British Journal of Sociology - 2017 - Storm - Is Ethnic Prejudice Declining in Britain Change in Social Distance Attitudes

The British Journal of Sociology 2017 Volume 68 Issue 3
Is ethnic prejudice declining in Britain? Change in

social distance attitudes among ethnic majority and
minority Britons1
Ingrid Storm, Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford
Abstract
Most literature on racial prejudice deals with the racial attitudes of the ethnic
majority and ethnic minorities separately. This paper breaks this tradition. We
examine the social distance attitudes of white and non-white British residents to
test if these attitudes follow the same trends over time, whether they are driven
by the same social processes and whether they are inter-related. We have three
main findings. Firstly, social distance from other ethnic groups has declined over
time for both white and ethnic minority Britons. For the white majority there
are both period and cohort elements to this decline. Secondly, we see some evi-
dence that social distance between the majority and minority groups is recipro-
cal. Specifically, minorities who experience rejection by the white British feel a
greater sense of distance from them. Thirdly, we find that all groups share the
perception of the same ethnic hierarchy. We see evidence of particularly wide-
spread hostility towards Muslim Britons from all ethnic groups suggesting that
Muslims are singled out for negative attention from many British residents of
all other backgrounds, including a large number who do not express hostility to
other groups.
Keywords: ethnic prejudice; social distance; interethnic marriage; ethnic
hierarchy; anti-Muslim bias; racial discrimination; social attitude trends; Britain
Introduction
Ethnic diversity is rising rapidly across Europe, a consequence of both high

immigration and the growth of native born ethnic minority communities. This
historically unprecedented demographic shift has triggered intense political and
academic debate. Concerns have been raised about the negative impact of
Storm, Sobolewska, and Ford (University of Manchester) (Corresponding author email: ingrid.storm@manchester.ac.uk)
C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online.
V
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 101 Station Landing, Suite 300,
Medford, MA 02155, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/1468-4446.12250
14684446, 2017, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-4446.12250 by <Shibboleth>-member@ucl.ac.uk, Wiley Online Library on [29/04/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Is ethnic prejudice declining in Britain? 411
rising diversity on social trust and support for the welfare state (Putnam 2007;
Banting and Kymlicka 2006). The perceived threat to traditional national and
ethnic identities has fuelled the emergence of a new family of radical right par-
ties in Europe (Mudde, 2007; Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and also generated anx-
iety among Europe’s mainstream political elites, with politicians of all
ideological persuasions speaking out about the alleged ‘failure’ of multicultural-
ism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013).
Against this negative narrative, there is growing evidence that majority group
citizens of many diverse countries are slowly becoming more tolerant towards
ethnically distinct groups (Ford 2008, Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Bobo
2001). Research into observable behaviours shows increased social contact
between different groups, including growing rates of interethnic marriage
(Muttarak and Heath 2010). One explanation for this apparent disjuncture is
that the debates around immigration tend to adopt a relatively short time hori-
zon. The values and identity attachments of individuals are difficult to change
in the short run, being shaped most strongly by conditions in youth and early
adulthood (Mannheim 1970), but over the long run new generations rise with
different values, producing steady change in aggregate attitudes through the
process of cohort replacement (Inglehart 1997; Tilley 2005).
Earlier research on Britain (Ford 2008), the US (Bobo 2001) and Europe
(Coenders and Scheepers 2003) has provided evidence that this generational
process of racial attitude change and minority integration is ongoing in coun-
tries with long established migrant-origin minority groups. However, this
research leaves several important questions unanswered. New data collected in
2013 by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey enable us to take this argu-
ment forward in several respects.
Firstly, existing research on Britain ends in the mid-1990s. Britain has subse-
quently experienced a second large wave of immigration, and an increase in popu-
lar anxiety about identity conflict and threats from minorities. It is not clear
whether the period and cohort shifts towards more tolerant racial attitudes
observed in the 1980s and 1990s will persist in the more polarized contemporary
social environment. On the other hand, the majority of white adults in the Britain
of 2013 have grown up with ethnic and racial diversity as an accepted fact of British
social life, and so racial and cultural distinctions may not be as relevant in drawing
group boundaries as they were 20 years ago. We can use this data to test whether
race still functions as a ‘bright boundary’ (Alba 2005) in British society, as earlier
research (Ford 2008; Song 2004: 864) suggests it did in the 1980s and 1990s.
Secondly, we examine the variation in majority reactions to different minor-
ity groups. Researchers have found evidence of persistent ‘ethnic hierarchies’
(Hagendoorn 1995) in many social contexts. Ethnic groups who are socio-
economically disadvantaged and racially or culturally different from the major-
ity group are consistently less valued by other ethnic groups within the same
society (Hagendoorn 1995; Ford 2011; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Other work
British Journal of Sociology 68(3) C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017
V
412 Ingrid Storm, Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford
has suggested that many of the distinctions in such hierarchies have become
‘blurred’ over time as groups are accepted as part of the mainstream culture.
However, some remaining ‘bright boundaries’ of differences in race, religious
practice and cultural background can leave some groups outside this main-
stream, and stigmatized by all within it (Alba 2005; Modood 2003; Song 2004).
The new data we employ measures attitudes about a wider range of groups:
Black Africans, East Europeans and Muslims, alongside the Asian and Carib-
bean groups asked about in earlier British data. These additional categories
provide a greater range of variation on racial, cultural and religious difference.
Specifically, they allow us to test whether Muslims have become singled out as
a particularly stigmatized minority (Saggar 2008; Modood 2003), attracting
more intense and persistent hostility from other groups.
Research in the US has observed that integration of immigrant-origin minor-
ities is a two way process of mutual change and acceptance (Alba and Nee
1997). Integration requires not only that the white majority population be fully
comfortable having intimate social relations with ethnic minorities, but that eth-
nic minorities feel similarly comfortable about contact with the white majority.
This other side of the social integration issue has not been subject to systematic
quantitative research over time in the British context. Using ethnic minority
survey data, collected in 1993–4 and 2010, we can compare the racial attitudes
and attitudinal change of ethnic minorities with those of the majority. This
offers us a unique opportunity to extend existing explanatory theories to
include the attitudes of non-white minorities (Song 2004: 874).
Looking at increasing rates of intermarriage among the younger cohorts of
ethnic minorities, Muttarak and Heath (2010) found ethnic differences even
after controlling for generational differences and the ethnic composition of resi-
dential areas, with people of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi background
being less likely to marry outside their own group. Since marriage in the vast
majority of cases will reflect the preferences of both parties involved, it is hard
to know whether the trends are driven by greater white resistance to marrying
into South Asian minority groups, or vice versa. It is also possible that these
processes are related: with the attitudes of the minority reciprocating those of
the majority. We will test this possibility, observing whether experience of rejec-
tion by the white majority, through racial discrimination, increases minorities’
hostility to the majority group.
Theory and hypotheses
Why should social distance decline over time and between generations?
Interethnic prejudice and ingroup favouritism are cognitive shortcuts for

