 to implead all persons who have a claim or any interest in the
proceedings, therefore RTC has no jurisdiction. Is the contention of the OSG correct?
Yes. The correction of Merly’s date of birth is substantial because changing the month, day and year from
“February 15, 1959” to “November 26, 1958” will alter her age. The age of a person is a matter of public concern
and an essential component of one’s status in law. A change in a person’s date of birth, in which an alteration in
her age is a necessary consequence, significantly affects her status with regard to matters, such as marriage and
family relations, obligations and contracts, and the exercise of legal rights. Corollarily, the substantial error in
Merly’s date of birth may be corrected only through the appropriate adversary proceedings. Merly correctly filed a
petition for cancellation and/or correction of the entries before the RTC under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, Merly failed to observe the required procedures under Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Rule 108. Thus, the
failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Rule 108 renders the proceedings void for the correction of
substantial errors on Merly’s date of birth. (Republic of the Philippines v. Merle M. Maligaya, G.R. No. 233068, November 9, 2020)

41. Differentiate substantial from clerical errors in relation to change or correction of an entry in the birth
certificate.
Substantial error refers to that which establishes, or affects the substantive right of the person on whose behalf
the change or correction is being sought. Thus, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, civil status, or citizenship of a person, are substantial in character. On the other hand,
Section 2(3) of RA No. 9048, as amended, defines a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the
date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and
can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Ontucam G.R. No. 232053, July 15, 2020)

42. Annabelle Ontuca y Peleño gave birth to her daughter, Zsanine. After Zsanine was born, Carabeo, a
registered midwife, volunteered herself to register Zsanine's birth with the Parañaque Civil Registrar.
Annabelle thus provided Carabeo with the necessary details. Annabelle saw the erroneous entries in the
certificate. Annabelle filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC. In her petition,
she prayed that the name "Mary Annabelle Peleño Ontuca" be corrected by removing "Mary" and
changing "Paliño" to "Peleño;" and that the date and place of marriage of parents be changed from "May
25, 1999 at Occ. Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED." The RTC granted the petition. The OSG moved for a
reconsideration, arguing that the RTC has no jurisdiction to correct Annabelle's first name and middle
name under Rule 108 because the errors are clerical that can be corrected through administrative
proceedings under Republic Act (RA) No. 9048, as amended. Is the OSG correct?
No. While the correction of Annabelle's middle name from "PALIÑO" to "PELEÑO" and the error in Annabelle's
first name is clerical since they neither affect nor prejudice her substantial rights, the correction of the date and
place of the parent's marriage from "May 25, 1999 at Occ. Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED" is substantial since it will
alter the child's status from legitimate to illegitimate. The correction of entries in the civil register pertaining to
 13

citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage involves substantial alterations, which may
be corrected, and the true facts established, provide the parties aggrieved by the error to avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings. In this case, Annabelle correctly filed a petition for cancellation and/or
correction of the entries before the RTC under Rule 108. Despite this, it will be more prudent and judicious for
Annabelle, and other persons similarly situated, to allow the filing of a single petition under Rule 108, rather than
two separate petitions before the RTC and the local civil registrar. This will avoid multiplicity of suits and further
litigation between the parties, which is offensive to the orderly administration of justice. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Ontucam G.R. No. 232053, July 15, 2020)

VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

43. Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners Ismael and Ajijon for violating Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 or
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Section 3.3.1 of the IRR of RA No. 8291 or Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the
dismissal of the cases by attacking the validity of the Information filed against them. While the the two
Informations against petitioners charged them for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and
treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality's GSIS contributions, they claim that the
information was insufficient as they alleged conspiracy but some conspirators were not impleaded nor
their participation in the alleged conspiracy stated. Petitioners argued that their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the accusations against them was violated. Are the petitioners correct?
No. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the necessary allegations to a criminal information,
namely: (1) the accused's name; (2) the stature's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained
of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the approximate date of the offense's commission;
and (6) the place where the offense was committed. The two Informations against petitioners clearly and
sufficiently stated that they were being charged for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to
ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality's GSIS contributions. The indictment of the purported
conspirators, as well as a statement of their part in the alleged conspiracy, is not necessary to sustain the
sufficiency of the Informations. So long as the criminal information clearly alleges the acts constituting the offense
specifically imputed against the accused for them to properly prepare their defense, the constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusations is not transgressed. (Ismael v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36. February 06,
2023)

