FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS – POTENTIAL QUESTIONS (prep HD plans for each)

- Weighted 35%
- 1500 words
- Answer a series of questions about the theoretical material covered in the lectures
- Exam will be of a take home format with an irrevocable submission deadline – late submissions
will not be accepted
- Answers must be in full sentence form and prepared on a Word processor so that they can be
submitted via Wattle/Turnitin
BEGINS @ 6:29PM  DUE @ 8:30PM

WEEK 1: RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (W1 Maya notes)

WEEK 2: BEHAVIOURAL MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (W2 Maya notes)

WEEK 3: EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (W3 Maya notes)

WEEK 4: FORECASTING (W4 Maya notes)

WEEK 5: SCENARIO PLANNING (make own notes)

WEEK 6: USING INTELLIGENCE (W5 Maya notes)

WEEK 7: OSINT (make own notes)

WEEK 8: DECISION MAKING IN GROUPS (make own notes)

WEEK 9: PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIETAL INFLUENCES (make own notes)

Plan– go to library

- Write out all weeks that haven’t already been covered in Maya notes
- Make summary/ plans from past exams for notes to cover

PAST Q’s

2019

PART 1
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEY ARE ALL OF EQUAL VALUE. TOGETHER
THEY ACCOUNT FOR 50% OF YOUR MARK FOR THE EXAM. ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
MAKE SURE TO PROVIDE EXAMPLES
1. What is 'distance diagnosis' as it relates to foreign political leaders?
2. In terms of forecasting, what is an ‘equivalence class’?
3. What is the ‘pretty prudent public’ model?
4. What is ‘theory theory’?
5. What is ‘red teaming’?

PART 2
PLEASE ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A FURTHER 50% OF
YOUR MARK
1. Some political leaders are characterized as ‘irrational’. To what extent do you believe that this
characterization is useful for understanding their decision making?
2. Of all of the factors mentioned in the readings and the lectures, which do you believe is the most
important constraint on the ability of an Australian Prime Minister to put his or her foreign
policy goals into practice?
3. Reflecting on the forecasting exercise, can you think of one thing that you missed which would
have made at least one of your forecasts significantly more accurate? How could this help you
produce more accurate geopolitical forecasts in future (I expect you to make reference to a
superforecasting commandment or technique)?

2021

PART 1
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEY ARE ALL OF EQUAL VALUE. TOGETHER
THEY ACCOUNT FOR 50% OF YOUR MARK FOR THE EXAM. ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
MAKE SURE TO PROVIDE EXAMPLES

1. Risk Aversion
2. Heuer Table
3. Disagreement point (also known as the deadlock or breakdown point)
4. Chokepoint effect
5. Presidential democracy

PART 2
PLEASE ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A FURTHER 50% OF
YOUR MARK

1. To what extent is ‘culture’ a useful concept for understanding foreign policy? Please ensure to
define the term carefully.
2. What is economic power comprised of? You should use a specific country of your choosing to
illustrate your points.
3. Many scholars believe that state leaders can be modelled ‘as if’ they were rational decision
makers. To what extent do you believe that this is justified?

2018
PART 1
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEY ARE ALL OF EQUAL VALUE. TOGETHER
THEY ACCOUNT FOR 50% OF YOUR MARK FOR THE EXAM. ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
MAKE SURE TO PROVIDE EXAMPLES

1. What is the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’?

2. In terms of forecasting, what does it mean to take ‘the outside view then the inside view’?
3. What is the ‘casualty cringe’?
4. What does Haidt’s Elephant and Rider metaphor mean?
5. What is a ‘frame of reference’?

PART 2
PLEASE ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A FURTHER 50% OF
YOUR MARK
1. To what extent are state leaders constrained by domestic factors in their pursuit of what they
consider to be the national interest?
2. To what extent do you believe that psychological concepts can help us to understand foreign
policy decision making?
3. To what extent is a nation’s foreign policy shaped by its national culture?

MAYA MID-SEM
PART 1
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEY ARE ALL OF EQUAL
VALUE. TOGETHER THEY ACCOUNT FOR 50% OF YOUR MARK FOR THE EXAM.
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. MAKE SURE TO PROVIDE EXAMPLES

