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Harriss ComparingPoliticalRegimes 1999
Harriss ComparingPoliticalRegimes 1999
Harriss ComparingPoliticalRegimes 1999
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
This article makes a strong case for differentiating the political systems of different states in India on
the basis of the balance of caste/class power and the nature of party organisation within those states. Such
differences can then be shown to influence the policy formulation and performances of these states, especially
with regard to decentralisation of power to lower caste/class groups and alleviation of poverty.
IT has been suggested - for example, by context. Others have disagreed. V S Vyas Approaching the ideal of democracy,
Atul Kohli (1987) - that India constitutes and P Bhargava, for example, summing therefore, depends upon the differentiation
a 'laboratory' for comparative political up the findings of comparative studies of of the realm of politics from overall systems
analysis. The fact that the country has a public intervention and rural poverty of inequality in a society - so that collective
number of states with quite diverse politics, alleviation in nine states, say emphatically decisions are not made by particular
but within the framework of Indian that "success in poverty alleviation efforts individuals or groups of people because
federalism, creates conditions for 'con- was not significantly affected ... [at least] of the power derived from their economic
trolled experiments'. But these apparent by the professed political ideology of the or social status [Rueschmayer et al 1992:
opportunities have not been taken up very ruling parties in the different states" (1995: 41ff]. In practice democratic forms of
much. There are important bodies of work 2572). The debate which is inherent in government, involving the accountability
by individual scholars on the politics of these different statements is more signi- of the executive to an assembly of repre-
particular states - one thinks of the ficant than it once was because of the sentatives elected through free, open
sustained research by Zoya Hasan and increased salience of state-level politics in elections, in the context of freedom of
Paul Brass on Uttar Pradesh, that of James the context of India's economic reforms. expression and association, can never
Manor on Karnataka, of Jayant Lele and The greater financial autonomy of the states eliminate altogether the significance of
latterly, of Thomas Blom Hansen on which these entail "is likely to combine differences of wealth, power and status in
Maharashtra, and of Ghanshyam Shah on with increased regulatory autonomy ... society. Hence, the Marxists have generally
Gujarat. It is also striking that some states making the state level a more important rejected such representative democracy as
have not been the subjects of such con- political arena, and therefore, more in need a sham, concealing the exercise of power
sistent research. And exercises in com- of study" [Jenkins 1996: 198]. The effort by the dominant class. The view expressed
parative politics have been rather thin on of developing a comparative analysis of by Rueschmayer and his co-authors is that
the ground. Efforts were made in collabo- state politics seems worthwhile, therefore. the ideal of democracy is approached more
rative exercises on the politics of various or less closely according to the balance of
DEFINING REGIME DIFFERENCES
states orchestrated by Myron Weiner class power in a society, and the nature
(1968), by Iqbal Narain (1967 and 1976) The term 'regime' is used widely but of the state system. The development of
and then by John Wood (1984). The latter quite loosely in political science. It is quite capitalism is, in some ways, actually con-
includes an interesting comparative essay often applied to a particular government, ducive to approaching the democratic ideal
by Roderick Church which is referred to as in 'the Telugu Desam regime in Andhra because it weakens the power of landlords
later in this article. Then Kohli published Pradesh'; but as frequently it is applied and strengthens subordinate classes,
the results of his research on the effec- to such broad distinctions as that between shifting them from the relatively un-
tiveness of different party regimes in democratic and authoritarian forms of rule. favourable environment of peasant agri-
Karnataka (that of the Congress under Clearly, in a discussion of Indian states, culture in which, as Marx argued in The
Devaraj Urs), in UP (the Janata coalition) operating within the framework of federal Eighteenth Brumaire, they are 'like
and in West Bengal (the Left Front), in democracy laid down in the Constitution potatoes in a sack' - divided from each
relation to poverty reduction, in his book of India, the latter distinction does not other, lacking a sense of a collective
The State and Poverty in India (1987). But apply. We may be concerned, however, interest, and given their identity by the
the most ambitious comparative project so with differences in the democratic more self-conscious classes which make
far has been that of Francine Frankel and functioning of different states, and describe up the rest of society. The democratic ideal
M S A Rao, who brought together work these in terms of 'regime types'. is approached more closely, too, if the
by a group of scholars within a framework 'Democracy' is taken to mean: 'govern- state-system (the organisation of the state)
which focused on the problematic of 'the ment by the people; the form of government is relatively autonomous in relation to
decline of dominance' (1989, 1990). The in which sovereign power resides in the society. But there is narrow gap between
exercise which I have undertaken draws people and is exercised either directly by the Scylla, of a state-system dominated by
heavily upon, and aims to extend the work them [participatory democracy] or by particular interests within society, such as
of Frankel and Rao. officers elected by them [representative those of landlords, or of industrial capital,
Kohli concluded from his comparative democracy]'. Clearly, this is a statement or of finance capital, and the Charybdis,
study that differences between the political of an ideal, for it evades the real problems of a state-system which is absolutely
regimes of different states do make a of collective action, which arise from the autonomous and able to exercise dic-
significant difference, specifically to the fact that the goals held by individuals ('the tatorship over society, over-riding the
adoption of pro-poor policies in the Indian people') rarely coincide absolutely. interests and aspirations of 'the people'.