quickly judging the risks and potential rewards of associating with someone one
has never met. Research in social psychology shows that prejudice can be
C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017
V British Journal of Sociology 68(3)
reduced by intergroup contact, but also that this requires some initial willing-
ness and trust (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Attitudes to social
contact with outgroup members should thus be a good indicator of prejudice
more generally. In this paper we focus exclusively on interpersonal social dis-
tance, and more specifically on acceptance of an in-law from an ethnic out-
group. This question is strongly associated with other social distance measures
(Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), and shows the same patterns and trends in Brit-
ain as accepting an ethnic minority as one’s boss (Ford 2008). This is also an
indicator that records particularly high levels of interethnic social distance com-
pared to alternative measures, most likely reflecting the intimate degree of
social contact involved. As a result, the measure provides a particularly strong
test of attitude change: acceptance of ethnic outgroups into the immediate fam-
ily implies a high degree of inter-group tolerance.
We expect four main mechanisms to reduce interethnic social distance in
Britain since the 1980s. Firstly, the non-white ethnic minority share of the popu-
lation increased from 3.9 per cent in 1983 to 11.9 per cent in 20132 (OPCS 1985;
ONS 2014) both through immigration and a steady increase in the size of the
British born ethnic minority population, increasing the chances of interpersonal
contact. Such direct personal contact between ethnic groups is hypothesized to
reduce anxiety about ethnic and cultural difference and increase empathy for
people from different ethnic groups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Secondly,
even those who live in places that are largely unaffected by immigration will
watch television broadcasts, support sports teams, and read magazines that now
more frequently reflect ethnic diversity as an established part of British cultural
and social life. Thirdly, participation in higher education has expanded rapidly
in the UK since the 1960s, and education is associated with a reduction in preju-
dice (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008:
271). Fourthly, there has been a general shift in norms and values over this
period, and blatant racism has become less socially acceptable. Compared to
the mid-twentieth century there is almost no cultural, intellectual or elite politi-
cal support for discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (Ford 2008). Previous
research on Britain shows both period and cohort effects play a role in driving
these aggregate changes. Thus, our first hypotheses are that:
(H1a) overall white social distance from ethnic minorities has continued to
decline over time from the 1980s until the 2010s;
(H1b) social distance between the white majority and ethnic minorities is
lower for cohorts born in the 1980s and 1990s than for previous generations.
Why might Muslims be singled out?
Islamophobia, or majority group hostility directed particularly at Muslim

minorities, has become a growing concern in developed democracies (Strabac
V
and Listhaug 2008). Despite their ethnic, national and religious diversity, Mus-
lims may be singled out for particular hostile attention due to both cultural and
socio-demographic differences which set them apart.
The first cultural mechanism is the association between Islam, religious fun-
damentalism and violence. Terrorist acts by Islamist extremists, such as the Sep-
tember 11th attacks and the Madrid and London train bombings, have
increased the salience of Islam in Europe during the 2000s, and encouraged nar-
ratives portraying Muslim religion and culture as violent and threatening, both
physically and symbolically, to Western civilization and values. Muslims in Brit-
ain are also on average more religious, and have more conservative social
norms on gender and sexuality than the majority (Field 2011). Negative views
of Muslims can therefore also stem from a perception that Muslims are opposed
to liberal secular Western values and lifestyles (Voas and Ling 2010: 84;
Werbner 2005: 8).
A second issue is the distinct socio-economic status of Muslim minor-
ities. Britain’s Muslim population tends to concentrate in relatively
deprived areas, and like other ethnic minorities, have lower social mobility
than average (CoDE 2014). British Muslims also tend to be more residen-
tially segregated than other ethnic minority groups. The combination of
high segregation and concentration in poor urban areas has inspired a nar-
rative of Muslims as unwilling or unable to integrate into mainstream soci-
ety, despite their mobility patterns being driven by similar social and
economic factors as those of other ethnic and religious groups in Britain
(Finney and Simpson 2009).
From this we would expect that:
(H2a) members of the white majority will express more social distance to
Muslims than to ethnic minority groups (H2b) the difference between
social distance to Muslims and social distance to other ethnic minorities
will be greater among the cohorts coming of age since the early 2000s.
Are minority perceptions of social distance shaped by the same

mechanisms as those of the majority?
As outlined in the introduction, we also look at social distance expressed by

ethnic minority groups when faced with a possibility of acquiring an in-law
from a different ethnic minority, or from the white majority group, and use this
data to test four hypotheses.
The first expectation is that minority groups share an ethnic hierarchy of
preference with the majority (Hagendoorn 1995). All groups will have a
preference for social contact with members of their own group. Next in the
hierarchy will be the white majority, whose social status is highest; the will-
ingness to have an in-law from other ethnic minority groups will then
follow the same status ordering for all groups, including the majority. Such
consensual ethnic hierarchies have been found in a number of countries
including the Netherlands and former Soviet societies (Hagendoorn 1995),
Sweden (Snellman and Ekehammar 2005), Canada (Kalin and Berry 1996)
and the US (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Hagendoorn (1995) proposed an
intergroup differentiation mechanism to account for this pattern. If a
minority group perceives another group to be lower in the status hierarchy
than they are, their resistance to social contact with members of that group
should increase, as such contact could be a risk to their own status. In con-
trast, contact with groups who are perceived to be higher in the hierarchy
is seen as status enhancing, and will be less resisted.
(H3a) Ethnic hierarchies: all minority groups will prefer intra-marriage, fol-
lowed by in-laws from the white majority and with the Muslim in-laws as
least desirable.
In addition to status maximization, another mechanism that can drive the for-
mation of ethnic hierarchies is cultural distance. It has been shown that some
immigrants and minority group members are more welcome (Ford 2011) and
assimilated faster into their new societies (Maxwell 2012) than others. The liter-
ature on ‘new racism’ argues that although in the past race was a more salient
differentiator between groups, cultural difference has become the more preva-
lent justification for prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995: 59). South Asians,
being culturally distant from the white British due to greater differences in reli-
gion, language and social norms, may have become more likely to be rejected
by the majority (Maxwell 2012). Cultural distance may also be a relevant mech-
anism for how ethnic minority attitudes to the majority are shaped. As a result,
we expect that:
(H3b) Cultural distance: South Asian groups, compared to other ethnic
groups, will feel a greater sense of social distance from the white majority
and other ethnic groups.
The mechanisms of status maximization and cultural distance that under-
pin the consensual ethnic hierarchy both make assumptions about how the
attitudes between majority and minority perceptions of social distance are
related. There are two possibilities here. Firstly, as white prejudice towards
ethnic minority groups declines, minorities may be more willing to engage
in social contact with the majority in a reciprocal manner (Kalin and Berry
1996). This would narrow the distance from the majority group, but not
necessarily between different minority groups. A second possibility is that
the same underlying social trends drive declines in prejudice for all groups
regardless of their position in the ethnic hierarchy. Education and experi-
ence of diversity should diminish younger whites’ sense of distance from
other groups; we can expect the same effect for ethnic minorities. As
V
Figure I: Percentage who mind if a close relative marries an Asian or Caribbean
70
Asian
Caribbean
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
198384 1986 1989 1991 1994 1996 2013
BSA 1983-2013 (only white respondents)
minorities experience educational upward mobility, and the British born

