TOS-HSE-SAAX-RA-L-0009 - (Rev.X1) HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING (ADDENDUM) 26.3.2024-SIGNED BY FA

COMPANY Doc.
No: TOS-HSE-SAAX-RA-L-0009
Contractor Doc. No: SAADECOM-PA21-0001-TOS-C-X-RA-0002
Document Title:
HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING

(ADDENDUM)
HIBISCUS OIL & GAS MALAYSIA LIMITED
PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PREPARATION, REMOVAL

AND DISPOSAL (EPRD) SERVICES FOR SOUTH ANGSI ALPHA
FACILITIES DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
CONTRACT NO: PA21-0001
KHAIRIL HUZAIMI
X1 25.3.2024 ISSUED FOR REVIEW JAB FAB
AZIM AMIR
APPROVED FOR
X 25.8.2023 PISB MHI MAZHAZMI
CONSTRUCTION
2A 17.8.2023 ISSUED FOR REVIEW PISB MHI MAZHAZMI

MAZHAZMI/
2 27.6.2023 ISSUED FOR REVIEW MZF MHI
SMM
ISSUE TOS HML
REV. DESCRIPTION PRE’D BY CHK’D BY
DATE APPR’D APPR’D
PROVISION OF ENGINEERING,
PREPARATION, REMOVAL AND
DISPOSAL (EPRD) SERVICES FOR
SOUTH ANGSI ALPHA FACILITIES
DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PREPARATION, REMOVAL AND
DISPOSAL (EPRD) SERVICES FOR SOUTH ANGSI ALPHA FACILITIES
Document Authority
This addendum document has been reviewed and approved Tanjung Offshore Services Sdn. Bhd.
Document Name Designation Signature Date

Authority
Prepared by Joanes Bujang HSE Lead
(TOSSB)
Reviewed by Faruk Ahmad Bin HSE Manager
Mahamad Harun (TOSSB) 28.03.2024
Reviewed by Khairil Azhar HSE Ops Delivery

Manager (HML)
Reviewed by Hafiza Akmar Che CSR

Daud (Company Site
Representative)
Approved by Khairil Azim Bin Project Manager
Khairuddin (TOSSB) 28.03.2024
Approved by Huzaimi Amir Project Manager

(HML)
Amendment Summary
The table below must be completed in detail for each revision. To indicate amendments from the previous version,
vertical lines in the left-hand margin shall be added at the amended section.
Rev Page Description Approved By Approval Date

1 9 HAZID Study Front Page added
1 21 3.1 Workshop & Participant
Description changed, date,
facilitator and HAZID location.
1 33 3.5 Updated HAZID parking lot
contents.
1 36 Updated HAZID worksheet
1 52-54 Appendix III Attendant List
HAZID Date, online attendant,
Minutes of Meeting (MOM) &
updated new attendant lists.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Document Authority ............................................................................................................................ 2
Amendment Summary ........................................................................................................................ 3
1.0 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Project Background ............................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Facilities Information ............................................................................................................... 6
2.0 HAZID REPORT FOR PRE- REMOVAL SURVEY & SITE VISIT ............................................... 8
HAZID STUDY FRONT PAGE (ISSUED BY PISB) ........................................................................... 10
ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 12
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 14
1.1 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT ................................................................................................. 14
1.2 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 14
1.3 SOUTH ANGSI A ( SAA) FACILITIES DESCRIPTION ..................................................... 16
1.3.1 TOPSIDES...................................................................................................... 16
1.3.1 SUBSTRUCTURE .......................................................................................... 17
1.4 HAZID OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................. 17
1.5 SCOPE OF WORK ................................................................................................................ 18
2.0 HAZID METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 19
2.1 OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................. 19
2.1.1 STEP 1: IDENTIFY ......................................................................................... 19
2.1.2 STEP 2: ASSESS ........................................................................................... 19
2.1.3 STEP 3: RISK RANKING................................................................................ 20
2.1.4 STEP 4: RISK REDUCTION MEASURES OR SAFEGUARDS ....................... 20
3.0 HAZID WORKSHOP .................................................................................................................... 22
3.1 WORKSHOP AND PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................... 22
3.2 HAZID WORKSHEET .............................................................................................................. 22
3.3 LIST OF ACTIVITIES INVOLVED ....................................................................................... 22
3.4 HAZID FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 23
3.4.1 HAZID FINDINGS ........................................................................................... 23
3.4.2 HAZID RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................... 23
3.5 PARKING LOT ..................................................................................................................... 34
3.6 HAZID CLOSED- OUT ............................................................................................................ 35
4.0 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 36
APPENDIX I – HAZID WORKSHEET ................................................................................................ 37
APPENDIX II – COMPANY RISK MATRIX ........................................................................................ 51
APPENDIX III – ATTENDANT LIST ................................................................................................... 53
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Project Background

COMPANY is the operator for the South Angsi Alpha (SAA) field after taking over the
ownership from Talisman in 2015. SAA Platform has been operating since its first oil date
of 14th August 2005. The initial discovery was made in March 2003 and the project was
tracked to meet the first oil date. SAA is located in Block 305/314, 145km Offshore
Peninsular Malaysia, in the South Western of Malay Basin with a water depth of 72m. The
contract covers CONTRACTOR’s scope for the provision of Engineering, Preparation,
Removal and Disposal (EPRD) services for South Angsi Alpha Facilities
Decommissioning Project.
Figure 1 Field Overview

1.2 Facilities Information
The weight of the structures inclusive of all appurtenance can be summarized facilities
date sheet below: -
MOAB
Water Substructure Weight Weight Pile Sizes Conductor & Casing
Depth (WCR #4 06 September 2004) (WCR #4 (Skirt) Sizes
10 May
2005)
Overall 24” x 25.4mm WT
Weight (Well #1-#12)
Inclusive
72 Meter Jacket Wellhead Piles 3927 MT 84” x 30” x 25.4mm WT
2130 MT Platform & Conductors 55mm WT (Well #13)
118 MT
3339 MT 13 3/8” (Well #1-9,
11-13), 9 5/8” (well
#10)
Table 1 Facilities Data Sheet

Note: No significant weight has been added to both substructure & MOAB except the boat fender to the boat landing and the
extension deck at the well bay area to accommodate the P&A activity. Additional weight estimated of 15MT.
The SAA field had Cease of Operation (COP) on 30th September 2019. All wells had been
shut in and suspended since 9 th March 2020. The FSO was demobilised on 30 th March
2020. The Plug & Abandonment (P&A) Program was started on 10 th April 2020 and
completed by 15th August 2022.
Figure 2: MOAB Facilities Current Status
Notes:
i. All FSO associated items such as mooring chains, anchors were already demobed
and removed from SAA Field since 30th March 2020.
ii. P&A activities was completed by 15 August 2022. All thirteen (13) nos. wells were
securely plugged with two (2) cement barriers at depth of 80m and 900m below
seabed.
iii. MOAB will be handed over with HC Free condition.
iv. No any submersible pipeline within SAA vicinity.
2.0 HAZID REPORT FOR PRE- REMOVAL SURVEY & SITE VISIT
CONTRACTOR has appointed Pure Integrity Sdn Bhd as a HAZID consultant to perform HAZID
Study Report with the document number PISB/T7G/003/HAZID/SAA which was issued on 14 th
August 2023.
Attached herewith is HAZID Study Report for COMPANY to review.
HAZID STUDY FRONT PAGE (ISSUED BY PISB)
CONTRACT NO.:
PISB/P/T7G/001/23/2
DOCUMENT TITLE:
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDY REPORT FOR

SOUTH ANGSI ALPHA (SAA) FACILITIES DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
DOCUMENT NO: PISB/T7G/003/HAZID/SAA
3 ISSUED FOR REVIEW 25/3/2024 JAB FAB KHAIRIL HUZAIMI

AZIM AMIR
2 ISSUED FOR APPROVAL 14/8/2023 NS MRS JAK (CLIENT)
1 ISSUED FOR REVIEW 6/6/2023 NS MRS JAK (CLIENT)
Rev. Description Date Prepared Checked Approved Client

REVISION LOG
Revision No. Section Revision Description

Abbreviations,
1 1.2, 1.5. 3.4.1, ISSUED FOR REVIEW
Appendix I
1.4. 1.5, 2.1,
R5.2.1, R12.3.2,
2 R12.6.1 and ISSUED FOR APPROVAL
R12.7.1 of
Appendix 1
ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
AHTS Anchor Handling Tug Supply
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
APMM Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia
AWJC Abrasive Water Jet Cutting
CoP Cease of Production
COG Centre of Gravity
DOF Department of Fisheries
DP Dynamic Positioning
DSV Diving Support Vessel
DWS Diamond Wire Saw
ERP Emergency Response Plan
FRC Fast Rescue Boat
FCB Fast Crew Boat
FSO Floating Storage Offloading
HAZID Hazard Identification Study
HSE Health, Safety, Environment
JHA Job Hazard Analysis
LOP Lifting Operating Procedure
LOLER Lifting Operating Lifting Equipment Regulation
MAH Major Accident Hazard
MAE Major Accident Event
MB#1 Material Barge #1
MB#2 Material Barge #2
MOAB Mobile Offshore Application Barge
MOB Man-Overboard
MOPO Marine Manual of Permitted Operation
MSR Malaysian Shipping Registry
MWVB Main Work Vessel / Barge
OSV Offshore Support Vessels
P&A Plug & Abandonment
Abbreviation Meaning
PISB Pure Integrity Sdn. Bhd.
PMS Preventive Maintenance System
PTB Personnel Transfer Bridge
PTW Permit To Work
PPE Personnel Protective Equipment
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
TRA Task Risk Analysis
TOR Terms of Reference
SAA South Angsi Alpha
SCBA Self-contained Breathing Apparatus
STS Ship To Ship
WHAP Wellhead Access Platform
Definition Meaning
COMPANY HIBISCUS Oil & Gas Malaysia Limited (HML)
CONTRACTOR Tanjung Offshore Services Sdn Bhd (TOSSB)
Facilities South Angsi Alpha (SAA) MOAB
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT
This document presents the methodology used for HAZID study as well as findings
and recommendations that pertain to the HAZID study for South Angsi Alpha (SAA)
Decommissioning Project.
1.2 BACKGROUND
The South Angsi Alpha (SAA) field has been operating since its first oil date of 14th
August 2005. It is located in Block 305/314, 145km offshore Peninsular Malaysia, and
consists of a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) connected to a Floating
Storage and Offtake (FSO) Angsi via a telescopic Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB).
The MOAB is a Mobile Application Barge type and its jacket is a pile design, and it was
designed in such a way to allow early drilling campaign prior to arrival of the MOAB.
Fabrication was done by MSE (renamed MMHE) for both the MOAB and its jacket. The
topsides facilities have 13 Slots (1 DOP/ GP and 8 OP (9 Strings) 4 WI (5 Strings)),
with Crude Processing capacity of 30000 stb/d, Water Processing 20000 bpd, Gas Lift
Compression of 12 mmscfd and Water Injection of 32000 bpd.
The stabilized oil is then pumped to a FSO tanker anchored about 40 meters away.
The MOAB and FSO were initially connected via a telescopic type bridge, but this was
decommissioned in August 2018. The SAA field had Cease of Operation (CoP) on 5th
September 2019 and all wells had been shut-in and suspended since 9th March 2020.
The FSO was demobilized on 30th March 2020 and MOAB was on the 'lighthouse
mode' since 15th April 2020. The Plug & Abandonment (P&A) Program was executed
on 10th April 2021 and was completed by 16th August 2022. Decommissioning of the
South Angsi facilities is the results of these CoP and P&A activities.
MOAB has utilities equipment such as 1 X Solar Turbine Generator, 1 X Emergency

Diesel Generator, 1 X 16 Tonnes Crane, 2 X Gas Lift Compressors, 1 X Fire Water
Pump, 1 X Sea Water Injection Pump, 2 X Instrument Air Compressor etc.
Figure 1-1: SAA Block Map

Figure 1-2: MOAB and FSO after PTB Decommissioning
1.3 SOUTH ANGSI A ( SAA) FACILITIES DESCRIPTION
1.3.1 TOPSIDES
The SAA Topsides is based on the Mobile Offshore Applications Barge (MOAB)
concept with an expected weight of 3927MT. It comprises a buoyant hull measuring
approximately 41m x 41m x 7.5 m deep. Processing equipment is arranged over two
main deck levels supported off the hull structure. A 30m high inclined flare boom
structure is cantilevered off the hull.
Internally the hull contains control and switchgear rooms along with offices, mechanical
workshops store and messing facilities along with buoyancy/ ballast compartments
used for the wet tow transportation from the fabrication yard to the South Angsi field.
An area within the hull, segregated from the safe areas, is used for production and test
manifolds along with gas lift and water injection manifolds. This area also contains the
Closed Drain Vessel and the Wellhead Control Panel. This area was watertight during
transportation and subsequently opened up after installation by the removal of a
bulkhead making the area naturally ventilated as a safety feature.
1.3.1 SUBSTRUCTURE
The substructure is a 4-legged skirt piled structure which also incorporates a 12-slot
cantilevered well bay. The substructure was skidded out from the fabrication yard onto
a barge and installed by the launch method. After piling operations were completed the
well bay decks, a single piece structure, and the forward leg extensions/ jacking
cruciform were installed as separate lifts. The substructure factored weight during load
out in Year 2005 was 2130MT. The well bay deck structure weighed 118MT. The total
substructure weight including piles and conductors was 3339MT.
After installation of the substructure, the topsides were floated over the substructure
and jacked up to final elevation using temporary strand jacks. The topsides/
substructure interface was secured with welded plate attachments/ gussets. The boat
landing was installed separately after mating.
1.4 HAZID OBJECTIVE
The objective of the HAZID decommissioned platform are as follows:
Identify and evaluate the main hazards and risk control mechanism associated
with dismantlement, removal of installations and other decommissioning and
post-survey activities;
Identify causes and consequences for the hazards related to decommissioning
and post-survey activities that may give rise to severe and immediate risk to
personnel safety, environment and assets;
Identify the existing barriers (engineering or operational controls to help prevent
escalation and measures to prevent the hazards from occurring) that are
already included in the design for the management of the risks associated with
the identified hazards;
Establish reliability techniques for such activities, i.e., cutting, heavy lifting,
toppling of jacket, stability and buoyancy during decommissioning activities;
and
Recommend any additional barriers to be implemented in the activities involved
during decommissioning and post-survey, where necessary, to demonstrate as
Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
1.5 SCOPE OF WORK
The HAZID workshop session is focused on the following scopes and the details of
activities involved can be referred to Section 3.3:
a) Decommissioning Activity
Offshore Activity
i. Mobilization and Demobilization
ii. Crane Barge Setup
iii. MOAB Preparation Works
iv. Lowering Down MOAB
v. Conductor Cutting at WHAP
vi. WHAP Topside Removal
vii. Reefing Works (MOAB Jacket & WHAP Sub-structure)
Onshore Activity
i. MOAB Loading at Disposal Yard Quayside
ii. Structure and Equipment Cutting
iii. Disposal of schedule/hazardous waste
b) Post Survey
Seabed survey (SAA and Reefing)
Soil Sampling (SAA)
2.0 HAZID METHODOLOGY
2.1 OVERVIEW
HAZID is an early identification and assessment of the critical HSE hazards, and it
provides essential input for project development decisions.
The HAZID is conducted in utilizing Hibiscus Oil & Gas Malaysia Limited (COMPANY)
Risk Matrix.
The HAZID technique is:
A means of identifying and describing credible major accident and occupational

hazards and threats at the earliest practicable stage of a development or venture.
It is therefore likely to be the first formal HSE related study for any new project.
A rapid identification and description process only, not a forum for trying to solve
potential problems.
The step-by-step methodology is discussed in the following sub-sections.
2.1.1 STEP 1: IDENTIFY
The initial stage of HAZID involves clearly defining the extent of the project and
identifying the range of tasks involved in decommissioning and post-survey activities,
as specified in Sections 1.5 and 3.3. This step consists of identifying and evaluating
the primary hazards associated with dismantling structures, removal of installations,
managing waste and other related decommissioning activities.
2.1.2 STEP 2: ASSESS
The credible risks/threats are assessed based on respective activity. A hazard has the
potential to cause harm. In this context, it refers to factors that could lead to accidents,
injuries, or environmental damage during decommissioning and post-survey activities.
Hazards can include;
Structural instability during dismantling;

