HISTORY NOBLE I DEALS AND BLOODY

REALITIES
OF WARFAR E I/I/Pza zm in the Aliddle Agas
General Editor

KELLY DEVRIES ICDITEI) BY

Loyola C0110gr:

}\‘IALI., CHRISTIE AND l\/IAYA YAZIGI

Pbwzding liditors‘

THERESA VANIN
PAUL GI IEVEDDEN

VOLUME 37

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 MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND THE VALUE OF A
HUMAN I_,IFE .

Kelly I)eV1"ies

It l13.S a.lwa.ys seemed to me illogi<:a.l and inhurnane that the people

of our world have ll~equently decided matters of relatively little impo1“~
tanee by sencling a large number of their y(>\1ngj males out to he
killed. The atet that diplomzttie 1'1eg(.>tiati<.ms, when used; have xnore
often been macle to increase alliances between parties who simllzu"].y
are willing to send tlleir young rnzlles to he killed seelns to confirm
this illogie and inhumanity. Recently 21 number of rnililary h.is't01"i
ans lmve sought broaclly chronological and geograph.ieal answers for
this dilemma‘. Focusing almost entirely on eu.lu1re, 1“21El'lL‘?1" them. te<:l'1~
nology, Victor Davis I Ians0n,_]'0l11'1 I{eega,n, Ge0. 'rey Parker (to 21
lesser extent, as he still holds to his 1:eehno].ogic.al determ'inist:ie the»
sea}, jererny Black, and, most retzently, ‘lolm Lynn have erossed over
the line once reserved for an.thr0pt)l,ogists zmcl sociologists of trying"
to 2u1alyze why men have fought W2].l"S and why, in pa1"til:ular, the
west has almost exclusively been the victor in these wars.‘ Using his
torical examples, these writers have at least surpassed their so<.:io~
logical and anthropological c0unt.crparts who all too freqnenljly still
rely on the “clerk glass” or “rosy shatles” belief,‘ of man heing; led to
war by something outsiele of an innate proclivity to do so, 51 la Jared
Diamond, who borrows a little too ‘much of the most Waczky
l\/Iozatesquieuesque explzlnatiolls for wztrlére to be either sensible. 01“
sehola,rly e0mf0rting.2
On the other hand, their own reliance on culture to explain w2.u"l'are
and the west"s success in this w2:,rl‘2n"e is elissatisfying, although prel‘e1"~
able in my estimation to the technological superiority explanations

‘ Rrfereltees to these works are listed below,

2 _]2u'ecl Divarnond Gum‘, Germs, and Steel York: W. W. N(n"t.r>n and Colnpzirly",
I997). See also Harry l*l0lbe1"L Turney Higll, Primitive I/1/av? its P71Z6£i£8.S' and (Q l')l’it7(f/)l_5‘,
Zncl ed. (Ciolumbiai University of South Carolina ll ‘rtts , l99E:i; I,:.t\v1"en(t<=. H. Keeley,
PI/Z11‘ Bejima C’ivi[iz1z1fir>n ‘Oxford: ()Xfb.r(l University Press, E995); zmtl. the vzu*ious stud
ies in R. Brian Fe1"g1ls(1I1 and Neil I... \Nhitehe:a.d, P1/m in the Tribal Z0110: Erjxanding
..5'ln..£e._r and Irzdigerzou.r I/1/lzg zre (Santa Fe: School cn"An1eriezm l._{c:searc1‘1 Press, I992).
‘Z8 KELLY DEVRIES
prol'lered by so many military and non military historians, most
recently the very dreadful Thmwzlzg Fsire." A 1115109, ¢j'PrQjectile Technology,
by Allied W. Orosbyf‘ Most speci cally, at least for the premodern
period, and in particular for my speciality, the l\/liddle Ages, culture
appears to be incorrtplcte as a means of de ning the history of warfare
and its success. \/Vhat I intend to do here is to supplement what is
currently being written about the relationship of warfare and culture
by adding another factor to the de nition, the value of a human life.
First, let me review the literature, beginning with the works of
one of the most popular military historians currently writing, but
one who also serves as the doyen of the neo conservatives, Victor
l)a"\/is Hanson. john Lynn has done this very well in reviewing
Hansoifs work in general in the rst chapter of his book discussed
below; my purpose here, as with the other authors discussed below,
is simply to focuson the place of the l\/.|.iddle in their histori
cal writings. Building on the thesis put forth earlier in his The Western
I/l/by qf I/Var Iigfrzntiy Battle in Classical Greece, which looked speci cally
at Greek hoplite warfare and its success against the Persians,‘ Hanson
has recently written the chronologically and geographically broad.
T7212 Sou! t5/'BallZe.' From Ancient TirIw.r to the Present Day, How Three Great
Libemtors Vanqzax/‘zeal Yjyranny (1999), which determines military lead
ership excellence as it “western way of warfare,” and his even more
chronologically and geographically broad Carnage and Culture." Landmark
Battles in the Rise of I/1/astem Power (200l}, which determines tactical
superiority as a “western way ofwar are.” Based on the above descrip
tion, neither of these books seems to focus on culture, alth0u.gh I.
assure you that they do. What is more troubling For the medieval
military historian is that neither focuses much on the Middle Ages.
The Soul of Bettie docs not introduce any medieval general in its case
studies, thus at least implying the author’s agreement with the well
worn but expressly disproved notion that the l\/Iiddle Ages produced
no ellicient general.“ What is oven more of a problem with l"lanson’s
1’ Alfred W. Crosby, Til"/ozving Fire: Projectile Teclarmlogjl Through Hii.v!.01y l lilinhridget
Cambriclge University Press, 2002}. For my assessment of this hook see my upcom
ing review in The journal Qfl12te1'd'i.rcijJlinan/ I"I1i§i01j>, although several other reviewers
have pointed out similar problems to those I have with Cr0sby’s premise, his use
of evidence, and his conclusions.
" Victor Davis Hanson, The I4/Ettem I/Val}: of I/Var." Infantry; Batik in Clatriml (I/rarer:
{()xlord: Oxforcl University Press, H389}.
Hanson does not actually say this in his work, but the fact that he admires
MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND 'I‘1 IE. VALUE or A HUMAN LIFE 29
notion of military leadership and the “western way of warfare,” as
expressed in this book is that during the l\/Iiddle Ages it was not the
western military leaders who were the most efhrzient. Indeed, most
medieval military historians would assign greatness to only Your
medieval generals, Attila, Charlemagne, Saladin, and Genghis Khan,
with only Charlemagne considered to be “western.°"5 Crulture and Carnage
contains more ease studies, but only one of these is medieval, the
Battle of Poitiers in 732. And the story oi‘ this battle, while tradi
tionally seen as a victory for the Franks under (lharles Martel against
Muslims who had recently conquered the Iberian peninsula, is far
from known, being based on relatively poor, wholly Frankish sources.
Thus it is far lirom de nitive as a clear victory of western forces over
eastern ones, as the Franks failed to pursue their enemy and the
Muslims still had time to bury their leader in lull religious ritual and
honor on the battlefield, and far frorn decisive, as it took the Franks
the rest of Charles Martel’s reign and that of his son, Pepin ll, and
his grandson, Clia1'l.e11i.a.gne, nally to push the Muslims behind the
Pyrenees Mountains.7 Again, if Hanson had wished to nd at per
fect example of medieval tactical superiority there are many other
examples. Take for instance the Battle of I lattin, fought in H87,
Where a brilliant medieval general was able to use tactical acumen,
the skill of his projectile troops, the weather, and the dearth of sup
plies, in this case water, to lure an enemy army into a valley trap
between two of his forces, resu.ltin,g in the almost complete annihi
lation of those Forces and the capture of their leaders. The problem
is that this leader was Saladin and thus not western, although he
arguably fought a western style of warfare in this battle and in his
bloodless capture olijerusalem a short time later."
several books that conclude that there was a lack oi‘ medieval military leaclerslilp" "
i.e_ B. H. Liddell Hart, tS‘trateg5:, 2nd ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), and Michael
Howard, I/Var in European Hislop: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, l97ti) has led
me to the statement made in the text above.
“ Naturally the western military leadership of Belisarius, William the Conqueror,
Edward l, Edward III, Hc:t1i"y V, and Joan of Arc must also be considered, but
none of these leaders conquered nearly as much. as those mentioned above, nor
were their conquests always held For any length of time. Equally impressive non
western medieval military leaders include Bayezid I, Mehmed Ill, and Suleynian the
l\/lagnilitzent.
7 Bernard S. Bachrach’s description of this battle (Earn: Carolirrgian I/l/rzr Irc.' Prelude
t0 Ernpire [l’l1iladclphiaI University oi‘ Pennsylvania Press, ZOUI], pp. l7U"77} is the
" best description of the l.)8lIlIlC, far superior to that oi lrzlanson. K
l‘ For a recent synopsis of this battle see my “The Bttttle of I Iattin, U871 lieginning
30 K.EI..I.vY D.EVR1ES
Hanson’s “western way of war” has been accepted almost com»
pletely without criticism by john Keegan, in A Histoiy ll/l/iarfrmcgg
and Geoffrey Parker, in The Militqijz Rr*00Zuti01z.' A filitary Imlomlian and
the Rise (if the West, i500—.I800,‘° but not by Jeremy Black or john
A. Lynn. l3lacl<’s locus is largely post medieval, so I will not spend
any time discussing his ideas here,“ but john Lynn’s Battle.‘ A Ifislopl
qf Combat and CuI,'tu1'e_ '0m Ancient Greece to /Modern /lnwrica devotes an
entire chapter to “Chivalry and Ghcvauchée; The Ideal, the Real
and the Perfect in Medieval Warfare.”‘2 OF all these cultural stud
ies of war, l.,ynn’s is the nest for medieval war ire, perhaps because
I assisted him with his research on this chapter, although l disagree
with some of its parts Lynn chose to follow C1i °o1"d J. Rogers’
definition of Edward .l.l.].’s crossing of Normandy from the Gotentin
peninsula. to Clrccy as a ehevauchée rather than the campaign that
l. have described it as;"‘ however, he does prefer my version of what
happened at the battle of Crecy over Rogers’,“' so l suppose we are
somewhat even. l..ynn’s medieval military culture is clearly a literate
crowd, one that champions the reading and writing of chivalric dis
courses and tales, as much as participating in warfare and tourna
ments, what he calls “the perfecterl form r_1rlwar.” Herc he is r.:apab.l.y
of the End,” A4aa’ieval Ilrlvtcrjl Magwgme {jam 20(34): 24~ f ll. Sec also David Nicolle,
flaitin, 1187: Saladin’: Greatexi Viciocgr (London: Osprey, H393), and Bcnja.mi.n Z.