make up an increasingly larger share of young ethnic minorities, we can
expect that they too will become more tolerant, cosmopolitan and open to
other cultures.
(H4a) Reciprocity: ethnic minorities’ social distance from the white majority
will decrease with diminishing negative attitudes of the white majority, and
increase with experience of discrimination;
(H4b) Parallel changes: generational change and education will reduce
social distance between all ethnic groups: young, British born, and better
educated minority group members will be more open to out-group contact.
Data and methods
We employ two sets of data to analyse majority attitudes, and two parallel sets
to analyse minority attitudes. In eight British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey
waves conducted between 1983 and 1996, white respondents were asked if they
would mind a close relative marrying an Asian or a Caribbean (West Indian)3
person. In 2013, these items were repeated, and additional items measuring
views of intermarriage with Muslims, Eastern Europeans and Black Africans
were added.
Our two ethnic minority datasets use comparable questions. The Fourth
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) from 1993–4 and the Ethnic
Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) from 2010 both asked questions
about intermarriage with other ethnic groups, including other minorities and
the white majority group. (For full details of all the variables used in the analy-
sis see Appendix Table A.I.)
Figure II: Percentage who mind having an ethnic minority in-law by birth cohort
80
70
60
Muslim
50
Black African
40
Asian
30 Caribbean
20 East European
10
0
1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
BSA 2013 (only white respondents)
Analysis
Trends over time
Figure I charts the trend in British attitudes to a relative marrying an Asian or

Caribbean person over the 30-year period covered by the data. Attitudes were
relatively stable during the 1980s, with around 50 per cent expressing opposition
to intermarriage with either group in each of the first four time points. Aggre-
gate opposition then declined considerably in the 1990s, falling in each of the
three time points, and declined again in 2013. Roughly half of the opposition to
intermarriage recorded in 1983 was gone by 2013. However, the evidence sug-
gests that the pace of decline has slowed. Opposition fell from c. 55 per cent to
c. 35 per cent in 13 years between 1983 and 1996 (about 1.5 percentage points
per year), and then to c. 25 per cent in the 17 years from 1996 to 2013 (about
0.6 points a year).
There is very little difference in the aggregate trends in attitudes towards the
two ethnic minority groups. Further analysis (Appendix Figure A.I) indicates
that the change in social distance to Asians and Caribbeans can be attributed to
both period and cohort effects. Each younger cohort is more tolerant than the
last, but there is an additional decline in social distance over time within each
cohort, supporting hypotheses H1a and H1b.4
Cohort structure of majority group’s attitudes

Figure II shows the distribution of opposition to intermarriage with five groups
across birth cohorts in the 2013 BSA data. The overall generational shift
towards acceptance identified in earlier analysis (Ford 2008) is seen here for all
V
five groups. In every case, opposition is highest amongst the oldest, pre-
migration, cohorts and declines in a more or less linear fashion as we move to
younger cohorts. While more than a third of the oldest cohorts express opposi-
tion to intermarriage with each ethnic minority group, less than one in ten of
the youngest cohort (those born in the 1990s) express opposition to any group
except Muslims.
Reactions to the five groups do not suggest a clear or consistent ethnic hierar-
chy. Social distance from four of the groups is rather similar, particularly among
respondents born in the 1950s or later. Only the oldest cohorts show greater
opposition to the non-white groups than to Eastern Europeans, suggesting
racial difference is salient for them, but is not so for younger cohorts. However,
for all cohorts, there is clear evidence of much greater social distance from Mus-
lims than any of the other groups, supporting the idea that Muslim religious
and cultural distance functions as a ‘bright boundary’. This distinct reaction to
Muslims also shows a generational dynamic – it is very intense amongst the old-
est cohorts: over two-thirds of those born in the 1940s or earlier oppose a Mus-
lim in-law. Opposition then falls steeply amongst younger cohorts, with
evidence of convergence towards other ethnic groups. Opposition to intermar-
riage with other groups runs at around 20 per cent for those born in the 1950s,
but 55 per cent for Muslims. Among those born in the 1980s, the figures are 10–
20 per cent for non-Muslim groups and 28 per cent for Muslims. There is also
evidence of somewhat greater opposition among the very youngest cohort, the
first to grow up in the post 9/11 and 7/7 environment, but as this group is still
relatively small in our data (as those born after 1995 were under 18 at the time
of the survey) this cannot be taken as conclusive.
To determine which factors seem to be driving the decline in social distance
from ethnic minorities, we run two ordered logistic regression models with the
dependent variables being whether the respondent would mind a lot, a little or
not at all if a relative marries an Asian or Caribbean person, respectively (see
Table A.I for details). The results are shown in Table I.
The first model includes dummy variables for each year since 1991 and com-
pares them with the 1980s (when attitudes were stable). We also include gender
and a centred variable of birth year, as well as birth year squared to account for
the possibility that the relationship with age/cohort may be curvilinear.
We test the impact of education on reactions to minority groups (Coenders
and Scheepers 2003; Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008: 271) using details of
the formal qualifications respondents have received, with no qualification as the
reference category. As prejudice could be associated with economic insecurity
(Bobo 1983), three other socioeconomic indicators were also included: the Reg-
istrar General’s measure of social class (the only measure available in all survey
years), unemployment, and housing tenure.
Being married and having children have been associated with more socially
conservative attitudes (Tilley 2005). Religious people may be more concerned
Table I: Opposition to a minority in-law, ordered logistic regressiona
Asian in-law Caribbean in-law

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Period (ref: 1980s)
1991 20.215* 0.091 20.215* 0.091 20.232* 0.097 20.243* 0.097
British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

1994 20.354*** 0.084 20.353*** 0.084 20.488*** 0.085 20.486*** 0.085
1996 20.524*** 0.086 20.523*** 0.087 20.493*** 0.084 20.495*** 0.084
2013 20.796*** 0.115 20.786*** 0.116 20.653*** 0.115 20.642*** 0.115
Sex (Female) 20.234*** 0.063 27.172*** 6.773 20.135* 0.064 18.716** 6.733
Birthyear centred 1.308*** 0.360 0.812* 0.381 0.378 0.346 20.179 0.369
Birthyear squared/1000 20.341*** 0.093 20.206* 0.098 20.104 0.089 0.046 0.095
Highest qualification (ref: no qualification)
GCSE 20.159 0.082 25.257** 9.000 0.032 0.080 24.426** 8.747
A levels 20.258** 0.091 33.994*** 9.417 20.118 0.093 32.102** 9.935
Degree 21.023*** 0.149 45.883** 16.084 20.709*** 0.140 61.849*** 15.939
V
Social class (ref: Unskilled/partly skilled)
Skilled manual/nonmanual 20.064 0.076 20.048 0.076 0.053 0.077 0.064 0.077
Professional/managerial 20.216* 0.097 20.217* 0.098 20.170 0.098 20.162 0.098
Unemployed 20.186 0.143 20.237 0.144 0.211 0.139 0.159 0.140
Tenure (ref: Own)
Rent council 20.221** 0.081 20.228** 0.082 20.165 0.084 20.162 0.084
Rent other 20.305** 0.110 20.306** 0.110 20.146 0.109 20.142 0.110
Marital status (ref: married)
Separated/divorced 20.070 0.108 20.091 0.109 20.201 0.110 20.218* 0.110
Widowed 20.068 0.104 20.121 0.106 20.047 0.106 20.087 0.108
Never married 20.266* 0.106 20.300** 0.107 20.209 0.107 20.243* 0.108
Children in household 20.083 0.073 20.082 0.074 0.111 0.072 0.102 0.072
Is ethnic prejudice declining in Britain?
Religion (ref: No religion)

