Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives

(catuṣkoṭi) in Buddhist Logic

Author(s): V. K. Bharadwaja
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 303-319
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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V.K. Bharadwaja Rationality,
argumentationandembarrassment:
offourlogicalalternatives
A study inBuddhist
(catuskoti) logic

In thispaperI shallconsider severalinterconnected issuescentering aroundthe

fourlogicalalternatives
(catuskoti) in Buddhist logicwhich, itseemstome,involve
of
questions rationality, and
argumentation, philosophical embarrassment. It
is mycontention thatphilosophers whohaveworkedin thisareaofBuddhist
logicduringthepastfifty yearsor so havenotfacedtheseissuessquarely.In
theirwork,theyshoweitheran obsessionwithlogic,'or a tiltin favorofthe
Inexpressible,2orhavefelta certain levelofphilosophical embarrassment3 while
discussing them.Letmestatetheseissues:
One: In theearlyPali Buddhist literaturewe find(a) notonlyexpressions
"Thereisa nextworld"and"Thereisnonextworld"butalsotheforms "Thereis
andisnota nextworld"and"Thereneither isnorisnota nextworld"4, and(b)
"The worldis finite," "The worldis infinite," "The worldis bothfinite and
and"Theworldisneither
infinite," finitenorinfinite".5 Therearetwofeatures of
theseexamples (a) and (b): (1) Regarding them as a subject/predicate of
form
statement, whatisinquestion in(a) istheexistence ofthenextworld(thesubject
term) ineachoneofthesefourexpressions; whilein(b) theexistence oftheworld,
thesubject term,isnotinquestion; whatisinquestion iswhether ornottheworld
is finite.
(2) In both(a) and (b), fourlogicalpossibilities havebeentakeninto
account:affirmation, negation, both affirmation and negation,and neither
affirmation nornegation. Thesefourpossibilities havebeenhistorically called
catuskoti,andphilosophers havetakenuponthemselves thetaskofexplaining
them,thequestionbeingas to howit is thatBuddha,theEnlightened One,
rejectedeach one of them.6Nagarjunaexploitsthisrejection as a formof
argumentation againsthiscritics andopponents.7 Thereis a vasthistorical gap
between thedateoftheBuddhaandthedateofNagarjuna;yetwhenonereads
Nagarjuna's worksoneissurprised bythesimilarity between hisworkandthatof
theBuddha-in theformulation of thefouralternatives and theirsystematic
rejection.8
Two: Nagarjunais saidto haveheldno thesisor philosophic positionofhis
ownon thegrounds thatherejects eachoneofthethefourpossiblealternatives
and thathe himself saysthat"he has no thesisof hisownor no positionto
defend." 9 Thequestion, however, isthatifhehasnothesisofhisowntodefend,
thenwhatis hedoing?Is heengagedinvitoa,0 a formofdebateinwhichoneis
concerned only with refuting opponent'sthesisbutnotwithestablishing
the
one'sown?An affirmative answerto thisquestionis "an embarrassment to the
11
philosophers,"however "usefulandeffective a philosophic method" 12 it
may
proveto be.
Three:TheabovetwobecomeissuesonlywhenwethinkthatbothBuddha,

V. K. Bharadwaja
isa member
oftheDepartment
ofPhilosophy ofDelhi.
at theUniversity
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am deeplyindebtedto Professors
S. S. Barlingay,R. C. Pandeya,and Mahesh
Tiwari,and to Kanchanafor theirkind commentsand criticismof an earlierdraftof thispaper.
However,I alone am responsible
foranymistakesin it.
East and West34, no. 3 (July1984). ? by theUniversity
Philosophy of Hawaii Press.All rightsreserved.

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304 Bharadwaja

theEnlightenedOne,andNagarjuna, theMadhyamaka werecon-

philosopher,
cernedwiththeInexpressible.
"'Allthingsarevoid'is nota proposition.
Itonly
the
expresses Inexpressible withthehelp of theconventional truth.
The real
languageherewouldbe silence." Or,as Ramchandra
13
Pandeyaputsit:Since
noneofthefouralternatives
havebeenasserted,
thequestion oftheir
denialdoes
notarisesuchthat"ifthere
beanyreality,
itcannotbeexpressed intermsoffour
kotis." 14
I willdiscusstheseissuesonebyone.Myplanisas follows: First,I willpickup
one or twomajorpositions on eachone of theseissuesand examinethemin
detail.Mystrategy istotakeintoaccountthecontext inwhichtheseissuesmake
theirmaidenappearance; to drawimportant distinctions,liketheonebetween
differenttypesofquestions; to indicatetherolewhichtheBuddhists assignto
denyingeach one of the fourpossiblealternatives in orderto rejectthe
opponent's position;and finally to outlinetheconceptualframework within
whichboththeBuddhaand Nagarjunaare operating. In thecourseof my
argument I suggest thatbothargumentation andembarrassment presuppose a
certainanalysis oftheconceptofrationality whichtomymindis toonarrow to
go withthesenseinwhichwesaythat'manis a rational animal'.
In theearlyPali Buddhistic fourtypesof questionshavebeen
literature,1s
differentiated.
(1) Therearequestions whichoughttobeexplained categorically.
Forexample, tothequestion "Is form impermanent?" theansweris "Yes,itis."
To thequestion "Is theworldfullofsuffering?" theansweris "Yes,itis."To the
question "Does everyone die?" the answer is "Yes, everyone dies."Theseare
questions whichare clearin respectofbothsyntaxand semantics and which
therefore are answeredcategorically. The Buddhists call thempanhaekam-
savydkaranlya. 6 (2) Thenthereare questionswhich oughttobeanswered witha
counter For the
question. example, question "Is consciousness a soul
person's or
isconsciousness onething andthesoulanother?" isresponded towitha counter
question"Whatdo youtaketo be thesoul?"The Buddhists call thempanha
17(3)A thirdtypeof questionis thosethatshouldbe set
patipucchavydkaraniya.
aside.Forexample, thequestion"WilltheTathagata liveafterhisdeathornot?"
isa question
whichistobesetaside.Suchquestions arecalledpanhathapanryo. 8
(4) Thefourthtypeofquestion isthosewhichoughttobeexplained analytically
and thenanswered.For example,to the question"Are all humanbeings
reborn?" theansweris "Someare and somearen't."Questionsliketheseare
calledpanhavibhajjavydkaraniya.'9 In thecase of thefourth type,adequate
andanalysisarerequired
clarification,
specification, beforethesequestionsare
answered Formypurposes,
correctly. twotypesofquestionareimportant: the
firsttypeof questionto whicha categorical answeris possible,and also is
generally
given;andthethird typeofquestion,thosequestionswhicharetobeset
the
aside-thatis, ekamsaandthethapaniya The
questions. remaining twotypesof
questionrequireclarification
andanalysis buttheyarebothaskableandanswer-
ableaffirmatively
ornegativelyas thecasemaybe.Thequestions ofevidence-