1. SIGINT
SIGNIT is a type of raw intelligence. SIGNIT refers to intelligence that is conveyed through signals
and codes. This form of intelligence involves the interception of enemy’s communication and can be
very useful if you can decrypt codes that are secret. SIGNIT is an old form of intelligence which
began through the interception of diplomatic correspondence, then through radio traffic, and is now
done through cyber hacking. However, as made evident through the House of Commons debate in
1927, it may sometimes be necessary to protect the source. In this case, the intelligence couldn’t be
acted on as the Germans would have changed their codes and this subsequently would have stopped
the possibility for gathering further intelligence in the future.
2. Analysis of competing hypotheses
An analysis of competing hypotheses is social science thinking tool. This tool is used by considering
and comparing two hypotheses to potentially explain an issue. An analysis of competing hypotheses
can be understood by looking at the example of whether Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
You must come up with a set of hypotheses which are mutually exclusive and cannot both be true.
Hypothesis 1 is that Iran plans to conduct experiments related to nuclear weapons for military
purposes. Hypothesis 2 is that Iran intends to conduct nuclear research for civilian purposes. You
must then evaluate the hypotheses with the evidence available and identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each hypothesis. In the case of the Iran example, Hypothesis 1 would be most correct
as it has the fewest pieces of evidence which are inconsistent with it.
3. Nash equilibrium
The nash equilibrium is a concept which can predict the outcome of a game between two non-
cooperative players and is a useful general tool for predicting social behaviour. To find the nash
equilibrium, you have to figure out the best responses for every one of the opponents strategies and
draw the two best responses on a piece of paper. Where the two lines meet is each player’s best
response to the other’s best response, and this is the nash equilibrium. It is unlikely that each player
would deviate from the nash equilibrium since they will only do worse by doing so. However, in
competitive situations, the nash equilibrium should not be used to pursue one single strategy with
unwavering confidence. This is because your opponent can exploit this knowledge to their advantage,
and as such, you should keep your opponent guessing by rationalising your choice of strategy. An
example of this is the Cold War where both the US and USSR began an arms race. The best situation
for both countries was to be armed with nuclear weapons but not to deploy them. This is because both
countries needed to be as armed as each other in order to feel secure, but if either was to deploy the
weapons, it would result in mass destruction.
4. Inside view/Outside view
The inside view/outside view is a technique used by superforecasters to reliably forecast future events.
Forecasters should first look at the probability of an event happening through an outside view by
examining the likelihood of an event of this kind happening anywhere in the world. For example, if
Russia was to agree to a peace treaty with the Ukraine by the end of 2023. An outside view would
involve looking at the probability of Russia agreeing to a peace treaty with any country it has been in
conflict with. If we look to Russia’s recent wars, it has ended in total victory as seen in Chechnya and
Syria or the dismemberment of the other country, as seen in Georgia. Now forecasters would consider
the inside view, which is to take in individual circumstances and apply this to the information we have
gathered from the outside view. In Russia’s case, spokespersons for the Kremlin have indicated that
there will be no successful peace talks until Ukraine can accept Russia’s claimed annexation of four
new regions. Thus, through a combined understanding of the outside and inside view, it would lead a
forecaster to predict that there would be a very low chance of Russia agreeing to a peace treaty with
Ukraine.
5. Parliamentary democracy
A parliamentary democratic system is a form of government where representatives are elected to
parliament, and this then forms the government. An example of a parliamentary democracy is
Australia, where the head of government is the prime minister and is appointed by the parliament. The
parliament is a part of the legislative branch of the government and is made up of the upper and lower
houses. The executive and the legislative branch work closely with each other to pass laws. This
contrasts with the presidential system where the president is directly elected by the people and the
legislative branch is quite separate. In relation to foreign policy, democracies are less likely to fight
with other democracies as per the democratic peace theory. Democracies also tend to be easier to deal
with due to free press and political debates which allows for a countries intentions and objectives to
be more easily understood. They are also held accountable by their people and therefore, are more
likely to conduct foreign policy in a way which aligns with the desires of the people in order to be
continually re-elected.
PART 2
PLEASE ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A
FURTHER 50% OF YOUR MARK

1. Which of the three forecasts which you made for the prediction exercise do you think is
most likely to prove to be wrong? Explain your answer.
I believe that my forecast regarding the probability of a peace treaty being signed between Russia and
Ukraine is the most likely to be proven wrong. I predicted a probability of 0.1 of this event happening
by the end of 2023.
I believed that there was a very low probability due to a serious unwillingness to continue peace talks
from both sides. Along with Russia’s past of not engaging with peace with other countries it has been
in conflict with, current attitudes highlight that Russia has demanded peace will be strictly on its
terms. The deputy head of Russia’s security council stated in July 2022 that ““Russia will achieve all
its goals. There will be peace – on our terms”. Another spokesperson for the Kremlin stated that there
will be no successful peace talks until Ukraine accepts Russia’s claimed annexation of four new
regions and that “any plan that does not take into account these circumstances cannot claim to be a
peace plan”.
At the time that I wrote my forecast, Ukraine had continuously taken a strong stance against these
claimed annexations. Zelensky was insistent that Russia restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
withdraw all military forces from the country in order for any peace talks to occur. Zelensky has been
adamant on not relinquishing the territories Russia has claimed to have annexed.
However, with recent information, I now believe that Ukraine is more open to recommencing peace
talks with Russia. In early April of 2023, a top advisor for Zelensky stated that Ukraine could soon be
ready to enter peace talks with Russia. This is the first time the possibility of peace talks has been
mentioned since April last year. The advisor spoke with Financial Times and said “if we will succeed
in achieving our strategic gaols on the battlefield and when we will be on the administrative border
with Crimea, we are ready to open [a] diplomatic page to discuss this issue.” Therefore, whilst this
does not definitively show that Ukraine will engage in peace negotiations, it demonstrates a new
willingness and has subsequently altered my position on the matter.
Whilst I still do not believe that Russia and Ukraine will sign a peace treaty by the end of 2023, with
the new information about Ukraine’s willingness to begin peace talks, I believe that my prediction
will be wrong. I would now say that the probability would be 0.4.

2. For the first half of your answer, make the case for the AUKUS agreement from the point of
view of Australia. For the second half of your answer, assume now that you are writing in 2060 and
that AUKUS is now viewed as a disastrous failure for Australia. Write a ‘post-morterm’ analysis
explaining why AUKUS failed. You may separate the two halves of your answer with a sub heading.

2. Many scholars believe that states can be modelled ‘as if’ they were unitary decision
makers. To what extent do you believe that this is justified?

POPPY MID-SEM
1. SIGINT
SIGINT is a source of raw intelligence and stands for ‘signals intelligence’, which includes the use of
signals and codes. SIGINT involves intercepting enemy communication and subsequently decrypting
if secret. As a very old form of intelligence, SIGINT has evolved from the interception of diplomatic
correspondence to radio traffic and now to cyber hacking of emails or other internal communications.
SIGINT is only useful if intelligence can break and interpret the codes. Furthermore, SIGINT is
redundant if the source cannot be protected as was demonstrated in the House of Commons debate
about Soviet subversion in 1927 whereby the UK Parliament argued that they did not act on
intelligence on the basis that if they had, the Germans would have changed it and stopped any future
streams of intelligence. Therefore, SIGINT is a valuable foreign policy tools if utilised effectively.

