SPE 36913

Risk Assessment of Hydrocarbon Releases during

Workover and Wireline Operations on ComDleted
Wells on Offshore Platforms
J N Edmondson, UK Health and Safely Executive& I SocletYof PetroleumEndnaers
D K Hide, Amoco Exploration (UK) Ltd

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Copyr8ghl 19S6 Scmety of Petroleum Engineers, Inc
risks relative to risks from other activities on
Thts paper was prepared {or presentatwn at the 199S SPE European Petroleum these platforms and to assess where the use of
Conference held m Mjlan, Italy, 22-24 Odcber 199S
average historical release frequencies could be
Thjs pap+r was selected for presentatmn by an SPE Prcgrsm Commme@
follomng rewew of mformatton contained #n an abstrti subm ,tted by the
justified and where additional analyses are
author(s) Contents of the Wper as presented, have not bean rewewed by ttm necessary, The study also provides a
SWety of Pe!roleum Engtneers an.5 are SuQ9CI 10 .cCmWon by the author(s)
Tfx3 material, as presented dc-9s not necessarily reflect any POsimn of the mechanism for identifying those
Society of Petroleum Engineers, !ts cdkars, or memb+rs Papers presented at
SPE meetqw are subJ.9cl to pubhc.mm revew by Edutcrlal Commitees of ttm
workover/wi relin ing operations which are
Scc8ety of Petroleum Engineers Penmss$on to WY IS res!rtcted 10 an abstract predicted to give rise to the highest risks and for
of not more !han 304 wcwdn Illu$tratmn$ may nti M copwd The abstract
should wntabn conspw..ws acknowbdgement of wfwe and by whom the paper which risk control measures should be reviewed
was presented Write L!brarmn, SPE, PO Box 833636 Rtdmrdsm, TX
75063-3836 USA Fax 01-214.952-S435
vefy closely.

Introduction
Following Lord Cullen’s Public Inquiry into the
Abstract 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, in 1992 the UK
Safety Regulations in the UK require operators introduced a requirement for offshore
to demonstrate that the risks to workers from installations in its sector of the North Sea to
well operations on offshore platforms have been submit safety cases for acceptance by the
reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably Offshore Safety Division of the UK Health and
practical. Each offshore platform in the UK has
Safety Executive, Amongst the details to be
a safety case which includes a quantified risk
included in the safe cases are:
assessment of well operation hazards with the
(a) a demonstration that all hazards with the
potential to cause a major accident, potential to cause a major accident have been
Assessment of the safety cases by the UK identified,
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) showed that
(b) a demonstration that risks have been
few operators have specifically analysed risks evaluated and measures have been, or will be,
resulting from well workover or wireline
taken to reduce the risks to persons affected by
operations, regarding such risks as subsumed
those hazards to the lowest level that is
within general blowout risks. Where
reasonably practicable.
workovedwirelining have been considered
Examination of the way in which these
separately, the risk estimates have been requirements were being met with respect to
determined from average worldwide historical workover/wirelining issues in a number of safety
hydrocarbon release frequencies and not by cases revealed concerns in that:
analysis of particular operations being carried (a) the issue of workover/wirelining activities
out on a specific platform. The prevalent
had not been specifically considered within
conclusion from such risk analyses is that the
many safety casesz, Although there are many
contribution of workoverhvireline risks to the different tasks that can be carried out under the
total platform risk levels is very small. In order general description of workover/wirelining, there
to evaluate whether such a conclusion is had otlen been no attempt to examine such
necessarily valid in all cases, HSE undertook a tasks individually and to determine what could
study to establish a method for estimating go wrong, its significance, its likelihood and
workover/wirelining risks for a number of
whether there were possible remedial
different types of platform. measures,
This paper describes the method used by HSE
(b) where separate workover/wirelining risk
to assess the risk of hydrocarbon releases figures had been calculated, the estimates often
during workover and wireline operations. The were for very low risk levels which it was
workscope was restricted to completed wells on claimed justified the area not being examined in
offshore platforms. The m~thod is based on a further detail. Well Operations specialists in
detailed analysis of all the different potential OSD were not convinced that this necessarily
failure modes associated with the various well
gave a reliable or realistic picture,
intervention operations carried out on these (c) where separate risk estimates had been
platforms. The failure mode analysis results are provided these had generally been calculated by
then used to estimate the significance of these takina world-wide averaae blowout frequencies
367 -
and combining these with installation-specific TUBING CHANGE OUT (TC)
consequence analysis. In view of the potential WORKOVER ON COMPLETED WELLS (WOCW)
great diversity of workover/wirelining activities COILED TUBING OPERATIONS (CT)
and differences in the frequency with which they POST WORKOVER PROCESSES (PWP)
were carried out on individual installation there
were concerns as to whether this use of single As might be expected given the number of

