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The impact of digital technology on work

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DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22588.90246

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

The impact of digital technology on work

Santiago Melián‐González
University Institute of Tourism and Sustainable Economic Development (TIDES)
University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
santiago.melian@ulpgc.es
Document version: March, 2019

Abstract

Digital technologies have deeply pervaded the economy and society, and, in turn, the world of
work. Twenty‐five years ago a worker would have been amazed by some of the current
characteristics of the labor market and company practices. Thus, progress in information
technologies has potential effects on the number of workers who telework. Some technology‐
based practices of present‐day companies can unfavorably affect their employees’ wellbeing. In
addition, there is a new labor market, the digital labor market, where individuals work through
Internet platforms. Simultaneously, there is a debate about automation because there are signs
that the traditional labor market is being shaken by the more advanced information
technologies. This article addresses these topics in an attempt to portray new aspects of the
contemporary world of work.

Keywords: Teleworking, worker wellbeing, worker electronic word of mouth, digital labor
market, automation.

1 Introduction

The world has experienced important changes due to the huge spread of the Internet and
information technologies (hereinafter IT). According to [1], digital technologies have infused all
facets of the economy and society since the irruption of interactive and mobile communication
technologies in the first decade of the 21st century. In turn, Carlson [2] states that the
digitization of information combined with the Internet represents a general‐purpose technology
that gives rise to a new digital economy.
It is hard to find a definition for the digital economy [3]. Hojeghan and Esfangareh [4] state that
this economy “is based on electronic goods and services produced by an electronic business and
traded through electronic commerce”. Thus, these authors nuance the concept of electronic
business, stating that this is a business with electronic production and processes that interact
with customers through Internet technologies. Based on these characteristics, the digital
economy cannot be conceived as a facet of the pre‐Internet economy. Although there are well
known firms that only operate in a digital environment (e.g., Amazon), many traditional firms
have adopted electronic tools and base their activities on the possibilities of IT. Thus, today it is
difficult to conceive of a company that does not interact with consumers through the Internet,
and so it would be appropriate to assert that the current economy is a digital economy.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353258

Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Regarding the world of work, everyone could mention an example of how the economy’s
digitization has impacted work. Perhaps an antecedent of this influence was the use of e‐
recruiting by employers. The spread of this human resource practice changed the way workers
applied for jobs from the late 1990s [5]. There are many studies about this practice considering
both companies and workers views. Additionally, the digital economy has involved further
changes in the field of work. This article seeks to describe some of these changes, focusing on
what are considered the most relevant novelties, structured in the following five topics:

The first is the number of teleworkers. IT allows more flexible relationships between companies
and their staff. Specifically, the available technology allows more workers than ever to do
telework. In this regard, it is common for companies to state that they allow their employees to
do telework, and so it could seem that there has been growth in the number of teleworkers.

The second is IT and workers’ wellbeing. Companies have introduced IT in order to interact with
their employees at any time. There is evidence that this can produce negative effects that did
not exist earlier.

Third, workers voice their opinions through the Internet. Electronic word of mouth is accessible
to everyone. Participating in specialized social media platforms is a new worker behavior that
makes companies more transparent.

Fourth, there is a new labor market, the digital labor market, which involves a new form of non‐
standard work through which many services can be exchanged.

Lastly, as occurred with previous important technological innovations, there is a great debate
about the consequences of the IT revolution for the amount and structure of employment.

This manuscript includes five sections that describe these topics, and a final conclusion section
summarizes the most important results.

2 Teleworkers

The practice of working outside the company facilities did not appear with the digital economy.
Nevertheless, this way of working has mostly been associated with technological progress, and
it is easy to guess how Internet technologies could trigger it. In fact, the extent to which
companies use IT explains their adoption of teleworking [6].

Remote work is not a single type of employment. According to Huws [7], teleworking consists of
working from home some or all of the time, working while on the move, or working from a
remotely located office. Based on technological advancement, Toffler [8] suggested that millions
of jobs hosted by firms could be performed in workers’ homes, and Kelly [9] conceived of it as
the ‘‘next workplace revolution’’ in the 1980s.

