Chavez v.

COMELEC
July 3, 1992, G.R. No. 105323 July 3, 1992

Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 104704, entitled
"Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private
respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992
elections. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However,
it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as
the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified candidates.

On May 11, 1992, Commissioner Rama of respondent Comelec issued a directive

over radio and TV ordering all "Chavez" votes to be credited in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the radio and TV announcements did not reach the BEI at
the 170,354 precincts nationwide. As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in
favor of petitioner.

On May 14, 1992, petitioner sent a letter to the Comelec requesting the latter to
devise ways and means in crediting "Chavez" votes in his favor but the respondent
Commission failed to act on said letter/complaint. Dissatisfied with the failure of
respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed, as aforesaid, this urgent
petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate.

Issue: WON the Court may review the decisions or orders of COMELEC (order to
delete the name of Chavez) in the discharge of its Quasi-Judicial Powers?

Ruling: Yes, the Court may review the decisions or orders of COMELEC in the
discharge of its Quasi-Judicial Powers.

The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor

Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the
Court's function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of
the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the
discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its
administrative functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure to implement
its own resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial
interference.

Sec. 15 of RA no. 7166 provides that while the Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials
(Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the
House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or

election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically
noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

Here, petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-
opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein.
Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates
of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none,
petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.

It is clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the
Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have
been proclaimed.

Lastly, in the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were either
invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of
the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not demonstrated
any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the
Comelec which would warrant their correction. As the authenticity of the
certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima
facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates.
 Salva v. Makalintal
340 SCRA 506, G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000.

Facts: On February 23, 1998, Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San
Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for the
annulment following:
1. Ordinance No. 05 3 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its
merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.
2. Resolution No. 345 5 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby
overriding the veto 6 exercised by the governor of Batangas.

Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under Section 9, in
relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the attestations or
certifications of the DOF, NSO, Land Management Bureau of the DENR.
Subsequently, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules
and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on
February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and
its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

Petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the conduct of the plebiscite
scheduled on February 28, 1998.

Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, the propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987 is dependent upon the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution
No. 345.

Issue: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite.

Ruling: No, the Court has no jurisdiction over the COMELEC resolution.

On the issue on the propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
being dependent upon the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No.
345--- [+It is already settled in this jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the
terms any decision, order or ruling’ of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari to this
Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, are
those that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials." The Solicitor
General further argues that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions,
hence, it is submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.cha

On the petitioners assertion that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial
functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881), its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court-- In Filipinas, we
have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that." . . . [t]he issuance of [COMELEC]
Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by
law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies
defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections
of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws."

Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.c
 Bulaong vs. COMELEC
220 SCRA 754, G.R. No. 116206. February 7, 1995
Facts: Jose M. Bulaong and private respondent Luis R. Villafuerte were candidates
for Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur in the elections held on May 11, 1992,
private respondent being, at the time, the incumbent Governor. Petitioner was
proclaimed elected by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. A total of 184,654 votes
were credited to him against 155,359 votes for private respondent.
On July 9, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest, alleging fraud and
other irregularities in 594 precincts located in 10 municipalities and one city (Iriga
City) of Camarines Sur. He prayed that a revision of the ballots and other election
documents and their technical examination be ordered, that the results of the
elections be annulled and that he be declared the duly elected Governor of
Camarines Sur.
COMELEC ordered the the revision of the ballots. The revision of ballots in 594
precincts resulted in a reversal of the results. Private respondent Luis R. Villafuerte
received 171,577 votes, while petitioner Jose M. Bulaong received 170,361.
Petitioner then filed a motion for the technical examination of the election
documents alleging that there had been tampering of the ballots between the time
the ballot boxes were brought to Manila and the time the revision began. The
Commission granted the hearings but were scheduled many times.
Noting that the next election was less than a year away, the Commission granted
petitioner only 15 days, from June 27, 1994 (up to July 12, 1994) within which to
submit the affidavits of his witnesses and after that another period of 15 days (up
to July 27, 1994) within which petitioner should make his formal offer of exhibits
and submit his memorandum. This directive was contained in an order dated June
27, 1994, the third order questioned. Altogether, petitioner was granted a period of
30 days.
testimonies and its order of July 7, 1994, denying "with finality" petitioner's
request for his witnesses to examine the election documents or to testify
personally at a hearing.
Anent the discrepancies on the ballots--Whether the ballots in this case were
indeed tampered with, is a question which the petitioner has to prove. That there is
a "huge discrepancy" between the result of the canvass and that of the revision is
no proof that the Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying his
request for additional time to conduct a technical examination of election
documents and to have his witnesses examine the ballots before requiring them to
make their affidavits. For as already stated, he was given sufficient time to present
proof of tampering or substitution of ballots but he failed to do so. Petitioner thus
begs the question when he claims that because the ballots have been tampered
with, the elections returns constitute the best evidence of the result of the election.
Anyway the question whether there has been substitution of ballots and what the
actual result of the election is, will still be determined by the Commission when it
undertakes its own independent evaluation and appreciation of the contested
ballots and election documents. As we have held, handwriting experts, while
probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this
can be done by the COMELEC itself. As for the allegedly fake ballots, no better
authority than the COMELEC can determine their authenticity, having itself ordered
and supervised the printing of all the official ballots. We cannot overemphasize the
fact that the Commission on Elections under the Constitution is the agency vested
with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Unless the Commission is
shown to have committed a grave abuse of discretion, its decision and rulings will
not be interfered with by this Court.

