TEAM CODE 25

TIMS 2023

Before

THE SUPREME COURT OF HOGSMEADE

S.L.P (Crl) NO. ___/2023

MS. GRINDELWALD……………………………………………………….APPELLANT

v.

UNION OF HOGSMEADE……...…………………………….…………..RESPONDENT
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................iii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................................... v

ISSUES RAISED.................................................................................................................... vii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS........................................................................................... vii

Issue 1 ..................................................................................................................................vii

Issue 2 ................................................................................................................................ viii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................................. 1

A. The trial court has wrongfully convicted Ms. Grindelwald under Sections 269,
270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code ....................................................................... 1

1. The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not fulfil the essential ingredients for

negligence under Section 269 .......................................................................................... 2

1.1. No unlawful/negligent act .................................................................................... 2

1.2. No act likely to spread infection of any disease .................................................. 2

1.3. No knowledge or reason to believe ...................................................................... 2

1.4. The consequences fail the reasonability test of negligence ................................. 3

2. The acts of Ms Grindelwaldare lawful and do not fulfill the standard of malice
as required under Section 270 ........................................................................................ 3

2.1. The question of malice is secondary as the act in itself is not unlawful .............. 4

2.2. No malicious intent can be gathered from the acts of Ms Grindelwald............... 4

3. The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not increase the likelihood of spread of

infection ............................................................................................................................. 5

4. The arrest under Section 271 is wrongful as no legitimate quarantine laws

were disobeyed at the time of the arrest ........................................................................ 6

4.1. The acts of the petitioner are protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution .................................................................................................................... 6

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 4.2. The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not violate any legitimate quarantine law in
force at the time of the arrest ......................................................................................... 7

4.3. There is no prima facie case against the petitioner under Section 271 ................ 7

B. The Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code are constitutional
as they do not violate the fundamental rights mentioned under Part III of the
Constitution of Hogsmeade ................................................................................................. 8

1. Sections 269, 270 and 271 violate fundamental rights ............................................. 9

1.1. There is a violation of Article 19(1)(a) ................................................................ 9

[1.1.1.] Restrictions are excessive since they go beyond Article 19(2) ..................... 9

1.2. There is a violation of Article 19(1)(g) .............................................................. 10

[1.2.1.] Restrictions stand too excessive in light of other alternatives available ..... 10

[1.2.2] Economic impact of Section 271 should be considered ............................... 10

1.3. Violation of Article 21 since sections fail Test of Reasonability ...................... 11

[1.3.1.] There is no reasonable nexus between the right curtailed and the object: .. 11

[1.3.2.] The powers vested in the executive are too broad and vague ..................... 11

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 13

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

• The Hogsmeade Penal Code, 1860.

• The Constitution of Hogsmeade, 1950.
• Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.
• Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Cases

1. Baldev Singh Gandhi v State of Punjab [2002] 3 SCC 667 (SC). ........................ 9
2. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [197]) 2 SCC 788 (SC)................. 3&6
3. Chintamanrao v State of Madhya Pradesh [1951] AIR 118 (SC). .................. 3&6
4. Modern Dental College & Research Centre v State of Madhya Pradesh [2016] 7 SCC
353 (SC). ............................................................................................................. 10
5. Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1976] 2 All ER 497. .................... 7
6. Dr. Meeru Bhatia Prasad v State [2001] 60 DRJ 594 (HC)/Del. ......................... 1
7. Dr YP Singh v State Of Uttar Pradesh [1982] AIR 439 (All). ............................. 7
8. Fazal Nawaz Jung v State of Hyderabad [1952] Cri LJ 873 ..................................
9. Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh [1975] AIR 1378 (SC). ..................................
10. Golbar Husain v State of Assam [2015] 11 SCC 242. ............................................
11. HLA Shwe v State of Maharashtra [2020] SCC OnLine 959 (Bom) ............... 2&5
12. Hamdard Dawakhana (WAKF) LalKuan Delhi and Another v Union of India [1960] 2
SCR 671 ................................................................................................................ 4
13. Hamid Ali v The State [1961] CriLJ 801 .............................................................. 2
14. Herndon v Lowry (1936) 301 US 242 at p. 259 (G) ............................................. 7
15. Jacob Puliyel [202l] Civil No. 607. ...................................................................... 4
16. Jayprakash Tiwari v State Of Uttarakhand [2022] MANU 0714 (UC). ............... 1
Joti Prasad v State of Haryana [1993] AIR 1167 (SC) 500. ................................ 2
17. KS Puttaswamy v Union of India [2014] 6 SCC 433. ......................................... 10
18. Kali Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808. ...................................
19. Kartar Singh v State of Punjab [1994] 3 SCC 569. ............................................ 12

