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    45 Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day JOHN ERIKSSON How should we understand the nature of moral thought and talk? This is one of ‘the central questions in meta-ethics and responses fall nto two main categories. According to cognitivism, moral statements express belief that purport to ‘tepresent morl properties and can be true or false. Noncognitivism, on the ther hand, can be understood as the denial of cognitivism and the theses associated with it, Le. as denying that moral statements express belief that can be true or false. More broadly, noncognitvism is associated with a set of ‘negative theses regarding, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language and mind, In particular, theses to the effect that there are no moral fact, that there is no moral knowledge, and that moral thought and talk is non. representational. A problem with characterizing noncognitivism as a set of distinct negative theses is that not all philosophers associated with the noncog.- nitvist tradition adhere to them all? A different way to approach noncogniti- vism is therefore as a distinct tradition running fom emotivism through _rescriptivsm to expressivism, In what follows these two ways of understanding. oncognitivism will be pursued side by side. By examining the noncognitivist tradition running from the Vienna Circle to the present day the reader will ‘becomé acquainted with the views, theses and motivations associated with it. ‘THE BARLY Days A natural starting point for an inquiry into noncognitivism is AJ. Ayer’s version advanced in Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Not only is this one of "The terms “moral” and “ethical” are used interchangeably forthe simple reason that lferent philosophers in the noncognitivis tradition have used them thus, * Teshould be neted that “cognitivsm” is equally dificult to define. For instance, itis ot the case tht all cognsivists affirm al the theses mentioned, Error theorists, for ‘example, claim that moral thought and talk purport to describe moral properties ‘bat argue that moral properties don't exist. Hence, moral statements are system tically ise. ERT JOHN BRIKSSON the earliest statement of noncognitivism, but it also nicely illustrates the main associated theses and fits well into the view that noncognitivism emerges from a critique of the intutionism propounded by H.A. Prichard (1012), W.D. Ross (1930), and, in particular, G.E. Moore (1903). Moore thought thatthe history of moral philosophy was guilty of committing what he called the naturalistic fallacy, ic, trying to define “goodness” in natural terms, eg., pleasure, something desired by the speaker, commanded by God or the like. Moote famously argued for this by wielding the open-question argument ‘The idea behind this argument is that a proper definition entails that some- ‘one who understands it cannot intlligibly ask whether M (the analysand) {s $ (the analysans) For example, if one understands the concept “square” the question “This isa plane figure with four equal straight sides and four tight angles, but is it a square?” is closed. By contrast, “This is good, but is it pleasant?” appears open. Indeed, Moore argued that regardless of what naturalistic definition is proposed, the question will remain open. This led “Moore to the view that the term “gookiness” is unanalyzable and denotes a simple non-natural property.? ‘Ayer agreed that the term “goodness” is unanalyzable on Moorean grounds. Hence, naturalism was not an option. However, neither was Moore's intuitionism. In order to understand the ground for his rejection ‘of Moore's intutionism we must consider the influence of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism on Ayer’s thinking. The Vienna Circle was a group of philosophers, including Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Moritz Schlic, ‘with a firm commitment to empiricism. A central doctrine of the group is, ‘what is known asthe verification criterion.“ A statement sliteraly significant provided that that itis empirically verifiable. For example, a proposition is (weakly) verifiable “fic is possible for experience to render it probable.”* The alternative is that the statement is analytic (tue by definition). Since no ‘naturalistic definition is feasible, moral statements are not analytic. However, given how Moore and other intuitionists understood statements of value, * Moore 190s: 10-11. Note that Moore thought that “moral rightness” and "moral obligation” are complex notions ~ “ighmess," for instance, means that it will prodiuce more goodness, which in tur isindefnabl, Foran eal cial discussion ‘of Moore's argument see Frankena 1939 “The eritesion was parly inspired by remasks made by Witgenstein in Tractatus, ‘where negative remarks about ctics also can be found, "Its clear that ethics cannot ‘be put into words. Ethic is wranscendental.(Bthics and aesthetic are one and the same)” (Witigensein 1922, 6 421. » ayer i936: 8 59a ‘Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day Ayer thought it was clear that they are not verifiable, Intuition is not a scientific method of verification and it gives us no way of adjudicating between different intuitions. Consequently, “a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition’s validity."