outcomes ... are a function of the regime We also know that in many instances class and banias. They have long dominated
controlling political power. Regime type, relationships are experienced as relations society and politics as landlords in the
in turn - at least in the case of India - between castes [see Harriss 1994]. Some- countryside and as businessmen and
closely reflects the nature of the ruling times potential or actual class political professionals in the city. [Note the
political party. The ideology, organisation mobilisation is cross-cut by caste relations, connection that is made throughout the
and class alliances underlying a party- and vice-versa - and sometimes not. In discussion between caste status and class
dominated regime are then of considerable positions.]
practice we have to study the class/caste
consequence for the redistributive bases of different regimes in order to The 'middle' castes are the principal
performance of that regime (1987: 10) address the critical question of 'the balance farming castes (jats, yadavs and kurmis in
In his book, of course, he goes on to of class power'. the north, for example; Marathas in
Maharashtra, and so on). According to
compare the performance of different Further analysis entails examining
caste tradition they are Sudras, the term
party-dominated regimes in three Indian political organisation, including the
for all those below the twice-born and
states. formation of different types of association
above the untouchables, but they have a
For the purposes of this paper, we may and the ideology, organisation and class
special status and importance because of
seek to distinguish regime differences alliances underlying different party-
their numbers and land. Typically they are
across states at both the structural level dominated regimes/governments. What are
kisans (farmers or [rich]/middle peasants.
and that of 'party-dominated government', the stated objectives of different regimes? [It is usually the case that the locally
searching in the first place for evidence How do they seek to win support, 'dominant castes' - dominant by virtue of
on the nature and extent of political ideologically and organisationally? What their control over land and labour, which
mobilisation and of organisation in both are the alliances on which they depend? are still commonly the basis of local
civil and political society. In the light of What are the relationships between 'local political power - are from these 'middle'
the preceding short discussion of demo- power' and state-level politics? Questions castes].
cratic political systems critical questions concerning leadership and organisational At the bottom of the traditional status
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hierarchy are the 'scheduled' castes, the TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL REGIMES IN DIFFERENT STATES, EARLY 1980S
links between middle and lower castes as significant political participation; and it is thought that the movement led by Bhindranwale, which
brought civil war to the state in the 1980s, appealed to poor Sikhs as well as to educated
fellow members of the 'backward classes' ;5
unemployed youth.
(iii) by emphasising the regional 3 Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, amongst the major states, are not
community (through appeals, forexample, considered here.
to 'We Telugus' or 'We Bengalis'). Such Source: Church (1984).
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structural changes which are necessary for placidity and civility of Rajasthan politics Mohanty argues that "a brahman-karan
the empowerment of poor, exploited and will be rocked by the 'power-drive' of the middle class dominates society and politics
oppressed people. But accommodation can agricultural castes, while bound to arrive, in contemporary Orissa" (1990: 321); and
also be considered positively, as part of is difficult to predict" (1990: 53). It has that "The failure of caste associations or
a gradual process of change which may still not come. Jaffrelot's work on politics opposition parties to pave the way for the
lead to greater equity and inhibit violence, in Madhya Pradesh (1998), similarly, autonomous politicisation of the lower
in a context in which radical change is shows the continuing pre-eminence of castes ... facilitated the continuation of
politically infeasible (this is more or less brahmans, rajputs and banias in both the upper caste control over major political
what the authors of Redistribution With BJP and the Congress in that state, though parties" [Mohanty in Frankel and Rao
Growth argued in the 1970s, of course). it seems that part of the reason for the 1990]. The numerical strength of scheduled
The standard works on the political success of Congress in retaining office in castes and tribes in the population of the
economy of India, those of Pranab Bardhan the state is that the party, under Digvijay state "could not be exploited by the left
(1984) and of Francine Frankel (1978), Singh's leadership, has been successful in parties ... conservative elements could
converge around the view that political incorporating some from the lower castes, manage to receive their [the SCs'/STs']
accommodation has frustrated the projects and members of the scheduled tribes (who political support ... (and) despite their
both of rapid economic growth and of make up one-fifth of the state's population). visible presence in the state and the
human development in India, and Paul This is the context, too, of some progressive legislature they have not emerged as an
Brass, in his survey of Indian politics, measures in education and local self- independent political force" [Misra 1989:
argues that "'accommodative politics' have government in the recent past. Previously 254]. Left-wing parties have never won
failed and cannot succeed in the face of the Congress in MP had a long history of much support outside small pockets. The
growing class antagonisms in the factionalism, and the longest single period most outstanding political leader from
countryside and the increasing dominance in office of any CM, before Digvijay Singh, Orissa has been the late Biju Patnaik, who
of India's 'proprietary classes"' (1990: was that of Arjun Singh (between 1980 maintained a political following in oppo-
246). This last assessment seems to have and 1985). The most significant changes sition to Congress for over two decades,
been falsified by events in the decade of party regime in these two states are widening the social base of electoral
since it was written, but it will be argued those which have taken place in the 1990s. politics and mobilising the rising 'agrarian
here that there are significant differences (2) Orissa: Orissa has features in middle class', as Mohanty describes it,
between states in the extent to which ac- common with these two states. It too was including notably khandayats, numerically
commodative politics still work, and in partially constituted by former princely the largest single caste group, and who
their modalities.7 states, and like MP it has a high proportion should probably be considered as 'middle'
We are now in a position to attempt to of scheduled tribes within its population. caste [in terms of Church's definitions;
extend and develop the framework first The princes of Orissa seem to have been and see Mitra 1982]. Biju Patnaik led the
worked out by Church (see Table 2). less successful in retaining political power, Janata Dal government of Orissa after
A (ii): States where upper caste/class but the right wing parties, initially 1990, before losing office again to
dominance has persisted - (1) MP and Swatantra - to which some of the princes Congress in 1995. The politics of Orissa
Rajasthan: These are both constituted gravitated and which took part in a coalition have had an unusually strong personal
largely by former princely states and in government after 1967 - and later the Jan element, and party contests have been
both some of the former rulers have Sangh/BJP, have long been influential. governed by intra-elite competition.