Despite previous forecasts [8,9], companies’ statements about their use of teleworking and the
possibilities of current technologies in terms of communication between companies and
workers (e.g., VPN connectivity, cloud‐based technology, and web‐based videoconference), the
figures do not reflect a huge spread of teleworking. According to Baruch [10], “it was suggested
that by 1995, about 50% of employees and 43% of the self‐employed could work from home”,
but the current statistics are quite different. In the European Union, 5% of workers usually
worked from home in 2017 (figure 1). Even in the country with the highest percentage, the
Netherlands, this figure is below 15%. This 5% of usual teleworkers has virtually not changed
over time because in 1995 the percentage was 4.5% in 15 EU countries [11].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353258

Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Figure 1. Employed persons aged 15‐64 who usually work from home in the EU, 2017 (% of total
employment).

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products‐eurostat‐news/‐/DDN‐20180620‐1

Figures are slightly higher in the case of workers who telework occasionally. According to
Eurostat [11], these workers represented 9.6% of workers in the European Union, with a slight
rise since 1995 (7.5%). In 2017, this type of worker was more frequent in Sweden (27.4%), which
has experienced significant growth because, in 2008, only 14.6% sometimes worked outside
their companies.

In the case of the US, the figures are higher. According to the American Time Use Survey [12],
24.1% of workers worked from home in 2015. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that this
figure is not restricted to people who only work at home, but it also includes those who work
from home occasionally. This way of working was more frequent in people who had a bachelor’s
degree (39.2%) and in management, business, and financial operation occupations (37.8%).
Nevertheless, the percentage of teleworkers in 2006 was 21.1%, and so there has not been much
growth.

Therefore, based on these global figures, it seems that today companies continue to prefer
employment relationships that involve attendance at the workplace. The statements made by
some corporations that their employees can telework do not represent what actually happens
in many companies. In any case, teleworking is not just a question of technology.

3 IT and workers’ wellbeing

Although the number of workers who currently work outside companies has not shown
significant growth in the past twenty years, what is new are some consequences of the
technologies that companies use to interact with workers when they are in their workplace and
outside of it. These technologies allow employers and workers to communicate with each other

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353258

Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

in an immediate manner, no matter where the employee is and/or what s/he is doing. In turn,
the current technology allows them to assign and to resolve tasks without waiting for the
traditional meeting. This new opportunity for workers to perform their jobs can produce a new
type of stress.

The term technostress was proposed in the 1980s as ‘‘a modern disease of adaptation caused
by an inability to cope with new technologies in a healthy manner’’ [13], but today it has become
more applicable because companies are using more technology than ever to manage their
employees [14]. Additionally, IT’s power has given rise to the expectation that people must
respond immediately to work‐related issues [15]. More specifically, Barber and Santuzzi [16]
introduce and validate the construct of telepressure, which “represents the combination of
preoccupation and urge to immediately respond to work‐related ICT messages”. In fact, workers
tend to use their personal IT devices, such as smartphones and mobile applications, for work
issues in what has been called IT consumerization [17]. This way of using technology further
blurs the boundaries between work and life, and it produces conflict in the work‐life balance
[18].

As usually occurs with stress, technostress has negative consequences for workers. Several
authors [19‐21] found that technostress negatively affects workers’ productivity, performance,
job satisfaction, and organizational commitment. Consequences such as these have been found
for common technologies such as cell‐phones [22] and email [23].

Nevertheless, findings show that workers can also experience these IT in a positive way [22], and
so technostress seems more a question of IT characteristics. Ayyagari, Grover, and Purvis [15]
analyzed which technology characteristics caused technostress. They found that the following
IT features: usefulness, reliability, presenteeism (i.e., the degree to which the technology
enables users to be reachable), anonymity (i.e., the degree to which the use of ICTs is not
identifiable), and pace of change (i.e., the degree to which individuals perceive the changes in
their technological environment to be rapid) predicted the following stressors: work‐home
conflict, work overload, role ambiguity, and job insecurity. They played a significant role in
explaining individuals’ stress. Intrusive technology characteristics (i.e., presenteeism and
anonymity) were the dominant predictors of these stressors. These findings show that IT design
matters, and that companies can influence the consequences of IT for workers.