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20. Kaushal Kishor v State of Uttar Pradesh [2017] 1 SCC 406 (SC)....................... 9
21. Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar [1962] AIR 955 (SC). ................................... 4
22. Kharak Singh v State of UP [1963] AIR 1295 (SC). ..............................................
23. Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh [1981] AIR 873 (SC). ........................ 8
24. Managing Director, Kerela Tourism Development Corporation Ltd v Deepti Singh
[2019] (2) RCR (Civil) 680................................................................................... 2
25. Namit Sharma v Union of India [2013] 1 SCC 745. ...............................................
26. Noor Aga v State of Punjab [2008] 16 SCC 417 ....................................................
27. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1961] 1 All ER
404......................................................................................................................... 2
28. PP Enterprises v Union of India [1982] AIR 1016 (SC). .......................................
29. Preeti Gupta v State of Jharkhand [2010] 7 SCC 667 (SC) ................................. 7
30. Rajagopal v State Of Tamil Nadu [1995] AIR 264 (SC). ..................................... 6
31. RR Verma v Union of India [1980] 3 SCC 402 .................................................. 11
32. Rangarajan Etc v Jagjivan Ram [1989] 2 SCC 574 (SC). .............................. 3&6
33. S Krishnan v State of Madras [1951] AIR 301 (SC). .............................................
34. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice SR Tendolkar [1958] AIR 538. .......... 12
35. SR Venkataraman v Union of India [1979] AIR 49 (SC) 51. .................................
36. Santosh Devi v National Insurance Co Ltd [2012] 6 SCC 421 (SC) .................. 10
37. Sarda Plywood Ltd. v Union of India [1991] 1 SCC 225 (SC) ..................... 3&10
38. Shivashakti Sugars Ltd. v Shree Renuka Sugar Ltd [2011] 4 SCC (SC). ........... 10
39. Shreya Singhal v Union of India [2015] 5 SCC 1 (SC). ..................................... 11
40. Sidak Singh Sandhu v UT Chandigarh [2022] MANU 1750 (PH) ....................... 1
41. State of Himachal Pradesh v Pawan Kumar [2005] 7 SCC 735. ......................... 1
42. State of Uttar Pradesh v Amarmani Tripathi [2005] 8 SCC 21 .............................
43. State of Uttar Pradesh v Vijay Anand [1963] AIR 946 (SC). ............................... 1
44. Tarun Jain v State of UP [2021] 7 ILR 386 (ALL) ............................................. 6
45. Town Area Committee v Prabhu Dayal [1975] AIR 132 (All). ............................ 4
46. Vinod Kumar v State of Haryana [2015] 3 SCC 138..............................................
47. Waman Rao v Union of India [1981] 2 SCC 362 (SC). ........................................ 6
48. Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] UKHL 1

iv
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

General Background of Hogsmeade

Hogsmeade is an island nation with a population of approximately 25 million, consisting

largely of descendants of immigrants from all over the world, with a wide range of cultures,
religions, races, and ethnicities. The nation could escape the impacts of the Covid-19 virus
through strict implementation of laws prohibiting international travel and tourism.

Chronological Order of the Events

1. January 2022 (Spread of the Disease) -

• A disease began spreading in Hogsmeade. It was initially believed to be a flu variant,
and symptomatic treatment was recommended. The fatality rate of this disease was
significantly higher than ordinary cases of flu.
• The health regulatory authority also recommended that all persons wear masks in public
since it was feared to be an air-borne disease.

2. February-March 2022 (Collapse of the public health infrastructure leading to

quarantine laws)-
• The public health infrastructure collapsed as the number of cases increased. Thousands
of persons across Hogsmeade died as a result.
• The government issued orders under ‘Quarantine Laws’ mandating all persons in
Hogsmeade to wear masks in public.

3. April 2022

a. Introduction of the vaccine

• It was found that the root cause of the disease was a new kind of virus. The research
was conducted by Hogwarts University, a premier research university in Hogsmeade.
• A subcutaneous-injection-based vaccine named Amortentia was developed by Episkey
Co. Ltd., a pharmaceutical company registered in Hogsmeade.
• In short-term clinical trials, some recipients of the vaccines showed some side effects.