remained politically powerful. They are
states, too, in which right wing parties - TABLE 2: TYPOLOGY OF INDIAN STATE REGIMES
Swatantra in the 1960s, and the Jan Sangh,
later BJP - have traditional base. The Jan
Category Characteristics States
Sangh shared office in Madhya Pradesh, A(i) States in which upper caste/class dominance-as persisted and Madhya Pradesh
briefly, as early as 1967, establishing a Congress has remained strong in the context of a stable two-party Orissa, Rajasthana
system [ 'traditional dominance' rather than politics of
pattern of two-party competition at an
accommodation vis-a-vis lower classes]
early stage; and the party led the Janata
government in Rajasthan after 1977. The A(ii) States in which upper caste/class dominance has been effectively Bihar,
BJP took office in both states in 1990, and challenged by middle castes/classes, and Congress support has Uttar Pradesha
retained it in 1993 (after a period of collapsed in the context of fractured and unstable party
president's rule, following the demolition competition [both 'dominance' and the politics of accommodation
have broken down]
of the Babri masjid at Ayodhya in 1992)
in Rajasthan (until 1998, when the party
B States with middle caste/class dominated regimes, where the Congress Andhra Pradesh,
lost) though not in Madhya Pradesh (where has been effectively challenged but has not collapsed, and there is Gujarat,
the party lost again to Congress in 1998). fairly stable and mainly two-party competition [the politics of Karnataka,
Neither state has offered much opportunity accommodation vis-a-vis lower class interests have continued to Maharashtra,
for left-wing political parties or their work effectively, most effectively in Maharashtra and Karnataka, Punjab?b
least effectively in Gujarat]
ideologies. Political leadership in
Rajasthan was divided between brahmans,
C States in which lower castes/classes are more strongly represented Kerala,
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Latterly the Congress and Patnaik's population); the patidars of Gujarat (about especially, successful industrialists, who
following (which has passed substantially 12 per cent); the lingayats and vokkaligas have pursued effective strategies of ac-
to his son Navin, now leader of the Biju of Karnataka (who together constitute 30 commodation of the lower caste/classe
Janata Dal, which is in alliance with the per cent or so of the population); and the interests, assisted in this by the fact that
BJP) have competed for power, operating marathas in Maharashtra (30 per cent or though those described as 'backward
from the same social base, and, "Mono- so of the population of the state). The jat castes' make up about 50 per cent of the
polising the competitive arena they (have) Sikhs, similarly, constitute more than 20 population in the districts of Andhra
pre-empted alternative popular forces from per cent of the population of Punjab. Upper Pradesh, they are also unevenly distributed
acquiring political significance" [Mohanty castes (brahmins, banias and kshatriyas) and divided into a large number of small
in Frankel and Rao 1990]. It is unlikely, have been significant in the politics of all groups. "In its actual functioning, the
here, that changes of party-regime are of four states, but more so in Gujarat, where practice of political accommodation took
any great significance for policy or its brahmins and banias generally dominated on an ad hoc and expedient character in
implementation. the ruling Congress Party up to and through response to the various claims raised by
A (ii): States where upper caste/class the 1960s [Wood 1984]. In all these states, competing social groups. Radical politics
dominance has been effectively challenged the dominant 'middle' castes (and the upper [in a state in which communists were
- (1) Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the core castes) have been challenged by lower initially powerful - it was thought likely
states of the 'Hindi heartland', where the castes, or they have accommodated lower that the CPI would form the first govern-
upper castes are much more numerous. caste aspirations, but the political grip of ment of the state after its formation in
The Congress Party in both states was the 'middle' castes has remained strong, 1956] were thereby avoided and amelio-
dominated by members of these upper though perhaps in varying degrees. They rative measures pursued" [this and the
castes. About UP, Zoya Hasan writes, are also states in which the BJP now has following quotations from Reddy in
"from the outset the ruling party restricted a significant presence, which is important Frankel and Rao 1989: 265]. The politics
the access of lower castes to positions in in relation to the concerns of this analysis of patronage (in which "The underlying
government, and successive Congress especially because of the way in which the assumption was that every aspirant to
regimes were dominated by upper castes- party has mobilised support which cross- power had his price ...", p 265) gave way,
classes. Upper caste domination provided cuts middle classes and some groups of as a result of the policies adopted in the
the framework of political bonding in a low caste/class people, though not in a 1970s under the inspiration of Indira
fragmented society" (1998: 19). But way which promises to deliver very much Gandhi to a populist strategy, which
'middle' caste, in our terms, 'Other Back- to the latter. The strength of the BJP is continued to win her and her party support
ward Classes' (OBCs) have become evident in Gujarat, where it came to power in the state even in the aftermath of the
politically powerful in both states; the in 1995 and has been in office, though not emergency (as noted above). But by the
Congress party has very substantially without internal convulsions, for much of end of the 1970s resentments built up
destroyed itself, after ruling each state for the time since then, and in Maharashtra, amongst higher caste groups because of
most of the time from independence up where it also held office, in alliance with what was perceived as the tilt towards
to 1989/1990, and no longer has much of Shiv Sena, from 1995 until October 1999. scheduled castes and "the rural poor
an electoral base; and politics in each state The BJP's electoral strength in both Andhra themselves became divided along caste