* But why is it that moral statements cannot be defined in naturalistic terms or be empiically verified? According to Ayer, the reason is that moral terms are “mere pseudo- concepts” that lack literal significance. ‘The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content, Thus if I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, “You stole that money.” In adding that this action is wrong | am not making any further statement about i. Tam simply evincing my moral disapproval of it Ieis as if had said, “You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror, ot ‘written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, ot the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It ‘merely serves to show thar the expression oft is attended by certain feelings in the speaker? Ayer’s statement illustrates the main negative theses associated with non- cognitivism. Metaphysical, there are no moral facts. Epistemologically, there is no moral knowledge. Semantically, moral statements do not purport to represent moral reality and therefore cannotbe true or false, Ayer does not say much about moral thinking, but itis clear that it is not a species of belief. Despite Ayers negative remarks he actually anticipates one of the central claims associated with contemporary expressivisin when he claims that "we ‘may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms of both the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke."® Given the Vienna Circe’s commitment to the verification criterion it should not be very surprising to find noncognitivist views among its mem- bers. Carnap (1935), for instance, claimed that “most moral philosophers have been deceived into thinking that a value statement is really an assertive proposition ... But actually a value statement is nothing else than a com- ‘mand in a misleading grammatical form.”? However, although Ayer and some of the members of the Vienna Circle advanced noncognitivst ideas, ‘moral philosophy or meta-ethics was not one of their primary interests. In * thd 206. Umson therefore deceres that noncognisivim inthe guise of emosivsm arose from epistemologial despa (96:9). 7 yersyt: 107. * Did 08. * Carap iis 245 383 JOHN ERIKSSON fact, Ayer's reason for considering value statements is in the context of addressing an objection to the verification criterion (see e.g. 1936, beginning of Chapter VD. On the other side of the Atlantic, Charles Stevenson advanced a form of emotivism in “The emotive meaning of ethical terms” (1937), which is claborated in Bthics and Language (1942). In contrast to Ayer, moral philoso- phy or meta-ethics was of central interest to Stevenson. Like Ayer, however, Stevenson was also concemed with problems facing naturalist analyses of ‘moral terms. In particular, focus is on so-called interest theories (a term ‘Stevenson gets from R.B. Perry) where “This is good” means “desired by me” or “approved of by most people” — views Stevenson attributes to Hobbes and Hume respectively the latter view is also attributed to Perry). Part of Stevenson's reason for objecting to interest theories is that they run into the kind of problems considered above in relation to the open-question argument. An analysis of “good,” as Stevenson puts it, “must not be dis coverable solely through the scientific method.” However, Stevenson also adds two further requirements that have played major roles in subsequent arguments for noncognitivism. First, “goodness” must be a topic for intelli gent disagreement’ and second, “it must be ‘magnetic,” i., it must explain how “{a} pesson who recognizes X to be ‘good’ must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency (0 actin its favour than he otherwise would have had” (hese arguments are treated in more detail below). No (pure) interest theory satisfies all these requirements, but, Stevenson argues, a kind of interest theory does. ‘Traditional interest theories hold that ethical statements are descriptive of the existing states and interests... Doubtless there is always some element ‘of description in ethical judgments, but this is by no means all. Theis major use is not to indicate facts but to create an influence, Instead of merely describing people's interest they change or intensify them. They recommend an interest in an object rather than state that the interest already exists. ‘Stevenson, by contrast to Ayer, thus claims that ethical judgments are indeed descriptive. However, they do not merely function to communicate beliefs or describe. Instead, their major function isto create an influence. This function is explained by the emotive meaning of ethical terms. “The emotive meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.” stevenson 193718. Ibid 16." Ibid, 3 34 [Noncognitivism: Fron the Vienna Cincle to the Present Day ‘The source of Stevenson's “emotive meaning” is C.K, Ogden and LA, Richards’ The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1923) and a proper presentation of emotivism is not complete without a brief account of their view. In this work Ogden and Richards actually present an emotive theory of moral terms “This peculiar ethical use of ‘good’ is, we suggest, a parely emotive use ‘When so used, the word has no symbolic function, ... it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude ... and perhaps evoking similar att tudes in other persons, or inciting them to action of one kin¢ or another.” Like Ayer and Stevenson, this statement is partly motivated by the open- ‘question argument and problems with intuitionism. Ieseems plausible that Ogden and Richards’ “emotive mearing” played an important role in the early development of emotivism." However, theit Positive view is arguably not motivated by a commitment to logical posit vism. Instead, the origin of theie view can be traced to another continental source, viz., Franz Brentano.” Ethics is, according to Brentamo, concemed with correct emotions (love and hate). An emotion is correct when it is adequate to its object, Anton Marty, one of Brentano's students, can be read as making semantics out of Brentano's psychology and a linguistic sign Marty called “cin Emotiv” is plausibly the origin of Ogden and Richards’ “emotive meaning,” Brentano is also arguably the source of Stevenson's concept of interest or emotion with the polarity of “for” and “against,” a concept he acquired through Perry's General Theory of Value 1926). In fact, roncognitivist views arose in different places at the beginning of the twentieth century." This may, of course, be a coincidence. However, it may also be argued that Brentano's heritage, via various other philosophers, is an important source of inspiration. Given the latter view, it seems rather plausible that Ayer and Stevenson's respective views have quite different historical backgrounds. Stevenson's view is “grounded in the psychology of Brentano and Perry ® gen and Richards 1923: 25. ayer (19k) admits having read Ogden and Richards’ book before wing Lenguage, Truth and Logi, but that the “plagiarism” was unconscious, ‘This draws on Sates (987), See, eg, Axel Higerscom'’s inaugural lecture “On the Truth of Moral Propositions” (ip) made accesible to the English-speaking world in the early 19508 by C.D. Broad’s transition. Broad (1923-4) also attibutes @ aoncognitivist view t0 AS. Duncan Jones, Urmson (198) claims thatthe use of the “boo hurrah theory of ethics” desives from the examples used to husrate Jones" view, €, that “This i good” may be equivalent ro “That's an act of self sacrifice, Hurrah!” See also Rusell (293). JOHN BRIKSSON and notin the main” ~as for Ayer— “an ethical work developed in reaction to Moore's Principia Ethica."” (One of the main virtues of Stevenson's view isits intuitive accommodation of both the descriptive and practical dimensions of moral language. ‘Throughout his work, he offers a number of different analyses meant to shed light on this dual function. To a first approximation, “This is good” ‘means “I approve of this - do so as well.” In Ethics and Language (1944), 4 second patter of analysis is advanced. According to it, “This is good’ has the ‘meaning of “This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z ...° except that ‘good’ has as well a laudatory emotive meaning which permits it to express the speaker's approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the hearer." In the retro- spective comments of Facts and Value (1963), finally, Stevenson considers deleting the autobiographical element and suggests that "X is good” means “Let us approve of X."" Stevenson never thought that these suggestions provided adequate analyses of the meaning of moral terms. Rather, they (or at Jeast the two fist) serve to illustrate the idea that moral thought and tall: are not merely a matter of description, but also have an action-guiding function. Moral language is conceived of as an instrament devised for adjusting human interests (this theme is elaborated in, e.g., Gibbard (1990) ‘where it is argued that moral language is essential for co-operation). ‘Ayer and Stevenson are the main emotivists in the noncognitivist lineage. "The next major development we find is R.M. Hare's The Language of Morals of 1952, where a different account of moral language is presented. Hare was critical of the emotivists’ attempe to shed light on the meaning of moral language in terms of expression of attitudes. Instead, Hare argued that moral language is best accounted for asa sort of prescriptive language. To say that someone is a good person, for example, is to commend that person, This is essential to understand the evaluative meaning of a value statement, However, Hare also argued, like Stevenson, that value statements involve a descriptive component. Commendations require grounds. It always makes sense to ask someone who claims that a person is good why the target agent is good, The answer to this question depends on the speaker's standard. For instance, a person may commend someone in virtue of the target agent having certain good-making characteristics X, Y, Z (compare Stevenson's second pattern). These characteristics in turn, are important to understand the descriptive meaning ofa value statement. As Hare writes, “[tjo know the descriptive meaning is to know by what standard the speaker is judging,""° Saris 1967126. Stevenson 94g 207. Thid, 214. * Hare 152: 