Potential for fires or explosions due to hot work activities;
Risks associated with lifting operation, etc.; and
Environmental impacts due to waste disposal.
The team brainstorms on the relevant threats that may cause this hazard, and
subsequently, the possible worst-case consequences of the hazard are discussed and
recorded. This includes a discussion on the historical frequency of such incidents, e.g.,
incidents in the industry, within the organization or at the current field location. The
safeguards for both mitigation and prevention of the MAE shall be identified and
recorded.
2.1.3 STEP 3: RISK RANKING
For each hazard scenario, the following consequences are determined as below:
People;
Environment;
Assets; and
Reputation.
The likelihood and severity of the consequences are risk ranked using COMPANY HSE
Risk Matrix as a basis.
The initial risk is assessed and prioritized according to their potential impact and the
probability of the hazard being released. The initial risk is determined using COMPANY
Risk Matrix considering the existing controls. Residual risk ranking is done if there are
any additional safeguards being proposed.
MAH is defined as an incident which leads to extensive damage to an asset, major

impact to company reputation and / or severe or catastrophic consequences to people.
The classification of hazards as MAH is determined by risk ranking using COMPANY
Risk Assessment Matrix attached in Appendix II. Major Accident Hazards are
represented by risks ranked as Orange HIGH.
2.1.4 STEP 4: RISK REDUCTION MEASURES OR SAFEGUARDS
The purpose of this step is to identify the required additional control measures or
safeguards for high-risk hazards. Establish reliability techniques for such activities, i.e.,
cutting, heavy lifting, toppling of jacket, stability and buoyancy during decommissioning
activities are also developed. Where necessary and feasible, appropriate additional
hazard controls/ barriers are recommended to manage, mitigate and reduce the risk of
the identified major hazards.
3.0 HAZID WORKSHOP
3.1 WORKSHOP AND PARTICIPANTS
The HAZID workshop session was held on 21st March at Level 16 KL Trillion Building
Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur.
The one-day session has been facilitated by HSE Lead Joanes Bujang (T7 Global)
and participated by multidisciplinary team from COMPANY(HML) and
CONTRACTOR(TOSSB). The full list of attendees are enclosed in Appendix III
Attendance List.
3.2 HAZID WORKSHEET
The salient points, safeguards, and recommendations during the workshop session
have been recorded in the HAZID Worksheet shown in Appendix I HAZID
Worksheet.
3.3 LIST OF ACTIVITIES INVOLVED
The list of activities involved in SAA Facilities Decommissioning Project are shown in
the Table 3-1 as shown below;
Table 3-1: List of Activities Involved
No. Descriptions
1 General Administration and Others
2 Mobilization and Demobilization
3 Crane Barge Setup
4. MOAB Preparation Works
4.1 ROV & Air Diving Works
4 4.2 Boat Landing Removal
4.3 Caisson 1-4 Removal
4.4 Setup Strand Jack at All Legs
5. Lowering Down MOAB
5.1 Setup of MB1 (330 class) underneath MOAB
5 5.2 Lowering Down of MOAB with strand jack
5.3 Sea fastening of MOAB to MB1
5.4 Remove A1 and A2 MOAB Leg & Transfer to MB2
No. Descriptions
6. Conductor Cutting at WHAP
6
6.1 WHAP Conductor removal via MB2 (280 class)
7 WHAP Topside Removal
8 Reefing Works (MOAB Jacket & WHAP Sub-Structure)
9 Demobilization (Refer to No. 2)
10. MOAB Loading at Disposal Yard Quayside
10.1 Mooring Plan
10
10.2 Load In plan
10.3 Equipment Setup & Disposal Activity
11 Post Removal Survey at SAA
12 Miscellaneous Work
3.4 HAZID FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.4.1 HAZID FINDINGS
The summary of the Initial and Residual HAZID Risk Ranking are shown in the Table
3-2 as shown below;
Table 3-2: Summary of Risk Ranking

Number of Hazards
Overall Risk Category
Initial Risk Residual Risk
Low 1 3
Medium 64 69
High 32 24
Very High 0 0
There are thirty-two (32) Major Accident Hazard (MAH) has been identified in the South
Angsi Alpha Facilities Decommissioning Project which corresponds to Hazards with a
High consequence scenario recorded.
3.4.2 HAZID RECOMMENDATIONS
The HAZID recommendations have been identified for this project. The
recommendations raised have been ranked based on the likelihood and consequences
according to the risk assessment matrix. Initial risk ranking already take into
consideration the existing controls are in place. The recommendations have been
ranked ad LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH and VERY HIGH. For residual risk of the hazard
scenarios, risk ranking is proposed to be lowered only if the recommendations are
implemented. The residual risk falls on LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH and VERY HIGH
categories.
The recommendations have been developed, either to prevent the causes of

hazardous events or to mitigate the consequences so as to reduce the risk of the
hazardous as well as improving the operability continuously.
The list of recommendations has been identified and tabulated in Table 3-3.
Table 3-3: Summary of HAZID Recommendations
Hazard
Activity Threats Causes Recommendations Responsible Party Status
No. (OPEN/CLOSE)Note 1
Mobilization and Demobilization
(2.1) Load out/ Lifting of R2.1.1 Falling equipment 1. Load under stress - swing 1. To identify escape route prior to start lifting activity 1. CONTRACTOR Barge
project materials, and material uncontrollably due to adverse 2. Follow latest colour coding for lifting gears and tackles Foreman
equipment weather (Vendors are required to provide documentation and to 2.CONTRACTOR Logistic
consumables, spares 2. Failure of lifting accessory color code accordingly before mobilization to quayside) Coordinator I
and etc. 3. Communication break-down 3. Sufficient lighting during night operations Vendors/Subcontractors of
1. Routine Lifting 4. Exceeded SWL of lifting gears & 4. Use certified container and visual inspection on lifting particular equipment
2. Non-Routing Lift - tackles gears before lifting 3. CONTRACTOR HSE
Simple 5. lifting tackles not line-up, i.e., 5. The stowage plan will be finalized and adhered during 4. CONTRACTOR Logistic
3. Non-Routine Lifts - entanglement, choke procedure etc. loading/ loadout. Hence each cargo will be stowage on deck Coordinator I MVVVB Barge
Complicated 6. COG - Unbalanced load as per lifting plan for loading & offloading. Foreman
4. Non-Routine Lifts - 7. Expired lifting gears & tackles. 5. CONTRACTOR Field
Complex Engineer/ MVVVB Barge Master
(2.5) Hot work at Deck R2.5.1 Fire and explosion 1. Fire from welding spark/flame 1. Detail deck layout, sea fastening, to be shared to MVVVB 1. CONTRACTOR Field
of MVVVB cutting. Barge Master Engineer
2. Malfunctioning equipment’s 2. To follow gas cylinder colour code 2. CONTRACTOR Fitter
(Leaking of gas cylinder & 3. To have sufficient fire extinguisher and firewatcher Foreman/ HSE
hose/welding current supply). 4. Welding machine must be located on the MVVVB deck or 3. CONTRACTOR Fitter
3. Incompetent personnel. at the proper/approved location instead of at the jetty. Foreman/ Welder Foreman I
4. Inadequate supervision. 5. To have proper cable management for hot work activity HSE
5. non certified equipment 4. CONTRACTOR Welder
6. Improper grounding of welding set Foreman
7. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent 5. CONTRACTOR Fitter
Paint/ oxygen/ acetylene storage Foreman/ Welder Foreman I
8. Insulation under deck (engine HSE
room)
9. Vapor present between tank and
under deck
Hazard
(2.6) Sail-away to/from R2.6.1 Vessel unable to 1. Piracy 1. Procedure for personnel to lock within accommodation in 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
location (Mob/Demob) reach location at 2. Adverse weather the event of pirate intrusion to be shared during vessel
timely manner 3. Tow line parted or entangled induction session.
4. AHT breakdown
MWVB Setup
(3.1) Vessel working R3.1.1 1. Vessel run-off/ 1. Obtain weather forecast from 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and marine 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
near to Platform station-keeping minimum of two (2. sources (6 personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging Document 2. CONTRACTOR Marine
compromised during hourly report) and one week in 2. Plan to provide Mandarin Conversant personnel located
approach / along side advance weather forecast on MWVB for effective communication with AHT
2. Vessel drifted and 2. 24 hrs Bridge Watch, Radar
collide with existing Watch
facilities during set-up 3. Vessel must be working within
& operations vessel weather limitation under
3. Malfunction of Vessel Master discretion
AHT 4. Pre-test the communication
system with all relevant parties
5. Dedicated communication
channel to be established between
relevant parties
6. Use common understandable
language (English)
7. Vessel procedures (Checklists,
ER procedure, PMS, etc.)
8. Comply to MOPO
9. All equipment onboard are sea
fasted and proper lashing to avoid
falling object to personnel during
vessel touching impact.
10. Any rectification I failure to be
acted on must be done outside 500m
zone.
Hazard
11. Updated Preventive
Maintenance
12. To complete checklist for entry
500m zone
13. Emergency pull out procedure
For MWVB
(3.2) Anchor Handling R3.2.1 Collision between • Operation Stage 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and marine 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
AHTS and MWVB 1) Survey system failure personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging Document 2. AHT Vessel Master
2) Miscommunication during 2. To follow Preventive Maintenance System (PMS)
operation
3) Engine failure
MOAB Preparation Works
(4.3) General Hot work R4.3.1 Fire, explosion 1. Uncontained spark 1. Ensure any residual diesel at hot work area vicinity is 1. CONTRACTOR HSE/ Welding
2. Improper grounding cleared prior to hot work activity Foreman/ Fitter Foreman
3. Damaged cable 2. Ensure any residual oil at or near hot work area is 2. CONTRACTOR HSE/ Welding
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent cleared prior to hot work activity Foreman/ Fitter Foreman
Paint/ oxygen/ acetylene/ Diesel 3. To conduct regular gas test in the event of combustible 3. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
storage gases nearby hot work area Foreman/ Fitter Foreman
5. Debris from grinding
6. Residue oil at or near hot work
area
(4.4) Air Diving R4.4.1 Diver stung/bitten by 1. Marine life in the surrounding 1. To notify MWVB & surrounding vessel that no food 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
operations marine life area dumping is allowed during diving operation. (To be
mentioned in PTW form)
R4.4.3 Diver/umbilical hit by • 1. Human error during crane 1. Good umbilical management with respect to crane 1. CONTRACTOR Diving
drop object operation movement Supervisor
2. Main block of the crane to be position away from the 2. CONTRACTOR Barge
diver working area Foreman
3. Dive Plan (prior to every diving activities) to be attached 3. CONTRACTOR Diving
to PTW Supervisor
Hazard
2. Rigging failure 1. Good umbilical management with respect to crane 1. CONTRACTOR Diving
movement Supervisor
2. Main block of the crane to be position away from the 2. CONTRACTOR Barge
diver working area Foreman
3. Dive Plan (prior to every diving activity) to be attached to 3. CONTRACTOR Diving
PTW Supervisor
(4.5) ROV R4.5.1 ROV umbilical cable 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
entanglement and/or Operator error structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage (to be Supervisor
parted 2. Electrical/Power failure explicitly defined in the ROV and operation procedure)
3. Poor visibility
4. Adverse weather
5. Poor condition of the cable
(4.7.2) Scaffold R4.7.2 1. Manual handling 1. Loose items 1. Removal procedure shall include sketches to confirm that 1. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
Erection for; 2. Dropped object 2. Poor ergonomics scaffolding will not impede boat landing & ancillary structure 2. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
a. Main boat landing 3. Working at heights 3. Fall from height removal 3. Pre-job briefing by
b. Cage ladder 4. Human error 4. Slip, trip and fall 2. Identify last cut point on boat landing to ensure proper CONTRACTOR Field Engineer/
c. Pirate Door Service 5. Scaffolding 5. Working over the side disengagement of the boat landing Attendance by Fitter
Platform impeding removal of 6. Man-overboard 3. Fitter to be briefed the foreseen movement of boat 4. CONTRACTOR Barge
boat landing & 7. Inadequate communication landing after last cut Foreman
ancillary structures 9. Poor lighting 4. Ensure adequate tag lines in place to reduce boat landing
6. Inadequate 10. Negligence by personnel movement after last cut
scaffolding to protect 11. Congested work area
fitter during last cut 12. Inclement weather
(4.8.4) Setup Rigging R4.8.4 1. Manual handling 1. Loose items 1. CONTRACTOR shall ensure there will be no 1. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
for Caisson Lifting and 2. Dropped object 2. Line of fire (direct exposure to contamination to the environment prior to removal of /HSE
Caisson lifting activity 3. Human factor hazard) caisson no.4
4. Environmental 3. Fall from height
contamination 4. Excessive load
5. Miscommunication
6. Rigging failure
7. Congested work area
Hazard
8. Inclement weather
9. Pinch point
10. Residual oil/sludge in caisson no.
4
(4.9.3) Confined Space R4.9.3 1. Insufficient Oxygen 1. Inadequate communication. 1. Remove residual hydrocarbon at Leg B2 and ensure gas 1. CONTRACTOR HSE/ AGT
during Anchor block Level 2. Inadequate ventilation/lighting. free prior to entry
installation at Leg B 2. Hazardous Gas
presence
Lowering Down MOAB
(5.1) Setup of MB1 (330 R5.1.1 1. AHT run-off/ 1. Bad weather and high swell 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and marine 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
class) underneath station-keeping 2. Miscommunication between AHT personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging Document 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
MOAB compromised during and CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman 2. Winch plan to be installed on MB1 to maintain positioning Team
approach underneath 3. AHT malfunction upon setup at intended location
MOAB
2. AHT/MB1 drifted
and collide with
existing facilities
during set-up &
operations
(5.3.5) General Hot R5.3.5 Fire, explosion 1. Uncontained spark 1. To conduct regular gas test in the event of combustible 1. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
WorkatMB1; 2. Improper grounding gases nearby hot work area Foreman/ Fitter Foreman
a. General activity 3. Damaged cable 2. Prepare A1/A2 legs cutting procedure as part of WHAP 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
b. Cutting of the legs of 4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent & Jacket Removal and Reefing Procedure Team
A1/A2 for MOAB Paint/ oxygen/ acetylene
(5.4.3) Remove A1 and R5.4.3 ROV umbilical cable 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
A2 MOAB Leg & entanglement and/or Operator error structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage (to be Supervisor
Transfer to MB2 - Setup parted 2. Electrical/Power failure explicitly defined in the ROV and operation procedure)
rigging and ROV 3. Poor visibility
monitoring 4. Adverse weather
Hazard
Conductor Cutting at WHAP
(6.3) Lifting of R6.3.1 Suspended load fall 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. This is considered non-routine lift-complicated which 1. CONTRACTOR HSE /
Conductor (Heavy Lift - during lifting 2. Poor rigging practice would required LOP (Lifting operational plan) to be prepared Engineering Team
Non-Routine Lifts - 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging and approved
Complex) equipment
a. During proof load test 4. Under-rated rigging equipment
b. During pickup of the 5. Communication failure
load from hatch 6. Adverse weather
c. During transfer of the 7. Human error
conductor from WHAP 8. No MOC been practice for any
over MWVB and changes of work procedure
onwards to MB2.
WHAP Topside Removal
(7.2.1) Cutting of WHAP R7.2.1 Fire, explosion 1. Uncontained spark 1. Prepare WHAP leg cutting procedure as part of WHAP & 1. CONTRACTOR Engineering
Legs 2. Improper grounding Jacket Removal and Reefing Procedure Team
3. Damaged cable
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent
Paint/ oxygen/ acetylene
(7.3.1) Lifting ofWHAP R7.3.1 Suspended load fall 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. This is considered non-routine lift-complicated which 1. CONTRACTOR HSE /
to MB2 (Heavy Lift - during lifting 2. Poor rigging practice would required LOP (Lifting operational plan) to be prepared Engineering Team
Non-Routine Lifts - 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging and approved
Complex) equipment
4. Under-rated rigging equipment
5. Communication failure
6. Adverse weather
7. Human error
8. No MOC been practice for any
changes of work procedure
Hazard
Reefing Works (MOAB Jacket & WHAP Sub-Structure
(8.1.8) ROV Monitoring R8.1.8 ROV umbilical cable 1. Poor maneuvering of ROV - 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
and assisting cutting entanglement and/or Operator error structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage (to be Supervisor
operation parted 2. Electrical/Power failure explicitly defined in the ROV and operation procedure)
a. Operation of Guiding 3. Poor visibility
DWS (Diamond Wire 4. Adverse weather
Saw) 5. Poor condition of the cable
R8.1.1O Guiding DWS 1. Poor maneuvering of ROV - 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
(Diamond Wire Saw) Operator error structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage (to be Supervisor
umbilical cable 2. Electrical/Power failure explicitly defined in the ROV and operation procedure)
entanglement and/or 3. Poor visibility
parted 4. Adverse weather
6. Human error
(8.1.11) ROV Cutting of R8.1.11 Whiplash of cut 1. Sacrificial string still in tension 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
sacrificial string sacrificial string while being cut structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage (to be Supervisor
a. Utilizing ROV Cutter 2. Poor visibility explicitly defined in the ROV and operation procedure)
3. Adverse weather
4. Human error
(8.2.1) Reefing In-SITU R8.2.1 1. Wrong reefing 1. Inaccurate survey data 1. To confirm DOF Requirements with regards to reefing 1. CONTRACTOR Project
as per approved reefing location 2. Human error Engineer
plan
(8.3.1) Reefing of R8.3.1 1. Wrong reefing 1. Inaccurate survey data 1. To confirm DOF Requirements with regards to reefing 1. CONTRACTOR Project
WHAP Sub-structure at location 2. Human error Engineer
Pulau Tenggol
MOAB Loading at Disposal Yard Quayside