It is not a coincidence that countries such as France and Spain have recently introduced
regulations that obligate companies to guarantee their employees the right to disconnect from
technologies such as e‐mail and cell‐phones. According to these regulations, firms must
negotiate measures that guarantee this digital detachment with their employees. This right is
mostly related to workers’ life outside working hours (i.e., weekends and holidays). Additionally,
organizations can help workers to reduce technostress. Ragu‐Nathan et al. [19] proposed and
tested the positive effect of practices such as literacy facilitation and training, technical support
for end users, and employees’ involvement in the implementation of new technologies.

4 Employers become more transparent

Social media has significantly increased the transparency of organizations [24]. Before the social
media phenomenon, companies produced and released most of the information about their
activities. Social media’s pervasiveness changed this scenario through websites such as Yelp and
TripAdvisor, where consumers rate and describe their experiences with different types of
products, services, and tourist experiences. This behavior is known as eWOM (electronic word

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353258

Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

of mouth), and it represents one of the most influential sources of information for purchasing
decisions [25]. Thus, due to the spread of the Internet, consumers can have a quick overview of
products’ and services’ characteristics, independently from the companies’ communication and
marketing practices.

eWOM behavior has been adopted by workers, and so anyone can now find information about
employers’ practices based on ratings and comments of firms’ employees and ex‐employees.
This behavior has been called weWOM (worker electronic word‐of‐ mouth), and platforms that
host it are called employer review websites. The most important platform is Glassdoor [26].
According to the Alexa tool, in 2019 this platform is ranked in the 416th position, considering the
traffic of all the web sites in the world. Other similar platforms are Indeed, CareerBliss, and
Kununu.

As with eWOM, individuals also rely on weWOM information. Unfavorable weWOM reduces
companies’ attractiveness for potential employees. Particularly, Melián‐González and Bulchand‐
Gidumal [27] showed that it decreases the probability of candidates submitting their resumes if
they see this negative information. Furthermore, individuals would demand higher
compensation when applying to a firm with negative weWOM. However, positive weWOM has
the opposite influence. Additionally, weWOM has been found to be more credible than
corporate websites [28] and external awards in terms of employers’ human resource practices
[27]. This attributed reliability draws on the independence of weWOM compared to other
sources of information about employers [29].

Employment conditions is one of the topics the media discuss on a daily basis, and people are
sensitive to information about how organizations treat their employees. In fact, this company
facet is a component of their organizational reputation [30], and most individuals work, have
worked, or will work. Thus, working conditions and employment characteristics are an important
topic for everyone. In this regard, compared to unfavorable eWOM, negative weWOM produces
disproportionally more harm to a company’s reputation [31]. Furthermore, conscious
consumption is becoming more important, and a company practice that consumers highly
appreciate is support for fair labor practices [32]. In fact, Hiscox and Smyth [33] and Hainmueller
and Hiscox [34] show that product information about labor standard commitment has a positive
effect on sales in particular segments of consumers.

Therefore, the consequences of weWOM may go beyond those arising from workers’
perceptions of the employer’s appeal. Based on weWOM about hotels, Melián‐González and
Bulchand‐Gidumal [35] found that weWOM influences clients’ perceptions of companies’ justice
for employees. Thus, when negative weWOM is observed, clients perceive that employees are
treated unfairly, which, in turn, negatively affects client satisfaction, revisit intentions, and word
of mouth to other consumers. In addition, clients appreciate companies with favorable weWOM,
which positively influences their perceptions and behavioral intentions.

As on other social media platforms, Glassdoor allows companies to answer the comments
uploaded by workers. Considering the described consequences of both positive and negative
weWOM, employers should seriously consider this option. Könsgen et al. [36] showed that, if
responses are constructive, they restore the trust lost due to unfavorable weWOM.

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

5 Digital Labor Market

A key component of the digital economy is the online platform based on a new business model
that operates as a two‐sided market. As explained by [3], one side of the market is made up of
consumers, whereas the other side consists of providers of products and/or services. Online
platforms act as intermediaries. Well‐known cases of online platforms are Booking.com and
Ebay.