2. Analysis of competing hypotheses

Analysis of competing hypothesis is a social science thinking tool which can be practically
demonstrated in the Heuers Table, adapted from Omand’s ‘How Spies Think’. Conducting an analysis
of competing hypotheses is common in intelligence analysis and decision-making where two mutually
exclusive hypotheses are held against the existing evidence and information.
The first step is to identify the problem. For example, an analyst who is being asked to assess whether
Iran is trying to get nuclear weapons. Next, they come up with two hypotheses that are competing, so
that they can’t both be true. The analyst deduces that Iran either (1) plans to conduct nuclear weapons-
related experiments for military purposes, or (2) intends to conduct nuclear research for civilian
purposes. Gathering the evidence and information available is the next step as the analyst must review
the source type, credibility, and relevance. By evaluating each hypothesis against the evidence and the
source type, credibility, and relevance, it can be categorised a consistent or inconsistent. For the Iran
example, a Heuers Table reveals that Hypothesis 1 has the fewest pieces of evidence that was
inconsistent.
Conducting an analysis of competing hypotheses is useful for evaluating competing policy options in
a systematic and evidence-based way. Therefore, decision-makers can make more informed and
effective foreign policy decisions.

3. Nash equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium is an aspect of Game Theory widely utilised in foreign policy analysis. A strategy
profile is a Nash Equilibrium if every player’s action (in this profile) is a best response to the actions
of the other players (in this profile). In essence, Nash Equilibrium is the idea that each player is doing
the best that they can given what the other players are doing. A common foreign policy example
pertains to nuclear weapon production during the Cold War between the US and USSR. These two
actors are playing a ‘game’ where they are trying to predict if the other has disarmed their nuclear
weapons stockpiles. For player 1 (US) the best response to player 2 (USSR) strategy is the keep their
nuclear weapons. For player 2, the best response to player 1 strategy is also to keep their nuclear
weapons. This is a Nash Equilibrium because the two best responses correspond as neither player
want to change. This example demonstrates the power of the Nash Equilibrium as it is unlikely that
any state would deviate from the Nash Equilibrium outcome as they would only do worse for
themselves by doing so. The US would not disarm their nuclear weapons stockpile as the USSR
would still have theirs, leaving them at a disadvantage. Thus, the Nash Equilibrium is useful for
foreign policy as it provides a general tool for predicting social behaviour.

4. Inside view/Outside view

The inside view/outside view is a superforecasting technique used when assessing the general
likelihood of a situation occurring (or not occurring). The inside view looks at the specific aspects of
the case that would influence a forecaster to push their judgement of something happening up or
down. The outside view encourages forecasters to look at a case as existing as a part of a broader
phenomenon. For example, if a forecaster is trying to predict whether Joe Biden will be re-elected in
the 2024 US Presidential Elections, the outside view would look at this case on a broader level by
finding an equivalence class. This may be cases where another left-liberal incumbent is re-elected as
president or US elections overall. The more general the equivalence class, the more statistical power it
holds. The inside view looks at what, specifically, is it about Joe Biden in 2024 that differentiates him
from the equivalence class, and if this moves the forecast up or down. Superforecasters may refer to
his age, his opposition and the international environment. It is important that the inside view and
outside view remain balanced during superforecasting as it can lead to a bias in the predictions.

5. Parliamentary democracy
A parliamentary democracy is a form of government where the people elect representatives to a
parliament or legislative body, who then decide on the government and Prime Minister. States with a
parliamentary democracy include Australia, the UK, Ireland, and Canada. In a parliamentary system,
the power of the state is relative to the legislature. Meaning that the Prime Minister is not able to
make the executive policy decisions.
Due to the nature of democracies as being characterised by universal suffrage and individual rights,
foreign policy decisions within parliamentary democracies are often driven by a combination of
national interests and values.
For foreign policy, states operating under a parliamentary democracy also act in accordance with the
democratic peace theory as they tend to fight less with other democracies. There are more checks and
balances in place for democracies as they are accountable to the people who voted them in. In
addition, parliamentary democracies usually form alliances with other parliamentary democracies as
their free press make them more transparent.
PART 2

1. Which of the three forecasts which you made for the prediction exercise do you think is most
likely to prove to be wrong? Explain your answer.

I think that my forecast for the likelihood that a formal peace treaty will be signed between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation by the end of 2023 is likely to prove to be wrong.
Initially, I forecasted a probability of 0.2, which deems the scenario very unlikely. My reasoning was
based on the fact that peace talks could only occur under one of two conditions: (1) Russia withdraws
its troops from Ukraine, or (2) Ukraine recognises Crimea as Russian territory as well as announcing
Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. At the time, I thought these were the only circumstances
that would encourage diplomacy. But now, I understand that as the circumstance become more dire,
the likelihood of peace talks increase.
Originally, I believed that there was absolutely no chance of Russia withdrawing their troops from
Ukraine or releasing Ukrainian prisoners of war. This is due to Putin’s unwavering support for
Russian invasion and his support from China. Similarly, I believed that the likelihood of Ukraine
meeting Russian demands was extremely unlikely as Zelenskyy had made his position on the matter
clear.
However, as the death tolls continue to rise on both sides, I believe that Zelenskyy is more likely to
initiate peace talks. As Putin remains stubborn in his demands, sacrifices must come from the
Ukrainian side. Therefore, the ongoing violence of the conflict could provide motive for peace talks.
Inherently, the political will of Ukrainians to compromise will influence their domestic politics.
Additionally, the growing pressure from the international community could provide the support
needed to facilitate a peace treaty. Actors such as the US and the European Union could provide an
objective third-party for peace talks. Incentives may be offered.
There may also be a possibility that Putin is captured as a war criminal due to his charges from the
International Criminal Court. This would cause significant strain on the conflict and might instigate
peace talks.
I now increase my forecast to 0.4, proving my initial prediction to be wrong.

