Foreign Policy Analysis (2019) 15, 432–449

Resistant to Change? The EU as a Normative

Power and Its Troubled Relations with Russia
and China

ANNA MICHALSKI
Department of Government, Uppsala University
AND
NIKLAS NILSSON
Forsvarshogskolan

In this article, we investigate the European Union’s (EU) role as a nor-

mative foreign policy actor and its troubled relations to Russia and China.
We contend that the lack of preparedness of the EU to foresee the in-
creasingly tense relations with these countries can be explained through
a role theoretical perspective. We show that the attachment of the EU to
its role as a normative international actor reduced its awareness of Rus-
sia’s and China’s growing refusal to accept the EU’s ambition to diffuse
liberal norms and principles. The EU’s inability to read the changing role
expectations of China and Russia hampered the shaping of an appropriate
foreign policy leading up the diplomatic crises with these two countries in
the late 2000s and early 2010s, respectively. Theoretically, the findings con-
tribute with a novel understanding of role conceptions in terms of reduc-
ing an actor’s preparedness to acknowledge changes to its international
role position caused by challenges raised by antagonistic partners.

Introduction
In the wake of the Euromaidan protests, Russia moved to enhance its influence
in Ukraine, resulting in the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Its continuous
support to the secessionist forces in the Donbass and Luhansk regions in eastern
Ukraine prolonged and aggravated the armed conflict with the Ukrainian army.
European Union (EU) representatives directed sharp protests to the Russian leader-
ship in both cases but were unable to halt Russia’s quest to secure its sphere of influ-
ence in Eastern Europe and destabilize Ukraine. A few years earlier, between 2008
and 2009, an unrelated diplomatic spat between the EU and China—triggered by
China’s displeasure over European political leaders’ meetings with the Dalai Lama
and repeated criticism of China over human rights’ abuses—brought the bilateral

Anna Michalski is an associate professor in the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. She holds
the chair of the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES). She obtained her PhD from the
Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and has since then
worked in several universities and research institutions around the world. Her current research focuses on European
foreign policy with China, strategic partnerships, and socialization in international organizations, especially the EU.
Niklas Nilsson is an assistant professor in War Studies at the Department of Military Studies, Swedish Defence
University. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from Uppsala University in 2015. His research focuses on foreign
policy decision-making and security in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet republics, as well as on asymmetric warfare and
military tactics.

Michalski, Anna, and Niklas Nilsson. (2019) Resistant to Change? The EU as a Normative Power and Its Troubled Relations
with Russia and China. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1093/fpa/ory008
© The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 433

relations to the brink. After the near-breakdown of diplomatic relations, EU repre-

sentatives, along with national European leaders, went to great lengths to restore
the EU’s links with China, chiefly by acquiescing to Chinese demands for territorial
respect and nonintervention in internal affairs. These unconnected events brought
to the fore the EU’s lack of preparedness and seeming unawareness of the strength
of Russia’s and China’s steadfastness in pursuing their aims, regardless of whether
they concerned securing Russian dominance over the former Soviet republics or
affirming China’s prestige as a global power.1
Both these instances have been thoroughly analyzed by scholars (see, for instance,
Men and Balducci 2011; Smith 2015), and numerous reasons for the EU’s inad-
equate handling of these diplomatic crises have been proposed, ranging from its
deficient strategic culture and military prowess to EU member states’ conflicting
strategic and material objectives (see, for instance, Fox and Godement 2009; Biehl,
Giegerich, and Jonas 2013; Haukkala 2015). Illuminating as these accounts may be
from a rational, neorealist perspective, there are so far few attempts to explain why
the EU misread these increasingly tense situations and misjudged the antagonistic
partners’ intentions despite strong indications to the contrary. Signs were clearly
visible well before the eruption of the crises and should have alerted the EU, if not
to change its course of action, at least to adopt a foreign policy stance that more
adequately addressed the challenges it was facing. In this article, we contend that
the EU’s adherence to its self-perception as a normative power clouded its assess-
ment of the aims and ambitions of Russia and China and made it impossible for
the EU to adjust its foreign policy to respond appropriately to these crises. We are
careful to stress that we are not arguing that the EU either could have adverted the
crises with Russia and China, which deep down are the result of fundamentally op-
posite worldviews, or should have refrained from enacting its role as a normative
power. Our argument is, rather, that in order to understand why the EU was caught
off-guard in these two incidents and failed to read its adversarial partners, we need
to look at how its self-conception as a normative power blinded its awareness of
structural changes in the international system and their consequences for the EU
as an international actor. The underlying problem, we assert, is that the EU’s un-
derstanding of itself as a normative power remained static in times of fundamental
underlying changes to the world order, leading significant others to challenge the
EU’s normative power. This resulted in a changed role position, which de facto
became an impediment to the EU’s foreign policy performance. Due to a lack of
internal agreement regarding the EU as an international actor, the EU held on to
its role conception as a normative power as an epitome of the fragile consensus of
its contested identity.
In order to address this compelling puzzle, we revisit some of the central tenets
of role theory. A role theoretical framework offers some important advantages in
comparison to rational and power-based approaches. Chiefly, role theory allows us
to focus on explaining output in terms of foreign policy stances as it addresses ques-
tions regarding actors’ perceived reasons for a certain behavior by posing “how pos-
sible” questions rather than “why” questions (Meyer 2005). In this vein, we seek
to understand how it was possible for the EU to stick to its role conception as
a normative power, in a collective sense, despite being challenged by significant
others. Our focus, therefore, lies on the consequences of a master role based on
an essentially contested identity; the impact of the role expectations of significant
1
We do not argue that Russia and China fully accepted the EU’s normative ambition and identity in the first period
and then through a volte-face ceased to do so. What we intend to show is that the diplomatic relations between the EU
and Russia and China, respectively, was initially built on the latter’s tacit acceptance of the EU’s self-understanding and
the consequences following from it in terms of foreign policy behaviour. This acceptance turned into defiance as the
leadership in Russia and China openly abandoned their (strategic) ambition to comply with the principles and values
of the liberal world order. This change of stance had deep implications for their strategic partnerships with the EU:
suspension in the case of Russia and a retreat of the EU to promote human rights and democracy in the case of China.
434 Resistant to Change?

(antagonistic) others on the role conception’s alter dimension; and the conse-
quences for the international role position of an actor and its subsequent role per-
formance.
The article takes as its point of departure the fundamental changes in the in-
ternational system that have caused the EU’s international role position to change
substantially, chiefly because significant others’ expectations toward the EU have
become less accepting of its socializing normative ambition. We argue that the EU
failed to adjust its foreign policy in view of its changed role position and therefore
became less effective in pushing back contending expectations, even though they
impinged on the alter dimension of the EU’s self-conception as a normative power.
On this basis, we seek to understand how the normative power conception pre-
vented the EU from adjusting its role position in increasingly tense contexts when
such an adjustment was arguably warranted. We do this by addressing three ele-
ments of role theory: (1) the nature of an actor’s role conception, (2) others’ role
expectations vis-à-vis this actor, and (3) the role position that ensues as a result of
interaction between role conceptions and role expectations.