Around the online platform model, the sharing economy has risen [37]. This term is based on
the theoretical social purpose of many of the exchanges promoted by the first platforms in this
economy. Platforms such as Airbnb and Uber were initially understood as a way individuals could
share their idle resources with peers [38, 39]. Obviously, owners could demand a fee for lending
their resources, but nobody argued that this activity was work. Both consumers and providers
could benefit from these kinds of exchanges. It was the beginning of the sharing economy, and
the purposes of the initial platforms and the number of exchanges involved did not suggest that
this activity could be a way of making a living.

The sharing economy evolved, and platforms such as Uber and Airbnb have become large
corporations whose platforms are used by many individuals as a stable source of income [40,
41]. Additionally, clear for‐profit‐oriented platforms that promote the exchange of services
arose (e.g., Upwork, Handy, TaskRabbit, Peopleperhour), and both companies and individual
consumers are using them as sources of labor. Because these services rely on providers’ effort
and behavior, it is accepted that these individuals are working through these platforms [42, 43].
In fact, other names such as the platform economy have been proposed to better describe what
these platforms really are [37, 44].

Scholz [45] suggested the term “digital labor market” to distinguish the work carried out in the
digital economy. Several authors [37, 42, 46] portray this digital labor market in the platform
economy in a very similar way. These authors distinguish two main digital labor market
segments. One of them, called the online or virtual labor market, includes work that is
performed remotely. The other includes work carried out in a particular place, and so it is called
the mobile or physical labor market.

Another criterion in the digital labor market is related to the level of skills workers must have in
order to meet consumers’ demands [42, 46]. Thus, there are two main segments based on the
level of skills the work requires: work that involves a low to medium level of skills and work that
requires a medium to high level of skills. In turn, Schmidt [37] considers whether the task is
performed by specific individuals or by an unidentifiable group of providers.

Work‐based service platforms make up most of the digital labor market. Nevertheless, some
authors [37, 47] posit that asset‐based platforms, such as Airbnb and Etsy, always involve work.
The reason is that, in addition to offering a tangible resource, if providers want to succeed on
these platforms, they must also perform tasks such as check‐in and check‐out, assisting clients
in case of doubts or failures, designing products, and showing kindness and a strong client
orientation. In fact, in the case of a platform like Airbnb, many unfavorable client ratings are due
to different hosts behaviors related to client service [48].

Figure 2 portrays the digital labor market, taking into consideration all the previous
characteristics.

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Figure 2. The digital labor market.

Amazon Upwork Eyeka

VIRTUAL mechanical
LABOR turk
MARKET
Clickworker Freelancer Innocentive
SKILLS Low High
LEVEL

Deliveroo Uber Airbnb

MOBILE experiences
LABOR
MARKET
Appjobber TaskRabbit

Individuals Collective Inteligence

Source: own elaboration.

A platform such as TaskRabbit mainly intermediates in work that requires basic skills, such as
delivery, furniture assembly, and moving help, performed in a specific place [49]. The same thing
can be said about platforms such as Glovo and Deliveroo, where “riders” deliver restaurants’
products. Although passenger transport based on the Uber platform is more complex than
delivering objects, it relies on non‐complex skills. Airbnb experiences also demand that the work
be carried out in specific places, but it requires more complex skills, such as knowledge of history
and art and interpersonal skills to interact with a group of clients [49]. Alternatively, on Upwork
and Freelancer, tasks such as translating, developing apps, and graphic design also require
complex skills, but it does not matter where they are performed. On most of these platforms,
consumers choose which provider will perform the task and interacts with him or her during the
course of the work. Nevertheless, on Uber, Glovo and Deliveroo, consumers also interact with
particular individuals, although the platform allocates tasks to workers.

Platforms such as eÿeka and Innocentive operate in a different way. They allow companies to
propose complex tasks from a wide range of disciplines (e.g., chemistry, business, life sciences,
social innovation, or engineering) according to a project format. The difference is that the work
is performed by an unidentifiable group of individuals who seek to solve the problems described
in these projects in order to win the attached rewards. The term crowdsourcing was proposed
to reflect these characteristics [50]. In Amazon Mechanical Turk, companies also upload tasks
that need the contribution of different individuals. These tasks are low‐skilled, and although
firms do not choose which individuals perform the tasks, they can establish several requirements
in order to filter the characteristics of the individuals who gain access to the tasks. Lastly, App‐
Jobber and Streetspostr also rely on the contribution of several unidentifiable individuals to
satisfying demands that involve easy skills (e.g., taking photos in specific shops), but in these
cases, the tasks must be performed in specific locations.