PART 1
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEY ARE ALL OF EQUAL
VALUE. TOGETHER THEY ACCOUNT FOR 50% OF YOUR MARK FOR THE EXAM.
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. MAKE SURE TO PROVIDE EXAMPLES

1. SIGINT
SIGINT is any intelligence that comes from the interception and decryption of signals. Nations use
signals whether they are physical signals in the use of lights and flags, to more modern equipment
communication devices. These signals can be used for a variety of purposes but the primary objective
is the transmission of information across large distances. Often these techniques are used when
nations intelligence services are unable to use HUMIT – human based intelligence, or when doing so
may compromise the security and identity of the information or of agent distributing such
intelligence. For instance, in Ancient Greece, a series of fires were lit every several kilometres in
order to warn for invasions or changes in the regime. The SIGINT techniques, following the
industrialisation observed during the First and Second World Wars saw increased complexity in both
coding methods and transmission of information. Notably, during these wars SIGINT interceptions
such as Ultra, were the Allied codename used to describe German messages that were decrypted by
Alan Turing’s enigma machine. This information gave the Allied forces an advantage in order to
identify and predict the movements of enemy troops. However, the advancement of modern
technologies has made this form of intelligence gathering more difficult and is often used
supplementary to contemporary intelligence methods.
2. Analysis of competing hypotheses
The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses is a form of deductive reasoning that involves a researcher
analysing and identifying the counterfactuals to their expected outcome, to test the likelihood of their
preconceived thinking. By creating an alternative hypothesis that opposes their theory the researcher
can test whether the dependent variable is caused by the independent variable or other unknown
factors. The primary reason this counterfactual analysis is conducted is to overcome any cognitive
biases - confirmation bias, availability heuristic, anchoring bias, framing effect – that may solicit
incorrect information despite the best effort of the researcher. While some research, particularly
qualitative in nature, has suggested it is impossible to remove the researcher from the research, the
analysis of competing hypothesis method represents an effort to be as impartial as possible, thus
giving the research added integrity. A foreign policy analyst, researching whether Australia’s form of
democracy has solicited jingoistic tendencies in the Asia Pacific, may look at whether ‘equivalent
classes’ – being other regime types or democratic forms - have a probability of also raising jingoistic
paradigm in foreign policy. This method also encourages individuals to not overlook negative
evidence and ascertain the other possible conclusions to the evidence gathered.

1. Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium is an outcome that represents the most effective point of compromise for two or
more actors. It is derived from the Rational Actor Model of foreign policy, using methods of Game
theory and conceptions of strategic interactions to find solutions to conflicts of interest. The concept
developed by John Nash explains argues two main points (1) Actors will seek to maximise their
possible benefit (2) Actors are constrained by the choices of their opponent. In this sense, Australia
will seek to maximise their ‘payoff’ or benefit in a trade deal with China, while knowing that they
must engage in some level of compromise to have the other actor agree. While Nash Equilibrium is
not always realised, it is a useful concept to understand the machinations and sometimes complexity
derived from: extended negotiations, bargaining, incomplete information, absence of dominant
strategies, needs for best responses. That being said, the concept is often criticised because it relies on
the fallacy of Menu Dependence in that in many cases, nations have more choices than simple (a) or
(b), and sequential rationality ignores missed information down the line of decision making.

2. Inside view/Outside view

The inside view and outside view are models of decision making that rationalise behavioural and
psychological tendencies in the domain of Foreign policy. These paradigms involve analysts
understanding the specific and unique cultural, social, and political dynamics that may condition a
foreign policy response. For instance, analysts “put themselves inside the shoes” of Chinese Officials
in their Belt and Road Project, understanding their motivations and the historical trends to gauge the
probability of the Belt and Road Project being what China describes as an effort to promote
sustainable development. The Analyst may interpret China’s motivations through their historical and
cultural tendencies as more likely being programme of power projection and economic coercion than
a humanitarian mission. However, relying solely on this inside view in order to understand the
probability of this program being a method of foreign intimidation could represent internal biases and
result in a misappropriate response to the problem. Therefore, the analysis may then consider the
outside view, which involves looking at how China has provided humanitarian aid in the past, and
how other similar countries also (1) Provide sustainable development funding (2) and create
international deals that seek to coerce and power project. The Analyst can then provide a more
accurate probability of whether China is telling the truth, and the responses their country could take as
a result.

3. Parliamentary democracy
Parliamentary Democracy is a system of government characterised by universal suffrage, competivite
elections and strong regard for individual rights. This system of government has evolved from the
gradual redistribution of rights from the monarch to the people, beginning with the signing of the
Magna Carta, a contract between both the British Monarch and the Aristocracy. This system of
government has shown to also solicit specific foreign policy tendencies. For instance, with
competitive elections it is common for Governments to regularly change their positions on
International Issues, and therefore frames of reference, where one Government may be more causality
sensitive, an unwillingness to sacrifice lives for international gains, than another party more likely to
support military operations. Similarly, parliamentary democracies have a strong regard for individual
rights, particularly the right to universal suffrage, and therefore it is supposed that Parliamentary
Democracies are more likely to intervene in two circumstances (1) when there is a realised or
potential existential threat to their rights being infringed– for instance America’s joining of the Allied
force during the German Nazi Campaign of World War Two (2) or on humanitarian missions that
focus on the restoration or provision of the same freedoms and liberties. Finally, consensus building,
and compromise are more common in Parliamentary democracies, also reflected in their broad
support for international institutions (Rules-Based Order) and mediation organisations, as opposed to
autocratic regimes that prefer unilateral actions.