44. May a person be held civilly liable despite acquittal for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Yes. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The dismissal of the criminal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. (Matobato, Sr. vs. People, G.R. No. 229265, February 15, 2022)

45. In a case for robbery with homicide, Ronald, the accused,pleaded not guilty and afterwards questioned
the warrantless arrest. Can he still raise the question of the validity of warrantless arrest after he pleaded
not guilty?
No. it is too late for Ronald to question the legality of his warrantless arrest in view of his arraignment and active
participation at the trial. Neither did he move to quash the information, hence, any supposed defect in his arrest
was deemed waived. It is settled that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. Any objection must be made before the accused enters his plea. Otherwise, the defect is
deemed cured. (People v. Laguda, G.R. No. 244843, October 07, 2020)

46. Jasper was charged with illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs after a buy-bust operation.
During the trial the prosecution presented PO2 Jose, the police officer who conducted surveillance and
buy-bust operation. He merely testified that after securing a search warrant, the police officer gave a
marked money to the poseur-buyer who transacted with Jasper at the gate of the latter's house. The
police officers were observing the transaction. The buy-bust operation was successful so they served
him a search warrant which led them to search Jasper's room in the presence of Barangay Captain.
Recovered were the marked money drug paraphernalia, and white crystalline substance found on a table
and on top of a cabinet inside Jasper's room. Is the search valid?
 14

No. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that "no search of a house, room or any
other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." Only in
the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family can the search be
observed by two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. After the buy-bust
operation, the police officers handcuffed Jasper, and was served a search warrant. Thereafter, the police officers
searched his room in the presence of the barangay captain. There is no evidence on record showing that Jasper
was brought to his room to observe the search of the premises. The police officers do not have the discretion to
substitute their choice of witness, the barangay captain in this case, for those witnesses prescribed by the rules.
(Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 232611, September 3, 2020)

47. Police Officer 2 Jerome Garcia received information about a person, known as "Kacho," who was
allegedly carrying shabu. An entrapment team was formed, and Kacho was apprehended on a jeepney.
Officer Garcia intercepted Kacho attempting to dispose of a small object wrapped in electrical tape, which
was later confirmed to contain shabu. Kacho, identified as Quiap, was arrested and convicted of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Was there a valid warrantless arrest and seizure?
Yes. The circumstances of this case are akin to a "stop and frisk" situation. Here, Quiap’s unusual and suspicious
conduct, and the fact that the police officers were on an intelligence mission to verify the report of illegal drug
activity, created a sufficient probable cause where search and seizure may be effected without first making an
arrest. Differently stated, the apprehending team had a reasonable suspicion, based on the police officers'
experience and the surrounding conditions, that the person to be held had contraband concealed about him. This
suspicion was fortified when Quiap attempted to throw out of the window an object wrapped with electrical tape
after PO2 Garcia boarded the jeepney. (Quiap v. People, G.R. No. 229183, February 17, 2021)

48. When is bail a matter of discretion insofar as the imposable penalty is concerned?
Under the Rules of Court, upon the accused's conviction by the Regional Trial Court of a non-capital offense,
admission to bail is discretionary. However, when the penalty imposed on the accused exceeds six years, and any
of the bail-negating circumstances exists, the accused's application for bail must be denied or cancelled. If an
accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on
the part of the court. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. (People vs. Revillar, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

49. Napoles was convicted of Plunder on December 7, 2018. She filed a Motion before the Supreme Court
alleging that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying
COVID-19 health condition. She contends that she is entitled to be provisionally released on humanitarian
grounds. Is the allegation of Janet Napoles citing humanitarian grounds meritorious to grant her prayer of
provisional release?
No. Napoles' allegation is a question of fact which is not within the province of the Supreme Court to determine.
Neither can the Court take judicial notice of her medical condition. However, even assuming that she is indeed
suffering from diabetes, that, in itself, is not sufficient to grant her provisional liberty, post-conviction. Unless there
is clear showing that Napoles is actually suffering from a medical condition that requires immediate and
specialized attention outside of their current confinement — as, for instance, an actual and proven exposure to or
infection with the novel coronavirus — she must remain in custody and isolation incidental to the crimes with
which they were charged, or for which they are being tried or serving sentence. Only then can there be an actual
controversy and a proper invocation of humanitarian and equity considerations that is ripe for this Court to
determine. (People vs. Revillar, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

