THEORIA, 2020

doi:10.1111/theo.12235

An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism

and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time
by

JAMIE TAYLOR
Durham University, UK

Abstract: Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is
gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are
three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally
gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I
will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to
accommodate temporal gunk if they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combina-
tion of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possi-
bility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false.
Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or
metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad’s inconsistency, then,
has some interesting metaphysical implications.
Keywords: priority pluralism, perdurantism, temporal gunk, mereological gunk

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING three views:

Priority pluralism: More than one object is basic.1
Perdurantism: Objects possess a temporal part at every interval of time they
exist.
“POSS” gunky time: There is some metaphysically possible world w, such that
every interval of time t in w contains some proper subinterval of time t’.
These three views are fairly commonly held in metaphysics. Many metaphysi-
cians are priority pluralists and think that the most basic entities are the mere-
ological simples. Whatever physicists discover to be the elementary particles is

1 Some concrete object, x, is basic iff x is not grounded in/ontologically dependent upon any other con-
crete object (Schaffer, 2010). Being basic, however, does not necessarily mean that the object is not
grounded in any other entity, however. For instance, it might be that the mereological simples are the
basic entities but are grounded in bundles of tropes which constitute them. To be a fundamental entity
then is for some entity, x, to not be grounded in any other entity at all. While there clearly is a strong
connection between the two notions, being basic is not coextensive with being fundamental (though
some philosophers, such as Schaffer, do think the basic objects are fundamental). I think this is an impor-
tant distinction to make, as we will see that rejecting that there are basic objects does not entail there are
no fundamental entities (see n. 40). As such, one could be a pluralist, yet reject that the basic objects are
fundamental.

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2 JAMIE TAYLOR

considered to be the intuitive view of what the ontologically basic entities are.
Many metaphysicians also think that objects are composed out of temporal parts,
and thus that ordinary objects such as tables, chairs and persons are either four-
dimensional objects extended through space–time and composed out of temporal
parts, or are instantaneous temporal parts which are connected to certain other
instantaneous temporal parts via temporal counterpart relations.2 Objects persist
by perduring rather than enduring. And many metaphysicians too think that at
the very least time could have been gunky. If we think that the nature of space–
time is contingent, then one would be hard pressed to think that gunky time is
metaphysically impossible.
These three views, however, cannot be consistently held. In this article, I will
show that there cannot be any possible world where the basic objects are mere-
ological simples, objects perdure and every interval of time is gunky. And therefore
– supposing that priority pluralism and perdurantism are metaphysically necessarily
true theses3 – it cannot be the case that priority pluralism is true, that objects per-
dure and that time could be/is gunky. Subsequently, the inconsistency of this triad
indicates that at least one of the following theses are true: priority monism or meta-
physical infinitism; endurantism; or an “atomistic” view of time.
In the first section of this article I will sketch out all three of the positions in the
triad, before then demonstrating, in the second section, that the triad is inconsistent. In
the third section, I will then consider a couple of responses the pluralist might make.
First, the perdurantist pluralist might try and argue that some non-instantaneous
objects do not necessarily have temporal parts. Second, they might instead argue in
favour of a non-atomistic version of pluralism. After arguing that both of these replies
are implausible, in the fourth and final section I will consider the implications of the
triad being inconsistent. I will argue that it entails that either priority monism or meta-
physical infinitism, endurantism, or the atomistic view of time is true.

1. Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and the (Possibility of) Gunky Time

Before demonstrating that the triad is inconsistent, we need first to have a clear
conception of three theses which constitute it, and thus I will begin by examining

2 The former view is that of worm-theoretic perdurantism, and has been defended by David Lewis
(1976, 1986) and Hud Hudson (2001). The latter view, meanwhile, is that of stage-theoretic perdurantism
(i.e., exdurantism), and has been defended by Ted Sider (2001) and Katherine Hawley (2001).
3 However, as I go on to mention in the first section, some philosophers have questioned whether prior-
ity pluralism ought to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. But I know of no serious attempt to show
that perdurantism is a contingent thesis: pretty much everyone in the perdurantism vs. endurantism
debate assumes that whichever of these views is true is necessarily true. So, for the purposes of the arti-
cle, I will just assume perdurantism ought to be necessarily true if it is true in the actual world.

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each of them in more detail than I did in the introduction. Let us begin with prior-
ity pluralism.

Priority pluralism: More than one object is basic (in any world w containing more than one
object).

In stating that at least two objects are basic in worlds containing more than one
object, pluralism rules out the universal mereological fusion, U – if the No Over-
lap condition of Schaffer’s Tiling Constraint holds4 – as being basic in worlds
which contain more than a single isolated object. Specifying that more than one
object is basic in worlds containing at least two objects I think is needed, because
I do not think most pluralists would want to rule out the possibility of there being
a world which contains nothing but a single mereological simple. What pluralists
reject is that a single object is basic in worlds in which that object has proper
parts. For in accepting that everything is grounded in/is ontologically dependent
in a single mereological fusion, is to embrace priority monism: that only one
object is basic (irrespective of whether that object has proper parts or not)
(Schaffer, 2010, p. 42). Also, pluralism, as outlined here, should be interpreted as
a position that is true as a matter of metaphysical necessity. There is no world in
which there are more than two objects, where those objects exist in virtue of a
universal mereological fusion. Nor could there be a world where no object is
basic at all. This assumption is associated with metaphysical foundationalism:
that, necessarily, all grounding/dependence chains between concrete objects are
well-founded in basic concrete objects. There must be a “ground of all being” for
all concreta in all possible worlds, and most foundationalists suppose that what
this ground is must be the same throughout all possible worlds. If pluralism is
false in any world w, it is false in all worlds.
Of course, it is quite possible that someone might question the inference from
“there must necessarily be a foundation” to “it is necessary that this foundation is
constituted out of the same sort of objects”. One might hold that what the incon-
sistency of the triad shows is that what is basic is contingent. For instance, some-
one could argue that pluralism is true in worlds where space–time is not gunky,
but argue monism is true in worlds where it is.5 So, rather than the three
discussed theses being incompatible, what the triad may just indicate is that