PART 2
PLEASE ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A
FURTHER 50% OF YOUR MARK

3. Many scholars believe that states can be modelled ‘as if’ they were unitary decision makers.
To what extent do you believe that this is justified?

On a fundamental level, a “nation state” can be characterised by a social contract between a

population, to cooperate on issues of collective importance, particularly security and foreign policy.
For this reason, all individuals relinquish their individual rights of defending themselves and
international dealings, to a collective government that can create broader, more effective, and efficient
solutions to these issues. The argument by many scholars that states can be modelled as unitary
decision makers is therefore highly justified, in that if one was to consider the alternative, ‘states’
would not exist, instead millions of individuals acting in their own self-interest with little regard for
international issues. It should be noted that I agree with the common criticism that my argument is an
oversimplification of the international system, it is far more logical and justified than the alternative,
that individuals are making their own decisions on foreign policy positions that in some way is
filtered to the international level. I will draw on the expertise of Kenneth Waltz, Alexander Wendt,
and James D. Fearon in order to justify my argument.

Firstly, Kenneth Waltz argued that nation states can be considered unitary decision makers not only
because of the social contract explained above, but mostly because national actors operate in a largely
self-interested and anarchial international system. His theory of “Realism” in foreign policy operates
on the presumption that every nation state is equal, where some nations may have more power, but no
country has higher authority than others. As such, I argue that the notion of equality, requires two
unitary actors held at constant level of authority, and while I resign that some nations use methods of
coercion or persuasion to realise their own gains, no country is inferior to another. By treating each
nation state as a unitary actor, representing the interests of their population, one can understand the
motivations, preferences and goals that are filtered through foreign policy decisions, that justified
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent statement that “we may be allies, but we are not a vassal
state to the United States.” By disrupting this close foreign relationship, Macron proves that France is
a unitary actor that on the Realise International stage will operate in the interests of his population.
For this reason, I argue that prominent scholar Kenneth Waltz would support my argument that every
state is a unitary actor.

Secondly, Alexander Wendt argued constructivism in the international domain, where countries not
only act in the material interests elaborated by Waltz, but also by cultural, social, and historical
contexts that have conditioned their international behaviours. I argue my argument that all states are
unitary decision makers is an observable implication to Wendt’s constructivist conclusions. For
instance, Wendt supposes that nations have specific cultural and historical contexts that shape their
understanding of the world and therefore their response to external stimuli. For instance, the Hundred
Years of Humiliation, beginning with the British Opium Wars until the end of the second world war
represents a highly significant stimulus for Chinese jingoism. It is argued that China holds two
beliefs, that firstly they are the ‘Central Nation’ the translation of Zhong guo (Chinese name for
China), and that they observed significant decay and hostilities as a result of Western and Japanese
exploitation and colonialism. As such, Wendt’s constructivist view of the international system would
argue that China cultural, social and historical context has conditioned their desire to reverse the
humiliation and territorial losses. This “reversal” is embodied in their desire for land expansion in the
South China Sea, and their hard-line stance on foreign investment and interference in their state
operations. I argue that this logical reasoning is incongruent with suggestions that nation states are not
unitary actors in that in order to consider the constructivist conditioning of foreign policy, one must
acknowledge that nations have their own unique interests, and one must consider the ‘individuality’ –
and therefore unitary nation - of states and their responses. For this reason, both Walt’s Realist and
Wendt’s Constructivist approaches to foreign policy support my argument that nations act as unitary
decision makers, based on observed and imagined interests.

Finally, James D. Fearon argues that there are rationalised strategic interactions that occur in the
absence of any perceived or realised international authority. Organisations such as the United Nations
have for a long time, sought to cement international institutions, such as the Rules Based Order
through the Security Council or International Courts of Justice. However, the British ignoring of the
Chagos Island dispute, the Japanese circumvention of the Whaling Convention and ICJ Decision, in
addition to frequent human rights violations by China, Russia and the United States, demonstrate that
there is neither perceived or realised international authority. For this reason, states do not make
decisions in the interests of appeasing to higher authorities, to advance their nation’s strategic
objectives. Fearon’s argument is useful because it rationalises state actions as being the result of
utility – qualitative or quantitative) calculations. Indeed, he conveys that a nation makes decisions on
the shared understanding of one’s goals and objectives, determining that while there may be short
costs to a trade war, the long benefits supersede these costs. As such, while individual traders in a
market economy may disagree with this decision, ultimately, the state makes decisions and choices
that reward that largest benefit for their state as a whole. For this reason, I argue that any suggestion
that individuals make their own decisions that affect foreign policy is not compatible with the
empirical facts in the operation of international decision making. Likewise, Donald Trump’s decision
to leave the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the World Health Organisation, indicate that individual
nations make unitary decisions to strategize and rationalise the greatest possible national benefit. For
such reason, my argument that nation states operate as unitary actors is supported by the scholarship
of Fearon’s representation of the international system.

Overall, individuals enter social contracts between each other, to create a UNITARY government that,
makes decisions in their broad national interests, even when it compromises on the beliefs or needs of
some of those individuals. This concept, developed by 17th century philosopher John Locke can be
applied to my argument that justifies all nations are operating as unitary actors. While some may form
alliances or protect international institutions, nations only do so, when it is in their own interest. This
concept of self-interest and international ‘realism’ is well developed by the scholar Kenneth Waltz
which I argue suggests that all nations have unbalanced power, but equal authority. Indeed, the
concept of equality both internationally and theoretically requires the supposition that actor is
independent and unitary, otherwise the need for the scales of equality would not exist. I also argue
that Alexander Wendt’s conception of constructivism in the international domain suggests that unitary
actors make their decisions based of realised or imagined cultural, historical, and social contexts. As
cih. to begin considering the integrity of “unique contexts”, one must acknowledge that each actor is
individually acting on the international stage, based of their “individual contexts”. Finally, Fearon’s
argument that all nations operate in strategic operations to maximise their own benefits, both supports
the realist and constructivist approaches, but also suggests that nations may act in ways that do not
align with an individual’s self interest to act in the collective national interest. For these reasons, and
with the integrity of these scholars, I argue that the stimulus statement “Many scholars believe that
states can be modelled ‘as if’ they were unitary decision makers” is entirely justified.