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b. Ms. Grindelwald and her claims
• Ms. Grindelwald, considered by her followers a ‘spiritual guru’, had millions of
followers in and outside Hogsmeade. She was also the owner of a company that made
products based on alternative medicines.
• Near the end of April, in a podcast, Ms Grindelwald expressed doubts about the
Quarantine Laws and Amortentia. She claimed that- (i) the according to her, the
disease was not air-borne, and therefore the Quarantine Laws were not effective and
they in fact took away the freedom of the people of Hogsmeade. (ii) she did not
believe that adequate testing had been conducted on Amortentia and that everyone
should avoid being administered with the vaccine.
• Immediately after her comments, millions of people stopped wearing masks.

4. May 2022 (Vaccine made compulsory)-

• The Hogsmeade Government fast-tracked the regulatory approvals for Amortentia and
made it compulsory for every person to be vaccinated. A law was passed to this effect.
• It was observed that the people who stopped wearing masks did not consent to be
vaccinated either.

5. June 30, 2022:

Ms. Grindelwald was arrested and charged with offences under sections 269, 270 and 271
of the Hogsmeade Penal.

6. November 30, 2022:

Ms Grindelwald was found guilty under Sections 270, 271 and alternatively Section 269
of the Hogsmeade Penal Code by the appropriate court.

7. December 10, 2022:

Ms. Grindelwald filed a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Hogsmeade
Constitution challenging a) her conviction and b) the constitutionality of sections 269,
270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code for being violative of her fundamental rights
under Part III of the Hogsmeade Constitution.
The special leave petition was admitted by the Supreme Court of Hogsmeade and is listed
for hearing before a 2-judge bench.

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 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1- Whether the trial court was justified in convicting Ms Grindelwald under
sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code?

ISSUE 2- Whether the sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code are
constitutional as against the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of
Hogsmeade?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1- Whether the trial court was justified in convicting Ms Grindelwald under
Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code?

It is humbly submitted before the Honourable Court that Ms Grindelwald is wrongfully

convicted of offences under Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code. Sections
269 and 270 penalize negligent and malignant acts respectively which lead to the likelihood of
the spread of an infectious disease. A negligent act under Section 269 requires either
‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’ that the act is likely to cause such infection. In the present
case, no evidence suggests either of the ingredients. A malignant act under Section 270 requires
intent without just cause. No intent can be proved from the acts of Ms Grindelwald and the act
in itself does not lead to the likelihood of spread of such infection. It is therefore pleaded before
the Honourable Court that the wrongful conviction of Ms Grindelwald under Sections 269 and
270 may be quashed. Section 271 penalizes disobedience of quarantine rule. Publication of
statements of opinions is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the acts of
Ms Grindelwald are within her rights. In the present case therefore, no instance of such
violation of any law promulgated by the Government of Hogsmeade is found.

vii
Issue 2: Whether Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code are
constitutional under Part III of the Constitution of Hogsmeade?
It is humbly submitted before the Honourable Court that Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the
Hogsmeade Penal Code are unconstitutional and are liable to be struck down as, they are
violative of the Part III of the Constitution. The impugned sections are against Article 19(1)(a)
since they restrict speech for public health which is not one of the reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2). Further, they also violate Article 19(1)(g) which guarantees Right to Freedom of
Trade and to carry on any Trade. With the restriction on the regulation of vessels that move
from and to other places, Section 271 curtails Article 19(1)(g) and has an adverse economic
impact. With a transformative jurisprudence that the Court has incorporated in many case laws,
it is submitted that it should be mindful of the economic consequences on people to adjudicate
the validity of a provision. It is further submitted that the impugned sections do not pass the
four- step Test of Reasonability under Article 21 and thus are in violation of it.