is fragmented, and bitterly contested Pradesh, where it won 18 per cent of the lines. Finally, the break-down in client-
between formations which derive from the vote and 4/42 seats in the 1998 general patron relations at the local level resulted
Lok Dal, in which OBCs are strong, the election, but has virtually no presence in in the failure of political communication
BJP, to which the upper castes have the state assembly, and in Kamataka, where and created a void which went unfilled in
gravitated but which seeks, as elsewhere, it won 27 per cent of the vote in 1998 and the absence of any new grass roots party
to win support from lower castes as well, became the second largest party in the organisation" (p 285). Youth, educated
and dalit-based parties (notably the state assembly in 1994, albeit with a much middle classes, members of 'lower' castes
Bahujan Samaj Party, one of whose leaders, smaller share of the vote than the Congress, and Kamma industrialists alike went in
Mayawati, became the first scheduled caste is much less secure. Manor argues that the search of an alternative to Congress. Then
woman to hold the chief ministership of prospects of the BJP in Kamataka still in the early 1980s Indira Gandhi's frequent
a major state, in a brief tenure in UP in depend rather on the self-destruction of interventions in Andhra politics, and a
1995). The rule of law has broken down the Congress and the Janata Dal than on rapid succession of ineffectual chief
to a greater extent in Bihar than elsewhere its own efforts, and that the BJP's organis- ministers, built up resentments which were
in India, but the home minister of India ation "has always been far less strong and successfully exploited by the film star
went on record in the Lok Sabha in March extensive in Karnataka than its counterparts N T Rama Rao, who established a new
1997 to state that UP is moving towards in northern and western India" (1998: 194). political party, the Telugu Desam Party
'anarchy, chaos and destruction'. These judgments were confirmed during (TDP), and - stepping into the political
B: States with 'middle' caste/class the 1999 Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha vacuum created by the decline of the
dominated regimes: There are of course elections in the state. The BJP is also likely Congress, and the 'void' at local level -
many differences between these states. to remain a minor force, in Manor's view, won office in the state in 1983 [see also
But they are alike in having powerful in Andhra Pradesh, though the performance Kohli 1988, and Vakil 1990, who confirm
'middle' castes/classes - numerically of the party in the 1998 general election the analysis given by Ram Reddy]. One
significant, locally dominant castes, but showed that it has finally arrived in the charismatic leader (NTR) effectively
whose dominance extends over wide areas, state. replaced another (Indira Gandhi), but later
and which have generally exercised (1) Andhra Pradesh: The politics of this was a national leader while the former
pervasive political influence: the reddys state has continued to be dominated by regional: "It was (NTR's) charisma that
and kammas of Andhra Pradesh (who make 'forward caste' reddys and kammas, major dominated the electoral scene, rendering
up, together, about 20 per cent of the landholders and in the case of the kammas most of the organised political parties
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irrelevant" (p 286). The TDP offered 'to charismatic leader, Chandrababu Naidu, Shah and Wood have noted, that there was
restore the dignity of the Telugu people'. is under threat as the scheme has been cut also a discrepancy between political power
The policies it proposed were frankly down in response to the World Bank and social dominance in the state. The
populist (notably promising rice at Rs 2 conditionality. In sum, continuity in the economy was dominated by brahmans,
per kilo), and attempted to accommodate dominance of 'middle' caste/class banias and patidars, but political power
youth, women and the 'lower' castes/ interests, but the populist programmes of was held mainly by rajput and koli
classes - indicating "the continuity in the TDP may represent a significant shift kshatriyas, and Wood remarked, in-
political style". Indeed the interim budget within the regime. sightfully, that "The haves, possessing
passed by the TDP immediately after it (2) Gujarat: The more complex caste- social and economic power but excluded
came to power shifted from irrigation and class structure of this state has made for from access to political power in the
power development, which received an politics which are even more Byzantine Congress-I, appear to have nowhere to
increased outlay of only 6 per cent, to than is usual in India. Ghanshyam Shah turn except to hopelessly weak and divided
social and community services, on which comments, "the social situation in Gujarat opposition parties, or to lawless behaviour"
trfe outlay was increased by 30 per cent is not quite clear. Caste as a social (1984: 221). He anticipated the violence
[see Pai 1996]. The continuities in the organisation ... is crumbling, though not and turbulent conflict which have
leadership of the dominant 'middle' castes/ disappearing. At the same time caste characterised Gujarat's politics in the
classes is shown in studies of the com- sentiments prevail in the intra-class con- 1980s. But the 'haves' did find a party to
position of the state assembly and of the flicts among the poor farmers, agricultural turn to by the end of the decade, in the
state cabinet (though it is true that kammas labourers and industrial workers [in this BJP. According to Shah's account of it
were more strongly represented under the relatively highly industrialised state with (1998), first the Jan Sangh and then the
TDP - NTR was himself a kamma), and particularly extensive commercial agri- BJP have pursued a long-run strategy of
the representation of members of the culture] as well as the rich peasants and building support in Gujarat, seeking to
'lower' castes/classes in local government business class. While different classes incorporate dalits (scheduled castes) and
has been only gradual. Ram Reddy sums cutting across caste boundaries are being OBCs (lower castes in our terminology)
up: "While the parties in power changed, formed, class consciousness as such is yet under upper caste leadership. "The party
the stability of the polity continued. The to develop. This situation works in favour has put the dalit, tribal and OBC members
