Diplomacy, Dominance and Deference:

The Foreign Relations of the Mughals with other Islamic Powers in Asia

INTRODUCTION
“The agony of International Relations is the need to practice politics without the basic
conditions for political order”
-Bernard Crick1
The metaphor of the multi-cultural environment one finds oneself in at an airport, would be
appropriate to explain the magnitude of the surprise one should experience; but due to the
habituation of our interaction with those of another country or of another race, one rarely does.
The peaceful and cohesive mix of ethnicities, races and peoples in the waiting room of an airport,
would otherwise be an unlikely congregation a mere 1000 years into the past, when encounters
with strangers were rare, dangerous and likely to turn violent. 2 Yet, the crowd maintains itself,
merely because the crowd knows that none of the other strangers wish to attack them and that
each stranger did not have to compete with the other in a harsh, brutish environment governed by
the rules of “might is right” and “winner takes all”, and that resources could be procured in a
manner that was agreeable to all and sanctioned by law. 3 So where in history did this
understanding among people of different backgrounds come about? Was it tacit and sporadic in
its origin in the different parts of the globe, or was it something explicit and universally agreed
upon?

The majority of our 2.5 million-year-old existence constitutes of our hunting-gathering past,
characterized by our constant movement fueled by a paucity of food, seasonal changes and
omnipresence of predators, which led to the prospect of meeting the “other”. 4 Land or resources
were not possessed solely by one individual or their clan and possession of every natural asset
was settled by means of brutish conflicts. It was only when humankind embarked upon
agriculture 10,000 years into our past that the understanding of resources belonging to us and the

1
Bernard Crick, Essays on Citizenship, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002, p. 7.
2
Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday, New York: Penguin Group, 2012, p. 4.
3
Ibid.
4
Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, London: Penguin Random Book House, 2011, p. 91.
other came into being, giving rise to the idea of private property and attachment to that piece of
land, leading to an immobility of humankind. 5 6 Due to geographical constraints and those related
to the geo-politics in the vicinity, resources that could have otherwise been procured by a
wandering hunter-gatherer now seemed beyond reach by virtue of them being present in
another’s property or in regions unknown. 7 Humankind, due to the insufficiency and inefficiency
of an agrarian lifestyle, embarked upon an age of territorial expansion where the boundaries of
nations as we know them today, were blurred and made redundant, by virtue of the constant need
to conquer new territories and acquire new resources.8 It is here that the “political animal” in
man, gained precedence over the “social animal”, and reaching out to the “other”, now became a
matter of force or that of friendship.

Amicability and the respect for the other’s sovereignty was constantly weighed against
territoriality and expansion. However, upon reaching a comfortable level of sustenance, there
was a resurgence of friendlier alliances amongst peoples of different cultures. The very existence
of a culture or a dynasty’s coins, objects and records in a space geographically removed from
what has been described to be the extent of their frontiers, adds testimony to diplomatic
endeavours and alliances assuming an international nature and humankind eventually interesting
themselves in reaching out to those different from them for purposes that were not antagonistic.
Sovereignty and statehood, not being concepts unfamiliar in history even before the Renaissance,
did not necessarily mean anachronism and lawlessness in the absence of an apparent universal
recognition of one’s boundaries, people and regime. 9 It is thereby the broader definitions of
thinkers such as Mathiesen and Wright that enable us to appreciate the role of what one today
designates as “international relations” by acknowledging human contact in an age of “uncertain
sovereignties.”10 Mathiesen aptly states that - International Relations embrace all kinds of
relations traversing state boundaries, no matter whether they are of economic, legal, political or
any other character and includes all human behavior originating on one side of the state
boundary and affecting human behavior on the other side.11
5
Ibid, p. 92.
6
Yuval Noah Harari, op.cit., p. 93.
7
Jared Diamond, op.cit., p. 16.
8
Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, London: Penguin Random House, 2011, p. 91.
9
William Bain, The Medieval Foundations of International Relations, Oxon: Routledge, 2017, p. 9.
10
Peu Ghosh, International Relations, Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited, 2011, p. 3.
11
Ibid.
With regards to the aforementioned definition, this paper, by focusing on Mughal Medieval India
(the timespan for which is broadly stated as 1526 C.E - 1707 C.E.), shall attempt to present the
history of foreign relations in a new light. While Europe, during its medieval age was a miserable
backwater, riddled with ignorance and disease, India represented the opposite and embodied the
very values the Europeans came to rediscover and appreciate during the Renaissance. 12 The
paper shall furthermore and more importantly address the nature of Mughal international
relations and diplomatic measures and address the questions of their origins, their evolution, their
effects and the key players involved. The paper shall acknowledge the changing priorities of the
empire, but shall consistently prove how the Mughal zeal for expansion and economics was
always secondary to the Mughal desire to ally and establish peace. Mughal peacemaking efforts
and attempts to maintain the international status-quo shall be focused on and the avant-garde
nature of their efforts, whether as a matter of necessity or that of the monarch’s personal
disposition, shall be focused on. What came to be defined as “international” in the Mughal
scenario and the subjugation of trade as a secondary priority shall be brought to the forefront,
along with its reasons. The relationship of the Mughals with the Sāfavids, the Uzbeks and the
Turks shall be analyzed in the historical context of India’s ties to the Islamic world of Central
and West Asia. That being said, following is our hypothesis for this paper:

The Mughals actively prioritized political alliances to preserve their sovereignty, over economic
ties to promote trade, with respect to their ties with Central and West Asian Islamic powers.

OBJECTIVE
The objective of writing this paper is to understand how the tacit understanding of the extent of
one’s empire and the defining of one’s boundaries came about between the Mughals and the
other West or Central Asian Islāmic powers. This shall ultimately be linked with our
understanding of the Islāmicisation of the administration and how a co-operative rather than
competitive relation was not only sought after, but also gained success in its establishment. It is
also our objective to understand the changing nature of Mughal relations and the motives behind

12
Niall Ferguson, op. cit., p. 4.
their actions, in the context of their relative military strength, soft power, political stability and
state structure.

METHODOLOGY
In order to conduct the required research for this paper, the libraries of St. Xavier’s College,
along with that of the Heras Institute shall be consulted extensively in order to obtain material for
analysis and presentation. Online repositories of academic journals and papers such as Sage,
Jstor, Academia, EPW and the IJHSS, to name a few, shall be consulted. Both the writers of this
paper shall debate, discuss and deliberate over the subject matter of each aspect of this paper and
only the information agreed upon as a result of the amalgamation of ideas shall be entered. Each
section of the paper represents a joint effort by both the writers. The citations used in this paper
shall be those of the Modern Language Association’s 7th edition.

OBSERVATIONS

The Mughals (green), Sāfavids (purple), Ottomans (red) and the Uzbeks (yellow) (1547 C.E.)13

Since the 7th Century C.E., Islām has been the driving force for state structures in West and
Central Asia. In this context, the Mughals, as well as other Islamic powers in Asia, that existed at
the time, did not exist in separate vacuums with isolated pasts, but rather in a web of inter-state
and inter-imperial dealings, surrounded by rituals, conventions and elaborate forms of cultural
exchange. The various Islāmic powers of Central Asia strived to gain a stronghold in the area,
which witnessed a lot of conflicts fueled by various racial and cultural reasons. Each dynasty

13
“India History Map - 1600 Mughal Empire | Maps - Historical Maps | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, India and
Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/530650768576525791/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:04pm.
claimed itself to be the rightful overlord of the region, by tracing its ancestry to previous Islamic
powers. The Sāfavids considered themselves to be the true successors of Prophet Muhammad
and therefore considered themselves superior to other Islāmic dynasties; the Ottomans were the
true successors of the Caliphate of Baghdād; while the Mughals traced their lineage to the
powerful Mongol rulers and Timūr.

UZBEKS
The Uzbeks were a clan of Sunni Muslims that hailed from Central Asia and occupied the
northern regions of Persia and Afghanistan, primarily the Trans-Oxania valley where the river
Oxus flowed. The empire’s frontiers touched Turkey in the West, Persia in South-west, and
regions occupied by the Mughals in the East. The strategic significance of this area was primarily
in terms of geo-politics and this fueled their initial conflict with Mughals. The first instances of
Mughal-Uzbek interactions can be traced back to as early as the 16th century C.E. The Uzbeks
have been credited for driving Bābur out of Central Asia, who after having lost Samarkand to
Muhammad Shaybani Khān in 1501 C.E., occupied the North-Western regions of the Indian
subcontinent and eventually established the Mughal Empire in India.

