US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

L104: Organizational Culture and Climate

Reading L104RB: It’s Not About the Saber
Author: Mr. Ken Turner

“There are no bad regiments – there are only bad colonels”

- Napoleon Bonaparte

Going to War

When the 1-157th Infantry Battalion received its deployment orders, its members gave a collective
sigh of relief; the anticipation and rumors were over. They had waited a long time for this deployment and
were anxious to prove their worth as a National Guard unit. They knew, however, that they still faced
serious challenges in their preparation. Personnel turnover, the filling of battle rosters, the inherent stress
of mobilization—all had to be overcome as the unit readied itself for deployment. The ongoing plan was
to fill battle rosters with individual “augmentees” from other Army NG units, many of which were former
naval personnel, Marines, and US Coast Guardsmen. This included many key and essential positions in
the battalion to include nearly half the staff. But probably the most significant replacement was the
battalion commander, LTC Edward Gelpi, who had taken over the organization the previous month.

LTC Gelpi, 51, a popular educator in civilian life, was now in command of an 800-man unit about to
be deployed to Iraq. He was an Armor officer with repeated tours in cavalry units while on active duty
and in the guard. He still wore his cavalry boots and often donned a Stetson, spurs, and saber for special
occasions. He had served in Panama during Operation Just Cause and in Desert Storm. He had never,
however, served in the 1-157th Infantry, a close-knit unit that had its own ways of getting things done.

Those ways were about to change.

A Colorful Character

LTC Gelpi’s leadership style and driving personality were the subject of much debate from the
beginning of his command tour. In civilian life, Gelpi taught at an elementary school and his fellow
educators admired his ability in the classroom. He possessed a knack for getting the attention of troubled
students with his enthusiastic and devoted teaching techniques. He was charismatic and friendly. His
classroom was described as “an exceptional learning environment” by fellow teachers. His energetic
personality, while appealing to young students, seemed a little “over the top” to many of the Soldiers in 1-
157th. One Soldier was heard grumbling, “He treats most of us like we just walked into a third-grade
classroom.”

LTC Gelpi designed his training program to prepare his Soldiers for what he envisioned would be a
violent and challenging deployment. During a planning meeting in his office, Gelpi confided in his XO,
Major Del Homme, a senior detective from a small town in the Midwest, what he thought about service to
his country and the challenges facing the 1-157th. “I don’t think many of our guys really comprehend what
we are about in the Army. They don’t appreciate the heritage and linage and honors of this unit. I don’t
even think they actually understand the hardships we are training for. I’m really concerned about that, but
I think we can get through this together. We just have to prepare them and not let up.”
Major Del Homme later told a friend, “I know some people disapprove of a lot of the things we are
doing in the battalion but LTC Gelpi really means well. He is just a little old fashioned. He believes in

L104 Reading B June 2023

Created by and for CGSC. Not to be reproduced without the express written consent of the author.
what we are doing and sees the Army as a noble profession. His challenge is in imparting these beliefs on
the organization and getting buy-in from the Soldiers.”

While preparing for deployment, serious challenges surfaced in the battalion. One of the most critical
was the finalizing of deployment rosters. During command and staff meetings, LTC Gelpi made his
guidance clear: everyone deploys. Comments like, “No one stays home,” and, “We are in this together,”
were commonplace during the discussions. He personally reviewed all the battle rosters for each company
in excruciating detail to ensure there were no “slackers’ or “malingerers in my unit.” Some Soldiers
believed the battalion commander was too much into the companies’ business and did not understand the
problems of Soldiers. A number of the company commanders felt the same way and tried to convince
Gelpi that many Soldiers had series issues preventing deployment. The battalion commander was
unmoved by the arguments and even called to question the judgment of his subordinate leaders. Gelpi
sensed the tension he was creating but continued pressing ahead. He would not go to war with an
undermanned organization. As SSG Miller, the battalion S1 NCOIC, stated: LTC Gelpi was real serious
about everyone deploying. He was intent on ensuring he had the assets to get the job done and stayed on
me pretty hard about those deployment rosters, battle rosters as he called them. I guess he was concerned
about getting things done though his actions really stressed out the staff.”