The digital labor market is clearly an on‐demand market where workers are requested when
they are needed. Once the task is finished, workers end their relationship with employers. Tasks

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

vary in terms of size. In the two large segments of the digital labor market, there are microtasks
that are both short in length and low skilled (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk for the virtual labor
market and App‐Jobber and Deliveroo for the mobile labor market). In the virtual labor market,
there is work that can be considered similar to work projects. This is the case of crowdsourcing
based on sophisticated skills (e.g., designing a new user‐friendly inflation system that can quickly
inflate a 300L SUP and reach 20 PSI on the Innocentive platform) and some of the commissions
hosted on platforms where employers choose highly skilled workers (e.g., Upwork, Freelancer).

There are few data about the number of workers in the digital labor market. Pesole et al. [51]
provide data from Europe based on an international survey. These authors find that on average,
10% of the adult population in Europe has worked through online platforms at some time.
Nevertheless, the number of workers who spend at least ten hours per week on these platforms
or earn at least 25% of their total income through them is around 6%. In the case of the US,
Farrell and Greig [52] estimate that 4.3% of adults have done work based on digital platforms,
and Robles and McGee [53] find that 4.6% of adults have worked with them in the past six
months.

In a context where non‐standard work arrangements are rising, the digital labor market provides
a contingent workforce that can be used by employers in an on‐demand way. Thus, it expands
the flexibility associated with the traditional labor market segment made up of secondary jobs
[54] or peripheral employees [55]. Atkinson [56] and Kalleberg [55] explain that companies meet
their needs for numerical and functional flexibility, respectively, through this type of
employment that includes temporary contracts, temporary work agencies, independent
contractors, and the outsourcing of activities. Currently, the digital labor market combines these
options as an additional way for firms to gain flexibility.

Nevertheless, working conditions in the digital labor market have received criticism because
they might foster workers’ precariousness [57]. In fact, it emphasizes many of the negative
characteristics associated with non‐standard employment [43]. Work is highly casual, and it
produces limited earnings. When this is coupled with the self‐employed condition of these
workers, their social protection in terms of sick leave, unemployment, and retirement is low.
Because the business models of the platforms rely on providing a large number of workers, there
is strong competition. Clients rely heavily on workers’ ratings when they choose providers, and
so workers with few or no ratings will find it hard to get requests. In fact, some results show that
most of platforms’ workers have not received any income [46, 58]. Furthermore, a superstar
effect has also been found, where a minority of workers perform most of the tasks [49, 59].
Finally, client ratings and worker behaviors such as rejecting assignments and their response
time are key components of algorithms of platforms that automatically allocate assignments.
Danaher [60] proposed the term algocracy to reflect how many decisions are made in the digital
era. In the digital labor market, algocracy is a common practice [61] that generates
subordination to the client experience [62]. Workers must accept platforms’ rules if they want
to participate. Additionally, the traditional conditions that drive workers’ bargaining power are
not present (e.g., communication among workers, shared spaces).

6 Changes in the labor market due to IT advances

The irruption of the digital labor market implies a change in the labor market: employers and
workers relate to each other based on a digital environment. In addition, relevant technological
progress has always affected the labor market through its influence on the number of jobs and

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

their requirements, respectively. This effect has often been perceived as negative for
employment. In fact, in the 1930s, [63] announced a new disease that he called technological
unemployment.

The relationship between technological advancement and employment is a complex matter that
has produced a lot of studies. Regarding IT, there is considerable consensus about the skill‐
biased technological change hypothesis. Although there are many theoretical versions, this
theory states that technology increases jobs that require high skills [64].

