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The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Evaluating Tesla's Human Factors in the Wild
West of Self-Driving Cars

Article in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting · October 2020
DOI: 10.1177/1071181320641020

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 The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Evaluating Tesla’s Human
Factors in the Wild West of Self-Driving Cars
Samineh Gillmore and Nathan L. Tenhundfeld
University of Alabama in Huntsville

With self-driving vehicles no longer a pipe-dream of science fiction comes the growing pains of the new
technology. Tesla Motors is the industry leader in implementing new self-driving technologies. Tesla has
used new technology in many ways to improve the human factors of their cars, but there are also design flaws
that represent threats to efficiency and safety. This paper details the good, the bad, and the ugly of Tesla’s
designs, not as a way to negatively impact Tesla’s reputation, but to point out the potential human factors
issues that relate to the rise of self-driving cars in general. While the future for autonomous cars has never
seemed so promising, it is abundantly clear that we are nowhere near a reality in which the human does not
need to be considered.

Introduction We have broken our evaluation into three distinct

Self-driving vehicles are no longer relegated to the works
of science fiction. With companies like Tesla, Audi, Toyota,
and Waymo investing heavily in the development of self-
driving capabilities, this cutting-edge technology will soon be
available in even the most economical models. However, such
advances in technology come with substantial growing pains.
One such growing pain has been the high profile fatal
accidents which resulted from instances of drivers seemingly
becoming complacent in their supervision over the system
(Abrams & Kurtz, 2016; Griggs & Wakabayashi, 2018). This
complacency is not a rare occurrence. Results indicate that
most drivers become complacent while tasked with monitoring
a self-driving system (Banks, Eriksson, O’Donoghue, &
Stanton, 2018). Part of this complacency could be explained
by the simple naming of the self-driving system. Names like
Tesla’s ‘Autopilot’ result in nearly half of respondents
indicating that it would be fine to keep their hands off the
steering wheel, despite Tesla explicitly stating that hands must
be kept on the steering wheel at all times (Teoh, 2019).
Beyond concerns of complacency have been evaluations
of familiarity (Tenhundfeld, de Visser, Haring, et al., 2019),
individual differences (Tenhundfeld, de Visser, Ries,
Finomore, & Tossell, 2019), transfer of control (Eriksson,
Banks, & Stanton, 2017; Stanton, Young, & McCaulder,
1997), training (Ebnali, Lamb, & Fathi, 2020), and situation
awareness (Endsley, 2017). However, to date there has not
been a critical human factors evaluation of any of these
commercially available systems. Such an evaluation is of
benefit to the field and industry alike. The purpose of this
paper is to highlight the areas in which Tesla, the industry
leader in self-driving technology, has implemented designs
which range from mild inconveniences to potential
catastrophes waiting to happen. The purpose is not to target
Tesla, but instead to start a dialogue about the need for careful
Human Factors evaluations when developing these cutting
edge technologies. While Tesla is far from the only
manufacturer with these problems, the authors have nearly
three years of combined experience driving Teslas, and thus
have chosen to critically evaluate the systems based on their
own experiences.
categories. ‘The good’ section will focus on the aspects of
design that Tesla has done well. ‘The bad’ section will identify
the human factors problems that are poorly designed but that
do not represent an obvious nor immediate danger. Finally,
‘the ugly’ section will focus exclusively on the design choices
Tesla had made, which we believe pose an immediate and
direct risk to users.
Review
The Good
Tesla’s redesign of their vehicles has led to novel human
factor choices for various aspects in the car. Some choices are
idiosyncratic changes to old technologies, such as the ways in
which one opens the glovebox or doors which has made Tesla
stand out in a unique way. Other design choices relate to the
new technologies and new capabilities Teslas offer.
One of the most obvious features in the ‘good’ category
is the configurability afforded by switching the user profiles.