4 As we shall see, Schaffer’s No Overlap condition states that basic objects cannot mereologically over-
lap with other basic objects. Schaffer’s weaker condition (which he suggests could be accepted instead of
No Overlap) of No Parthood would also preclude U and its proper parts being basic, as it states that no
basic object can be the proper part of another basic object (Schaffer, 2010, p. 40). I will go on to discuss
why both No Overlap and No Parthood seem plausible constraints on basic objects later on in the article.
5 Indeed, both Siegel (2016) and Trogdon (2017) have argued that priority monism can be defended as
a contingent metaphysical thesis.

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4 JAMIE TAYLOR

pluralism cannot be necessarily true. However, given that the above inference
is generally accepted in the literature,6 and that many of the arguments
for/objections against pluralism rest on the inference,7 I am going to assume it is
sound. But if someone instead wishes to take the inconsistency of the triad as evi-
dence of the contingency of priority pluralism, they can, as I have no watertight
objection to this.8,9
Before moving on, it should also be mentioned that pluralists are generally
atomists. That is, they hold:

Atomism: x is a basic object iff x is a mereological simple.

Most pluralists are atomists in that they think the basic objects do not have any
proper parts. Their acceptance of atomism can be attributed to two reasons. First,
to reject atomism may lead to ontological arbitrariness in supposing which mere-
ological “level” is basic. Schaffer (2010, p. 63), for instance, asks us to imagine a
possible world which contains a single homogeneous sphere, and that everything
that there is in that world is a proper part of the sphere. He argues that selecting
any intermediate level of the sphere would be arbitrary, as no such layer of the
sphere seems any more ontologically privileged than any other. The only layer
which the pluralist could select that is distinct from any other is that of the bot-
tom, and the objects there do not have any proper parts. Second, pluralists gener-
ally argue that it is intuitive to think that mereological fusions are grounded
in/dependent upon their parts, and it is because of this direction of the depen-
dence chain that we should be pluralists as opposed to being monists. Unless we

6 Schaffer (2010) obviously being one, but also see Brzozowski (2008) and Cameron (2014).
7 Schaffer’s (2010) argument from the metaphysical possibility of mereological gunk obviously being
one of them.
8 Schaffer (2010, p. 63) argues that the direction of grounding should be fixed by what is metaphysi-
cally possible, and thus the direction of grounding should necessarily hold in the same direction between
the same sort of entities. So, if some composite objects require a ground in one world, we can, therefore,
infer that they are grounded in every world in which they exist and are composite. Schaffer’s contention
here seems closely tied to his later idea that there are “laws of metaphysics” which specify “what entities
ground what”, and that some of these laws of metaphysics concern fundamental entities/facts Schaffer
(2017). While I am sympathetic to Schaffer’s intuition here, giving a rigorous of defence of it would
probably require a paper in itself. See also Brzozowksi (2008) and Cameron (2014) for mereological
motivations to accept pluralism as a metaphysically necessary thesis.
9 Alternatively, one might think priority pluralism is contingent because metaphysical foundationalism
is contingent, and thus deny the inference’s antecedent. However, for the purposes of the article, I take
metaphysical foundationalism to be the thesis that, necessarily, there are some basic entities. This is typi-
cally assumed by its defenders, and for arguments for this being the case, see Schaffer (2016) and Bliss
(2019). Still, if one thinks metaphysical foundationalism can be a contingent thesis, one can just take the
triad as showing that pluralism is not necessarily true. I would like to thank two anonymous referees
from this journal for pointing out to me the option of just taking the triad as showing pluralism to be a
metaphysically contingent thesis.

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select the mereological simples as the basic objects, however, it would turn out
that some objects would be grounded in mereological fusions (i.e., the mere-
ological fusions within the intermediate level selected as containing the basic
objects).
Perdurantism, meanwhile, can be outlined as follows:
Perdurantism: For any object, x, x perdures iff x possesses temporal parts at every subinterval time
t’ of the interval time t that x exists throughout.10

And, following Dean Zimmerman (1996, p. 121), we can define a temporal

part as follows:
Temporal part: x is a temporal part of y throughout t, =df x exists during and only during t; (ii) for
every subinterval t* of t, there is a z such that (a) z is a part of x, and (b) for all u, u has a part in
common with z during t* iff u has a part in common with y during t*; and (iii) y exists at times
outside t.