Trade routes of Medieval Asia14

The Uzbeks were the most immediate and proximal antagonists of the Mughal Empire. Initially,
the territories of the Mughals and the Uzbeks shared soft borders, which existed as a set of
loosely administered areas between the two powers that often led to minor and insignificant
14
William Robert Shepherd, "Medieval Commerce from the Historical Atlas", Art.com,
<https://www.art.com/products/p34990970678-sa-i9409948/william-robert-shepherd-medieval-commerce-from-the-
historical-atlas.htm?RFID=990319>, n.d., 24 January 2019.
skirmishes. The boundaries between the Uzbeks and the Mughals came to be formalized with the
extermination of the Yūsufzai Afghān tribes and the treaty between Abdullāh and Akbar in 1586
C.E. The Persian Empire had grown weak due to Ottoman invasions, rebellious nobles and
incompetent rulers. This led Akbar to maintain a more conciliatory attitude towards the Uzbeks.
The Treaty of 1586 C.E. had the following clauses:
1. The Mughal ruler was to not take any interest in Badakśān and Balkh.
2. The Uzbek ruler was to not interfere in Kābul and Kandāhār.
3. Akbar promised to remain neutral during the Uzbek invasion against the Sāfavids, for
Khurāsān.
4. Abdullāh Khān agreed to refuse to subsidize, support or offer refuge to the Yūsufzai
tribes.
The Uzbeks maintained friendly alliances with the Ottomans, who had defeated Persia, thereby
influencing Babur to support Persia initially, which led to the creation of two major factions of
Islamic powers in Central Asia. Later, the Uzbek ruler wished for Akbar to have no friendly
alliances with Persia, which the Mughal emperor refused as he wished to not take part in the
partitioning of Persia by the other Central Asian powers. The successors of Akbar maintained
mixed relations with the Uzbeks, with Shāh Jahān attempting to capture Bukhārā while
Aurangzeb attempted to sustain friendly relations with Uzbeks.

SĀFAVIDS
The Sāfavid Empire, at its height, spanned over contemporary regions of Iran, Iraq,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia,
Turkey, Syria, Bahrain and Kuwait. The rise of the Sāfavids in Persia and the Mughals in India
were almost synchronous.15 The first instances of Mughal-Sāfavid interactions can be traced back
to as early as the 16th century C.E., when Ismail I provided military assistance to Bābur in
Central Asia.

15
Abolghasem Dadvar, Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606 - 1658), 1999, p. 34
 Map of the Sāfavid Empire16 Map of Afghanistan during the Sāfavid and Mughal
Empire, from 16th century C.E to 1747 C.E.17
In 1540 C.E., his son – Humāyūn – sought refuge in Persia when he was defeated by Sher Shāh
Sūrī. Shāh Tahmasp of Persia helped Humāyūn regain his empire in India, but on the conditions
of conversion. Many Iranis from the Sāfavid Empire migrated to Mughal India and had
considerable influence on the politics, economy and society of the Mughal Empire. 18 Nearly 70%
of the Mansabdārs listed in the Ain-i-Akbari were foreigners whose families hailed from Central
Asian lands of Turkey and Persia.19 Most of these Persian migrations to India were forced, due to
Uzbek attacks on eastern frontiers and Ottoman raids on western frontiers.

Regions under Timūr (in dark yellow) Regions under Humāyūn (2nd conquest
and Bābur (in chrome yellow)20 in chrome yellow) and Akbar (in light yellow)

16
“File:Herman Moll. Persia, Caspian Sea, part of Independent Tartary. 1736.A.jpg", Wikimedia Commons,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Herman_Moll._Persia,_Caspian_Sea,_part_of_Independent_Tartary._17
36.A.jpg>, 30 January 2011, 24 January 2019.
17
"Map of Afghanistan during the Safavid and Mughal Empire, from the 16th century to 1747 when the current
nation-state was created. Extracted from Bowen's A new & accurate map of Persia, with the adjacent countries
(1747)", Imgur, <https://imgur.com/qpFyJcN>, 11 June 2017, 24 January 2019.
18
Abolghasem Dadvar, Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606 - 1658), 1999, p. 21
19
R. Islam, ‘Iran and the Mughal Frontier Provinces’, Farhang-i-Iran Zamin, Vol. XXI, Tehran, 1976, p. 10
20
Roolvink, R., Historical Atlas of the Muslim Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 32
Due to friendly alliances between the Mughals and the Sāfavids from the time of Babur and
refuge of Humāyūn in Persia, the boundaries between them were not a matter of contention. The
region of Kandāhār was the only issue of contention between the two powers, due to its
importance in Central Asian land trade and proximity to Samarkand – the ancestral homeland of
the Mughals. Post Humāyūn’s death in 1556 C.E., Kandāhār was captured by the Sāfavids, but
Akbar captured it shortly. However, Jahāngīr lost Kandāhār to Persia yet again and his
successors – Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb – were unsuccessful in capturing Kandāhār during the
Mughal-Sāfavid War lasting from 1649 C.E. to 1653 C.E.