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305

whether thatevidenceis analyticor empirical or whether it is of someother

admissible kindofevidence-aredefinitely relevant to thetruth and falsityof
theiranswers.
Considerfirst thethapaniya kindof question.A thapaniya questionis one
whichistobesetaside.Jayatilleke seesinthistype"a modern parallelinthekind
of questionswhichthePositivist dismisses as meaningless and therefore un-
answerable." 20The question, however, is: "Whatis thecriterion byapplying
whicha certain question is saidtobe setaside?OneanswerwhichBuddhaghosa
gives is that a thapaniya questionis "a question whichoughtnottobeexplained
andwhichoughtto be setasideon thegroundthatitwasnotexplained bythe
Exaltedone."21Butas Jayatilleke observes: "Thisis notveryhelpful, forhe is
virtually saying thatthesequestions oughttobe setasidebecausetheyhavebeen
setasidebytheBuddha."22Buddhaghosa's position thusamounts toaccepting
theauthority oftheBuddha,anauthority whicheventheBuddhahimself didnot
regard as unchallengeable, andthisisphilosophically veryembarrassing. Wedo
needa criterion totella thapaniya froma thapaniya question.
Broadly, therearetwodifferent criteriaforidentifying a thapaniya question:
(1) thepragmatic criterion and(2) thelogicalcriterion. As regards thepragmatic
criterion Jayatilleke observes: "Thesequestions were'tobesetaside'(thapaniya)
onpragmatic grounds since belief in any of the possibleanswers wasconsidered
irrelevant and otioseforour purpose."23Here theparableof thearrowis
relevant. Theparableisdesigned tobring hometheideathatwhatisimportant is
giving urgent medicalattention totheonewhoisshotwiththearrow.Questions
suchas "Whoshotthearrow?" arelefttobeanswered later,whenaninquiry into
theincident is conducted. In thecontext of inquiry, thesequestionsare both
askableand answerable; butinthecontext ofgivingurgent medicalaid to the
victim, theyareirrelevant.
Thesecondisthelogicalcriterion. A thapantya question iseither (a) misleading
inform, the of
violating logic meaningful syntax and thus rendered meaningless,
or(b) itisconceptually impossible foruswithin a givenconceptual framework to
assigntruth values,trueorfalse,toanyanswergiventoit.Take,forinstance, the
question whether theTathdgata willexistafter death.Ananswertoitisclassified
as oneoftheavydkata theses24 (which we shall discusspresently). Froma logical
of it
point view, shouldbe possible say to that any one of the four is
alternatives
true.Thepossiblealternatives are(1) 'Yes, itis thecase',(2) 'No, itis notthe
case',(3) 'Itisboththecaseandnotthecase',and(4) 'Itisneither thecasenornot
thecase'.But,ontheBuddhist view, none of the four alternatives "fitsthecase"
To
(upeti). say that the Tathagata existsafter death does not fitthe case;thathe
doesnotexistafterdeathdoesnotfitthecase;thatheexistsanddoesnotexist
afterdeathdoesnotfitthecase;thathe neither existsnordoesnotexistafter
deathdoes notfitthecase.25Wheneach of thefourpossiblealternatives is
rejected, then within the context in which the is
question asked, one obvious
conclusion is thatitis notpossibletoanswerthequestion"Does theTathagata

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306 Bharadwaja

existafter death?"Thispossibility isnotempirical; andoneisledtosurmise that

it involveslogicaland conceptualconfusions-for instance, a
having good
syntaxgrammatically but semantically havinga resultthatis a meaningless
sentence like"TheTaj Mahalis kindto peoplewhovisitit" or an unaskable
questionlike"Is thefatherthefemaleparent?"The question,forexample,
"Wheredoestheflameofa candlego to whenitis blownout?"26is onewhich
doesnotadmita meaningful answerbecauseitis basedon a conceptual confu-
sionoftwodistinct logicalconcepts. (It isinteresting toobserve thatintheearly
PaliBuddhistic textsan exactly similar exampleis given.Compare"Thisfirein
frontof you,whichhas goneout,in whichdirection has it gone?")27The
question thrives onthemistaken syntactical similaritywithanother questionlike
"Wheredo I go whenI fallsick?"Thesecondquestionis perfectly meaningful
whilethefirst isincomprehensible. Thesecondadmitsofa perfectly meaningful
answerwhilethefirst doesnot.
Thereis anothertypeofquestionwhichis regarded as "inappropriate" (na
kalla)and28which, likethethapanlya questions, isalsosetasideonthegrounds
thatitis "literallymeaningless." 29Forexample, "Whatisdecayanddeathand
of whomis thisdecayand death?"30is an inappropriate question;it is a
misleading questionto ask "Whofeedson thefoodof consciousness?" Both
areexamples ofinappropriate, improper questions (na kallapanha).31
I saidearlier thatquestions ofthefirst type, namely, thequestions whichought
tobeexplained categorically, raise a specialproblem about the logicalstatusof
theiranswers. To a question ofthistypelike"Is theworldfullofsuffering?" the
categorical answeris "Yes, theworldis fullof suffering." Whatis thelogical
statusof thisanswer? Regardedas an empirical statement or an unrestricted
empirical it is
generalization patently false. But for Buddha,theEnlightened
One, itis truewithabsolutecertainty. Andweshallseelaterthathisanswerto
thisquestionis oneofthefundamental constituents or presuppositions ofthe
Buddhist conceptual framework. As such,itmaybe said,itiseither analytically
trueorthequestion ofitstruth orfalsity within thatframework simply doesnot
arise.Theonlyquestion onecanaskaboutitis "Whyafterallshouldweaccept
thisstatement thattheworldis fullofsuffering as true?"Andthereis all the
difference intheworldbetween saying (1) thata statement S istrueandsaying (2)
thatS isacceptedtobetrue.(1) maybe a goodreasonfor(2),butitneednotbe;
andfrom(2), (1) neednotfollow.Besides,thereasonsfor(1) neednotbe the
reasonsfor(2) and conversely also.32The question"Whyafterall shouldwe
acceptthattheworldis fullof suffering?" is external to Buddha'sconceptual
framework; anditis decidableon grounds ofpragmatic considerations only.33
Suchconsiderations may not be regarded as rational in the narrow senseofthe
word"rational," thesenseinwhichgiving reasonsforthetruth ofa statement is
being rational. But,all thesame,theyarenotirrational, for
either, theyconcern
andtakeintoaccountthereasonsforaccepting thestatement to be true.They