CofE/Anglican 0.394*** 0.074 0.411*** 0.075 0.227** 0.074 0.237** 0.074
419

V
420
Table I: Continued
Asian in-law Caribbean in-law

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Roman Catholic 0.107 0.115 0.131 0.115 0.193 0.118 0.214 0.118
Other Christian 0.163 0.097 0.180 0.097 0.128 0.096 0.133 0.097
Non-Christian 0.641* 0.316 0.723* 0.318 0.784** 0.287 0.833** 0.288
Religious service attendance 20.157 0.083 20.192* 0.084 20.192* 0.085 20.209* 0.086
Highest qualification 3 birthyear
GCSE*birthyear 20.013** 0.005 20.013** 0.005

A levels*birthyear 20.018*** 0.005 20.017** 0.005
Degree*birthyear 20.024** 0.008 20.032*** 0.008
Gender*birthyear 20.014*** 0.003 20.010** 0.003
Intercept 1 21293.717 351.341 2780.210 372.020 2394.157 337.114 173.192 360.495
Intercept 2 21292.634 351.340 2779.123 372.020 2393.031 337.115 174.321 360.496
N 4826 4826 4717 4717
Log likelihood 24282.0 24266.5 24234.4 24220.6
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.069 0.064 0.067
Notes: BSA 1983–2013 (only white respondents); * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
a
The model does not fit the proportional-odds assumption or the parallel regression assumption for either attitudes to Asian in-laws or Caribbean in-laws,
due to the relationship with education. However, as all the other variables meet the assumptions, and have the same relationship in the multinomial, logistic
and ordered logistic regressions, we only show the ordered logistic models here. Multinomial regressions (available on request) show that all levels of educa-
tion are negatively associated with ‘mind a lot’, whereas only degree level is negatively associated with ‘mind a little’. GCSE level education is positively
associated with minding ‘a little’ if a relative marries a Caribbean.

about religious differences between spouses (Voas and Crockett 2005; Voas
and Ling 2010:77). As previous research (Ford 2008; Storm 2011) found that
Christian affiliation is generally associated with more negative attitudes to
immigration and minorities, while regular church attendance is associated with
positive attitudes, we control for both in the model.
The second model includes interactions between birth year and educational
qualifications and gender respectively, as Ford (2008) showed a much steeper
decline by birth year in social distance to ethnic minorities among women and
people with higher education, and including these interactions improved the
model fit.
A number of key results emerge from Table I. First, social distance to both
groups is significantly lower in the 1994, 1996 and 2013 surveys than the earlier
surveys, confirming that there is a sustained overall decline in social distance in
this period even after controlling for generational shifts and other social factors
(Hypothesis 1a).
The period effects suggest an overall liberal shift across all respondents, but
in support of Hypothesis 1b, we also find significant cohort structure in the atti-
tudes to both groups. The oldest respondents are the most sceptical of new eth-
nic minority in-laws, and younger cohorts are consistently more liberal.
However, for attitudes to black Caribbeans, this cohort trend levels off – those
born in the 1980s or 1990s are no more liberal than those born in the 1960s and
1970s, after controlling for period (see Figure A.I).
We also find significant gender differences – women are less opposed to inter-
marriage than men – and educational differences: those with A-levels are more
liberal than those with GCSEs or less, and those with university degrees are
more liberal still. The interaction effects show that the generational change in
social distance to Asians has occurred to a greater extent for women than men,
as was also found in earlier analysis (Ford 2008). Education appears to have
had the largest effect on the tolerance of cohorts born between 1930 and 1970.
University graduates led the trend towards social acceptance of interethnic mar-
riage, but for graduates born in the 1980s or later such acceptance is already
near-universal. In these youngest cohorts, acceptance of intermarriage is a
widespread social norm only rejected by those with no educational qualifica-
tions at all and by a shrinking minority even in this group. (See Figure A.II for
the predicted probabilities by birth-cohort and highest qualification.)
Are Muslims singled out?
Muslims stand out in the 2013 data as the only group which still faces wide-
spread hostility from across the white population (see Figure II). This supports
Hypothesis 2a that opposition to intimate social contact with Muslims would be
stronger than similar contact with other out-group members. We also hypothe-
sized that this phenomenon would have a generational aspect. Young people
V
born in the 1980s and 90s, growing up amid increased media salience of Muslim
terrorism are expected to have more divergent attitudes towards Muslims and
other minority groups (H2b). To test this hypothesis, and see what other predic-
tors can explain Muslims’ position at the bottom of the hierarchy, we show the
results of a logistic regression analysis restricted to the data from 2013 (when
people were asked about Muslims, East Europeans and Black Africans for the
first time) in Table II. The model is otherwise similar to the previous analysis
(Table I), and shows that generational differences in social distance from Mus-
lims are as large, or possibly larger, than those seen for other groups. There is
no evidence that those born in the 1980s and 1990s express greater opposition
to intermarriage with Muslims. Instead, the opposite is true.
Table II also shows that in addition to age or year of birth, attitudes to Mus-
lims are largely determined by education, which also predicts diminished social
distance towards other minority groups.
Social distance from Muslims is much higher than from any other ethnic
group. This suggests some people single out Muslims, even while accepting
other minorities. We can analyse the drivers of this ‘Muslim penalty’ (Heath
and Martin 2013), as all those who were asked about their attitudes to Muslim
intermarriage were also asked about either Black Caribbeans or Black Afri-
cans. This enables us to identify those who say they oppose intermarriage with
Muslims, but do not oppose intermarriage with one of the black groups. As
Table III shows, at least half of those who said they mind if a relative marries a
Muslim, would not mind if they married the other ethnic minority group they
were asked about (Black African or Caribbean), while only a small proportion
of respondents express opposition to intermarriage with the black group, but
not the Muslim group.
This finding supports earlier research on the 2008 British Social Attitudes
Survey, which found that a large proportion of those who express negative feel-
ings towards Muslims do not express negative feelings towards any other ethnic
or religious minority, and very few show dislike to any other ethnic or religious
minority on its own (Voas and Ling 2010: 80). Because Muslims are the only
religious minority asked about in 2013, we cannot exclude the possibility that
resistance to Muslim in-laws reflects concerns about inter-religious, as opposed
to inter-racial marriage, but Voas and Ling’s work indicate that this is unlikely:
the unique dislike for Muslims does not apply to Buddhists or Jews.
The logistic regression model in Table IV shows that those who single out
Muslims in this way are primarily people over 30, married and with some quali-
fications, but not university degrees. In comparison, those who mind both Mus-
lims and blacks, are older, less educated, and more likely to have an Anglican
or non-Christian religious affiliation. This is consistent with the earlier analysis
and indicates that there is a sizeable group of relatively younger and more edu-
cated people, who do not have general high levels of ethnic prejudice, but who
still show considerable social distance to Muslims. This could reflect perceived
Table II: Opposition to minority in-law (2013), ordered logistic regression
Muslim Asian Black African Caribbean East European

Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Sex (Female) 20.049 0.115 20.404* 0.204 20.303 0.224 20.370 0.205 20.240 0.213
Birth cohort (ref: born before 1940)
1940s-50s 20.247 0.179 20.058 0.286 20.720* 0.292 20.128 0.286 0.205 0.302
1960s-70s 20.941*** 0.219 0.506 0.380 21.628*** 0.403 20.409 0.377 0.517 0.398
1980s-90s 21.509*** 0.272 20.321 0.537 21.782** 0.562 20.411 0.455 20.703 0.615
GCSE 20.102 0.167 20.673* 0.277 20.186 0.296 21.051*** 0.271 20.726* 0.292
A levels 20.445* 0.181 20.747* 0.314 20.662* 0.325 21.199*** 0.308 20.540 0.319
Degree 20.958*** 0.207 21.491*** 0.410 21.066** 0.395 21.785*** 0.368 21.688*** 0.453
Social class (ref: Unskilled/partly skilled)
V
Skilled manual/nonmanual 0.078 0.155 20.074 0.250 0.064 0.274 20.050 0.263 20.326 0.257
Professional/managerial 20.239 0.179 20.420 0.308 20.447 0.324 0.042 0.315 20.635* 0.312
Unemployed 0.023 0.308 21.037 0.667 21.012 0.790 0.222 0.488 22.327* 1.060
Tenure (ref: Own)
Rent council 20.053 0.169 0.510 0.274 20.563 0.311 0.464 0.273 0.604 0.293
Rent other 0.377* 0.183 20.546 0.358 20.116 0.415 0.528 0.300 20.203 0.367
Separated/divorced 0.040 0.166 0.183 0.302 0.029 0.320 20.246 0.316 20.079 0.320
Widowed 20.139 0.191 0.076 0.303 0.032 0.310 0.776* 0.300 20.172 0.326
Never married 20.326 0.183 20.195 0.316 20.047 0.390 0.221 0.315 20.338 0.339
Children in household 0.085 0.142 20.712* 0.277 20.006 0.293 0.210 0.256 20.737* 0.290
423

V
424
Table II: Continued
Muslim Asian Black African Caribbean East European

Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
CofE/Anglican 0.249 0.146 0.633* 0.256 0.549* 0.263 0.208 0.250 0.452 0.263
Roman Catholic 20.334 0.199 20.005 0.393 20.146 0.390 21.162** 0.431 20.438 0.445
Other Christian 0.019 0.155 0.670* 0.273 0.208 0.298 20.589* 0.282 0.471 0.281

Non-Christian 0.099 0.410 1.424 0.925 1.911** 0.664 0.300 0.565 0.512 1.166
Religious service attendance 0.282 0.158 20.162 0.272 20.320 0.296 0.548 0.281 20.427 0.303
Intercept 1 21.121*** 0.288 0.026 0.466 20.586 0.500 20.319 0.479 0.116 0.489
Intercept 2 0.037 0.286 1.119 0.471 0.624 0.503 0.819 0.482 1.442*** 0.499
N 1334 674 683 680 678
Log likelihood 21277.454 2427.396 2390.148 2442.325 2386.548
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.097 0.123 0.111 0.110
Notes: BSA 2013; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table III: Percentage who would mind if a close relative marries a [. . .]:
Mind Mind
Mind (1) (2) Mind
Would mind. . .(%) both only only neither % N
(1) Muslim and (2) Black African 20.3 28.0 1.8 49.9 100 932
(1) Muslim and (2) Caribbean 23.9 25.9 1.3 48.9 100 919
(1) Asian and (2) East European 16.3 7.5 3.4 72.9 100 910
N 557 567 60 1577
Note: BSA 2013.
conflicts between Islam and liberal social values (Werbner 2005) related to the,
on average, higher levels of religiosity and material deprivation of Muslim
minorities.
Figure III shows the predicted probabilities of minding a Muslim in-law by
birth cohort when controlling for all the other variables in the model. Overall
opposition to Muslim intermarriage, shown by the darkest line, falls sharply
between cohorts. However, distinguishing between those who only mind
Table IV: Would mind if a close relative marries a [. . .]:
Only mind Mind Muslim and

Muslim in-law Black in-law
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Sex (Female) 0.218 0.135 20.343 0.155
Birth cohort (ref: born before 1940)
1940s-50s 0.145 0.214 20.302 0.213
1960s-70s 20.361 0.258 20.807** 0.282
1980s-90s 21.070** 0.329 20.830* 0.360
GCSE 0.670** 0.199 20.557** 0.203
A levels 0.581** 0.215 20.933*** 0.230
Degree 0.250 0.244 21.405*** 0.281
Separated/divorced 20.139 0.190 0.076 0.227
Widowed 20.801** 0.234 0.548* 0.226
Never married 20.526* 0.217 20.033 0.254
CofE/Anglican 20.039 0.172 0.403* 0.188
Roman Catholic 0.237 0.227 20.614* 0.303
Other Christian 0.265 0.179 0.027 0.209
Non-Christian 21.142 0.642 1.138* 0.466
Constant 21.257*** 0.335 0.167 0.356
N 1321 1321
Log likelihood 2743.060 2603.726
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.124
Notes: BSA 2013; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
(Controlled for social class, unemployment, tenure, marital status, children and religious serv-
ice attendance.)
V
Figure III: Predicted probability of minding if relative marries a Muslim by birth cohort
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Mind Muslim
0.4
Mind Muslim only
0.3 Mind Muslim and Black
0.2
0.1
0
1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
BSA 2013 (Controlling for all variables in Table IV)
Muslims, and those who mind both Muslims and black ethnic minorities,
reveals a more differentiated pattern. The oldest cohorts tend to oppose inter-
marriage with both groups, suggesting a generalized opposition to outgroup
marriage. Among those in middle age, opposition to the black group declines,
but opposition to the Muslim group remains. These middle cohorts – born
between the 1940s and the 1970s – are most likely to single out Muslims. In the
youngest age groups, however, the difference is considerably smaller. Despite
the increased salience of Muslims as an outgroup after 2001, the cohorts coming
of age in this period (born in the 1980s and 90s) are in fact less likely than their
parents to single out Muslims. In other words, Hypothesis 2b was not supported
– the experience of growing up in the polarized post 9/11 environment has not
made the youngest cohort of Britons more likely to have uniquely negative atti-
tudes to Muslims.
Ethnic hierarchy, parallel trends or reciprocity? Social distance attitudes