The Internal Construction of the EU’s Role as a Normative Power

The EU is a self-proclaimed normative foreign policy actor (Manners 2002; Sjursen
2006). Its self-conception as a normative power is based on a deeply entrenched nar-
rative harking back to historical calamities and the necessity to forge a lasting peace
among European states (Duchêne 1973). The security community narrative was ac-
cepted by the EU member states as a symbolic construction to which they could all
sign up, but which did not challenge their national identities and cultural expres-
sions (see also, Pace 2007; Manners 2011; Kuus 2015). Since the early 2000s, the
EU’s international role conception has encompassed a vision of a rule-based inter-
national system founded on multilateralism, good governance, rule of law, human
rights, and democracy, bolstered by the success of the Eastern enlargement and an
increasingly confident international position (Ferrero-Waldner 2005; Solana 2009).
It has enabled the EU to construct a postsovereign foreign policy based on an ambi-
tion to diffuse values, norms, and principles of global governance (Haukkala 2010;
Pan 2012). The diffusion of European (liberal) norms became the basis for the
EU’s principle of international engagement with third countries, including “strate-
gic partners,” such as Russia and China; states in the EU’s neighborhood, such as
Ukraine; and countries further afield, such as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
states (Bengtsson and Elgström 2012).
Nonetheless, there are a number of inconsistencies in the EU’s role as a diplo-
matic actor, often conceived of as a mismatch between what it claims to be and what
it does, as well as whether it possesses enough “stateness” to be a foreign policy actor
at all. The inherent tension between the member states’ desire to retain the ability
for independent action and the search for a unified European position in inter-
national politics is often brought forward to explain inconsistencies in EU foreign
policy behavior (Orenstein and Kelemen 2017). Underlying this predicament is the
contested nature of the EU’s foreign policy identity, which carries important impli-
cations for the coherence of the EU’s external role conception. Noting that the EU’s
foreign and security policies remain intergovernmental because of member states’
sovereignty concerns, Risse argues that we should take “the EU’s self-proclaimed
foreign policy goals as a ‘civilian or normative power,’ not as a prescription for a
grand strategy, but as a more reflexive attempt at conscious identity creation in for-
eign policy” (2012). In Risse’s interpretation, the normative power should therefore
be understood as an attempt to find a workable basis for the EU’s international role
conception in the absence of a shared foreign policy identity. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that the depiction of the EU as a normative power, although primarily discur-
sively constructed, is built on a more complex foundation than solely the rhetorical
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 435

action of EU office holders (Diez, 2005, 2014). This is because the foundations of
European integration have grown out of the values, norms, and principles of (a ma-
jority of) the EU member states, as well as their adherence to the liberal post-WWII
international order, which means that they cannot repudiate the EU’s normative
role conception. The shared basis for symbolic power creates a modicum of inter-
nal cohesion and a degree of credibility vis-à-vis external actors.
Therefore, notwithstanding the contested nature of EU foreign policy identity, it
(or to be more precise, the EU institutions) has attempted to project a coherent
persona in the arena of international politics and to forge an international identity
consummate with its founding values. However, the construction of the role as a
normative power must allow the member states to retain their specific national for-
eign policy identity while simultaneously supporting the formal expression of the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its ideational role concep-
tion. Therefore, the EU’s external identity is certainly much “thinner” than that of
its member states, as the role conception of “normative power” is built on a careful
calibration between the common endeavor to project ideational and material goals
and, at the same time, avoid the encroachment on national identities and member
states’ ability to pursue independent foreign policy.
In role theoretical terms, the argument we are making here is that the contesta-
tion regarding which role(s) the EU should play on the international scene is not of
the same kind as on the domestic level (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012), chiefly because
the EU’s own boundaries and legitimacy are uncertain, even contested. Here, we
pick up Wehner and Thies’s (2014) argument to distinguish between the structural
aspect of roles providing patterns of expected and appropriate behavior, on the one
hand, and agency, on the other, as state actors, in this case an institutionalized EU,
build roles on the basis of traditions and beliefs that encompass identities without
challenging or refuting them. This perspective emphasizes the enabling dimension
of roles, which allows the agent to assume roles that include both acceptable beliefs
and ideas about the self, as well as expectations about the Other. By separating roles
and identity in terms of their conceptual properties, we contend that it is possible to
analyze the EU’s role conception as a normative power at the aggregate level with-
out refuting member states’ practice of pursuing independent foreign policy action
or the existence of contending national identities.

The EU’s Role Position in Changing International Conditions

The EU’s position as a normative power was made possible due to the dominance
of the liberal world order, which remained without challengers from the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991 until the mid-2000s. During these decades, virtually no
other competing world order was put forward, at least not with a lasting impression,
and, therefore, the principles of the liberal order became the reference point for
policy-makers in Europe. However, a number of events started to change this state
of affairs. First, struck by hubris, the Western powers undermined the claim of uni-
versality as a principle of the liberal order by going to war in Iraq in 2003. Also, the
financial and economic crisis from 2008 damaged the prestige of the West’s market-
economy model. Second, the reconfiguration of the international system and the
advent of new global powers, primarily through the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and South Africa) challenged the dominance of the liberal order.
Russia and China, in particular, have proposed alternative principles of interna-
tional engagement, shunning the multilateral order promoted by the EU in favor
of an international system based on the logic of balance of power.
The EU has been slow to recognize the implications of the reconfiguration of
the international system for its role as a normative power. In particular, it has en-
countered problems factoring into its international identity the implications of
sovereignty-based principles of international politics and the consequences for the
436 Resistant to Change?

implementation of its foreign and security policy. The adherence to its role as a
normative power has hampered the EU’s ability to foresee Russian reactions to its
rapprochement with Ukraine, which in Russia’s view encroached on its traditional
sphere of influence. Similarly, the EU maintained confidence in its ability to so-
cialize China into liberal values long after China made amply clear its refusal to this
effect and adopted a strategy of external dissemination of its sovereignty-based prin-
ciples for international interaction. We are clearly faced with a conceptual problem:
why was the EU unable to gauge the role expectations of significant others, such as
Russia and China, with whom it was engaged diplomatically in the framework of
strategic partnerships? In answering this question, we need to consider the condi-
tions under which role conceptions change as a result of ongoing transformations
in the international environment, as well as, conversely, why they resist pressures to
adapt and even remain static, despite profound underlying changes to the interna-
tional system.

Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Roles in a Changing International System

The usefulness of role theory for explaining and, to a certain extent, predicting
foreign policy has been amply explored in the literature (Walker 1987; Thies 2010;
Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). The original definition of international roles as
patterns of appropriate or expected behavior, based on an actor’s social position in
a group or wider society, forms the point of departure for theoretical investigations
of roles (Bengtsson and Elgström 2011; Harnisch 2011). To this effect, the descrip-
tive, organizational, and explanatory dimensions of role theory have been used as
a means to understand foreign policy behavior (Walker 1987). They have also been
expanded to tackle some of the most intractable problems of international rela-
tions (IR) theory, namely the agency-structure debate and the social interaction
among actors in an anarchical international system (Wendt 1999; Thies and Breun-
ing 2012). Proponents of role theory usually point at its rich conceptual apparatus,
which opens up possibilities for fine-grained analyses of actors’ self-perceptions and
foreign policy behavior (Wehner and Thies 2014). However, at the same time, quite
stark criticism (Elgström and Smith 2006) has been leveled against the application
of the descriptive dimension of foreign policy roles, to the effect that too much
scholarly effort has been expended on identifying and explicating role conceptions,
at the expense of more analytically and dynamically driven analysis of behavioral
change in international diplomacy and domestic contestation of foreign policy.
This article places the focus on a hitherto unexplored phenomenon, namely the
constraining effect of deeply ingrained role conceptions that act on the cognitive
and behavioral dimensions of policy-makers to the detriment of their ability to inter-
nalize the consequences of a transformation of an actor’s role position. The article
posits that this inability to adjust to changes in the external environment has a bear-
ing on an actor’s foreign policy behavior. Drawing on Walker (1987), the article
focuses on the incongruence built into the EU’s rhetoric and behavior in relation
to its changed role position and the role expectations of significant (antagonistic)
others. Before constructing an analytical framework that enables us to explore the
EU’s stance toward Russia and China, our assumptions of the ongoing changes in
the international system, and what they signify in role-theoretical terms, are expli-
cated below.

Role Playing in a Changing International Context

In conceptual terms, role theory is no stranger to competitive international con-
texts. Indeed, Holsti’s seminal article of 1970, in which he explores the role concep-
tions of seventy-one states, is set against the backcloth of the antagonistic stand-off
between the Soviet Union and the United States at the height of the Cold War
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 437

(Holsti 1970). Holsti introduced role theory to international relations by arguing

that the sum of the roles that states play, posited as role positions, forms a structure
in which the social interaction in the international system occurs (Holsti 1970). A
few decades and a very different international context later, the relaunch of role
theory in the 1990s took place against a wider paradigm shift in IR toward con-
structivism, most eminently represented by its structural variant, which focused on
the social interaction among states in the international system (Wendt 1992; Wendt
1999). Here, Holsti’s notion of international roles making up a pattern of social
interaction fitted in nicely. According to structural constructivism, the composition
of the international system denotes the social quality of roles and the interaction
among states, implying that role conceptions and role expectations are constructed
on the actor’s own perceptions and the demands placed on the actor as well as
those of significant others (Thies 2010). Actors tend to locate themselves in an in-
terstate social structure “according to a master role—defined as [their] most salient
attribute” (Wehner and Thies 2014). In other words, role theory makes an explicit
assumption about the existence of an international system, structured on the basis
of the social interaction between actors arranged according to their role positions
and influenced by the role expectations that they hold vis-à-vis each other. The pro-
cess through which an actor takes possession of a role position in the international
system is conceived of in terms of socialization, denoting the process by which new
members learn their appropriate roles (Thies 2010). The socialization process has
been described in terms of a novice learning from a master (Thies 2012), implying
a system in which specific norms are accepted as legitimate and accepted by sig-
nificant players. This article makes a contrary assumption about the international
system, namely by considering it as a competitive system in which norms and prin-
ciples are contested and where there is a continuous battle over whose worldviews
should prevail. In such a system, the direction of socialization is indeterminate and
the appraisal of appropriate roles may shift over time and among system occupiers.
There are two major consequences for role playing in a competitive system: first,
there is more room for influencing others’ role positions by emitting role expec-
tations vis-à-vis these actors with the aim of enhancing one’s own status within the
system; and second, actors must learn to understand significant others’ role expec-
tations that are placed upon them, including expectations that go against their own
principal role conception, in order to know how to respond to antagonistic role de-
mands. In a more fluid context, where norms of different political orders clash with
each other, actors must learn to pick up on cues from a wider audience composed
of a multitude of states and international organizations and to detect, and when
necessary refute, attempts to altercast (imposing alternative roles on an actor, cf.
McCourt 2012) individual states and international organizations into specific role
locations. Thies (2012) depicts this competitive interaction among states as a “so-
cialization ‘game,’” whereas He and Walker (2015) point to the outcome of such a
socialization “game” in terms of the role location into which actors find themselves
pushed.
The argument made here is that the transformation of the international system
implies a reassessment of the assumption of uninterrupted general socialization
within the liberal world order. This has implications for the actors in the system,
which have so far taken the direction of socialization as given, whereas in this new
environment, the role positions they commonly occupy are continuously contested
by significant (antagonistic) others. The socialization “game” will henceforth be
played out in a more competitive environment. This means that an actor’s inability
to read the expectations of significant (antagonistic) others will lead it to misjudge
its role position and run the risk of retaining a foreign policy stance that is inade-
quate given the changing circumstances. The faltering role performance that will
ensue in such cases has a bearing on the actor’s role conception and its foreign
policy performance.
438 Resistant to Change?

A Framework for Tracing Role Position Transformation and Its Effect on Foreign Policy
Performance
Role theory has, until recently, rested on the assumption of a relatively stable inter-
national environment in terms of prevailing norms and values. This has allowed
for an underlying expectation that changes in role conceptions and role posi-
tions will be driven primarily by internal transformations (see, for instance, Cantir
and Kaarbo 2012) or pressure to fit into the liberal order (Lavenex and Schim-
melfennnig 2009). Here, we conceptualize instead a contrary case, where external,
dissimilar actors attempt to shape the international system according to their world-
views and hence emit expectations toward other actors in the system that challenge
their role positions rooted in the liberal world order. We establish a number of
assumptions to guide us in the ensuing empirical analysis:

1. The socialization process is competitive and multidirectional.

2. Competitive role-playing will occur when actors try to impress on each
other the validity of their specific worldview. Actors may be more or less
receptive to this socializing “game.”
3. Role demands will be placed upon actors by significant others’ role ex-
pectations and altercasting through rhetorical cues, expressed in the guise
of framing, symbolic representations, and narratives, as well as specifically
targeted foreign policy action, often linked to rhetorical action.
4. Competitive role expectations are likely to lead to a change in an actor’s
alter-role position, which the actor may choose to ignore or counteract,
depending on the actor’s awareness of the change and preparedness to
react.
5. The ability to read cues will influence an actor’s foreign policy perfor-
mance.
6. The nature of the challenge posed to the underlying identity by the role
expectations of a significant (antagonistic) other has an impact on the role
performance of the role holder.

Above, an actor’s socialization into its role position was described in terms of a
learning process. Regardless whether the system is characterized by competition or
not, this process is primarily cognitive denoting the stages of the actor’s position-
taking and interaction with other system occupiers. In this article, we use concepts
such as “awareness,” “preparedness,” “receptiveness,” and ability to “read.” These
concepts are further operationalized below.
The concepts awareness and ability to read refer, respectively, to the actor’s propen-
sity to understand its own role position and the role conceptions of others. Aware-
ness impacts on the actor’s ability to absorb and digest information that challenges
the role position. A reduction of an actor’s “awareness” will occur when it is un-
able to pick up and process cues emanating from other actors in the system. Ability
to read signifies an actor’s propensity to understand the role conceptions and at-
tached behavior of other actors in the system and relate that information to its own
role position.
The concepts receptiveness and preparedness, respectively, relate to the actor’s will-
ingness and ability to respond to developments and cues that challenge its role con-
ception. Receptiveness refers to an actor’s propensity to adjust to other actors’ role
expectations and to changing conditions in the international system that impact
on its role position. Preparedness denotes an actor’s propensity to act if internal or
external conditions impacting on the role conception demand it in order to avoid
role dissonance.
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 439