OTTOMANS
The Ottomans, a dynasty of Sunni Muslims, were the true successors of the Caliphate of
Baghdād. During the 16th and 17th centuries C.E., the empire reached its peak under Suleimān-
‘the Magnificent’. During this time the empire covered a vast territory that included regions of
West Asia, Central Europe, Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and Caucasus, North Africa and
Horn of Africa. The relationship between the Mughals and the Ottomans was one of cordiality
with occasional outbursts of spasmodic hostility. Bābur was steeped in Turkish culture and spoke
and wrote beautiful Turkish (Chagtai).21 His conquest into the Indian mainland was possible only
due to the military support of the Ottomans, who provided him with military tactics and methods,
the most important resource being gunpowder. However, Bābur never really recognised the
Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of the Islāmic world. His successor, Humāyūn, maintained a
diplomatic relationship with the Ottomans by exchanging letters, but he never really
acknowledged the supremacy of the Suleimān ‘the Magnificent’. The Ottomans did not
appreciate the Mughals supporting the Shiā Sāfavids – who the Ottomans were in conflict with.

21
Razi Ashraf, 'Ottoman-Mughal Political Relations circa 1500-1923', The Eurasia Studies Society Journal, Volume
II, Issue 1, 2013, p. 4.
 The Ottoman Empire, 1481 C.E. – 1683 C.E.22
It was Akbar who considered it important, during his early years, to strengthen a friendly alliance
between the Mughals and the Ottoman Turks. Later, however, he too like his ancestors, did not
accept the Sultān as the caliph of the Islāmic world but advanced his own claim as the caliph of
the age.23 Under the reign of Jahāngīr, the Mughals allied with Turks and the Uzbeks against the
Sāfavids. However, this Mughal-Uzbek-Turk alliance was short-lived. The reign of Shāh Jahān
witnessed amicable relations between the two Islamic powers. When Shāh Jahān visited
Baghdād, the Ottoman ruler Sultān Murād IV gifted the Mughal with finest of weapons, saddles
and kāftāns (tunics). The Sultān also provided forces to accompany the Mughals when they were
on their way back to Sūrat.24 Aurangzeb was too embroiled in the domestic affairs of his empire
and thus, was unable to initiate such friendly alliances with the Turks.

ANALYSIS
In order to be able to analyze the Mughal Empire’s foreign relations, military might and extent of
their territories, it is necessary to acknowledge the historical and geopolitical context of the facts
in order to gain a more macro understanding of the actions of monarchs. Three rulers from
India’s Ancient and Medieval past can be spoken of in order to gain a better understanding of

22
"The Maps of Ottoman Empire From Several Sources", Ottoman Souvenir,
<http://libertyparkusafd.org/Franklin/Ancient%20Empires/The%20Maps%20of%20Ottoman%20Empire.htm>, n.d.,
24 January 2019
23
A. L. Srivastava, Akbar the Great: Evolution of administration, 1556-1605 A.D, Shiva Lal Agarwala, 1962, pp.
349-50.
24
N. R. Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations Between Mughal India
and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748, Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, Delhi, 1989.
Mughal hesitancy to engage in expansion. Chandragupta Maurya, Rājendra Cōḷa I and
Muhammad Bin Tughluq; all did, to varying degrees of success, attempt to engage with foreign
powers militarily and annex their territories. Chandragupta Maurya successfully vanquished the
remaining Macedonian Śaka Kśatrapas to modern-day India’s north west; Rajendra Cōḷa I
annexed several parts of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia, thereby defeating
the Śrivijaya Empire; and Muhammad bin Tughluq only harboured plans for an elaborate and
ambitious Khurāsān expedition to annex territories in Iran. 25 26 27

The empires under Candragupta Maurya 28, Rajendra Cōḷa I 29 and Muhammad Bin Tughluq 30
(from left to right)

There is a common thread in state structure and economy that enabled these powers to even
envision the possibility of expanding beyond the typical frontiers of one’s empire and
furthermore, displace dynasties regarded as “foreign.” All three monarchs, arguably represented
their empires at their zenith and all the territories under them were under a centralized or
centralized bureaucratic state structure; thereby representing the lack of a need to be a sedentary,
centrifugal or centripetal administration that appeases local powers and grants them autonomy. 31