success of a party seemed to lie in building of the upper classes of the dominant castes in the forefront in various campaigns"
a strong and charismatic personality on the in perpetuating their hold over society" (1998: 257), fielding significant numbers
one hand and carrying out populist policies (1990: 111). The state does not fit so of OBC candidates in state assembly
on the other, capable of appealing to a clearly into the category of 'a middle caste elections, whilst at the same time contriving
broad spectrum of disadvantaged groups. dominated regime' as do Andhra, never actively to support job reservations
[No new party organisation could be built Karnataka and Maharashtra, because for them. And in 1991 as many as 63 per
to substitute horizontal mobilisation of members of the upper castes - brahmans cent, still, of the state and district level
the poor for vertical patron client networks and especially banias, as well as patidars leaders were from upper castes (brahmans,
...(which)... contributed to excessive - a classic 'middle' caste in Church's banias) and the patidars. After the BJP
dependence on a single charismatic leader terms, exercising local dominance in parts took power in the state in 1995 it was
and increasing centralisation of power; of the state, and 'kshatriyas' - who include rapidly split by a conflict between leaders
p287]. As the politics of accommodation both rajputs and some kolis, the most which seemed to reflect traditional rivalry
appeared to break down because of its own numerous caste group of the state between patidars and rajputs-cum-kolis.
social contradictions [not all groups or (accounting for around a quarter of the Shankarsinh Vaghela, himself a rajput but
aspirants to powercan possibly be satisfied] population), who include large numbers with a base amongst kolis, broke away to
another party emerged with a new of small and marginal farmers, and form the Rashtriya Janata Party, ruled for
charismatic leader and more expansive agricultural labourers, and can be defined a time with Congress support and "tried
populist policies" (p 291). Sure enough as 'lower' caste, have all vied for power. with some success to emerge as a leader
NTR's TDP, though it retained office in As Wood argued (1984) the Congress-I of the OBCs in Gujarat" [Shah: in Franke
1985 after a badly bungled attempt by the was successful in the 1980s in establishing land Rao 1998: 265]. But in the state
Congress government at the centre to a power base by deploying the so-called elections in 1998 the polarisation on caste
remove him, lost in the state in 1989 to 'KHAM' strategy which was presented by lines which Vaghela anticipated did not
the Congress, even though by this stage its own advocates in the party as a way occur and the BJP won widespread support
Rajiv Gandhi's charisma had worn rather of 'uplifting' disadvantaged members of in a comprehensive victory (Vaghela
thin. The Congress government in the state society. 'KHAM' refers to 'kshatriya' subsequently merged the RJP with Con-
was then defeated in turn in 1994 by the including lower caste kolis, harijan gress, arguing - curiously for one so
TDP, which was able to highlight the issue (scheduled castes - around 7 per cent of recently a leader of the BJP - that his party
of the distributional effects of the fiscal the population), 'Adivasis' (scheduled had no ideological differences with
reforms which were by then being imple- tribes - around 18 per cent), and Muslims Congress). The current chief minister,
mented in the country. The issue of sub- (another 8 per cent or more). Thus it was Keshubhai Patel, is now perceived, how-
sidised rice was centrally important. The that Church defined Gujarat as a state in ever, as favouring patidars at the cost of
cheap rice scheme had been effectively which lower castes/classes had been 'lower' castes, and there are reports of
run by the TDP before 1989, and the recruited into Congress regimes, though trouble in the ruling party for this reason
record of the Congress in running it was it was already clear that the 'KHAM' (Frontline, June 18, 1999).
perceived as poor, not least because the strategy had exacerbated divisions within In sum, there is little evidence to suggest
price had been increased from Rs 2 to each of its constituent groups, with the that lower castes/classes have won much
Rs 3.50 per kilo. Now the future of the worse-off amongst them being excluded political ground in Gujarat, and the current
TDP, under a new and somewhat from benefits. But it did mean, as both ascendancy of the BJP is founded on 'the
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upper classes of the dominant castes'. But His view was that as a result of these organisational setting ... it has an
regime shifts occurred in the later 1970s events in the early 1980s, it was no longer incompatible leadership structure
and 1980s in the period of the 'KHAM' possible for any single social force to emanating mainly from discrete and pre-
strategy and again in the mid-1990s with dominate Karnataka politics, and he existing political backgrounds [The
the assumption of power by the BJP, and (correctly, as it has turned out) foresaw recurrent conflicts between the top leaders
the realignment of economic and political that politics in Karnataka might become of the Janata Party, later Janata Dal in
power. increasingly unstable. Karataka - Hegde, Bommai and Deve
(3) Karataka: The politics of Karataka The local dominance of lingayats and Gowda, a brahman, a lingayat and a
has been described by Manor as a state vokkaligas may have persisted - this is vokkaliga, respectively, - bear out this
with a conservative social order, in which quite clearly shown by Ray and Kumpatla's point]. The Janata Party has no ideological
"the disparities in wealth, status andpower analysis of the social backgrounds of zilla commitment to the poor; its ideology can
have not been so severe as to undermine parishad presidents in the mid- 1980s, under be spelled out only in terms of some
the comparative cohesiveness of society" the Janata government of the state (1987) generalities like democracy and de-
(1989: 323). Later, he argues that this - but they were no longer dominant, Manor centralisation. The hold of the dominant
'cohesion' "rooted in small peasant pro- maintained, as they had been at supra- landowning castes in the party is enormous.