The profiles are incredibly user friendly, requiring at most 2
clicks to change profiles. Like most cars, the user profiles
contain seat, mirror, and steering wheel settings, but Tesla
goes one step further by saving driving preferences as well;
preferences such as steering mode, braking modes, autopilot
settings, and climate are tied to a user’s profile. This way users
can tailor settings based on preferences that can change
between profiles. This configurability allows for multiple
drivers to readjust to their preferred or needed settings,
enhancing safety and user experience at the literal touch of a
button (Lee, Wickens, Liu, & Boyle, 2017).
Another redesign that has a positive benefit is the model
3 dashboard redesign. Tesla decided to remove the traditional
dashboard and relocate the information to a center console
screen located to the right of the steering wheel. While there
are cons to removing the dash (discussed later), one benefit is
that it allows for greater visibility of the road and one’s
surroundings while driving the car.
With the increases in technology comes an increase in
the host of various sensors that allow the vehicle to detect both
proximal and distal objects. The information that is then
subsequently presented to the driver is often done so in an
intuitive manner. For instance, the Tesla displays the other
vehicles in the immediate vicinity it detects, allowing the user
to understand what the vehicle ‘sees’. Similar projections are
given for objects which are within approximately 2 feet, by
presenting a color-coded indication on a top down display of
the vehicle. The color-coded indication is displayed in the
region where the object is detected (Figure 1). This display
nicely adheres to design principles recommended for
likelihood alarms, which makes such presentation of
information intuitive, learnable, and non-taxing (Lee et al.,
2017; Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz, 1988).
Figure 1. Color coded indications (LivingTesla, 2018).
A final area in which Tesla should be lauded, is in the
redundancy of information presented to the driver. For
example, when engaging the Autopilot feature Tesla provides
both transient feedback (a chime) and persistent feedback
(image on the display). This allows users the ability to quickly
detect that the Autopilot has been engaged, if they are
expecting the feedback (Lee et al., 2017). Similarly, when the
Autopilot has been disengaged there is a distinct chime
(different from the chime signifying it was engaged), and the
persistent feedback of the image disappears.
Tesla’s positive redesigns show that they have worked to
enhance safety and efficacy in their vehicles through human
factors. Despite the positives, there are many cases in which
there seems to be significant neglect of human factors
principles in design.
The Bad
With a redesign of any new system comes aspects that
introduce new problems. One main example of this is the
relocation of the dashboard information in the Model 3. In this
redesign, Tesla has moved the information from behind the
steering wheel, to the center console (Figure 2). While this
redesign comes with the benefit of a larger out the window
view, it also has a detrimental effect that drivers have to look
farther away from the road to get speed or alert information
than they otherwise would have. Whereas normal dashboard
displays allow for a quick shifting of the eyes, this new
configuration requires substantial movement of the head. The
N-SEEV model of noticing would predict that users are
significantly less likely to notice relevant changes in
information as a function of increased required effort to attend
to the information (Steelman-Allen, McCarley, Wickens,
Sebok, & Bzostek, 2009). While the information is displayed
clearly, the requirement that the user looks away from the road
to acquire pertinent information is a concern. This presentation
of such important information on the center console is
particularly concerning given the history of the console screen
going blank in the middle of driving (Rishabh0428, 2019).
Figure 2. Model 3 dashboard (DeBord, 2017)
Another poor design is the system for non-emergency
alerts on the car. For example, in the case that the car detects
low tire pressure or a certain amount of weight on a seat that
does not have a seatbelt fastened, an alert will be displayed on
the dashboard (or center console in the Tesla Model 3). These
alerts will show up and can be dismissed, but leave a symbol
on the dash. However, even once an alert has been dismissed,
the vehicle will re-alert the driver by showing a banner on the
representation of the car every few minutes until the issue has
been resolved. This presents a significant concern for several
reasons. First, a salient cue will redirect driver attention from
the road and towards the cue itself (Meyer & Lee, 2013). This
attention capture does not pose an immediate risk, but could
serve to diminish situational awareness (SA) (Endsley, 2001).