It is further pleaded that the wording of the aforementioned sections is too wide and subjective
leading to arbitrary consequences. It is submitted that they are too wide and subjective to be a
reasonable restriction on Fundamental Rights. Due to such excessively broad ambit and vague
wording, acts done innocently might fall under these provisions. Such a wide limitation would
lead to manifest injustice. It is further pleaded that the Legislature that enacted the Sections
should not be considered a competent authority. Even if it is considered to be one, it does not
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, it is submitted that mere legislative
competence should not deem the impugned sections constitutional.

viii
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

A. The trial court has wrongfully convicted Ms. Grindelwald under Sections 269,
270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code

1. It is humbly submitted before this Honourable Court that the High Court has erroneously
convicted Ms Grindelwald of offences under Section 269, 270 and 271 and has not appreciated
the basic rule with regard to such cases as reaffirmed by various Courts in the jurisdiction.1
Therefore, the arrest is unlawful as a) no negligent act was committed by Ms Grindelwald, b)
no evidence suggests any malicious intent, c) no act so as to increase the likelihood of spread
of infection of the infectious disease was committed and d) there is no disobedience of any
quarantine laws or orders
2. While interpreting the statutory provisions, and especially Section 271, it is pleaded before
the Honourable Court that it may resort to the maxim ‘absoluta sententia expositore non
indiget’ (A complete statement requires no interpreter)2 while adopting the literal rule of
statutory interpretation as has been the case with various Courts.3 Words such as ‘negligent
act’, ‘malignant act’ and ‘disobedience’ may be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical
meaning.4 This will ensure that they may have effect in a wide and just amplitude and in the
sense implied by the legislators.5

1
Jayprakash Tiwari v State of Uttarakhand [2022] MANU 0714 (UC).; Sidak Singh Sandhu v UT Chandigarh
[2022] MANU 1750 (PH).
2
Oxford references
3
Supra note 1
4
State of HP v Pawan Kumar [2005] 7 SCC 735.
5
Ibid; State of Uttar Pradesh v Vijay Anand [1963] AIR 946 (SC).
1
 1. The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not fulfil the essential ingredients for negligence
under Section 269
Section 269 punishes an act of negligence which increases the likelihood of spread of infectious
disease dangerous to life. The essential ingredients for an offence under Section 269 6 are: a)
the accused has acted unlawfully or negligently, b) that such act is likely to spread infection of
any disease dangerous to life, c) that the accused had ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’ that
the act is likely to cause such infection.

1.1. No unlawful/negligent act

The petitioner in the present case has acted within the scope of her rights under Article 19 (1)
(a) and Article 19 (1) (g) (to the extent of promotion of remedies promoted by her
pharmaceutical company) and hence her behaviour is lawful. For an act to be called negligent,
there should be a breach of duty as the first element.7 However, she was acting well within her
rights and the act neither reasonably nor foreseeably led to any unlawful consequence.8
1.2. No act likely to spread infection of any disease

It is submitted that the throughout the course of the outbreak, Ms Grindelwald did not visit any
public spaces so as to actively spread any infectious disease. The legal phrase ‘acts likely to
spread infection’ if given to its natural and legal meaning as interpreted by Courts, necessarily
implies an act by an infected person.9 This cannot include a speech which in itself is not made
with any intention to incite people against any law promulgated by the government. Therefore,
such statements as expressed by Ms Grindelwald cannot be considered as acts likely to spread
infection of any disease by the Court.

1.3. No knowledge or reason to believe

In the present case, ‘reason to believe’ is on a higher pedestal than mere ‘suspicion’ or ‘doubt’10
and therefore it cannot be equated with merely ‘seeing’11 the consequences. Knowledge is on

6
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (32nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2019) 925; Dr Meeru Bhatia Prasad v
State [2001] 60 DRJ 594 (Del).
7
Managing Director, Kerela Tourism Development Corporation Ltd v Deepti Singh [2019] (2) RCR (Civil) 680
8
Problem, para 16
9
HLA Shwe v State of Maharashtra [2020] SCC OnLine 959 (Bom).
10
The Hogsmeade Penal Code 1860, sec 26; Hamid Ali v The State [1961] CriLJ 801
11
Joti Prasad v State of Haryana [1993] AIR 1167 (SC) 500.

2
an even higher pedestal.12 The facts that Ms Grindelwald is a public figure and that she has
more than a million followers13 could only mean the existence of the possibility of a direct
consequence, which is not punishable under law.14 However, there is no evidence to suggest
any cause for ‘reason to believe’ in a consequence where millions of people will disobey the
law on mere expression of opinions by a public figure.

1.4.The consequences fail the reasonability test of negligence

It is submitted before the Honourable Court that it is a well-accepted principle in law that
foreseeable or reasonable consequences of any act or speech cannot be equated direct or natural
consequences and a person cannot be made liable for the latter. 15 The public situation even if
held as a direct consequence, cannot be reasonably foreseeable as Ms Grindelwald was merely
expressing her reservations and imploring the citizens to follow caution. It is not reasonable to
assume that millions of well-informed citizens will disobey the law solely because of any
insinuation as deduced from the petitioner’s comments. Accordingly, it is pleaded that the
charge under Section 269 for negligence should be quashed by the Court.