prietorship" (p 331), has been dominated local levels. He considered that "The Its policies and programmes are not
by lingayats and vokkaligas. Congress problem of the Hegde government [after therefore intended to imperil the entren-
administrations led by vokkaligas and 1983] was not that they favoured locally ched interests of the propertied classes as
lingayats in the 1950s and 1960s are said dominant groups but that they risked a whole ..." [Ray and Kumpatla 1987:
to have carried out 'modest reforms', spreading their resources too thinly by 1830]. Manor, and Kohli, in the light of
offering modest concessions to poorer distributing largesse to nearly every their commentaries on the Urs' govern-
groups [though it is possible that Manor sizeable group in the state" (1989: 357). ment, might well argue that this is precisely
has latterly over-emphasised the effec- Srinivas and Pannini had been even more the point: these were regimes which were
tiveness of the land reforms of 1961, as positive about the character of the Hegde able to pursue modestly progressive
well as those carried out in the times of government, suggesting that it had agendas because - pursuing the politics
the Urs administration in the 1970s: see "restored the bias that Urs gave to rural of accommodation they took a pragmatic
Damle 1989]. But by the late 1960s the uplift and poverty eradication" (1984:73). attitude towards propertied classes. But it
solidarity of 'lingayat raj' was being Ray and Kumpatla, however, found that has yet to be demonstrated that they
undermined by frustrations over access to in local government the representation of achieved lasting benefits for poorer people
patronage. This assisted Devaraj Urs' rise lingayats and vokkaligas was greater under in Karnataka (and, it would seem, from
to power, which involved mobilisation of Hegde than it had been in Urs' time and the studies of Minhas-Jain-Tendulkar
lower caste/class groups in the 1970s. But held that because the Janata government (1987) and Datt-Ravallion (1998), that
Urs' regime, described as 'progressive' by had neither the will nor the capacity to they did not). The 1994 elections to the
Manor (1980) and after him by Kohli, challenge local power holders "the newly state assembly in which lingayats and
lacked organisational foundations and did created powerful [panchayati raj] system vokkaligas won, respectively, 29 and 24
not endure. Neither does it seem - in the of democratic decentralisation is unlikely per cent of the seats, show the persistence
light of subsequentevents -that Urs sowed to create substantial gains for the rural of their influence (see also Harold Gould's
the seeds of radical change in Karnataka poor" (1987: 1825), a finding which is analysis ( 1997) of the Janata Dal electoral
society in the way in which M N Srinivas broadly substantiated by Manor's own later strategy in the general elections in the state
and M N Pannini suggested when they work on panchayati raj in Karnataka, with in 1996, which confirms the point.
wrote, "He succeeded in making the poorer Richard Crook. Crook and Manor argue In sum, it is not clear that 'middle' caste/
sections realise that in a democracy not that decentralisation in Karnataka has class dominance has been shaken in
only should the government work for the improved political participation and Karnataka, or that lower castes/classes have
welfare of the poor but also that it should government performance, but, they say exercised some voice in the way that they
be run by them" (1984: 73). The Congress- "Even (this) the most successful of our have in Andhra and in Gujarat. It is possible
I was restored to power in 1980, under the cases showed little evidence of having that both the Urs and the Janata Party/
leadership of Gundu Rao, who proceeded been particularly responsive to 'vulnerable Janata Dal regimes have been more 'pro-
to govern with such bungling ineptitude groups', the poor or the marginalised" poor' than others, but it has yet to be
(Manor saves his most cutting language (1998: 301). In Karnataka there was no shown that - if this was so - they have
for Gundu Rao) as to alienate "a vast array mechanism or political process for had much effect.