MOCK MID TERM ANSWERS

1. Confirmation bias is a psychological tendency which individuals have by which they look for
evidence in favour of the hypothesis which they already believe. Instead of looking for
evidence in favour of our hypothesis, we should look for evidence against. If we cannot find
convincing evidence against our hypothesis (even though we’re looking for it), then we have
good reason to believe it’s true. Confirmation bias is something it’s important to be aware of
because it can lead us to be too confident in our conclusions which in turn can lead us to
make dangerous mistakes.
2. An operational code is a term which political scientists use to understand the beliefs of
opposing leaders. The operational code consists of the leader’s beliefs about the world, their
goals and the most effective means to achieve their goals. For instance, Hitler’s operational
 code included a belief in Aryan superiority and racial struggle along with the crucial
importance of violence in achieving his end goal of Aryan/German global domination.
Operational codes are important because they allow us to anticipate how opposing leaders
might act in particular sets of circumstances.
3. The sunk costs fallacy is a cognitive heuristic by which individuals believe that the value of a
particular goal is greater if they have already expended resources seeking it. For example,
the US may believe that the goal of winning in Afghanistan is more important since they
have lost so many soldiers there and spent so much money there than they would if they
had not lost any lives or spent any money. It’s important in foreign policy analysis because it
can lead policymakers to stick with failing projects for too long.
4. A state in which a single party is always in power and cannot be thrown out by elections (e.g.
the People’s Republic of China). Contrasted with a democracy in that in a democracy the
ruling party can lose elections and hence power. But it’s also contrasted with other types of
autocracies - traditionalist autocracies which are based on religion or cultural tradition (e.g.
monarchies) and personalist autocracies in which the ruler usually comes from a single
family with no real political party or backing in national tradition (e.g. Saddam Hussein in
Iraq). It’s important for a number of reasons but especially because single party autocracies
are more predictable and consistent in their foreign policy behaviour than other types of
autocracies (but less so than democracies, generally).
5. A standard operating procedure is a set of rules or norms about how members of particular
institutions are supposed to behave in a given situation (e.g. how the air force is supposed to
respond to an air attack on national territory). Usually this will be formalized in written
instruction manuals. They’re important for a number of reasons - one of them is that they
help us to predict how particular organizations will react in a set of circumstances. SOPs can
also be important in that they can create accidents and misunderstandings within the
bureaucracy when outsiders (such as policymakers) have a different understanding of
different terms and orders from the agencies carrying them out (e.g. US Navy in the Cuban
missile crisis and their understanding of the term ‘blockade’).
6. A two level game is a situation in which leaders must negotiate with key domestic interest
groups to formulate a national goal which they then negotiate over with international
counterparts (who are also doing the same thing with their own domestic interest groups).
The game is ‘two level’ therefore because negotiations take place at both the domestic and
the international level. This concept is important because, in a negotiating situation, you
need to understand your own domestic constraints and the domestic constraints of the
foreign government you are negotiating with (i.e. what their public will and will not accept).
7. Sanctions paradox comes from Dan Drezner. It refers to the fact that sanctions are most
likely to be imposed in the circumstances in which they are least likely to be effective - ie
where political relations between two states are poor, they are unlikely to trade much with
one another, so that any imposition of sanctions on one by the other will not have a
significant enough economic impact to produce a policy change (e.g. US and Iran, US and
North Korea). It’s important for us to understand this paradox as it suggests that there are
strict limits on the effectiveness of sanctions as an economic policy tool.
8. National self image is a nation’s view of itself - its values and likely course of behaviour. For
instance, Australia’s self image is as a democratic, liberal country which is open to
international trade and outsiders. It helps you to predict how a country will act in a given set
 of circumstances:- nations unlikely to act in such a way as to contradict their national self
image.
9. The Almond Lippmann consensus states that the public don’t care much about foreign policy
and are not well informed about it. According to the consensus, it follows from this that
policymakers don’t have to (either morally or practically) pay much attention to the public
when formulating foreign policy. It’s important for us to understand because in many
instances it’s true - unless there is a very important crisis going on, the public does not much
care about foreign policy and policymakers often ignore the public’s stated preferences (for
instance in opinion polls).
10. An expected utility calculation is an implicit mathematical formula whereby policymakers are
alleged to weigh the benefits of a given course of action by the probability that they will
occur and compare them to the weighted benefits of other courses of action ( for instance
E(Invade Ukraine)= (Benefits of invading Ukraine)*Pr(Invasion of Ukraine succesful) which
Putin would then compare to the expected benefit of not invading Ukraine in order to arrive
at a decision.) It’s important for foreign policy analysis because it helps us to break down an
opponent’s decision making calculus and so anticipate what he or she will do, and it also
points out that opponents don’t just factor in how good it would be if a given policy is
successful, they also factor in how likely the policy is to succeed. An example is military
deterrence - in which one seeks to reduce an enemy’s estimate of the chances that an
invasion will succeed.

Part 2.

Brainstorming….

1. Knowledge about the enemy based only on past behaviour which may be an unreliable guide
to the future
2. Enemy has a strategic incentive to act unpredictably in order to throw you off
3. For some types of states (e.g. personalist autocracies) policy is dependent on the whims of
one leader which can lead to rapid and unpredictable change
4. Ownside bias - you may think that your decisions are rational but the enemy’s are irrational
5. Enemy may have some cultural motivation which is important to them but not to you.