(10.1) Mooring of MB1 R10.1.1 1. Mooring failure 1. Failure of mooring lines 1. Pre-job briefing to be conducted prior to mooring at 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
at quayside 2. Insufficient depth 2. Poor mooring practice quayside (Note: admin control inadequate to reduce the
at quayside 3. Communication failure probability)
3. Grounding of MB1 4. Adverse weather
Hazard
5. Human error
(10.2) Skidding R10.2.1 1. Skidding operation 1. Failure of skidding 1. Pre-job briefing to be conducted prior to skidding 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
Operation (MOAB) failure equipment/gears operations at quayside (Note: admin control inadequate to 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
2. Man overboard 2. Under-rated skidding equipment reduce the probability) Team
3. Inadequate soil 3. Communication failure 2. Ensure selected disposal yard meet all criteria for
bearing strength 4. Adverse weather/ tidal conditions skidding operations (e.g., soil strength/level, etc)
5. Human error
6. No MOC been practice for any
changes of work procedure
7. Improper ballasting
8. High pressure hydraulic release
(10.3.2) Structure R10.3.2 Fire, explosion 1. Uncontained spark 1. To conduct regular gas test in the event of combustible 1. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
Cutting (Hot work) 2. Improper grounding gases nearby hot work area Foreman I Fitter Foreman
3. Damaged cable
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent
Paint/ oxygen/ acetylene
Post Removal Survey at SAA

(11.1.1) ROV seabed R11.1.1 ROV umbilical cable 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - 1. Engage EIA Consultant with offshore monitoring 1. CONTRACTOR Procurement
survey and water entanglement and/or Operator error experience for sampling works utilising ROV.
parted 2. Electrical/Power failure
3. Poor visibility
4. Adverse weather
Miscellaneous Completion Works
(12.1) Working at night R12.1.1 1. Poor visibility 1. Work area to be adequately 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Case 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
2. Man overboard lighted (for work during night time)
2. Buddy system applied
3. Provide dedicated shift
4. Adequate rest
Hazard
5. To comply with fatigue
Management Guideline
6. Work vest provided with reflectors
(12.3) Working during R12.3.2 Lightning strike 1. Adverse weather 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Case 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
adverse Weather (for work during adverse weather including lightning shall be
considered)
(12.4) Personnel R12.4.1 1. Manoverboard 1. Adverse weather 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Case 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
Transfer by PTB 2. Movement of the boat (for personnel transfer using PTB)
(Personnel Transfer 3. Equipment failure
Basket) 4. incompetent crane operator and
rigger
5. Poor rigging practice
6. insufficient landing space
Note:
1. Status (OPEN/CLOSE) will be completed in Hazard Identification (HAZID) Close-Out Report
3.5 PARKING LOT
During the course of the HAZID Workshop, the following parking lots are recorded;
Table 3-4: Summary of Parking Lots
Status
Item Reference Issue or Concern Action to be Taken Responsible Party
(OPEN/CLOSE) Note 1
NORM, TENORM and hazardous gas monitoring Frequent monitoring of any hazardous gas, TENORM during CONTRACTOR & SUB-
and after finish cutting conductor CONTRACTOR
2 Mechanical Cutter Operation To erect proper working platform for the mechanical cutting CONTRACTOR
operator.
3 Anchor Pattern Barge contingency plan to be made available in case the barge CONTRACTOR
pulling in getting close to the MOAB/WHAP during adverse
weather.
4 Lifting operation (Crane Capacity) To decide the length of conductor to be cut taking into CONTRACTOR
consideration of PEX & MOAB crane capacity.
Banksman and Firewatcher to wear safety reflective vest during
5 Safety Reflective Vest executing task CONTRACTOR
6 Sling used to hang up conductor after cutting To decide the sling length x outside diameter CONTRACTOR
come with certification.
To prevent internal column vibration of the conductor

7 Four-point tag weld at internal conductor to prevent remaining CONTRACTOR
slot vibration.
Note:
1. Status (OPEN/CLOSE) will be completed in Hazard Identification (HAZID) Close-Out Report
3.6 HAZID CLOSED- OUT
The close-out of each recommendation listed in Table 3-3 shall be the responsibility of
the assigned party. CONTRACTOR shall issue the closed-out report, which will contain
the correspondent and evidence where required (i.e., report, drawings,
datasheets, etc.), as well as confirmation that issues have been resolved, mitigated or
become not applicable.
4.0 REFERENCES
/1/ Scope of Work, South Angsi Alpha (SAA) Facilities Decommissioning Project
/2/ Project Execution Plan, South Angsi Alpha (SAA) Facilities Decommissioning Project
/3/ Hazard Identification (HAZID) Terms of Reference, South Angsi Alpha (SAA) Facilities
Decommissioning Project
APPENDIX I – HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) WORKSHOP

DATE: 21 MARCH 2024
EPRD SAA 2024
LOCATION: BOARD ROOM LEVEL 16 KL TRILLION BUILDING REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
(1. Project Execution Plan - TOS-GEN-SAAX-MG-G-0004
(2. HAZID TOR
BASIC / GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Basic / General Safety Requirements:

1. APPROPRIATE PPE 2. TASK SPECIFIC PROCEDURE. 3. SPECIFIC TRAINING. 4. RESTRICT WORK AREA ACCESS. 5. PERMIT TO WORK (PTW & TRA). 6. MECHANICAL ISOLATION. 7. ELECTIRCAL ISOLATION 8. POST BARRIERS / SIGNS 9. SUPERVISION. 10. CERTIFICATION. 11. TOOL BOX TALKS. 12. COMPETENT PERSON. 13. PROPER HOUSEKEEPING. 14. PROPER/GOOD COMMUNICATION. 15. COMPANY PTW WITHIN 500m ZONE .16. COMPANY LIFE SAVING RULES. 17. WEATHER FORECAST
PROJECT PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PREPARATION, REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL (EPRD) SERVICES FOR SOUTH ANGSI ALPHA FACILITIES DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
ACTIVITY EPRD - Engineering Preparation, Removal and Disposal
LOCATION South Angsi Field
1. General Administration and Others
2. Mobilization and Demobilization
3. Main Work Vessel Barge Setup
7. WHAP Topside Removal
DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES 8. Reefing Works (MOAB Jacket & WHAP Sub-Structure)
9. Demobilization (Refer to No. 2.
11. Post Removal Survey at SAA
12. Miscellaneous Work
13. Rigging Up Hydraulic Workover Unit
14. Casing and Conductor Removal
Current Controls Initial Risk Additional Mitigations Residual Risk
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
Activity Consequences Causes Responsible Party Deadline Status
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
Threats Preventive Measures Mitigative Measure Preventive Measures Mitigative Measure
1. Administration
(1.1) General Administration R1.1.1 Health Hazards - Endemic: COVID-19 1. Risk of exposure to offshore 1. Personnel infected by COVID-19, Infection 1. Hand washing and use of alcohol-based hand sanitizers should be encouraged - to 1. Symptomatic Person Under Investigation (PUI) will be demob
- At site (offshore) personnel being infected with COVID-19 risk stems from:- place hand sanitizer at designated area/location 2. Symptomatic person will be isolated onboard and monitored by Medic
leading to some delays to complete a. Exposure to positive COVID-19 cases; 2. Clean / wipe all areas that are likely to have frequent hand contact routinely and when
work and potential fatalities to b. Exposure to unhealthy personnel which visibly soiled (e.g. taps, handrails, doorknobs). Work surfaces and equipment should also
personnel infected with COVID-19 may be in contact with other positive cases; be cleaned frequently
3. Employees shall be educated on the characteristics of the relevant disease, to include
actions for prevention of infection, initial disease symptoms, preventing the spread of the
disease
4. To educate personnel to use a tissue during cough and sneeze. If without the tissue,
3 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 6 N 3 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 6
turn away from other people and cough and sneeze into your arm not your hand
5. Full vaccination (including 1st booster) of personnel is requirement
2. Mobilization and Demobilization