While the alerts do not represent false alarms, their salience
indicates a level of immediate importance that is not inherent
in what is being alerted to. This is likely to elicit a response in
line with the ‘cry wolf’ effect, such that subsequent more
important information will be ignored as a function of less
important information being continuously cued (Wickens et
al., 2009). Finally, this repetitive alerting for a non-urgent
situation can lead to users to be unnecessarily annoyed and
irritated. This annoyance and irritation can lead to users
ignoring or turning off alarms rather than taking them
seriously (Marshall & Lee, 2007).
In addition to the aforementioned concerns which can
affect the user in both manual control and auto-driving, exist
concerns inherent to self-driving systems. Transparency refers
to the system’s communication of relevant information to the
operator (e.g. Kraus, Scholz, Stiegemeier, & Baumann, 2019;
Mercado et al., 2016). Transparency is an important factor in
the development and repair of trust in a system (de Visser,
Pak, & Shaw, 2018; Matthews, Lin, Panganiban, & Long,
2019). There are undeniably cases in which the vehicle does a
good job communicating with the user, such as its detection of
vehicles and objects around. However, much of the design of
Teslas seems to be agnostic towards transparency. One such
example is the lack of communication with regards to
automation disengagement. Once the vehicle is unable to
continue in self-driving mode, or is unable to complete
autoparking it simply disengages without any presentation of
information as to why. This poses a significant threat to the
calibration of trust such that the user is unable to tie the
disengagement to a specific environmental event, but rather
attributes it to the vehicle itself. There are also instances in
which communication of the vehicle’s intention would be
beneficial. Previous work has shown over 50% intervention
rates when using the autoparking feature for the first time
(Tenhundfeld, de Visser, Haring, et al., 2019; Tenhundfeld, de
Visser, Ries, et al., 2019; Tomzcak et al., 2019). Part of this
high intervention rate may be attributable to the idiosyncratic
method by which the Tesla parks perpendicularly (backing in
with a three-point turn versus pulling in nose first). Once users
learn what the vehicle is doing, and how it plans to accomplish
the autoparking task, they are quick to develop trust, letting
the vehicle park itself. However, the lack of communication
mars early experiences, and can lead to subsequently unsafe
intervention behaviors from the driver.
The final ‘bad’ design feature is the unintuitive
organization of the settings menu. For example, information
regarding emergency braking, lane deviation warnings, and
blind spot collision warnings are all located within the
‘Autopilot’ header rather than the ‘Safety & Security’ header.
This is particularly perplexing given that they are not part of
the features that Tesla advertises as part of the Autopilot
system, and instead as ‘Safety Features’ (see
https://www.tesla.com/autopilot). Additionally, it is housed
separately from the park assist chimes feature, which is found
under the ‘Safety Features’. Another example includes the
button to turn off the vehicle being under ‘Safety & Security’
rather than ‘Quick Controls’. Unfortunately, there is also no
search feature which would otherwise allow users to overcome
this nonintuitive display layout. This all contributes to poor
learnability for the system (Lee et al., 2017).
While the examples in this section represent poor
designs, the consequence of such poor design is not likely to
be severe. With that said, we have identified several design
flaws which we believe constitute severe risk.
The Ugly
Our final category is ‘the ugly’ of Tesla designs. This
category represents our most serious concerns regarding the
design of Tesla vehicles. This is not necessarily to say that the
concerns addressed herein represent the greatest deviation
from optimal design, but rather that the design flaws here pose
the greatest overall risk to users. It is worth prefacing that,
once again, these concerns are not limited to Tesla. Thus,
points discussed herein should be considered by all auto
manufacturers.
The creation of new driving technologies comes with the
reality that some features can impose dangers that are not
inherent in normal driving. For instance, in vehicles with self-
driving capabilities like Tesla has, there needs to be careful
consideration regarding the transfer of control (TOC) between
the vehicle and human. There are two circumstances under
which TOC occurs: from the human to the vehicle and the
vehicle to the human.