46, 596 Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day He also claimed that the descriptive meaning of a value statement is second- ary whereas the evaluative meaning is primary. Hare's reason for thinking this is ewofold, First, the evaluative meaning of “good” or “right” is constant ‘whereas the descriptive meaning isn’t. Second, the evaluative force of “good” and “right” can be used to change their descriptive meaning,” Moreover, value statements do not merely apply to the situation at hand, but are covertly universal. Commending an agent in virtue of certain good. ‘making characteristics commits the judger to commend other people if they possess the same (or relevantly similat) property. This has to do with the supervenience of the evaluative on the non-evaluative, Its impossible for there to be a difference in evaluative matters (between two persons, situa- tions or the like) without there being a difference in descriptive matters, e.g, ‘motives, consequences or the like. "[Tyhis impossibility is a logical one, stemming from the way in which, and the purposes for which, we use these words.” Because of the “covert” universality of moral statements, Hare's position is also known as “universal prescriptivism.” CONTEMPORARY VIEWS Ayer, Stevenson and Hare all in different ways influence the development of the next stage of noncognitivism: expressivism. Here the main proponents ‘are Simon Blackbur (1984, 1993, 1998) and Allan Gibbard (2990, 2003). Gibbard explicates expressivism as a distinctive approach to meaning: “to ‘explain the meaning of a term, explain what state of mind the term can be used to express."® This explication requires the addressing of (at least) two questions, First, how should the expression relation be understood? It may be understood as a causal, intentional, conventional or more technical notion.™* A suggestion made popular by Schroeder (2008) is that a sentence expresses the state of mind that makes it semantically appropriate to use. ‘The next question is what state of mind moral sentences express (or what makes them semantically appropriate to use). The central idea among expressivists is still that the relevant state of mind isn't a belief that purports to represent of describe some kind of moral reality, but a state of mind with a different sirection of ft, ie, something more like approval or disapproval, However, a potential problem for expressivism is that moral disapproval ‘must be distinguished from other kinds of disapproval, e.g, aesthetic or © Thid, 8-19. * Mid, 53. Gibbard anes 7 ™ See Schroeder 2008 for discussion, 07 JOHN BRIKSSON gustatory (a.k.a. the moral attitude problem). Blackburn does not think that a strict definition of the attitude involved can be given.” Gibbard, by contrast, twies to be mote specific. In Wise Choices, Apt Felings (1990), he advances a psychological theory of moral judgments and judgments of rationality. In fact, moral judgments are about the rationality of certain sentiments, viz. guilt and anger. ‘To judge that an act is morally wrong isto judge it rational for the perpetrator to feel guilt and for other people to be angry with him or her. However, to judge that its rational is not to attribute any property, but to accept a system of norms. This is the kind of state of mind that a moral sentence functions to express. In Thinking How to Live (2003), Gibbard's view 4s slightly different, Moral sentences are sald co express plans or planning states (One of the central theses of noncognitivism is that moral thought and tall is radically different from descriptive thought and talk. However, moral thought and talk behaves pretty much like descriptive thought and talk. For example, we talk as if moral statements can be true or false, that moral terms denote moral facts that are mind-independent, that people have moral belief and that we can be wrong about moral matters, This seems decisively odd if moral thought and talks a matter of attitudes, as noncognitivsts think. Part of the contemporary expressivist aim is to “explain, and justify, the realistic seeming nature of our talk of evaluations™* without abandoning the expressivist framework. Blackburn calls this project quasi-realism. The aim is to show that the realisic-seeming nature is compatible with expressivism, For instance, Blackbur (1984) makes use of higher-order attitudes in order to explain why we think and talk as we do In his later work he relies more on so: called minimalist notions of “truth,” “properties,” “facts,” and “beliefs” and “propositions.” Minimalism about truth (as anllutration) is the view that all there is to understand the truth predicate is to understand instances of the following schema: the proposition that pis true if and only if p (see Horwich 1990). According to minimalism, truth is not a substantive property. Saying “Stealing is wrong is tre,” on this picture, just amounts to saying "Stealing is ‘wrong.” Moreover, once “truth” is accounted for it seems that facts come along, since saying that it isa fact that stealing is wrong amounts to no more than saying that itis true. Blackburn develops this theme.” In his early work, * Blackburn 1998: 19-14,“ Blackburn ip: 10, ™ Blackbur (1993, 1998). A potential problem with quasi realism and the appeal ro ‘minimalism is thar i makes i dificule to see what the differences berween cexpressvisn and mote realist accounts af mora thought and talk amount to. See Dreier (004) for discussion 598 Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day Gibbard denies that moral statements can be either true or false, In his more recent work, however, he is more open to minimalism.”