(2.1) Load out/ Lifting of project materials, R2.1.1 1. Falling equipment and material 1. Personnel injury/ death 1. Load under stress - swing uncontrollably 1. JHA/TRA Cascading 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death 1. To identify escape route prior to start lifting Preventive Measures;
equipment consumables, spares and etc. 2. Damage to the vessel equipment. 2. Property damage due to adverse weather 2. Extra precaution at pinch point area 2. Using Impact gloves activity 1. CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman
1. Routine Lifting 3. Major movement of the cargo 2. Failure of lifting accessory 3. Barrier Management (safety signage) 3. Ensure that there is access to on-site medical support 2. Follow latest colour coding for lifting gears and 2. CONTRACTOR Logistic
2. Non-Routing Lift - Simple during rough sea state 3. Communication break-down 4. Maintain good housekeeping at working area 4. Vessel/barge person in charge (Bosun) to ensure seafastening done correctly tackles (Vendors are required to provide Coordinator /
3. Non-Routine Lifts - Complicated 4. HWU Substructure shifted and 4. Exceeded SWL of lifting gears & tackles 5. Ensure visual inspection prior activity prior mobilization. documentation and to color code accordingly before Vendors/Subcontractors of
4. Non-Routine Lifts - Complex fall into the sea. 5. lifting tackles not line-up, i.e. 6. Toolbox meeting - 5. Asset owner to verify the on the condition of seafastening. mobilization to quayside) particular equipment
5. Seafastening & Unseafastening HWU package entanglement, choke procedure etc a. Sufficient Lenght of Tag-lines or push & pull stick utilized during lifting 3. Sufficient lighting during night operations 3. CONTRACTOR HSE
and equipments. 6. COG - Unbalanced load b. Emphasize no hands on load during lifting 4. Use certified container and visual inspection on 4. CONTRACTOR Logistic
7. Expired lifting gears & tackles. 7. Inspection on crane condition and lifting equipment prior to activity lifting gears before lifting Coordinator / MWVB Barge
8. Insufficient seafastening strenght & 8. Clear communication between all party involved 5. The stowage plan will be finalized and adhered Foreman
incorrect seafastening method. 9. Uninterrupted line of sight between banksman and crane operator during loading/ loadout. Hence each cargoes will be 5. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer/
9. Incompetency and no basic training (Crane 10. Pre & Post-Usage Inspection of lifting equipments. stowage on deck as per lifting plan for loading & MWVB Barge Master
operator, rigger and signalman) 11. Use of approved, certified & compliance Cargo Handling Equipment especially for 5 N/A 3 3 C(3) 15 Y offloading. 5 N/A 3 3 B(2) 10
10. Working under suspended load. loose items.
12. Stowage plan to follow. NO “cherry picking”, to avoid mishandling of load.
13. . Lifting according to lifting plan
14. Lifting procedures to follow LOLER Standards (Lifting Operating Lifting Equipment
Regulation)
15. Weather Conditions Assessment.
16. Ensure that all personnel involved in lifting activities are adequately trained and
certified for their role
17. Full seafastening of the equipments to be carried out prior mobilisation and
demobilisation. (Barge Master/Chief Officer to confirm on seafastening)
(2.2) Manual handling and transfer of equipment R2.2.1 1. Sharp edges Personnel Injury 1. Crew can't identify sharp edges 1. Wearing full PPE (Hand glove, Safety Helmet, Safety Boot, Safety Glasses). 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Pinch Point 2. No secure or covered on the sharp edge 2. Awareness and supervision of sharp edges/pinch point hazards
3. Fingers trapped in-between
3 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 6
4. Failure to recognize hazards i.e.
closing/opening doors.
R2.2.2 Poor Manual Handling (Unaware of Personnel Injury 1. Repetitive activity 1. Wearing PPE (Rigging glove, Safety Helmet, Safety Boot, Safety Glasses). 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
good handling methodology) 2. Not familiar with manual handling 2. For load over 20kg or big bulk; assign enough manpower (Buddy system)
techniques 3. Crew to make sure walkway clear from slip, trips and fall hazard 2 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 4 N 2 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 4
3. Did not practice buddy system. 4. Ensure use proper manual handling techniques - awareness
4. improper work area
R2.2.3 Dropped Object 1. Personnel injury 1. Wrong lifting technique 1. Ensure all tools and equipment are transferred and handled properly. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Property damage 2. Improper packing and lashing of 2. Material and equipment properly packed and secured.
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
equipment 3. Buddy system
R2.2.4 Tripping hazards 1. Personnel Injury 1. Unfamiliar with vessel's layout and 1. Ship Familiarization during sign on 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Equipment damage arrangement 2. Signages where applicable
2. Lack of signages 3. Crew to make sure walkway clear from slip, trips and fall hazard
3. Poor housekeeping
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(2.3) Personnel Movement R2.3.1 Personnel movement via Gangway 1. Personnel injury 1. Improper installation of gangway 1. Proper install of gangway. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
(Main Work Vessel Barge (MWVB)/ 2. Personnel carry heavy and many luggage. 2. Standby person to assist incoming crew.
Jetty) 3. To follow vessel safe operation procedure for crossing gangway
4. Drop object netting. 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
5. Compulsary the usage of work vest.
6. T-card system to be made available at the area.
7. Deck crew will monitor T-Card compliance.
(2.4) Working overboard/edge of Main Work R2.4.1 Man Overboard (MOB) 1. Personnel injury. 1. Adverse weather. 1. Monitoring of local weather. 1. Personnel work vest
Vessel Barge (MWVB) 2. Miscommunication. 2. Adequate lighting system and hazard marking. 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
3. Poor Judgement/Human error. 3. Tool box talk and safety briefing prior to work 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. Poor visibility. 4. Availability of life ring on potential MOB work area 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death
5. Standby boat from the port (pilot boat) 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8
6. Work vest for personnel working edge vessel
7. Buddy system
(2.5) Hot work at Deck of MWVB and Material R2.5.1 Fire and explosion 1. Personnel injury./death 1. Fire from welding spark/flame cutting. 1. Provide proper and adequate storage areas for chemicals, paints and other flammable 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death 1. Detail deck layout, sea fastening, to be shared to Preventive Measures;
Barge (MB) 2. Project delay. 2. Malfunctioning equipments (leaking of gas substances and adequate separation of oxygen & acetylene cylinder. MWVB Barge Master 1. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
3. Tarnish image. cylinder & hose/welding current supply). 2. Hot work areas must be cleared from combustible materials. 2. To follow gas cylinder colour code 2. CONTRACTOR Fitter Foreman
4. Property damage. 3. Incompetent personnel. 3. Continuous leakage monitoring on gas cylinders & hoses and welding current supply by 3. To have sufficient fire extinguisher and firewatcher / HSE
4. Inadequate supervision. welding crew / supv. 4. Welding machine must be located on the MWVB 3. CONTRACTOR Fitter Foreman
5. non certified equipment 4. Fire Fighting Equipments (portable fire extinguishers / fire blankets / running water deck or at the proper/approved location instead of at / Welder Foreman / HSE
6. Improper grounding of welding set hoses / Fire Watcher) must make available at the hot work / storage area. the jetty. 4. CONTRACTOR Welder
7. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent Paint/ 5. Immediately close the supply valve of gas cylinders in case of leaking and fire. 5. To have proper cable management for hot work Foreman
oxygen/ acetylene storage 6. Conduct gas test at the confined space area. activity 5. CONTRACTOR Fitter Foreman
8. Insulation under deck (engine room) 7. ensure equipment used with valid certification / Welder Foreman / HSE
9. Vapor present between tank and under 8. Valid Port PTW for hot works.
deck 9. Check welding machine for proper earthing
10. Oil/chemical spill 10. Pre-check cables/connection and condition before use. 5 N/A 3 4 B(2) 10 Y 5 N/A 3 4 A(1) 5
11. Flash back arrestors for oxygen and acetylene regulators
12. Ensure proper ventilation systems are in place to remove fumes and gases generated
during hot work. (Confined space area)
13. Mandate the use of appropriate PPE for personnel involved in hot work, including
flame-resistant clothing, face shields, gloves, and safety goggles. Conduct regular checks to
ensure that PPE is in good condition.
14. Required oil spill kit (With proper labelling)
15. Jerry can, funnel to be used for proper oil handling.
16. Ensure sufficient supplies of oil spill kits onboard.
17. Every sub contractor involved with the operation shall bring their own spill kits.
(2.6) Sail-away to/from location (Mob/Demob) R2.6.1 Vessel unable to reach location at 1. Loss of asset 1. Piracy 1. Vessel voyage safety & security plan. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Procedure for personnel to lock within Preventive Measures;
timely manner 2. Schedule delay 2. Adverse weather 2. Weather forecast accommodation in the event of pirate intrusion to be 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Equipment damage 3. Tow line parted or entangled 3. Tow line inspection prior to sail-away shared during vessel induction session.
4. Personnel injury 4. AHT breakdown 4. Inform authority (APMM/Navy/Jabatan Laut) of passage planning 3 N/A 2 2 C(3) 9 2 N/A 2 2 C(3) 6
5. AHT schedule maintenance
6. Piracy watch 24 hours at hot area
7. Security assessment prior Mob/Demob
3. MWVB SETUP
(3.1) Vessel working near to Platform R3.1.1 1. Vessel run-off/ station-keeping 1. Personnel injury 1. Bad weather and high swell 1. Obtain weather forecast from minimum of two (2. sources (6 hourly report) and one 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and Preventive Measures;
compromised during approach / 2. Property damage 2. Miscommunication between MWVB and week in advance weather forecast (Bridging Document Between TOSSB and IOSB to be prepared) marine personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
along side 3. Environmental damage AHT 2. 24 hrs Bridge Watch, Radar Watch Document 2. CONTRACTOR Marine
2. Vessel drifted and collide with 4. Project Delay 3. Vessel must be working within vessel weather limitation under Vessel Master discretion 2. Plan to provide Mandarin Conversant personnel
existing facilities during set-up & 5. Damage of Reputation 4. Pre-test the communication system with all relevant parties located on MWVB for effective communication with
operations 5. Dedicated communication channel to be established between relevant parties AHT
3. Malfunction of AHT 6. Use common understandable language (English) 3. Surveyor to view current field layout from post pre-
4. Collisions with underwater 7. Vessel procedures (Checklists, ER procedure, PMS, etc.) removal survey.
obstacles or uncharted structures. 8. Comply to HML MOPO Latest Rev.
5. Technical failure of essential 9. All equipment onboard are sea fasted and proper lashing to avoid falling object to
vessel systems during operations. personnel during vessel touching impact.
10. Any rectification / failure to be acted on must be done outside 500m zone. 4 N/A 5 3 C(3) 15 Y 4 N/A 5 3 B(2) 10
11. Updated Preventive Maintenance
12. To complete checklist for entry 500m zone
13. Emergency pull out procedure for MWVB
14. Implement a regular and rigorous maintenance schedule for all critical systems and
equipment.
15. MWVB & AHTS will go through specific vessel inspection (PMI) by HML punchlist to be
closeout prior mobilisation.
R3.1.2 Other vessel in the field colliding 1. Personnel injury Loss/ failure of communication and 1. Establish communication with all parties involve at site. Dedicated communications 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
with MWVB 2. Property damage coordination while MWVB in operation channels between all vessels.
3. Environmental damage 2. Coordinate activity between vessel.
3. Bridge watch 24 hrs
4 N/A 4 4 C(3) 12 Y 4 N/A 4 4 C(3) 12
4. Platform Supt / Supv to control & coordinate all vessel activities within 500m zone
5. Radar to be switched on at all time to monitor squall and traffic
(3.2) Anchor Handling R3.2.1 Collision between AHTS and MWVB 1. Personnel injury Operation Stage 1. Check the survey system equipment fit to use at AHT. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and Preventive Measures;
2. Property damage 1) Survey system failure 2. Equipment back up / spares available. marine personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Environmental damage 2) Miscommunication during operation 3. Competent personnel - Anchor foreman overseeing operation Document 2. AHT Vessel Master
3) Engine failure 4. System must be verified and calibrated. 4 N/A 4 4 C(3) 12 Y 2. To follow Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) 4 N/A 4 4 B(2) 8
5. Stop all Operations if survey system fails.
6. Running the anchor based on approved anchor pattern
R3.2.2 1.Insufficient pennant wire length 1. Property damage. 1. improper preparation to consider water 1. Ensure sufficient length of pennant wire. (1.5 x water depth as a minimum). Further to
for anchor buoy leading to potential 2. Additional cost of repair. depth variation (between high and low tide) comply with COMPANY requirements
inability to locate anchor for 3. Schedule delay. at the location N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6 N N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6
retrieval resulting in asset loss. 2. inadequate inspection of length
R3.2.3 1.Shark Jaw not properly closed on 1. Personnel Injury/ fatality 1. Inadequate maintenance 1. Proper pre-hire inspection before vessel acceptance 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/fatality
AHT leading to wire jumping out of 2. Schedule delay leading to additional 2. Not following procedure 2. Equipment to be tested - Function Test of all Anchor Handling equipment.
5 N/A 2 4 B(2) 10 5 N/A 2 4 B(2) 10
shark jaw project cost 3. equipment malfunction 3. Anchor Handling Operation to Stop if System Fails.
R3.2.4 1.Adverse weather condition 1. Schedule delay 1. Passing squall 1. Obtain weather forecast and establish suitable weather window. 1. Stop work the activity in case of bad weather; follow MAPO guidelines
(passing squall) 2. Strong wind and wave 2. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition. 2. AHT engine in standby mode
3. Observe sea state limitation for anchoring.
4. Sequence for vessel set up and anchoring to be communicated. (Approved anchor
pattern) N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6 N N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6
5. Barge movement and anchor pattern to be discussed and concurred by both CSR and
Marine Captain on board.
R3.2.5 1.Anchor Dragging-The anchor may 1. Loss of positioning for the Barge, 1. Inadequate monitoring of anchor position, 1. Regularly monitor anchor position using DGPS and to confirm with TOPO Surveyor. 1. Activate contingency plans promptly.
1.PEX to ensure anchor wires spare and anchor
drag along the seabed, leading to a potential damage to subsea 2. failure to assess seabed conditions, or 2. Utilize and sharing of previous survey report to AHTS. 2. Use thrusters to regain control.
available in the event of the anchor wire parted.
potential loss of positioning for the infrastructure, and increased risk of 3. insufficient anchor holding capacity. 3. Have contingency plans for repositioning in case of dragging.
2. PEX to provide valid cert for anchor wires
Barge. accidents. 4. Perform anchor soak test as per approved anchor handling procedures.
certificate.
5. Anchor wire tension monitoring.
3. Winch perator to be available at the anchor
6. Weather monitoring. 1 2 1 2 B(2) 4 N
console at all times.
7. Surveyor on duty must be at station and frequently monitor.
4. PEX to ensure anchor handling jewelleries
assesories i.e anchor wire socket and wire lock
available (Spare)
R3.2.6 1.Equipment Failure- Mechanical 1. Operational downtime, 1. Lack of maintenance, 1. Strict preventive maintenance program for all equipment. 1. Activate backup systems.
failure of the winch, anchor 2. potential accidents, and 2. poor equipment condition, or 2. Conduct pre-operational checks before anchor handling. 2. Initiate emergency response procedures.
handling equipment, or other 3. loss of anchor handling capability. 3. unforeseen mechanical issues. 3. Have redundant systems and backup equipment on standby. 3. Coordinate with support vessels for assistance.
critical components. 4. Train crew members in emergency response procedures. 4. PEX to asssign personnel during pull in and pull out fwd and aft barge on the
5. PEX to ensure LTMS system/limitation alarm to be fully functioning. (20/3) anchor wire leading and direction. 20/3 1 N/A 2 2 B(2) 4 N
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
R3.2.7 1. Communication Breakdown- 1. Coordination issues, 1. Technical failures, 1. Implement reliable communication systems with backup options. 1. Activate alternative communication channels.
Inadequate communication 2. delays in operations, and 2. language barriers, or 2. Conduct regular communication drills and training sessions. 2. Initiate emergency signals and alarms.
between the AHT and the Barge, 3. increased risk of accidents. 3. lack of clear communication protocols. 3. Use standardized communication procedures and language. 3. Established agreed working channel for VHF.
leading to coordination issues. 4. Pre-job safety meeting (PJSM) to be conducted prior the anchor handling operations.
N/A N/A N/A 1 A(1) 2 N
R3.2.8 Personnel Safety-Accidents or 1. Injuries, 1. inadequate personal protective equipment 1. TBT prior for anchor handling job 1. Activate emergency response procedures.
injuries during anchor handling 2. potential fatalities, and (PPE), or 2. Enforce the use of appropriate PPE. 2. Provide immediate medical attention.
operations. 3. long-term impact on crew morale. 2. failure to follow safety procedures. 3. Implement strict adherence to safety protocols. 3. Evacuate injured personnel if necessary.
4. Conduct regular safety audits and inspections. 4. PEX to ensure helideck team sufficient (HRO,HLO,HDA,HERTM) 20/3
5. Experience medic well verse with emergency protocal (Medevac,Casevac and
4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 10 Y
Bodyvac)
6. Medical equipments condition to be fully functional.
7. DFA
R3.2.9 Uncontrolled Drift-Unintended 1. Loss of position, 1. Strong currents, 1. Master to confirm current speed from DOPPLER equipment. 1. Followed communication protocol as per extablished mooring procedure.
movement or drift of the Barge due 2. potential collisions, and 2. equipment failure, or 2. Monitor current conditions and adjust operations accordingly. 2. Another AHT's standby to assist in event of barge drifting toward the
to strong currents or external 3. increased risk to personnel. 3. inadequate station-keeping measures. 3. To Comply with the APPROVED anchor deployment procedures. platform.
forces. 1. Closely monitoring current weather condition
1. Yokohama fender to be made
2 N/A 3 3 C(3) 8 N based on the weather forecast (Storm Geo)
available on deck. (If required)
R3.2.10 Crew fatigue due to long hours of 1. Property Damage 1) Insufficient manning to cater long hours of 1. Current manning of AHT can manage extended operation of up to 16 hrs and additional 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
operation 2. Personnel Injury operation manning can be provided if necessary for 24 hrs operation.
2 N/A N/A N/A C(3) 6 N 2 N/A N/A N/A C(3) 6
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset

(4.1) Lifting Operation (General) R4.1.1 Suspended load fall during lifting 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of crane, lifting equipment/gears 1. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
1. Routine Lifting 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area
2. Non-Routing Lift - Simple 3. Schedule impact 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging equipment 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding
3. Non-Routine Lifts - Complicated 4. Cost impact 4. Under-rated rigging equipment 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
4. Non-Routine Lifts - Complex 5. Communication failure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
6. Adverse weather 6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language i.e., English
7. Human error 7. Dedicated banksman need clear line of sight (To ensure banksman/lifting pic wear vest
8. No MOC being practiced for any changes and whistle)
of work procedure 8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation
9. Incompetence personnel. 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12 Y 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12
10. Competent personnel (Crane operator, riggers)
11. COMPANY MAPO as reference
12. Approved field rigging lifting calculations and procedure
Regulation)
14. PA announcement for critical lift to be made.
R4.1.2 Uncontrolled swinging loads 1. Personnel injury 1. Sudden change of weather 1. Obtain site specific weather forecast 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Property damage 2. Incorrect rigging arrangement 2. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
3. Human error 3. Observe sea state direction and limitation
4. ) Lifting during good weather window
5. Competent/ qualified crane operator/ banksman/rigger, and aware of emergency 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12 Y 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12
procedure
6. Sufficient tagline and proper rigging arrangement
7. To follow COMPANY MAPO guideline
8. To follow COMPANY colour coding
(4.2) Scaffolding Activity R4.2.1 1. Scaffolding equipment dropped 1. Personnel injury/fatality 1. scaffolding material failure 1. Experienced/competent Scaffolder 1. ERP for personnel rescue working at height
2. Personnel falling from height 2. Property damage 2. Human error 2. Wear full fall arrestor equipment (with double lanyard) or work vest for overboard
3. Substandard scaffolding material erection
3. Clear unnecessary obstruction/barricade workspace. Barrier management system
4. Utilise Aloft tools
5. certified scaffolding material 3 N/A 2 2 B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 2 B(2) 6
6. Sufficient manpower to erect the scaffolding
7. Visual inspection of scaffolding material prior to erection
R4.2.2 Inappropriate method for manual 1. Personnel injury 1. Awkward body position 1. Wearing PPE (Rigging glove, Safety Helmet, Safety Boot, Safety Glasses). 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
handling 2. Repetitive task 2. For load over 20kg or big bulk; assign enough manpower (Buddy system)
3. Using mechanical aid, pallet jack, trolley and crane to the need of manual handling.
R4.2.3 Scaffolding topple/collapse 1. Personnel injury/fatality 1. scaffolding material failure 1. Experienced/ Competent Scaffolder 1. ERP for personnel rescue working at height
2. Property damage 2. Human error 2. Wear full fall arrestor equipment (with double lanyard) or work vest for overboard
3. Substandard scaffolding material erection
4. Incompetent scaffolders 2. Clear unnecessary obstruction/barricade workspace
4. Utilise Aloft tools
5. certified scaffolding material 3 N/A 2 2 B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 2 B(2) 6
6. Sufficient manpower to erect the scaffolding
7. Visual inspection of scaffolding material prior to erection
8. Final inspection by competent level 3 scaffolding inspector and put the scaffold tag.
(4.3) General Hot work R4.3.1 Fire, explosion 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontained spark 1. Pre-inspection of cables/hoses and connection (comply to checklist/procedure) 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Ensure any residual diesel at hot work area vicinity Preventive Measures;
2. Property damage 2. Improper grounding 2. Hoses to be properly managed away from sparks/hot slags is cleared prior to hot work activity 1. CONTRACTOR HSE/ Welding
3. Damaged cable 3. Fire watcher in attendance at all times with vest. 2. Ensure any residual oil at or near hot work area is Foreman / Fitter Foreman
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent Paint/ 4. Fire extinguisher, fire blanket, on standby at workplace cleared prior to hot work activity 2. CONTRACTOR HSE/ Welding
oxygen/ acetylene/ Diesel storage 5. Use flash back arrestor 3. To conduct regular gas test in the event of Foreman / Fitter Foreman
5. Debris from grinding 6. Check welding machine for proper earthing combustible gases nearby hot work area 3. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
4 1 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 1 2 2 A(1) 4
6. Residue oil at or near hot work area 7. sufficient distance of oxygen and acetylene cylinder (Min 3 meters) Foreman / Fitter Foreman
8. Welding area must be clear from flammable/combustible material
9. Wear specific PPE for hot work (Dust mask, welding shield etc)
10. Authorized gas tester (AGT) to conduct gas test prior to hot work activity
(4.4) Air Diving operations R4.4.1 Diver stung/bitten by marine life 1. Personnel injury 1. Marine life in the surrounding area 1. Look out for marine life 1. Suitable anti-allergic medicine in stock onboard 1. To notify MWVB & surrounding vessel that no food Preventive Measures;
2. Schedule delay 2. no food dumping during operations 2. Recover diver back to dive cage / surface dumping is allowed during diving operation. (To be 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 6 N 3 N/A N/A 3 A(1) 3
3. Proper suit to be used 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury mentioned in PTW form)
R4.4.2 Diving personal equipment failure 1. Fatality 1. Improper equipment maintenance and 1. Preventive maintenance system 1. Hyperbaric chamber
(Note: Maximum diving depth 2. Property damage (diving equipment) usage 2. Follow diving/equipment procedures 2. Standby diver to recover diver
expected of 32m) 3. IMCA guidelines 3. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for fatality 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10
4. IMCA audit compliance
R4.4.3 Diver/umbilical hit by drop object 1. Personnel injury / fatality 1. Human error during crane operation 1. Establish good communication between Diving Superintendent and MWVB Barge 1. Hyperbaric chamber Preventive Measures;
1. Good umbilical management with respect to
2. Property damage (diving umbilical) Foreman 2. Standby diver to recover diver 1. CONTRACTOR Diving
crane movement
2. PTW in place 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for perosnnel injuyr /fatality Supervisor
2. Main block of the crane to be position away from
5 N/A N/A 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10 2. CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman
the diver working area
3. CONTRACTOR Diving
3. Dive Plan (prior to every diving activities) to be
Supervisor
attached to PTW
2. Rigging failure 1. Carry out pre-job briefing and inspection 1. Hyperbaric chamber Preventive Measures;
2. Certified, color-coded and proper rigging 2. Standby diver to recover diver 1. Good umbilical management with respect to 1. CONTRACTOR Diving
3. Carry out routine inspection on riggings crane movement Supervisor
4. Engineered riggings 2. Main block of the crane to be position away from 2. CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman
5 N/A N/A 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10
5. Lift Plan in place the diver working area 3. CONTRACTOR Diving
6. Suspended load to be position away from diver during lowering/lifting process 3. Dive Plan (prior to every diving activities) to be Supervisor
7. Ensure underwater rigging fit for purpose attached to PTW
R4.4.4 Uncontrolled release of pressure for 1. Personnel injury 1. Poor equipment 1. Periodic inspection and maintenance of equipment 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
subsea tools (High pressure water 2. Improper connection 2. Pre-check connection / Whip check install for every high pressure hose connection
4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8
jet, Hydraulic Hoses)
R4.4.5 Pinch point during manual handling 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontrolled load movement 1. Specific dive activity to be incorporated in the procedure 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Moving equipment (crane movement) 2. To remind diver to identify pinch point prior start work
3. Clear communication to made available between MWVB Barge Foreman, Crane 3 N/A N/A 2 C(3) 9 Y 3 N/A N/A 2 C(3) 9
Operator and Dive supversior
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
R4.4.6 Entanglement 1. Schedule delay 1. improper umbilical management 1. Preventive maintenance of umbilical 1. Diver recovery by standby diver
2. Personnel injury 2. Sudden squall 2. Good communication between dive supervisor and dive system tech who is paying out 2. Use standby bailout (standby self contained breathing apparatus)
the umbilical 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 4 N 2 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 4
R4.4.7 Diving operation during helicopter

operations - no issue as all diving
operation will stop during
helicopter operations
(4.5) ROV R4.5.1 ROV umbilical cable entanglement 1. Property damage (ROV) 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - Operator 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- Preventive Measures;
and/or parted 2. Schedule delay error 2. ROV umbilical management in place. structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
2. Electrical/Power failure 3. Safe position of MWVB & AHT . (to be explicitly defined in the ROV and operation Supervisor
3. Poor visibility 4. ROV supervisor/pilot to familiarize with general jacket sub-structure layout drawing. procedure)
4. Adverse weather 5. To provide clear work instruction to the ROV team
N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6 N N/A N/A 2 N/A B(2) 4
5. Poor condition of the cable 6. To obtain current status from current meter real time readings
7. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
8. No launching/recovering of ROV during adverse weather
9. PMS certificate in place; IMCA Audit, load test
R4.5.2 Exposure to high voltage 1. Personnel injury 1. Equipment in poor condition 1. Regular preventive maintenance 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Schedule delay 2. Too much tether pay-out 2. Comply with ROV procedures - tether management
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
3. Congested working area 3. Barricade /signage in place
(4.6) SIMOPS for ROV and Diving R4.6.1 Diver clash with ROV umbilical or 1. Personnel injury 1. Miscommunication between dive / ROV 1. To have clear communication between all parties involved 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
vice versa 2. Schedule delay supervisor 2. Comply with ROV and air diving procedures
3. Property Damage 2. Poor tether management 3. Weather watch on stand-by to observe sudden change of weather condition 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
3. Poor visibility 4. Beacon provided for ROV and Diver and accurate more than 15m water depth
4. Human error
(4.7) Boat Landing Removal R4.7.1 Man Overboard (MOB) 1. Personnel injury. 1. Adverse weather. 1. Monitoring of local weather. 1. Personnel work vest
2. Miscommunication. 2. Adequate lighting system and hazard marking. 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
4. Poor visibility. 4. Availability of life ring on potential MOB work area 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death
5. Standby boat from the port (pilot boat) 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8
6. Work vest for personnel working edge vessel
7. Buddy system
(4.7.2) Scaffold Erection for ; R4.7.2 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container/toolbag and tool lanyard. 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby 1. Removal procedure shall include sketches to Preventive Measures;
a. Main boat landing 2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Buddy system 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea confirm that scaffolding will not impede boat landing 1. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
b. Cage ladder 3. Working at heights 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place & ancillary structure removal 2. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer
c. Pirate Door Service Platform 4. Human error 4. Slip, trip and fall 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area 2. Identify last cut point on boat landing to ensure 3. Pre-job briefing by
5. Scaffolding impeding removal of 5. Working over the side 5. Follow communication protocol proper disengagement of the boat landing CONTRACTOR Field Engineer /
boat landing & ancillary structures 6. Man-overboard 6. Continuous weather forecasting 3. Fitter to be briefed the foreseen movement of Attendance by Fitter
6. Inadequate scaffolding to protect 7. Inadequate communication 7. Adequate lighting during operations 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N boat landing after last cut 4 N/A 2 2 A(1) 4 4. CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman
fitter during last cut 9. Poor lighting 8. Competent scaffolder level 3 inspector provided 4. Ensure adequate tag lines in place to reduce boat
10. Negligence by personnel 9. Scaffolding plan provided landing movement after last cut
11. Congested work area 10. JHA/TRA/ Working at Height Rescue Plan.
(4.7.3) Removal of Grating R4.7.3 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Offshore Preparatory Work procedure in place 1. Ring buoy deployed at sea
2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Loose items are secured on basket/container/toolbag/tool lanyards. 2. FRC on standby in vicinity
3. Working at heights 3. Back injuries 3. Fall from height 3. Buddy system 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. Human factor 4. Heavy grating 4. Hard barricade in place (at access point to boat landing) 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death
5. Man-overboard 5. Slip, trip and fall 5. Personnel made aware of the openings i.e., signage
6. Unprotected openings 6. Use mechanical tools (grating hook) to remove grating
7. Inadequate communication 7. Wear full body harness and proper anchored point 100% tie-off at all times. 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
8. Wearing of work vest (when working overboard)
9. To ensure scaffolding complete erect before grating removal
10. Only authorized personnel are allowed at working area.
11. Grating maybe removed within boat landing area on top of existing grating - in this
case, the grating will be secured to existing grating
(4.7.4) Setup-rig-up rigging assemblies R4.7.4 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Wearing of work vest at all time 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Line of fire (direct exposure to hazard) 2. Buddy system.
3. Human factor 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off and strong anchored point
4. Excessive load 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area.
5. Miscommunication 5. Follow communication protocol.
6. Rigging failure 6. Monitor weather forecast
4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
7. Congested work area 7. Adequate lighting for night operations
8. Inclement weather 8. Inspect all lifting gears with valid lifting code.
9. Pinch point
10. Lifting gears not inspected and without
valid colour code.
(4.7.5) Lifting of Boat Landing (Note: Lifting to R4.7.5 Suspended load fall during lifting 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
MB2). This considered 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area
as Non-Routine Lifts - Complicated 3. Schedule impact 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging equipment 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding
4. Cost impact 4. Under-rated rigging equipment 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
5. Communication failure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
7. Human error 7. Dedicated banksman need clear line of sight and wear vest.
8. No MOC being practiced for any changes 8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation
of work procedure 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12 Y 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12
Regulation)
14. Crane PM and daily checklist to be filled out by competent crane operator.
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(4.8) Caisson 1-4 Removal R4.8.1 Man Overboard (MOB) 1. Personnel injury. 1. Adverse weather. 1. Monitoring of local weather. 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby
2. Miscommunication. 2. Adequate lighting system and hazard marking. 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
4. Poor visibility. 4. Work vest for personnel working edge vessel 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death
5. Buddy system
4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8M
(4.8.2) Scaffold Erection R4.8.2 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby
2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Buddy system 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
3. Working at heights 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. Human error 4. Slip, trip and fall 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area
5. Scaffolding impeding removal of 5. Working over the side 5. Follow communication protocol
boat landing & ancillary structures 6. Man-overboard 6. Continuous weather forecasting
4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 A(1) 4
6. Inadequate scaffolding to protect 7. Inadequate communication 7. Adequate lighting during operations
fitter during last cut 9. Poor lighting 8. Competent scaffolder level 3 inspector provided
10. Negligence by personnel 9. Scaffolding plan provided
11. Congested work area 10. JHA/TRA/ Wah rescue plan.
12. Inclement weather 11. Competent scaffolders.
13. Poor scaffolding erection.
(4.8.3) Cutting of MOAB Extension Deck and R4.8.3 Fire, explosion 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontained spark 1. Pre-inspection of cables/hoses and connection (comply to checklist/procedure) 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury Refer R4.3.1 additional mitigations preventive
Beam 2. Property damage 2. Improper grounding 2. Hoses to be properly managed away from sparks/hot slags measures
3. Damaged cable 3. Fire watcher in attendance at all times
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent Paint/ 4. Fire extinguisher, fire blanket, on standby at workplace
oxygen/ acetylene/ Diesel storage 5. Use flash back arrestor
5. Debris from grinding 6. sufficient distance of oxygen and acetylene cylinder
6. Residue oil at or near hot work area 7. Cutting area must be clear from flammable/combustible material (3 meters) 4 1 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 1 2 2 A(1) 4
10. To install hard barricade after deck/beam removal
11. To inspect all related equipment before start.
(4.8.4) Setup Rigging for Caisson Lifting and R4.8.4 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Wearing of work vest at all time 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. CONTRACTOR shall ensure there will be no Preventive Measures;
Caisson lifting activity 2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Line of fire (direct exposure to hazard) 2. Buddy system. contamination to the environment prior to removal 1. CONTRACTOR Field Engineer /
3. Human factor 3. Environmental pollution 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off and strong anchored point of caisson no.4 HSE
4. Environmental contamination 4. Excessive load 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area.
6. Rigging failure 6. Monitor weather forecast 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 A(1) 4
9. Pinch point
10. Residual oil/sludge in caisson no. 4
(4.9) Setup Strand Jack at MOAB Legs; R4.9.1 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby
a. Scaffolding erection around Strand Jack 2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Buddy system 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
location 3. Working at heights 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
b. Power cable and hydraulic hoses 4. Human error 4. Slip, trip and fall 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area
c. Installation of Jacks 5. Pinch point 5. Working over the side 5. Follow communication protocol
d. Installation of strand wires 6. Man-overboard 6. Continuous weather forecasting
e. Installation of Strand Jack Anchor 7. Inadequate communication 7. Adequate lighting during operations
Note: Hot work required - Refer to R4.3.1 for hot 9. Poor lighting 8. Competent scaffolder level 3 inspector provided 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
work hazard 10. Negligence by personnel 9. Scaffolding plan provided
11. Congested work area 10. JHA/TRA
12. Inclement weather 11. Cable/hose management
(4.9.2) Working at Height R4.9.2 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC on standby
3. Human error 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. Slip, trip and fall 4. No obstruction at the scaffolding work area
5. Working over the side 5. Follow communication protocol
6. Man-overboard 6. Continuous weather forecasting
7. Inadequate communication 7. Adequate lighting during operations 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
9. Poor lighting
10. Negligence by personnel
(4.9.3) Confined Space during Anchor block R4.9.3 1. Insufficient Oxygen Level 1. Personnel Injury/Death 1. Inadequate communication. 1. Forced ventilation and adequate lighting 1. Standby SCBA, escape sets 1. Remove residual hydrocarbon at Leg B2 and Preventive Measures;
installation at Leg B 2. Hazardous Gas presence 2. Inadequate ventilation/lighting. 2. CSE procedure adherence (gas tests, Standby person, communication means, rescue 2. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death ensure gas free prior to entry 1. CONTRACTOR HSE/ AGT
equipment, life line)
3. Authorized Entrants and Standby Person (AESP) requirement. 5 2 N/A 2 B(2) 10 Y 5 2 N/A 2 A(1) 5
4. Gas test prior to entry & continuous gas testing via AGT
5. Buddy system