among ethnic minorities
Figure IV shows that the period decline in white social distance from all minor-
ity groups is also found in ethnic minority attitudes towards whites: in almost all
cases opposition to a white in-law declines between 1994 and 2010. The excep-
tion is the black Caribbean group, whose social distance from whites was
already low in 1994, when 12 per cent expressed opposition to intermarriage,
notably lower than the 39 per cent of whites who opposed marrying a black
Caribbean in the same year. This figure remained unchanged in 2010. Although
resistance to intermarriage declines in all three Asian groups between the two
time points, they all express higher opposition than the African, Caribbean or
Chinese groups, a pattern which does not change over time, and is also reflected
Figure IV: Percentage who mind if a close relative marries a white person [. . .] by year
and ethnic group
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
year year 2010 year year 2010 year year 2010 year year 2010 year year 2010
1993-4 1993-4 1993-4 1993-4 1993-4
Pakistani Bangladeshi Indian Black Caribbean Chinese Black
African
th
4 Naonal Survey 1994/ EMBES 2010. Not all ethnic groups were included in both surveys.
in marriage statistics (Muttarak and Heath 2010). The particularly negative

views about intermarriage with Muslims found among whites is mirrored in the
views of Muslim minorities themselves – the highest opposition to intermar-
riage with whites is found in the predominantly Muslim Pakistani and Bangla-
deshi groups.
Table V, based on EMBES 2010, suggests that a three tier ethnic hierarchy
operates in Britain, with the white majority at the top, Muslims at the bottom
and all other ethnic minorities in between. Ethnic minorities and the white
majority broadly agree on the relative acceptability of different groups, support-
ing Hypothesis 3a. As predicted, white in-laws are the least opposed by all
minority groups, while the group which consistently evokes the most opposition
is Muslims. Non-Muslim Indians, Black Caribbeans and non-Muslim Black
Africans all expressed much greater social distance to Muslims than they did to
other ethnic groups, suggesting that the unique status of Muslims is recognized
by non-Muslim ethnic minorities. As with the data for white respondents, the
question about Muslims was unfortunately only asked once, and there is no
comparative question for other religious groups.
There does not seem to be a consistent pattern according to group status out-
side of this three-tiered division. As shown in Table V, Black and Asian non-
Muslims are equally accepted by whites, yet non-Muslim Asians are by far the
least comfortable with an out-group in-law. Table V also shows that while Afri-
can Muslims are one of the groups most accepting of intermarriage, Asian
V
Table V: Percentage bothered by a [. . .] in-law by ethnoreligious group in 2010 (2013)
Black African non- African Asian non- Asian White

Caribbean Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim (BSA 2013)
White in-law 14.24 22.11 18.12 28.24 37.57

Black in-law 41.62 42.14 23.12
Asian in-law 22.61 29.15 18.25 24.02
Muslim in-law 37.30 42.93 58.69 49.52
Notes: EMBES 2010 (BSA 2013).
Muslims reject white in-laws the most. Hypothesis 3b, which argued that South
Asians as most culturally distant from other groups and thus least favourable to
intermarriage, finds some support here.
To further examine the cultural distance (H3b), reciprocity (H4a) and paral-
lel change (H4b) hypotheses, we conducted multivariate analysis. In Table VI
we analyse ethnic differences in social distance found in the EMBES 2010 data
in a logistic regression model, controlling for sex, birth cohort, country of birth
and education as well as the ethnic and religious groups used in Table V. To
test the reciprocity hypothesis (H4a) we also include a dichotomous variable of
whether the respondent has experienced discrimination based on their race,
ethnicity or religion in the past five years. To control for the salience of religios-
ity to the respondent’s identity (Perry 2014), we also include the frequency of
religious service attendance.
Even after controlling for these variables, some ethnic differences in social
distance persist. Most notably, the analysis offers further support for Hypothesis
3b, as Asians are more likely than Africans and Caribbeans to mind their rela-
tives marrying a white person, and non-Muslim Asians are more likely to mind
intermarriage with a Muslim. As for the differences between Muslim and non-
Muslim respondents the results are mixed: Asian Muslims are somewhat more
likely to be bothered by the prospect of White in-laws, but non-Muslims are
more bothered by Black ones. There is no significant difference between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims among the Africans.
In contrast to the white majority, there is no significant cohort effect, nor do
we see a clear association between gender or education and social distance
among the ethnic minorities. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 4b that parallel
social changes are driving declines in social distance in the majority and minor-
ity populations. However, what does seem to make a big difference is how long
the respondent has been in the UK. Those who are born in the UK are more
likely than first-generation immigrants to accept white in-laws5 suggesting that
social distance is in part based on experience of and contact with the white
majority. An alternative explanation may be that UK-born minorities tend to
have less traditional values than immigrant co-ethnics regarding family, caste,
class and relationships, and hence attach less importance to endogamy.
Table VI: Ordered logistic regression: Bothered by [. . .] in-law
White in-law Black in-law Asian in-law Muslim in-law

Sex (Female) 0.229 0.136 0.451** 0.159 0.147 0.184 0.191 0.150

Birth cohort (ref: Before 1960)
1960s-1970s 0.260 0.203 0.057 0.233 0.114 0.267 20.057 0.205
1980s-1990s 0.145 0.222 20.199 0.267 20.389 0.282 20.351 0.229
Born in UK 20.434** 0.158 20.190 0.171 0.277 0.229 0.028 0.173
Highest qualification (ref: No qualification)
GCSE 20.210 0.202 20.265 0.236 20.231 0.285 20.099 0.245
A-levels 20.193 0.204 20.448 0.242 20.417 0.295 20.273 0.234
Degree 20.179 0.201 20.240 0.234 20.573 0.314 20.047 0.234
Ethnic/religious group (ref: Caribbean) (ref: Asian non-Muslim) (ref: Caribbean) (ref: Caribbean)
African non-Muslim 0.116 0.244 0.430 0.226 0.010 0.197
V
African Muslim 20.168 0.338 20.061 0.339
Asian non-Muslim 0.922*** 0.201 1.326*** 0.166
Asian Muslim 1.100*** 0.189 20.409* 0.172
Discrimination 0.307* 0.140 0.342* 0.171 0.459* 0.183 0.381* 0.154
Religious attendance 0.233*** 0.049 0.179** 0.057 0.293*** 0.072 0.372*** 0.058
Intercept 1 2.133*** 0.326 0.468 0.335 2.587*** 0.440 1.578*** 0.340
Intercept 2 2.908*** 0.339 1.183*** 0.339 3.237*** 0.449 2.420*** 0.346
N 2117 1090 984 1277
Log Likelihood 21482.723 21209.188 2481.281 21202.445
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.026 0.037 0.081
Notes: EMBES 2010; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
429

