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FPA Histroical Analogies
FPA Histroical Analogies
AND
JEFFREY COLLINS
Carleton University
This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel’s
decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah.
Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power
superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments
in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and
the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese
quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel’s own traumatic experience of
Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these
analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war pro-
duced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on
air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained
from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and
unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies
prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effec-
tive calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous
studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or
episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies
contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during
the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
On the morning of July 12, 2006, the Lebanese Shia guerrilla group Hezbollah
ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing three Israeli Defence Force (IDF)
soldiers and capturing two more. Soon after the abduction, an Israeli Merkava
tank went in pursuit of the missing soldiers, but it hit a land mine, killing its
crew of four. Another soldier was killed in a shoot-out with Hezbollah gunmen
as he tried to recover the bodies of the dead tank crew (Norton 2007; Lambeth
2011). That night, at the end of a two-hour meeting, the Israeli government
approved an air campaign of massive retaliation against Hezbollah. According to
the findings of the Winograd Commission, the government “did not want a war,
did not intend to go to war, and did not know it was going to war. Only on
March 25, 2007 did the government publicly refer to the military campaign as
‘war’. Nevertheless, this was the essence of the 12 July decision” (Winograd
2008:33). Israel’s inner circle of decision making during the 34-day war with
1
We thank the support of the Leverhulme Trust (Research Fellowship # 2011-222) and the helpful comments
of the three anonymous reviewers.
Siniver, Asaf and Jeffrey Collins. (2015) Airpower and Quagmire: Historical Analogies and the Second Lebanon War. Foreign
Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12029
© 2013 International Studies Association
216 Airpower and Quagmire
quo may increase the probability of the use of force to defuse it. These constrain-
ing factors may then lead to a sub-optimal decision-making process, where poli-
cymakers come to rely on cognitive schemes to compensate for the deficiencies
in time, information, and resource management (Herman 1969; Jervis 1976;
Holsti 1999; Cowan 2009; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Accordingly, when analyz-
ing foreign policy decisions one ought to consider the human element and its
impact on the quality of the process as well as the outcome.
Studies of the psychological or cognitive makeup of policymakers have
bearing similarity to a previous one, and subsequently tie “to that analogy…a
specific course of action which should be taken to achieve a desired outcome or
avoided to prevent an undesirable outcome”; in essence, this is the “power of
the analogy” (Breuning 2003:230; Angstrom 2011:228).
Despite their analytical appeal, the effectiveness of analogies is limited by the
cognitive biases of their users, meaning that analogies are frequently used to
make poor decisions (May 1973; Neustadt and May 1988; Khong 1992; Hough-
ton 2001; Noon 2004). This practice usually manifests itself in two forms. Firstly,
off (Shelah and Limor 2007:64).4 As will be discussed later, Halutz too, exhibited
patterns of low conceptual complexity, particularly with regard to his dogmatic
belief in the superiority of airpower and his failure to heed the advice of others.
According to the Winograd commission, Halutz “failed in his duties as com-
mander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political–military leader-
ship, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment”
(Winograd Interim Report 2007). As for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, by his
own admission he realized within one hour that his decision to give Peretz the
4
Ironically, six years after the war many Israelis were grateful for having the neophyte Peretz as Defence Minis-
ter in 2006. While his performance during the war in Lebanon was rightly criticized, his decision to invest large
sums of money into the then-unproven and un-tested Iron Dome anti-missile defense system potentially saved the
lives of thousands of Israelis who lived under the range of Hamas’s Qassam rockets during the Gaza Conflict of
2012. Precisely because Peretz was an outsider in the defense establishment he headed, he was not bound by tradi-
tional combat doctrines and was more open to evolutionary ideas. See, for example, Levinson (2012), Shushan
(2012).
5
See, for example, Lavran (2007), Kober (2008), Matthews (2008), McMaster (2008), Nir and Knafo (2009),
Bar-Joseph (2010), Marciano (2011), Mor (2012), Pahlavi and Ouellet (2012), and Petrelli (2012).
220 Airpower and Quagmire
but again, they fail to explain why airpower was the primary method to achieve
these objectives.
The abovementioned explanations can thus be explained as cumulative ingre-
dients in a conceptual framework which rested on two clear and powerful analo-
gies. Within hours of the news of the kidnaping, the dominant mind frame
among the political–military triumvirate of Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz was the
need to deliver a quick and massive blow to Hezbollah. Almost simultaneously,
the option of large ground maneuver was discarded as a real option. To achieve
Halutz argued that “Airpower alone can decide, and let alone be the senior part-
ner to such decision” (Kober 2008:22).
In April 2006, Halutz endorsed a new operational doctrine for the IDF. One
of its core principles was the theory of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) which
was developed by the Americans in the aftermath of 1991 Gulf War. EBO repre-
sented a body of military thought which maintained that precision firepower
would allow for a swifter campaign with relatively low number of combat casual-
ties. Intellectually, EBO was inspired by the new military language of Systemic
“they merely forgot to mention that during the months of pounding Kosovo, the
citizens of NATO states did not sit in shelters,” unlike one million Israeli citizens
during the daily barrage of Hezbollah’s Katyusha rockets (Harel 2006).