2. The acts of Ms Grindelwaldare lawful and do not fulfill the standard of malice as
required under Section 270

Section 270 is an aggravated form of offence under Section 269.16 It punishes malignant act
likely to spread an infectious disease dangerous to life. For an offence under Section 270, the
person spreading infection should be actuated by malice.17 Therefore, it requires an unlawful
act with an intent without just cause.18 The requirements for the offence are A) unlawful act
without just cause, and B) malicious intention.
It is submitted before the Court that as the act in itself was lawful, the question of malice is
secondary. However, if the Court is to consider malice as a relevant question of law, it is

12
ibid
13
Moot Prob, para 14.
14
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 404
15
Ibid.
16
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (32nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2019).
17
Ibid.

3
submitted that such standards of malice as required for an offence under the above section are
not fulfilled.
2.1.The question of malice is secondary as the act in itself is not unlawful

It is humbly submitted before the Court that this Court has held that different views are allowed
to be expressed (and published)19 by proponents and opponents of a policy not because they
are correct or valid but because there is freedom in this country for expressing differing views
on any issue.20 This forms the jurisprudence behind Article 19(1)(a). While such freedom is
subjected to reasonable restrictions,21 the restrictions are not to be exercised excessively.22
In the present case, it is worth reinstating before the Honourable Court that Ms Grindelwald
has merely expressed her opinions on a public forum. Ms Grindelwald has expressed her doubts
regarding the laws in force. She has also questioned the legitimacy of the vaccine ‘Amortentia’.
There are bona fide reasons for criticising the vaccine which was produced in extraordinary
circumstances.23 While doing so, she has promoted the use of natural remedies manufactured
by her company. Such promotion is within the realm of her rights under Article 19(1)(g) 24 to
practice any profession and that her promotion of remedies on public forum forms a part of this
practice. Therefore, as the acts of Ms Grindelwald are not unlawful, it is not necessary to assess
whether the intention was malafide or not.25 Therefore, it is submitted that the moot question
of malice may not be considered by the Court as there is no evidence to suggest any unlawful
act on part of Ms Grindelwald and the arrest may be quashed accordingly.
2.2.No malicious intent can be gathered from the acts of Ms Grindelwald

If the Court is to consider the question of malice relevant to the case at hand, it is submitted
that for conviction under Section 270, ‘intent without just cause’ is an essential ingredient as it
is a charge for malicious actions.26 Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be

19
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [197]) 2 SCC 788 (SC).
20
Rangarajan Etc v Jagjivan Ram [1989] 2 SCC 574 (SC).
21
The Constitution of Hogsmead 1950, art 19(2) – 19(6).
22
Sarda Plywood Ltd. v Union of India [1991] 1 SCC 225 (SC); Chintamanrao v State of Madhya Pradesh
[1951] AIR 118 (SC).
23
Jacob Puliyel [202l] Civil No. 607.
24
Hamdard Dawakhana (WAKF) LalKuan, Delhi and Another v Union of India [1960] 2 SCR 671.
25
Town Area Committee v Prabhu Dayal [1975] AIR 132 (All).

4
assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for
want of reasonable cause.27
It is a noted fact that Ms Grindelwald had ‘expressed serious doubts’28 regarding the quarantine
laws and the vaccine in the publication of her statements on the podcast. The actions of Ms
Grindelwald intended to criticize the public policy and not to spread any infectious disease.29
The petitioner’s intent as gathered from the above facts cannot be said to be malicious as
expressions of dissatisfaction do not show any intent to incite disorder.30 No intention as
required for an offence under Section 270 is therefore made out. If the court upholds the
conviction on the charges as listed above, it would amount to an equation between criticism of
law and disobedience of law.31 To avoid such manifest injustice and arbitrary use of legislative
power, it is humbly submitted before the Court that the conviction may be quashed.