Some of the frustrated staff officers began questioning LTC Gelpi’s motives to MAJ Homme. “The
commander does not listen to reason unless you are one of his favorites,” one stated. Another reminded
the XO that Gelpi had screamed at him during a command and staff, "I can't express how mad you make
me without getting violent and I would fire you now if I had a replacement. Do you realize how bad you
make us look?" A third officer added that he heard Gelpi yell at the adjutant, “Don't come to me with
your problems. Act like a leader and bring me recommendations and solutions." Homme attempted to
quell the grumbling: “The old man is fed up with the staff bringing every little problem to him. He is
frustrated. He believes he has to solve everything. Look, we have to do a better job in meeting his
guidance. He is just trying to do what he thinks is right for the battalion.”

Prior to deploying, the battalion trained at a former World War II prisoner of war camp in the
Southwest desert. Like most old posts throughout the western U.S., conditions were spartan and Soldiers
began to complain to anyone who listened. Many thought the circumstances were unnecessarily harsh. To
make matters worse, when there was free time they were not allowed to travel off the compound to the
nearby communities. Many of the Soldiers voiced concerns to the senior NCOs and officers about being
treated like second-class citizens. “The leadership is treating us like second stringers and we haven’t even
deployed. Imagine what it will be like when we do get over there.”

In their civilian jobs, many of the Soldiers were police officers, lawyers, office managers, public
relations specialists, and well-educated professionals. Several were in their forties with active-duty
experience prior to joining the guard. Many were going on their second or third deployment. One SFC
mentioned, “I’m a senior detective. I’ve got a career, a house, a family, a college degree; I volunteered for
this because I think what we are doing over there is important. I want to contribute, but this is a mess. I
believed in this mission but this training and these conditions are pointless and are not preparing us for
what we need. I don’t understand why we have to train to be miserable. This is demoralizing and I have
regretted ever volunteering. I am not sure what I was thinking!”

During the pre-deployment train-up, one of LTC Gelpi’s first actions was to take his battalion on
what he termed a team-building event, his version of a Spur Ride. He directed a battalion eight-mile run
the first day of training. But it was not just a run. He arranged to have combative stations every mile
along the route where the unit stopped and participated in a myriad of combative skills and problem
solving scenarios. Some of the Soldiers thought it was just right. “We need to be tougher than the
enemy.” Others felt it was harsh and too early in the cycle for this type of focus. Seventy-two members

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of the battalion were injured during the event, fifteen so severe they were unable to deploy. LTC Gelpi
was pleased with the effort. He felt it was a critical first step in creating a resilient and combat-ready
force.

After the Spur Ride, SSG Henry Montgomery, a 46-year-old augmentee from another National Guard
unit, took the unusual step of complaining to a local reporter observing the event that the unit had little
confidence in its chain of command. Other unit members said they had received little or no training for
operations in Iraq, from convoy protection to guarding against insurgent roadside bombs. “We were so
busy doing “combatives” and weapons qualification that we had no time for what we should have been
focused on. We were not doing Arab cultural awareness or language classes, that’s for sure.”

Staff Sergeant Montgomery’s criticisms did not stop at the level of training but extended directly to
LTC Gelpi and his leadership of the battalion. Montgomery recalled a recent promotion ceremony,
“There were three specialists getting promoted to sergeant. LTC Gelpi called them up to the front of the
formation and screams out: ‘Take a knee!’” Everyone was shocked. The guys getting promoted hesitated
and finally dropped to a knee. Gelpi starts doing a knight routine with his saber, ‘knighting’ them with it.
He moves it side to side, and you can hear him slapping the shoulders. Whack. And then he goes over to
the other one. Whack. And then the third one. Then he orders them to all stand up and then puts his hand
up, almost like a baptismal thing. He says something that I can’t make out from the back of the formation.
It was all just weird.”