of important social groups" who then, in checking the exercise of local power, such (4) Maharashtra: Jayant Lele, who has
January 1983 "astonished India by rejecting as might be supplied, they imply - a la written extensively on Maharashtra
a Congress government for the first time". Kohli - by dominance in the political politics, says of the marathas that "In no
According to Manor "Because so many system of a leftist party. We should not other state do we find an ideologically
alienated groups had turned to the then "expect democratic decentralisation guided and economically differentiated
opposition, the Janata government which in India to assist in poverty alleviation caste cluster of this size" (1990: 180); and
took power in 1983 contained repre- over the short to medium term, unless the Robert Jenkins sums up Lele's views on
sentatives of nearly every important social centralised system is dominated by a leftist the politics of the state as follows: "the
force in the state. Despite ill-informed and party" [Crook and Manor 1998: 77]. The Maratha caste cluster has constructed a
quite unsubstantiated cliches in sections Urs regime, and subsequently the Janata/ system of elite-pluralist hegemony, which
of the Indian press, lingayats and Janata Dal failed (pace Srinivas and subsumes many unprivileged members of
vokkaligas have not succeeded in domi- Pannini) to bring about radical change in that caste cluster as well as other dis-
nating that government" [this and the Karnataka politics: "Hegde, like Urs, heads advantaged castes, and has cut short a
preceding quotations Manor 1989: 356]. a party which has a loose ideological and 'coalition of the disadvantaged' ... this
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system is flexible enough to respond to in 1995, though its social character was none of them has 'middle' castes extending
most challenges of change" (1996: 210, changed in other ways. Maratha strength local dominance over wide areas, as is the
note 12). Dalits have been more con- was maintained - but the kinds ofmarathas case with the marathas, the reddys or the
tinuously organised in Maharashtra than who won were different from those who lingayats and vokkaligas. In all the three
has been the case elsewhere in India, and had held seats in previous assemblies. The states there are strong indications of higher
in consequence perhaps there has been Maratha Maha Sangh (a caste association) levels of political mobilisation and
more 'generous' accommodation of elites allied with the Shiv Sena, but successful participation by 'lower' castes/classes than
from the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes maratha candidates who won on the Shiv is true elsewhere. Papers in Wood (1984)
and Muslims than elsewhere, so that "They Sena ticket were young and had little or substantiate this case for Kerala and West
have developed a vested interest in the no support from Maharashtra's co- Bengal, where it is due to the activities
maintenance of the system. Lele says operatives or other institutions: "They are of a left-of-centre party, the CPI(M) which
elsewhere, "Ambedkar's project' of low those disgruntled elements who are not has combined coherent leadership,
caste- emancipation 'is on the buffers'... absorbed in the local power structure by pragmatism towards the propertied classes,
(while) ... Those from the Other Backward the clannish marathas of the Congress" and ideological and organisational
Classes .. have also realised that without [Vora 1996: 173; points confirmed in commitment which has successfully
control over land or trade, without a caste Banerjee's analysis (1997) of the success challenged local landed power-holders. In
cluster ideology equivalent to that of the of the BJP-Shiv Sena in the 1996 general both states there has been more significant
Marathas or Mahars [the most numerous election]. The BJP's 64 MLAs "reflected effort made at asset redistribution through
Scheduled Caste] and without spatial the party's systematic strategy of trans- agrarian reform than elsewhere. Kerala,
concentrations, mobilising against Maratha forming its upper-caste image" [Hansen however, has a more developed civil society
hegemony or the Congress system cannot 1998: 147]. Only 10 were brahmins and and more political competition, whereas
yield a lasting alternate system of rewards" 24 came from the maratha-kunbi caste the CPI(M) in West Bengal has become
[Lele 1990:188]. The Maharashtra govern- cluster. rather a monolithic machine. Echeverri-
ment was unable to provide satisfactory A commentator argues that in India's Gent acknowledges "The party's relative
information to the Mandal Commission most urbanised and industrialised state success in dislodging traditional landed
about the status of the 'OBCs' in the state, "the rural-based Congress is becoming elites ...". But he argues that "democratic
but there was also unlike Gujarat, little in irrelevant" [Vora 1996: 172], but the same competition is essential in maintaining
the way of 'anti-reservation' outbursts in writergoes on to suggest that crucial factors party commitment and discipline over the
Maharashtra in the 1980s. The state's in the elections were first, the Congress longerrun" and he fears that "The declining
widely celebrated employment guarantee in-fighting, which meant that there were competitiveness of politics in West Bengal
scheme (EGS)- the state's most important large numbers of rebel Congress can- suggests that there may be a reduction in
anti-poverty programme, has played a didates, and second, the party's loss of responsiveness to the rural poor"
significant part in 'the system', too: "Large support amongst Muslims (following the [Echeverri-Grant 1993: 168-169]. None-
part of the funds for the EGS is provided violence against Muslims in the Bombay theless the work of Richard Crook shows
by the prosperous urban sector of the state... riots of 1992-1993). Here, as elsewhere, that amongst all the instances of de-
(the) politically powerful rural elite in the the self-destruction of the Congress has centralisation which he has been able to
state succeeded in extracting finance from played a significant, if not vital, part in identify and to study from across the world,
the urban sector for the GS in order to get the BJP's rise. It is certainly still too early West Bengal's has been most successful.
benefits from the assets created in the rural to write off the Congress as a political He concludes his comparative study by
areas [whilst also managing potential force in Maharashtra (though it has been arguing that "It is highly significant that
resistance: JH]" [Mahendra Dev 1995: further damaged by the recent split between the most successful cases [like West
2674]. Sharad Pawar and Sonia Gandhi). But Bengal] were the ones where central
Another outcome of the system was that meanwhile there has been a change of government not only had an ideological
Congress rule proved most durable, party-regime for the first time in Maha- commitment to pro-poor policies, but was
amongst all the major states, in Maha- rashtra. The significance of this has yet prepared to engage actively with local
rashtra, and until 1995 the party was only to become apparent. On one level the BJP- politics ... to challenge local elite resistance
out of power there for two years (and even Shiv Sena seems to accommodate different if necessary and to ensure implementation
then, the government which ruled between class interests very effectively, though in of policies". (Where central governments
1978 and 1980, in the aftermath of the a different way from that which worked had not confronted local elites, the results
emergency, included those who had been under the old Maharashtrian Congress of decentralisation in relation to the poor
and who were to be again leaders of the system in Maharashtra. The implications were universally poor.)