3. The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not increase the likelihood of spread of infection

For an offence under either Section 269 or Section 270, an act which is likely to spread an
infectious disease is a common requirement. It is pleaded before the Court, that while
evaluating charges under Sections 269 and 270, the approach taken by various High Courts
should be considered. Courts have evaluated ‘actions’ of the accused in the literal and natural
meaning of the word and have decided cases on the basis of physical acts of the accused.32 The
interpretation of the word ‘acts’ under 269 and 270 is ‘the acts by an infected person’ as
interpreted by various High Courts.33 Medical tests on the body of the accused and symptoms
of the infectious disease are therefore an essential ingredient for charges under Sections 269
and 270.34 It is mandatory for the police to conduct medical tests on the body of Ms
Grindelwald for the disease before taking cognizance under Section 269 35 and consequently

27
SR Venkataraman v Union of India [1979] AIR 49 (SC) 51.
28
Moot Problem, para 15.
29
Ibid.
30
Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar [1962] AIR 955 (SC).
31
Ibid
32
Supra note 1
33
Ibid
34
Sidak Singh Sandhu v UT Chandigarh [2022] MANU 1750 (PH)
35
HLA Shwe v. State of Maharashtra [2020] SCC OnLine 959 (Bom).

5
270. Ms Grindelwald was subjected to no such tests and therefore her arrest under the above
sections is unlawful in the substantive sense.

4. The arrest under Section 271 is wrongful as no legitimate quarantine laws were
disobeyed at the time of the arrest

The counsel for the petitioner most humbly submits that the acts of Ms Grindelwald are
protected by Article 19(1)(a) and in the present case are not subject to restrictions. Section 271
punishes disobedience of quarantine laws promulgated by the Government. The ‘quarantine
laws’ include laws authorising the government to issue orders mandating wearing of masks,
isolation of sick/infected patients and quarantining of certain areas among other
legitimaterules.36 In the case at hand, Ms Grindelwald has not violated/incited the violation of
any such laws. The arrest under this Section is therefore illegal and may be rescinded.

4.1.The acts of the petitioner are protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution

In the present case, it is a noted fact that Ms Grindelwald was a public figure with millions of
followers and had access to mass media communications.37 It has been observed that citizens
have legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons and the freedom of
speech which subsumes the freedom of press extends to engaging in uninhibited debate about
the involvement of public figures, issues and events.38 The petitioner’s statements fall in the
above category as Ms Grindelwald had expressed her personal opinions as is clearly evident
from the phrases ‘expressed serious doubts’, ‘according to her’ and ‘she did not believe’.39
Article 19(1)(a) protects the publication of such opinions40 subject to restrictions under Article
19(2). Such restrictions are to be exercised reasonably41 without excessive force.42
Ms Grindelwald was merely critical of the policy of the government and at no point made any
statement prejudicial to public order/decency/morality or any other restriction under Article

36
Clarification 3
37
Moot Problem, paras 14&15.
38
Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu [1995] AIR 264 (SC).
39
Moot Problem, para 15.
40
Bennett Coleman & Co v Union of India [197]) 2 SCC 788 (SC).
41
Waman Rao v Union of India [1981] 2 SCC 362 (SC).
42
Chintamanrao v State of Madhya Pradesh [1951] AIR 118 (SC).

6
19. In such cases, the validity of the criticism is not a matter of concern as far as the freedom
of such expression is concerned43 and the statements of Ms Grindelwald are hence protected
by Article 19 (1)(a). Therefore, Ms Grindelwald should not be charged for any offence by the
Court as a wrongful act is absent in the first place.
4.2.The acts of Ms Grindelwald do not violate any legitimate quarantine law in force at
the time of the arrest

It is pleaded before the Court that Ms Grindelwald did not at any point disobey any quarantine
rule promulgated by the Government of Hogsmeade, including the rule making masks
compulsory.44 As Ms Grindelwald has not stepped out in public spaces during the course of the
outbreak,45 the question of violating other quarantine laws46 does not arise. Section 271 deals
with disobedience to a quarantine rule, and largely about vessels or the regulation of intercourse
of vessels,47 and therefore no speech or expression which is not in itself a violation of such
quarantine laws can be punishable under Section 271.48

4.3.There is no prima facie case against the petitioner under Section 271

In the present case, as submitted to the Court previously, it is clear that Ms Grindelwald has
not acted in any way to the detriment of the law, quarantine or otherwise. Ms Grindelwald
made the aforementioned statements on a social media platform in the confines of a private
space. The ‘quarantine laws’ include laws authorizing the government to issue orders
mandating the wearing of masks, isolation of sick/infected patients and quarantining of certain
areas.49 No such law was violated by Ms Grindelwald in order to attract offence under Section
271.
In this case, therefore, the prosecution has no prima facie case under Section 271. It has been
observed by the court in relation to detentions under Section 271 that if the prosecution fails to
disclose a cognizable case against the petitioner, as is the case with the present situation, it is a

43
Rangarajan Etc v Jagjivan Ram [1989] 2 SCC 574 (SC).
44
Moot Problem, para 8.
45
Clarification 11.
46
Clarification 3.
47
The Hogsmeade Penal Code 1860, s 271.
48
Tarun Jain v State of Uttar Pradesh [2021] 7 ILR 386 (ALL).
49
Clarification 3.