Kcdar, “'l‘hr;? Battle of Hattin Reconsidcrcd,” in Tire Hrmzs qf aitin, ed. licnjamin
Z. Kcdar (Jerusalcni: Yacl lzhala Ben Zvi and Israel Exploration Society, E992),
l§l() —'2[)7. Salaclizfs own account of the battle is iound in C. P. l\/Iclvillc and l\/lalcolm
Carricron Lyons, “Sala(lin’s Hattin Letiter,” in The Harm qf Halon, 208" 12. On
Sala.din’s life and his military capabilities as a whole sec Malcolm (larricron Lyons
and D. E. P. jaclcson, .‘Jaladi11: The I“0l1':fz'c.r of lire mg» War (Clambriclgc: (laniliriclge
University Press, i982}.
9 john Kecgan, /I ]'Iisl0r}» qf I/I/'a.(/éms {New York: /\ll‘rcd A. Knopl, Z993).
“J Geoffrey Parker, The /l/Iililazjl Revolution." /l/Iililmy Innrmazfin/2 and the Rise the
l/Vest,
1500 180/), ‘incl ed l anihriclgei Cmnbriclgc University Press, l99(i).
1' Jeremy l3la.cl<’s large collection oi works on military history is well known. I lis
rcjc<;l'ion of the “wcstcrra way of war” can be found in a numl)er of these. Sec, for
example, I/Var and the Wm"la': Militmy Power and [ha Fate of Conixinenls, I45!) ~20f)() {New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); The (I'a11"zl1ri/ylgd 1llu.&'£mied Adlai‘ (if l’l/aq zre.‘ 1?m.rnf.n1u1.r:e
to Rr?€I().l7l.lZl7I1, I492" I 792 (Canibriclgci Cambridge University Press, l99(i); and l/I/lartern
l/Vagrjimz, .177/5*I<98Z (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
' *2 _]ol‘\n A. Lynn, Battle: A Ilislvg Com/ml am!’ (failure,/rrrm Anselm! Greece to ll//urlern
Arrzciica (Boulder: Wcstvictw Press, 2003), 73"l.Q9.
ll‘ Cliflorcl Rogers’ View is put foi"vvz1.rcl in his ll/or Cruel and Sharp.‘ English Strrrtqgy
under Edward III, ].3’27"].?60 Wooclbriclgc: Boydcll Press, 2000], 238m(i!l—. My alter
nate view had appeared in Kelly DcVrics, Infantry llrhg zre in the Ezzrhr Iihumenih
Ce1ziu1j1.'I)1lse2]1L"ine, Tarticij, and T}:ch110[0_g3> (VV'ood.l1)ri.<igc: Boydell Press, W95}, l55"5l3.
"' DcVri<~:s, Irgjkiiltfy I/l/aifdre, 158 ‘"75, and Rogers, War (hue! and Sharj), 'l64l~ 7'2.
MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND THE VALUE OF A I IUMAN LIFE
in uenced. by the work of Richard W. Kaeuper, who recently reit
cratecl this thesis in his paper, “lgitcrature as the Key to Cliivalric
Ideology,” delivered as the journal Medieval Milling I466 [Mfg annual
lecture at the 39th International Congress oi‘ l\/llcdicval Studies at
the University of Westerli i\/lichigan in 2004 .“ Lynn also holds to a
strong ecclesiastical role in medieval warfare, both in trying to mit
igate it " the Peace and Truce of God Wantl to encourage it~ the
Crusades. This, too, is the culture that defines medieval warlare,
although to Lynn il. sits at the end ol‘ his chapter, while I [eel its
prominence is more pronounced than chivalry. .
I do not object to john Lynn’s eliliorts here. l do think that cul
ture played an importanl; role in the means and motivations of
medieval xvaiilarc, especially among the nobility and niilitary lead
ership. And, he also does not try to push the untenable position
of western dominance so prevaleirit in the writings of Hanson and
others, I certainly feel that this is a preFcra.blc work to theirs. But I
wonder if it goes far eiriough to explain the way wars were carried
out in incdicval society at large, especially among those lower class
soldiers who did most of the ghting. For one thing, few inedic :val
soldiers were able to participate in the kind of military culture Lynn
champions. Most ncitlier participated in tournaments nor could read
or were the audience for chivalric manuals or literature; l have also
concluded that by the late fourliecntli century, if not ca.rl.ier in some
places, those who fought i.n tournaments and were ini'l11encctl by
chivalric works, ctitious or otherwise, were not the same ones who
fought wars.“
Second, John Lynn focuses, as do most other authors, primarily
on the ollensivc military struggles of the Miiddle Ages, and in par
iicular the waging of o ensive con icts in the form of'ba1.tl< rs. In this
he has been inlluen<.:ed by the importance placed on such conflicts
by many medieval military historians, including, among others, Gustav
Kolilcr, Sir Charles Ornan, Hans Dclbrtick, Emil Daniels, Willittlin
1:‘
‘ This will appear in a forlliconiing issue of Tlmjournal qj‘/Mediezaal Jl/Iilitagy .Hisi0r;n
The work that most inl‘luen(:c(l_I0l1n Lynn is liaeupe s excellent Chizralvy and l/inlrince
in /Iediwal Euroflw (Qxlorclt Oxibrcl University Press, W99).
l“ My ideas on this will appear initially in an article, “Was There a Renaissance
in l/V:u"farc? l.ntellc‘ctua.l llvolulion and 'lCL§l1l]Ol()$'lC£ll Dcicrrninism, l3UU*l56U,“
lorlhcolning in the journal offs/liliiarjl ]tfrLs'i0;g.', and will he developed further in 771$
Humlred Yea"/.§‘ lil/arts", .1'i?02".1'~iF<95 (lorthc:ornir1g in the l..ongrnans l\/lO(lC1‘1"1 Wars in
PerSp(:(;t.iv(i Series).
32 K1?;I..LY DEVR.IF.S
lilrbcn, li'erdinand Lot, Alfred Borne, and F. Verbruggen,” when
in fact early or high medieval battles were largely infrequent endeavors.
Large medieval land battles were usually fought in desperatiotl, only
when one power was invading or trying to stem an invasion (c.g.
Poitiers lnlentionednbovel, Edington, the Dyle, Lechlleld, $taml'ord
Bridge, Hastings, Manzikert, l\lorLhallerton, Arsul, and Falkirk) or when
leading or encountering rebellions Cassel, the Elster, Brémule,
Bourgtherolde, Lincoln, Legnano, Parnm, Benevento, Tagliacozzo,
Lewes, Evesham, and Bouvincsl. On only very rare occasions would
a. leader light more than one large battle for example, Kings \/Villiain
the Conqueror and Henry I, and Emperors Henry IV and Frederick
ll.""*a.nd then, it seems, only when their sel.f con. .de.1:1ce overpowered
their wisdom. As often as not, a leader flushed with victory in one
battle would meet defeat in a. following engagement, Harold
Godwinson, Simon de Montfort, and William Wallace. Even the
renowned warrior, Richard the Lionheart, was only involved in three
pitched battles during his career, including all of those fought elur»
ing the Third Crusade.“ Certainly some change in this came at the
end of the l\/Iidclle Ages, during the ghting of the Hundred. Years
Walt, the Swiss Burgiiiidian Wars, and tlie V\/"a.1's of the Roses. This
may be true in consideration of the rather unique Swiss Burgundian
Wars (4 battles in two years) and Wars of the Roses (lilleen battles
U Gustav Koliler, Dig lintznirklrzrzg (125 IFrieg.§w/:.9en,t urld der Kriqg lftrvlrgg in dew Ritterzeit
urm i/laliite des II. jalzrlzunctm l.s' bis‘ zit den IIu.s:ritm!:2"tkgm, 3 vols. (Breslau: W. Kohner,
H386); Sir Charles Omall, A Hi.s't0q'y qftlee Art l/1/'ar. Ylte .[l/fiddle Age.r 'arn the Plmrt/z
£0 the Frlrtrteertt/1 Cerzturjy (London: Methuen, H398) and A Hirtmjl rgf the Art I4/mt in
t/Le Mir1a'leAges', 2 vols. (I924; reprint, Loiidonz Grecnhill Books, l998); Hans Dell'Jri.'1Cl<,
Hirlmjr the ./lrt I/Var l/I/itfzin the Fminework Politiml Hiring’, vol. 3, Mledievrzl War/ere,
trans. W. Renfroe, (Westport: Greenwood Press, l984‘), originally Gm/ticltte den’
Kriegs/cum! im Ra/Jmen (165 Pnlitirri/Mn ()ardziclzte, vol. 3, /Wtittetalter, Znd ed. (Berlin: G. Stilke,
1923); Emil Daniels, Gert/tichta drr Ifriqg/szve.rcn.r, vol. ‘Z, Dar mittetttttcrlic/ze Kriqgsweren,
Qnd ed. (licrlini Gosehen, H327}; \1Vilht:lm Erlxtri, la’1iq.1;(ge.<c11ic/tte day Mtttelallars (Berlin:
R. (')ldenl)ourg, l929),: Ferdinand Lot, I/art rnilitaire at lei" armées au mg/rm gs an Europe
61 darts [6 [1706/Z6’ orient, 2 vols. (Paris: Payot, ll J46); Allrod H. Borne, T/ze Cmgl l/Var."