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307

involve a necessary referencetoouraims,motives, andpurposes, toourvalues,

commitments, and concerns, and evento our aestheticconsiderations, like
simplicityandelegance.In Carnap'sterminology34 suchquestions areexternal
and notinternal to theBuddhist conceptual framework. However,I disagree
withCarnapon thepointthatonlybecauseexternal questionscannotbe an-
swered within thegivenlinguistic framework, theiranswers mustbeanalytically
truewithrespect to theframework. To mymind,theyneednotbe,andinfact
theyarenotanalytically true.Thestatement thattheworldis fullofsuffering is
notanalytically true; ratherit our
expresses commitments,35 and whether these
commitments aremoral,intellectual, orphilosophical willdependuponthetype
ofconceptual framework within whichweoperate.
Thereis a distinction between vydkata and avydkata questions. In theearly
PaliBuddhist literature wecomeacrossfourquestions whichhavebeencharac-
terizedas avydkata."Vydkata"means"analysed,explained, clear,compre-
hensible."36 Thusa vydkata questionis well-analyzed, explained, clear,and
comprehensible such thata meaningful answer to it can be given within the
conceptual framework in which it occurs. The question is both askable and
answerable within thatframework. It is nota thapaniya question, a question
whichis to be setaside.Giventhetypesofquestions wehaveenumerated and
differentiated, all questions otherthantheimproper ones(na kallapaiha) and
thosethataretobe setaside(thananiya panha)fallwithin therangeofvydkata
questions. Thequestions whicharetobe setasideneedtobe differentiated from
thosethatareimproper ormisleading. Animproper question (nakallapanha)is
tobesetasideonthegrounds thatitis"literally meaningless." 37 I shallcallthem
unaskable The
questions. question 'What is decay and death and ofwhomisthe
38
decayand death?' and thequestion'Who feedson thefoodof conscious-
ness?'39 areimproper andmisleading questions. Theyarequestions "whichare
suggested the
by grammar of the language but which or
give implya falseor
distorted picture of the nature of reality.40 This feature ofna kallaquestions
showsthattheyform a proper subsetofthapaniya questions. Butthenwhatisthe
differentiaofna kallaquestions?
Bothtypesofquestions are thosewhichare to be setaside.Bothtypesare
grammatically well-formed also.Thetwomaybe differentiated on thegrounds
thatwhilea na kalla questionis eitherimproper or misleading, a thapanmya
question is setaside(a) on thestrength ofpragmatic considerations formulated
onthelinesoftheparableofthearrow,or(b) onlogicalgrounds withrespect to
(i) thatany answer to them fails to fitthe case and
(upeti) (ii) that any answer to
them resultsinanavydkata thesis.Besides, the kind of response which they evoke
woulddifferentiate a na kallafroma thapanlya question. In thecaseofnakalla
questions, "all fourofthelogicalalternatives maybe false,"41 buttheseques-
tionsare not to be treatedas thapanmya sincetheyhave beencategorically
answered. TheNikayasdistinguish between thetwotypesbyusingtheformula

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308 Bharadwaja

'mah'evam'(do not[say]so) forallthefouralternatives

ofa thapanlya question,
whileinthecaseofnakallaquestions, "theusualnegation 'noh'idam'(itis not
so) isusedforeachofthefouralternatives." 42
We havesaidabovethatanyanswerto a thapaniya questionresultsin an
avydkata a thesiswhichis unanalyzed,
thesis, unexplained,is notclear,and is
incomprehensible.Such a thesis
broadlyis oftwo first,
types: thatwhichaffirms
ordeniestheexistenceofthenominatum34 ofthesubjectterm, andsecond,that
which, whilepresupposing theexistenceofthenominatum ofthesubjectterm,
affirmsordeniesa certainpredicateofit.44An example45ofthefirst typeis:
(A) (1) Thereis a nextworld
(2) Thereis no nextworld
(3) Thereisandis nota nextworld
(4) Thereneitheris noris nota nextworld
In (A) itis theexistence
ofthenextworldwhichis affirmedin(1),deniedin(2),
bothaffirmed and deniedin (3), and neither nordeniedin (4). An
affirmed
example46 ofthesecondtypeis:
(B) (1) Thisworldis finite
(2) Thisworldis infinite
(3) Thisworldis bothfiniteandinfinite
(4) Thisworldis neitherfinite
norinfinite
Thereareotherexamples ofavydkata butthedifference
theses; between themas
in(C) belowisintermsofthesubject chosenina givencontext;
andthepredicate
or,as in(E) below,thedifference
is intermsofthecontraryor contradictory
predicatesaffirmed
or deniedofthe An of
subject. example47 (C) is as follows:
(C) (1) Thesoulis identical
withthebody
(2) Thesoulis different
fromthebody
(3) Thesoulis bothidentical
withanddifferent
fromthebody
(4) Thesoulis neither withnordifferent
identical fromthebody.
Herein (C), if(1) through(4) are regarded formsofthe
as subject-predicate
statement,thenthedifferencebetween (B) and(C) isintheparticular and
subject
predicatechosen in a givencontext.From the of
logicalpoint view,formally
thereis no difference
between (B) and(C).
(D) (1) TheTathagataexistsafterdeath
(2) TheTathagatadoesnotexistafterdeath
(3) TheTathagataboth.existsanddoesnotexistafterdeath
(4) TheTathagataneitherexistsnordoesnotexistafterdeath.48
In(D) as in(A) theexistence
ofthenominatum in
ofthesubjecttermisaffirmed
(1),deniedin(2),bothaffirmedand in
denied (3),andneither
affirmednordenied
in(4). Anexampleof(E) is as follows:
(E) (1) Thesoulis happy
(2) Thesoulis unhappy

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309

(3) Thesoulis bothhappyandunhappy

(4) Thesoulis neither
happynorunhappy
Herein(E) thepredicates ordeniedofthesubjectin(1) through
affirmed (4) are
contraryand not contradictory.49
An examplein whichthepredicates are
neither nor
contrary contradictory50is as follows:
(F) (1) Thegoalcanbe attainedbyknowledge
(2) Thegoalcan be attained
byconduct
(3) Thegoalcanbe attainedbybothknowledge
and conduct
(4) Thegoalcanbe attainedbyneither norconduct.
knowledge