25
Radhakumud Mookerji, Chandragupta Maurya and his times, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988, p. 63.
26
Vijay Sakhuja, Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to South East Asia,
Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2009, p.66.
27
J.L. Mehta, Advanced Study in the History of Medieval India, Noida: Sterling Books, 2017, p. 208.
28
“Chandragupta Maurya.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 21 Jan. 2019,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chandragupta_Maurya. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:08pm.
29
Ajithkumar. “The 1000th Coronation Year of Rajendra Chola – One of the Greatest Kings of India.” Ajith Kumar.
CC, 5 Aug. 2015, www.ajithkumar.cc/my-thoughts/the-1000th-coronation-year-of-rajendra-chola-one-of-the-
greatest-kings-of-india/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm.
30
“Biography of Muhammad Bin Tughluq | Tughluq Dynasty | Indian History.” History Discussion - Discuss
Anything About History, 8 Mar. 2017, www.historydiscussion.net/history-of-india/tughluq-dynasty/biography-of-
muhammad-bin-tughluq-tughluq-dynasty-indian-history/6578. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:12pm.
31
Hermann Kulke, The State in India: 1000-1700, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.134.
Military superiority over others augmented their confidence with regards to taking on foreign
powers and a parity in status, if not superiority was observed when engaging with such powers.
Trade flourished as well in each of the three empires with commodities even being exchanged
with the Hellenistic Empires in case of the Mauryas, and Burma, China and Maldives in case of
the Tughluqs (who traded via Bengal) and the Cōḷas. 32 33 34
Owing to their military superiority,
territorial vastness and political stability; three factors that shall be analyzed in relation to other
smaller factors in this analysis, such powers could afford to maintain favourable trade relations
as a conspicuous priority in the functioning of their foreign affairs. Having subjugated the
foreign powers via armed conflict, a system of political alliances seeking appeasement or
subservience in order to ensure the non-infringement of one’s sovereignty was not needed and
instead, trade and economic relations could predominate one’s dealings with those outside of the
empire. 35

The foreign trade routes under the Mauryas 36, Cōḷas 37 and Tughluqs 38 (from left to right)

In order to put these anecdotes within context, the victory of the Mauryas over the Kśatrapas of
European origin came approximately 800 years prior to the advent of the Mughals in India. 39 It is
in this interim that we can observe the decline of the military superiority of the powers in South
32
Moti Chandra, Trade and Trade Routes in Ancient Routes, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1977, p. 157.
33
Prakash Charan Prasad, Foreign Trade and Commerce in Ancient India, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1977,
p. 143.
34
Shireen Moosvi, ‘Numismatic Evidence and the Economic History of the Delhi Sultanate’, Proceedings of the
Indian History Congress, Volume 50, Issue 4, March 1989, p. 211.
35
Hermann Kulke, op.cit., p. 34.
36
“Bay of Bengal Trade Route – The Origins of Shipping in the Indian Subcontinent.” Sea News Global Maritime
News, 15 Nov. 2017, seanews.co.uk/features/bay-of-bengal-trade-route-the-origins-of-shipping-in-the-indian-
subcontinent/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:14pm.
37
Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-chola.htm.
Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:16pm.
38
MAPS & ATLAS - SILK ROAD TRADE ROUTES MAP, Jan. 2013,
www.silkroutes.net/orient/mapssilkroutestrade.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:19pm.
39
Radhakumund Mookerji, op. cit., p.4.
and East Asia, relative to the advances made in West Asia, especially by the Islāmic Renaissance
in the 8th and 9th Centuries CE. 40 The advances made in weapons manufacturing in consonance
with the Prophetic and Caliphate zeal of proselytization and crusades necessitated the subsequent
advances made in the disciplines which laid the foundation for such advancements in
weaponry.41 The development in such an important arena in the era of conquests and expansion
was marked by a lopsided nature with the South and East Asian nations being rendered
vulnerable to armed conquests and subsequently the tide of Islam.

One of the primary reasons the Mughals could not afford to engage militarily with the other
Islamic powers of Central Asia and West Asia, and had to pursue a path of political alliances to
safeguard their boundaries, is due to this inferiority in their artillery and firearm technology and
subsequent reliance on the Ottomans for their manufacture and the Sāfavids and Uzbeks for their
transportation.42 The liberal patronage provided by Caliphs and Sultāns created the conducive
conditions for what we can now term as The First Renaissance or the Islāmic Golden Age;
which, some historians theorize, by virtue of the spread of Islam to the Iberian Peninsula and
Southern Europe, laid the foundation for the succeeding European one. 43 The development of
disciplines such as geometry, trigonometry and physics produced weapons that employed
gunpowder and possessed great mathematical accuracy in their firing, range and damage. 44 The
very fact that Bābur employed two expert Ottoman gunners and used their expertise, alongside
the revolutionary nature of the Ottoman cannons themselves is a testimony to the superiority in
firearms emanating from West Asia and declining eastwards due to lack of innovation and
scientific discoveries.45 The Mughals thereby were not pioneers in the revolutions in the
development of weaponry.