One Soldier maintained a blog of what he called wasted days of training. It listed 95 days, which he
asserted the Soldiers learned nothing to prepare them for Iraq, just lots of physical training, road marches,
and weapons qualification. The existence of the blog was common knowledge among the battalion staff,
but no one was sure if the commander knew about it. Captain Bob Simon, the battalion adjutant,
considered mentioning it to the MAJ Homme but thought better of it. He had finally gotten on LTC
Gelpi’s good side and did not want to get blown out of the water again.

Many Soldiers found LTC Gelpi’s eccentric style unsettling. When he became aware of some of the
local newspaper articles, he formed the battalion in full equipment and conducted a 10-mile road march
into the desert. After crawling through the sand in full “battle rattle” under simulated automatic weapons
fire, Gelpi, accompanied by his command sergeant major, CSM Jorge Salinis, read some of the news
clippings to the assembled battalion. He made it clear to the Soldiers that he felt any public criticism of
the battalion and the Army was unacceptable and besmirched all those who serve. He went on to describe
with great emotion the glorious achievements of the battalion’s past and how the same glory awaited the
unit in Iraq. While many of the younger Soldiers shared his enthusiasm and excitement, most of long-
serving members of the battalion did not. They felt Gelpi had a misplaced belief in the romance of war,
and his “hooah stupid” techniques were better suited for recruits, not professionals.

LTC Gelpi was undeterred by the ambivalence within the battalion. He saw his enthusiasm and gung-
ho style as the hallmarks of a combat leader. He knew he had the strength of personality to change
attitudes in the unit if he pushed hard enough, articulated his expectations, and then enforced the
standards. A key component of his expectations was the creation of a values-based organization. When
alerted to deploy, he penned a letter to the Soldiers’ families characterizing the upcoming deployment as a
“decisive struggle between good and evil.” Throughout the pre-deployment train-up, he implemented
policies that seemed to the Soldiers too restrictive and did not acknowledge their maturity or experience.
He told them to stay away from the women in the local community during leave, stating that “he knew
what they wanted but that honorable men keep their pants zipped.” He prohibited the use of alcohol,
restricted movement on the compound, and prohibited visits to nearby civilian towns. Many of the
Soldiers felt the restrictions were unnecessary and, as a result, fifteen refused to deploy. Several Soldiers
wrote their congressmen and discussed the issue with the installation IG. Others blamed the problems on

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a few misfits. After all, SSG Montgomery had taken some of his Soldiers downtown in blatant disregard
of the battalion commander’s directive. Who was he to complain to the press? Whatever the problem, the
results would surely follow the unit to Iraq.

In a departing interview, LTC Gelpi told a local reporter, “Our time in the train-up was one of the
best things I have ever done as a commander. It allowed us to really come together as a unit. Soldiers
need to be inoculated against the stress and hardships they will face when deployed. We were able to do
that in the desert.”

In Country

The unit deployed to the Dora District in Southern Baghdad. An active-duty division was already in
place when 1-157th arrived, and the division assigned the 1-157th to its 3rd BCT. The BCT commander,
Colonel Drake, was looking forward to having an additional 800-man force, especially one manned with
so many law enforcement specialists in civilian life.

Because of the civilian expertise in the National Guard unit, Col Drake assigned the 1-157 th to one of
the most difficult sections of Baghdad. This seemed like a logical move to exploit their civilian skills. The
National Guardsmen did not share this feeling. They felt the active duty BCT was taking advantage of
them. Their area of operation in Baghdad was a densely populated, squalid neighborhood teaming with
insurgent activity. It was an area everyone was afraid to enter. What better assignment for the newly
arrived and lightly regarded National Guard unit that did not know any better? An undercurrent of dissent
and animosity towards the 3rd BCT began to take hold in the battalion.