Crucially, unlike Ted Sider’s definition of a temporal part,11 Zimmerman’s does

not rely upon there being any instantaneous temporal parts: it is not part of the
definition of a temporal part that things must ultimately decompose into some
smallest temporal part, which exists only for a durationless instant.12 It should
not follow from the definition of either perdurance or temporal part that the per-
durantist is committed to an atomistic mereology.
Perdurantists then believe that (ordinary) objects do not persist by being
“wholly” located at each instant of time t they exist, but rather persist by either
having temporal parts at every spatiotemporal region they occupy or being identi-
cal to instantaneous temporal parts which bear temporal counterpart relations to
certain other temporal parts located at distinct spatiotemporal regions.13
To think that it is metaphysically possible that time is gunky is to believe that
the following is true:
“POSS” gunky time: There is some metaphysically possible world w, such that every interval of
time t in w contains some proper subinterval of time t’.

10 It should be noted, then, that unlike Hofweber and Velleman (2011), I think the distinction between
endurantism and perdurantism can be formulated in terms of whether persisting objects have temporal
parts at each interval they pervade. If they are right though that even an endurantist should embrace tem-
poral parts, then I think what the triad indicates is that one must either reject priority pluralism or tempo-
ral gunk. Furthermore, I will also count Josh Parsons’s (2000) view of persistence (in which objects are
four-dimensionally extended yet lack temporal parts) as an endurantist theory (albeit not a
multilocational endurantist theory).
11 See Sider (2001, pp. 59–60) for definitions of temporal part in terms of instantaneous temporal
parts.
12 This has been previously pointed out by Josh Stuchlik (2003).
13 Again, the former view is worm-theoretic perdurantism, while the latter is stage-theoretic
perdurantism.

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6 JAMIE TAYLOR

To hold that time could have been gunky then is to think there is at least
one possible world in which there is no smallest interval of time: that every
segment of time consists of a duration containing smaller temporal segments.
But why suppose that time either is or could have been gunky? Well, first, it
seems conceivable that time could be gunky. It seems we can imagine that for
every interval of time t, we can imagine t being constituted out of a smaller
interval of time t’. And if we take conceivability as at least being a strong
guide to metaphysical possibility, this gives us defeasible evidence that there
are temporally gunky worlds. We also might think that time is gunky because
we think that any “atomistic” view of time is untenable. On a continuous atom-
istic view of time,14 for example, one could argue that it seems hard to ima-
gine how an interval of time could lack any temporal extension (i.e., the
smallest minutiae of continuous atomistic time). And we might perhaps reject
the discrete view of time because of Zeno’s paradox of the stadium or Weyl’s
(1949) tiling problem.15
But it seems plausible to suppose that the structure of space–time is not some-
thing we can determine a priori, but is instead a contingent metaphysical truth
which can only be determined empirically. Determining space and/or time’s sub-
structure is a job for physicists, and is not something which can be determined
via the philosophical armchair. Forrest (1995, pp. 340–341), for instance, argues
that empirical tests could establish whether space–time is discrete or dense. Sup-
pose we discovered that elementary particles “jumped” from one region of space–
time to another, without occupying any region in between the two. Such experi-
mental evidence would then suggest that the substructure of space–time was dis-
crete as opposed to being either continuous or gunky. Equally, however, we can
imagine the experiment confirming the particle occupied regions which were in
between and/or overlapped those two regions, which would then suggest the sub-
structure of space–time was not discrete after all.16,17 If we think then that deter-
mining the nature of space–time is an empirical, contingent matter, this gives us

14 For time to be continuous is not synonymous with it being gunky. Any gunky interval of time is
continuous, but it is not necessary that a continuous interval be gunky. For continuous time could still
ultimately be constituted by intervals which have no temporal extent (i.e. continuous atomistic time).
Both continuous atomistic time and gunky time are dense temporal series, but an extended temporal
series being infinitely divisible and “gap-free” does not suffice for it being temporally gunky; just as a
spatial region being infinitely divisible does not entail that it does not ultimately decompose into points.
15 See Dainton (2010, pp. 294–299) for discussions of both of these objections to discrete space–time.
16 It should be noted that I have taken this thought experiment from Nikk Effingham (2013, p. 194);
though he, himself, is actually sympathetic to the notion that the substructure of space–time and the pos-
sible change of an object can be settled a priori.
17 Other philosophers who think the substructure of space–time may be contingent include Katherine
Hawley (2001, p. 51) and Michael Traynor (2013); though see Effingham (2013) for a response.

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reason to suppose that whether time is gunky or not is a contingent truth.18 It

seems, then, there is good reason to suppose that it is metaphysically possible that
time is gunky.

2. The Inconsistent Triad Demonstrated

The three views outlined in the previous section are reasonably plausible, main-
stream views in contemporary metaphysics.19 Unfortunately, they are jointly
incompatible.
To see why, for reductio, let us suppose that there is a world (i.e., Elric world),
in which objects perdure, the basic objects are mereological simples and the sub-
structure of time is gunky. Now imagine that a certain elementary particle, Elric,
has existed since the Big Bang and will cease to exist only when the universe
comes to an end at the Big Crunch. Elric persists by perduring,20 but given that
Elric perdures it is not actually mereologically simple; it is composed out of tem-
poral parts, which it has at each subinterval of the entire interval that it perdures.
Given atomism, Elric cannot be basic and is thus grounded in/ontologically
dependent upon its temporal parts. But then, as time is gunky, Elric will not