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average historical frequencies could be justified potential accident scenarios identified, a wide
unless it could be demonstrated to be coverage was achieved both in terms of
conservative. (a) accident mechanisms, and
(b) the size of release that was likely to result.
Study Objectives Examples of the type of scenario identified were:
In the light of these concerns it was decided to (a) pulling out of a hole with partially fired
set up a study to examine the position in more perforating guns, radio silence is lifted, the
detail. Amongst the study objectives were: remaining guns detonate, the X-mas tree is
(a) to estimate the risks from workover/wirelining sufficiently damaged for hydrocarbon release to
operations for four reference or marker occur,
installations by carrying a detailed analysis of (b) the lifting and removal of an X-mas tree
the different potential failure modes. The four prior to tubing change-out ,where the X-mas
marker installations were selected as being fairly tree swings out during a lift and impacts an
typical of the wider spectrum of fixed adjacent X-mas tree and the impact ruptures the
installations in the UK sector of the North Sea, flowline,
(b) to assess the significance of the risk levels (c) blowing down a wireline lubricator where,
adduced relative to the overall risk levels unbeknown to the operator, the blowdown valve
estimated for these installations, becomes blocked by hydrates. Cessation of
(c) to assess whether the average historical flow is taken to indicate that the lubricator is
blowout frequency approach could be justified empty and removal of the lubricator is started,
on the grounds of conservatism, allowing the remaining hydrocarbon to flow out,
(d) to provide a methodology for OSD to carry
out its own analysis of workover/wirelining Frequency Analysis
operations, where appropriate, Having identified the different accident
(e) to provide a mechanism for highlighting scenarios, the next stage was to progress to
those operations likely to give rise to the frequency analysis and tfy to assess how likely
greatest risk, so that the arrangements for such it was that each of the individual accident
operations could receive appropriate scrutiny. scenarios should occur. In order for this to be
(f) to assess the likely impact of small releases accomplished it was first necessay to transpose
on overall risk levels from workover/wirelining the basic accident scenarios into fault tree
operations. format. An example of the type of fault tree
produced is given in Figure 1.
Hazard Identification Where appropriate, the fault trees were
An initial part of the study was an extensive sub-divided into two; the initial part displaying
hazard identification stage where with input from the events required to give a limited duration
well operations specialists within OSD an release (which would be terminated by the
attempt was made to identify the problems and operation of some safety barrier); the second
accident scenarios which could arise during part displaying the further events and failures
workover/wirelining operations. This stage required to give a continuing release.
resulted in the identification of 37 different basic In order to quantify the fault trees, input data
accident scenarios. However when the accident was required for the various base events shown
scenarios were subsequently transposed onto on the trees. The data used broadly fell into 4
fault trees slight variations in individual categories:
scenarios were often identified and these were ‘(a) Activity frequencies. This would usually
also included in the analysis. This considerably require a knowledge of the number of times a
increased the overall number of scenarios. For given activity was carried out annually on the
ease of identification the accident scenarios installation under consideration, eg the number
were divided into four different groups, reflecting of annual .sIickline operations, number of X-mas
the type of tasks being undertaken namely: tree removals etc. Information regarding the
frequency with which the various activities took
place was collected for each of the marker
installations. The data was generally averaged
368
 over the past one or two years and hence was frequencies, the release rate/duration estimates
fairly specific to current operations. for the different accident scenarios were
(b) Equipment failure probabilities. These examined and those predicted to result in small
generally referred to the probability of failure on release sizes were deselected from fi.rther
demand of standard items of safety equipment analysis. This was done because it was
such as BOP stacks, down hole safety valves considered unlikely many small releases would
(DHSV) and automatic master valves. The