In the following account, we analyze the EU’s relations to Russia and China in
the periods leading up to the (near) breakdown of their strategic partnerships. Our
intention is to explain the EU’s performance in its bilateral relations with Russia
and China as an outcome of its lack of preparedness to meet their refusal to abide
by the norms of the liberal order. We will do this in three steps. First, we identify
and explicate the EU’s role expectations vis-à-vis Russia and China. Then, we trace
the role expectations and altercasting that were emitted by Russia and China toward
the EU as a normative power. Indications of Russia’s and China’s growing refusal to
accept the alter part of the EU’s role conception as a normative power are gathered
from periods prior to the (near) breakdown of privileged bilateral relations. Finally,
we record the EU’s reactions to the role expectations and altercasting by Russia and
China. Here, we are looking for a divergence between the EU’s understanding of
the crises and that of Russia and China. We are also examining the nature of the
expectations emanating from Russia and China toward the EU and whether or not
they constituted a real challenge to the EU’s identity as an international actor. In
essence, we highlight the EU’s lack of preparedness in the run-up to the crises, as
it was taken by surprise by the strong reactions of Russia and China. We show how
the EU’s role position as a normative power proved inadequate in the face of the
challenge that Russia and China directed toward it. Finally, we trace the steps taken
by the EU to meet the challenges and handle the crises, which were determined by
the severity of the challenge posed to the values, norms, and principles of the EU’s
normative role conception. In the following analysis, we are primarily interested in
why the EU seemed unable to “read” the changes in Russia’s and China’s own role
positions that occurred in the early 2000s. To do this, we focus on the period in
which bilateral relations began to deepen, which refers to the mid-1990s in the case
of China and to the early 1990s in the case of Russia. Then, we move to the period
in which the EU’s lack of recognition of China’s and Russia’s new role positions
became untenable, and severe tension and breakdown ensued. In the case of China
this refers to the years between 2007 and 2009, and in the case of Russia to the years
between 2012 and 2014. The first period is characterized by the EU’s attempts to
socialize China and Russia into the liberal order, which emphasizes multilateralism,
a rule-bound international trading system, and liberal norms, while the second pe-
riod is characterized by their refusal to be socialized, the ensuing push-backs in the
form of their alternative worldviews and the challenges posed to the EU’s normative
role conception by antagonistic role expectations.
Our analysis is based on official reactions by the EU, China, and Russia, respec-
tively, with the purpose to substantiate our argument that the EU’s role concep-
tion as a normative power remained static, basically because it fulfilled a deeply
ingrained self-perception held by the political and bureaucratic elite in the EU in-
stitutions and member states. We are therefore interested in officially sanctioned
role representations, which we treat as negotiated self-understandings in a complex
political system. Therefore, we do not consider whether these self-understandings
corresponded to what political and bureaucratic elites in the EU institutions and
member states actually believed, thought, or knew about relations between the EU
and China and Russia respectively.

The EU’s Troubled Relations with China and Russia

Any observer of the EU’s foreign policy toward Russia and China in the period from
the mid-1990s to the late 2000s is struck by the EU’s lack of insight about the other
parties’ views on the international system, resulting in a nonacknowledgement of
the limits of socialization in the bilateral strategic partnerships.
440 Resistant to Change?

The EU’s Socializing Ambition toward China and Russia

The EU’s self-confidence as a normative actor reached its pinnacle in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. This is the period when the EU drew up its strategy to enlarge for
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, presented in the strategy document
Agenda 2000 (European Commission 1997), whose successful recipe for deep polit-
ical, social, and economic transformation in the guise of the Copenhagen criteria
was later applied also to the countries in the European Neighborhood lying to the
EU’s east and south (European Commission 2003a). In Agenda 2000, endorsed by
the EU member states, the European Commission spelled out the vision that the
geopolitical shifts taking place in Europe at the end of the Cold War propelled the
EU to assume a more significant global role (European Commission 1997).
This period is characterized by the EU’s growing awareness of its burgeoning
status as an international actor. It marks the start of forging a foreign policy iden-
tity molded on some specific features of the EU’s self-understanding, rather than
as an outgrowth of its member states’ historical ties and colonial trading patterns.
It is therefore no coincidence that the EU set up its first bilateral partnerships at
the same time as it enlarged to the European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) coun-
tries and started negotiating with the Central and Eastern European countries for
EU membership. One of the EU’s earliest common foreign policy strategy papers,
published in 1994, was directed toward the Asian countries (European Commis-
sion 1994). The role position that the EU envisaged was largely expressed in terms
of economic interests, linked to the Asian countries’ rise as major potential trad-
ing partners. Therefore, in order to “keep Europe in its major role on the world
stage, it is imperative to take account of the emergence of these new Asian powers”
(European Commission 1994, no page number).
Given the growing importance of China in economic and political terms, the
EU published a communication dedicated to the country in 1995, followed by
further strategy papers in 1998, 2001, and 2003, duly endorsed by the Council of
the EU (2001b, 2003). In these communications, the EU made clear its position as
a burgeoning international actor in no uncertain terms: “[T]he EU stands on the
threshold of a single currency and enlargement eastwards, and with the Treaty of
Amsterdam has equipped itself with new means to assert itself on the world stage”
(European Commission 1998). For the EU, a close relationship with China was
regarded as essential for the newly established global actor, but it underlined at the
same time that “China presents a particular challenge” and that its policy toward
China was “the most important factor in the EU’s image” (European Commission
1995a, no page number). In this sense, the EU’s China policy constituted a litmus
test for the EU’s self-conception as a normative power, as it could hardly maintain
close relations with China without emphasizing principled normative standpoints,
lest it lose its standing as a normative foreign policy actor. The EU’s socialization
ambitions vis-à-vis China were expressed in statements emphasizing that “support-
ing the transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and the respect for
human rights is an essential element of the EU’s policy towards China” (Council
of the EU 2003). Taking stock of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in 2001,
the council reaffirmed that “the European Union’s objective remained a stable and
prosperous China, governed by the rule of law and based on respect for democratic
principles and human rights” (Council of the EU 2001a). It was therefore of partic-
ular importance for the EU to coax China into adopting liberal values—foremost
human rights and political democratic rights. In this early period of EU-China
relations, the EU clearly assumed the role of the master tasked to teach China how
to become a fully fledged international actor, assume the responsibilities inherent
in its growing global standing, and conduct domestic economic, social, and political
reforms of a liberal orientation. The EU’s aim was “to continue to speak out on
its human rights concerns, and to encourage the rule of law and political reforms
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 441