A ll/Iititctry I stnrjl of the Hundred Yeurit l/1/ar om I337 to the Peace qf Brett£17)’; 2 1350
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955) and The zlgincrlurt l/Var." A Military» Ifixtoijl 0/‘
the Latter Part rj the Hurtriied Ylzurs War_fmm 135. 9 to /453 (Lorldotii Eyre and
Spottiswoode; 1956); and F. Verhruggen, The ./lrt qf 1/l/airfare in I/Vertem Eztropze dur
ing the /l4irl¢'lt:2‘/lgar rm? the Eiglz z Centuzfu to .I.'34()], trans. S. Willard and R. VV.
Southerii (\’\/oodbridge: Boydell Press, l995), originally De /o@Qgkun.rt in west~ez.!r0j)u. in
dz: middeleezm, an (IX” tot XIV" eeu1i.1,l (llrusselsl Paleis dc Aeaclernien, l.95‘l).
”‘ john. Gillingham, “Richard l and the Science of l/Var in the Middle Ages," in
l/V1111 and Govemment in the Middle /lgex: Es'.s‘@25 in Honour U. Pms'tz.m'ch, ed. john
Gillingham and (1. Holt (Totowa: Barnes and Noble, 1984»), 78 "~91.
' v ~ '
MEDIEVAL V\/ARFARE AND THE VAl..UIl£ OF A HUMAN LIFE.
in thirty years). However, the ltlundred Years \/Var, which gave his
tory such battles as Sluys (l3‘lO}, Crecy (1346), Poitiers (1356),
Agincourt (1415), Formigny M50), and Castillon (i453), was really
more a war of sieges; for example, the l$urgt1n<lian leader, John the
Fearless, certainly one of the greatest l lundred Years War leaders,
never Fought a single battle in that war, while Henry V and joan
of Arc only lought in one eache'"and_]oan’s participation in the bat
tle ol‘ Patay was minimal at l:)est.“’ l\/loreover, at the same time as
the Hundred Years \/‘Jar, the Qttoman Wars being fought across the
continent involved almost no pitched battles and yet yielded some
of the largesli ground gains in l'1i.story.'“‘ Simply put, medieval sieges
were fought Far more frequently than battles because medieval. war
fare was characterized more by the dcl.'e1'1sive than the ollensive; and
it was chara.eteri7.ed more by the del'erisivc.: because of‘ the high value
of human life placed on combatants and 1'1OHCQIl’1lU?lllk).1'1liS.21 _
Now I know that this view goes against the traclitioiis and myths
that for so many centuries have clescrilaecl. medieval warfare. The
notion ofhlood thi1~sty l)8.l"l'J2l,1‘lZl.1‘1S"""‘GrO[l1S, l Inns, Viki.1‘1gs, and Mongols,
to use the four popular “BarlJa.rian” cultures identi ed. in the recent
popular History Channel show~—~or ruthless nobles have permeated
almost all n.arrati.ves set in the Middle Ages, from Ia§~!tv pf the _lfm,g
and Ivan/we to The Once and tlze Future King and Lord ("he Rings. But
this is an erroneous irnage of medieval warl‘are, and while l will be
able to do little more than outline my ideas here, for further devel
opment .la.ter, l wish to express my thesis rmly; medieval military
leaders, by and large, placed 22. very high value on human l.i‘l'e, and
'5' On_]ohn the Fearless’ generalship see Kelly Devries, “john the Fearless’ Way
of War,” in ]€ef2ulutrIon and Rt?/)T¢.§6Ttt(ttt(l71 in Illflemth (,'mtu1;y Eurojze, ed._l)ouglas
Biggs, Sharon 1'). l\/l'icl'ialovc, and A. Compton Reeves (Leiden: Brlll, QUU4}: ,i5l'".t.‘_>;
on Henry V see (Ihristopher Allmand, ]'Ie;'uj1 V (Berltelcy and Los Angclest bmvcrsity
of California Press, l99‘Z), and Desmond Seward, Ilmry V or l/I/a1'tum’_(l9ll7; reprint,
London: Penguin Books, 2001); and on Joan of Arc see Kelly l)e'\/rues, joan 9/ Arc:
A Mititay 1..(f(t([t'7'(Slf1"(]lJClI Sutton ]’ublishii'1g, V399). I _ _ _ _ i
2° Two good general studies ol the early Ottoman l mpirc. are Halil lfll/1lC1l{,‘
Utmmart Em[Ji1'e.' The (ltrmicat Age, 1300 rrr"16i()(), trans. Norman lt7.lf:ow‘1tz and (plan
Imber (New York: l’1'aeger, l973), and Colin lmher, 'Il'za Ottoman hmjatre, 1;>’()0":i 6.50
(Houndmills: 1.’algrav(r Maeinillan, 2002). On the military success of these early <'.§C)r!1..
quests sec. Stephen Turnbull, The Ottoman 1!.'1rtjJi1'c, 1326" I 699 (London:_(.)sprey, 2005).
2‘ Setrjini lrlraclhury, Wm A/[ed12?:1at,S"tege (\/Voodbridg'e: Boydell Press, 1992); R.‘Rogers,
Latin .Sliege Warjizre in the Trraeft/1 Ce atupl {Oxiordz (.llarend0n Press, 1992}; and l5e:"r|a.r'cl
S. Bacliracl'1, “Medieval $iege Wa1‘tl;1re: A Reeonnaisszlnce," juumrzt qfM'1lrta1y I Itrtugl
58 (1994): ll.9* ""33.
 KELLY DEVRIES
this not only supplements the cultural cle nition that John Lynn uses
to de ne medieval warfare, but also more than anything else deter~
mines the reasons why medieval wars were fought and why leaders
led and soldiers fought in them.
Let me begin by establishing the fact that medieval soldiers were
dillerent from their ancient counterparts, and that this began very
early in the Middle Ages. Even before many of the successes of the
barbarian invaders had brought about any governmental or societal
changes in the Roman Empire, a barbarization of the Roman armies
had taken place. Vegetius and Arnmianus Mareelliniis decried it;
Sidonius Apollinariyus and Proeopius accepted it.” With the bar
barizatioitl of the Roman army came the barbarization of military
leadership""" Aetius, Stilieho and otherseeeeeand the ultimate barbanzaiion
()i_gO\Ffil’l711Tl€Xll.. New legal codes .i.nti"0duced new societal statuses and
values: weigeld, which quite literally reduced all humans to inonetary
worth?" Tlie warrioi." in these legal systems was placed at the top,
his value recognized and, consequently, protected by virtue of the
impoverishment that would be siil"l°ei?ecl by the one who killed him.
This was quite different. frorn the Roman l:radi.tion and eertainlyy led
to an elitism developed by early medieval warriors, a rnachismo not
earlier seen. In 470 Sidonius Apollinar.ius wrote with awe when he
encountered Fiankish warriors in a soutlierri. Gaulish urban setting:
Their swords hung from their shoulders on baldricks, and round their
waists they wore a belt oi‘ fur adorned with bosses [>. . .] In their right
hands they held barbed latices and throwing axes, and in their lelt
shields, on which the liglit shone, white on the circuit and red on the
boss, displaying both opulence and craftsmanship.2“ '
invariably these warriors fought, but not as often as one would tliink.
Battles described by Gregory of Tours, Paul the Deacon, Jordancs,
Bede, and other “narrators oi" barbarian hist<iry”2“ were small allairs,
2')
See Kelly l)eVrieS, jl/Iedieval [l/Iilitagyi Tee/uwlogji Peterborouglit Broadview Press,
i992), 8, 5’l:<"i5. This is also indicated in Arther lllerrill, The Ii}/if! rift/ze Ronmiz 1;!77{Jil‘6','
/1 M/ililaiy lfxplanatiun {horidoiii Thaines and I Iudson, l98(i), and Bernzird S. Itlachracli,
“Proeopius, Agathias and the Fi"anl<ish Military," iS]{mr:ulum 45 {I970}: 435' "/l~4l.
2?’ l xamples of uievgeld suins can be found in 771.2 Lomliarcl Lantai", trans. Katherine
Fis(:hi:r Drew {’I’hilacleiphia.: University of Pennsylvariia Press, l973), and Tlir Bmgundian
Code, trans. Katherine FlS(Il'lC1" Drew Philadelphia: University ofl’ennsylvania Press,
I972).
Translated in R. H. C. Davis, /l Hitting of iltleclicrizil Europe." From Crnistaiztiiie £0
Sairili Lauri; (London: lliongmaiis, I970), l(l8"'ll9.
”~" The term is Walter G0 aei~t‘s, taken from his exeelleiit study of these authors
MEDIEVAL. WARFARE AND THE VALUi€Z or A I—I[Ui\/IAN LIFE 35
involving few soldiers, especially after the initial conquests of Gaul
and Italy had been accomplished. More time seems to have been
spent avoiding open conflict and, when unavoidable, getting it over
quicldy with the least amount of damage and the least number of
l‘atalities.2‘l Old Norse sagas tell similar stories about the beandinavians
before and during the early Viking period.” Wlien large battles did
result one also that they were fouzglit to cause rout rather tlizm
death, with defeated soldiers often allowed their ight from the
battle eld without pursuit Already by the early Middle Ages 1'l 1"1"Zl
tive sources begin to list names and numbers .kil.led in conllictis, obvi
ously to indicate the prominent men who had been slain, but in
doing so also indicating how few actually were killed because they
could list the names of all who had, (lied! For example, Einhard,
Charlemagne’s biographer, in recording the Battle of Roncevalles,
mentions only three deaths, one of whom was the soon to be made
famous Roland..2“ _
‘By the time of (llharlernagne, but eerta;inly begun by his lather,
J» ' II,
lepin ' and grandfat
' =
ier, “iar es Martel , a. new direction was l.bl~
_
lowed: the establishment of an extremely large and dominating mil
igayy force filled with well. trained, well armed, and well provisioned
professional soldiers. In this, despite the fact that .1t is unpopular t0
do so, I am convinced by the work of Bernard S. Baehracli, 2Lll;l1()L1gl’1
I do not think that by building this force Glizirlemagne was 2)1't€‘.lT1'pii
ing to recreate a. Roman style military force .Baeh.rach aversf ‘
and their narrative chronicles, Y71e.]Vmra|£0;r5 qfliarl/arirm. I"1i.s'£0iy Q21). 55¢" 300;?‘_7'?1T1l Fl@:Y>
(,1; @3013» of 'fbm_s', Bade, and Paul /he Deacon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, lfllllll.