Petitioner claimed that the examination of ballots by the witnesses (teachers who
composed the Board of Elections Inspectors in the last election) was "absolutely
necessary" for his witnesses to be able to execute their affidavits. In the alternative,
petitioner asked that his witnesses be allowed to give oral testimonies instead of
affidavits.

Petitioner failed to make an offer of his evidence and file his memorandum. Instead
he filed the instant petition for Certiorari alleging that the Commission gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the orders of June 7, 20, 27 and July 7, 1994. in other
words, Petitioner asserts that the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he was not allowed to have further extension of the time to complete the
technical examination.

Issue: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner to have further extension of the time to complete the technical
examination?

Ruling: No, COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s request.

Petitioner had been given sufficient time to prove his allegations. The grant of
further extension to him would be inconsistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings, especially given the proximity of the May 1995 elections. Petitioner's
request to have his witnesses examine and identify the ballots appears to be
actually an attempt to circumvent the first order dated June 7, 1994 which denied
his motion for additional time to finish the technical examination of the ballots and
other election documents. Petitioner had been given, at first, a period of 30 days
(April 4 to May 4, 1994) and, then, 25 more days (from May 17 to June 10, 1994) for
the technical examination of election documents. Altogether he was given 55 days
to complete the technical examination of election documents. Despite this,
however, he still wanted further extension.

The Commission likewise granted petitioner reasonable time to prove his

allegation. At the hearing on June 20, 1994 he was required to present his evidence
but he refused to proceed, insisting on a prior ruling by the Commission on his
objections to private respondent's exhibits. But he could not present his written
objections which he said he had sent through the mail from Naga City on June 17.
He could have produced a copy of his objections, or he could have made his oral
objections, but he did not.

There is no basis for his allegation that he was "practically forced" to agree to
submit the affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their testimonies, considering that it
was his own failure twice to present them which "forced" him to agree to submit
instead their affidavits.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the Commission did not commit any abuse
of its discretion in issuing its order of June 7, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for
further time to have a technical examination of the ballots, its order of June 27,
1994 requiring petitioner to submit the affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their oral
 Soller v. Makalintal
339 SCRA 685, G.R. No. 139853. September 5, 2000

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. Soller was
proclaimed as the winner. Respondent Saulong filed with the COMELEC a ‘petition
for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return." Saulong also filed
an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
Both the COMELEC and RTC dismissed the petitions. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private
respondent’s election protest.

Ruling:
Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."

In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental
issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within
the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order
denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the
principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of
the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to
incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a division of the
COMELEC for resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the first instance.

Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the
petition herein is without doubt meritorious and has to be granted.

On the issue that petitioner failed to pay the amount of P300.00 filing fee
required under the COMELEC rules-- Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that
private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as
prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752
was issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the entries in the cash
book of the clerk of court. 11 Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478 credited to the
general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by private respondent for his
protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal of private
respondent’s protest case.

On the verification-- it is noted that the verification of aforesaid protest is

defective. In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the
preparation of his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations
therein. Certainly, this is insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the
contents of his election protest are true and correct of his personal knowledge.
Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be treated as an unsigned
pleading and must be dismissed.

The Court also finds that private respondent did not comply with the required
certification against forum shopping.

Pre-proclamation is a wrong remedy-- note that such petition was filed after the
proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no
longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be
claimed with some reason that private respondent, by resorting to the wrong
remedy, abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed.

Lastly, private respondent’s belief that he no longer had a pending case before the
COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid
reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that
the COMELEC dismissed private respondent’s pre-proclamation case only on July 3,
1998. Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution. Similarly,
the fact that private respondent’s protest was not based on the same cause of
action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the
required disclosure in the certification against forum shopping.