Anyexampleinwhichthepredicates arecontradictory is thesameas (B) or(C)

above.Inmydiscussion, I willrestrict
myself totheforms (A) and(B) only.From
thelogicalpointofview,itisthe(A) and(B) forms whichareinteresting andnot
theothers-atleastso itseemtome.Thetheses(1) through (4) inboth (A) and
are
(B) avydkata theses.
The questionsto which they are answers arethapaniya to
be setaside.In both(A) and (B) each one of thefourlogicalalternatives is
Thisformofrejection,
rejected. at thehandsofNagarjuna,51 developed into"a
veryusefuland effective philosophic method" 52 calledtheprasarmga formof
that the
argumentation,53 is, argument by reductio ad absurdum.54
Whatareweto makeoftherejection ofeachoneofthefourlogicalalterna-
tives?Thegroundcitedfortherejection is thatnoneofthealternatives fitsthe
case(upeti).As farbackas 1917Poussin55 treated thefourlogicalalternatives
as "a fourbranched
(catuskoti), dilemma"ofBuddhist dialectic.56 He believes
thatitviolatesthelawofcontradiction. He writes: "Indiansdo notmakea clear
distinctionbetween factsand ideas,between ideasand words;theyhavenever
clearlyrecognized theprinciple ofcontradiction. Buddhist dialectichas a four
branched dilemma: Nirvanaisexistence, ornon-existence, orbothexistence and
non-existence,orneitherexistence nornon-existence. Wearehelpless." 57I wish
thatPoussinhadrealizedthattheoldAristotelian threelawsofthought arethe
markofhumanrationality (andon Leibniz'reckoning,58 evenGod couldnot
violatethem-inparticular thelaw of contradiction), and it does notmatter
whether a humanbeingis white, black,brown, yellow, orred.Forthisreason,if
fornoother, I donotagreewithPoussinthatIndians, iftheyarerational enough,
haveviolatedthelawofcontradiction inrejecting eachoneofthefourlogical
alternatives.
Anyway, Poussinwaspuzzledaboutthestructure ofcatuskoti, and
hefoundhimself tounderstand
helpless it.But he need not have so
despaired very
muchaboutit.
Mrs.RhysDavids59callstherejection ofthefourlogicalalternatives "Lawsof
Thought." She writes:
"The import of a number of terms is setout, usuallyin
dichotomic divisionbutsometimes inthedistinctively Indianmethod ofpresent-
ingtheby-usso calledLawsofThought thus,Is A B & Ifnot,isA notB? Ifnot,is
A bothB and notB? If not,is A neither B nornotB (in otherwordsis A a
chimera)?" 60Sheregarded therejection ofthesecondandthethird alternatives

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310 Bharadwaja

as an assertion, ofthelawofcontradiction
respectively, andthelawofexcluded
middle.61 Mr. B. M. BaruaagreeswithMrs.RhysDavidsbutmakesthebold
statement ofcalling
allfourlogicalalternatives
thefourlawsofthought.
He says:
"Theseareintheirapplication topropositions:
1. (IfA is B), A is B
2. A cannotbe bothB andnotB
3. A is either
B ornotB
4. A is neitherB nornot B" 62

Itneedslittleargument topointoutMr.Barua'slogicalfolly. Onetendstoagree

withJayatilleke thatthecontentions ofbothMrs.RhysDavidsandMr.Barua,
thatthefourlogicalalternatives are laws of thought, are equallyfantastic.
Buddha,theEnlightened One,wasnotinterested inasserting logicaltruths or
inconsistent statements inrejecting any one or all of the four alternatives.Mr.
Barua'sconstrual oftherejection ofthefourth alternative as an assertionofthe
law of doublenegationis beyondcomprehension, as it does violenceto the
commonsenseandlogicthatwehavelearntfromthecradle.63
P. T. Raju'sinterpretation64 oftherejection ofthecatuskoti alternativesreduces
tothis:Eachoneofthefourlogicalalternatives isaboutthesunya(void),which
inmathematics means'zero'.He writes "Zeroisthequantity ofwhichallthefour
alternativesaredenied:itisneither positive, negative." To mymind,thisis
nor 65
an assertion whichis theleastilluminating; anditturnsouttobe identical with
whatwastobe analyzed, explained,andmadeclear,theanalysandum. Besides,
Raju makesmistakes likeconflating theBuddhistnotionof avydkata("un-
analyzed, unexplained, unclear, andincomprehensible") withtheJainanotionof
avaktavya66 ("indescribable"), on the one hand, and with theSamkaraVedantic
notionofanirvacanlya ("indefinable"), on theother,a readingwhich,to my
mind,is unwarranted and misplaced. RichardChi67seeksto analyzethefour
logicalalternatives interms ofthefirst-order functional calculus.He utilizes the
truth functional logic also when and where this adds to clarification.This is an
admirably effective approach.He opinesthatifone keepsapartthedifferent
levelsof truth and thedifferent pointsof view,theso-calledpuzzleaboutthe
rejectionofthefourlogicalalternatives doesnotarise.68 Suppose,however, that
allfouralternatives aredeniedoneandthesamesubject atthesameleveloftruth
andfrom thesamepointofview;thenthepuzzledoesarise.69 Howisitpossible
tonegateall fourlogicalalternatives simultaneously? Thisproblem, ofcourse,
explains dela ValleePoussin'shelplessness; butatthesametimeitcriesoutfora
satisfactory solution.Chi's observation thatBuddha,the Enlightened One,
tackledthefourlogicalalternatives by "not a rejectionby negation a but
rejectionby silence" is noteworthy.70 Yet,logically, catuskoti remains a puzzle;
and theremustbe somewayto solveit.Chi mentions one tacksuggested by
Jayatilleke71-to construct a solutionutilizing thenotionsdevelopedin the
many-valued logicsofLukasiewiez andLobochevsky-but Chihimself doesnot

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311

offera solutionto thepuzzle on theselines.Instead,utilizingL. E. J. Brouwer

and A. Heyting'sIntuitionistic
negationoperator,he formulates thefourlogical
alternatives
as

(1) p (2) -p (3) p A p (4) npA 7 -p.

And therehe stops.72Chi's own solutionhas quitean affinity withJayatilleke's

solutionoftheproblemofcatuskoti. The coreofJayatilleke's
thesisis thatwe treat
not-P(in thefouralternatives) as thecontrary and notthecontradictory ofP. He
writes:"We maintainthattheproposition,natthiparoloko,shouldaccordingto
itscontextbe treatedas thecontrary and notthecontradictory ofatthiparoloko
despitelinguistic form." 73 Chi exploitsthenotion of contrarynegationas found
in theIntuitionistic logic and reformulates thefourlogical alternativesso that
theycould be deniedsimultaneously.74 In a way,Chi's solutionis a reformu-
lationofJayatilleke's inthestrictly formallogicalterminology oftheIntuitionist
logicians.75 The value of thissort of solution has implicationsforthe meth-
odology to be in
employed the studyof Buddhistlogic. This, however,is an
independent topicwhichI do not proposeto investigate in thispaper.
Let us call theoperator"' " Boolean negationoperationand theoperator
"'" de Morgan negation.Unlikede Morgan negation,Boolean negationhas
properties such that
A & -A entailsB,
and that
7A & (A v B) entailsB.76

The idea of Boolean negationoriginatedin thesemanticalcontextsof relevant

logics; but it can be discussedin the contextof a four-valuedsemantics.The
motivationforBelnapwas to "devisean effective logicforcomputors(mechani-
cal question-answering systems)to use whenthereis a realriskthatthedata-base
fromwhichanswersto questionsare to be inferred maybe inconsistent." 77The
fourvaluesused are:

T(rue) F(alse) B(oth) N(one)

'T' represents thecase inwhichthepersonhas beentoldabout a certainsentence
S thatitis truebuthas notbeentoldthatitis false;'F' whenhe has beentoldthat
S is falsebut not told that it is true;'N' when the personhas not been told
anything; and 'B' whenthepersonhas beentoldboththatS is trueand also that
S is false."78 On thisinterpretation of 'T', F', 'N', and 'B', usingtheMorgan
negationoperation
(1) -T=F (2) -F=T (3) -B-B (4) -N=N
we can use, on thesaid fourvalues,Boolean negationoperationand get:

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312 Bharadwaja

(1) ~T=F (2) -1F=T

(1) and (2) behavethesame wayas in thecase of theoperation ~ ofde Morgan
negation;but (3) 1B = N, and (4) -N = B. Here (3) 1B = N will mean
something likethis:"If a sentenceA is markedas bothtrueand false,then- A
cannotbe markedas true,sinceinorderforthisto be thecase itwouldhaveto be
thatA is notmarkedas true(butitis). And similarly A cannotbe markedas false
sincethenA wouldhaveto be notmarkedas false(butitis). So A mustbe marked
'
as None."79Similarly, can be givenfor N = B. Belnapand Dunn
justification
remark:"In a nutshell, thedifferencebetween- and 1 wouldseemtobe that-
is a kindof 'internal'negation,whereas- is a kindof 'external'negation.- A
mightbe readas 'A is false',whereas" A shouldbe readas 'itis notthecase that
A is true'."80Butthenhow are we to understand"not" in a givencontext?For,
wehavemadeintelligible Boolean negation( 1) in termsofde Morgannegation
(-). Given this situation,ordinarilythe distinctionbetween ~ and -
collapses-so muchso that 1 is understoodin termsof - only-and "so we
have onlyone kindof negationafterall." 81If thisis so, theneventheBoolean
negation 1 cannotbe employedwithadvantageoverotheralternative interpre-
tationsgivenin termsofde Morgannegationto solvethecenturiesold puzzle of
catuskoti.
We mustseeksomeothertackin orderto solvethepuzzle,or look at it once
again in orderto be surewhatitreallyis. To do thisI willtakeintoaccountthe
contextin whichthe fourlogical alternativesare rejected,and the purposes
whichare achievedbyrejectingthem.The considerations whichled thiskindof
rejectionto transform itselfintotheprasamgaformofargument82 willnotbe out
ofplace here.In thisconnection,to repeat,considerthe(A) and (B) typesof the
avydkatatheses:
(A) (1) Thereis a nextworld
(2) Thereis no nextworld
(3) Therebothis and is not a nextworld
(4) Thereneitheris noris nota nextworld
and

(B) (1) This worldis finite

(2) This worldis infinite
(3) This worldis bothfiniteand infinite
(4) This worldis neitherfinitenorinfinite.
The alternatives (1) through(4) in both (A) and (B) are answersto thapanlya
questions;and theanswersareavydkatatheses.The questionsare thapaniya, since
in each one of themat thesame timea na kalla questionis involved.Further,
thesealternatives are not negatedor deniedbut theyare rejected.The alterna-
tivesarerejectedbymd'hevam(do not[say]so),and notbynoh' idam(itis notso).
The avydkatathesesare to be setaside,so therulesays(Avydkatdni thapitdni).83
writes:"Whenthefouralternatives
Jayatilleke happenedtobe thoseofa thapaniya

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313

panhaora meaningless questionall fouralternatives wererejectedrather than

negatedbecause the questionineach ofthealternativeswas notconsideredto be
a properquestion(kallapanha)."84Jayatilleke showsremarkable insightwhen
hesaysthat"RajuandBahmhavetherefore misdescribed85 their
natureas faras
thePali Canonicalpositionis concerned bycallingthisdoctrine thatof 'four
cornered negation' when it oughtproperly to be called'four cornered rejec-
tion'."86I failto understand whyJayatilleke did notfollowthisimportant
insightbutremained obsessedwithtreating theavydkata thesesfroma logical
pointofview If
exclusively. we look atthem carefullywe findthatbycharacteriz-
ing them avydkata(unanalyzed, unexplained, unclear,incomprehensible) we
ourselves
legislate outfrombeingina position tosaywhether ornoteachoneof
themistrueorfalse.Theirappraisalinterms oftruth ispossibleonlyif
andfalsity
wehavecriteria fortheirfactualevaluation.Butwherearethecriteria? We find
themnowhere. The alternative forus is to rejectthemand set themaside
(thapaniya).
In a moralcontext "avyakata"means"neither goodnorbad." In thissense
"avydkata" isusedto denote what is "neutral" inmoral contexts where"whatis
indeterminate" (avydkata) are actswhich are neither good nor evil.87
Jayatilleke
suggests thatifwe extendthisapplication ofavydkata to anyone ofthefour
logicalalternativesin(A) and(B), wewouldliketo saythattheavydkata theses
arelogically indeterminate inthesenseofbeingneither truenorfalse.Thereare
no criteriafortheirfactualappraisal.Norperhapscan therebe any;fortheir
logicalstatusis indeterminate. Giventhissituation we cannotdenyor negate
themsincewecoulddo thisonlybypresupposing a certainsetofcriteria fortheir
factualevaluation. In theabsenceof somemethodological conceptual frame-
workwithin whichalonetheir factualrelevance andappraisalispossible, wecan
onlyrejectthem, setthemaside.
We do notrejecta theory in a vacuum,88 notleastan avydkata thesis.For
an
rejecting avydkata thesis,we need a framework of criteria.
Fortunately, inthis
casewehaveoneintheconceptual framework oftheFourNobleTruths. Thisis
shownbytheparableofthearrow.Differentiating avydkata from vydkata theses,
Buddha,theEnlightened One,remarks: Theavydkata questions arenotanswered
(theyarethapaniya) andtheavydkata thesesarerejected (theytooarethapanlya)
becausetheyare "notuseful,notrelatedto thefundamentals ofreligion, not
conducive torevulsion, dispassion,cessation, peace,higher knowledge, realiza-
tion,andNirvana."89Giventhis,I shallcallitthepragmatic criterial
framework
inwhichtheavydkata questions and theavydkata thesesarerejected, setaside
(thapanya),notnegated ordenied.Logicisnotrelevant here.For,wherethereis
neitheraffirmation nornegation norinclusion or exclusion ofboth,whatrole
doeslogichavetoplay?Bothlogicandtheobsession withlogic,taking logictobe
theonlyform ofrationality,aretobesetasideas irrelevant. Thecatuskoti, which
has beenconsidered an "insolubleproblemforcenturies,"90 simplyis nora
problem. We sawlogicinitwheretherewasnone.Theresult: theproblem was