'2“ the numerous examples mentioned in Beriiartl S. l5aelii'ac.l1, I‘./Im'01nrigm;'1.
il/Iifitaiji Oiganizatimz, 481" 751 {l\/linneapolis: University oi‘ Nlinn l PT<f$5, >l97_2l~_
'17 Sm; for (‘,X;1]I1plC, l)avici M. \'Vilson, The l/'iking.1' and their Urigiiw Slcartdinrzvza 1711
[lie 17511;! fl/Iillermium {Londonz Thames and l"lutlsor_1; Elli/'(l_l> *_1‘_'l‘l.l¢ *5‘: BYO(!3l<= fliwd 7”
Imlandic Saga (llerlreley and Los /\ngeles: I,lI}1\’C1‘5ll'y of _U21l1lO1"T11i\ PFC 95» 195%)»
2“ In Einhard and Notker the Starimierer, 7100 l.izI£.i‘ of (.,'l1.a"/Zrznurgne, trans. L U101"P“
(l'l'¢H'l’1'l()l'l(i$W()}’ll}1 Penguin Books, I969), 64 "b5. V I _
2“ This is most recently seen in Ba<;l'ir;icl'1’s Early Carrifzngwn l/I/crrfrlre, but see also
his nuinerous articzleson (Iarolingian w:.ii'l‘are including: “Military g)l‘g?).l'l1Z T}OH in
Aquitaiiic tinder the l arly Carolingiaiis,” Speculum 1i»§l\(l97’l}: l"55; gltarleiiiagiie s
Cavalry: Myth and Reality,” Mililrini /l iliis 4'7 W83): 181" 87; and (iharleinagnc
l
and mg (j;1;<,1;ng1an ~\ ;ra_l Stall,~¢= joumal gf ,1’l4il1£rzi)1
(Jam 1" H ‘ E26‘
Iilltlfg ‘ _(.Zl)OZ,~._
~' ‘\ did
' ‘ T)8.
Tlmse opposing l§a(;l1ra.ch’s icleas incliide: john l7:raii_{:e, “_.l he Military I“i]Sf(3‘l;Y“()I‘
the Caroliiigian Period,” Revue lielge d’histriire mil :..tam 2%" {l985):__8lflOO; _lhe
Composition and Raising oi the Ai‘irii<:s of Cliarl.eiTiag1'ie,“ _jriumzil Q] A/Iedaeval M1.lztaqj=
I liitorp 1 (2002): 61* 82 ii1'id l*". Verbruggen, “lJarii'i€:<: ct la. strategic (il Charlemagri.e,”
36 k1~:I.LY DEVRIES
indeed, the position of cavalry in Gha.rlemagne’s army denies that
possibility in my estimation. lnstead, I believe that Charlemagne built
this force in part because he valued the lives of his soldiers. His goal
was obviously for conquest, and the surest way oi‘ achieving this goal
was to build up the numbers of his soldiers, to require them to he
well armed and armored, to keep them well trained and well pro
Visioned, and to provide them with good leadership. The result was
that all of his conquests were successful and that the losses of his
soldiers were minimal.
There is of course much more to be said about the early Middle
Ages, the Carolingian period, Viking invasions, and high Middle
Ages, but in this brief survey I want to mention three aspects of
warfare that came out of this time that define the defensive priori
ties of medieval warfare in gene1"a..l,iat least until the very end of the
Middle Ages, and characterize the high value placed on human life
during the Middle Ages: armor, fortifications, and military surgery.
Armor
The rst of these was the development of defensive armaments for
individual protection. Although. personal delensive armaments, or
arrnor for short, had been used since prehistoric times, as evidenced
in cave paintings, it was not 1.int.il the ancient period that Egyptian,
Greek, Persian, and Roman forces began to acquire standardized
metallic armor, yet even then this did. not cover the entire body and
was largely limited in use to elite and regular soldiersfl“ By the
Carolingian period, this had begun to change. Charlemagne recog
nized quite early in his reign that his military conquests depended
on the security of his soldiers, whose expertise at lighting wars could
not be easily replaced.“ Consequently, they needed to be well armored.
in Karl rler Gms.s‘e.' Leberzrwerk and Nita/ileben, hand l, Personlich/sci! mm’ (}c.rc/tic/1150, ed. H.
Bcumann et ai. (Dusseldorf: L. Sehwann, 3965}, ‘l'20""36; “L’art mililaire clans Fem
pirt: ca1"olin'gien (7 ll4'—lU(lU},” Revue Iirnlge al’/zirtuire miliiaire 23 l§l79" ~80}: 289 3l(),
393" 412; “Dc krijgcrs van Karel dc Grotc,” Gmomchaf) 0001' gear/n'ea'— an r1ua'heia'/tundra
fc Vilvoomle 5.2 (June l999)t QWQO; and “De oorlogen van Karel dc Grotc [763—8l4 },"
(;!,’!l00ll~‘>'C/t lfi 11001 gesc/2iea'— an oudlrrrkikrrrade Z0 Vilrsrmrde 5.l (Mar E999): ‘Z*22.
3” De‘/ries, Mediciial /l/Iilitzzzfy Tar;/analog)», 5U"55, and Arthcr Fcrrill, T720 ()rzgin.i 0,/l
Vlimj/trim the Stone Age to zllexancler the Great London: Thanies and Hudson, 1985), 22.
3' This expertise is not contested by any of“ the Carolingian. military historians.
MEDIEVAL WARl?ARI~i AND "ran vAt.U1=i: or A HUMAN LIFE 37
'l“l"i.e rst extant law to state this policy was the capilularz: 1m.t.s0rm'r:. of
792/3, which demanded that all bcnelice and oflice holders in the
Carolingian realm possess full armor and shield as well as a horse
and oflensive weaponry.” This was followed in 802/Fl by a capitu
lary again charging these nobles to have their own helmets and
euirasses {known to the Carolingians Ig'rnie.s").33 Finally, in 805, E116
law was made even more speci c. ln this c.:apitulary, Charlernagrie
required anyone oi‘ his empire who held twelve mansi of land to have
his ow11 armor and to serve a horseman in his army; if he failed
in his duty, both his land and his armor would be taken from h1n”r.°"
Tliese Qyrnias" were standardized coats oi‘ interlaced rings [chain mail),
which were draped liroml the shoulders but also covered the thighs
and upper arms, with bibs and coils that could be attached by litres
to the also required l1elmet.3"‘ Sliiclds, too, were required oi‘Carolir1gian
s.oldiersf‘“ _
Coats of mail such as the €larolingian Ipimies were not .ll1“1lC]_U.6 to
the Carolingian Empire. lntieed, the Romans had the skill to pro»
duce these types oi’ iron armor but generally seem to have p1"elerred
the solid. bronze breast plate. However, Charleinagne did seem to
l_'){fliQ\I('_’. that f;;.nnie.s' were uniq_ue enough to keep them out of the
hands of his eneinies. As early as 779, Clh.arlemagne forbade the sale
of this armor outside the realm; in 803, he added a declaration that
soldiers were forbiddeiii even to give it to a rnerehant, who might
sell it to a potential enemy. It does appear, however, tliiat certain
amoral Frankish merchants still sold Jlynzier to .Musli1'ns, Bretons and
Viltingsfll lit also appears that the Carolingian i§yrnz'el;>(~:ea1'ne the stan
dard for all medieval armor until. the very end of the l\/liddle Ages,
when during the lourt.een.th century plates began rst to be attached
to vulnerable parts ol“ the coats of mail and then, in the mid to late
.. ‘ V , _, > ._ w '..§3ll ll‘
hlteenth century, to be Formed into complete metal suits. V\h1lc
'52 Sirnon (louplarid, “(iarolingian 1\rms and Armor in the Nintli Century," Vi/2.I.m'
21 (l990)1 30.
3“ Coupland, 38~39. . _ V
3" l:7ranc.ois Ganshof, Iiizmlcish 1n.rli.£u1ioi1.s' under (,l’zarlernrz_.qrze, trans. Bryce and Many
Lyon (New York: W. W. Norton and (1ompany.,‘lnc., i968}, lib, and Bernard S.
llaczlirach, “i\/lilitary (‘)rganiv.a.t.ioii in t\q\1il?li1'i<Y>=l '5l"5"'”l”m 49 l.l974‘l3 29
3*" l'.)eVrics, /l/Ir,'r1't'erm1.l /liililrzry 71?:/zrzolragy, ['ill’62.
ll“ .lf)e\/rics, Medizrial Military Yezrlllznlegjz, 59‘""€i(l.
3'" Coupland, 39, and Ganshoi‘, 66.
3" l§)eV1"i< :s, ll/lleriietvzlil/IiZ1'tzzry Trzc/analogy, 63~~~~~'72.
38 K_El..LY DEVRi}?.S
the coats of mail tl“lem.selves changed in amount of body covered,
until they were worn over the head and even on the hands and ll eel 3
the concept of defensive, life savilig protection did not Change.