Halutz often claimed that he had “observed the Kosovo war, its reliance on air-
power and the apparent connection with a rapid victorious outcome, and sought
to adopt that intervention as a model of strategic behaviour”; another account
suggests that Halutz’s study of the Kosovo War strongly influenced his belief
“that air strikes alone would be sufficient to bring Hezbollah to its knees” (Kreps
assessment of the Kosovo conflict, airpower alone did not in fact win that war. It
was the realization on the part of Milosevic in late-May 1999 that he faced a seri-
ous threat of a NATO ground invasion as well as total isolation in international
diplomatic circles. These dangers were, in turn, reinforced by the destruction of
Serbian infrastructure by NATO airpower (Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999). At the
beginning of what turned into a 78-day war, NATO officials had thought, like
Halutz in 2006, that airpower could ensure a quick victory. But knowing that
NATO’s airpower strategy was largely premised on a desire to avoid casualties,
over the operation led to the resignation of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the
premature departure of Chief of the General Staff Rafael Eytan, and the removal
from office of Defence Minister Sharon. Thus, the quagmire analogy can be
summed up as a simple lesson to Israeli policymakers: do not enter Lebanon, or
else risk getting entangled in a bloody, unpopular and protracted conflict.
This chastising lesson was reinforced by what Edward Luttwak termed “post-
heroic warfare”: the changing views adopted by Western societies toward war in
recent years. Particularly, it refers to the growing intolerance these societies have
casualties the IDF sustained in battle. After the IDF lost eight troops in one day,
he was seen holding his head in his hands, asking Halutz “how will this end?”
(Halutz 2010). Peretz’s sensitivity to the loss of life in battle was typical of a post-
heroic society in which victory or defeat is measured by the number of casualties.
According to Major General Elazar Stern, “Every casualty was reported to the
Chief of Staff, and there was a case in which an entire battle was stopped
because of one casualty” (Kober 2008:11). Major General Udi Adam, com-
mander of the IDF’s Northern Command for most of the Second Lebanon War
and Halutz found the answer not in their own infatuation with the superiority of
airpower, but rather in the fact that “the Israeli society was not ready to accept
penetration into Lebanon on 12 July. There was no acceptance of a ground
operation” (Winograd 2008:156). The conclusion that only a large ground opera-
tion could successfully tackle the threat from Hezbollah’s short-range rockets
was not a matter of hindsight toward the end of the war and in its aftermath. It
was the conclusion of a long series of IDF studies, war games and military exer-
cises which took place in the years preceding the war, including one in June
10
Public criticism over the Vietnam War was one of the reasons behind Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek
re-election in 1968 (in addition to his weak position within the Democratic party and his ill health), whereas Mena-
chem Begin famously declared “I cannot go on anymore” before he resigned from office amidst daily protests
against the war outside his residence.
A SAF S INIVER AND J EFF REY C OLLINS 227
Intifada, there was readiness on the part of the public to endure the prolong
fighting and its consequences in order to achieve long-lasting calm and security.
As one retired Israeli army colonel noted during the war, “Something has hap-
pened to our society when we think losing eight soldiers is a tough day. Well I’m
sorry, it’s not” (Boot 2006). Indeed the fear of a large number of combat casual-
ties (especially of reservists) and the belief that the Israeli public “was not ready”
for such a large-scale operation had a crippling effect on virtually the entire
political–military echelon. In one of the most telling observations about the
In displaying this aversion to combat casualties and the fear of another quag-
mire, government may have even negated on its most basic contractual obliga-
tion to its own citizens—to provide for their protection (Inbar 2007). An
inherent problem with the Lebanon quagmire analogy was the fact that in
essence the 1982 invasion was a war a choice, which explains its enduring unpop-
ularity. However, in 2006, with more than one million Israelis hiding in shelters
or fleeing south to avoid the barrage of rockets, there is some traction to the
argument that Israel had no choice but to go into Lebanon to remove the threat
from Hezbollah’s rockets; only during Israel’s war of Independence in 1948 and
the first Gulf War in 1991 did large proportions of the home front come under
sustained attacks for such a prolonged period of time. Once more, the Winograd
commission provided the most incisive observation about the conduct of the war
against the crippling effect of the quagmire analogy: “it seems that Israel went to
war without being prepared to pay the price of war” (Winograd 2008:397).
Conclusion
The case of the Second Lebanon War demonstrates how multiple analogies,
once invoked, can overlap to influence policy decisions (Angstrom’s “competing
analogies”).11 The number and variety of analogies evoked—as well as their use-
fulness—depend both on the cognitive schemas of the decision makers as well as
the contours of the present crisis. The ubiquitous misuse of the Munich analogy
in almost every major U.S. foreign policy crisis since the 1940s, or the Carter
administration’s use of no less than a dozen analogies during the Iran hostage
crisis, for example, demonstrates the extent to which historical analogies not
only dominate the foreign policy decision-making process, but also the impor-
tance of understanding their role in shaping policymakers’ perceptions of policy
options, the crisis environment and even the justification of the outcome. Histor-
ical analogies are not value-neutral—they can be commonly divided into “good”
or “bad” examples from the past of how to approach a crisis. Unfortunately,
however, it seems that policymakers are more inclined to refer to past failures
rather than successes when confronted with a new crisis. Dowty’s study of Ameri-
can foreign policy in the Middle East concludes that “the bigger the success, the
less the learning process” (Dowty 1984:376), while Reiter observes that often
11
Angstrom (2011:225).
228 Airpower and Quagmire
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