in China,” indicating that “the stability and development of China itself is a key
concern also of the EU” and that it has “a clear stake in China’s successful transition
to a stable, prosperous and open country that fully embraces democracy, free
market principles and the rule of law” (European Commission 2003b).
At the time, China considered it to be in its interest to cultivate a strategic part-
nership with the EU to enhance its prestige as a global player. In the process, it
would seek to lift the status of the EU to the global level, which would help China to
realize the goal of a multipolar world order. China, therefore, emitted role expec-
tations vis-à-vis the EU to this effect, stating that “the European integration process
is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional
and international affairs (Foreign Ministry of China 2003, no page number). In
2003, the EU and China established a strategic partnership that allowed for ongo-
ing diplomatic dialogue and exchanges on various levels. The strategic partnership
secured the mutual interest of the EU and China to establish themselves as global
actors, bestowing prestige and international standing on both (Michalski and Pan
2017). However, this is where the consensus between the two stops. For China, the
privileged partnership was built on an agreement of not meddling in each other’s
internal affairs and respecting the principle of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, whereas for the EU, close relations with China were built on a tacit un-
derstanding that China would gradually move toward liberal values and a demo-
cratic organization of society. China’s premises for cooperation were unambigu-
ously spelled out in its strategy paper on the EU, as China pledged to build “a new
international political and economic order that is fair and equitable, and based
on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”2 At the same time, it expected
the EU to “strictly abide by the one-China principle” and urged EU leaders not to
“have any contact with the ‘Tibetan government in exile’ or provide facilities to the
separatist activities of the Dalai clique” (Foreign Ministry of China 2003, no page
number).
The EU’s relations with Russia dovetailed closely with its evolving self-perception
as an actor with a global role. While first caught off-guard by the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the EU undertook to develop new strategies toward the post-
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
The policies adopted toward these newly independent countries propelled the EU
to formulate a new role also vis-à-vis Russia. In this vital relationship, the EU con-
ceived of itself as a partner with the ability to provide resources and know-how to
assist Russia in its transition from a totalitarian command economy to a democratic
market economy, based on a conviction that it was able to “contribute to [Russia’s]
evolution as a democratic and progressive nation” (European Commission 1995b),
a commitment subsequently confirmed by the EU member states (European Coun-
cil 1995). Contrary to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Russian member-
ship of the EU was ruled out early on (Haukkala 2000). The legal basis for EU-Russia
relations was laid down in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),
which was signed in 1994 and ratified in 1997 after a delay caused by the EU’s
condemnation of the first Chechen war.
The leading principle of the PCA was to “support Russian efforts to consolidate
its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a
market economy” (European Union and Russian Federation 1997, article 1). The
view of Russia as a former superpower, whose transition the EU was destined to assist
through the diffusion of EU norms, long dominated the EU’s perspective on its re-
lations with Russia. For instance, the principal objectives of the EU’s Common Strategy
on Russia, elaborated in response to the economic crisis in 1998, were based on the
“consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia” and

2
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence comprise: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;
nonaggression; noninterference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.
442 Resistant to Change?

the integration of Russia “into a common European economic and social space”
(European Council 1999). These objectives neatly sum up the EU’s socializing am-
bition toward Russia, namely to assist Russia’s transition into a modern, stable,
and democratic country by including it in the European project. In addition, the
Common Strategy on Russia listed a number of measures through which the EU would
make its resources and expertise useful in assisting Russian reforms. As put by the
Council of the EU: “This cooperation must have as its prime objective to support
a constitutional state which meets the democratic requirements of a modern econ-
omy and benefits the whole of Russian society” (Council of the EU 2000). In this
early period of bilateral relations, the EU addressed specific role expectations with
Russia regarding its transition to a democratic market economy, which contained
profound implications for Russian domestic politics.
Russian enthusiasm for Boris Yeltsin’s government’s rapprochement with the EU
cooled considerably in the 1990s as doubts deepened over the fallout of the shock
therapy on the Russian economy. Furthermore, divisions with the West hardened
over the war in former Yugoslavia, Russia’s conduct in Chechnya, and US President
Bill Clinton’s administration’s policy of enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO). Yet, throughout the 1990s, despite increasing aversion toward the
perceived interference of the EU in Russia’s domestic affairs, the Russian leadership
shared in large part the EU’s vision of Russia’s integration with Europe.
Since Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power in 1999, the Russian leadership has taken
an increasingly principled position on national sovereignty, voicing role expecta-
tions to the effect that the EU should treat Russia as an equal partner rather than
as a novice. In 1999, Russia launched a medium-term strategy on its relations with
the EU as a reaction to the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia. In this document, “The
Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Fed-
eration and the EU (2000–2010),” Russia underlined its status as a great power and
placed national interests at the center of its relations with the EU so as to ensure
“the freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies.” Co-
operation with the EU was conceived on the vision of a multipolar international
system to counterbalance the dominance of the United States and NATO in Euro-
pean security (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). The document formulated
a role expectation toward the EU as an emerging independent European pole in
the international system, reducing the significance of the transatlantic link.
In its Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, Russia depicted the pending enlargement of
the EU, the introduction of the euro, and the strengthening of the CFSP as “having
a growing impact on the situation in Europe.” In the face of these developments,
Russia announced it would “seek due respect for its interest, including in the sphere
of bilateral relations with individual EU member countries” (Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2000). However, Russia’s earlier acceptance of externally promoted
reform was replaced by the political leadership’s concept of “Sovereign Democracy.”
In parallel with the increasingly assertive stance of Russia, the European Commis-
sion noted in 2004 that Putin’s first four years in power “raise questions about Rus-
sia’s commitment and ability to uphold core universal and European values and
pursue democratic reforms” (European Commission 2004a).
Partly in response to Russia’s demands for a more equal relationship, the EU-
Russia energy dialogue was launched in 2000 with the aim of “establish[ing] a rela-
tion of constructive interdependence” (European Commission 2004b). During the
St. Petersburg summit in 2003, the EU agreed with Russia to establish four common
spaces in the areas of the economy; freedom, security, and justice; external security;
and research, education, and culture. In 2004, the Council of the EU confirmed the
EU’s “determination to build a genuine strategic partnership with Russia based on
equal rights and obligations,” emphasizing that the partnership would “encourage
the respect for common values and the balanced and reciprocal promotion of in-
terests.” Yet the EU also reiterated its “strong and genuine interest” in a Russia that
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 443

was “open, stable and democratic,” with a continued emphasis on reform and the
implementation of mutual commitments (Council of the EU 2004).
Juxtaposed with its objections to the EU’s interference in its internal affairs, the
Russian government emitted role expectations toward the EU, depicting it as a
geopolitical player. In Russia’s view, the EU’s enlargement and its European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP) were part of a geopolitical project competing with Russia
for influence in the “near abroad.” Clearly, the EU and Russia saw the EU’s poli-
cies in these regions very differently. For instance, as the EU’s enlargement was
approaching in 2004, the Council noted that this would “bring the EU and Russia
closer together, increase opportunities for co-operation, and strengthen our joint
responsibility for promoting a European continent that is stable, democratic, pros-
perous and free” (Council of the EU 2004).
Further indicating the lack of understanding of each other’s ambitions, Moscow
interpreted the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution
in Ukraine as part of a concerted effort by the West to reduce Russia’s influence in
the post-Soviet region. Although Russia’s official objections were primarily directed
toward the prospect of NATO enlargement, the inclusion of Ukraine, Moldova,
and the Caucasus in the ENP was considered an infringement on Russian interests,
taken without proper consultation with Russia. It cemented a perception in Russia
of the EU as a “harmful actor whose increasing influence in the former Soviet space
impinged upon the Putin regime’s objectives in this region” (Maas 2017).