Whatever the mechanism, socialization in a British context seems to have an

effect on attitudes. Rates of interethnic marriage show a similar pattern – they
are considerably higher for the UK-born minorities of all ethnic groups
(Muttarak and Heath 2010).
However, contact with the majority can cut both ways: those who report hav-
ing experienced ethnic discrimination are generally more opposed to marriage
with the white majority, in line with the reciprocity hypothesis (H4a). We also
find evidence that religiosity encourages minority social distance from all other
groups, with a particularly large effect for the question about Muslims. This
could reflect several factors – more religious minority respondents may be more
embedded within their own group (Perry 2014), may have more conservative
social values (Altemeyer 1981) or may simply place greater weight on cultural
and religious difference when judging those from other groups.
These findings suggest that cultural difference, but not group status, shape
minority attitudes towards other ethnic groups. There is evidence also of a
strong reciprocity mechanism with regards to the white majority – ethnic minor-
ities who have experienced discrimination become more opposed to intermar-
riage with the white majority group. The decline in ethnic minority social
distance from the white majority does not seem to be driven by the same social
processes as those that drive the parallel decline in white social distance. Minor-
ity attitude change is not the product of cohort value shifts, or educational
expansion, but instead the result of being born and raised in Britain, and
thereby having extended social contact with the white majority.
Conclusions
This study showed a continued decline in white social distance toward ethnic
minorities, as expressed by opposition to interethnic marriage in one’s close
family. The decline is clear whether measured by survey year or by birth cohort,
and applies to all ethnic groups where there is data available, thus supporting
Hypothesis 1a and 1b. The trend seems to be caused in part by the growth in
education, but the effect of education also appears to have diminished in recent
years. A large majority of British respondents born in the 1990s accept inter-
marriage with all minority groups except Muslims.
The finding that all minority groups express smaller or similar levels of social
distance to whites compared to the other ethnic out-groups seem to offer partial
support for the ethnic hierarchy hypothesis (H3a), that the same hierarchy of
social distance can be observed among different ethnic groups. Nonetheless,
the ‘hierarchy’ we observe is a very rudimentary one. The majority white group
is consistently ranked at the top, Muslims are consistently ranked at the bottom,
while the other groups fall in between in no particular order. Race also matters
as a distinguishing factor for older whites, and in earlier surveys, but younger
whites in the 2013 survey showed similar attitudes toward all minority groups
except Muslims.
The consistency of the larger social distance towards Muslims expressed
among both the majority and minority non-Muslim respondents, offers support
for the description of Muslims as a minority attracting uniquely intense hostility
from all other groups (H2a). The significance of religious affiliation and attend-
ance in some of the models also seems to underscore the importance of cultural
and religious identity as determinants of social distance, at least when measured
by attitudes to interethnic marriage in the family.
While social distance from Muslims may in part be the result of recent
events and public discourses, the results do not support the hypothesis
(H2b) that this has disproportionately affected cohorts coming of age in
the 2000s. The relative social distance to Muslims as compared to other
groups is no higher for younger cohorts than for middle-aged ones. While
the results suggest that there is a specific anti-Muslim bias, there is no indi-
cation that this is a growing generational trend – in fact there is evidence
for the opposite trend, with attitudes to Muslims converging on views of
other groups in the most recent cohorts. However, measures for more than
one year would be needed to establish with certainty whether the specific
anti-Muslim bias is declining over time.
The decline in white social distance from ethnic minorities is mirrored in
minority attitudes to the majority – social distance from whites declined
between 1994 and 2010 for the three groups where it started highest, and in the
fourth group, black Caribbeans, it started low and did not rise. The mechanisms
driving this change appear to be distinct, however: attitude change in minorities
is associated with British birth, secularism and positive social contact with
whites rather than educational expansion and cohort value change. Direct social
experience clearly matters for ethnic minorities – those born in Britain, who
thus have more extensive contact with the majority group, report much lower
social distance, but those who report experience of discrimination report
greater social distance. However, we do not find evidence that Muslim minor-
ities, who are on the receiving end of more hostile attitudes, react by becoming
more hostile to other groups: the views of Asian and African Muslims are no
different to those of non-Muslims with the same ethnic origin.
Taken together, the results suggest that racial boundaries between whites,
blacks and Asians have blurred in recent decades, and continue to do so. Far
fewer people express opposition to intermarriage with other ethnic groups.
However, some boundaries remain bright, or may even have brightened over
time. Muslims are singled out for unique hostility from both the white majority
and other minorities, including from many who express inclusive attitudes
towards other groups.
(Date accepted: April 2016)