(5.1) Setup of MB1 (330 class) underneath MOAB R5.1.1 1. AHT run-off/ station-keeping 1. Personnel injury 1. Bad weather and high swell 1. Obtain weather forecast from minimum of two (2. sources (6 hourly report) and one 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Dedicated radio channel for construction and Preventive Measures;
compromised during approach 2. Property damage 2. Miscommunication between AHT and week in advance weather forecast marine personnel to be stipulated inside Bridging 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
underneath MOAB 3. Environmental damage CONTRACTOR Barge Foreman 2. 24 hrs Bridge Watch, Radar Watch Document 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
2. AHT/MB1 drifted and collide 4. Project Delay 3. AHT malfunction 3. AHTs must be working within AHT weather limitation under AHT Master discretion 2. Winch plan to be installed on MB1 to maintain Team
with existing facilities during set-up 5. Damage of Reputation 4. Pre-test the communication system with all relevant parties positioning upon setup at intended location
& operations 5. Dedicated communication channel to be established between relevant parties
6. Use common understandable language (English)
7. Comply to MAPO
4 N/A 5 3 C(3) 15 Y 4 N/A 5 3 B(2) 10
8. All equipment onboard are sea fasted and proper lashing to avoid falling object to
personnel during vessel touching impact.
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(5.2) Lowering Down of MOAB with strand jack; R5.2.1 1. Jerking or sudden loading during 1. Property damage 1. Bad weather and high swell 1. Obtain weather forecast from minimum of two (2. sources (6 hourly report) and one 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
a. Load transfer from permanent legs to jacks load transfer to jacks 2. Project delay 2. Miscommunication between Strand Jack week in advance weather forecast
b. Lowering with load on jacks 2. HPU failed while lowering 3. Personnel injury Operator and Barge Foreman 2. 24 hrs Bridge Watch, Radar Watch
c. Load transfer from strand jack to barge with 3. Lowering down not synchronized 4. Damage of reputation 3. Equipment failure 3. AHTs must be working within AHT weather limitation under AHT Master discretion
mooring and tugs between all legs 4. Pre-test the communication system with all relevant parties
4. Strand jack equipment failure 5. Dedicated communication channel to be established between relevant parties
5. Pinch points 6. Use common understandable language (English)
7. Comply to MAPO
4 N/A 5 3 B(2) 10 Y 4 N/A 5 3 B(2) 10
9. Follow approved procedures, analysis and sequence
10. Function Test of Strand Jack spread
11. Close monitoring on all legs for any anomalies via computer and visual
12. Ensure no obstruction along the lowering path on each legs (prior to lowering)
13. Proper positioning of personnel during last cut
(5.3) Sea fastening of MOAB to MB1 - Manual R5.3.1 1. Sharp edges Personnel Injury 1. Crew can't identify sharp edges 1. Wearing full PPE (Hand glove, Safety Helmet, Safety Boot, Safety Glasses). 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
Handling 2. Pinch Point 2. No secure or covered on the sharp edge 2. Awareness and supervision of sharp edges/pinch point hazards
3. Fingers trapped in-between
4. Failure to recognize hazards i.e.
closing/opening doors.
R5.3.2 Poor Manual Handling (Unaware of Personnel Injury 1. Repetitive activity 1. Wearing PPE (Rigging glove, Safety Helmet, Safety Boot, Safety Glasses). 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
good handling methodology) 2. Not familiar with manual handling 2. For load over 20kg or big bulk; assign enough manpower (Buddy system)
techniques 3. Crew to make sure walkway clear from slip, trips and fall hazard 2 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 4 N 2 N/A N/A N/A B(2) 4
3. Did not practice buddy system. 4. Ensure use proper manual handling techniques - awareness
4. improper work area
R5.3.3 Dropped Object 1. Personnel injury 1. Wrong lifting technique 1. Ensure all tools and equipment are transferred and handled properly. 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Property damage 2. Improper packing and lashing of 2. Material and equipment properly packed and secured.
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
equipment 3. Buddy system
R5.3.4 Tripping hazards 1. Personnel Injury 1. Unfamiliar with vessel's layout and 1. Ship Familiarization during sign on 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Equipment damage arrangement 2. Signages where applicable
2. Lack of signages 3. Crew to make sure walkway clear from slip, trips and fall hazard
3. Poor housekeeping
(5.3.5) General Hot Work at MB1; R5.3.5 Fire, explosion 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontained spark 1. Pre-inspection of cables/hoses and connection (comply to checklist/procedure) 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. To conduct regular gas test in the event of Preventive Measures;
a. General activity 2. Property damage 2. Improper grounding 2. Hoses to be properly managed away from sparks/hot slags combustible gases nearby hot work area 1. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
b. Cutting of the legs of A1/A2 for MOAB 3. Damaged cable 3. Fire watcher in attendance at all times 2. Prepare A1/A2 legs cutting procedure as part of Foreman / Fitter Foreman
4. Improper Oil/ Chemical/ Solvent Paint/ 4. Fire extinguisher, fire blanket, on standby at workplace WHAP & Jacket Removal and Reefing Procedure 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
oxygen/ acetylene 5. Use flash back arrestor Team
5. Debris from grinding 6. Check welding machine for proper earthing 4 1 2 2 C(3) 12 Y 4 1 2 2 B(2) 8
7. sufficient distance of oxygen and acetylene cylinder
(5.3.6) Scaffolding at MB1 R5.3.6 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby
6. Man-overboard 6. Continuous weather forecasting 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
7. Inadequate communication 7. Adequate lighting during operations
9. Poor lighting 8. Competent scaffolder level 3 inspector provided
(5.4) Remove A1 and A2 MOAB Leg & Transfer to R5.4.1 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Wearing of work vest at all time 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
MB2 - Setup rigging 2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Line of fire (direct exposure to hazard) 2. Buddy system.
4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
9. Pinch point
(5.4.2) Remove A1 and A2 MOAB Leg & Transfer R5.4.2 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC on standby
to MB2 - Setup rigging while working at height 2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Buddy system 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea
3. Human error 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
9. Poor lighting
(5.4.3) Remove A1 and A2 MOAB Leg & Transfer R5.4.3 ROV umbilical cable entanglement 1. Property damage (ROV) 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - Operator 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- Preventive Measures;
to MB2 - Setup rigging and ROV monitoring and/or parted 2. Schedule delay error 2. ROV umbilical management in place. structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
2. Electrical/Power failure 3. Safe position of MWVB & AHT . (to be explicitly defined in the ROV and operation Supervisor
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset

(6.1) Setup of equipment on Main Deck R6.1.1 1. Dropped Object 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. Ensure TRA content and working procedure to be briefed to related personnel prior to 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
a. Deployment frame 2. Pinch Point 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice job commencement
b. Abrasive water jet cutter 3. Falling at height 3. Schedule impact 3. Communication failure 2. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan
c. HPU 4. Trips, slip and fall 4. Cost impact 4. Adverse weather 3. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area
d. Abrasive mixing unit 5. Human error 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding
e. High pressure pumping package 6. No MOC been practice for any changes of 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
work procedure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language
7. Dedicated banksman need clear line of sight
8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
10. competent personnel (Crane operator, riggers)
(6.2) Conductor cutting utilizing high pressure R6.2.1 Burst pressurized hoses 1. Personnel injury 1. Poor equipment 1. Periodic inspection and maintenance of equipment 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
abrasive water jet cutting (AWJC) 2. Improper connection 2. pre-check connection
3. Whip check install for every high pressure hose connection
4. Ensure control measure steps are followed as per offshore operating procedure for
AWJC (pre-cutting tool checks, pressure leak test)
5. Line walking prior to operating AWJC 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
6. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area
7. Announcement via PA system prior to operating AWJC
(6.3) Lifting of Conductor (Heavy Lift - Non- R6.3.1 Suspended load fall during lifting 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. This is considered non-routine lift-complicated Preventive Measures;
Routine Lifts - Complex) 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area which would required LOP (Lifting operational plan) 1. CONTRACTOR HSE /
a. During proof load test 3. Schedule impact 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging equipment 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding to be prepared and approved Engineering Team
b. During pickup of the load from hatch 4. Cost impact 4. Under-rated rigging equipment 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
c. During transfer of the conductor from WHAP 5. Communication failure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
over MWVB and onwards to MB2. 6. Adverse weather 6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language
7. Human error 7. Dedicated banksman need clear line of sight
8. No MOC been practice for any changes of 8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation
work procedure 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
10. competent personnel (Crane operator, riggers)
12. Dry run (without conductor) will be performed
13. Approved field rigging lifting calculations by the CONTRACTOR (and endorsed by
COMPANY MWS) 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8
14. To verify actual conductor load post cut activity
15. Pre-job briefing before lifting and not to exceed the approved SWL
16. To ensure no obstruction to retrieve Conductor through the hatch cover
17. To ensure sufficient length of tag line prior to lift
18. Inspection on crane condition and lifting equipment prior to activity
Regulation)
2. Property damage 2. Incompetent of crane operator/ 2. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
banksman/rigger 3. Observe sea state direction and limitation
3. Incorrect rigging arrangement 4. ) Lifting during good weather window
5. Toolbox meeting -
a. Tag-lines or push stick utilized during lifting
b. Emphasize no hands on load during lifting
c. Maintain good housekeeping at working area
8. JHA/TRA Cascading
9. Extra precaution at pinch point area
10. Barricade area 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8
11. To use correct lifting gears which provide good COG
12. Ensure visual inspection prior activity
14. Clear communication between all party involved
15. Uninterrupted line of sight between banksman and crane operator
16. Pre & Post-Usage Inspection of lifting equipments.
17. Use of approved, certified & compliance Cargo Handling Equipment especially for
loose items.
19. Lifting according to lifting plan
7. WHAP Topside Removal

(7.1.1) Scaffold Erection R7.1.1 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. FRC - fast rescue boat from MWVB on standby
9. Poor lighting 8. Competent scaffolder level 3 inspector provided
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(7.2.1) Cutting of WHAP Legs R7.2.1 Fire, explosion 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontained spark 1. Pre-inspection of cables/hoses and connection (comply to checklist/procedure) 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. Prepare WHAP leg cutting procedure as part of Preventive Measures;
2. Property damage 2. Improper grounding 2. Hoses to be properly managed away from sparks/hot slags WHAP & Jacket Removal and Reefing Procedure 1. CONTRACTOR Engineering
3. Damaged cable 3. Fire watcher in attendance at all times Team
oxygen/ acetylene 5. Use flash back arrestor
(7.2.2) Setup Rigging for WHAP Lifting R7.2.2 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Wearing of work vest at all time 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Line of fire (direct exposure to hazard) 2. Buddy system.
4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 2 2 B(2) 8
9. Pinch point
(7.3.1) Lifting of WHAP to MB2 (Heavy Lift - Non- R7.3.1 Suspended load fall during lifting 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. This is considered non-routine lift-complicated Preventive Measures;
Routine Lifts - Complex) 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area which would required LOP (Lifting operational plan) 1. CONTRACTOR HSE /
3. Schedule impact 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging equipment 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding to be prepared and approved Engineering Team
4. Cost impact 4. Under-rated rigging equipment 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
5. Communication failure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
6. Adverse weather 6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language
8. No MOC been practice for any changes of 8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 3 2 A(1) 4
work procedure 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
11. COMPANY MOPO as reference
Regulation)
2. Property damage 2. Incompetent of crane operator/ 2. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
banksman/rigger 3. Observe sea state direction and limitation
3. Incorrect rigging arrangement 4. ) Lifting during good weather window
5. Toolbox meeting -
a. Tag-lines or push stick utilized during lifting
b. Emphasize no hands on load during lifting
c. Maintain good housekeeping at working area
8. JHA/TRA Cascading
9. Extra precaution at pinch point area
10. Barricade area 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A 3 2 B(2) 8
11. To use correct lifting gears which provide good COG
12. Ensure visual inspection prior activity
14. Clear communication between all party involved
15. Uninterrupted line of sight between banksman and crane operator
16. Pre & Post-Usage Inspection of lifting equipments.
17. Use of approved, certified & compliance Cargo Handling Equipment especially for
loose items.
19. . Lifting according to lifting plan
8. Reefing Works (MOAB Jacket & WHAP Sub-Structure)

(8.1.1) Setup Rigging by Air Diver R8.1.1 Diver stung/bitten by marine life 1. Personnel injury 1. Marine life in the surrounding area 1. Look out for marine life 1. Suitable anti-allergic medicine in stock onboard Refer R4.4.1 additional mitigations preventive
2. Schedule delay 2. no food dumping during operations 2. Recover diver back to dive cage / surface measures
3. Proper suit to be used 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 3 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 6 N 3 N/A N/A 3 A(1) 3
R8.1.2 Diving personal equipment failure 1. Fatality 1. Improper equipment maintenance and 1. Preventive maintenance system 1. Hyperbaric chamber Refer R4.4.2 additional mitigations preventive
(Note: Maximum diving depth 2. Property damage (diving equipment) usage 2. Follow diving/equipment procedures 2. Standby diver to recover diver measures
expected of 32m) 3. IMCA guidelines 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10
4. IMCA audit compliance
R8.1.3 Diver/umbilical hit by drop object 1. Personnel injury / fatality 1. Human error during crane operation 1. Establish good communication between Diving Superintendent and MWVB Barge 1. Hyperbaric chamber Refer R4.4.3 additional mitigations preventive
2. Property damage (diving umbilical) Foreman 2. Standby diver to recover diver measures
5 N/A N/A 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10
2. PTW in place 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Rigging failure 1. Carry out pre-job briefing and inspection 1. Hyperbaric chamber Refer R4.4.3 additional mitigations preventive
2. Certified, color-coded and proper rigging 2. Standby diver to recover diver measures
3. Carry out routine inspection on riggings
4. Engineered riggings
5 N/A N/A 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A N/A 4 B(2) 10
5. Lift Plan in place
6. Suspended load to be position away from diver during lowering/lifting process
7. Ensure underwater rigging fit for purpose
R8.1.4 Uncontrolled release of pressure for 1. Personnel injury 1. Poor equipment 1. Periodic inspection and maintenance of equipment 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury Refer R4.4.4 additional mitigations preventive
subsea tools (High pressure water 2. Improper connection 2. Pre-check connection / Whip check install for every high pressure hose connection measures
4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8
jet, Hydraulic Hoses)
R8.1.5 Pinch point during manual handling 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontrolled load movement 1. Specific dive activity to be incorporated in the procedure 1. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury Refer R4.4.5 additional mitigations preventive
2. Moving equipment (crane movement) 2. To remind diver to identify pinch point prior start work measures
3. Clear communication to made available between MWVB Barge Foreman, Crane 3 N/A N/A 2 C(3) 9 Y 3 N/A N/A 2 C(3) 9
Operator and Dive supversior
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
R8.1.6 Entanglement 1. Schedule delay 1. improper umbilical management 1. Preventive maintenance of umbilical 1. Diver recovery by standby diver Refer R4.4.6 additional mitigations preventive
2. Personnel injury 2. Sudden squall 2. Good communication between dive supervisor and dive system tech who is paying out 2. Use standby bailout (standby self contained breathing apparatus) measures
the umbilical 3. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 4 N 2 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 4
R8.1.7 Diving operation during helicopter

operations - no issue as all diving
operation will stop during
helicopter operations
(8.1.8) ROV Monitoring and assisting cutting R8.1.8 ROV umbilical cable entanglement 1. Property damage (ROV) 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - Operator 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- Preventive Measures;
operation and/or parted 2. Schedule delay error 2. ROV umbilical management in place. structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
a. Operation of Guiding DWS (Diamond Wire Saw) 2. Electrical/Power failure 3. Safe position of MWVB & AHT . (to be explicitly defined in the ROV and operation Supervisor
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
R8.1.10 Guiding DWS (Diamond Wire Saw) 1. Property damage (DWS) 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - Operator 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- Preventive Measures;
umbilical cable entanglement 2. Schedule delay error 2. ROV/DWS umbilical management in place. structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
and/or parted 2. Electrical/Power failure 3. Safe position of MWVB & AHT . (to be explicitly defined in the ROV and operation Supervisor
4. Adverse weather 5. To provide clear work instruction to the ROV/DWS team
6. Human error 7. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
(8.1.11) ROV Cutting of sacrificial string R8.1.11 Whiplash of cut sacrificial string 1. Property damage (ROV) 1. Sacrificial string still in tension while being 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Ensure ROV path is outside the parameter of sub- Preventive Measures;
a. Utilizing ROV Cutter 2. Schedule delay cut 2. ROV umbilical management in place. structure as to minimize potential umbilical damage 1. CONTRACTOR ROV
2. Poor visibility 3. Safe position of MWVB (to be explicitly defined in the ROV and operation Supervisor
3. Adverse weather 4. ROV supervisor/pilot to familiarize with general jacket sub-structure layout drawing. procedure)
4. Human error 5. To provide clear work instruction to the ROV team
6. To obtain current status from current meter real time readings
N/A N/A 2 2 C(3) 6 N N/A N/A 2 2 B(2) 4
10. Ensure sacrificial string is de-tensioned prior to cut
11. Function test of ROV Cutter
(8.2.1) Reefing In-SITU as per approved reefing R8.2.1 1. Wrong reefing location 1. Project delay 1. Inaccurate survey data 1. Follow approved reefing plan Preventive Measures;
plan 2. Not meeting Department of Fisheries 2. Human error 2. Ensure survey system in good working condition 1. To confirm DOF Requirements with regards to 1. CONTRACTOR Project
N/A 2 2 2 C(3) 6 N N/A 2 2 2 C(3) 6
(DOF) requirements reefing Engineer
(8.3.1) Reefing of WHAP Sub-structure at Pulau R8.3.1 1. Wrong reefing location 1. Project delay 1. Inaccurate survey data 1. Follow approved reefing plan Preventive Measures;
Tenggol 2. Not meeting Department of Fisheries 2. Human error 2. Ensure survey system in good working condition 1. To confirm DOF Requirements with regards to 1. CONTRACTOR Project
N/A 2 2 2 C(3) 6 N N/A 2 2 2 C(3) 6
(DOF) requirements reefing Engineer
9. Demobilization
(9.1) Demobilization (Refer to No.2) R9.1.1