LTC Gelpi and CSM Salinas did not share these concerns. “We are trained and ready and can handle
ourselves. The last thing we want is to come across as a bunch of whiners to the active duty guys,” the
CSM stated. COL Drake echoed these remarks: “The myth about National Guard Soldiers not being equal
is just that, a myth. It’s really a matter of leadership, training time and resources. I have complete
confidence in the 1-157th’s ability to handle this mission.”

As the unit settled into its responsibilities, LTC Gelpi maintained his high energy, pacesetting
leadership style in the battalion with his trademark boots, spurs, Stetson, and saber marking his presence
in the forward operating base and on patrols. At first, COL Drake found Gelpi’s energy level refreshing
but quickly tired of his saber-waving antics as a motivational tool. Why was he trying to turn an infantry
battalion into a cav unit, he thought? COL Drake quickly drew the line when he found the battalion
commander on a presence patrol in full cavalry regalia.

“This has gone far enough,” COL Drake stated. “You will wear a Kevlar like everyone else leaving
the FOB and the saber has to go.”

LTC Gelpi was stunned, “The saber? It is the symbol of my unit, the rallying cry for my Soldiers. It
represents our strength and élan as warfighters. You will have to give me a direct order before I give up
the saber!”

“I just did,” COL Drake coolly replied.

That evening, LTC Gelpi discussed the incident with his XO. “COL Drake has no idea what I am
trying to do down here. It’s not about the saber! This is my unit. I have taken on more than my share of
missions for him and this is what he is worried about!” After stewing over the incident for a couple of
days, Gelpi decided to keep the saber though he restricted its use to the FOB when he was sure the BCT
commander was not around.

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 Despite his concerns with LTC Gelpi’s flamboyant leadership style, the BCT commander did his
utmost to set the 1-157th up for success by addressing the battalion’s equipment and personnel shortfalls.
He made the decision to cross-level equipment and people from other battalions in the BCT to fill the
unit’s most critical shortages. This decision was a godsend to the 1-157 th though it worsened the growing
resentment between the guard unit and its active-duty counterparts.

Operating out of its FOB, Soldiers from the 1-157th conducted what they termed aggressive contact
with the community. Their patrols included meetings with community leaders and lots of handshakes with
residents, something LTC Gelpi believed his predecessors did not do. LTC Gelpi confidently assured
COL Drake that these activities would result in a marked decrease in bombs along the main routes
through their sector.

But the casualty rate in the battalion told a different story—it was climbing, and not just in the
battalion. It was climbing across the entire BCT as insurgent activity intensified. Many of the Soldiers in
1-157th did not care about the big picture. All they knew was that casualties were up and they put the
blame squarely on their pre-deployment training—it had not prepared them for what they were asked to
do in theater. They were losing confidence in their battalion leadership.

The Tipping Point

Three months into the deployment a seemingly routine situation occurred that shook the battalion.
During a patrol on the south side of the Dora District, along the road the battalion had named Chicken
Run, Alpha Company spotted an IED and called it in. This area had become known as a favorite spot for
IEDs and CPT Glock, the A Co commander, was on site with his 1st platoon. He directed the platoon to
secure the area as the EOD team worked to clear the device. The platoon leader, LT Fidding, moved his
vehicle 50 meters up the road for security. He dismounted leaving his gunner, PFC Harding, to observe
the road. LT Fidding joined CPT Glock as they watched the EOD team disarm the device. It looked like a
routine IED disarming, much like the other 30-odd clearing actions they had participated in. The sudden
heavy thumping of the M2’s chain gun pulled their focus away.

A rusty old blue sedan laid smoking in the street, riddled by the Bradley’s 25mm gun. PFC Harding
was shaken as he explained to CPT Glock why he had to fire on the oncoming vehicle as it sped up the
road. “I didn’t know what to do! I tried to call the PSG to see if he saw it coming but everyone was
watching the EOD team. It looked like they were heading straight for us.” A quick survey of the
destroyed vehicle by CPT Glock showed an elderly man and toddler in the front seat, hardly a threat to
the patrol.