* Terry Horgan and ‘Mark ‘Timmons (2006) also defend a view in this family, which they call “cognitivist expressivism.” According to this view, moral judgments are ‘genuine belief, but lack descriptive content. ‘One difference between Ayer, Blackbum and Gibbard, on the one hand, and Stevenson and Hare, on the other, i thatthe former think that a moral statement does not express a belief or has descriptive meaning. These views are versions of pure expressivism. The latter views are, by contrast, impure. Recently, Michael Ridge (2006) has advanced an influential theory in the spirit of the later, which he calls “ecumenical expressivism,” Moral statements, on this view, express both beliefs and desires.*® The latest addition of views in the expressivist family is “relational expressivism.” Rather than that moral statements express a par of attitudes, itis claimed that they express relational states (Schroeder 2013; Toppinen 2013; Ridge 2014). As this recent develop- ‘ment shows, expressivism is constantly being refined in different ways and relational expressivism is not likely to be the last step in the evolution of noncognitivist or expressivist ideas CENTRAL MOTIVATIONS [As this brief historical survey illustrates, there are both similarities and differences between noncognitivist views. However, the central motivations are more uniform, We have already become familiar with one of the main arguments, viz, Moore’s open-question argument. ‘This, together with the apparent implausibility of non-naturalism, once “seemed to force anyone ‘to noncognitivism, even kicking and screaming,”” Those days are long gone, but the apparent difference between facts and values is sill a consideration that makes noncognitivism attractive, Normative terms generally seem to be different from ordinary descriptive terms. As Gibbard writes, “the normative involves a kind of endorsement ~ an endorsement that any descriptive analysis treats inadequately.” Along with the traditional metaphysical and epistemological considerations, this still makes some kind of noncognitivism ‘See also Stevenson (1983: 244-18), Ridge conceives of his view 25 part of the noncognitivst tradition. See Schroeder (2009) for discussion of other hybrid options. See also Eriksson (2005) fr a hybrid theory inspced by Hare © Darwal etal. (1992): 144, * Gibbard 1990338 JOHN ERIKSSON attractive It should be noted that these considerations also suggest that noncognitivism or expressivism cannot, for better or worse, be confined to the moral domain. In fact, it has recently become popular to examine extensions to other domains, eg, epistemology, truth, epistemic modality and so on, Stevenson, recall, also claimed that an adequate analysis of “good” is expected to comply with two additional requirements: (1) “goodiness' must be a topic for intelligent disagreement”; (2) it must be "magneti.”® ‘Asguments based on these requirements have played important roles in meta-ethics and will, in reverse order, be briefly presented below. Stevenson's second requirement is the idea that “[a] person who recog- izes X to be ‘good! must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favour than he otherwise would have had.” Similarly, Hare claims that the most reliable way of finding out what a person's moral principles are is to study his orhe: behavior” For instance, if someone claims that one ought to donate to charity, but when given the opportunity displays complete indif- ference to the cause, we are likely to doubt his or her sincerity. The under- lying observaton here is that there is an intimate connection between an agent's values and motivation, ‘A common argument for noncognitivism based on this observation draws inspiration fam David Hume's Treatise (1739-1740). Hume claimed that reason is inert ic, that it cannot influence our actions and affections. Only our passions have this ability. However, Hume also observed that an agent's ‘moral opinions have an influence on his or her actions and affections, which seems to suggest that they must belong to our passions rather than reason.”” Inmodem parlance, the argument relies on two premises. The firs is what is commonly referred to as “motivational internalism,” which is usually under- stood as the thesis that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. ‘The second premise is the Humean theory of ‘motivation, ic, the thesis that beliefs do not motivate, only desires do. From these two premises it seems to follow that moral judgments aren't beliefs. Hence, they must be desires. "That noncognitivism easily explains why motivational intermalism is true is often presented as one of the major attractions of such a view. However, it is also frequersly invoked as an argument against such theses. In virtue of ® Although these considerations fora long time discouraged any defense of non- ‘auralism, this s no longer the case. See eg. Enoch (201) and Pasfic (20). ® Stevenson 17:8. Ibid. Hare rysx:1. % Hume 1739-1740: 315.6. 