In the first instance of TOC (human to vehicle), Tesla
seems to have done a nice job with the design (as discussed
above). However, one of the main issues with TOC revolves
around the disengagement caused by the vehicle itself. When
the autopilot is unable to navigate a particular situation, it will
spontaneously “give up”. It alerts the driver with a salient
beeping, and displayed image on the dashboard (or center
console in the Model 3) telling the driver to regain control
immediately. However, at this moment the vehicle has already
relinquished control over to the human. If the human is
unable, or unprepared to regain control the vehicle has no fail-
safe: the vehicle will simply continue ahead as would a normal
car once the driver’s hands are removed from the steering
wheel. This has resulted in several close calls for both of the
authors, wherein the vehicle would straighten out in the
middle of a turn, directly into oncoming traffic. While the
beep is jarring and would get the attention of drivers who were
actively monitoring the car, the lack of a fail-safe when it
comes to the autopilot is concerning for those who are not.
Even for those users who are not distracted with secondary
tasks (e.g. Banks et al., 2018) there remain issues of the loss of
SA (Endsley, 2001), performance decrements once regaining
control (Stanton et al., 1997), and even out-of-the-loop
unfamiliarity (OOTLUF) over long periods of use (Sebok &
Wickens, 2017), each of which could result in potentially
disastrous consequences for the user or others. While a default
‘fail-safe’ would be potentially difficult to implement,
inclusion of driver monitoring may be a useful addition in that
it would allow a self-driving car to abstain for transferring
control to an individual who is clearly unable to resume
control. However, when pressed about incorporation of a
driver monitoring system on Lex Fridman’s Artificial
Intelligence podcast, Elon Musk responded that it was ‘totally
moot’ because Tesla is so close to a fully autonomous vehicle
(Fridman, 2019). We are inclined to disagree on both points.
Such a system may also help in cases wherein the driver
unintentionally disengages the autopilot, by analyzing for
behaviors inconsistent with full control over the vehicle. This
misalignment of belief and reality about the state of the
automation (i.e. engaged or not) is known as mode confusion
(Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997). While there are both
auditory and visual indications that the autopilot has been
disengaged, they are relatively non-salient, and unlikely to
result in the driver noticing them, especially when expectancy
is low (Steelman-Allen et al., 2009). There have been many
instances we have noticed wherein we, or others we have
observed, have unintentionally disengaged the autopilot
without noticing, only to jarringly realize we had moments
later when the vehicle did not respond to the environment.
Similarly, the method by which a user engages the
autopilot on the Model S and Model X is a source of concern.
On the left side of the steering wheel there is a smaller stick
which is to be pulled towards the driver twice in order to
engage the autopilot (Figure 3). Despite there being a very
noticeable size difference between the ‘cruise control lever’
and the two other control sticks on the left-hand side, the
action of pulling the stick towards the driver is one that does
not require the driver’s hand to be oriented in such a way as to
notice the size difference. As such, on many occasions this has
resulted in the authors (or those they observed) pulling one of
the other two aforementioned sticks toward them, rather than
the desired ‘cruise control lever’, which has caused mode
confusion. A simple shape redesign of the ‘cruise control
lever’ would help prevent such confusion (Hunt, 1953). It is
worth noting however, that in the Model 3 only, Tesla has
integrated the features into a single stick. Baring a shape
redesign, the actions necessary to engage the autopilot should
be distinct from the available actions with the other sticks. For
example, requiring that operators push the ‘cruise control
lever’ in towards the steering column would require an action
not afforded by the other sticks. Simple reliance on the
transient feedback of the chime, and persistent feedback of the
light is insufficient for a task which normally takes place in
noisy or rich environments which are attentionally demanding
(Lee et al., 2017).