Two ways of doing this essay

 1) A laundry list like the above
2) Or identify a debate which underlies the question and then write your essay in response to
this debate.

In this case, you could say - are we more or less likely to read the enemy wrongly by putting
ourselves in their shoes?

One side to the debate - ‘pro-putting-yourself-in-the-enemy’s-shoes’ side

- It can sensitize you to the fact that the enemy may believe they are in the right
- It can sensitize you to the possibility that the enemy sometimes makes mistakes and has to
make trade-offs amongst their own domestic constituents
- It can sensitize you to their payoffs and probability calculations, helping you to predict what
they’re going to do

Alternative side to the debate - ‘anti-putting-yourself-in-the-enemy’s-shoes’ side

- You may come from a very different culture which has different ends and believes in the use
of different means to achieve them
- You cannot therefore put yourself in the enemy’s shoes because you will inevitably get their
goals wrong and also misjudge the type of actions they are likely to take to achieve their
goals even if you got them right.
- So in some ways, in this view, you might be best just not to try at all!

Now I decide which side of the debate I fall on - in my case I’m ‘pro-putting-myself-in-my-enemy’s-
shoes’.

Now I design the structure of my essay….

INTRODUCTION - BODY - CONCLUSION

INTRO

“Anticipating the enemy’s moves is a key skill in foreign policy analysis because it allows us to
formulate an effective response. Some analysts believe that we can improve our ability to do this by
putting ourselves in the enemy’s shoes. However, others believe that we are often so culturally
different to the enemy that we cannot do this effectively - we are likely to misread the enemy’s
ultimate intentions and the means they use to obtain their ends. These analysts therefore believe
that an attempt to put ourselves in the enemy’s shoes can do more harm than good. In this essay, I
will argue that putting ourselves in the enemy’s shoes is an effective way to anticipate what they will
do. This essay will proceed as follows: first I will outline why some analysts believe that putting
oneself in the enemy’s shoes can be misleading. Then I will respond to their critiques and outline
why this exercise can yield important insights about the enemy’s likely behavior. I will then wrap up
my analysis with a conclusion.”

Anti Side

Can involve basically fleshing out the points brainstormed above…

- You may come from a very different culture which has different ends and believes in the use
of different means to achieve them
- You cannot therefore put yourself in the enemy’s shoes because you will inevitably get their
goals wrong and also misjudge the type of actions they are likely to take to achieve their
goals even if you got them right.
- So in some ways, in this view, you might be best just not to try at all!

Add in historical examples or examples from the readings...Make the best possible case even for the
point of view you don’t agree with…

Pro Side

Push back against the (strongest) arguments of the anti side…

Then make a positive case for the pro side….

- It can sensitize you to the fact that the enemy may believe they are in the right
- It can sensitize you to the possibility that the enemy sometimes makes mistakes and has to
make trade-offs amongst their own domestic constituents
- It can sensitize you to their payoffs and probability calculations, helping you to predict what
they’re going to do

Add in historical examples as much as possible…

CONCLUSION

In summary, to conclude, therefore…

Then in the conclusion simply repeat briefly the points you’ve made above.

‘Say what you said’

MOCK MID-TERM ANSWERS 2

Part A

6. What is the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’?

The hypothetico-deductive method is a scientific method which proposes a hypothesis and
then makes it falsifiable. First, one considers what one would expect if the theory were
correct, and any observable inferences that may be derived from it. Second, one looks at
making the theory falsifiable and considers any evidence that could disprove the theory.
Third, any opposing theories are to be considered. Finally, discriminating tests are conducted
and potential evidence that may be seen with the original or alternate hypothesis is
considered. It is a way to test theories against each other, to find the most likely one. For
example, if there exists a theory that ISIS has nuclear weapons then the process mentioned
would be followed. The observable inferences that ISIS does have nuclear weapons would
be, for example, having bases or warehouses that house them. The theory could be made
falsifiable by claiming that the people who saw the bases mistook them for what they are.
Then, any alternative theories are considered, for example, the base/warehouses are used to
store non-nuclear ammunition. Finally, the two theories are weighed up against each other, all
evidence is considered and the theory which is most consistent with the evidence is taken to
be the most likely truth.

7. In terms of forecasting, what does it mean to take ‘the outside view then the inside
view’?
The ‘outside view-inside view’ is an element of superforecasting which looks at the general
probability of something happening, then changing the probability either up or down by
looking at the specific facts of the case. For example, if one was to forecast whether the US
and China were to go to war, they would first look at the chances of two states going to war
in the first place. Then, they would look at the chances of the US and China in particular
going to war, and any factors which would make them change their probability. This could be
done by looking at their leaders, past interactions, current disputes etc. Once these are
considered, the forecast/probability is tailored to that specific occurrence. In this way,
forecasters can get a baseline of the probability of something happening in general as a
starting point, and then consider individual circumstances.

8. What is the ‘casualty cringe’?

Casualty cringe is the idea that the public in general are unwilling to support policies which
involve casualties from people of their nation. They may support a policy at first, but then
after casualties start building, may turn against it. This is similar to Mueller’s idea of casualty
sensitivity, whereby the public can influence public policy in this way. For example, the
Australian public quickly turned against the Vietnam and Iraq Wars once casualties started
mounting, putting pressure on the government to withdraw and/or change their foreign
policy. However, this is not always the case, research by Miller found that even though
Australian casualties increased during the Afghan War, public support did not due to the
belief that there was a high chance of success by staying. The ‘casualty cringe’ is a general
pattern that the public follows and is a factor in impacting foreign policy.

