DECISION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE REQUEST FOR

SUPPLEMENTATION AND RECTIFICATION OF ITS DECISION CONCERNING

ANNULMENT OF THE AWARD
The stance taken by both sides in a conflict about the rendering of an additional ruling and the
correction of particular errors in an arbitration case. The Claimants disagree with Argentina's
demands, which are for the Committee to issue a second ruling and to correct seven particular
issues.
We are confronted with a disagreement involving the Argentine Republic and a Claimant about
the legality of an arbitration judgment reached by the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in this request submitted by Argentina. The Argentine Republic
has asked that seven substantial flaws in the Decision be corrected. It claims that the flaws in the
Decision are so substantial that if they are not corrected, they would void the Decision on
Annulment and harm Argentina's standing for subsequent ICSID arbitrations. The Claimant, on
the contrary, contends that the 7 correction applications should be refused since they go beyond
the scope of Article 49(2) and reflect additional attempts by the responding party to resume
discussion on topics previously adjudicated by the Committee.
Argentina additionally claims the Committee made seven major mistakes in its portrayal of
Argentina's legal views and standing in the cancellation proceedings. The Claimants, on the
other hand, object to Argentina's request for a supplemental ruling and correction of particular
issues. They contend that the requests should be denied since they reveal no omission or error on
the part of the Committee. The Claimants feel that the Committee's judgment was accurate and
that no additional judgment or correction was required.
The Argentine Republic had asked the committee for a supplementary decision, claiming that the
tribunal in the initial arbitration failed to take into account how ownership of the business at the
core of the conflict was transferred from one side to another, and that this oversight weakened
the arbitration court's authority over the dispute. The committee dismissed this claim, stating that
the tribunal had reviewed the matter and determined that it had authority over the case since the
side in dispute maintained an investor within ICSID jurisdiction after the transfer of
management.
The Claimants argued that the Committee was not obligated to opine on every single matter
raised by the parties and that the Request exceeded the scope of Article 49(2) of the ICSID
Convention. They also argued that the Decision did not reveal any omission, but rather a
decision by the Committee contrary to the position advocated by the Respondent.
The Committee claimed in its reply that neither the Committee nor the Arbitral Tribunal had
overlooked Argentina's standing on the facts related to the exchange of the company's
capitals from one company to another, or the implications of that transmit for the Tribunal's
ability. The Committee pointed out that CGE had always been a shareholder, whether or not it
had full authority of the entity, and that CGE regulated the company at the point that arbitration
proceedings were initiated, so there was no doubt that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the
entity in question. The Request aimed at restarting an important discussion that had previously
been settled during the initial, grounds phase of the cancellation case, the Committee determined,
and it dismissed Argentina's assertion that it had failed to answer the issues.
The report unmistakably demonstrated that the corporation was a "body corporation substantially
regulated, either directly or indirectly, by" CGE, as the Committee further emphasized. The
Committee made it clear that, notwithstanding the possibility that they could be relevant to the
merits, its focus was on jurisdiction and not the repercussions of an inability to adhere to
statutory or other standards. The Committee came to the conclusion that even if CGE had been
obligated to get Tucuman's consent before purchasing the company's stock but did not, it was
still true that CGE directly or indirectly controlled the entity at the time the arbitration process
began, and for the intent of ICSID authority, that was sufficient.
The key question at issue is whether the Argentine Republic's demands for correction fall outside
the purview of Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention. A examination of applicable arbitral
rulings demonstrates that the fulfillment of two factual requirements must exist in order for the
correction remedy provided by Article 49(2) to be available. First, it must be established that an
award or judgment contains a clerical, mathematical, or other mistake. Secondly, the desired
correction must be related solely to the merits of the challenged decision or judgment.
This request then addresses each of the particular rectification demands made by the Argentine
Republic individually. The Republic, for example, asks whether the Committee was correct to
state that there was no disagreement between both sides about CGE's control over CAA when the
arbitration procedures were originally initiated. The Committee rejects this request, contending
that the pertinent portions of the Decision only address the actual facts surrounding the purported
change of authority over CAA before the start of the arbitration process and not the legality or
ramifications of that transmission. The Committee doesn't discover any mistakes that need to be
fixed.
Then, it examines a number of additional demands for rectifying, determining that none of them
do so either and that no faults have been discovered that may be corrected. It highlights the need
of differentiating between actual results and simply ancillary parts of an award or judgment
when taking applications for rectification into account and demonstrates the restrictions of the
rectification option outlined in Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention.

Arbitration Decision:
The petitioner's request for a supplemental judgment has been rejected, according to the first
point (a). This indicates that the committee has determined that the initial judgment does not
require additional explanation or clarification.
The respondent's claims for correction are addressed in the second section (b). Rectification
refers to the process of making anything that was incorrect or erroneous right. With the
exception of two particular amendments, the committee has rejected the majority of these
proposals. The first modification concerns the third sentence of the original decision's paragraph
72. The term "Claimants" is used in place of the phrase "Respondent." The second revision
pertains to the first line of the original decision's paragraph 86. ", and neither party disputes" will
be removed.
The expenditures related to the request for replenishment and rectification are covered in the
third item (c). Apart from the committee's costs and expenditures, which will be covered by the
responder, the committee has concluded that each party will be liable for its own expenses
associated with this inquiry.
The First Tribunal had been entitled to hold that it had authority over the claims brought before
it, but the ad hoc committee found that by refusing to consider the complaints' merits for acts
committed by the Tucumán government in violation of the BIT, the First Tribunal had
overstepped its authority.