Figure 3. Autopilot control stick referred to as the ‘cruise control lever’ by
Tesla, indicated by arrow (Amadeo, 2015)
Our final point of concern regards an idiosyncrasy
afforded by the advance of technology. Because vehicles
today are so reliant on computers for their functioning,
enhancements to the vehicles can be made with simple
software updates. Tesla has adopted a method by which they
are able to update vehicles through Wi-Fi and cellular
connection. While owners are able to turn off automatic
updates, failure to update a vehicle’s software will result in
subsequent damage not being covered by the warranty (Tesla,
2017). There have been many documented cases of Tesla
pushing updates to vehicles which have unexpected
consequences. One such example is the changing of default
settings pertaining to things like whether the car will roll or
hold its position on a hill (Brandonlive, 2019). The pushing of
software updates presents a substantial concern amidst
criticism that the new features are far from flawless, a clear
issue in the face of user overtrust. The most recent evidence of
this was the multitude of issues, including accidents, near
misses, and complete failures, when using the new ‘Smart
Summons’ feature, all resulting in ‘#TeslaSummonIssues’
emerging on Twitter (Lekach, 2019).
Each of these aforementioned issues presents what we
believe is clear and significant risk to Tesla owners and those
in the surrounding environment. While the probability of fatal
consequences may be low, there needs to be significant
consideration about the design of such systems such that there
is consideration of the human element.
New Contribution
Elon Musk has publicly stated that a Tesla is “…not a
car, it’s a thing to maximize enjoyment” (Rogan, 2018).
While, in our opinion, Tesla has certainly provided a highly
enjoyable ‘thing’, there are serious human factors concerns
regarding various design choices. The unfortunate truth is that
users will find ways to either intentionally or unintentionally
push the limits of these self-driving vehicles. From trying to
trick the car into believing the driver’s hands are on the wheel
when they are not, to reading or playing games while the car
drives itself, the human will always be the relatively
unpredictable variable in human-automation interaction. Thus,
as we move forward there needs to be greater consideration as
to the ways in which humans will struggle with imperfect
designs. This paper has attempted to highlight some of the
areas in which these imperfect designs pose a risk to the
human operator.
Discussion
Again, many other car manufacturers have their own
human factors design issues, and so this paper should not be
construed to insinuate that Tesla has committed a sin of
human factors neglect that has not been committed by others.
Simply put, we have extensive experience with Tesla and have
spent considerable amounts of time contemplating and
discussing the human factors issues. Inherent in these sorts of
cutting-edge technologies is the reality that many of these
companies are in a race with one another to provide the first
fully autonomous car on the market. While there is much to be
said for the advancements made by Tesla, we would caution
all car manufacturers against delivering systems to market
without thorough evaluation of human factors. This is
particularly relevant for tasks related to the human-automation
interactions and TOC, for which most users are naïve.
In conclusion, Tesla has brought to market the most
cutting-edge technologies for self-driving vehicles. There are
certain design choices which Tesla has made, that should be
lauded for their adherence to human factors principles while
other design flaws represent threats to efficiency and safety
alike. We have detailed the good, the bad, and the ugly of
Tesla’s design of its vehicles, as it relates to what the field of
human factors already about design principles. Our hope is
that this paper serves three distinct purposes. First, we believe
it is important to illustrate the shortcomings of Tesla’s design,
not to negatively impact perceptions of Tesla, but rather to
illustrate the deficiencies in consideration of human factors as
it relates to self-driving vehicles. Secondly, we hope to inform
other researchers of potential safety and experimental control
issues which should be considered for research being
conducted in a Tesla. Finally, we hope this paper sparks a
dialogue about the best ways for the field of Human Factors to
communicate our understandings of complex fields of study,
such as human-automation interactions, to the industries
which need this information the most. While the future for
autonomous cars has never seemed so promising, it is
abundantly clear that we are nowhere near a reality in which
the human does not need to be considered.
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