The End of Socialization: China’s and Russia’s Worldviews Confront the EU’s Normative
Actorness
From around 2005 onward, the liberal world order was gradually losing its attraction
for states around the world, leaving more room for the alternative visions of China
and Russia. The reasons for its waning lure had as much to do with the gradual
weakening of the West’s dominance—starting with the ill-fated American invasion
in Iraq and the weakening of the market-economy model because of the financial
crisis—as it had to do with the strengthening of China’s and Russia’s military, eco-
nomic, and political might. The rise of the BRICS nations, the establishment of the
Shanghai Corporation Organization, and the Russian free-trade agreement with the
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States constituted conspicuous ri-
vals to the Bretton Woods institutions of the liberal world order and the role of the
United States as the unchallenged “lone superpower” (Bremmer 2015).
For the EU, this fundamental shift of power in the international system had great
implications, more severe than for the United States, as its standing on the interna-
tional scene is dependent on other players recognizing it as an international actor
on a par with traditional state actors and accepting its normative self-conception.
This new competitive environment had a significant impact on the EU’s ability to
fulfil its role as a normative power, as the diffusion of liberal values and norms was
simply no longer accepted by illiberal global powers, which instead endeavored to
push back against the EU’s normative mission, thereby challenging the foundations
of its contested identity.
In the case of China, the shift in a significant other’s perception of the EU’s role
position is very clear, as bilateral relations were brought to a halt in 2008 following
the Chinese refusal to accept European leaders’ criticism of China’s handling of the
unrest in Tibet and the conduct of several official meetings with the Dalai Lama.
From China’s point of view, the EU and political leaders in EU member states had
overstepped the limits set out in the principles of engagement with China on a num-
ber of occasions, starting with the attack by a Tibetan protester on a Paralympic con-
testant during the procession of the Olympic torch in Paris and the boycott by many
European leaders of the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, followed
444 Resistant to Change?

by the visits of the Dalai Lama to European capitals and to the European Parlia-
ment in December 2008. Quite clearly, European leaders had underestimated the
importance that the Chinese leadership attached to these symbolic acts, as well as
China’s readiness to punish the EU and individual EU member states for meddling
in internal Chinese affairs. As a direct consequence thereof, China suspended the
planned summit with the EU in autumn 2008, refused to visit France during Chi-
nese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s tour of Europe in winter 2009, and suspended
diplomatic relations with Denmark for a few months in 2009. The conclusion that
can be drawn is that the EU and the European leaders had failed to acknowledge,
or at least to factor into their foreign-policy stance toward China, the change in
China’s role expectations vis-à-vis the EU, to the effect that China no longer ac-
cepted the EU’s normative diffusion and being treated as a novice international
player.
In the aftermath of this diplomatic crisis, the EU-China strategic partnership en-
tered a new phase, one in which the EU’s role as a normative power was considerably
toned down. This newfound equilibrium is based on the EU no longer emitting role
expectations vis-à-vis China that concern China’s internal democratization and the
EU confining discussions on human rights solely to the EU-China Human Rights
Dialogue, where the matter is considered to be of common concern—that is, not
solely a criticism of China. The then president of the European Commission, José
Manuel Barroso, endorsed the Chinese multipolar vision of the world, in which he
designated multilateralism as a means to an end but not the end in itself, satisfying
Chinese altercasting to this effect (Barroso 2010).
It is noticeable that the communicative action between China and the EU has
changed quite substantially since the rebalancing of the relationship. In the early
period, the European Commission published five major policy papers on China
(European Commission 1995a, European Commission 1995a, 1998, 2001, 2003b,
2006), while China published only one on the EU (Foreign Ministry of China 2003).
In the latter period, the EU refrained from publishing policy papers on EU-China
relations until 2016, when it confirmed its relations with China as “principled, prac-
tical and pragmatic, staying true to its interests and values . . . based on a positive
agenda of partnership coupled with the constructive management of differences”
(European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity 2016). However, the main document guiding EU-China relations is the joint
EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which constitutes the cornerstone of
the strategic partnership, based on “the principles of equality, respect and trust,”
and in which “the EU reaffirms its respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity [while] China reaffirms its support to EU integration” (European Union
and Foreign Ministry of China 2013).
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Russia’s aversion toward West-
ern policies was interpreted primarily through the prism of NATO enlargement
and US military power, as a remnant of the Cold War threat perceptions. Russia’s
invasion of Georgia in 2008, a few months after NATO had promised Georgia and
Ukraine future membership at the Bucharest summit, highlighted the risks associ-
ated with enlargement to these countries and effectively removed the issue from
NATO’s agenda. The EU responded to the conflict in Georgia by speeding up the
launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), an initiative involving Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine that had been instigated with the aim
of promoting “stability, better governance and economic development” at the EU’s
Eastern borders (European Commission 2008). The Council termed the EaP a tool
for “creating the necessary conditions for political association and further economic
integration between the EU and interested partner countries” and to offer the part-
ner countries support for “political and socio-economic reforms . . . facilitating ap-
proximation and convergence towards the European Union” (Council of the EU
2010).
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 445

From its onset, the Russian leadership voiced strong objections to the EaP. Rus-
sian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated: “We are accused of having spheres of
influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the
EU’s sphere of influence, including to Belarus?” (Pop 2009). By the end of the
decade, Russia’s foreign policy overtly ascribed to the EU the role of a geopolit-
ical competitor and perceived Russia’s dealings with the EU as a zero-sum game.
Russia set out to further its own Russia-centered model of regional integration. In
2010, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan formed a customs union, building on the pre-
existing Eurasian Economic Community; in 2012, the three countries established
the Eurasian Economic Space; and in May 2014, they signed a treaty on the es-
tablishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), later joined by Armenia and
Kyrgyzstan.
It is against this backdrop that we should view Russia’s strong objections to
Ukraine’s preparations to sign the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU at the
EaP summit in Vilnius in 2013, when it expended considerable effort and resources
to persuade Ukraine’s Yanukovych government to back away from the deal. Russia
initially deployed economic means to persuade Ukraine not to sign the AA with
the EU (Delcour and Kostanyan 2014). Soon, however, Russia took more sinister
steps to halt the rapprochement between the EU and Ukraine. In response to the
Euromaidan protests, followed by the ousting of the Ukrainian government, Rus-
sia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 and fueled the secessionist
rebellions in Donbass and Luhansk. Russia’s determination to counter Ukraine’s
enhanced participation in the EaP framework, along with its actions to stop simi-
lar processes in Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, seemingly took Brussels and Eu-
ropean governments by surprise. The developments in Ukraine caused a rapid
breakdown in EU-Russian relations. In response to the annexation of Crimea, the
EU froze its diplomatic engagements with Russia, cancelled the EU-Russia summit
planned for June 2014, and suspended talks on visa liberalization and a new agree-
ment to replace the PCA. The EU declared its support for “the Ukrainian people
and their right to choose their own future” and for “the Ukrainian government in
its efforts to stabilize Ukraine and undertake reforms” (European Council 2014).
Conversely, Putin denounced the West’s support for Ukraine: “we understand
that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian inte-
gration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues
in the West . . . We want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to
be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps” (Putin 2014). Despite Rus-
sia having voiced objections to the EaP for several years, the EU appeared to be
ill prepared for a situation in which Russia resorted to the use of military force.
The fact that Russia’s actions against Ukraine came primarily as a response to the
EU’s promotion of the EaP, not the perceived military threat from NATO or the
United States, was deeply problematic for the EU’s role conception as a normative
power. Russia’s assertion that the EaP constituted an attempt by the EU to establish
a sphere of influence in its eastern neighborhood altercasted the EU into a geopo-
litical player seeking to extend power and influence beyond its borders in the same
way as Russia.
The sustained effort to unite EU member states behind a far-reaching sanctions’
regime against Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine indicates a change in the
EU’s role position vis-à-vis Russia, caused by the radical challenge to European prin-
ciples of international society, the inviolability of territorial borders, and the duty
to uphold international law. The perceived eastward reach of the EU’s normative
influence is now confined to the active EaP partners—primarily Ukraine, Moldova,
and Georgia. The EU has proven willing to deploy its economic power to counter
Russia’s attempts to constrain its policy in its eastern neighborhood, by engaging
de facto in a geopolitical struggle on the principles of the European security or-
der. As expressed by the current president of the European Council, Donald Tusk,
446 Resistant to Change?