50. When is recognizance available as an alternative form of bail?

RA No. 10389 or the Recognizance Act of 2012 provides that recognizance is available to those who are entitled
to bail, but are unable to post bail due to abject poverty. However, it does not apply to those charged with
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong. (People vs.
Revillar, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

51. Mangali was charged with robbery committed against JCLV Realty before the RTC. Allegedly, Mangali
removed JCLV Realty's electric facilities with intent to gain and intimidation against persons. After the
 15

prosecution rested its case, Mangali filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to
establish intent to gain and that the metering instruments belonged to JCLV Realty. RTC granted the
demurrer and dismissed the criminal case for lack of evidence that Mangali perpetrated the robbery.
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, JCLV Realty elevated the case to the CA through a special civil action
for certiorari. Has double jeopardy set in?
Yes. Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint
or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted, or the case is
dismissed without his/her consent. In this case, all the elements are present. A valid Information for the crime of
robbery was filed against Mangali before the RTC. Also, Mangali had pleaded not guilty to the charge, and after
the prosecution rested, the criminal case was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence. (JCLV Realty & Dev’t. Corp. v.
Mangali, G.R. No. 236618, August 27, 2020)

52. Mercado, a fuel retailer, delivered fuel to Byron Express Bus Company. The fuel was received by the
company’s clerk, Juson, under a trust receipt. Juson failed to remit the proceeds, prompting Mercado to
file estafa charges against both Juson and Cacdac, the alleged owner of Byron Express. The prosecution
presented evidence including the Trust Receipt Agreement, demand letter, and sworn statements.
However, Cacdac moved for a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, arguing he was not party to
the trust receipt, the transaction was a sale, and the demand letter was addressed solely to Juson. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the criminal charge against Cacdac but affirmed his civil liability to
pay the amount with interest. Did the trial court violate Cacdac’s right to due process when it held him
civilly liable?
No. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is governed by Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. Here, Cacdac filed a demurrer to evidence, which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the
case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Cacdac was not deprived
of due process when the trial court rendered judgment on his civil liability. He is deemed to have waived the right
to present evidence when he filed a demurrer without leave of court. (Cacdac v. Mercado, G.R. No. 242731, June 14, 2021)

53. Ramos was charged with administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Documents for having declared in her Personal Data Sheet that she took the Career Service
Sub-Professional Eligibility (CSSPE) examination. However, the records did not show that a career
service examination was conducted on that date and that Ramos was included in the Register of
Eligibles. In her Answer, Ramos alleged that there is another PDS with correct entries. Ramos was found
guilty by CSC. Ramos sought reconsideration, explaining that entries in the March 28, 2005 PDS relating
to her eligibility status were made inadvertently. She reiterated that she accomplished another PDS to
correct these erroneous entries, yet, the substitute PDS was not found in her 201 files brought by the
HRMO of Municipality of Baganga during the hearing. Ramos was subsequently issued the substitute
PDS and she filed a motion to admit the same as newly discovered evidence. Is the substitute PDS
admissible as a newly discovered evidence?
Yes. Newly-discovered evidence may be admissible in evidence if the following requisites are present: (1) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (4) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. It
is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or
during the trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. Here, the substitute PDS meets the criteria for newly discovered
evidence. As early as in her Answer to the formal charge, Ramos already raised the existence of the substitute
PDS claiming that she submitted a new PDS to replace the March 28, 2005 PDS. Unfortunately, the substitute
PDS could not be found in the records of the HRMO of the Municipality of Baganga. It was only after Ramos
reiterated in her Motion for Reconsideration the existence of the substitute PDS that she was provided by the
HRMO with a copy of the substitute PDS. (Ramos v. Rosell et al., G.R. No. 241363, September 16, 2020)