(10.1) Mooring of MB1 at quayside R10.1.1 1. Mooring failure 1. Property damage 1. Failure of mooring lines 1. Mooring operation to be performed as per approved methodology 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death 1. Pre-job briefing to be conducted prior to mooring Preventive Measures;
2. Insufficient depth at quayside 2. Schedule impact 2. Poor mooring practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area at quayside (Note: admin control inadequate to 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Grounding of MB1 3. Cost impact 3. Communication failure 3. Regular inspection of mooring equipment reduce the probability)
4. Personnel injury / death 4. Adverse weather 4. Selection of mooring gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ mooring
5. Human error plan.
5. Any deviation on the mooring arrangement need to be address with MOC
5 N/A 5 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A 5 4 C(3) 15
6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language
7. Dedicated mooring gang need clear line of sight
8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of mooring operation
9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather/ tidal window
10. Pre-engineering assessment/analysis to be conducted
(10.2) Skidding Operation (MOAB) R10.2.1 1. Skidding operation failure 1. Personnel injury/death 1. Failure of skidding equipment/gears 1. Skidding operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ skidding plan 1. Personnel work vest 1. Pre-job briefing to be conducted prior to skidding Preventive Measures;
2. Man overboard 2. Property damage 2. Under-rated skidding equipment 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea operations at quayside (Note: admin control 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Inadequate soil bearing strength 3. Schedule impact 3. Communication failure 3. Function test of the equipment 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place inadequate to reduce the probability) 2. CONTRACTOR Engineering
4. Cost impact 4. Adverse weather/ tidal conditions 4. Preventive maintenance in place. 4. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury/death 2. Ensure selected disposal yard meet all criteria for Team
5. Human error 5. Sufficient critical spare parts/hydraulics items available at site skidding operations (e.g., soil strength/level, etc)
6. No MOC been practice for any changes of 6. Dedicated communication channel & use common communication language
work procedure 7. Dedicated mooring/skidding gang need clear line of sight
7. Improper ballasting 8. Weather/tidal criteria to specify for all phases of skidding operation
8. High pressure hydraulic release 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
10. Competent personnel 5 N/A 5 4 C(3) 15 Y 5 N/A 5 4 C(3) 15
11. Ballasting plan with sufficient ballasting pumps
12. Soil strengthening etc (levelling, location) will be performed as part of disposal yard
engineering document
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(10.3) Equipment Setup & Disposal Activity/ R10.3.1 1. Hazardous waste 1. Personnel Injury 1. Spillage 1. Radio active protective officer (RPO) to verify 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
Decontamination 2. Environmental contamination 2. Non-identified hazardous contaminants 2. To refer SAA MOAB flushing work report
3. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area 3 2 N/A 2 C(3) 9 Y 3 2 N/A 2 C(3) 9
4. Dedicated area to handle contaminants
(10.3.2) Structure Cutting (Hot work) R10.3.2 Fire, explosion 1. Personnel injury 1. Uncontained spark 1. Pre-inspection of cables/hoses and connection (comply to checklist/procedure) 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury 1. To conduct regular gas test in the event of Preventive Measures;
2. Property damage 2. Improper grounding 2. Hoses to be properly managed away from sparks/hot slags combustible gases nearby hot work area 1. CONTRACTOR AGT/ Welding
3. Damaged cable 3. Fire watcher in attendance at all times Foreman / Fitter Foreman
oxygen/ acetylene 5. Use flash back arrestor
(10.3.3) Lifting; R10.3.3 Suspended load fall during lifting 1. Personnel injury 1. Failure of lifting equipment/gears 1. Lifting operation to be performed as per approved methodology/ lifting plan 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
1. Routine Lifting 2. Property damage 2. Poor rigging practice 2. Only authorized personnel in the working area and barricade the area
2. Non-Routing Lift - Simple 3. Schedule impact 3. Uncertified lifting/ slinging equipment 3. Regular inspection, to follow COMPANY's color coding
3. Non-Routine Lifts - Complicated 4. Cost impact 4. Under-rated rigging equipment 4. Selection of rigging gears and arrangement to be done as per procedure/ lifting plan.
4. Non-Routine Lifts - Complex 5. Communication failure 5. Any deviation on the rigging arrangement need to be address with MOC
8. No MOC being practiced for any changes 8. Weather criteria to specify for all phases of lifting operation
of work procedure 9. Obtain site specific weather forecast and establish suitable weather window
10. Competent personnel (Crane operator, riggers) 4 N/A 3 3 3 12 Y 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12
Regulation)
R10.3.4 Uncontrolled swinging loads 1. Personnel injury 1. Sudden change of weather 1. Obtain site specific weather forecast 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Property damage 2. Incorrect rigging arrangement 2. Weather watch on standby to observe sudden changes of weather condition
3. Human error 3. Observe sea state direction and limitation
4. ) Lifting during good weather window
5. Competent/ qualified crane operator/ banksman/rigger, and aware of emergency 4 N/A 3 3 3 12 Y 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 12
procedure
6. Sufficient tagline and proper rigging arrangement
(10.3.5) Working at Height R10.3.5 1. Manual handling 1. Personnel Injury 1. Loose items 1. Loose items are secured on basket/container 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Dropped object 2. Asset Damage 2. Poor ergonomics 2. Buddy system
3. Human error 3. Fall from height 3. 100% tie-off
9. Poor lighting
(10.3.6) Scheduled waste handling/disposal R10.3.6 1. Release of hazardous radioactive 1. Environmental impact 1. Non-licensed scheduled waste disposal 1. Approved scheduled waste disposal contractor 1. Disposal yard will have leachate handling capability (bunding etc)
(including NORM/TENORM) waste 2. Personnel injury contractor 2. RPO (Radiation Protection Officer) in place who will prepare waste management 2. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
2. Scheduled waste management not procedure
complying to regulatory requirements
3 2 N/A 2 C(3) 9 Y 3 2 N/A 2 C(3) 9
3. Waste if being transported or disposed
illegally
4. Waste is sent to illegal recycling facility
11. Post Removal Survey at SAA

(11.1.1) ROV seabed survey and water, soil and R11.1.1 ROV umbilical cable entanglement 1. Property damage (ROV) 1. Poor manoeuvring of ROV - Operator 1. Spare parts made available onboard 1. Engage EIA Consultant with offshore monitoring Preventive Measures;
sediment sampling and/or parted 2. Schedule delay error 2. ROV umbilical management in place. experience for sampling works utilising ROV. 1. CONTRACTOR Procurement
2. Electrical/Power failure 3. Safe position of MWVB & AHT .
3. Poor visibility 4. ROV supervisor/pilot to familiarize with general jacket sub-structure layout drawing.
5. Poor condition of the cable 6. To obtain current status from current meter real time readings N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6 N N/A N/A 2 N/A C(3) 6
R11.1.2 Exposure to high voltage 1. Personnel injury 1. Equipment in poor condition 1. Regular preventive maintenance 1. Onshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
12. Miscellaneous Completion Works

(12.1) Working at night R12.1.1 1. Poor visibility 1. Personnel injury 1. Insufficient lighting 1. Work area to be adequately lighted 1. Personnel work vest 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Preventive Measures;
2. Man overboard 2. property damage 2. Fatigue/Sleepy 2. Buddy system applied 2. Ring buoy/life jacket deployed at sea Case (for work during night time) 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Provide dedicated shift 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. Adequate rest 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
5. To comply with fatigue Management Guideline 5. Search light available on board MWVB and AHT
6. Work vest provided with reflectors
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(13.2) Machineries Handling R12.2.1 1. Machinery breakdown. 1. Property damage. 1. Improper handling procedure. 1. To conduct equipment pre-inspection before performing the task. 1. Fire extinguishers
2. Fire 2. Personal Injury 2. Unauthorized personnel. 2. Equipment owner to provide valid equipment certificate
3. Project delay 3. To conduct test run on equipment before performing the job.
4. Damage on reputation. 5. Drip pan / secondary containment must be installed and available
3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6 N 3 N/A 2 N/A B(2) 6
6. Only authorized personnel allowed to operate the machineries.
7. Extra precaution measures must be in place during work execution
8. Implementation of Stop Work Policy for any unsafe situation.
9. Personnel to comply with standard operating procedures.
(12.3) Working during adverse Weather R12.3.1 Workers stranded on MOAB 1. Stress, fatigue 1. Adverse weather 1. Standby extra food provision.
1 N/A N/A N/A C(3) 3 N 1 N/A N/A N/A C(3) 3
2. To identify temporary and proper shelter at MOAB
R12.3.2 Lightning Strike (adverse weather) 1. Injury to personnel 1. Adverse weather 1. Obtain weather forecast, weather watch on standby and establish suitable weather 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Preventive Measures;
2. Property damage window Case (for work during adverse weather including 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
2. Establish good communication between relevant parties (dedicated channel, protocol, lightning shall be considered)
use common language)
3. Proper earthing
4. No excessive jewellery/ring etc. during operations. To be informed during pre-mob
briefing/tool box talk
5. To follow weather monitoring procedure
4 N/A N/A 2 C(3) 12 Y 4 N/A N/A 2 B(2) 8
6. . Crew will remain inside the shelter/safe heaven until its clear there's no possible storm
or lightning
7. Announcement to be made to remind personnel to be cleared from open area if there
any appearance of excessive lightning
8. Continuous monitoring on radar and obtain lightning/ weather from other vessels
within vicinity.
9. To follow COMPANY adverse weather procedure.
(12.4) Personnel Transfer by PTB (Personnel R12.4.1 1. Man overboard 1. Personnel injury 1. Adverse weather 1. Certified type personnel transfer basket 1. Personnel work vest 1. MOPO Guideline to be developed as part of HSE Preventive Measures;
Transfer Basket) 2. Movement of the boat 2. proper rigging arrangement 2. Ring buoy deployed at sea Case (for personnel transfer using PTB) 1. CONTRACTOR HSE
3. Equipment failure 3. visual inspection of PTB prior to be used 3. Man-overboard emergency response plan in place
4. incompetent crane operator and rigger 4. Regular inspection on lifting appliances, crane condition & personnel transfer basket. 4. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
5. Poor rigging practice 6. To ensure vessel crane is certified as man-riding.
6. insufficient landing space 7. To ensure personnel didn't carry any luggage during transfer basket lifting operation.
8. To follow SOP while using PTB
9. Weather monitoring.
10. Safety briefing to be conducted prior the activity.
4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8 N 4 N/A N/A 3 B(2) 8
11. Stop work policy to be implemented if the situation is not permitted to conduct the
activity.
12. Weather criteria for basket transfer shall be based on COMPANY MOPO guideline.
13. Platform/Boat to have sufficient clear & safe Deck space for Personal Transfer Basket
landing area.
14. Clear visibility and communication between crane operator and banksman
(12.5) Bunkering R12.5.1 Vessel Collision 1. Property damage 1. adverse weather 1. Bunkering checklist in place ship to ship (STS) 1. Oil spill response
2. personnel injury 2. Human error while performing bunkering 2. 7 days look ahead bunkering plan 2. Offshore ERP and Bridging Documents for personnel injury
3. environmental oil spill 2 3 3 2 B(2) 6 N 2 3 3 2 B(2) 6
13.Hydraulic Workover Unit - 460K

(13.1) Manual handling-HWU equipments R13.1.1 1. Exposure to pinch point 1. (Physical injuries) Fingers Blisters and 1. Lack of pinch point awareness 1. Potential pinch point hazards must be properly labelled/painted. 1. Implementation of PBED (Plan,Brief,Execute,Debrief) application during
Hoses,valves lifting and installation 2. Risk of back pain due to repetitive contusions, severe and minor hand 2. Improper manual handling technique 2. Establish proper work rotation for the crews. debrief session after the task completion.
movement. injuries 3. Lack of situational awareness and dropped 3. Stop work authorities to be practiced upon seeing any unsafe act during manual 2. Brief to the crews on the importance of proper hand placement during
3. Spread and strain 2. Restrict a person movement, which object awareness. handling activities. toolbox briefing and weekly safety meetings.
4. Risk of dropped object. can affect their work 4. Drop awareness training to be conducted for all crews that involved with HWU. 3. Conduct safety awareness program onboard focusing on hand and fingers 2 N/A 1 1 C(3) 3 N
injury prevention
4. Ensure the crews are sufficient for the task. Implement a buddy system and
encourage clear communication among team members.
(13.2) HWU Skidding Operation R13.1.2 1. Exposure to the risk of falling 1. Physical injuries caused by falling 1. Lack of personnel situational awareness 1. Ensure all potential of drop objects such as equipments, tools have been cleared from 1. Skidding operation readiness shall be checked and implemented
unsecured object (On the HWU objects (Standing within the line of fire) the high elevated rig platform. 2. Conduct safety awareness program (Drop objects prevention and Pinch Point
work basket) 2. Equipment damage cause by the rig 2. Improper housekeeping (Tools,equipment 2. Safety announcement to be made prior skidding operation awareness)
2. Risk of equipments damage due skidding operation left on the work basket) 3. Skidding area to be barricaded (Only authorized personnel at the area) 3. PBED technique application prior skidding operations.
to skidding operation 3. Fingers and hand injuries due to 3. Equipments within the skidding path 4. Other operations involving HWU shall be halted prior to skidding operation.
3. Exposure to pinch point hazard improper hand placement 4. Lack of pinch point 5. Drop inspection to be carried out before skidding operation.
4. Risk of hydraulic hoses caught by 4.Hydraulic oil spillage awareness/complacency 6. Ensure all skidding pathway are clear from any obstruction before skidding rig 3 1 3 2 B(2) 5 N
the skidding system 5. Hydraulic hoses getting caught/damaged operations.
4. Risk of hydraulic hoses parted . by the skidding system 7. Skidding beam surface need to be clean. (To remove minor debris out of the skidding
cylinder path)
8. Usage of FSR. (Only applicable for high pressure hose),
9. (HSR) Hydraulic restraint system for high pressure connection on powerpack
10. Spill kit to be made available.
(13.3) Lifting Operation- HWU Components and R13.1.3 1. Risk of falling objects (heavy 1. Potential for injury or loss of life 1. Defective lifting equipments 1. Defective lifting gears such as shackles, wire sling,masterlink etc to be isolated and 1. Conduct a thorough inspection on lifting gears prior lifting operations.
Substructure equipments/substructures) 2. Equipments damage 2. Personnels standing within the viccinity of disposed. 2. Lifting gears condition inspection checklist to be made available
3. Potential NPT potential dropped objects. 2. Stop work authorities to be practiced. 3. Ensure only competents personnel carrying out lifting operation.
3. Barricade the lifting area- No unauthorized personnel to enter lifting operation area. 4. Remind crews to always stay vigilant and stay away from potential line of fire.
4. Develop and follow a comprehensive load testing protocol, ensuring all equipment 5. Implement a comprehensive preventive maintenance of the crane
meets safety standards, ( LOLER 1998 and established EEST procedures, etc). 6. Schedule operations during favorable weather conditions and have
5. To prepare lifting plan and to include total known weight of each HWU substructures. contingency plans for adverse weather. 5 N/A 3 3 C(3) 9 Y
6. To use double tagline for load control. 7. All the lifting gears are certfied by LEEA and done at Thailand.
7. Push pull stick to be used for the lifting operation. NHOL (No hands on Load) 8. The offshore crane expertise to be part of the lifting operation execution.
8. PPE compulsary (Impact Gloves) (MOAB)
14.Casing and Conductor Removal