7
‘reckless abuse of the process of Court.’50 It is the duty of the Court to prevent such abuse.51 It
is therefore submitted before the Court that the arrest should be held unlawful and a gross
violation of the process of Court while relieving Ms Grindelwald of the charge under Section
271.
It is submitted that if the Honourable Court considers the conviction of Ms Grindelwald under
the said sections, it will harm the jurisprudence of free speech and the notion of democracy by
making an utterance or an act which may be innocently said or done with no intent to induce
resort to violence, an offence.52 Mere expression of opinion or criticism of governmental policy
if considered as ‘an act likely to spread an infectious disease’ gives way for legislative
overreach and negatively impacts the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

B. The Sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code are constitutional
as they do not violate the fundamental rights mentioned under Part III of the
Constitution of Hogsmeade

The implementation of the sections 269, 270 and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code by the
respective authorities is submitted to be unconstitutional by the counsels of the appellant.
Article 13 of the Constitution of Hogsmeade states that any law in derogation with fundamental
rights shall be held void.53 But, it is also held by the courts that an imposition of a limitation
on a fundamental right is not invalid per se, as long as the abridgement is constitutional.54 In
the present case, it is submitted that the restrictions are excessive and their application leads to
a gross violation of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution under Articles
19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and Article 21. Further, it is submitted that the legislature that enacted the
provisions must not considered a competent authority. Arguendo, even if it is assumed to be
one, it should not enjoy presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, mere legislative
competency would not be a ground to make the provisions constitutional.

50
Supra 47
51
Ibid; Preeti Gupta v State of Jharkhand [2010] 7 SCC 667 (SC); Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys
[1976] 2 All ER 497.
52
Herndon v Lowry [1936] 301 US 242 at p. 259 (G)
53
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, art 13.
54
Dr YP Singh v State Of Uttar Pradesh [1982] AIR 439 (All).

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 1. Sections 269, 270 and 271 violate fundamental rights

It is humbly submitted to the Honourable Court that the sections in question violate
Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and Article 21. The restrictions imposed
by the Sections are unreasonable and disproportionate.
1.1.There is a violation of Article 19(1)(a)

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees Freedom of Speech and Expression under it.55 However, it is
established that no right is absolute in nature.56 Article 19(2) lays down the reasonable
restrictions under which the right can be curtailed.57 It is submitted to the Honourable Court
that there is a violation of Article 19(1)(a) is -

[1.1.1.] Restrictions are excessive since they go beyond Article 19(2)

By the implementation of Section 269, any act which is negligent/unlawful and for which there
is a reason to believe that it might spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life is
punished.58 Under its ambit, even speech -which cannot be argued to actually cause the disease
which is caused by a virus59 or any other vector - is criminalized.
Similarly, speech may also come under the ambit of Section 270.60

When imposing restrictions on freedom of speech under sections 269, 270 and 271 and
classifying the said speech as an act likely to spread a disease dangerous to life, the State
curtails Article 19(1)(a) in the interest of health which has not been mentioned as a reasonable
restriction under Article 19(2). The State cannot restrict a right beyond what is prescribed in
the limiting clause of the right.61 In the rights that specifically could be abridged for health,

55
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, art 19(1)(a).
56
Laxmi Khandsari v State of UP [1981] AIR 873 (SC).
57
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, art 19(2).
58
The Hogsmeade Penal Code 1860, s 269.
59
Moot proposition, para 4.
60
The Hogsmeade Penal Code 1860, s 270.
61
Kaushal Kishor v State of Uttar Pradesh [2017] 1 SCC 406 (SC).