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have been captured in historical databases and
values used came from standard sources such hence their inclusion would have distorted the
as 0REDA3. comparison. A release size of less than 50 kg of
(c) Conditional probabilities for base events of hydrocarbon was defined as a small release.
a more operational nature. In general this was a
difficult area because information of this type is Release Frequency Predictions
not usually available from release databases, Having made the delineation between small and
which tend to be focused on top-events such as large releases as described above, the
blow-out frequencies, nor from the data in predicted release frequency for accident
equipment reliability databases. To overcome scenarios in each categoy were aggregated,
the problem, the conditional probabilities used The frequency predictions were based on the
were generated on the basis of expert number and type of workover/wireling
judgemenffexperience by OSD well operations operations taking place on each installation.
personnel, with initial judgments being peer (a) Frequency of large hydrocarbon releases
reviewed by other members of the group to Table 1 indicates both the predicted frequencies
arrive at a consensus view, The values of large continuing hydrocarbon releases and
assigned were also reviewed by external firms large limited duration releases for each of the
intimately involved in workoverA.virelining and marker installations
coiled tubing operations and in some instances The relative importance of individual accident
the internal judgement values were modified in scenarios in contributing to the predicted overall
the light of their comments. In some instances, release frequencies varied somewhat according
they were dependent on installation specific to the installation under consideration but in
conditions, eg hydrate formation and control and general scenarios CT9, CT4, PWPI and
a range of values for different installations was WOCWS 1,8 & 12 (see Table 3) were found to
produced. be important contributors,
(d) Well characteristics. A consideration (b) Frequency of small hydrocarbon releases
relevant to a number of the accident scenarios Table 2 indicates the predicted frequency of
was whether the well being worked over was small hydrocarbon releases. As might be
capable of flowing naturally or not since this expected, the predictions were for small
affected the ease with which any undesired releases to occur much more frequently than for
release could be terminated. For installations large releases with frequencies generally in the
with a mix of natural and assisted production the range once per year to once per 15 years
approach used was a probabilistic one in that it depending on the level of activity and the mix of
was assumed that the scenario could have operations,
developed for any well but the probability of it
occurring on a naturally producing well was COMPARISON WITH HISTORICAL
simply the ratio of naturally producing wells to BLOWOUT FREQUENCIES
total wells. A number of different blowout frequencies have
been quoted in safety cases as being the
Release Size Assessments average historical blowout frequency relevant to
For each of the different accident scenarios, North Sea operations. The differences reflect
detailed estimates were made of the rate of variations in the way attempts have been made
hydrocarbon release and its likely duration. This to adjust world-wide frequencies to North Sea
involved consideration of factors such as well conditions and remove incidents which arose
pressure, well geometry, gas/oil ratio, water cut from mechanisms captured in separate
etc. As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives analyses, eg ship collision. After reviewing the
for the study was to assess whether historically figures available it was decided to employ
based blowout frequencies for workover/wireline values toward the less pessimistic end of the
operations were likely to provide a conservative available. This meant that if these figures were
input into safety case risk assessments. In found to be conservative, a similar conclusion
order to make the comparison between the would apply to other figures. The values used
study’s prediction and historically based were:
369
 6.8 x 10”5 per wirelining operation and historical blowout frequencies are also
3.4 x 104 per workover operation conservative for limited duration releases.
and were employed in conjunction with the (c) The results can be greatly influenced by the
annual number of workover/wireline operations number of wirelining/workout activities taking
on each marker installation to provide the place in the installation, as witnessed by
estimates shown in Table 1. Installation D which has an extremely low level