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314 Bharadwnaja

not susceptibleof solutionon the logical plane. Once thingsare put in their
proper,naturalplace,theproblemsimplyceases to be a genuineproblem.91
The catuskoti and therejectionofeach one ofthefourlogicalalternatives have
become in the hands of Nagarjuna "a veryusefuland effective philosophic
method,"92 calledtheprasamgaor thereductio formofargumentation.93 In using
thisformof argumentation, thereasoneror "thedebatormayhave no thesisof
hisownor no positionto defend."94In thisconnection,Nagarjunais frequently
quoted as saying:"If I had any proposition,thenthisdefectwould be mine.I
have,however,no proposition.Therefore, thereis no defectthatis mine."95On
theface of it,thisway of argumentation is indeed "an embarrassment to the
96
philosophers." The structure of thismethodof argumentation is as follows:
We considereach one of the fourpossiblelogical alternatives(catuskoti)and
rejectitas untenable.The functionis to showthatanyphilosophicalpositioncan
be shownto be logicallydiscrepant,foritcan be statedexclusively intermsofthe
fourpossiblelogicalalternatives,each one of which is (or can be) easilyrejected.
Considerforexample:

(G) Thingsare notoriginatedby themselves;

Nor are theyoriginatedbyothers;
Neitherbyboth;norwithoutcause;
Therefore,thereis no origination.97

and,

(H) Nirvanais notan existent;

Nirvanais nota non-existent;
Nirvanais notbothan existentand also a non-existent;
Nirvanais not neitheran existentnora non-existent.98
None ofthesefourpossiblelogicalalternatives is applicableto nirvana.Theyare
notupadeya99in relationto nirvana.The idea underlying (G) is thateverything,
whethermentalor material,is withoutan intrinsicnature(nihsvabhava). '0 If
thisis so, thensaying(1) thatsomematerialthingis produced,or saying(2) that
somematerialthingis notproduced,areequallytheresultofconflating thecate-
goryof"production"withthecategoryof "materialthing." The two categories,
whichare conceptuallydifferent, cannotbe logicallycombinedin theway that
theyare combinedin (1) and (2). Syntactically (1) and (2) are correctly formed
but
expressions, semanticallythey are avyakata and hence thapaniya (unan-
alyzed, unexplained,unclear, and incomprehensible, and therefore to be set
aside). Similarlyin thecase of (H), theunderlying idea is that the categoryof
'nirvana'and thecategoryof'existentthing'havebeenconflatedinthegivenfour
possiblelogical alternatives,withthe resultthateach one of the alternatives,
thoughsyntactically correct,is avydkatasemantically and henceto be setaside.
Thisreasoningfollowstherule,namely,thatthetheseswhichareavydkataare to
be setaside (avydkatanithapitani).
Apparently, theavydkatathesesareindeedcorrectfromtheordinarylanguage

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315

pointof view.Anybody whorejectsa certainthesisin thiswaymusthavea

certain criterial
framework within whichheis operating, as wehavesaidearlier.
In thecaseofNagarjuna, theframework is definitelynotthatofformallogic,
forin hisview,theseare bothavydkata and thapanlya. Nor is hisframework
thatofthemethodology ofempirical knowledge (pramanas).He acceptsonly
twocriteria of knowledge (pramanas):observation (pratyaksa) and inference
(anumdna). He uses them to decide whether a certainpieceof information gained
observationallyorinferentially istrueorfalse.Butinthecaseofquestions about
(a) dependent origination (pratltyasamutpdda), (b) voidness(sunyata), and (c)
nirvana herejectstheapplicability ofthepramdna methodology. "' IfI amright
inthisthinking, thenthreethings becomeapparent:
First,Nagarjunaregards (a), (b),and(c) as theconstituents oftheconceptual
framework within whichheisoperating whenheisengaged inarguing againsthis
criticsandopponents. He cannotbe saidto be arguing against his criticsin a
vacuum.Matilalis mistaken whenhesaysthat"thedebatermayhaveno thesis
ofhisownornoposition todefend."02 Onecanindeedregard (a), (b),and(c) as
axiomsorthepresuppositions ofNagarjuna's philosophicalthought, constituting
thebackground ofhisarguments againsthiscritics.
Second,nirvana isa wayoflooking atthings. Itisa conceptual style (drsti).103
Onedevelops thisconceptual style of
byway understanding dependent origination
and voidness(sunyata).Hence, in thecase of nirvana,the
(pratTtyasamutpdda)
questionwhether
nirvana or notsimply
is an existent doesnotarise.And,once
youhave this
conceptual all
style(drsti), questionsconcerning originationand
and so forth
nonorigination, become irrelevant
and needto be setaside.
Third,Nagarjuna'sargumentation, at thesametime,workswithin thecon-
oftheFourNobleTruths.
ceptualframework Beinga Buddhist,hecannot,and
infacthe does not,giveitup.104 So he says:"All thingsprevailforhimforwhom
Nothingprevailsforhimforwhomvoidnessdoes not
thisvoidnessprevails).
prevail.05
In fact,in Nagarjuna'sthought,
all threeare interconnected;
(a) dependent
origination
(pratltyasamutpdda), and (c) nirvanaconstitute
(b) voidness(sunyatd),
theconceptual framework F, withinwhichheisoperating. Theaimistodevelop
thenirvanadrstiorthenirvana conceptual Thisaimisequallywellachieved
style.
iftheconceptual framework F2 of theFour Noble Truthsis accepted;and
Nagarjunadoesoperatewithin thisframework'06 also.Within theframework
F2 theavyakata theses are setasideon pragmatic grounds of dharma;butwith
to F1 are
respect theframework they rejected on the grounds that F1 the
within
fourpossiblelogicalalternativesbecomeavydkata theses,andoutsidetheframe-
worktheymakeno sense.Theordinary languagedoespermit them;butwithin
Nagarjuna's conceptual framework F, they areto be setasideas beingexternal
totheframework. However it
embarrassingmight beto thephilosophers,neither
formallogicnorthemethodology of empiricalknowledge can said to be
be
relevantforan adequateunderstanding oftheso calledproblem ofcatuskoti.