54. Can a complainant question the Order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case without
discussing the accused's civil liability in its petition filed before the Court of Appeals?
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No. In any criminal case or proceeding, only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State before the Supreme Court and the CA. The rationale behind this rule
is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private
complainant. The interest of the private offended party is restricted only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of
the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal on the criminal aspect may be undertaken
only by the State through the OSG. The private offended party may not take such appeal, but may only do so as
to the civil aspect of the case. Differently stated, the private offended party may file an appeal without the
intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Also, the complainant
may file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of
preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case. (JCLV Realty & Dev’t. Corp. v. Mangali, G.R. No. 236618, August 27, 2020)

VII. EVIDENCE

55. AAA, a 12-year old girl went missing after her parents instructed her and siblings to collect the payment
of rice cakes from their neighbor, Milo. Her lifeless body was found the following day underneath Milo's
wooden bed. She was lying flat on her back with a cloth wrapped around her mouth and nose, and with
both hands tied and twisted at her back. The Autopsy report found that AAA died due to asphyxia by
suffocation. The medical examination also revealed that AAA sustained hymenal lacerations due to the
insertion of a blunt object like a human penis or any hard item and suffered multiple injuries and
abrasions on different parts of her body. Accordingly, Milo was charged with the complex crime of rape
with homicide. The RTC found adequate circumstantial evidence that Milo was guilty of the crime. Can
Milo be convicted based only on Circumstantial Evidence?
Yes. The Rules of Court allows resort to circumstantial evidence provided the following conditions are satisfied :
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, compatible with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and in conflict with the notion that he is innocent. In this case, the corpus of
circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of events pointing to Milo's guilt. AAA went to Milo's house
and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body the following day in the same place. The medical
examination revealed that AAA sustained hymenal lacerations. The most incriminating evidence against Milo is
when AAA’s body was found underneath his bed. These proven facts, when weaved together, lead to no other
conclusion but of Milo's culpability for the crime. (People vs. Leocadio, G.R. No. 227396, February 22, 2023)

56. In determining the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-court identification, what are the factors that a
court has to look into considering the totality of circumstances?
In determining the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-court identification, the Court must look at the totality of
the circumstances and consider the following factors, namely: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional requirements of due process in regard to
out-of-court identification, and prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification. (People v. Campos,
G.R. No. 252212, July 14, 2021)

VIII. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES

57. Napoleon engaged Atty. Capela for legal services in a civil case regarding breach of contract and
damages. The retainer agreement included provision of Napoleon's Toyota Corolla GLI model, official
receipt, and certificate of registration as an acceptance fee. Although Atty. Capela filed an appearance
and answer before the RTC, the draft retainer agreement remained unsigned. Atty. Capela's absence
during the preliminary conference and subsequent hearings led to Napoleon agreeing to a Compromise
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Agreement approved by RTC, without legal representation. Atty. Capela later denied being engaged as
counsel, citing lack of a signed retainer agreement and absence of compensation in the form of a motor
vehicle. Are the contentions of Atty. Capela tenable?
No. A written contract or retainer agreement is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; a
contract may be express or implied. To establish a lawyer-client relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession, as in this case.
Neither does the claim that no payment was received defeat the existence of the relationship. It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for, to constitute professional employment. (Quitazol
v. Atty. Capela, A.C. No. 12072, December 9, 2020)

58. What are the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest?
The three tests developed by jurisprudence to determine the existence of conflict of interest are: first, whether a
lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue, or claim on behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client; second, whether acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client, or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty; and third, whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
(Pilar v. Atty. Ballicud, A.C. No. 12792, November 16, 2020)