Yet, what may be perhaps more interesting in view of the thesis
l am proposing is that this armor was not meant solely {or the elite
or cavalry soldier. While iiilantry during the Ca1"(>lir1glar1 period were
not always out tted with body armor, although the Capitulary of
Aachen, proclaimed in 802/3, did require them all to carry a sliicrldf“
nearly all soldiers, iillarltry or cavalry who pa1"tieipa.ted on the Crusades
in the Holy Land and elsewhere from 1096 until the end of the
l\/l.i.dcl.le Ages were out tted. with mail armor. In acklition, by at least
1302 and the Battle of Courtrai, if‘ not earlier, evidenced in the
conternporary Courtrai Chest and con rmed by contemporary doe
uments and narrative sources, urban militias were also completely
out tted with 2:1I‘1Tl()I‘.4ll E><;cavati,ons of grave mounds at the battle elds
of Visby (1361) and Towton (1461) suggest that this was simi1.arly
true of rural warriors?‘ 1
Never in military history have armies been so uniforrnly well
armored; and this arrnor was eifective. Those same excavations at
Visby and Towt on have shown how protective body *1>.. ISO >u* ,.. .4 ,. , >—. fa~
Middle Ages was, as only wounds to the limbs and lxeat:9a_ were fotsrid,
those to the head being, of course, the fatal ones/Q Experiments car
ll’ Couplanci, 30.
1“ Tlie hes!’ hook on the bztttle o[(1¢>t1rtrai remains F. Verlaruggrrn; De mhg tier
gulden..rf1rm::t.' B_1j¢t'mg¢2 tot ale geschiedenir van Vlrranzlerenr ?I?‘_L']i'lZ€I:(ll1‘ f17'[Q{[, 129741305 (Antwerp:
btandaard BO€l(l1EU1ClCl, 1952), which has been recently trar1r.late:'l as ']‘)'ze lialtle of
>1/2»: Golden Sjzunt Courtmi, I I _ 1.9 O2, ed. Kelly l)eVrie5, trans. David Ritihzlrd
F<:rgt:s(m {Wood.brid,gc: Boyclcll Press, 2002), In this Verhrtzggcai goes through the
scenes on the Courrrai chest and how they relate to the battle. However, recently
$01110 have dotlbtecl the veracity of this art,il}u:t_ Sec, lor example, R1 H, Marijnissen,
De “C/mt {/fCoum'ai”.' lien rmrvalvirrg mm /mt jJatvll'c1:i0—@1]Jc (llrussrzls: Paleis de 1\caclen':ien,
E9’/ll}, and Brian Gilmour and lan Tyers, “Courirai Clicsti Relic or Recent:
Reassessment and FLl1‘1'l’1C1" Work: /\r1 Interim Report,” in I)/zfmis‘ Q/1!/m ‘1'l‘ler!1}2z/al l':u'm])e
Bmgge I997’ Co1gférem'e, vol. 5, AH and \5j)771i)!)Z1l.fY1L in rMr:dieval Eumpe (Bruges: l. A. P.
{lnstituut voor lxet /'\FC l'iC()l()glSCl] Patriznonium), 1997), l7 26_ Tlicse have been
couritered r.le(;isively, in my estimation, in A. LR]. Van rle Walla: and R. Heughebaert,
“Dc Chest of Courtrai: E011 dipl.om.atiel:c laoller anno 1392, t(:cl1nicl< en g'(:E1eim,”
.D?"ierr1ar1n/1el'_z']'ks i rllvc/zr?.']'l vuor induslriale cultuur 74 (iZUUi}: 1'"'72.
'1" Bengt Tllordemami, /l?"m0ur_ '0m the Battle {If I/l'*i.s‘!gy, 136/ (1939; reprint, Union
City: Chivalry llool (shelf, 2001), and Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, and
Cliristopher Kntisel, Blood Red Roms.‘ The Arrzimeolqgy Q/Er, f!/lam; G9’/.!Zi€_ 07'.'l the Bait/11 (1/l
Ybwlrm, A1) I 46] Oxford: Oxbow Books, 290(3).
’*"’ Both oi.“ the boolzs in Iii. 4 1 have sections devoted to the wouncls sullerecl by
the exeavatecl corpses, a<;l<ri<>wl<:<l§_;in§;' the lillili o:1'i1ors0 wountls.
M1ZlI)I1‘5ZVAI{,. \'\/'AR1?AR.1£ AND 'I'I:I.1"5 \/‘ALLEIE OF A. Ir1UMAN L1F}':‘.
ried out by the Royal Armouries in Er1gla.r1tl, and elsewhere have
eontirmecl how elilhcult it was to penetrate a moving target covered
by mail or plate arrnor, especially if also wearing some heavy rnaterral
under this armor; even l,hi,(:l< felt would provide extra protection,
while 2 1 qtiilted. gambeson or leather garment, the more coinmon,
was idealfl“
F0r2f] (.'a[i1)n.s‘
Moving from individual to societal protectiori, a second military tech
nological development oi‘ the early i\/liddle Ages that rel‘le(.il1(:cl the
cultural value of human life was the fO1'tl'l'l(l£Ll..l.()l1.l. O1’ course, rnedievill
.i}>1"tilic.atio11s were not the rst such societal protections in world his
tory. Sydney Toy’s A Ifislugr F0rtgI cali01t_/lmn 3000 111.2. to /1.11 I 700,
which grew out of his earlier study, Cars t[e.s~.' A Slum’: flisloay Fort_z'/icatiortr
rom I600 1:.<J:. to M), I 600, establishecl for every tzastellologist an incred
ibly large chronology for the study of i'0r'ti:{"icatior1s.“'4' Yet once one
begins reading either of these ehrorxologirzally broad tomes, one real
izes that the pztges devoted to forti txatioiis built during the Midclle
rv C3 Q»:
HQ es, i:>ot1'1. castles and city walls, con.si..itute the real orii1"y' of thes
?‘f
any similar studies. V
Again, it is in the early l\/Iiclclle Ages that earth an.Cl—wooel :[r_>r1:i ea~
lions‘ began being used to protect not just: ind.ivieluals and i.nclividual
i lluxiilies but also somewhat larger societies. 'l"1‘1ese iwere especially
important in the &.(;e of .invztdi|'1g forces, such the \/ikings or
1 l',ungaria.ns, especially as these invaders were often not nu.rnerou.s or
serious enough to und.er1al<e the ellort to attack or besiege such 2.:
"" About two years ago rnemlucrs of the Royal Armouries stall (;arrie<l out a num»
her of experiments using clill"erent meclieval wearious agzunst a free moving dummy
to approximate human movement and dressed it in maul arsnor, Vilfyllllg the gztw
ments urscler the mail»leathcr, quillerl gambcson, lie21\'§,g tluck lelt, etc. lhe zrrirlor
in all cases and with all undergarments proteeietl its user almost eoinpletely élg lml
all vvea.pon attacks, l121n(l~l1eld, cast, and shot. 'l‘l1esc experirnents have not yer httfn
E!L!lJll.Sl.lCCl, ()!'her experiments have proven the weapons to be more suecesslul, ‘hut
ihese were ztgainst staicl targets and wi!,houl' various layers? ol 1ir1clc:rgarrr1errLs. Sec,
for exa:npl(:,il’eter N. _lor:(~rs, “'l."lze i\/[emll(>grapi1y arxcl Rrtlat.1ve ‘.lill_e(1tt\ICI1€! S5 Ol
Arrowheads and Armor during the Mirldltz !\ges,“ rl/Iaier"ia[.1" (.,1ll&l’6l'(.‘i€?"l.Z(ll1:’I?1 29 (l992)I
111*l17. W H _ , V _
“"5 Sydney Toy, Casller: /l S/zmri f'1"i.s"1imj.' qf 1*}Jrt_1f1cet1uv1.r__[w'r1a"rz 1' oU() I'M." in A1), 1'60!)
(.l..,onclon; VV4 l"l.<7i.ru':ma11r1, l¥)3ll}, and A ]‘[i!1Yl' llfjl Q] ]*b1'!r[zumon N/mm .300!) 131;. to /1.1).
[700 (_I..ondon.t \/V1 ll Ieinenr:a1'u1, 1955}.
4. 0 KELLY DEVRIES
iort1"ess. Alfred the Great thus found in his earth and Wood barbs
safety from Vikings invading his kingdorn,"5 while German and French
l\/Iarcliier lords secured their borders from similar invasions with sim
ilar fortifications.“‘ Eventually these ring worl< style of Forts were
replaced by the motte and bailey castles, which utilized a tall man
rnade hill placed within a ring work to provide even greater pro
tection for its inhabitants and potential refugcesf"
Yet, it was the Crusades that introduced European lorti catioii
builders and, even more importantly, lort.i cation nanciers to the
styles, techniques, and uses of precipitous terrain as added defense
that would become characteristics oi‘ all high and late medieval
loirtiilications. While by the time of the First Crusade Europeans had
already been constructing castles in stone, I/Villiam the Conquero s
‘White Tower and Colchcster Castle being two of the most famous
of these struc't:ures,"“ the paucity of wood, in the Middle East neces~
sitated that all Crusader forti cations be constructed in stone.
Additionally, as so few Grusaclers remained in their captured “king'
dorns” after their initial conquests, with "perhaps as many as one
half to two thirds of those still alive at the fall ofJerusalem» estimated
to he '5' 1: (5 >1 han 25,000” ¥.(E F:s. *1:5ing to l?iurc pe, and few newer
(1
Crusacling recruits taking their p.lace,“" numerous forti cations needed
to be built there. UMortzunattely, scholars have not been able to put
a deiinittive total’ on the number oi‘ castles that were built during the
time of the Crusaders’ Middle Eastern occupation. However, it is
clear that the number lies above one hundred, if not two hundred.5°
4*" The 1')._e)@rwe gt I/I/r:.r.\vzx.' ‘Tire B1111!/till flidrrqe mm’ Angle Sixon Iibrtje,/ica£inn_i~, ed David
Hill and Alexandci" R. Rumble (Manchester: Manchester University Press, i996).