40
George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007,
p.135.
41
Ibid.
42
Jos Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700, London: Routledge,
1995, p.35.
43
Abdus Salam, Renaissance of Sciences in Islamic Countries, Singapore: World Scientific, 1994, p.183.
44
George Saliba, op.cit., p.155.
45
Satish Chandra, History of Medieval India, Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 2007, p.206.
 The spread of Islam and with it, that of the knowledge and scientific temper it carried 46

Similar to most modern-day arms manufacturing nations, the powers such as the Ottomans who
were considered pioneers in such technology never provided their purchasers, especially those of
another empire, with arms that were in consonance with the power of their most powerful ones. 47
It was always those which were outdated or at times in disuse that were provided to the Mughals,
furthermore along an unpredictable route that spanned across other empires. The lack of firearms
initially that could be fired from the back of an elephant or camel and that necessitated their
unloading before usage, as compared to the Ottoman weapons that could be fired from
horseback, rendered the Mughals a poor match in case of an armed conflict. 48 The Mughal
flintlock guns and muskets, as compared to the new and improved matchlock arms that the
Uzbeks and Ottomans possessed, represented a less foolproof and less accurate mode of dealing
damage due to phosphorus in the matchlock guns representing a material that ignites almost
immediately and explosively. 49

46
IlmFeed. “Cool Map Shows the Spread of Islam.” IlmFeed, 15 Apr. 2014, ilmfeed.com/cool-map-shows-spread-
of-islam/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:20pm.
47
Jos Gommans, op.cit. p.51.
48
Andrew de la Garza, ‘The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-
1605’, Journal of Military History, Volume 78, Issue 3, July 2014, p.234.
49
Andrew de la Garza, op.cit., p.236.
 The “gunpowder” empires in Asia in 17th Century C.E. 50

The navy was the poorest, most ill-equipped and smallest section of the Mughal armed forces,
which was not developed to its fullest potential even after Akbar’s acquisition of Gujarāt and its
several ports and long, amenable coastline. 51 Most trade under the Mughals was carried out over
land and no new initiative with regards to seaborne trade was initiated under any monarch,
probably due to preoccupation with internal strife and the acquisition of all desired commodities
via the silk route.52 The Mughal navy was merely supplementary in nature and existed with the
primary objective of ushering pilgrims to and from Meccā for the Haj Pilgrimage, instead of
trade.53 Contrasting this with the Ottomans and the Sāfavids, who exploited to the fullest the
potential of their respective access to the Black and Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf,
Mughal efforts to engage in trade over the sea represent a priority that is extremely low on their
agenda.54 Evidence for foreign trade ranking extremely low on the Mughal agenda is witnessed

50
“World History PowerPoint #27: Transformation of Gunpowder Empires in 1800s.” Teachers Pay Teachers,
www.teacherspayteachers.com/Product/World-History-PowerPoint-27-Transformation-of-Gunpowder-Empires-in-
1800s-2851741?aref=69yc7v3k. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:30pm.
51
Anirudh Deshpande, ‘Limitations of Naval Warfare: Naval Warfare on the West Coast’, Economic and Political
Weekly, volume 27, Issue 17, April 1992, p.901.
52
Muzaffar Alam, ‘Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations,
C.1550-1750’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Volume 37, Issue 3, March 1994, p. 211.
53
Barbara T. Metcalf, Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination, London:
Routledge, 1990, p.80.
54
Ahmed el-Ashker, ‘Islamic Economics’, Themes in Islamic Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, October 2006, p.90.
not only by their nonchalance towards seaborne trade, but also their indifference towards the
already existing silk route trade that stretched from their north-western frontiers and extended to
the Mediterranean.55 Unlike monarchs such as Sher Shāh Sūrī or Alā-ud-dīn Khilji, who made
efforts to facilitate trade and the influx of foreign traders and commodities into their realm by
building extensive roads, constructing safehouses for travelers and combating dacoity and
banditry en route, there was no such conspicuous effort on behalf of the Mughals. 56 On the other
hand, the few records of road construction beyond one’s frontiers were in fact done with the
intention of political subjugation by Akbar in 1586 C.E., in order to combat the dacoitry of the
Afghan tribes who often looted and plundered Mughal caravans. 57 The mention of the burning
down of the entire market of Peśāwar in 1585 C.E. due to neglect by the authorities under Akbar
is another example of such a tendency of the Mughals.58