59. KWP is a corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). KWP engaged the
services of Atty. Ballicud to draft legal documents, such as policy on retirement benefits, voluntary
resignation, and shareholder's agreement, from 2010 to 2013. Allegedly, KWP had previously lost several
project bids to Engel Anlagen Technik Phils., Inc. (EAT) that resulted in the loss of clients and business
opportunities on their part. KWP found out that EAT was registered with the SEC on March 27, 2013, with
Atty. Ballicud as its President and one of the incorporators. The other incorporators are the nephews of
KWP's former President who resigned in 2014. KWP’s Vice President AND KWP filed a disbarment
complaint against Atty. Ballicud due to conflict of interests. Atty. Ballicud contends that he never handled
a case for, or against KWP and that he has no knowledge of any confidential information relating to
KWP's business operations. Are his contentions valid?
No. Actual case or controversy is not required for the proscription against representation of conflicting interests to
apply. The important criterion is the probability, and not the certainty, of conflict. The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter however slight the adverse interest may be, even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer's
private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In this case, Atty. Ballicud
caused the registration of EAT with the SEC on March 27, 2013. He occupied the highest position as EAT's
President. Atty. Ballicud's new relation with EAT would prevent the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to KWP and would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of his duty.
(Pilar v. Atty. Ballicud, A.C. No. 12792, November 16, 2020)

60. What is the nature of a disbarment proceeding?

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis; neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. (Capinpin v. Atty. Espiritu, A.C. No. 12537, September 03, 2020)

61. What is the effect of acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal case on a pending disbarment case involving the
same act?
A disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer. The two cases may
proceed independently of each other. A conviction in the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of
liability in the administrative case.In the same way, the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused does not
automatically exculpate the respondent from administrative liability. The quantum of evidence is different. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. In an administrative case against a lawyer,
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preponderant evidence is necessary which means that the evidence adduced by one side is superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. More importantly, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The
lawyer's presumption of innocence subsists absent contrary evidence. (Tiongson vs. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 12424,
September 1, 2020)

62. Atty. Ramon was found to have appeared as a private prosecutor in a criminal case despite being
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years. RTC recorded her appearance despite her
suspension. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ramon by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Despite due notice, Atty. Ramon did not respond to the complaint. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline found Atty. Ramon guilty of unauthorized practice of law, which warranted the penalty
of disbarment. However, in a previous case, it was found that Atty. Ramon was involved in a scheme to
sell fake Court of Appeals Decisions where she was disbarred and the Court removed Atty. Ramon's
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Can the Court impose an additional suspension involving Atty. Ramon’s
unauthorized practice of law considering that she is already disbarred?
No. Case law consistently provides an additional suspension of six months on instances involving unauthorized
practice of law despite the previous order of suspension. However, since Atty. Ramon had already been
disbarred, the additional penalty can no longer be imposed upon her. There is no double or multiple disbarment in
our laws or jurisprudence. Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his
privilege to practice law. Nevertheless, the Court may impose a fine upon a disbarred lawyer who committed an
offense prior to disbarment. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over other offenses of a disbarred
lawyer committed while he was still a member of the legal profession. (In Re: Order dated October 27, 2016 issued by
branch 137, RTC Makati v. Atty. Ramon, A.C. No. 12456, September 08, 2020)

63. Differentiate gross neglect from simple neglect of duty?

Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or frequency of instances, becomes so serious
in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. It also refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own
property." Simple neglect of duty means the "failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task
expected of him or her, signifying a 'disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference." (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Ferraris, A.M. No. MTJ-21-001 [FORMERLY A.M. No. 20-12-45-MTCC], December 06, 2022)

64. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit owing to the compulsory
retirement of Judge Ferraris, Jr. The OCA discovered delays in the following: rendition of judgment,
resolution of pending incidents and motions, appropriate actions in the implementation of writs of
execution, release of orders requiring the submission of counter-affidavits in criminal cases, and
submission of returns and periodic reports in the implementation of writs of execution. OCA
recommended imposing administrative liability against Judge Ferraris, Jr. Is Judge Ferraris
administratively liable?
Yes. Delay undermines the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is
anticipated and expected. It also reinforces the litigants' impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.
Thus, a judge is administratively liable if he commits unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Notably, the
litigants deserve their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases. The corollary to
this right is the duty mandated by Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for judges to "dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Rule 3.07 and Rule 3.08 require a judge to
"maintain professional competence in court management" and "supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business." The New Code of Judicial Conduct reiterates the judges' obligations to
"perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness." (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ferraris, A.M. No. MTJ-21-001 [FORMERLY A.M. No. 20-12-45-MTCC],
December 06, 2022)