600 ‘Noncoggicvism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day identifying moral judgments with emotions, commendations or the like, critics argue, noncognitivism rules out the conceivability of agents who Judge that an act is right or wrong in a certain situation, but who are wholly indifferent in the relevant circumstances. Such agents are clearly possible, critics argue (Boyd 1988 and Brink 1980). However, noncognitivism cannot account for them and is in this respect seriously flawed. One response is simply to deny that such agents are conceivable. Perhaps the best interpreta tion of such agents is that they use moral terms in an “inverted commas” sense, €g., meaning that so-and-so is approved of by the majority of the agent's circle or the like.” Another response is to weaken the connection between moral judgments and motivation.” However, weakening the con- nection between moral judgments and motivation also weakens the tradi- tional argument for noncognitivism. Nevertheless, one may still think that the apparent action-guiding function is a feature of moral thought and talk that makes noncognitivism more plausible than rival views” Stevenson's third requirement concerns moral disagreement, For exam ple, if Jack judges that stealing is wrong and jill judges that stealing is right, then they are, intuitively, disagreeing. According to cognitivists, in order for Jack and jill to disagree they must express inconsistent beliefs. However, suppose that Jack and fill judge by completely different standards. jack is a utilitarian. fills a virtue ethiist. This, in tum, makes it plausible to think that the descriptive meaning oftheir respective uses ofthe terms will diffe. Thisis ‘what Hare's famous example involving cannibals and missionaries purports to show." In this case, there is no apparent disagreement in belief. If moral disagreement is exhausted by disagreement in belief, then Jack and jill wll not really disagree. However, possible disagreements are arguably not exhausted by disagree- ‘ment in belief. Stevenson famously distinguished between disagreement in beliefs and disagreement in attitude. The latter is illustrated by a number of different examples. Bill and Berta are going out to eat. Bill suggests an Italian place, but Berta expresses her aversion to Italian food and suggests that they ‘eat Thai. In this example they seem to disagree about where to eat. However, © Hare agp 124-6, 184-5. ™ ‘See, eg, Blackburn 1998, Gibbard 1993, Bjémsson 2002 and Eriksson 2or4 for discussion The relevance of interalism to noncognitvism (and in metaethis more gener- ally) continues to be debated. See Bjorklund etal. ora for a brief overview of the recent debate and theses “© Hare 1952. See alto Horgan and Timmons resaa and rab 01 JOHN ERIKSSON itseems that they could agree completely in belief (.., on all factual matters). Instead, “the disagreement springs (...] from divergent preferences (J and ‘will end when they both wish to go to the same place.”*" Stevenson gives a number of sight different explications of disagreement in atvtude, but most importantly it occurs when two people have opposing attitudes that cannot be simultaneously satisfied. How does this play into the hands of noncognitivism? Given the considerations advanced above, it seems that Jack and jill do not disagree in belief. On noncognitivist premises, on the other hand, moral statements are not used to (merely) express belief, but (also) to express attitudes, e.g., approval or cisapproval. Given such a view, Jack and Jill give voice to (or accept) attimdes that cannot be satisfied simultancously. Hence, the disagreement is explained in terms of disagree ment in attitude Considerations based on the open-question argument, the practicality of ‘moral thought and talk and the ability to account for disagreement even in the absence of disagreement in belief continue to attract philosophers to noncognitivism. However, noncognitivism is also problematic for a number ofreasons. We will end by briefly considering the most influential objection: the Frege-Geach problem. "The name of the problem derives from Peter Geach (who attributes the point to Frege), whose presentation has been most influential”"The target of Geach's argument was primarily a view like Hare's, according to which we should understand the meaning ofa moral sentence in terms of the speech act of commending, The argument, however, applies to noncognitivism more generally. Noncognitivism seems well suited to explain simple contexts Stevenson 19443 “ ‘See also Gibbard 2003. For discussion regarding the Stevensonian conception of “disagreement” and how "disagreement’ should be understood, ste Ridge (2013, 2014) and Eriksson (2016). Fora thorough examination of various arguments from. isagreement and the relevance to the debate, yee Tersman 2006. Ayer, intrest ‘ingly, claimed chat “one really never does dispate about questions about value” (i936: 10). A “moral disagreement” i not reallya disagreement about value but

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