9. What does Haidt’s Elephant and Rider metaphor mean?

The Elephant and Rider metaphor is the idea of how humans are composed of two distinct
sides. The elephant is our emotional/irrational side and represents our values and deep seated
beliefs that we acquire from our environment and upbringing. The ‘elephant’ may not always
be rational or logical. The ‘rider’ represents our rational/analytical side and our ability to use
logic and reason. However, these reasoning abilities are made to guard, not question our
beliefs. In this sense, trying to reason with even a highly intelligent person that one of their
deep-seated beliefs is wrong is likely to be unsuccessful, they will most likely think up a
complex way to justify their belief is right. The elephant is bigger than the rider, so this
means that even though reason may guide our moral values, they can also overpower it. This
metaphor highlights just how big a role our deeply rooted views play in the way we make
decisions and interact with others.
10. What is a ‘frame of reference’?
A frame of reference is a way in which policymakers use similarities from their own
country’s history first and find other ways to think about things harder. This in turn may
influence how they interpret and predict states’ actions and how to best react to them. For
example, the US will most likely analogize current wars with either the Vietnam War or
Revolutionary War, meaning that they make decisions based on what was historically done in
those wars. Contrarily, a state like Iraq would not analogize current wars with those, and
instead draw on wars from their own history.
Part B
To what extent do you believe that psychological concepts can help us to understand
foreign policy decision making?
Psychological concepts are an important way to understand the way humans make decisions
and for the purposes of this essay they will be defined as heuristics or fallacies which humans
may suffer from in decision making. This essay will argue that these concepts do help us to
understand foreign policy decision making to a large extent. The inherent irrationality of
humans, and a variety of heuristics and examples will be used to support the argument.
Although type of government and economic sectors within a state can also influence foreign
policy decision making and potentially undermine psychological concepts, it will be shown
that they arguably do not have as great an effect as psychological concepts on foreign policy
decision making.
A debate exists in foreign policy and that is whether states/state leaders are rational or
irrational actors. The idea of a state being a ‘rational actor’ means that they will always make
decisions based on maximizing their utility and do so in a logical way. However, this can
arguably be refuted by psychological concepts such as the sunk costs fallacy, small sample
bias, and availability heuristic. This can then help us to understand the irrationality
underpinning foreign policy decision making and understand why they made those decisions.
The availability heuristic is the idea that a person will continually overestimate the chances of
something happening if they can personally remember it from happening. However, just
because one can recall an event happening, does not increase the chances of it occurring. For
example, after 9/11, many foreign policy makers in the US believed that the threat of a
terrorist attack was quite high, even though it wasn’t. As such, they implemented strict
security policies, and waged a ‘war on terrorism’ in the belief that if they didn’t, then terrorist
attacks would likely occur. Even though the chance of a terrorist attack was not as high as
they believed, because they could easily recall 9/11, they thought it was. In this way it can be
shown how this psychological concept can help to understand foreign policy decision
making.
The sunk costs fallacy is the psychological concept that a person is likely to preference a
decision which they have already spent money or incurred some costs from more than the
alternative. This is due to the fact that humans should feel like they should go along with
something that they have already sustained costs from. For example, the reason why the US
did not withdraw from Iraq was arguably because foreign policy decision makers knew that
they had spent a lot of time and money on it, so preferenced the idea of staying. In this way, it
can again be seen that a psychological concept can help to understand foreign policy decision
making.
Furthermore, confirmation bias is another psychological which can help us understand
foreign policy. This bias reflects the habit of seeking evidence that supports a theory, and not
evidence that goes against it. Instead, one should be looking for alternate evidence against the
theory so as to test the validity and chances of it being true. For example, foreign policy
makers did not look at the evidence that bin Laden wasn’t in the compound and instead relied
more on the evidence that he was there. If they had, they would likely have realized that the
chances of him not being there were higher than they thought and potentially changed their
foreign policy. This again shows how psychological concepts help us to understand decision
making.
There are many more psychological concepts which affect foreign policy decision makers
such as small sample bias, sacred values protection and probability neglect and are just as
important in supporting this argument. However, this essay will now go on to address
counterarguments that may be proposed.
The first counterargument is that the type of government of a particular state influences
foreign policy decision making arguably more than psychological concepts. For example,
whether a state is a democracy or autocracy can greatly vary the foreign policies that they
pursue. Democracies are less likely to go to war with other democracies (Democratic Peace
Theory), and autocracies can be quite fickle in their foreign policies if they are under a
personalist regime. Although these assertions may be true, Rosenthau’s research suggests
otherwise. He tried to put different states into different categories based on their
economy/government type and try to find a pattern with their foreign policies. However, he
found limited trends within each category. Although his use of categories has been criticized,
this nevertheless points to the idea that categorizing states and finding a trend in foreign
policy making can be quite limiting. This therefore arguably supports the idea that other
things, such as psychological concepts, are better at helping us understand foreign policy
decision making.
Another counterargument is that economic sectors influence foreign policy the most and
arguably help us to understand foreign policy more than psychological concepts. The idea is
that large economic industries can put pressure on the government to adopt certain policies
(e.g. protectionism etc.). Because these economic industries affect a large section of the
population, foreign policy decision makers are theoretically inclined to follow what these
industries lobby for. However, there is an issue with this argument in that oftentimes different
economic sectors clash and oftentimes don’t get what they lobby for. This means that foreign
policy makers do not actually always make decisions which follow the interests of such
economic sectors. This arguably shows how economic sectors are not an entirely useful way
to help us understand foreign policy decision making.
To conclude, there is a lot of evidence and real life examples which points to the fact that
foreign policy makers are largely irrational and commit fallacies and suffer from heuristics.
In this way, the decisions they make reflect such irrationality and can therefore help us
understand why they do so. Although other factors such as the type of government and
economic sectors in a nation could be argued to better help us understand such decision
making, they arguably have their own flaws. As such, psychological concepts are to a large
extent arguably the best way to help us understand foreign policy decision making.