“Europe must do everything in its power to make sure that Ukraine’s independence,
sovereignty and stability are preserved . . . The last three years have seen the birth
of a new Ukraine that advances its democracy and economy through, sometimes
very tough, reforms. Additional assistance from Europe should support Ukraine in
strengthening its democratic path” (Tusk 2016).

Conclusion
Tracing the buildup to the crises between the EU and China and Russia, respec-
tively, shows that the EU held on to its role conception as a normative actor without
fully recognizing that role expectations were changing in the periods prior to the
crises. The boosting of Russia’s and China’s self-confidence as rising powers and
their increasing resistance to the EU’s normative ambitions to spread liberal values
and principles is key to understanding the changes to the EU’s role position. The
EU’s normative mission was no longer regarded as desirable, and demands were
raised that the Western world’s dominance of the world order should be dismantled
to make way for sovereign principles in interactions among states. The EU was
slow to recognize and understand the cues emanating from Russia and China
and certainly did not believe that its normative foreign policy was fundamentally
challenged. This disparity between perceptions of the rules of international en-
gagement and the objectives of each other’s foreign policy contributed to the crises
in the EU’s relations with Russia and China. Once the crises were apparent and
bilateral relations were breaking down in the case of Russia, or were close to break-
ing point in the case of China, the EU became aware of the gravity of the situation
and acted upon it. However, the ways in which the EU tackled the situations were
quite different in the two cases, as, too, were the outcomes. Obviously, the incidents
regarding Russia and China were in themselves different. Russia’s attempts to stop
Ukraine from moving toward the EU—by annexing the Crimean Peninsula and
supporting a military uprising in two Ukrainian regions—were far more serious
than China’s diplomatic punishment of the EU. For that reason, the EU’s reactions
to the crises naturally differed as well. Nonetheless, the EU’s self-perception as a
normative power clouded its awareness of the strength of the misgivings harbored
by Russia and China vis-à-vis the EU’s normative ambition, and its lack of prepared-
ness reduced its ability to adjust its foreign policy behavior at the onset of the
crises. Therefore, the outcome in both cases constituted a challenge to the EU’s
role position. In the case of Russia, the challenge was to the very foundations on
which European society was built, and, therefore, the response engaged both the
EU and the EU member states. It also coalesced European governments to seek
a common response, robust enough to signal the inadmissibility of the Russian
action. The EU positioned itself in the struggle of norms in Eastern Europe by
defending Ukraine’s right to decide upon its rapprochement with the EU, and in
the process, entered into a standoff with Russia on which order should prevail in
the region. As a consequence, the strategic partnership was suspended until further
notice. In the case of China, the EU was ready to abandon the role expectations
and its practice of altercasting China into accepting liberal norms and values. The
EU did not give up its norms and values but decided no longer to project these
upon China, which, in its turn, accepted the EU’s role conception on the condition
that it does not impinge on China’s principles of international engagement. Since
this change, relations between the EU and China have taken on a more tradi-
tional diplomatic nature, where the principles of sovereignty and noninterference
in domestic affairs prevail. The EU-China strategic partnership has reached a
new equilibrium on the basis of which they manage their contending normative
self-understandings.
Theoretically, this article has shown how role conceptions can act as limitations
to an actor’s ability to perceive changes in its role position in the international
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 447

system generated by the changing positions of other actors. This becomes partic-
ularly important in a competitive international environment that is undergoing
change in the distribution of both material and social sources of power. The case of
the EU’s apparent inability to formulate timely responses to the changing role po-
sitions of Russia and China highlights the significance of the interactive aspects of
roles—that is, the ability of actors to perceive and understand role expectations and
role demands from other actors—as an important precondition for foreign policy
adaptation. It also demonstrates that an actor whose role-conception is based on a
consensus among its constituent members, without necessarily sharing a common
foreign policy identity, may have a harder time reading the competing role expec-
tations from its antagonistic partners.

References
BARROSO, JOSÉ MANUEL. 2010. “The European Union and Multilateral Global Governance.” Speech at the
European University Institute, Florence, June 18. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-
10-322_en.htm?locale=en.
BENGTSSON, RIKARD, AND OLE ELGSTRÖM. 2011. “Reconsidering the European Union’s Roles in International
Relations: Self-Conceptions, Expectations, and Performance.” In Role Theory in International Relation,
edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hans W. Maull, 113–31. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
BENGTSSON, RIKARD, AND OLE ELGSTRÖM. 2012. “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in
Global Politics.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (1): 93–108.
BIEHL, HEIKO, BASTIAN GIEGERICH, AND ALEXANDRA JONAS. 2013. “Introduction.” In Strategic Cultures in Europe.
Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, edited by Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra
Jonas, 7–18. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS.
BREMMER, IAN. 2015. Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World. New York: Portfolio.
CANTIR, CRISTIAN, AND JULIET KAARBO. 2012. “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role
Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (1): 5–24.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 2000. Draft Council Conclusions, 10106/00, Brussels, July 5, 2000.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 2001a. EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights, 5345/01, Brussels, January
17, 2001.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 2001b. Draft Council conclusions, 10123/3/01, Brussels, June 27, 2001.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2003. Council Conclusions on the Commission’s Policy Paper on China.
13544/03, Brussels, October 14, 2003.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 2004. Draft Council Conclusions on Russia. 5900/04, Brussels, February
18, 2004.
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 2010. Draft Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. 15520/10, Brus-
sels, October 26, 2010.
DELCOUR, LAURE, AND HRANT KOSTANYAN. 2014. Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and
Russia and Their Consequences for the Area That Lies Between. CEPS Essay No. 17, Brussels: Centre for
European Policy Studies.
DIEZ, THOMAS. 2005. “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Eu-
rope.’” Millennium 33 (3): 613–36.
DIEZ, THOMAS. 2014. “Setting the Limits: Discourse and EU Foreign Policy.” Cooperation and Conflict 49
(3): 319–33.
DUCHÊNE, FRANÇOIS. 1973. “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence.” In A
Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community, edited by Max Kohnstamm and
Wolfgang Hager. London: Macmillan.
ELGSTRÖM, OLE, AND MICHAEL SMITH. 2006. “Introduction.” In The European Union’s Roles in International
Politics, edited by Ole Elgström and Smith, 1–10. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1994. Towards a New Asia Strategy. COM(94)314 final, Brussels, July 13.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1995a. A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations. COM(1995)279/final, Brussels,
July 5.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1995b. The European Union and Russia: The Future Relationship. COM(95)223 final,
Brussels, May 31.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1997. Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. COM(1997)2000 final, Brussels,
July 15.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1998. Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China. COM(1998)181 final, Brus-
sels, March 25.
448 Resistant to Change?

