DOMICILE IN FAMILY LAW BAGUMA ROBERT

In the case of Robinah Erina Kagaya Kiyingi V Doctor Aggrey Kiyingi High court civil
Appeal No. 41 of 2004 The word domicile was defined as the country in which a person is or
presumed to be permanently resident the place of a person’s permanent home. It depends on the
physical fact of residence plus the intension of remaining. The definition was defined according
to the Osborn’s Concise Law dictionary.

Similarly, in the case of Whicker V Hume (1843-60) ALLER. In this case Lord Wensleydale
said that domicile means habitation in a place however with an intension of remaining unless
something happens to change the intension. A person can only have one domicile in a place that
has a separate legal system.

In Robinah Erina Kagaya Kiyingi V Doctor Aggery Kiyingi [Supra] The court stated that a
person that is to say a British may be domiciled in England, Scotland or Northern Ireland but can
only be domiciled in one of them, this is because they have different legal systems,

Domicile is different from nationality because a person can have a domicile in a country but
without the nationality. In the case of Robinah Erina Kagaya Kiyingi V Doctor Aggery
Kiyingi.[ supra] It was stated that domicile must not be confused with nationality for the latter
is rarely a relevant factor where matters of family law are concerned. A person is a subject or
national of a sovereign state but he has his domicile in some area which has its own system of
law and courts. Furthermore, a person is not bound to be domiciled in the state of which he is a
national.
However, their different types of domicile and they include the following as stated below.

DOMICILE OF ORIGIN
Domicile of origin. In the case of Robinah Erina Kagaya Kiyingi v Doctor Aggery
Kiyingi[supra] domicile of origin was said to be the domicile that is acquired at birth.

In the case of Udny v Udny (1896) L.R I S C DIV 44 at Page 457 Lord Wels bury said “that no
man shall be without a domicile and to secure this result the law attributes to every individual as
soon as he or she is born the domicile of his father, if the child is legitimate and domiciled of the
mother if the child is illegitimate.” Similarly, section 6 of the succession Act Cap 162, states
that,
domicile of origin of a person of legitimate birth is in the country in which at the time of his or
her birth, his or father is domiciled or if he or she is a posthumous child in the country in which
his or her father was domiciled at the time of the father’s death.

Section 7 of the same Act states that the domicile of origin of an illegitimate child is in the
country of in which at the time of his or her birth, his or her mother was domiciled. However, the
domicile of origin can be replaced by another domicile for example in the domicile of origin can
be replaced by a domicile of choice or dependency.

However, there must be evidence to show that the domicile of origin has changed hence the party
has acquired another domicile. In the case of Gordon v Gordon, (1965) EA 87 in this case the
petitioner filed for divorce, he was born in England in 1946 at 22 he came to Tanganyika as a
district officer appointed by the colonial office on permanent terms. The petitioner then married
an African woman who is the respondent and together they had 6 children most of the
petitioner’s assets were in Tanganyika for example a building. He said that he had retained his
domicile of origin and that he acquired a domicile of choice in Tanganyika. The petitioner said
that if his employment was retained he would get another employment in Tanganyika but if he
does not get another employment in Tanganyika, he would go back to England. The petitioner
also said he had no intension of staying in Tanganyika, he also meant to return to England. The
issues’ was whether the petitioner had acquired a domicile of choice or his domicile in England
was retained. The court held that although the petitioner has been a resident in Tanganyika for 18
years and most of his interests in Tanganyika, this fall short or even raising the presumption that
he had abandoned his domicile in England.

DOMICILE OF CHOICE
In the case of Robinah Erina Kagaya Aggery V Doctor Kiyingi Aggery High court Appeal No
41 of 2004 The court stated that the domicile of choice may be acquired by a person of full age
by residing in a country other than his domicile origin with the intension of remaining in that
country permanently or indefinitely. This intension is termed “animus mamedi” the court stated
that the burden of proof lies on the person asserting he has acquired a domicile of choice.
Similarly, in the succession Act cap 162 section 9. It states that a man acquires a new domicile
by taking up fixed habitation in a country which is not that of his origin except that man is not to
be considered as having taken up habitation in Uganda merely by reason of his residing there in
the exercise of any profession or calling

Where however the person abandons his or her domicile of choice, his domicile of origin will
revive and continue to govern his legal position until he acquires a new domicile of choice. For
example, in the case of Bell V Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307 In this case, Mr. Bell was a
Jamaican of born but of Scottish parents, educated in Scotland he returned to Jamaica where he
married. However, he left Jamaica and went to live with his mother-in-law while deciding
whether to live in Scotland, England or France. His wife died and the question arose as to where
he was domiciled. The House of Lords overruled that Court of Session and decided that he
returned to domicile of origin in Jamaica.