Congress-I). The 1995 state assembly in the longer run of local challenge to In Tamil Nadu the participation of lower
elections saw the first serious challenge Maratha dominance may be profound. But castes/classes has rather been articulated
to both Congress and the Maratha domi- in terms of policy, at least in the short run, by a local, regional party which at one time
nance. The BJP-Shiv Sena alliance won there has not been great deal of change. propagated cultural nationalism, and which
29.1 per cent of the vote and 64 and 73 C: States in which lower castes/classes has had charismatic leaders who have
seats respectively against the Congress have been more strongly represented: successfully appealed to lower castes/
'80 (and 30.9 percent of the vote), bringing Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are classes through populist programmes.
about the first change of party regime. For states which stand out because their caste/ Cross-class political alliances have been
the first time in its history, the state had class structures have historically been quite established by fairly well-institutionalised
a real non-Congress government, and one fragmented. In none of them was upper political parties. Politics is quite clearly
not dominated by marathas coming from caste dominance as strongly entrenched as not upper caste/class-dominated as in (say)
rural areas. The caste composition of the in the north (though brahmans had MP, or middle caste/class-dominated as
Vidhan Sabha did not change very much positions of importance in all of them); in (e g) Maharashtra, but the DMK/
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AIADMK regime does have a petit institutionalised party system than does institutions, and requires that they should be
Karnataka, where the party system is identified by a commission appointed by the
bourgeois rather than working class
president. When the V P Singh government
character. Kohli' s observations on Madurai increasingly fragmented - though it is still
decided in 1990, to adopt the recommendations
suggest that the ADMK became dominated by the locally powerful middle
of the second such Backward Classes
deradicalised, failed to build institutional castes/classes. Unsurprisingly Crook found Commission there was violent protest from
roots (beyond the MGR fan clubs), and that decentralisation in Karnataka was less members of upper castes, especially across
failed to deliver on its anti-centre, anti- effective in relation to poverty alleviation northern India. The extraordinary sensitivity
brahman and pro-poor goals, which than in West Bengal given that the central surrounding 'Mandal' (the name of the
chairman of the second commission, which
"slowly brought to the fore a ruler elected (state) government made no attempt to
came to be applied generally to the recom-
primarily by virtue of his personal appeal" challenge local power. There has been mendations of the report) is in part a reflection
(1990:182). Similarly, Washbrooks views more party competition in Gujarat than in of the increasing political strength of some of
"the AIADMK regime was one of bread Maharashtra which may have made for the 'OBCs' ('other backward classes'), and
(or rice) and circuses (or movies) and in rather greater responsiveness to the poor may also have contributed to its development.
broad political terms, might be conceived (eg through the PDS). Where stable, One reason for favouring the use of Church's
distinction between 'middle' and 'lower' castes,
as a form of Bonapartist or Caesarian relatively well-institutionalised parties
rather than - as if often the case in political
democracy. Classically, the bourgeoisie, compete for their votes, the political system
commentary in and on India - using only the
or the elite of wealth, withdrew from a is likely to be more responsive to the needs category of 'OBCs', is precisely that the latter
formal position of control over the state and interests of poorer people, and more are quite clearly differentiated in the way that
apparatus and the constitutional political effective in bringing about poverty Church suggests.
reduction. 6 A fortiori during the period in which Jayalalitha,
process. Not only was their direct control
leader of the ADMK, was chief minister of
no longer necessary for the purposes of
Notes Tamil Nadu after 1991.
capital accumulation but their attempt to 7 Jenkins' argument, developed in the context of
exercise it ... provoked resistance and [This paper was written in connection with a a discussion about 'the politics of protecting
instability. Formal control was transferred collaborative project on 'Political Systems and the poor', in the process of economic reform
to [I would ratherput it, 'was assumed by'] Poverty', directed by Mick Moore (of the Institute in Maharashtra, is an interesting one. He
of Development Studies, Sussex) and James Putzel suggests "that both the rich and politicians
a cadre of professional political managers
(of the LSE) for the governance department of alike, though clearly diverting to themselves
who on the basis of a populist ideology, the UK department for international development. a good deal of the resources meant for the poor,
mollified resistance by turing what was I am grateful to Mick and James for their have something togain from preserving a system
left of the state into a welfare agency and encouragement of my work.] of social welfare which has allowed them to
by stirring up feelings of patriotism and control the flow of resources and thereby to
1 Frankel's masterly analysis of India's political
atavism" [Washbrook in Frankel and Rao shore up their waning traditional authority ..
economy 1947-77 shows how accommodation
1989: 258]. there may be life left yet in the corpse of
worked and what its effects were [Frankel
political accommodationism" (1996: 200).And
In conclusion, therefore, there does seem 1978].
no bad thing, either, for the poor of Maharashtra,
to be a strong case for differentiating 2 In the two-volume work Dominance and State
he seems to suggest, stand their best chance
between the political systems of different Power in Modern India (1989, 1990) edited
of gaining some protection from the effects of
by Frankel and Rao, various authors analyse
states in terms of the balance of caste/class economic liberalisation. There are political
the relations of dominance, in this sense, and
power, and the nature of theirparty systems, pressures in India, in his view, which will tend
'state power' ('the exertion of secular authority
to create the conditions for the type of coalition
and it may be expected that these dif- by individuals appointed or elected to offices
envisaged by Joan Nelson between 'some;
ferences can be shown to influence the of the state, who claim legitimacy under the
among the poor' and those in middling income
policy process and the performance of the law'). A central theme of the work as a whole
deciles.
states. For example, in the group of states concerns the decline of 'dominance', associated
with brahmanism. References
where middle castes/classes have been
3 There is a lot of variation in terms of the
dominant, a middle income state (according
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