18 I do not think it plausible (at least if we subscribe to a possibilist theory of modality) that the sub-
structure of space–time is an a posteriori necessity: uncovering the substructure of the world’s space–
time does not seem to entail that all worlds must have the same substructure, as opposed to deciphering
that H20 is necessarily water. For suppose we did empirically confirm that space–time is continuous; we
do not seem to be making a theoretical identification, in the same way we did when we discovered water
was H20. For (if we are essentialists about natural kinds, in any case) to be water is for it to be H20,
whereas it does not seem to be part of space–time’s essence that it is continuous (unless we can provide
some a priori argument for this). Certainly, it seems hard to imagine why one might suppose if we can-
not deduce a priori the substructure of space–time, that the substructure it has in the actual world holds
true of space–time in different possible worlds.
19 I must confess, however, I know of nobody in the present literature who explicitly accepts all three
views. Both Stuchlik (2003) and Giberman (2019a, 2019b), for instance, seem sympathetic towards tem-
poral gunk, and think worm-theoretic perdurantism is compatible with it; but Stuchlik (2003, p. 310)
does not seem to think temporal parts are more fundamental than the objects they are parts of, and
Giberman (2015) has previously defended a view on fundamental particulars which would be compatible
with priority pluralism being false (see n. 40). This might well be evidence that metaphysicians implicitly
recognize the tension between the three views. Still, I think establishing that there is such a tension is an
important task, especially given (as we will see in section 4) the triad’s inconsistency might undermine
certain pluralist strategies in explaining away the existence of mereological gunk. I would like to thank
an anonymous referee for helping clarify my thoughts on this.
20 For ease of explanation, I am supposing that Elric here is a four-dimensional worm as opposed to
being an instantaneous temporal stage. If one is a stage theorist, one will presumably identify Elric with
such a stage. What the stage theorist should take from my argument then is that there is no Elric in Elric
world, as there are no instantaneous temporal stages in such a world. As has been argued initially by Stu-
chlik (2003) – and then later by Giberman (2019a) – gunky time worlds are incompatible with stage
theory.

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8 JAMIE TAYLOR

decompose into any mereological simples, given that there are no smallest tempo-
ral parts of Elric. Every temporal part of Elric will be grounded in another tempo-
ral (proper) part, and thus to quote Schaffer (2010, p. 64), “being would be
infinitely deferred, never achieved”. The well-foundedness of grounding is vio-
lated in Elric world; and thus given the necessity of pluralism, perdurantists who
think that time could be gunky cannot think mereological simples are the basic
entities. The reductio then is complete: one of priority pluralism, perdurantism
and “POSS” gunky time must be false.

3. Objections

I think there are two possible responses that could be given to the above argu-
ment. The first is that perhaps the perdurantist who also accepts priority pluralism
could drop the idea that non-instantaneous objects necessarily have temporal
parts. That is, perhaps there are atomic temporal parts which can pervade a
space–time region without having any temporal proper parts in that region. We
can think of these, perhaps, as temporally extended simples: objects which have
temporal extension, yet do not have any spatial or temporal parts. Elric, then, we
might suppose, perhaps eventually decomposes into some collection of temporal
parts which are mereologically simple, yet have a non-zero duration.
I do not think this is a plausible response for a perdurantist to make, as it con-
flicts with their account of change. According to perdurantists, what accounts for
change in objects is a qualitative difference between their earlier and later tempo-
ral parts. To say that I have grown taller is for it to be the case that my present
temporal part is taller than a past temporal part. Furthermore, the perdurantist’s
account of change can be extended to modal cases. To say that I could have had
black hair for five seconds, five years ago, is for it to be the case that I have a
temporal part – located five years ago in the past – which could have had black
hair and has a temporal duration of five seconds.21 Seemingly, then, to account
for possible change, temporal parts must be fine-grained as possible change
(Hawley, 2001, pp. 48–50). However, if time is gunky then it seems metaphysi-
cally possible that for any interval of time t, some object could undergo a change
in that time. Given t was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that the object in question
has no atomic temporal parts, as it could undergo a change during any interval of
time it exists at.

21 For ease of explanation, I presume worm-theoretic perdurantism here as opposed to stage-theoretic

perdurantism. If one is a stage theorist, one can simply amend the explanation of change/possible change
to be in terms of temporally counterpart related stages. For instance, I could have had black hair for five
seconds because the stage I am is temporally counterpart related to some past stages which collectively
have a duration of five seconds, and each of which could have had black hair.

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A possible rejoinder to this a fan of the triad might make, is that it is physically
impossible for there to be change shorter than the Planck length, and there is no
need to posit temporal parts for space–time regions which are too short in dura-
tion for change to occur. I do not think, however, that such a reply is plausible.
Perhaps, in the actual world, there cannot be change occurring in a shorter inter-
val than the Planck length, but that does not entail there cannot be such change
in all possible worlds. It seems metaphysically possible that an object could
change in some interval shorter than the Planck length, and so objects need to
have temporal parts which are short enough in duration to account for such possi-
ble change. Maybe it could be argued that though there are gunky time worlds
where there is change shorter than the Planck length, in such worlds there is some
unit of time that is an analogue of the Planck length, in that change cannot occur
in a (proper) subinterval of that time. However, it seems arbitrary and ad hoc to
hold that it is metaphysically necessary that there is always some duration of time
at which there cannot be possible change. This is a metaphysically substantive
claim which needs independent motivation, and without which I do not think we
should accept the claim that every possible world has some analogue to the
Planck length.22 I hold then that we should suppose that temporal parts are as
fine-grained as time is in the world in which they are in, even if physical possible
change in such a world has some minimal duration.23
The second reply a perdurantist could make is to point out that the inconsis-
tency of the triad rests on a crucial assumption: atomism. In the first section, I
argued that pluralists should accept atomism, but it might be that a worm-
theoretic perdurantist could respond to the triad by replacing atomism with a the-
sis which is reasonably close to it, but which, unlike (perdurantist) atomism, is
compatible with time being gunky. Let us say that some object, x, is
mereologically-spatially simple iff x does not have any proper parts which have a
smaller spatial extent than x. Something being mereologically-spatially simple,