LOSS OF DOMICILE OF CHOICE

The domicile of choice is lost when both the residence and the intension necessary for its
acquisition are given up. In Relloyd Evans DECD National Provincial Bank (1947) Ch 545A
testor born in Wales in 1864, whose parents were British subject went to Java in 1880 and till
1917, he married a Dutch woman had 3 children he settled in Brussels and bought a house and
carried on business. The Germany Army invaded Belgium and he was persuaded to leave the
country, he went to South France and escaped to England. In France he wrote that he was
domiciled in Belgium for the last 19 years but had no time to make his intended will, in England
he occupied 3 flats. The evidence showed that he was obliged and that during his last years he
made conflicting statement as regard’s his intension as to residence after the war the court held
that although it is less evidence to establish abandonment of a domicile of choice that it had to
establish it’s acquisition in either both the intension and the act must be unequivocal. In the
United Kingdom persons above 16 years may acquire a domicile of choice and in Uganda
persons over the age of 18 may acquire domicile of choice in case he or she does not have the
capacity to form the necessary animus.

DEPENDENT DOMICILE
Dependant domicile is a domicile that is acquired by minors, married women and mentally ill
persons. In the succession Act cap 162 section 14; it states that by marriage a woman acquires
the domicile of her husband if she had not the same before. Section 15 states that subject sub
section (2) the domicile of a wife during the marriage follow the domicile of her husband.
Married women acquired the domicile of her husband and her domicile would change with that
of her husband even if they lived apart. Lord Advocate v Jaffery (1921) 1 AC 146 In this case a
husband and wife were domiciled in Scotland. The husband contracted a bigamous marriage in
Queensland with the consent of the wife, while the wife remained in Scotland where she died
proceedings were brought in Scotland to determine the domicile of the wife. The court of Appeal
on the House of Lord held that the wife was domiciled in Queensland even though she had never
visited there.

However, a wife can lose the domicile of dependency if the husband dies. In the case of
Scullaud Decd Smith V Brock and other [1957]1 Ch 107 in this case Ethel Mary Scullaud the
testatrix left her husband in 1908 and never lived with him again. The husband had and English
domicile which he retained until his death on 4th February 1955. The wife lived in various places
till the year 1946 or 1947 when she settled in Guernsey with the intension of residing there until
her death. The question was whether at the time of her death she was domiciled in Guernsey. The
court held that after the death of her husband, she showed her continued intension to reside
permanently in Guernsey, and she had a domicile of choice in Guernsey at the date of her death.

The wife could also lose her dependent domicile through a decree of divorce and not by an order
of judicial separation. Section 15(2) of the succession Act states that the domicile of a wife no
longer follows that of her husband if they separated by the sentence of a competent court. In the
case of AG for Alberta V Cook (1926) AC 444 In this case a wife acquired a decree of judicial
separation where she lived; however, she then presented a petition for divorce. Her husband
retained his domicile of origin in Ontario. On appeal to the Privy Council, it was held that the
Alberta court had no jurisdiction to hear the divorce petition because jurisdiction was dependent
on the domicile and the woman remained domicile in Ontario. Lord Marrivol in the judgment of
the Privy Council explained the rational as being “…the contention that a wife judicially
separated from her husband is given choice of a new domicile is contrary to the general principle
on which the unity of the domicile of the married pair depend.”

Minors also have a dependent domicile and it is acquired upon birth a legitimate child acquired
the domicile of its father while an illegitimate child acquired the domicile of its mother. Under
the section 13 of the succession Act cap 162, it states that subject to subsection (2) the domicile
of a minor follows the domicile of the parent from whom the minor derived his or her domicile
of origin, section 16 of the same Act states that, except as provided in section 13 (1) a person
cannot during minority acquire a new domicile. The dependent domicile of the minor, would
change depending on the domicile of the parent, for instance a legitimate child born to a father
domiciled in Italy would acquire a domicile of origin and dependency in Italy, however in case
the father would acquire a domicile of choice in France, the child’s domicile would also change
and acquire a domicile of dependence in France.