Both Richard l’. Ahcls, /11/mt L/arr Great: War, Iiirlgs/ii]? and (lfulture in /lngl0—$ax0n Ertglarzd
(l'.0ndon: I_.ongman, 1998], and joint Peddic, /l_l/irrd." I/l/ttrrior King (Stroucl: Sutton
lhllilisliing Limited, L999), also discuss the bur/ti‘ in the context of Al "cd’s dctferisivc
plans against these invadcrsf raiders.
'"’ DeVries, Ilhrliaial Zllilit/129; 7'échn0!rJ_;§, 197 "201.
"7 DeVries, Merlieml /l/Iitidrinr Tet/Analogy, 201 12. Numerous studies have been lT12L(l(3
on these fortifications, especially in England. For a bibliography of these works see
Kelly lJc\/ties, A Clrinulaiivt ]3i[>[iqgra])I'§_')" zgfMe1l[ez:al ll/liliirzmy l"[i.ti0;f)1 and Te/zlmology
(Leiden: ii. Brill, 2002), 837 42.
ll‘ ll)eV:’ies_, Medieval Miliiavjl Yer/trivlrigy, QQ(J'""§'Z5.
ll’ (i)l.’l'll'lC numerical strength oi‘ the Crusarlcrs who chose to remain in the Middle
East sec Steven Runcirnan, /I Hirtuzfy Qf the C'm.rade.t (§.\lew York: Harper and Row,
l‘u§')lishers, 1964 ), l:
5" Sec R. C. Smail, “Crusadc1s’ Castles otthc ':l.lWCll.l.l] Century,” Cmnl,rri¢l_ga I stnrical
7f)U7‘1’lC|1[ l.(l (l95l}: 35""'3tl, and R. C. Sinail Cru.s‘a( ing I/1 'l1gy‘i1,re, 109? 1.19.5’ (Camlwiclgc:
Cziinlnriclgc University Press, lil56),i2t34 ifll.
MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND T} I11". VAI_.'Ui?l OF A HUMAN LIFE
In deference to those built in Europe at the same time, Crusader
castles builtrin the countryside used the harshness and inaccessibil
ity of the Middle Eastern terrain to add to the defensibility of the
structures. Tlicse castles were built on the summits of precipitous
crags or next to steep ravines. At two places, Tyron and Habis, the
Crusaders even forti ed caves. Most castles had thick walls, usually
more than live meters in width, Faced with large stones, and intri
cate, welhdeieiided entryways. They were also incredibly large, what
I have called elsewhere “castle complexes,” ahlr: to shelter and pro
vide all of the necessities of lilc for a large number of people for a
long time. Because their inhabitants anticipated long sieges that. might
last. until reinforcements could arrive from Europe, the castles were
provided with reservoirs for water supply and large cellars for iood
storage. For example, at the castle of l\/.{a.rgat it is estimated that
there were su icieiit food and water supplies t.o feed a garrison of
1000 men for five years?‘ _
It seems logical, although this logic can also be con rmed by
empirical, archaeological, and written. evidence, that soldiers return
ing from the Criisades were deeply im.pr< zssed by the security provided
by the forti cations there, for onlyat the end of the Crusades, from
the middle of the. thirteenth century on, were these castles even
threatened by enemy troops. indeed, rnost withstood almost all
attcnipts to attack or ‘oesiege them, with many surrendering only
when the numbers of defenders inside Fell so low as to make aban
donment more prudent tlian resistance. "2 These returning soldiers
then transferred this forti cation construction knowledge to Europe
where it influenced the bti.ild,ing of castles and urban fortificartions
for the remainder of the l\/Iiddle Ages, especially during the tweliith
and thirteenth centuries, the so called golden age of medieval
lt)1"til'lC8.tI()l’iS.53
Without going into liirther detail on the construction of castles
and town walls throughout medieval Europe, let me end with two
observations that I will state with far more simplicity than their
5* DeV17ics, /l/Ierliwal Milikiijz TIerlm.0l0gy, 5123; Smail, Cm.s'at!1.ng I/Vrzjrjme, 2l7":l_ll; anti
I F4 S. R. Boasc, Crlsiler and Cllmrlmr lireCru.iaa'ir1g Kiitgdowt (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 44 _ V _ _
52 See Hugh Kennedy, C:ru..racler (l”a.s'l[r.i {Camliiridgcz Cambridgr: University Press,
‘E994 ), 98*l 19.
I)eVries, /l/Icdieval ll/Iiiitzzrjr The/tn0lug)1, 123."? ' l 3.
42 K.}.1L‘LY navmrzs
obvious complexity warrants. First, the constructitm. of any medieval
forti cation was extremely expensive. ‘Nhether it was an earth and
wood construction built using only the expense of lorced labor, a
large stone castle complex that served both as royal residence and
fortification, or a town wall to extend around the urban area of even
a small town, let alone a city the size of Bruges, Ghent, Milan,
Florence, Naples, Paris, or Constantinople, such a construction was
a major economic endeavor. Sometimes the cost of a medieval
fortification is known; [or example, the cost of Cacrnarvon Castle,
built hy Edward l in Wales at the end of the thirteenth century, is
recorded as having cost the English king £2U,UU(), with a total for
all ol‘ his castle construction projects in Wales costing between £52,0(l(l
and ElO_,O(JO.5"‘At other times, the medieval military historian must
recognize the expense implied from more indirect means, such as
the punishment so often levied by conquering generals of having the
urban l'ort:ii"icat'ions of a defeated town pulled down, the expense of
rebuilding a perc.epti1Jl.e deterrent against disputes with the conctuexrori“
The second observation is less of an obvious one, because it goes
against; what: most modern historians are led to believe about medieval
fortification.s. These huilrglings, wiiih their straighti, tall stone walls, did
not fall easily. lf those inside a ‘forti cation, whether a, castle or a
town, wanted to witlistancl an attaclcing army they generally did, and
little could dissuade them from this d.eterrnination. Attacking the
walls of such 'lot*t1"esses was costly in terms Olll men and was gener
ally only accomplished with the use of large numbers of artillery
pieces and other siege maeliines, and generally also if there was no
army Friendly to the besieged that COL1lCl bring reliel’. Tlms tirric in
these situations was of the essence, as the old saying goes; the army
with time on its side usually won the siege. Time also allowed con '
quest more frequently by the old means of mining, starvation, nego
tiation, or treachery. This meant that almost all sieges took a very
long time to accomplish, ll they were accomplished at all: Rome
took ten years to fall in 4 10; Cliateau Gaillard was lI)ftSl(!gC(l for more
than a year in l203—04'; Calais took nearly the sarne amount of time
5" On lzldward l“s castles in Wales sec De‘\/ries, 1l4'm'r'¢va1T1Wilitap' Dr/zrzuloy, 24 /l~""1l 9.
Costs oi’ these castles can he found on p. 24 8.
Sec the examples in Kelly l)eVrics, “'l."l1.e Rcliiellions ol‘ the Southern Low
Countries’ 'l‘owi‘is during the Ftmrteentla. and ,l“illce11tl1 Centtlrics,” in Power and the
Cvigéy in 1/m.Net/zerlaitdic l’i/hrld, ].()|9()—.?U(I'O, ed. W, 'l“cBrake and VW. l§il1>lcr (_Lcide1"1:
ll). Brill, Qllllllr l_‘l‘(:vrtl1(:(>rriii1§_ ,*'_'}),
MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND T1 IE VALUE OF A HUMAN LIFE
in l,3‘l 6 4 7, and Constantinople held out for almost a year in 1,453;
while’Neuss did not fall after more than a year’s siege in lll 74 ~75.€’“
Again, despite the contrary thought prevailing, gunpowder weaponry
did not alter this situation decisively, as the of Nenss proved.“
At times in the history of the World the value ol‘ protection, the
value placed on the human life, both combatant and noncomhat
ant, did not warrant the expense of lortilicat'i()n construction, but
throughout the Middle Ages it did, sometimes in an almost inco1'n~
preliensible way: Edward l’s bankruptcy ol‘ the English treasury to
build his Welsh castles has never been .satisl‘act,orily explained, for
example, at least not for most 1ned.ieva.l_ English liistoria.r1s.5“
fldiliiaiy Surgery)“
Finally, despite these attteinpts at protection, those ligliiting in medieval
wars, as in all of history°s military en.gag;ements, were .som< ztirnes
wounded. Like armor and l‘or1;i:licat,i.ons, military surgery had its
ancient predecessors, quite good ones in icl; ln particular, those
ancient imperial and royal leaders who valued the lives of their sol
diers furnished. their military units with 1 :3cdical personnel who would
P’\ /
accompany and take care of the troops 2 v 13y the time of the Roman
Empire, military surgery had progressed so far that only the soldier
who was most severely wounded would perish.“
5“ Tlie best hook on nicrlieval sieges, which dates all of these siegcs and many
more lasting equally long is llradl)nry, The llélmfiezarzl’ Siege.
57 This is dealt with at length and with more examples in Robert D. Smith and
Kelly l)e\/rics, The Artillery [fieValoit D11.ke.r rgfif utfgunrfy, T_'>’(i3~l 47 7 (\/V<)r>dl)ricl_g*e:
Boydell Press, 2605),
5“ A bibliograpliy of works on E(lwarcl‘s cHstle~building in Wales is found in
Dc\/ries, Cltl itltl tl I ihliograji/9», 887 89.
5“ l\/lucli ol‘ the lollowing section originally appcarccl as Kelly DeVrics, “l\/leclieval
Military Surgery,” Medieval Hi.s‘1fmy ll/Irzgrlzine 4 (Dee 2003): l8"'25.
'5“ A good general study of this can be Found in Guido Majno, T713 Ilaalzizg Hrmd:
ll/[LUZ and l/Vazmd in the Ancient l/Vorld (('lan’1l)rlr.lge: Harvard University Press, l975).