22 For a similar response to a similar objection, see Giberman (2019a, p. 234).

23 Perhaps one could respond by appealing to Traynor’s (2013) argument that temporal parts are not as
fine-grained as possible change/time in a distinct possible world, on pain of generating the absurd result
that temporal parts are more fine-grained than time is in the world they are in. In the case of Traynor’s
argument, however, the reason we may be obliged to accept his argument is because intuitively temporal
parts cannot be more fine-grained than time is in the world they are in, and this seems to be a substantive
metaphysical problem. If the actual world has discrete time, we should suppose its temporal parts are as
fine-grained as discrete time, even though in a world with continuous time they would be more fine-
grained. If the actual world has continuous time, however, there seems no metaphysically problematic
reason as to why we cannot infer temporal parts are as fine-grained as continuous time, even if physical
possible change cannot occur in a duration shorter than the Planck length. Furthermore, perdurantism
and pluralism are supposed to be metaphysically necessary theses, so as long as there is a world which
has no mimimal duration in which physical possible change can occur, one of these views must be false.

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10 JAMIE TAYLOR

however, does not entail that it has no proper parts, providing, that is, those
proper parts are only temporal parts (and not spatial parts) of the object in ques-
tion. If some object, x, is mereologically-spatially simple and has a proper part, y,
then (i) y must be spatially simple, and (ii) the temporal duration of y must be a
proper subinterval of that of x’s duration. What the pluralist then would be argu-
ing is that while we should think objects which occupy atomic spatial regions are
more fundamental than those which occupy regions of greater spatial extent, it
does not follow that objects which occupy smaller space–time regions are always
more fundamental than those which occupy larger regions.
Unfortunately, I do not think this approach is plausible, for two reasons. First,
by embracing this line of argument, the pluralist, it seems, thinks that Elric is
what Schaffer calls an integrated whole. According to Schaffer (2010), integrated
wholes are composite objects which are ontologically prior to their parts, as they
have a unity which a mere aggregate – i.e., such as a heap of sand – of things
does not possess. Consider an organism and its organs: the organism should be
judged as being ontologically prior, as the organs are defined by their functional
role within the organism.24 Indeed, one could say that the body’s organs depend
for their identity upon the organism they belong to, but the converse does not
hold for the identity of the organism. What I am is not determined by my kidney,
but my kidney could not be my kidney unless I exist. By utilizing the notion of
identity dependence (Lowe, 1998, pp. 147–151), perhaps we can determine
whether some parts ground their mereological fusion or vice versa.
My worry is that in identifying the perduring Elric as basic, Elric seems to
have the status of being an integrated whole: it is a whole which is ontologically
prior to its proper parts. But by admitting Elric as an integrated whole, the plural-
ist is then hard pressed to deny that other composite objects such as organisms
are too. Suppose we ask such a pluralist why it is that their basic objects are not
grounded in their proper parts. To insist that it is because some objects are basic
would be an ad hoc response, so the pluralist needs to give us reason to suppose
why the basic objects are not grounded in their temporal parts. The clear reason,
I think, would be to hold that it is because the identity of Elric and other basic
objects are not dependent for their identity on their temporal parts. That is, we
use the notion of identity dependence – as suggested above – to show why this
class of objects is not grounded in their temporal parts. Elric is not grounded in
its temporal parts because its identity is not determined by them. It could have
existed even if it lacked any particular one of them. If Elric ceased to exist a
minute before it did, it would still be the same object even if – as a result – it
lacks some of the temporal parts it has. By contrast, a temporal part representing