In situations where the father of a legitimate child dies, the domicile of the child will normally
follow the domicile of the mother save in situations where the mother decides to move to a new
country. For example, in Re Beaumont. [1893] Ch 490 A widow who was domiciled in
Scotland with her minor children, she decided to remarry and went to England and lived there
with her new spouses, she took all her children except one whom she left to stay with an Aunt in
Scotland. The court held that the domicile of the other children was in England; however, that of
this one child continued to be Scottish.

In the case of an adopted child in United Kingdom and in Uganda, the child will be treated as he
or she was the natural child of his adopted parents, that is to say he or she will have the domicile
of the parent, the children Act cap 59 section 43(3) states that a foster parent is whose care child
is committed shall, while the child remain in his or her care, have the same responsibilities in
respect of the of the child’s maintenance as if he or she were the parents of the child.

However, in situation where the minor marries, holds an office of employment with the
government, set up a business, the minor loses his domicile of dependency. Section 13(2) of the
succession Act 162 states that, the domicile of a minor does not change with that of the minor’s
parent if the minor is married or holds any office or employment in the service government or
has set with consent of the parent in any district business.

Mentally incorrect or mental disorder people have a domicile of dependence and this is because
they lack the legal capacity to form the requisite intension of remaining in a country permanently
or indefinitely, they cannot acquire a domicile of choice. Urguhart Vs Butterfield [1887] 37 Ch
337 In this case it was stated that if an independent person becomes insane, he becomes
incapable of acquiring a domicile of choice because he is unable to exercise any will. Section 17
of the succession Act cap 162, it states that an insane person cannot acquire a new domicile in
any other way than by his or her domicile following the domicile of another person retain the
domicile he had before he became insane that is to say he or she is of a majority age and his
domicile cannot be changed by him. However, if he or she is of a minority age, the domicile
depends on the alternative of the domicile of the parent upon where he or she attains majority.

Merits of dependency domicile

In case of a legitimate child whose parents later divorce and the father does not provide for the
child the child’s domicile will become that of the mother. For instance, in the case of Hope V
Hope (1969) 20 N.i.L.Q 304 in this case Lord MacDermott L.C.J said “that the father’s domicile
control must be based on the authority and responsibility that a father has to act for his child …
in this case the mother had divorced from the father and the father was being irresponsible.

Dependency domicile simplifies the question of private international law it provides a relatively
simple and more way of ascertaining solutions in most cases thus spouses and their legal advisers
should be able to determine their position with some confidence. Aslanidis v Aslanidis. This
case wife petitioned on the respondents domicile in Uganda it was proved the he came to East
Africa with a Greek domicile of origin but born in Egypt. He move from Kenya to Uganda in
1957 and continued to live in Uganda since he was a sales proprietor of a business in Uganda.
The respondent also testified that he intended to stay in Uganda indefinitely. The respondent
however left the wife and decided to reside with another lady and child. It was held that he was
domiciled in Uganda. He had acquired a domicile of choice in Uganda.

Dependant domicile enables children without parents acquire a sense of belonging; acquire
homes and the love of parents. The adopted minors will have the domicile of his or her foster
parent this is because they are to treat the child as if they were the parents of the child and it is
the duty of the foster parent to care of the minor. Section 43(3) of the children Act cap 59 states
that a foster parent is whose care a child is committed shall, while the child remains in his or her
care have the same responsibilities in respect of the child’s maintenance as if he or she were the
parent of the child.

It also enables the foster children to have right to inherit property, in the children Act cap 59,
section 52(1) it states that where an adopter dies intestates, his or her property shall devolve in
all respect as if the adopted child were the natural child of the adopter

The domicile of dependency creates unity between the parties for instance in the case of married
people since the wife’s domicile is dependant to the husbands’ domicile. This rule was based on
the principle of the unity of husband and wife, the rule was supported by a clear authority in the
case of Lord Advocate V Jaffery [1921] AC 146 Similarly in the case AG of Alberta v Cook
[1926] ac 444. Lord Merrivale said “the contention that a wife judicially separated from her
husband is given choice of a new domicile is contrary to the general principle on which the unity
of the domicile of the married pair depends”
Dependency domicile helps or enable in determining of the mutual rights and obligations of
husbands and wife, parent and child varying from country to country

However, the law of domicile has demerit and these include the following. The wife is deemed to
be domiciled in the country of her husband whether she has not been there, even though she does
not have a connection in the husbands country of domicile, hence the view that dependence
domicile creates unity is as artificial one because it may bear no relation to the actual
circumstances of the spouse. In the case of Lord Advocate V Jaffrey [1921] AC 146 In this case
the husband was in Queensland and the wife was in Scotland, she had never been in Queensland.
The court of appeal on the House of Lords held that the wife was domiciled in Queens land even
though she has never been there.