(14.1) Drill & Boring hole for conductor pinning R14.1.1 1. Exposure to noise hazards 1. Potential hearing loss due to prolong 1. PPE non-compliance (Not wearing earplug) 1. Personal Protective Equipment check to be done prior executing the task. (Brief during prejob 1. PPE inspection exercise to be done by the work leader prior to starting the job.
2. Risk of hydraulic hose to be snapped exposure of noise 2. High pressure hydraulic hoses fitment not fully safety meeting and check for compliance before task executions) 2. To ensure PPE stock is sufficient until the end of the campaign.
due to loose hose fitting. 2. Body parts injuries due to high pressure tighten. 2. STOP work/TOFS (Time off for safety) to be implemented upon seeing personnels non adherence 3. Conduct thorough inspection by referring to the applicable checklist (Inspect all the
3. Hazardous exposure to surface. hose parted. 3. Introduction of chemical hazardous release. to PPE requirements. hosses connection, and equipment condition prior to start work)
3. Potential health issue. 3. Thorough condition inspection to be carried out to ensure the equipment is ready to be use and in 2 N/A 1 1 B(2) 3 N
good condition.
4. AGT and TENORM personnel to perform gas/radiation monitoring.
5. Personnal gas detector to be equipped.
6. To prepare designated working area/platform for the cutter operator.
(14.2) Inserting resting beam to hold the R14.1.2 1. Risk of pinch point 1. Fingers and hand injuries due to improper 1. Lack of situational awareness 1. Buddy system practiced during manual handling 1. All potential pinch point must be properly labelled and addressed by all involved
conductor for conductor pinning 20/3 2. Manual handling (repetitive task) hand/finger placements 2. Complacencies 2. Crew rotation to be established to avoid fatigue personnels.
1 N/A 2 2 B(2) 3 N
2. Back pain injury (Muscle strain,slip disc) 3. Improper lifting technique 3. Usage of finger saver tools 2. Fatigue management system to be implemented.
4. Crew rotation not established
(14.3) Conductor pulling- Using the hydraulic jack R14.1.3 1. Risk of equipment damage 1. Damage to the equipments due to 1. Lack of situational awareness 1. Ensure all equipments/hoses that potentially expose to the hydraulic jack have been secured 1. Ensure all hose fastening have been done.
2. Risk of hydraulic jack leaking hydraulic jack compression 2. Inadequate inspection of hydraulic jack hose 2. Ensure that only competent personnel to be at work basket area (Non authorized personnel to stay 2. Limit the numbers of crews personnel working on work basket/work window. (Ensure
3. Risk of falling object (Marine growth 2. Leakage at hydraulic jack hose potentially 3. Personnel standing within the viccinity of the clear from work basket) only competent rig personnel working on HWU)
scale) 20/3 minor LOPC line of fire. 3. Rig crew to thoroughly inspect the hydraulic jack condition and ensure all the components in good 3. Conduct a frequent condition inspection for all hydraulic components.
3. Potential of physical injuries (Head/body 4. Hydraulic oil spillage. condition prior execute the operations 2 2 2 2 B(2) 3 N
parts) 4. Non authorized personnel to be clear from the area during conductor pulling operation.
5. Spill kits to be available at site
6. Compulsary to wear full PPE.
(14.4) Conductor cutting R14.1.4 1. Exposure to noise hazards 1. Potential hearing loss due to prolong 1. PPE non-compliance (Not wearing 1. STOP work authorities to be implemented upon noticing equipments experiencing technical issues. 1. Conduct thorough inspection referring to the inspection checklist for the mechanical
(Using mechanical pipe saw) 2. Exposure to potential line of fire due exposure of noise earmuffs/earplug) Such as equipment condition ,ie. cutting saw blade crack, hydraulic hose fitment loosen. equipments (cutter).
to broken pipe saw 2. Body part injuries due to physical injuries 2. Not performing equipments inspection and 2. PPE compliance to be actively monitored and implemented 2. Brief to the crews to stay vigilant all the time, STOP the work and regroup upon seeing
3. Exposure to pinch point due to due to wrong hand placement during sawing condition inspection of the mechanical pipe saw. 3. Conducting thorough inspection prior to use the mechanical cutter. Checking for hose connection any UAUC at workplace.
improper hand placement activities. 3. Standing within the radius of potential line of and fitment and cutter blade.
4. Risk of hydraulic hose to be snapped 3. Physical injuries due to sudden hose burst. fire 4. Pre-job safety meeting (PJSM) conducted and imform the mechanical cutter operator to be extra
2 N/A 1 1 B(2) 3 N
due to loose hose fitting. 4. Physical injuries struct by swinging load. 4. Improper hand positioning during handling the vigilant while operating the mechanical cutter.
5. Conducter cut piece swing. mechanical saw. 5. Preventive maintenance to be carried out prior to use the mechanical cutter.
5. Hydraulic hose fitment not fully tighten and 6. Temporary secure the conducter cut section to avoid conductor swing after cutting.
secured. 7. Tag weld the plate at the end of conductor to prevent falling objetcs.
6. Conductor not properly secured.
(14.5) Holding the conductor using MOAB Crane R14.1.5 1. Risk of dropped lifting appliances. 1. Major injuries or loss of life due to 1. Defective lifting equipments 1. Barricade the potential dropped objects area (Unauthorized personnel to stay away from the area) 1. Lifting gears to be frequently inspected and undergo 3rd party inspection.
2. Risk of conductor toppling due to dropped objects 2. Personnels standing within the viccinity of 2. Defectives lifting gears to be isolated and dispose. 2. PBED practice to be implemented before and after the task has been finished/before
lifting gears failure. 2. Significant/major damage to the potential dropped objects. 3. Plate with tag weld to cover the conductor to secure cement drop from inside the conductor. shift change.
3. Risk of falling object (Cement scale equipments and assets 3. Conductor internal cement scale residue. 4. Sufficient tagline to be used to control the conductor movement. 3. Competent personnel to carry out thorough lifting gears condition inspection prior
3 N/A 3 3 C(3) 8 Y
residue) 3. Potential NPT. 4. Human error. 5. Unauthorized personnel to be clear from the area. commencing lifting activities.
4. Crane breakdown/failure 5. Lack of crane maintenance and mechanical 6. Clear communication between crane operator and bankman. 4. Clearly brief to the crew during PJSM (Only crew the involved with the operation to be
failure. at the area) No auntorized entry to be perform during the operation.
5. PEX crane standing by to assist.
Environment
Environment
Overall Risk
Overall Risk
MAH (Y/N)
Risk/
Reputation
Reputation
Probability
Probability
People
People
Rating
Rating
Asset
Asset
(14.6) Lifting and slewing the conductor using SAA R14.1.6 1. Exposure to the risk of falling objects 1. Major injuries or loss of life due to 1. Defective lifting equipments 1. Barricade the potential dropped objects area (Unauthorized personnel to stay away from the area) 1. Lifting gears to be frequently inspected and undergo 3rd party inspection.
MOAB Crane (Loss of control of the load-conductors) dropped objects 2. Personnels standing within the viccinity of 2. Defectives lifting gears to be isolated and dispose. 2. PBED practice to be implemented before and after the task has been finished/before
2. Risk of falling object (Cement scale 2. Significant/major damage to the potential dropped objects. 3. Only competent banksman and crane operator have full control of lifting operation shift change.
residue) equipments and assets 3. Conductor internal cement scale residue. 4. STOP the work upon seeing/noticing UAUC during lifting operations 3. Competent personnel to carry out thorough lifting gears condition inspection before
3. Potential of the conductor to hit the 4. Equipments damage. 5. Double tagline to be used to control the load. commencing lifting activities. 4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 8 Y
structures. 6. Clear communication between crane operator. 4. Ensure no interruption of the radio communication during lifting operation. (Radio
7. Proper designated layout plan to accommodate conductors to be made available. check to be perform prior lifting operation)
5. Utilisation's of PEX and MOAB deck space to accommodate the conductors after cut.
(14.7) Lifting and transfer cut conductor from R14.1.7 1. Exposure to the risk of falling objects 1. Major injuries or loss of life due to 1. Defective lifting gears such as slings,shackle, 1. Barricade the potential dropped objects area (Unauthorized personnel to stay away from the area) 1. Lifting gears to be frequently inspected and undergo 3rd party inspection.
WHAP to MWVB by using Barge Crane dropped objects master link etc. 2. Defectives lifting gears to be isolated and dispose. 2. PBED practice to be implemented before and after the task has been finished/before
2. Significant/major damage to the 2. Personnel within the viccinity of potential line of 3. Only competent banksman and crane operator have full control of lifting operation shift change.
equipments and assets fire (dropped objects) 4. STOP the work upon seeing/noticing UAUC during lifting operations 3. Competent personnel to carry out thorough lifting gears condition inspection before
5. Establish proper communication during the operations. commencing lifting activities.
4. Ensure no interruption of the radio communication during lifting operation. (Radio
4 N/A 3 3 C(3) 7 Y
check to be perform prior lifting operation) Set a dedicated channel only for lifting
operations.
5. Limit the access for the non authorized personnel. (Only competent riggers and
banksman at the area during lifting operation)
6. Scheduled preventive maintenance to be carried out and done by competent personnel.
APPENDIX II – COMPANY RISK MATRIX

Severity People -P Environment - E Reputation - R

Very unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Almost
Single Fatality Massive Damage Massive Effect Massive International certain
Consequence
Catastrophic
15 25
Major Damage Major Effect Major National

Consequence
Major •
• 20
•
:::: 12 vVeeks Q[:::: 10-20%
Major Injury I Moderate Damage Moderate Effect Moderate Localised

Health Effect
Moderate
15
:::: 4-12 weeks Q[:::: 5-

10%
Minor Injury I Minor Damage Minor Effect Limited
Health Effect Consequence
Minor LWC / RWC 4 calendar
days
:::: 1 day-4 vVeeks Q[ 1-5%

Slight Injury/ AnnualSlight
TargetDamage Slight Effect Slight Effect
Health Effect
Sligh
t
PTO: Permanent total Direct Cost: Costs LOPC - Loss of Primary (See Appendix 5: Never heard of l-leard of I-las happened I-las happened Has happened
disability attributable to the incident Containment Material Explanation Table) in within within the last at more than
PPD: Permanent including loss of revenue, Release Threshold 5 years in the the Operating once per
partial disability. repair or restoration costs Quantities per API O&G Industry Company year at the
LWC: Lost Workday Case Recommended Practice 754 OR HPB Level once Operating
RWC: Restricted Work (See Appendix 3: Group of per year Company
Case Explanation Table) (See Appendix 4: Companies Level
FAC: First Aid Case Explanation Table) Operating
Company
(See Appendix 2: (e.g. AOC,
SEAH,
APPENDIX III – ATTENDANT LIST

HAZID 21 March 2024 (Thursday)

Time conducted: 9:00 AM
Session Ended :2:30 PM
MS Team Online Attendant

1.Captain Zaini (Perdana Petroleum/IOSB)
2.Pham Ngoc Huang (EEST)
Minutes Of Meeting (MOM)

1. Opening Remark by HSE Manager (Mr. Faruk) and Project Manager (Mr. Khairil Azim).
9:00 AM-9:10AM
2. Scope Of Work (Introduction to Vessel’s and AWB), Mechanicals Equipment (Cutter and Pinning),
Anchor Pattern and HWU Conductor Cutting Sequences By EEST. 9:10-10:30AM
3. HAZID Workshop Session-10:30 AM-2:30PM
4. End of Session

TOS-HSE-SAAX-RA-L-0009 - (Rev.X1) HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING (ADDENDUM) 26.3.2024-SIGNED BY FA

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HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING

HIBISCUS OIL & GAS MALAYSIA LIMITED

PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PREPARATION, REMOVAL

2A 17.8.2023 ISSUED FOR REVIEW PISB MHI MAZHAZMI

Document Name Designation Signature Date

Reviewed by Khairil Azhar HSE Ops Delivery

Reviewed by Hafiza Akmar Che CSR

Approved by Huzaimi Amir Project Manager

Rev Page Description Approved By Approval Date

1.1 Project Background

Figure 1 Field Overview

1.2 Facilities Information

Table 1 Facilities Data Sheet

Figure 2: MOAB Facilities Current Status

HAZID STUDY FRONT PAGE (ISSUED BY PISB)

HIBISCUS OIL & GAS MALAYSIA LIMITED

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDY REPORT FOR

DOCUMENT NO: PISB/T7G/003/HAZID/SAA

3 ISSUED FOR REVIEW 25/3/2024 JAB FAB KHAIRIL HUZAIMI

2 ISSUED FOR APPROVAL 14/8/2023 NS MRS JAK (CLIENT)

1 ISSUED FOR REVIEW 6/6/2023 NS MRS JAK (CLIENT)

Rev. Description Date Prepared Checked Approved Client

Revision No. Section Revision Description

1.1 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

MOAB has utilities equipment such as 1 X Solar Turbine Generator, 1 X Emergency

Figure 1-1: SAA Block Map

Figure 1-2: MOAB and FSO after PTB Decommissioning

1.3 SOUTH ANGSI A ( SAA) FACILITIES DESCRIPTION

The objective of the HAZID decommissioned platform are as follows:

1.5 SCOPE OF WORK

2.0 HAZID METHODOLOGY

The HAZID technique is:

A means of identifying and describing credible major accident and occupational

The step-by-step methodology is discussed in the following sub-sections.

2.1.1 STEP 1: IDENTIFY

2.1.2 STEP 2: ASSESS

Hazards can include;

Structural instability during dismantling;

Environmental impacts due to waste disposal.

2.1.3 STEP 3: RISK RANKING

MAH is defined as an incident which leads to extensive damage to an asset, major

2.1.4 STEP 4: RISK REDUCTION MEASURES OR SAFEGUARDS

3.0 HAZID WORKSHOP

3.1 WORKSHOP AND PARTICIPANTS

3.2 HAZID WORKSHEET

3.3 LIST OF ACTIVITIES INVOLVED

3.4 HAZID FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.4.1 HAZID FINDINGS

Table 3-2: Summary of Risk Ranking

3.4.2 HAZID RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations have been developed, either to prevent the causes of

MOAB Loading at Disposal Yard Quayside

Post Removal Survey at SAA

To prevent internal column vibration of the conductor

3.6 HAZID CLOSED- OUT

APPENDIX I – HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) WORKSHOP

BASIC / GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

Basic / General Safety Requirements:

Current Controls Initial Risk Additional Mitigations Residual Risk

2. Mobilization and Demobilization

4. MOAB Preparation Works