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There are several conclusions that may be of activity and where even the predicted limited
drawn from these results compared with the duration release frequencies for this study are a
predicted frequencies also shown in Table 1. factor of 8 lower than the blowout frequency
(a) The predicted blowout frequency based on predicted by average historical data.
average historical data is always higher (by a
factor of between 10 and 60) than the large RELEASE POTENTIAL FOR DIFFERENT
continuing release frequencies predicted by this ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
study. Whilst the nature of the present study is The predicted frequencies indicated in
fairly coarse and ‘broadbrush’ it is nevertheless Tables 1&2 were calculated on the basis of the
considered that the accuracy of the analysis is type and number of operations being carried out
such that the differences are significant. There on the four marker installations. Hence if a
are several reasons which could contribute to particular operation was only being carried out
the observed differences. For example, it is rarely (or not at all) on the marker installations
possible that not all potential accidents have its contribution to the overall predicted release
been reflected in the study and that their frequencies would have been negligible. This
inclusion would increase the pr~icted release could obscure the fact that a particular operation
frequencies. Whilst this is undoubtedly possible, might be potentially ‘high risk’ in terms of release
it is not believed that any major scenarios have potential and if it were to be carried out to any
been omitted and that any increase should significant extent on a particular installation it
therefore be relatively small and would not could have a dominant effect on the overall
explain the differences observed. The dominant predicted release frequencies. In order to take
reason for the difference is believed to be that account of this potential effect a different
the historical data fails to reflect adequately analytical approach was adopted. The number
current equipment and procedures. There are of operations that would need to be carried out
perceived to have been significant advances before each accident scenario would individually
over recent years in both equipment and give rise to a predicted release frequency of
procedures employed in workover and wirelining 104 yrl was calculated. This enabled
operations. These are reflected in the discrimination between high release potential
judgmental data used in the study but not in the accident scenarios, only requiring a few
historical databases, Since, in general, it is the operations annually to give the 104 yr’ release
large continuing releases that pose the” greatest frequency prediction and others where the same
threat of escalation and hence danger to the predicted release frequency would only be
overall workforce (rather than just associated with very high levels of activity.
workover/wirelin ing operatives) on an From this it was possible to rank the different
installation, this would indicate that the use of accident mechanisms in terms of release
average historical data would normally be potential. This identified some high release
conservative. potential activities which were not present on
(b) With the exception of Installation D, the any of the marker installations, The ten accident
predicted limited duration release frequencies scenarios with the predicted greatest potential
are higher than those based on historical data for a large continuing hydrocarbon release are
(by a factor of 5.5 and 28). However given in Table 3. From the results it was clear
contributions to the limited duration category that if a large number of high release potential
tend to be dominated by two installation specific operations took place annually on a particular
scenarios, namely handling/lifting operations in installation, it was possible to reach a point
the vicinity of a gas Iifl well causing annular where historically based average blowout
X-mas tree valve damage so allowing leakage of frequencies would cease to be consewative.
tubing annulus gas and failure of coiled tubing Consequently algorithms were produced to
stripper seals, whose relevance needs to be allow OSD well operations specialists to
carefully examined with respect to other determine when this was likely to be the case
installations. If measures can be taken to and where the use of average historical blowout
counter these two scenarios, then average frequencies should be queried,

370
RISK CALCULATIONS large number of high release potential
Hydrocarbon releases of all sizes from operations, they would not necessarily be valid.
workover/wirelining operations could present a No specific estimates were made with respect
potential threat to personnel on the installation, to societal or group risk. However since such
However whilst large releases present a threat parameters are directly related to the frequency
to all personnel on the installation, the effect of of large hydrocarbon releases it can be seen