In case of divorce, it can only be granted in the country where both the parties are domiciled but
cannot be granted independently, for instance if a wife wants to file a petition for a divorce to
dissolve her marriage, she can only file the petition in the country of her dependency domicile.
Section 2(a) of the divorce Act states that the making of any decree of dissolution of marriage
unless the petitioner is domiciled in Uganda at the time when the petition is presented. For
example in the case Joy Kiggundu v Horace Awori High court of Uganda at Kampala Divorce
cause No 8 of 1998 in this case the petitioner filed a decree dissolving her marriage to the
respondent in the high court of Uganda at Kampala, the respondent was domiciled in Kenya and
lived in Nairobi Kenya where at the time the couple got 3 issues of the marriage being the
husband committed adultery with named women, the respondent has been cruel to the petitioner
in various ways and by reason of which the petitioner suffered ill health both in mind and body.
The court held that, the petitioner is domiciled in Kenya; the court therefore has no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition she chose to file in this court. The petition is dismissed.

The concept of domicile of dependency may offend Article 33(1) of the constitution of Uganda
which states that women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person with men, hence
in that, it discriminates invidiously between persons. Dependency domicile may be said to
involve a question of status rather than that of person rights.

In case a person whose domicile is not in Uganda marries in Uganda a person whose domicile is
in Uganda none of the parties acquire the property of the other unless it is agreed in a settlement
hence for instance if a woman whose domicile is not in Uganda marries a man whose domicile is
in Uganda her domicile will be Ugandan. Section 34 of the succession Act Cap 162 state that if
a person whose domicile is not in Uganda marries in Uganda a person whose domicile is in
Uganda, neither party acquires by the marriage any right in respect of any other party not
compromised in a settlement made previous to the marriage, which he or she would not acquire
by the marriage if both were domiciled in Uganda at the time of the marriage.

The capacity of the wife to make a will and the devolution of her personal property on her death
may be governed by a system laws of a country she has no connection. For example in the case
Lord Advocate V Jaffrey [1921] Ac 146 in this case the husband was in Queensland and the wife
was in Scotland were she died proceeding were brought in Scotland. The court held that even
though she had never been in Queensland, her domicile of dependency was there.

In conclusion, the law of the domicile of dependency in Uganda has led to the discrimination of
many women thus degrading the dignity of the women depriving them the right to choice yet we
are equal according to Article 33(1) of the constitution of the republic of Uganda and with the
women emancipated today, this law ought to be changed. The law is more complicated.
However, dependency domicile is advantageous in a way that it has made legal matters between
the persons easy that is to say there is no need to use 2 different laws of different countries to
handle matters and it has provided a sense of Identification mostly children and lunatics.
Therefore, even though it has some merits, the demerits are of a large extent mostly to the
women because it deprives them the right of choice in this matter the right of them to acquire
another domicile of choice instead their domicile is dependent to their husbands and changes
when the domicile of the husband changes. However, in the United Kingdom, the domicile of
dependency of a married woman was abolished because this rule reflected social conditions and
attitudes, it was abolished by s1 (1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.
Section 1(1) of the Act stated that, the Act is retrospective in the sense that it applies to women
married before as well as after January 1, 1974. Hence a transitional provision was needed.
Section 1 (2) provides that where immediately before that date a woman was married and then
had her husband’s domicile by dependence, she is to be treated as retaining that domicile as a
domicile of choice, if is not also her domicile of origin. In the case of IRC V Duchess of
Portland [1982] Ch 314 in this case the wife lived had a domicile of origin in Quebec married a
husband domiciled in England, the issue was whether her domicile was in England. It was held
that the effect of s1 (2) was that she retained her domicile of dependency as a domicile of
choice.