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316 Bharadwaja

NOTES

1. Archie J.Bahm,"Does Seven-Fold PredicationEqualFourCornered Negation Reversed?"

Philosophy EastandWest7,nos.3 and4 (October1957andJanuary 1958):127-130;RichardS. Y.
Chi,Buddhist FormalLogic (London:TheRoyalAsiaticSociety ofGreatBritain andIreland;soldby
LuzacandCo.,Ltd.,1969);Mrs.RhysDavids,"Logic(Buddhist)," Encyclopaedia ofReligion and
Ethics(NewYork:CharlesScribner's Sons,1926),vol.8,p. 133;K. N. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhist
Theoryof Knowledge (London:GeorgeAllen& UnwinLtd., 1963;reprint, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1980)(hereaftercitedas EarlyBuddhist Theory); P. T. Raju,"ThePrinciple ofFour-
Cornered Negationin IndianPhilosophy," TheReviewofMetaphysics 7 (1953-1954):694-713
citedas "Four-Cornered
(hereafter Negation");RichardH. Robinson, "SomeLogicalAspectsof
Nagarjuna'sSystem,"Philosophy East and West6, no. 4 (January1957): 291-308; St.
Schayer,"AltindischeAntizipationen derAussagenlogik,"inStudien zurindischen Logik,Extraitdu
Bulletinde l'AcademiePolonaisedes Scienceset des Letters cracovic(1933),p. 93; and R. D.
Gunaratne, "TheLogicalFormofCatuskoti: A NewSolution," Philosophy EastandWest30,no.2
(April1960):211-239(hereafter citedas "LogicalForm").Gunaratne offersa vehement defense of
theapplication offormal logic(including settheory)to catuskotistatements whosestructure, he
isisolable
insists, andcanbegiven a consistent He tends
interpretation. torejectAlexWayman's view
expressed in his article"Who Understands The Four Alternatives of the BuddhistTexts?"
(PhilosophyEastandWest27,no.1 (January 1977)(hereaftercitedas "WhoUnderstands?"): 3-21),
thatafterall itmaybe "hazardousandprobably contraindicated to applysymbolic logic"(p. 5)
without reservationsto catuskoti. My ownpositionlendssupportto Wayman'sviewvisa vis
Gunaratne's.
2. Ramachandra Pandeya, "TheLogicofCatuskoti andIndescribability," inhisIndianStudies
in Philosophy (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 1977),pp. 89-103 (hereafter citedas "Logic of
Catuskoti");T. R. V. Murti,The CentralPhilosophy (London: GeorgeAllen& Unwin,
ofBuddhism
1955).Observe inthisconnection inhisarticle"Topicson Beingand
RichardS. Y. Chi'sremarks
LogicalReasoning" EastandWest24,no.3 (October1974):298):"After
(Philosophy manyyearsof
I stillthink
dispute, thatMurti's
viewonthissubjectistheright
one"(hereaftercitedas "Topicson
Being").
3. B. K. Matilal, The Logical Illumination
of Indian Mysticism(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
New Delhi: OxfordUniversity
Press,1977;reprint, citedas Logical
Press,1978) (hereafter
Illumination).
4. Jayatilleke,
EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 134.
'5. Chi,BuddhistFormalLogic,p. 161.
6. As innote1 above.
7. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka-sdstra BuddhistSanskritTexts No. 10
and Vigrahavydvartani,
(Darbhanga: ofPost-Graduate
TheMithilaInstitute Studiesand Researchin Sanskrit
Learning,
1960).Foran English ofthelatter
translation work,seeKamaleswar Bhattacharya,TheDialectical
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1978) (hereaftercited as
Methodof Ndgdrjuna(Vigrahavyavartani)
DialecticalMethod).
8. Wayman,
"WhoUnderstands?" inthematter
p. 15."Nagarjuna, isheirto
ofthecatuskoti,
andthecontinuator
ofteachings canon(inPali,thefourNikayas;inSanskrit,
intheearlyBuddhist
thefourAgamas."
9. Matilal,Logical Illumination,
and Vigrahavyavartani.
bySatisaChandraVidyabhusana;
10. TheNydyaSutrasofGotama,translated New
reprint,
Delhi:Oriental BooksReprint Chi,"Topicson
1975;Matilal,LogicalIllumination;
Corporation,
Being,"p. 295.
11. Matilal,Logical Illumination.
12. Ibid.
13. Bhattacharyya,
DialecticalMethod.
14. Pandeya,"LogicofCatuskoti."
15. Anguttara Nikaya,5 vols.,ed. R. Morrisand E. Hardy(London:Pali TextSociety,
1885-1900);F. L. Woodward 5 vols.
and E. M. Hare,trans.,TheBookoftheGradualSayings,
(London:PaliTextSociety,1932-1936).

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317

16. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,pp. 281-283.

17. Ibid., p. 287.
18. Ibid., p. 288.
19. Ibid.,p. 281
20. Ibid., p. 287.
21. Ibid., p. 288.
22. Ibid., p. 288.
23. Ibid., pp. 288, 274.
24. Ibid., pp. 471-476.
25. Majjhima Nikaya,3 vols., ed. V. Trenknerand R. Chalmers(London: Pali Text Society,
1948-1951), 1.486;I. B. Horner,trans.,MiddleLengthSayings,3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society,
1954-1959);R. Chalmers,trans.,Further DialoguesoftheBuddha,2 vols.(London: Pali TextSociety,
1888); K. E. Neumann,trans.,Die Reden Gotamo Buddho'saus der mittleren SammlungMajj-
himanikdyo, vols. 1 and 2 (Leipzig, 1896-1900).
26. LudwigWittgenstein, The Blue and BrownBooks (Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1958),p. 108.
27. MajjhimaNikdya,I. 487.
28. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 292.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. G. E. Moore, PrincipiaEthica (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1903), chap. 5;
V. K. Bharadwaja,Naturalistic EthicalTheory(Delhi: University of Delhi Press,1978).
33. RudolfCarnap,Meaningand Necessity, 2 ed. (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1956).
34. Ibid.
35. Michael Polayni, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-CriticalPhilosophy(London:
Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1958).
36. Vaman Apte, SanskritEnglishPractical Dictionary(Poona: Prasad Prakashan; reprint,
1977).RichardChi, in "Topics on Being,"mistranslates theSanskrit"avy4krta"as "inexpressible"
(p. 296). See Apte's Dictionary.Avydkatais Pali of Sanskritavydkrta.It means "unanalysed,
unexplained,incomprehensible."
37. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 292.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 293.
43. BertrandRussell,"On Denoting,"in Contemporary ReadingsinLogical Theory,ed. I. Copi
and J.Gould (New York: MacmillanCompany,1967).
44. G. Frege,"Senseand Nominatum,"and P. F. Strawson,"On Referring," inCopi and Gould,
eds., Contemporary Readingsin Logical Theory;Saul Kripke,Namingand Necessity(Oxford:Basil
Blackwell,1972).
45. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 335.
46. Ibid.,p. 340.
47. Chi BuddhistFormalLogic,pp. 158-159.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani.
52. Matilal,Logical Illumination, p. 17.
53. Ibid.,p. 18; Th. Stcherbatsky, The CentralConceptionofBuddhismand TheMeaningof the
Word"Dharma"(Reprint,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1970),p. 22.
54. Matilal,Logical Illumination, p. 18.
55. Louis de La Valle Poussin,The Wayof Nirvana(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1917),p. 111.
56. Ibid., p. 111.