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small releases would be expected to be largely from the frequency analysis that there are only
confined to the immediate area of the release. likely to be problems in the calculations of these
Therefore, in terms of individual risk the largest parameters where the basic conservatism of the
potential effect would be that on historical average blowout assumption breaks
workover/wireline operators since they would be down Hence there would again be concerns for
at risk from both small and large releases. In installations carrying out a number of high
order to assess the potential magnitude of the release potential operations.
workover/wirelining individual risk contribution,
the contribution for workover/wirelining BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
operatives was estimated as an upper bound In general terms the study objectives as
estimate for other groups of workers on the previously described were achieved and have
installation. given an insight into the relative effects of
Taking the predicted frequencies for large and workover/wirelining operations on risk levels on
small hydrocarbon releases for each of the four fixed offshore installations. However one of the
marker installations, these were then converted significant findings from the study was that there
into individual risk contributions. In carrying out were circumstances, dictated by level and type
the calculations relationships and assumptions of workover/wirelining activity, where the risk
were employed for determining the probability of contribution from such operations could be very
ignition, the type of event (eg fire or explosion), significant and would not be adequately
the size of event, the location of personnel, the reflected by the simple use of average historical
effects of a patilcular stimulus on personnel etc. blowout data. It is therefore considered
The calculations for workoverlwirelining important that in preparing safety case
operators indicated that small releases could be submissions operators give appropriate
a significant source of risk in some cases. The consideration to the scale of their own
results obtained are indicated in Table 4 workover/wirelining operations, are able to
together with the individual risk levels estimated demonstrate that they have carefully examined
using historical average blowout frequencies. relevant fault sequences, have done all that is
The results indicate that even with the inclusion reasonably practicable to reduce the possibility
of the effects of small releases predicted by this of their occurrence and that where average
study, the use of historical average blowout historical blowout frequencies have been used
frequencies results in conservative estimates for in related analysis their deployment can be
the four marker installations. It is believed that justified.
this is likely to be the case for many installations
in the UKCS. The figures estimated for Acknowledgements
workover/wirelining individual risk were then The authors would like to acknowledge the
compared with the estimates of overall individual valuable support and assistance by C Dykes
risk level faced by different groups of workers on and G Smith of Well Operations, OSD and
each of the installations, as reported in the H Smallman of Technology Branch, OSD.
relevant safety cases. These are also shown in
Table 4. References
These indicate that for the four marker 1, The Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
installations, individual risk from Regulations 1992,
workover/wirelining operations only made a 2. Survey of Workover & Wireline Risk Assessment,
H Smallman, February 1995.
small contribution to the total individual risk
3. OREDA; Offshore Reliability Data, DnV Technics
levels on the installations. Again this is
1992.
considered likely to be the case for many
installations in the UKCS.
With respect to both the above conclusions it
needs to be borne in mind that they relate
specifically to the marker installations and that
for example, in the case of installations with a

371
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FIGURE 1 - FAULT TREE EXAMPLE

‘7
RELEASE OF
HYDROCARBON

&
,
II I1
I

II
ANNUAL EXPLOSIVE

7
EXPLOSIVES X-MAS
NO. OF CHARGE
INITIATE TREE
ELECTRIC SUSCEPTIBLE
IN THE
LINE TO SUFFICIENTLY
INITIATION
X-MAS DAMAGED
OPERATIONS
TREE AREA
USING A BY RADIO FOR
PERFORATING SIGNAL OR P6 RELEASE
GUN STRAY ,I #
I TO OCCUR

A
ELECTRICAL
F CURRENT RADIO & OTHER P7

SILENCE STRAY
PI NOT ELECTRIC DHSV
DHSV

u
MAINTAINED CURRENT OUT
PRESENT OF LOCKED
WHILST
ALL F?ADIO HOLE OPEN
RUNNING

L-
CHARGES ::NCE
IN
DO NOT ‘5 WELL CAN
HOLE
DETONATE yH1l~NEc FLOW P11 P10
UNAIDED
P2 P. PULLING DHSV
. TO THE
OUT OF FAILS
SURFACE
HOLE ON
J DEMAND