For a more speci c approach to ancient military surgery sec Christine lfi. $alazar,
The Treatment of l/Var I/l/0tma'.s" in (§'rec0—Rrmtan /lnliqruigr (Leiden: E. Brill, Qllllll}.
"1 Roman military historians have olten suggested that at the height of the Roman
imperial army (lirst seeoncl century A.D.), it was so costly to replace the training‘ and
experience of a soldier that it was imperative to preserve him for warllirc. Sec,
among others, G. R. Watson, The Roman Slaldirr [l.tl1aea: Cornell University Press,
1959}, and Yann I..e llohce, The Im[)erim' Roman Anny, tratis_ Raphael Bate (London:
Routlctlge, l99’l :1.
4. 4: KELLY DEVRIES
The Byzantines retained the Roman military system and organi
zation, including military surgeons. The military treatises of Emperor
l\/laurice and Emperor Leo VI, the Stmtegikon and Tactika respectively,
established that each unit of three to four hundred cavalry or iniantry
was to have two physicians (a general p1"a(;titi0ne1" and a surgeon)
and between eight and ten orclerlies attached to it. As with the
Romans, lor the Byzantines the immediacy of military wound trcat~
ment and repair was most important and saved the most lives. To
accomplish this, the ordcrlies worked as medics in a modern sense,
carr"ying strctchers, performing rst aid, and transporting wounded
soldiers from the battle eld. Orderlies were even given nancial incen»
tives lbr the most wounded saved, and booty was also shared between
the soldiers and medical personnel.“
G reek and Roman Incdical and surgical texts continued to be used
by Byzantine m.ili.tary surgeons. As the weapons had not changed,
the wounds and other a iictions that plagued the troops continued
to be the same. These ancient texts were supplemented in the sev
enth century by a surgery manual contained in the text, Epitome, of
Paul of Aegina. So popular was this manual that it became the stan
dard surgical text for rnil.itary surgeons until tliie twelfth century.
It was not just in military engagements that wounded Byzantine
soldiers were taken care of. Veterans who were d.i.sabl.ed, wounded,
or crippled were liospitalhced and housed for life at government
expense. Constantine established the rst veterans’ hospitals in
Constantinople in the beginning of the fourth century, with Emperors
Justin ll. and Alexius Gomnenus l also founding crippled and 1ong~
term veteran. hospitals. ' transportation from the battle eld oi‘ wounded soldiers continued.
As for what was happening in the former Western Roman Empire,
unfortunately much erroneous scholarly thought persists about the
Barbarian invaders. That they did not retain any Roman military
organization and technology has largely been disproved, as has the
idea that military surgery virtually clisappeareclflg Fortunately, the
“'2 lan l\’lcCullo<".h, “Battle eld l\/lcdicinc"—Thc Middle Ages /\.n. 500 M50,” ().tfJr@'
Jllilitarp Jamaal 4.2 (Q€.)l_)Q): l4'— l 7. On the Byzantine military system, iiiclucliilg the
aspects of miiifzlry surgciy and care for the wounded and aging veterans, sec _l0l'u1
Haldon, I4/a m, Stair: and Soc:/‘eh in the l.l’y<:rmlir2e World .565" 1204 {Londonz UCL
Press, i999), and Warren Treadgold, Iiyzaniiuin and 1l.s‘/l'rm)1, 234 i i "I081 (Stanford:
S1,ai1lor<l University Press, I995).
‘ll’ Tile best history For this and much oil what lbllows is Found in Pierre Hoard
and l\/lirlto l)razcn Gifmclc, Mills ans ale chimrgie mm 0r:viic!z.*rii.' V" *XV’ .rii'cle.s (Paris:
R. Dacosta, 1966}.
MEDIEVAL WARFARIE AND ‘THE VALUE OF A PIUMAN LIFE
notion that no evidence means decline and disappearance is no longer
seen as valid.
This still leaves a gap in our knowledge. Early medieval military
actions were not recorded with as much detail about the wounded
as they were in Roman sources. Oi‘ much greater importance was
the recording of the names oi‘ those killed in action rather than those
saved. Nevertheless, that there were some important gures who had
been wounded and then survived gives an indication that military
surgery may have been practiced. l\lor does it do much good to
dwell on unknown “German tribal medicine” as some historians have
done. Anthropological arguments of pharmacological treatrnent are
largely unfounded; indeed, pharmacology gerie1"ally indicates the
educative skills of a craltsnianf“ Certainly there are several prob
lems associated with practices and myths ol'l1un'1or inequities and
poisons in the body that have their origins somewhere, but simply
because there are no texts that explain an.ci.ent Barbarian pharma
cological. practices does not denote a lack of knowledge or skill.
Evidence of the continued importance and skills of military med
ical personnel comes from numerous sources. The accounts of
Ammianus Marcellinus {c. 330 395} discuss many engagements
between Romans and Barbarians where surgical personnel were pre
sent, although it is clear that their numbers and skills were not
sutlicient to keep up with the large numbers of wounds su irred in
such warfare. Scythian. surgeons in the Crimean region are known
to have bandaged wounds. Medieval Norse medics used herbs and
cauterization to staunch blood [low from wounds. And care and
While it must be admittecl that these are isolated accounts, they do
show a continuity in military surgery with the Roman past, as well
as the existence of an inherent Barbarian system 0|" military surgery.“"
At the same time the early medieval military surgeons were
developing their skills, a new and dillcrcnt tradition oi‘ military med
lcinc, seemingly unin ucnced by Roman practice, appeared among
the lands dominated by lslam. Instead, lslarnic military surgical tech
niques probably descended from Arab bedouin or merchant training
M On this see Carole Rawr"lil'le, ildeziicirte and Soriatji in Later Medieval Evzglaitri (Strond:
Sutton l.’ul3lisliii.1g, 1997) and Nancy G. Sirasi, Mediezial mid‘ Earhr l?1?rzr11ls‘.s'a1zcri ll/1'ea'icine.'
/in introduction to Knomlmfgrz and Practice (Chi(:a.go: University of Chicago ljrcss, i990).
‘ll’ l\/,E<:Clulloch, l 1 6.
46 KIZLLY DEVRIES V MEDIEVAL. VVARFARE AND 'l”lI~lliI VALU1‘ L OP’ A I YUMAN LIFE
that evolved as llslaniic armies came in contact with the Byzantine,
Egyptian, and Persian armies they conquered. Like the myths that
sprung up about Barbarian military surgery, it used to be thought
that early Nlusliin armies also had 1'10 milillary surgical capabilities,
although the love of learning brought about by a. desire to read and
lollow the Q_ur’an must eventually have led to an understanding of
the importance of surgery in preserving t.he lives of wounded sol»
dicrs. The value placed by Islamic teaching on hygiene and human
life led to further interest in the treatment of wounds. There were
of‘ course some Q_ur’anic restrictions to surgery, but most oil these
concerned the treatment of women and the dissection of the dead.
As this study is meant to icus on western medieval military expo
ricnee, I. will not locus lurthcr on Islamic practice, except to suggest
that surgeons working among Muslim armies develo§.)ed dillcreiit‘
skills than did their European coun.terpa.rts. T1:'iis becarne especially
evident during the Crusades when the two traditions were forced to
coexist together. This is ‘unl‘ortun.ate, because historians have put
too much emphasis on comparative comments made about the two
surgical traditions in the twelftl:i~century autobiography of Usama ibn
i\./lunqiclli. (1 095*“ 1 188}, an Arab living in the Crusadenoccupied Holy
Land. In an oft cited passage Usama describes the experience of his
uncle who sent a Syrian surgeon “to treat certain sick persons”
among the Christians. lrlowever, at the point of successftilly healing
some of these, this surgeon was pushed aside by a Crusader surgeon.
whose crude techniques not only brought the death oi" his ‘patients,
hut increased their pain quite niark'edly.““
Usamzfs indignation towards European military surgical practices
may be justified or it may be exaggerated. lndicatiions are that as
Islamic surgery had progrr :ssed, so too had Euroliean surgery. Certainly
there was no lack ol‘ European wars bclbre the Crusades, and in
each of these there were naturally wounded soldiers who needed
Care. Still, one of the most important improvements in military rncd~
icine actually came in the Holy Land alter the success of the First
Crusade. Around lll(), the monastic rnilitaiy order known as the
“G Usarnah ibn l\/lunqidli, /in /l.r'al>—$;WrIu.n Gentleman and M/(l'V7‘il()7' in the Penna’ ti/ii/Z6
(Immdes: M£v1wir.r Qf llmma/z ibn A/Iunqirlh, trans. Philip K. Hitti (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, i987), H52. For 21 study ()lll.l1l.S passage? sec David. C. Nicolle,
“\/Vountls, Military Surgfrry and the Reality of (lrusadirig ‘\/\la.rl‘are: 'lI‘l'1e Evidcrlce
of Usarnzilfs .\/lernoirs,” _]mm ml qf (Marital and zi iir:/m. $lYAdilt?.\‘ { E993):
Knights of john, or the Hospitalleis, was esl.al.)lished as an order
concerned with the health of soldiers and pilgrinis’; only later did it
evolve into a lighting organization, althougli one that never gave up
its initial mission. The l":lospitalle1"s, both in the Holy lgand and later
when they were given rst Cyprus, then Rhodes, and nally Malta
as refuges, continued to provide military surgery and hospitahzation
for their knights and other soldiers. Wliilc the knights did not often
provide medical service, choosing instead to devote themselves to
military and administrative duties, the Hospitaller order would hire
civilian physicians, sur'geo.ns, and orderlies to stall‘ their hospitals and
campaign p()sitio1'1s.l"
\/Vhile the lrlospitiallers were tliriving in the Holy Land, a European
school of surgery was lounded in Salerno. Begun under the influences
of Islamic and Byzaritiiiie occupation, the Salerno school remained
in operation once the island ol’ Sicily liad been conquered by the
Normans. T dominant influence in the rise of the school. was
Constantiinus Africanus (c. lOl5~~rlO€37}, but it is the surgical manual
of Roger of Salerno that is perhaps the most important work to
come ll"om_ the school. The C/iirurgvla, written. in 1180, attributed to
Roger ol’ Salerno but probably written by his student, Gui of Arles,
was enormously popular, surviving in more than twenty manuscripts
in England and France alone, several of thern illustrated, with more
than fteen translations being made beloi'c the sixteenth century.