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2001. EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future
Steps for a More Effective EU Policy. COM(2001)265 final, Brussels, May 15.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2003a. Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and
Southern Neighbours. COM(2003)104 final, Brussels, March 11.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2003b. A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations.
COM(2003)533 final, Brussels, September 10.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2004a. On Relations with Russia. COM(2004)106 final, Brussels, February 10.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2004b. The Energy Dialogue between the European Union and the Russian Federation
between 2000 and 2004. COM(2004)777 final, Brussels, December 13.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2006. EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities. COM (2006)631 final, Brus-
sels, October 24.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2008. Eastern Partnership. COM(2008)823 final, Brussels, December 3.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY. 2016.
Elements for a New EU Strategy on China. JOIN(2016)30 final, Brussels, June 22.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL. 1995. Presidency Conclusions, Cannes, 26 and 27 June.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL. 1999. Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 1999/414/CFSP.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL. 2014. Conclusions on Ukraine, Brussels, 20 March.
EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 1997. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. Official Jour-
nal L 327, November 28, P. 0003–0069. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/
tradoc_114138.pdf.
EUROPEAN UNION AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OF CHINA. 2013. EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.
November 21. http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/20131123_agenda_2020__en.pdf.
FERRERO-WALDNER, BENITA. 2005. “Quo Vadis Europa?” Speech at European People’s Party’s “Paneu-
ropa” Group. Strasbourg, December 14, 2005. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-
797_en.htm.
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF CHINA. 2003. China’s EU Policy Paper. Beijing, October 2003. http://china.org.cn/e-
white/20050817/index.htm.
FOX, JOHN, AND FRANÇOIS GODEMENT. 2009. A Power Audit of EU-China Relations. London: The European
Council of Foreign Relations.
HARNISCH, SEBASTIAN. 2011. “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts.” In Role Theory in Interna-
tional Relation, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hans W. Maull, 7–15. Abingdon,
UK: Routledge.
HARNISCH, SEBASTIAN, CORNELIA FRANK, AND HANS W. MAULL. 2011. Role Theory in International Relations.
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
HAUKKALA, HISKI. 2000. “The Making of the European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia.” UPI Working Papers
28. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
HAUKKALA, HISKI. 2010. The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-sovereignty in International Rela-
tions. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
HAUKKALA, HISKI. 2015. “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmina-
tion of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 (1):
25–40.
HE, KAI, AND STEPHEN WALKER. 2015. “Role Bargaining Strategies for China’s Peaceful Rise.” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics 8 (4): 371–88
HOLSTI, KALEVI. 1970. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International Studies
Quarterly 14 (3): 233–309.
KUUS, MERJE. 2015. “Symbolic Power in Diplomatic Practice: Matters of Style in Brussels.” Cooperation and
Conflict 50 (3): 368–84.
LAVENEX, SANDRA, AND FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG. 2009. “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External
Governance in European Politics.” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (6): 791–812.
MAAS, ANNA-SOPHIE. 2017. EU-Russia Relations, from 1999–2015: From Courtship to Confrontation. New York:
Routledge.
MANNERS, IAN. 2002. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market
Studies 40 (2): 235–58.
MANNERS, IAN. 2011. “Symbolism in European Integration.” Comparative European Politics 9 (3): 243–68
MCCOURT, DAVID. 2012. “The Roles That States Play: A Meadian Interactionist Approach.” Journal of Inter-
national Relations and Development 15 (3): 370–92.
MEN, JING, AND GIUSEPPE BALDUCCI. 2011. “Introduction: EU-China Relations in the 21st Century.” In
Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st Century, edited by Jing Men and Giuseppe
Balducci, 21–31. Brussels: Peter Lang.
MEYER, CHRISTOPH. 2005. “Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Frame-
work for Explaining Changing Norms.” European Journal of International Relations 11 (4): 523–49.
 ANNA MICHALSKI AND NIKLAS NILSSON 449

MICHALSKI, ANNA, AND ZHONGQI PAN. 2017. Unlikely Partners? China, the European Union and the Forging of a
Strategic Partnership. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
ORENSTEIN, MITCHELL A., AND R. DANIEL KELEMEN. 2017. “Trojan horses in EU Foreign Policy.” Journal of
Common Market Studies 55 (1): 87–102.
PACE, MICHELLE. 2007. “The Construction of EU Normative Power.” Journal of Common Market Studies 45
(5): 1041–64.
PAN, ZHONGQI. 2012. “Sovereignty in China-EU Relations: The Conceptual Gap and Its Implications.” In
Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations: Global Governance, Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships, edited
by Pan Zhongqi. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
POP, VALENTINA, . 2009. “EU Expanding its ‘Sphere of Influence,’ Russia Says.” EUObserver, March 21, 2009.
https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827.
PUTIN, VLADIMIR. 2014. “Address by President of the Russian Federation: Vladimir Putin
Addressed State Duma Deputies, Federation Council Members, Heads of Russian Re-
gions and Civil Society Representatives in the Kremlin.” Moscow, March 18, 2014.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
RISSE, THOMAS. 2012. “Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy.” Global Policy 3
(1): 87–95.
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 1999. The Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the
Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010), presented at the European Council summit in Helsinki, December
1999.
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 2000. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000.
SJURSEN, HELENE. 2006. “The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power: How Can This Be?” Journal of European Public
Policy 13 (2): 235–51.
SMITH, NICHOLAS ROSS. 2015. “The EU and Russia’s Conflicting Regime Preferences in Ukraine: Assessing
Regime Promotion Strategies in the Scope of the Ukraine Crisis.” European Security 24 (4): 525–40.
SOLANA, JAVIER. 2009. Europe in the World. Speech at Kennedy School, Harvard University, September 17,
2009. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/110218.pdf.
THIES, CAMERON. 2010. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” In The International Studies Encyclopedia. edited
by Robert A. Denmark, 6335–51. Oxford: Blackwell.
THIES, CAMERON. 2012. “International Socialization Processes vs. Israeli National Role Conceptions: Can
Role Theory Integrate IR Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis?” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (1): 25–46.
THIES, CAMERON, AND MARIJKE BREUNING. 2012. “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Re-
lations through Role Theory.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (1): 1–4.
TUSK, DONALD. 2016. Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the EU-Ukraine Summit. 24 Novem-
ber, 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/24/tusk-remarks-
ukraine-summit/.
WALKER, STEPHEN. 1987. Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
WEHNER, LESLIE, AND CAMERON THIES. 2014. “Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic
Contestation of Roles.” International Studies Review 16 (3): 411–36.
WENDT, ALEXANDER. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”
International Organization 46 (2): 391–425.
WENDT, ALEXANDER. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.