24 Schaffer takes Aristotle (1984, p. 1634) as the inspiration for this example.

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the last minute of Elric’s life would not be the temporal part it is unless Elric
exists. Elric, then, is not identity dependent upon its temporal parts, and is, there-
fore, not grounded in them.
But what goes for Elric can also be applied to other composite objects. I am
not grounded in my organs because my identity is not dependent upon any partic-
ular organ. But if am not identity dependent upon my organs, then it does not
seem I am identity dependent upon any of the elementary particles out of which I
am composed. Suppose Elric is a proper part of me. It does not seem that my
identity is any way dependent upon Elric or any other elementary particle which
makes me up. My identity certainly does not depend on this particular collection
of elementary particles which compose me. But then it would follow that I am
not grounded in the pluralist’s basic objects, and thus that I am a basic object.
Resultantly, this means that either (i) perduring elementary particles are grounded
in macrophysical objects, or (ii) both perduring elementary particles and certain
macrophysical objects are basic.
To begin with (i), it just does not seem plausible that the existence and nature
of microphysical objects are ultimately grounded in macrophysical objects. For
instance, without an exchange of mesons between nucleons per the strong nuclear
force, the nuclei of atoms would not be able to exist, without which there seem-
ingly would not be any composite objects. Now, perhaps one could argue that this
interaction ultimately holds in-virtue-of the physical state of the entire universe, if
one is a priority monist. But it just does not seem plausible that it occurs in-vir-
tue-of organisms. It is the fact there is an exchange of mesons between nucleons
which provides a metaphysical explanation for the existence and nature of the
atomic nuclei, not facts about organisms which have atomic nuclei as proper
parts.25
As for (ii), this would lead to a violation of Schaffer’s No Overlap condition of
his Tiling Constraint. According to No Overlap (Schaffer, 2010, pp. 39–40), basic
objects cannot mereologically overlap with other basic objects. Schaffer argues
that as “independent units of being”, basic objects should be freely recombinable,
and this cannot be so if they mereologically overlap with one another. For if two
entities modally constrain each other in some way, and this modal relationship is
not because of a causal relationship between them, then it seems we can only
explain the modal relationship by either (i) positing a grounding relation between

25 The only pluralist I am aware of who might disagree with this claim is Bernstein (forthcoming),
who defends the view that the basic objects occupy some middle mereological level. The vast majority
of pluralists, however, either are atomists or will accept a thesis which is similar to atomism. Pluralists
are generally priority micropluralists: basic objects are microphysical objects. If, however, one is sympa-
thetic towards Bernstein’s view, then one perhaps should see this article as showing there is a tension
between gunky time, perdurantism, and priority micropluralism.

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12 JAMIE TAYLOR

them, or (ii) holding they are both grounded in some “common ground”. But as
basic objects cannot be grounded in other objects, then whichever option we go
for, both objects cannot be basic.26 Given mereological overlap is taken to be a
mereological and not a causal notion, No Overlap seems a prima facie plausible
condition. But if I am a basic object, and Elric – which is a proper part of me –
is basic, then two distinct basic objects would overlap one another.27 Ultimately,
then, I do not think the pluralist can argue that some wholes are more fundamen-
tal on the basis of identity dependence. But without such a notion, there seems to
be no reason as to why we should hold that Elric is more fundamental than its
temporal parts.
Second, many perdurantists think that mereological composition is unrestricted;28
indeed, many perdurantists are perdurantists because of motivations which also sup-
port unrestricted composition. For instance, the argument from vagueness has been
given as an argument in favour of both unrestricted composition and perdurantism:
if composition is unrestricted because there cannot be either a sharp or vague cut-
off point between a case where composition occurs and where it does not, then
objects must perdure, for otherwise, there would be either a sharp or vague cut-off
point between a case where there is a cross-time fusion and where there is not
(Sider, 2001, pp. 120–139). Basically, if we think there are strong reasons to sup-
pose that composition is synchronically unrestricted (i.e., unrestricted at a time),
then – unless one is a presentist about time – those motivations can similarly be
used to support the notion that composition is also diachronically unrestricted
(i.e., unrestricted across time). And as Varzi (2007) has argued, there is good rea-
son to think that diachronic universalism is more compatible with perdurantism than
it is with endurantism.29 Furthermore, if one is a perdurantist because one is a

26 The idea that modal connections between entities are indicative of either a causal or a grounding
relation existing between them, comes from Schaffer’s co-authored paper with Jennan Ismael (forthcom-
ing) on quantum holism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee from this journal for convincing
me of the need to justify “No Overlap” in the article.
27 It should be noted that a non-atomistic pluralist would not avoid problems by dropping “No Over-
lap” in favour of the weaker condition of “No Parthood”: that no basic object can be a proper part of
another basic object (Schaffer, 2010, p. 40). This is obviously because Elric would be a proper part of
me. Schaffer motivates “No Parthood” on the basis of ontological parsimony; given a whole and its parts
will supervene on one another – unless the whole perhaps has an emergent property – it is redundant to
suppose that both are basic. Also, if proper parthood is a species of the grounding relation, then two
objects cannot both be basic if one is a proper part of the other.
28 These include David Lewis (1986), Hud Hudson (2001) and Ted Sider (2001) (though Sider is a
stage theorist, and not a worm theorist unlike the other two).
29 Varzi (2007) points out that endurantists of such a sort are likely to be committed to holding that
there are countless cases of spatial coincidence between objects which are of the same kind. It is one
thing to suppose that a statue and a lump of clay are coincident but distinct objects because they fall
under different sortals; it is another to suppose there can be a plethora of objects, of the same sortal,
which are wholly present at the same spatial region.