9
there is a clear and explicit mention by the constitution makers.62.A legitimate exercise of right
of speech and expression including fair criticism is not to be throttled.63

1.2.There is a violation of Article 19(1)(g)

Article 19(1)(g) guarantees freedom to practice and carry on any trade or profession.64
However, applying the previously established principle of reasonable restrictions65 Article
19(6) states that the right to trade can be limited in the interest of the public. However, it is

[1.2.1.] Restrictions stand too excessive in light of other alternatives available

An island nation like Hogsmeade would depend on shores for regular trade. The
implementation of section 271 which puts restrictions on vessels from the shores would affect
the regulation and movement of it which would directly have a negative impact on the trade
and economy of Hogsmeade.66 . Arguendo, if we assume that such a limitation was applied for
the interest of the public, the restriction is still excessive since it is the duty of the State to
formulate less intrusive ways of curtailment of right, instead of a total prohibition of an act. 67
Furthermore, it is a high possibility to assume that the impact of a disease may not be uniform
in nature. Hence, it is the onus on the State to create a gradation of rules opting for a less
restrictive alternative.68

[1.2.2] Economic impact of Section 271 should be considered

Further, it has been observed by the Court, that “they must avoid a particular outcome that has
a potentially adverse effect on employment, the economy, or state revenue, and should consider
the economic impact of a decision.”69 In the present scenario, it is reasonable to foresee that
the implementation of section 271 would have an adverse effect on the island nation of
Hogsmeade which would foreseeably very heavily depend on their shores for regular trade. It

62
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, art 25.
63
Baldev Singh Gandhi v State of Punjab [2002] 3 SCC 667 (SC).
64
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, art 19(1)(g).
65
JK Industries Ltd. v Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers [1996] 6 SCC 665 (SC).
66
Th Hogmeade Penal Code 1860, art 271.
67
KS Puttaswamy v Union of India [2014] 6 SCC 433.
68
Ibid.
69
Shivashakti Sugars Ltd v Shree Renuka Sugar Ltd [2011] 4 SCC (SC).

10
is submitted that the detrimental economic effect must be a factor in deciding whether the
section stands constitutional or not.70 Hence, by the application of Part III of the
Constitution, Article 19(1)(g) is violated by Section 271.

1.3.Violation of Article 21 since sections fail Test of Reasonability

It is submitted that the sections do not stand constitutional in light of Article 21.71 The
constitutionality of provisions under Article 21 is checked by the Test of Reasonability72
evolved by the courts.

[1.3.1.] There is no reasonable nexus between the right curtailed and the object:

Rational nexus between the right to curtail and the objective behind it involves establishing a
connection between the intent and the provisions. This means the measures required to
implement such a limitation must be logically related to the accomplishment of that goal. The
period of time in which the three sections were introduced and the diseases that prevailed when
the sections were incorporated were very different from the diseases that prevail now. By
historical usage of the provisions for cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox, it is concluded
that the spread of the disease varied from the ones dealt with now. The mode of transmission
differs greatly, additionally, with introduction of newer methods of science, it is not rational to
continue to implement an outdated provision. Further, because of an outdated wording of the
provisions, in the present case, mere criticism of a government rule attracted the attention of
the impugned sections. Such gross injustice could have been averted had the government made
laws in consonance with the present-day situation.

[1.3.2.] The powers vested in the executive are too broad and vague

It is humbly submitted that this Court has stated that where no reasonable standards are laid
down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and where no clear guidance is
given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a Section which creates an

70
Santosh Devi v National Insurance Co. Ltd [2012] 6 SCC 421 (SC).
71
The Constitution of Hogsmeade 1950, artpu 21.
72
KS Puttaswamy v Union of India [2014] 6 SCC 433; Modern Dental College & Research Centre v State of
Madhya Pradesh [2016] 7 SCC 353 (SC).

11
offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and unreasonable.73 The
impugned sections have a potential of criminalising trivial acts of sneezing and coughing, thus,
even penalizing acts done innocently and even arresting a fair criticism of government
vaccines74 under the garb of ‘likely to spread infection’. Such nature vests broad powers to the
administrative authority leaving to their discretion which acts are to be charged under it. 75 This
leads to manifest arbitrariness and goes against the tenets of rule of law.

73
Shreya Singhal v Union of India [2015] 5 SCC 1 (SC).
74
Moot proposition, para 15.
75
RR Verma v Union of India [1980] 3 SCC 402

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 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that,

1. Overturn the conviction of Ms Grindelwald by the trial court under Sections 269,
270, and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code.
2. Strike down Sections 269, 270, and 271 of the Hogsmeade Penal Code as
unconstitutional and violative of Part III of the Hogsmeade Constitution.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the
interests of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed,

Counsellors for the appellant.

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