Rogr .:r‘s manual borrowed from numerous other, now lost, texts and
was i11{'luenced by Byzantine and Islamic; well as European, tra
ditions of the time. While Urirurggia was not speci cally meant for
military surgeons, its influence rnust certainly have been Felt?“
Other surgical manuals followed, a number of which were writ»
ten during the thirteenth and the first hall’ of the Fourteenth cen
turies. These included volumes written by Gilbertus, Roger dc Baronc,
“7 There are several histories of the military monastic orders and several difliéreut
histories ol‘ the llospitaller order. One could do no better than to start with l"lelei'1
l\lieliolson, T720 Knig/1i.r /"lorjiitalltrr (l/Voodbridgc: Boydell Press, 2l)(]l) and _]onath21n
Riley~S1'nith, H0.9jii[rilla1.r." The Hixlvzy (ff the Order qf Si. J0/in London: Hainlilcclori
Pr'e.<s, F399}. For the later history ol.‘ the order sec lrl. /\. Sire, T/Mr Knighi.r rgfill/laltli.
{New lriavent Yale University Press, l994 }. For 21 more complete bibliogr:ip.l'iy ol
the order sec ll)cVries, Cumulative Iiibliogmji/pi, 1180
B“ lVl.cCull0(:l':, 16. See also Linda M. Paterson, “Nlilitary Surgery: Kniglits,
Sergeants, and Raimon oi‘ AVigl]OI'1lS Version oi‘ the (7/l.z'ru1j_Q:ia of Roger oi‘ Salerno
[ll8()"*l2U9),” in 7716 [death and Pmctice M rliezial Hizig/ltlzrinrl H, ed. (.:il3I"iSl.(Jpl1Cl"
Harper Bill and Ruth .l larvey {_\/\7o0db!'.l(lg(‘:: Boydell Press, i938), 117*” lti.
48 KELLY nsvmes
Lanli"anc, Arnalrl of Villanova, Anselm of Genoa, Guy do Vigevano,
Jan Yperman, Bernard de Gordon, jean Pitart, jean de Prouville,
‘1 .
Pierre Fremont, Henri de Mondeville, (my de Chauliac, ’l homas
Seellinek, _}'ohn OF Arderne, and john de Gaddesden. Most. of these
surgeons were associated with royal or noble courts, and many also
served as military surgeons.‘l9 ln particular, Guy de Vigevano served
as a surgeon with the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry VI, in his early
i'ou1"tee1'1tl"1 century campaigns in Ita.ly,7“ and john of Arderne served
as a military surgeon with King Edward ill of England during the
opening phase of the Hundred Years War." Others may not have
served as battlefield surgeons lout directed much of their surgical
writings to wounds that might be su ered by soldiers. For example,
in Book ll of Henri de l\/l.ondeville’s Cjrmrgia, the surgeon is instructed
on how to treat wounds. The procedure suggested by Mondevilie
was to cleanse the wound, removing all detritus, espeeial.ly “strange
metals,” and then to bandage the wound, to allow suppuration, or
to suture it. Should the metal cletritus prove to be too d:i{"lieult to
he removed by ngers or probes, the surgeon was instructed to use
a crossbow to assist in its removal. This was done by coeldrig the
crossbow string, attaching the string to the object to he removed,
and then cliscliarging the weapon. The detritus would be jerked out
of’ the wound with such a speed that, hopefully, it rnight lessen any
pain to the vietirn.”
By the end of the Midclle Ages battle eld surgery had reached its
medieval peak. The constant warfare of the age demanded skilled
medical personnel who Could dress wounds of Soldiers, and almost
ali surgeons of the lourteenth and fteenth ecanturies had seen mil
itary action. The invention and pr0l.ilerati.on of gunpowder weapons
brought yet another l;echnological innovation to the eld of military
science. Armor and fortifications tried to adapt to the weapons, and
“" l luard and Grmelt, 35"52.
7“ Hoard and Grm k, 35
7' Huard and Grmelz, 5l"52, and _]cren1y Citrome, “Bodies that Splatterz
Surgery, Chivalry, and the Body in the Pmrtica o1"_}ohn Arderne,” Iiicenzplarrla i3
(2001): l37*"72.
72 Huard and Grrnek, ‘ill. Henri de Mondevill<:’s treatise, written originally in
Latin, is badly in need ol‘ a modern critical edition, although numerous translations
exist, mostly into French or German. On the use of the crossbow as a surgical tool
see Robert lgnatius Burns, “The Medieval Crossbow Surgical lrlstrument: An
iillusiratccl Case History,” in Iiwgys on the I stovy of )'l4ériici1ie, ed. _]arr:h0 New
York: Science History Publications, i976), 64 "'70.
MEDIEVAL \'\/ARFARF. AND THE V'Al..UliL OI" A HUMAN l..lFli.', .
so too did, the hattleiieicl surgeons. Initially, rt1ili.ta.ry surgeons seem
to have adopted a similar technique of wound repair as they had
used so e iretivelty in treating non~gunpowde1" wounds: cl.eansi.ng the
wound, removing the detritus, and then snppurating or suturing.
Howevtrr, some surgeons, especially those in uenced by lslamic sur~
gieal practice, hogan to consider wounds caused by gunpowder
Weapons to be poisoned, and that the only means of eraclicating that
poison was eauterization. Life had grown cheap in the eyes of medieval
leaders laced with so many wounds. Sometimes these wounds were
not even cleansed nor the detritus renioved l,i"01r1 them beli)1~e they
were lled with boiling oil. OF course, few wounded soldiers could
withstand the da.11'1ag<: such a “mire” eatlsed and many died. Ultimately,
at the siege of Turin in 1536, the Freneli military siirgczori, Ambroise
l’a'r€:, discovered tliaii leaving gunshot wounds untreated was actually
better than cauter.ization. by hot oil, and his observations would lead
to a halting oi‘ this procedure. Of eouiise, he only discovered what
many med.ieva.li1‘r1iii.tary surgeons had long been practising: the ellective
and life valuing repair of wounded soldiers on the batde eld or at
a siege.”
No doubt this idea of the value of a human life beixig a de ning
feature of medieval warfare needs to he developed more fully than
if can do liere. Let rne merely suggest. that changes were afoot’ in
warfare and its relation to the value of human life by the end of
the Middle Ages, especially during the last few decades of the four
teenth and the entire fteenth Centuries. The greatest cause of this
was the constant warfare going on t’l1rougl10’L1t Etlrope during this
period. Added to this was the encounter of the western with the
eastern armies of’ the Ottoman Turks whose leaders did not value
human life in the same way as European generals and soldiers did.
‘Witness the massacre of prisoners at the conclusion of the disastrous
(lbr the West at least) Battle of Nicopolls in H596 and the shock
wave that sent thi ougliout Europe, at least until such a niassaere
ll Kelly De'\/ries, “Milita'ry Surgical Practice and the Advent of Gunpowder
Weaponry,” Canazliarz liullettic rgf fl/Iediml Hiiizifil 7 U990}: l3l 46. Amhroise ‘I>=m'»,‘.<
initial observations are made in /krnhroise Pare, '1'./rt; ./ljiolqgie and Ti'eaii.s"a, ed. and
trans. G. Keynes [Ch.icago: University of Cliitiago 1’1"<:ss, 1952}, E33. He discusses
more extensively his tire atnient for gunshot wounds in his later work, Thu 1300/'c.i rgf
Suqgeqjr uni/2 1/2:2 ll/Iagazim: of time Irzsirurnertti‘ .JVece.n"ar]i _/E11‘ Id, ed. and tram. R(>lI>e1‘t Wllitt.
linker and Nathan \"v'oma<1l< (Athens: l.lnive.rsity of Cltrorgia l’ress, l96El), le 47.
30 KELLY DEVRIES , MF.DIEVAI., WARFARE AND T1'l.l':‘. VAI..U'E OF A HUMAN LIFE
was duplicated by l lenry V two decades later at Agin.c0urt.H‘ Then.
there was Joan of Arc, whose military superiority came from the fact
that, as she believed she was on a mission from God, any soldier
who died ghting with her would go to heaven. Consequently, she
could he said to have lessened the value of her own solclierse “tor at
least worried less about their deaths in military con ict, as such
would certainly bring their salvationiwhich allowed her to use their
numerical advantage (at least 300 per cent) to gain victory over less
numerous Englisl‘: forces in the Hundred Years War.7~" Finally, while
not giving into any facet of the Military Revolution thesis, the inac
curacy of gunpowder weapons, the rst military technology in which
selecting and aiming at a target did not matter, meant the dernoc~
rat.i‘z.aLi0n of the hattlelielcl, with the result that nobles and elite sol
diers could not ensure their survival based on economic worth alonefl“
All of these changes, together with others that l cannot even :men~
tion in this short outline of later medieval warfare, weakened the
value of human life on the battle eld and began the early rnodern
military period. The medieval culture that clefined. warfare valued
human. life as no era before or after.
Bibliograji/'1_.;1
Ahcls, Richard P. A._lfi'ec[ tile Great.‘ l/Var, I fngr/11]) and ()'ullm1r in. _/1ln_glo~Saxon England.
London: Longman, I998.
Allnmnd, Cliristoplier. Hem)» V. llcrlseley and Los Angrrlest University oli Galiibrniu
I ‘ress, £992.
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