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 AN INCONSISTENT TRIAD 13

supersubstantivalist,30 then one obviously holds that all space–time regions are
identical to concrete objects. But given that any arbitrary plurality of space–time
regions make up a space–time region, it follows that any arbitrary plurality of
concrete objects have some mereological fusion (Schaffer, 2009, p. 135). If,
though, a perdurantist thinks that composition is unrestricted, she will find her-
self violating Schaffer’s No Overlap condition of his Tiling Constraint if she
thinks Elric is basic.
To see this, suppose that in Elric world there is some object, “Kaladin”. Like
Elric, Kaladin exists from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch, and until roughly
halfway through its existence, t*, Kaladin shares all the same temporal parts as
Elric. But after t*, Kaladin no longer shares any temporal parts with Elric, and
thereafter shares all its temporal parts with a basic object – spatiotemporally iso-
lated from Elric – “Dalinar”. Kaladin then mereologically overlaps with two basic
objects, and is itself a basic object given that it is mereologically-spatially simple:
no part of Kaladin is three-dimensionally smaller than it. No Overlap is violated.
If the perdurantist wishes to be a non-atomistic pluralist and preserve No Over-
lap, she must deny that Kaladin exists. But if composition is unrestricted, Kaladin
must exist, as there must be a mereological fusion of all Elric’s temporal parts
prior to t* and all of Dalinar’s temporal parts following t*. Hence, if a per-
durantist is committed to unrestricted composition – as many are – they cannot
accept non-atomistic pluralism without violating No Overlap.31 For this reason,
and for concerns about integrated wholes and identity dependence, I do not think
non-atomistic pluralism is a plausible response to the inconsistency of the triad.

4. Implications

Given the triad’s inconsistency, then one of priority pluralism, perdurantism and
“POSS” gunky time must be necessarily false. Let us explore the implications of
denying each part of the triad.
Suppose we are perdurantists who think that it is metaphysically possible that
time is gunky. In which case, if one accepts metaphysical foundationalism is

30 See Sider (2001, p. 110). The argument is that given space–time regions perdure, then in identifying
objects with space–time, one must also hold that they perdure.
31 Perhaps a non-atomistic perdurantist might drop “No Overlap” in favour of the weaker condition of
“No Parthood”. Even if unrestricted composition is true, this version of pluralism is compatible with
“No Parthood”, as Kaladin is not a proper part of either Elric or Dalinar. Nevertheless, I do think it is
plausible to suppose – like Schaffer – that as basic objects are not grounded in any other basic object,
they should be “modally free” of one another (per the argument from “modal connections” we saw ear-
lier, which can be traced to Ismael and Schaffer (forthcoming)). Having said that, there are admittedly
those who are sceptical of whether basic/fundamental entities should be freely recombinable
(i.e., Wang, 2016).

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14 JAMIE TAYLOR

necessarily true, then one must be a priority monist. What is basic is never more
than one object: the Cosmos, U. For as Schaffer (2010) has argued, if mere-
ological gunk is possible, then not in every possible world will the pluralist have
mereological simples to serve as their basic objects. What this shows is that prior-
ity pluralists are more vulnerable to the argument from gunk for monism if they
are perdurantists. For if temporally extended objects perdure and time is gunky, it
will necessarily follow that temporally extended objects are mereologically
gunky; whereas if temporally extended objects perdure and space is gunky, that
alone will not entail that temporally extended objects are mereologically gunky.
For unless a perdurantist accepts a principle such as the “Geometric Correspon-
dence Principle” (GCP),32 they could hold that even if the region an object
occupies is gunky, the object itself is not. For instance, one could be a per-
durantist and also accept the existence of spatially extended simples. This would
admittedly preclude certain motivations for perdurantism,33 but such a combina-
tion of views would still be compatible with some of the main arguments given
for perdurantism,34 and seems coherent. As such, a pluralist who accepts the exis-
tence of extended simples might be able to explain away the conceivability of
mereological gunk, by holding that when we think we can conceive mereological
gunk, what we are actually imagining is an infinitely descending series of co-
located extended simples. And given that such a series would not be an infinite
descending chain of proper parthood, the pluralist would be able to deny the con-
ceivability of gunk.35 And what this shows is the existence of gunky space alone
– whether one is a perdurantist or not – would not entail that mereological gunk
is possible, and that there are means available to the pluralist through which they
could undermine its possibility.
But if one accepts the possibility of temporal gunk, and one is a perdurantist,
that alone will entail that mereological gunk is possible. For if – as I argued at

32 According to (GCP), any spatially extended object has parts that correspond to parts of the region it
occupies. As Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006) argue, however, accepting (GCP) only entails there are
no extended simples if space is not discrete.
33 For example, if one accepts perdurantism because one is a supersubstantivalist (Sider, 2001,
p. 110), that will entail that an object has parts in any occupiable spatiotemporal subregion of the region
it occupies.
34 For instance, the argument from vagueness could still be utilized by the perdurantist even if they
rejected (GCP): accepting the argument from vagueness means that one will hold that any collection of
parts – whether spatial or temporal – has a fusion, but it does not mean that an object which occupies a
composite spatial region has parts in that region. The argument from vagueness does not necessarily
preclude there being “spatially” extended simples, even in continuous space. Also, rejecting (GCP) will
not undermine perdurantist (whether worm or stage theoretic) solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence
(see Sider, 2001, pp. 140–208).
35 Both Williams (2006) and Brzozowski (2008) attempt to explain away the possibility of gunk in
such a way.