V
Notes
1. This work was supported by the 4. Age, period and cohort effects cannot
Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE). be uniquely identified, but based on the pre-
CoDE is an ESRC funded centre (Grant liminary analysis and the previous literature
number: ES/K002198/1). (Ford 2008; Inglehart 1997; Tilley 2005), in
2. This figure is based on the Labour the following analysis we will assume a
Force Surveys and includes all non-white cohort effect to be the most plausible inter-
minorities. pretation of the relationship between birth
3. The question asked used the term year and the outcome variable.
‘West Indian’ in all years of the BSA. 5. In alternative models, age of migra-
However, to be consistent with the other tion to, and length of residence in the UK
survey data we will refer to this category were both significant in the same direction,
as ‘Caribbean’ in the remainder of this but due to multicollinearity these variables
article. were excluded from the model.
Bibliography
Alba, R. 2005 ‘Bright vs. Blurred Bounda- Their Consequences, Washington DC:
ries: Second-Generation Assimilation and National Academy Press.
Exclusion in France, Germany, and the CoDE (Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity)
United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 2014 ‘Addressing Ethnic Inequalities in
28(1): 20–49. Social Mobility: Research Findings from the
Alba, R, and Nee, V. 1997 ‘Rethinking CoDE and Cumberland Lodge Policy Work-
Assimilation Theory for a New Era of shop’. Available at: http://www.ethnicity.ac.
Immigration’, The International Migration uk/medialibrary/briefings/policy/code-social-
Review 31(4): 826–74. mobility-briefing-Jun2014.pdf [Accessed on
Allport, G. W. 1954 The Nature of Preju- 29 June 2015].
dice, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. 2003 ‘The
Altemeyer, B. 1981 Right-wing authoritari- Effect of Education on Nationalism and
anism, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Ethnic Exclusionism: An International
Press. Comparison’, Political Psychology 24(2):
Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (eds) 2006 Mul- 313–43.
ticulturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. 2008
and Redistribution in Contemporary Democra- ‘Changes in Resistance to the Social Inte-
cies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. gration of Foreigners in Germany 1980–
Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. 2013 ‘Is 2000: Individual and Contextual Determi-
There Really a Retreat from Multicultural- nants’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
ism Policies? New Evidence from the Multi- Studies 34(1): 1–26.
culturalism Policy Index’, Comparative Field, C.D. 2011 ‘Young British Muslims
European Politics 11(5): 577–98. since 9/11: A Composite Attitudinal Pro-
Bobo, L. 1983 ‘Whites’ Opposition to Bus- file’, Religion, State and Society 39(2-3):
ing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group 159–75.
Conflict?’ Journal of Personality and Social Finney, N. and Simpson, L. 2009 Sleepwalking
Psychology 45(6): 1196–210. to Segregation? Challenging Myths about Race
Bobo, L. 2001 ‘Racial Attitudes and Rela- and Migration, Bristol: Policy Press.
tions at the Close of the Twentieth Century’ Ford, R. 2008 ‘Is Racial Prejudice Declining
in N.J. Smelser, W.J. Wilson and F. Mitchell in Britain?’, The British Journal of Socio-
(eds) America Becoming: Racial Trends and logy 59(4): 609–36.
Ford, R. 2011 ‘Acceptable and Unaccept- Archive [distributor]. SN: 2029: 10.5255/
able Immigrants: The Ethnic Hierarchy in UKDA-SN-2029-1
British Immigration Preferences’, Journal of Perry, S.L. 2014 ‘More Like Us: How Reli-
Ethnic and Migration Studies 37(7): gious Service Attendance Hinders Interra-
1017–37. cial Romance’, Sociology of Religion 75(3):
Ford, R. and Goodwin, M.J. 2014 Revolt on 442–62.
the Right: Explaining Support for the Radi- Pettigrew, T.F. and Meertens, R.W. 1995
cal Right in Britain, Abingdon: Routledge. ‘Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western
Hagendoorn, L. 1995 ‘Intergroup Biases in Europe’, European Journal of Social Psy-
Multiple Group Systems: The Perception of chology 25(1): 57–75.
Ethnic Hierarchies’, European Review of Pettigrew, T.F. and Tropp, L.R. 2008 ‘How
Social Psychology 6(1): 199–228. Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Preju-
Heath, A. and Martin, J. 2013 ‘Can Reli- dice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Media-
gious Affiliation Explain “Ethnic” Inequal- tors’, European Journal of Social
ities in the Labour Market?’, Ethnic and Psychology 38(6): 922–34.
Racial Studies 36(6): 1005–27. Putnam, R. 2007 ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diver-
Inglehart, R. 1997 Modernization and Post- sity and Community in the Twenty-First
modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Century’, Scandinavian Political Studies
Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, 30(2): 137–74.
NJ: Princeton University Press. Saggar, S. 2008 Pariah Politics: Understand-
Kalin, R. and Berry, J. W. 1996 ‘Interethnic ing Western Radical Islamism and What
Attitudes in Canada: Ethnocentrism, Con- Should Be Done, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sensual Hierarchy and Reciprocity’, Cana- sity Press.
dian Journal of Behavioural Science 28(4): Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. 1999 Social Dom-
253–61. inance: An Intergroup Theory of Social
Mannheim, K. 1970 ‘The Problem of Genera- Hierarchy and Oppression, Cambridge:
tions’, Psychoanalytical Review 57: 378–404. Cambridge University Press.
Maxwell, R. 2012 Ethnic Minority Migrants in Snellman, A. and Ekehammar, B. 2005
Britain and France: Integration Trade-offs, ‘Ethnic Hierarchies, Ethnic Prejudice, and
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Social Dominance Orientation’, Journal of
Modood, T. 2003 ‘Muslims and The Politics Community and Applied Social Psychology
of Difference’, Political Quarterly 74(S1): 15(2): 83–94.
100–115. Song, M. 2004 ‘Introduction: Who’s at the
Mudde, C. 2007 Populist Radical Right Par- Bottom? Examining Claims about Racial
ties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- Hierarchy’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 27(6):
versity Press. 859–77.
Muttarak, R., and Heath, A. 2010 ‘Who Storm, I. 2011 ‘“Christian Nations”? Ethnic
Intermarries in Britain? Explaining Ethnic Christianity and Anti-Immigration Atti-
Diversity in Intermarriage Patterns’, British tudes in Four Western European Coun-
Journal of Sociology 61(2): 275–305. tries’, Nordic Journal of Religion and
ONS (Office for National Statistics) 2014 Society 24(1): 75–96.
‘Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October Strabac, Z. and Listhaug, O. 2008 ‘Anti-
– December, 2013’ [computer file]. 2nd Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A Multilevel
edn, Colchester: UK Data Archive [dis- Analysis of Survey-data from 30 Countries’.
tributor], SN: 7468: 10.5255/UKDA-SN- Social Science Research 37: 268–86.
7468-2 Tilley, J.R. 2005 ‘Research Note:
OPCS (Office of Population Censuses and Libertarian-Authoritarian Value Change in
Surveys) 1985 ‘Labour Force Survey, 1983’ Britain, 1974–2001’, Political Studies 53(2):
[computer file]. Colchester: UK Data 442–53.
V
Voas, D. and Crockett, A. 2005 ‘Religion in Supporting information

Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging’,
Sociology, 39(1): 11–28. Additional supporting information may be
Voas, D. and Ling, R. 2010 ‘Religion in found in the online version of this article at
Britain and the United States’ in A. the publisher’s web-site:
Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. Phillips Table AI: List of variables used in the
and S. Butt (eds) British Social Attitudes: analysis
The 26th Report, London: SAGE Figure AI: Percentage who mind (a little or a
Publications. lot) if their relative marries an Asian or
Werbner, P. 2005 ‘Islamophobia: Incitement Caribbean, by birth cohort and survey year
to Religious Hatred - Legislating for a New Figure AII: Predicted probabilities of opposi-
Fear?’, Anthropology Today 21(1): 5–9. tion to Asian or Caribbean in-law


British Journal of Sociology - 2017 - Storm - Is Ethnic Prejudice Declining in Britain Change in Social Distance Attitudes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

British Journal of Sociology - 2017 - Storm - Is Ethnic Prejudice Declining in Britain Change in Social Distance Attitudes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The British Journal of Sociology 2017 Volume 68 Issue 3

Is ethnic prejudice declining in Britain? Change in

Ingrid Storm, Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford

Ethnic diversity is rising rapidly across Europe, a consequence of both high

Theory and hypotheses

Interethnic prejudice and ingroup favouritism are cognitive shortcuts for

Why might Muslims be singled out?

Islamophobia, or majority group hostility directed particularly at Muslim

Are minority perceptions of social distance shaped by the same

As outlined in the introduction, we also look at social distance expressed by

Figure I: Percentage who mind if a close relative marries an Asian or Caribbean

minorities experience educational upward mobility, and the British born

Data and methods

Trends over time

Figure I charts the trend in British attitudes to a relative marrying an Asian or

Cohort structure of majority group’s attitudes

Asian in-law Caribbean in-law

British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

Religion (ref: No religion)

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

Asian in-law Caribbean in-law

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

Pseudo R2 0.066 0.069 0.064 0.067

British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

Are Muslims singled out?

Muslim Asian Black African Caribbean East European

British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

Table II: Continued

Muslim Asian Black African Caribbean East European

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

Note: BSA 2013.

Table IV: Would mind if a close relative marries a [. . .]:

Only mind Mind Muslim and

Ethnic hierarchy, parallel trends or reciprocity? Social distance attitudes

in marriage statistics (Muttarak and Heath 2010). The particularly negative

Table V: Percentage bothered by a [. . .] in-law by ethnoreligious group in 2010 (2013)

Black African non- African Asian non- Asian White

White in-law 14.24 22.11 18.12 28.24 37.57

Notes: EMBES 2010 (BSA 2013).

White in-law Black in-law Asian in-law Muslim in-law

British Journal of Sociology 68(3)

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

Whatever the mechanism, socialization in a British context seems to have an

(Date accepted: April 2016)

Voas, D. and Crockett, A. 2005 ‘Religion in Supporting information

C London School of Economics and Political Science 2017

You might also like