Although several studies support it [65], this hypothesis cannot explain findings about the job
polarization phenomenon: an increase in jobs that involve non‐routine tasks, both demanding
low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers, respectively, at the expense of jobs based on routine
content, which require medium‐skilled workers. Findings support this change in the
occupational structure [66‐68], and so the routine‐biased technological change hypothesis was
proposed [67]. Thus, technology could be replacing workers in administrative and secretarial
occupations, processing plant and machine operators, skilled agricultural trades, skilled metal
and electrical trades, and textile and printing trades [69]. Recent research based on the US and
the EU15 [70] confirms that between 2000 and 2010, employment growth was mainly driven by
non‐routine occupations that mostly belong to the private services industry (e.g., management
and organization analysts, lawyers, managing directors and chief executives,
telecommunications and mechanical engineers, vocational education teachers, construction
supervisors, etc.).

The impact of IT‐based technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine‐learning, robotics,

and 3D printing on work has produced a large number of reports. Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s
[71, 72] books had a great impact due to their descriptions of the potential of IT to take over
tasks that traditionally were thought to be performed by individuals (i.e., those characterized by
a low degree of routinization). Then, in 2013, the first working paper version of Frey and
Osborne’s [73] study warned that 47% of total US employment was at risk of automation in a
decade or two. Other research produced similarly disturbing figures: 35% and 59% in the cases
of Finland [74] and Germany [75], respectively. The fear triggered by these results and numerous
examples of the power of IT to perform manual and cognitive complex work activities has led to
what Akst [76] called anxiety over automation. This is not a new feeling because past relevant
technological innovations have often led to fears of worker displacement. Nevertheless,
although past technological innovations produced more employment than they destroyed,
people who currently foresee significant worker displacement claim that this time things may
be different due to IT’s potential.

Despite the previous results and the recognized power of IT to take over work, Autor [77]
analyzes why employment figures do not definitively fall. The author mentions that one of the
possible causes would be trade‐offs among economic sectors that increase consumer demand
for certain services or products, which triggers the demand of specific occupations (e.g.,
restaurant meals and personal fitness). Thus, in 27 EU countries, Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn
[78] find that a significant number of routine jobs have been reduced, but this has been
compensated for by product demand and spillover effects that, together, have increased the
labor demand by up 11.6 million jobs.

Autor [77] also draws on organizational processes and job contents, respectively. The author
emphasizes that most work processes rely on a combination of inputs. They can be different
types of skills that have different risk of automation (e.g, creativity and processing information

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Santiago Melián‐González The impact of digital technology on work
TIDES. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

in a routine manner). Although automation can displace some of these components, it can also
enhance others needed for the process. Therefore, companies keep workers because new
technologies also have the role of complementing skills, which in turn increases their business
contribution. Regarding job contents, Autor [77, 79] explains that performance on many jobs
involves tacit skills that are not explicitly collected in job descriptions. Skills such as common
sense, judgment, improvisation, intuition, and spoken language can be crucial, in addition to the
technical and/or more formal skills that make up jobs. Technological advances (e.g., a self‐
service kiosk for clients in hotels) frequently focus on emulating explicit skills, and they do not
consider that, for example, great performance in a receptionist job at a sun and beach hotel
involves a fast check‐in, as well as suggesting alternative leisure activities to clients on a cloudy.
An example of this is the case of the Japanese hotel Henn na, which was based on 243 robots.
Finally, after three years, the managers eliminated several robots. Among them were the ones
at the reception desk because they had to be helped by individuals due to their inability to solve
clients’ queries [80].

Autor [81] mentions that one limitation of studies that analyze the effect of technology on
employment is that they do not take into account that occupations vary in terms of the tasks
they include, and that job incumbents differ in the skills they apply. Furthermore, many of the
task combinations that make up jobs cannot be easily unbundled without affecting work quality.
This in an important issue because the most extended hypothesis about the impact of
technology on employment is that it takes over tasks that are routine and codifiable [64]. If jobs
involve both non routine and routine tasks, and these tasks cannot be easily separated, it is hard
to predict how many jobs are going to be displaced.