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 AN INCONSISTENT TRIAD 15

the beginning of section 3 – temporal parts are as fine-grained as time,36 and an

object persists in a temporally gunky interval, that object will be mereologically
gunky. If one is a perdurantist, and time is gunky, then any object in such a world
will not ultimately decompose into atomic temporal parts. Pluralism would, there-
fore, be false. The Schafferian argument from gunk to monism is thus on much
stronger footing if one is a perdurantist about persistence,37 and thus if we are
foundationalists, the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism entails pri-
ority monism.38
Alternatively, however, one could take the lesson from the triad to be that meta-
physical infinitism is true. Metaphysical infinitism is the thesis that there can be
infinitely long grounding/dependence chains which never terminate at any basic
objects,39 and the infinitist might well argue that what the triad demonstrates is
that it is not metaphysically necessary that there must be any basic objects.40 Fur-
thermore, all this suggests that Stuchlik’s (2003) objection to stage theory on the
supposition that gunky time is possible is only successful if one is willing to
embrace monism or infinitism.41 For, like the stage theorist, a worm-theoretic per-
durantist will also need to reject that it is possible that time is gunky if they

36 So, while I think it is possible a perdurantist could reject (GCP), they could not reject a temporal
analogue of (GCP). A perdurantist need not necessarily think that objects are as fine-grained as space,
but they must think that extended objects are as fine-grained as time.
37 I would like to thank an anonymous referee from this journal for pushing me on this point, which
led me to set out my argument as to why pluralist perdurantists are more vulnerable than ordinary plural-
ists, in respect to the argument from gunk for monism.
38 Could someone argue, however, that there is an inconsistent triad between monism, worm-theoretic
perdurantism and temporal junk (where a world is temporally junk just in case every interval of time is a
proper subinterval of some interval of time)? If a world is temporally junk, and objects perdure, then
there would be no maximal object, U, which was the fusion of all that world’s temporal parts. This would
undermine priority monism, but Giberman (2019b) has also argued that perdurantists cannot deal with
temporal junk in any case. My own personal view is that it is easier for monists and perdurantists to
explain away temporal junk than spatial junk, but – for reasons of space – will not consider this in any
depth in this article. But I do acknowledge that an alternative triad could be developed, which would
raise difficulties for a monist sympathetic to perdurantism. Again, I would like to thank an anonymous
referee of this journal for pointing this issue out.
39 For instance, Morganti (2015).
40 This, however, would not necessarily preclude there being some fundamental entities. Giberman
(2015), for instance, has argued in favour of a topological conception of fundamental particulars, where
what is fundamental are “fully connected” property instances which do not asymmetrically supervene on
any other properties. This view is compatible with gunk, but it is obviously not a view on which objects
themselves are fundamental. Nor does it entail that any objects are basic. Alternatively, as stated in n. 9,
the lesson to be learned might be just that metaphysical foundationalism is contingent (in which case
both infinitism and foundationalism should be reconceived as metaphysically contingent theses).
41 Though to be more precise, as Giberman (2019a) has shown, the stage theorist might have the
resources to deal with temporal gunk by appealing to “shortish stages”; but only at the expense of caus-
ing trouble for the theory’s semantics, such that it loses its advantages in counting objects over worm
theory.

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16 JAMIE TAYLOR

accept atomism; since if time is gunky, then – as we have already observed – a

perdurantist is committed to a gunky mereology.
If we are pluralists who think that gunky time is possible, however, what we
may take from the triad is that some version of endurantism is true. If objects do
not have temporal parts one can avoid the entailment from temporal gunk to mer-
eological gunk. Endurantists do not face any problem from there being temporal
gunk, as it is not necessarily the case that endurantists must suppose that objects
exactly occupy instantaneous spatiotemporal regions.42 The endurantist then
could potentially utilize the triad as an argument against perdurantism.
But if we think that both pluralism and perdurantism are true, however, we
might take the lesson to be learned from the triad as being that time must be
atomistic: there must be some interval of time t which is not composed out of
some proper subinterval t’ of time. Hence, while we perhaps cannot determine a
priori whether time is discrete or continuous, we can determine a priori that time
is not gunky. If one then thinks that an atomistic conception of time is correct,
then one could utilize the triad to show that this is so. Given that mereological
simples are basic objects and that objects perdure, time must be atomistic. Fur-
thermore, this might offer up a potential response the stage theorist could make
to Stucklik’s objection to stage theory from the possibility of gunky time. For, as
we have observed, if the worm theorist is a priority pluralist, then they too cannot
accept that gunky time is possible. The stage theorist then can argue that if the
basic objects must be mereological simples, then perdurantists – whether worm
or stage theorists – cannot accept the possibility of gunky time.

5. Conclusion

Priority pluralism, perdurantism and “POSS” gunky time are mainstream, seem-
ingly plausible metaphysical theses. But all three them of cannot be true. This is
surprising, and it suggests subsequently that one of the following theses is true:
priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; or the atomistic view of
time. Subsequently, it can be seen that the monistic argument from gunk might
be harder for the pluralist to evade if they are a perdurantist; and Stuchlik’s objec-
tion to stage theory from the possibility of gunk is not compatible with priority
pluralism, giving a potential rejoinder to the stage theorist. The triad’s inconsis-
tency, then, certainly has some interesting metaphysical implications.

42 Parsons’ (2000) version of endurantism obviously does not have any problems with spatiotemporal
gunk, and Matt Leonard (2018) has shown how multilocational endurantism can accommodate it as well.

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 AN INCONSISTENT TRIAD 17

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Matthew Tugby and Giacomo Giannini for providing com-
ments on this article, as well as those who saw me present it at the 2018 Italian
Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) conference in Novara, Italy, and gave me
feedback either during the Q&A or after the talk. I am also very grateful to two
anonymous referees who reviewed this article for Theoria, whose feedback has
greatly helped improve it.

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