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318 Bharadwaja

57. Ibid., p. 111. See also F. J. Hoffman,"Rationalityin Early BuddhistFour Fold Logic,"
JournalofIndianPhilosophy10,no. 4 December1982): 309-337 (hereafter citedas "Rationality").
58. BertrandRussell,Historyof WesternPhilosophy, 1sted. (London: GeorgeAllenand Unwin
Ltd., 1946),2nded. (1961), thechapteron Leibniz,pp. 563-576.
59. Mrs. RhysDavids, "Logic Buddist,"p. 133.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. B. M. Barua,A HistoryofPre-Buddhistic IndianPhilosophy (Calcutta,1921;reprint,Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass,1970),p. 47.
63. For a different lineofcriticism,see Jayatilleke,
EarlyBuddistTheory, pp. 334-336. Also see,
forsome otherattemptsto solve the so-calledproblemof catuskoti,Bahm, "Does Seven-Fold?";
Wayman,"Who Understands?"; Hoffman, "Rationality";Gunaratne,"Logical Form"; and Shosun
Miyamoto,"The Logic of Relativityas the commonGroundforthe Developmentof the Middle
Way," in Buddhism and Culture,ed. SusumuYamaguchi(Nakano Press,1960),pp. 67-68.
64. Raju, "Four-CorneredNegation."
65. Ibid., p. 702.
66. For a clarificationof the Jaina notion of avaktavyasee V. K. Bharadwaja, "The Jaina
Conceptof Logic," IndianPhilosophicalQuarterly9, no. 4 (July1982): 363-375.
67. Chi, BuddhistFormalLogic,pp. 156-163.
68. Ibid.,p. 161.
69. Ibid.,p. 162.
70. Ibid.
71. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,pp. 333-346.
72. Chi, BuddhistFormalLogic,pp. vii-ix. He writes:
The catuskotihas been consideredan insolubleproblemforcenturies.In December 1967,I read a
paper ("A TentativeSolution to the Problemof Four CornerNegation") at the Universityof
Chicago,whichI believesolvestheproblem.The solutiondependson applyingBertrandRussell's
vicious-circleprincipleand my explanationof "unavoidable mistakes,"namely,"under cultural
circumstances x, a mistakentheoryy is inevitable."The paperis unmanageablein lengthand needs
furtherrevision:itwillappearas an article.For themoment,I can onlysaythatitcorrectsmyearlier
explanationof thecatuskotiwhichis erroneous.(pp. vii-ix of his Foreward[1968]to his Buddhist
FormalLogic (1969).

Observealso changeinhispositionreflected inhisarticle"Topics on beingand Logical Reasoning,"

pp. 293-300.
73. Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 343. For Jayatilleke'sownsolutionoftheproblem,see
pp. 333-346.
74. In 1974, Richard Chi came out withthe thesisthat "Buddhistlogic belongs to strictly
conventionaltwo-valuedlogic" ("Topics on Being," p. 297), that he had made a "mistakeby
comparingcatuskotiwithintuitionism" (p. 297), and that"the subjectof catuskoti... is not at all
'Buddhistlogic"' (p. 298). Havingsaid this,he tendsto subscribeto T. R. V. Murti'sview,and adds:
"As a matterof fact,catuskotiis applicableto metaphysicalspeculationsonly"(ibid.,p. 298).
75. See L. E. J. Brouwerand A. Heyting'sworkon Intuitionistic logic.
76. Nuel D. Belnap, Jr.,and J. Michael Dunn, "Entailmentand the DisjunctiveSyllogism,"
Contemporary PhilosophyI, ed. G. Floistad (The Hague: MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1981), pp.
337-366 (hereaftercitedas "Entailment").See also J. M. Dunn, "IntuitiveSemanticsfor First-
degreeEntailmentsand Coupled Trees," PhilosophicalStudies29 (1976): 149-168, and Nuel D.
Belnap,Jr.,"A UsefulFour-valuedLogic," in J. M. Dunn and G. Epstein,eds., Modern Uses of
Multiple-valued Logic (Dordrecht:D. Reidel PublishingCo., 1977).
77. Belnapand Dunn, "Entailment,"p. 342.
78. Ibid.,p. 342.
79. Ibid., p. 343.
80. Ibid., p. 343.
81. Ibid., p. 345.
82. Matilal,Logical Illumination,pp. 16-18.
83. MajjhimaNikaya,I. 426.

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319

84. Jayatilleke,EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 346.

85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Dhammasangani, EarlyBuddhist
ed. E. Muller(London: Pali TextSociety,1885);Jayatilleke,
Theory,p. 355.
88. LudwigWittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1969).
89. MajjhimaNikaya,I. 431; Jayatilleke, EarlyBuddhistTheory,p. 357.
90. Chi BuddhistFormalLogic,p. vii.
91. Ludwig Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan
Company,1968).
92. Matilal,Logical Illumination, p. 17.
93. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
94. Ibid., pp. 16-19. Also compareChi, "Topics on being."
95. Bhattacharya, DialecticalMethod,p. 23.
96. Matilal,Logical Illumination, p. 16.
97. BuddhistFormalLogic,p. 159.
98. Nagarjuna'sMadhyamaka-sdstra, chap. 25, Kdrikas,3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.
99. ComparethePali expression"upeti" ('fitsthecase').
100. Nagarjuna'sMadhyamaka-sastra.
101. Nagarjuna's Vigrahavydvartani, stanzas24 to 34.
102. Matilal,Logical Illumination, pp. 16-19. Also compareChi, "Topics on Being,"p. 295.
103. RichardChi seemsto translate"drsti"as "dogmatism"("Topics on Being,"p. 296). I agree
withhimthatitis hardto findan Englishsynonym for"drsti."But,then,"dogmatism"won'tdo; "a
wayof lookingat theworld"or "a pointof view" are bettersynonyms.
104. AlexWaymanhas thisimportant insightwhenhe writes:"thefourNoble Truthshave beena
basic ingredientof Buddhistthinkingand attitude"(Wayman,"Who Understands,"p. 10). And,
again,"Nagarjuna,in thematterof catuskoti,is heirto and thecontinuatorof teachingsin theearly
Buddhistcanon" (Wayman,ibid.,p. 15).
105. Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani, stanza LXX.
106. In fact,thetwoframeworks one. The lineof
F1 and F2 can easilybe shownto be essentially
argumentin thatcase will be thatthe frameworkof the fourNoble Truthsundergoeslinguistic
mutationat thehandsof Nagarjuna,as a historicaldevelopment, intotheframework of dependent
origination,voidness,and nirvana.(This,however,formsthesubjectof anotherpaper.)

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