Based on the idea that jobs combine sets of tasks that differ in terms of both their routine
intensity and the skill levels they require, Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn [82] adopt a task‐based
approach to study the impact of modern IT on employment. These authors explain that studies
such as [73] have overestimated the risk of automation because they used a job‐based approach
that did not consider the task variety concept. Adapting the methodology of [73] to the different
workforce characteristics and production structures of the OECD countries, it has been
estimated that the share of jobs at risk of automation (i.e., the share of workers whose
automatibility is at least 70%) is on average 9% [82]. They found differences among countries,
but the figures are far from those in Frey and Osborne’s [73] study: Korea and Austria have the
lowest (6%) and highest (12%) percentages of employment at risk of automation, respectively.
Chui, Manyika and Miremadi [83] also prefer to focus on work activities instead of jobs. They
state that automation will not eliminate a significant number of jobs, but it will impact the
activities involved in most jobs. Specifically, they estimate that current technologies could
automate 30% or more of the key activities of 60% of all occupations. Regarding the type of
activities that jobs require, the probability that they will be displaced by technology varies (e.g,
a predictable physical work is at high risk of automation, and managing others has a low risk of
being automated).

Although a task‐based approach to automation can nuance the pessimistic view about this issue,
it is undeniable that IT advancement will seriously affect certain types of jobs. The job
polarization phenomenon and research on the latest IT advances always point to routine work
activities or to jobs or jobs families that rely on them in a significant way: for example, office and
administrative, manufacturing and production, and construction [84] or transportation and
material moving, and office and administrative support [83]. In fact, based on a particular
technology aimed to perform routine tasks, industrial robots, Acemoglu and Restrepo [85]

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estimate that “one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment to population
ratio by about 0.18‐0.34 percentage points and wages by 0.25‐0.5 percent”. This effect has
considered the impacts of imports, the decline in routine jobs, offshoring, other types of IT, or
the total capital stock.

Finally, as suggested [77] and confirmed [82], it should be considered that the reduction in
production costs due to workers’ replacement by IT could, via trade, enable other industries to
create new employment. Thus, although IT are certainly destroying jobs, this does not mean
that the total employment is going to be reduced. As Healy, Nicholson, and Parker [86] assert,
in addition to job destruction, the job transformation impact must also be taken into
consideration. Many workers will probably find that they must provide new skills in order to
meet the changes that technology produces in jobs.

7 Conclusion

Perhaps the only similarity a worker from twenty‐five years ago would find in the current world
of work is that he or she had to go to a particular workplace. Currently, there are more
technologies than ever for companies to develop teleworking. Although it seems to be more
frequent in the US than in EU countries, there is not a significant number of employees who fully
or partially telework. In some countries and occupations, teleworking can be more frequent, but
in global terms, companies require most of their employees to attend a workplace. Because
many companies state that teleworking is a practice they allow, more fine‐ grained data might
reveal growth in particular occupations.

Nevertheless, that person from twenty‐five years ago could experience technostress if he or she
were an employee today. Although the design of the technology companies use to interact with
their staff impacts their wellbeing, there is evidence about the frequency of negative effects.
Furthermore, the imagined employee could communicate his/her unfavorable experience
through employer review websites, and other workers who are searching for employment could
easily know about this opinion. If the latter were shared by other employees through their
reviews, the employer would be perceived as a non‐attractive place to work. Consequently, this
would negatively affect its recruitment results.

This worker would find a new source of income: the digital labor market. Although it is not a
very frequent employment option, s/he could voluntarily use it as a part‐time occupation. In this
case, the worker would have to get used to the current practice of being publicly rated by clients.
In addition, this person would need to acquire new skills to function effectively in the Internet
environment.

If this individual is a middle‐skilled worker, the most recent technologies might have reduced
the jobs that s/he used to do because they were probably based on routine tasks. In that case,
this worker can find employment doing less qualified jobs that involve tasks that technology
cannot yet carry out. A more positive scenario is that s/he would find a different job in another
industry that is experiencing a situation of high demand. If the worker does not find any job in
the traditional labor market, s/he will have to fully rely on the digital labor market. In this case,
this individual would need to get enough income to face the social security costs that any self‐
employed worker must pay. This is difficult because low‐skilled tasks in the digital labor market
are short in length, and there is high competition, which means that many workers do not
receive assignments.

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If this worker is highly skilled, s/he would find a job and other employment alternatives in the
traditional labor market because of his/her capacity to perform non‐routine tasks. In the digital
labor market, s/he can also find more interesting opportunities because, although competition
is also high, workers can find larger tasks that involve higher payments. In any case, this new
way of working could be a complementary source of income to his/her main occupation in the
offline labor market.

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