It is upon analyzing the Treaty of 1586 C.E. between Akbar and the Uzbeks, as explained in the
Observations section, that one can explicitly understand the subservience of economic motives to
politics and power structures. Akbar arrived at Kābul in 1585 C.E. in order to crush the growing
menace of the Yūsufzai Afghān tribes who had inflicted misery on the people of the north west
frontier of his empire by routinely looting and plundering.59 It was however the construction of a
road over the Khyber Pass and several bridges above the Indus that finally piqued the Uzbek,
Abdullāh, to now reach out to Akbar for an alliance due to the threat such actions caused him. 60
Trade is not a priority as seen in the absence of its mention in the clauses. Although the Afghān
tribes harassed the Mughal caravan trade, there is no attempt made by Akbar to alter the existing
status quo or to expand his economic outreach by demanding favours in trading. Instead, there is
an element of continuity and the maintenance of the political status quo by a policy of mutual
non-interference in each other’s existing territories and subsequent expansionist activities.

55
Muzaffar Alam, op.cit., p.212.
56
Satish Chandra, op.cit., p.221.
57
Irfan Habib, ‘The Potentialities of Capitalist Development in the Economy of Mughal India’, the Journal of
Economic History, Volume 29, Issue 1, March 1969, p.54.
58
Ibid, p.55.
59
Mansura Haider, ‘Relations of Abdullah Khan Uzbeg with Akbar’, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, Volume
34, Issue 4, December 1982, p. 320.
60
Ibid, p.321.
 Kandahar, in the shaded region that marks the overlap between the Sāfavids and the
Mughals61

However, the crux of Mughal interest in such a measure was constituted by the capture of
Kandāhār; often known as the gateway to India. The geo-political significance of its capture was
due to the fact that it effectively connected the Mughal boundaries to the Sāfavids, their closest
ally at this point.62 This provided Akbar reassurance not only due to the fact that the capture of
Kandāhār was of symbolic significance considering his ancestral roots in Central Asia, but also
because of the direct geographical connect it provided, as against the nascent, uneasy and
precarious peace with the Uzbeks, who had only acquiesced to a Mughal treaty to stop their
minor encroachment and to exterminate the pestilent Afghān tribes. Akbar’s masterful diplomacy
was beneficial on two fronts: with the Uzbeks and with the Sāfavids, along with both of whom
there now prevailed peace and with the latter existed a more profitable setting in case of
obtaining military aid.

The Mughals also had a policy of not easily responding to skirmishes or provocations made by
other powers along their borders. The capture of Kandāhār itself by the Sāfavids under
Jahāngīr’s reign, the blatant non-interference commanded of the Mughals by the Uzbeks in
Badakhshān and Balkh, Bābur’s inability and subsequent nonchalance towards the recapture of

61
“The Battle over Afghanistan.” Afghanistan, www.moesmus-afghanistan.dk/?p=3429. Accessed on 23/1/18,
4:34pm.
62
Muzaffar Alam, op.cit., p.89.
Farghānā and Shāh Jahān’s ill equipped and almost half-hearted expeditions to capture Bukhārā
betrayed Mughal hesitancy and reticence towards regions beyond their north west frontier.63

The present-day locations of Farghānā,64 Badakshān 65 and Bukhara 66

The Mughals preferred allying themselves advantageously and opportunistically with the most
powerful power at any time. This is witnessed in Jahāngīr’s 1626 reversal of the pro-Persian
policy followed since the reign of Bābur, in consonance with the decline and temporary
weakening of the Sāfavid Empire.67 The attempted, yet failed 1626 tripartite alliance between the
Mughals, Turks and Uzbeks against the Sāfavids, with the objective of partitioning the almost
disintegrated empire never actually materialized due to Jahangīr’s death the following year and
the resurgence of the Sāfavids, by way of their assertion of dominance and beating back of the
swelling Uzbek and Turk forces.68 This was then followed by, in agreement with our
hypothetical argument, of the Mughals switching sides again in order to maintain political and
opportunistic subservience to the most powerful political power at the time. Shāh Jahān’s envoys
to Persia to re-establish relations, now emphasized along cultural and socio-religious lines was
parallel to his attempts to antagonize the Uzbeks by skirmishing for Bukhārā, thereby
representing a reversal in policy.