The resulting AR 15-6 investigation revealed security measures inconsistent with published
directives, blatant disregard for escalation of force procedures in direct violation of published ROE, and
inadequate command and control combined with negligence. In the words of the investigating officer,
“The tragic event is symptomatic of deeper issues within the company that if not quickly corrected, will
lead to continued loss of life, both innocent civilians and Soldiers of the battalion.”

Recommendations to the battalion commander ranged from relief of company leadership and other
non-judicial punishment to include article 15s, to verbal admonishment of junior Soldiers. LTC Gelpi
gave a field grade Article 15 to PFC Harding and relieved LT Fidding, moving him to the S3 shop. As
one of the Soldiers in the S3 shop remarked later, “Everyone knew the boss would not touch CPT Glock,
their families are close. Besides, look what he got away with at train-up.”

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 LTC Gelpi sensed the discouragement in the battalion and felt he had to set a more proactive example
as a courageous leader, always willing and able to challenge adversity. He did this by conducting patrols
using only his personal security detachment. According to the NCOIC of his security team, he would
typically go to the most dangerous parts of his sector and stop in the middle of the road to taunt the
insurgents. He would get out of his vehicle and dare the insurgents to come out, show themselves, and
attack him. Intelligence collected by the HUMINT resources of the BCT indicated the insurgents loved
these displays because it discredited US forces. LTC Gelpi ignored these reports; he was more concerned
with the welfare of his battalion.

Six months into the deployment, MAJ York, the battalion S3, a 33-year-old accounting executive
back home, came to LTC Gelpi with a problem. A Soldier from A Co had brought a video to the S3 that
showed a naked Iraqi detainee kneeling in a darkened room. A platoon interpreter was sitting across from
the detainee with his pistol on his lap. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and members of the platoon
were arrayed around the room. The interpreter told the detainee, “You can either give me the information
or I will kill you.” The detainee just smiled and responded that he loves his family. The interrogation
continued but to no avail. One of the Soldiers moved to the detainee and struck him. The LT did not stop
the attack and moved to the detainee, once again re-iterating, “If you do not tell me what I need to know,
he will kill you.” The interpreter then leaned close to the man’s ear and discharged his weapon into the
dirt next to the detainee. The tape then went black. The video also showed other members of the battalion
taking photos of the abuse. LTC Gelpi gave the video to COL Drake and the Criminal Investigation
Division immediately began an investigation.

Soon after, the Department of the Army issued a news release saying that unnamed National Guard
troops in Iraq faced court-martial for detainee abuse. The division commander ordered the Soldiers of 1-
157th not to make public statements or talk to relatives about the incident. This was necessary, according
to the division, to ensure fair trials. Many unit members believed the active Army was attempting to
protect itself by singling out the National Guard unit and limiting the damage to its reputation from other
abuse scandals.

The investigation of the detainee video open a flood gate of other unreported incidents within the
battalion leading to 24 separate 15-6 investigations on issues ranging from alcohol use and graft to
mistreatment of civilians. As a result of these incidents, LTC Gelpi was initially suspended and then
relieved of command. When the initial detainee abuse investigation ended, the platoon leader and three
sergeants were court-martialed and pleaded guilty to dereliction of duty and conspiracy to maltreat
detainees. They were sentenced to prison for up to 12 months. Eight others received lesser punishment in
lower-level military proceedings. The Soldier who provided the tape to the XO was found not guilty.
COL Drake relieved the Alpha Company commander, but the problems were not isolated to Alpha
Company. The BCT commander also relieved the battalion S2 for incompetence and the 1SG of Delta
Company for accepting cash from an Iraqi merchant for special privileges.

The division commander replaced the battalion commander, battalion S2, and Alpha Company
commander with active-duty officers from the division.

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