LIMITED DURATION RELEASE

CONTINUING RELEASE
<
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TABLE 1

r PREDICTED URGE CONTINUING

HYDROCARBON RELEASE
FREQUENCY (YR1)

8.0 X 104
PREDICTED LARGE LIMITED
DURATION RELEASE FREQUENCY
(YR”)

5.4 x 10-2
RELEASE FREQUENCY BASED ON
AVERAGE HISTORICAL BLOWOUT
DATA*

7.95 x 10-3

2,3 104 1.6x 10-’ 5.8 10-3

l----+-
X X

7.2 X lCr5 5.2 X 10-3 9.7 x lo-

6.6 x 10-’3 9.6 X 10-7 4.1 x 104

ti
● Allowing for the annual number of workoverhvkeline operations on each installation
 TABLE 2

PREDICTED SMALL RELEASE FREQUENCIES FOR THE MARKER INSTALLATIONS

INSTALLATION PREDICTED SMALL HYDROCARBON PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR(S)

RELEASE FREQUENCY YFc’

Stuffing box or grease tube failure.

A 1.2X 1o”’

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Grease seal failure during electric line
operations

B 33x 1o”’ As above.

c 1.4X 1o”’ As above

D 6x IO”2 Stuffing box or grease tube failure.

TABLE 3

PREDICTED SCENARIOS WITH HIGH POTENTIAL FOR A LARGE

CONTINUING RELEASE

SCENARIO TYPE & No. BRIEF SCENARIO OUTLINE

CT7 Fracture stimulation with a tree saver, packing on tubing hanger fails -
release occurs.
1

CT4 Coiled tubing strippers will not seal, (eg coiled tubing collapses) - release
occurs,
1

VJOCW8 Pulling out of hole with a partially fired perforating gun, radio silence Iifled,
1-
cwn detonates, damages X-mas tree - release occurs.
Wocwl 2 Operator detonates perforating guns at too shallow a depth, well blows
out internally. and hydrocarbons
. find a route to surface.
1

CT9 I Coiled tubing or tool stuck across X-mas tree, tree displaced to water and
frozen with N, to form a plug to install fishing lubricator. Pressure control
equipment cracks, thaws out and release occurs. I
PbVP2 Gas lift - while handling equipment, (eg lubricator), it knocks and
dameges X-mas tree annulus valve, No downhole annular safety valve or
downhole annular safetv valve fails. Live annukrs causes aaa release.

CT8 During fracture stimulation, tubing fails, causes overpressure

annulus, failure of annulus seals-release occurs.
of the
I
Wocwl Tool jammed across X-mas tree. Attempts to free tool, wire tension
causes lubricator to fail wth leak path below BOPS. Maeter valve can’t be
closed - release occurs.

TC5 Downhole plug incorrectly set (or wireline retrievable MLSV not correctly
reset afler opn), leaks, well influxes after X-maa tree removed before bop
installed (or, for MLSV, after bop removed before X-mas tree replaced) -
releaae occurs,

PWP 1 On well start-up, high pressure gas is injected down annulus, hole in
tubing causes high pressure gas to be circulated to production facilities -
causea vessel rupture,

374
 TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL RISK PREDICTIONS

INSTALLATION PREDICTED INDIVIDUAL RISK INDIVIDUAL RISK INDIVIDUAL RISK FROM ALL
CONTRIBUTION FROM CONTRIBUTION FROM OFFSHORE HAZARDS
WORKOVERIWIRELINING WORKOVER/WIRELINING (FROM SAFETY CASE)
FROM THIS STUDY USING AVERAGE HISTORICAL
BLOWOUT FREQUENCY
(FROM SAFETY CASE]

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A 6.1 X 10”6 Not given 4.9x 104

B 1,4X104 2.3x 105 12XIO”5

c 4.6 X 10’ 8x 1o”’ 1.5X103

D 2.6 X 10”5 7.7 x 10’ 62x10”4

375