63
N.R. Farooqui, ‘Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure under the Mughals’, The Medieval History Journal,
Volume 7, Issue 1, April 2004, p.174.
64
“WSR1 BABUR Timeline.” Timetoast, www.timetoast.com/timelines/wsr1-babur. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:39pm.
65
WHKMLA: The Economic History of Italy During the Renaissance,
www.zum.de/whkmla/region/centrasia/xbadakhshan.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:43pm.
66
“Where Is Bukhara, Uzbekistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 15 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/uz/04/where-
is-bukhara.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:46pm.
67
Francis Robinson, ‘Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and Connective Systems’, Journal of Islamic
Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, July 1997, p. 162.
68
Ibid.
 The present-day locations of Balkh 69 and Kabul 70

Mughal preoccupation with domestic strife and continuous infighting further pushed trade down
the agenda for the state. With several civil wars, wars of succession and petty politics playing in
the ever-expanding domestic arena, the easiest way to deal with them in a focused manner by the
monarch, was to establish peace along the frontiers and to postpone activities like trade and
exchange for a later time, after having established stability. With several Mughal monarchs such
as Humāyūn, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb rising to power only after a protracted power struggle
with their siblings and initial displeasing of the nobles, the monarchs had to concentrate their
energies within the boundaries of their empire and also to cultivate trade within in order to
strengthen the economy.71 To trade with those in foreign lands was a prospect that would have
not occurred to any able administrator in such circumstances.

69
“Where Is Balkh, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/bal/where-is-
balkh.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:55pm.
70
“Where Is Kabul, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/kab/where-is-
kabul.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:59pm.
71
M. Athar Ali, ‘Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume
110, Issue 1, January 1978, p.41.
An 18th century map of the regions in and around the Indian subcontinent showing its proximity
to foreign powers in the North West 72

The rise of regional powers further hampered Mughal stability and thereby reflecting poorly on
their emissarial activities. With the insurgence of the Rājpūts under Mahārāṇā Pratāp under
Akbar, the Bāhamanīs in the Deccan, the Sīkhs under Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān and the Marāthās
under Aurangzeb, trade further suffered.73 Such circumstances further add testimony to our
hypothesis by means of Mughal cautiousness and restraint on expansionist and economic
ambition. Cartography in Mughal India suffered as well, with most major advances being made
only with the advent of the Europeans into India. No conspicuous attempts to formulate maps to

72
“India History Map - 1600 Mughal Empire | Maps - Historical Maps | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, India and
Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/530650768576525791/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:04pm.
73
Farhat Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India: Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572-1730, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.45.
foster trade with newer lands or even to expedite trade routes with existing partners, whether
over land or over sea, was also a factor that often-rendered Mughals vulnerable in battle in
unknown lands, due to minimal surveying and research done upon the area. 74

Maps portraying Śivājī’s kingdom in 1667 C.E.75 A late 16th century depiction of the area
under the Deccan Sultanates76

The map of the Indian subcontinent with the various regional powers and their places of origin77

Lastly, irrespective of military might, internal disturbances and geographical boundaries, the
Mughals also sadly lacked in soft power and cultural influence. The tendency to mimic the

74
Susan Gole, Maps of Mughal India, Delhi: Manohar Press, 1988, p.7.
75
My India, My India, www.mapsofindia.com/history/maratha-empire.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:09pm.
76
Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-bahmani.htm.
Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:12pm.
77
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Persian court, language, functioning, practices and lifestyle by the Mughals, was not one that
unfortunately mirrored by the Persians. Cultural inferiority was not conducive Mughal
domination or even receiving favourable terms of trade.78

CONCLUSION
The Islāmic Renaissance’s effects petered out by the time the zeal of knowledge acquisition and
innovation spread to the east of Asia. Politically precarious circumstances, combined with
military and strategic inferiority produced a vulnerable and subservient empire. The Mughals
displayed caution, diplomacy and tact in their dealings with aggressors, instead of chauvinism
and force, since the time of Humāyūn’s expulsion from India and his survival at the mercy of the
Sāfavids. Economic activities thereby always took the backseat in terms of Mughal priorities and
their preference for safeguarding their sovereignty. The Mughals, at the end of the mid-20 th
Century, now being non-existent, met their end in the same manner as that of the other powers it
tried so hard to maintain peace with: the extermination and subjugation by the even superior
arms of European powers.

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