THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM

Volume XXm, Nos. 1-2, Fall-Winter 1991-92

PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT*

LUCIEN GOLDMANN

At first glance, when one compares a work by Kant with the Pensées, the
differences are pronounced. It is necessary to delineate what is essential, to
reduce these two modes of thought to their schema, to their "ideal type," in
order to see that both express the same tragic vision of man and of the universe.
A world-view can express itself, however, in different forms; within this
framework, Pascal and Kant diverge radically. But if Kant, above all, thinks the
tragic vision of the world, Pascal, while thinking it too, first and foremost lives
it. Kant's work presents itself as a magnificent conceptual constmction; Pascal's
Pensées are also direct and poignant testimony of a real and full life. This is also
why Kant can develop his system and pursue the tragic vision in all the domains
of philosophical thought, elaborating an epistemology, an ethics, an aesthetics,
a philosophy of religion, and even a philosophy of history. Pascal's focus, by
contrast, is entirely on morals and above all on religion—those domains to which
the tragic vision accords essential importance.' He treats aesthetics and episte-
mology only in an accessory manner.
Beginning with the same initial premises, Kant, writing during the epoch of
the French Revolution and at the culminating moment of the philosophy of the
Enlightenment, asks himself, above all, what can man now look forward to in the
different levels of experience, the categorical imperative, the beautiful. Pascal,
whose very life is tragic, attributes little importance to those realities which, for
him, as for Kant, are no more than provisional and relative. He remains centered
instead on the only authentic reality: the Absolute, the Sovereign Good, God.
These differences are, however, far from being of a purely individual char-
acter. They are also, in large part, reflections of the social conditions in which
these two systems of thought developed. Kant, in the eighteenth century, rep-
resented the most advanced segment of the German bourgeoisie. It is this which

* In this essay, first published in 1950, Goldmann developed the essential themes later appearing in
his most celebrated work. Le Dieu caché (The Hidden God).
 LUCIEN GOLDMANN

gives his system its great historical import, and ties him, despite tragedy, to the
real, concrete, worid of his time. By contrast, Pascal, in seventeenth-century
France, expresses the ideology of an intermediate stratum of society, the no-
blesse de robe, which is totally removed from the center of activity, as we shall
see later. That's why he can live tragedy to its final consequences, and fall back
entirely upon the transcendent.
In the France of the seventeenth century, the ascendant class—the third es-
tate—is represented in philosophy by the dogmatic rationalism of Descartes.
Because of this, Pascal's thought, despite its dialectical character, and despite
the fact that its profundity and penetrating qualities far surpass those of his
antagonist, will remain a fleeting phenomenon, without a future. The real de-
velopment of thought and of social life in France will take place under the seal
of Cartesianism, though it will have been philosophically transcended by then.
Thus, my purpose is not to assert that the thought of Kant and of Pascal are
identical, but simply that they mark the same tuming point in the history of
philosophy, from individualist thinking—whether empiricist or rationalist—to
dialectical thinking.
The majority of works on Pascal attempt to situate him in relation to the
past—that is, to the Augustinian tradition—or in relation to his own time—that
is, to Port-Royal and to the Jesuits. Others try to assimilate him to various
philosophical doctrines: Victor Cousin saw him as a skeptic, Leon Chestov as an
irrationalist, etc. All of these authors are partially right, without a doubt. How-
ever, no one, as far as I know, has tried to see in Pascal the first modem thinker,
the point of transition between individualist and dialectical thinking, and to cast
light on those elements which unite him to Kant, to Hegel, and to Marx. How-
ever, as I have already noted, this is the only perspective which would allow an
understanding of the whole of his work, grasping its unity, and at the same time
giving proper due to skepticism, individualism, Jansenism, and other elements
which interpreters have taken, each in their tum, to be fundamental, while
neglecting the others: "There are only three kinds of people: those who serve
God, having found Him; those who preoccupy themselves with searching for
Him, not having found him; and others who live without searching for Him, and
without having found Him."^ (275)
This isn't merely a psychological classification. In an extremely general and
abstract way, it is also a schema of the history of philosophy from the Middle
Ages to our own times. The medieval thinkers found God in revelation, and for
whatever their differences, there is one common characteristic among all of them
who can be called tmly representative: They don't search for God, because they
already have Him, and their faith helps them to serve Him, and at the same time,
to understand man and the universe.

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 PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT

The transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, at the spiritual level,
is the transition to a purely this-worldly orientation. The earth is accorded a
reality of its own; it becomes the only place where the life of man is played out.
And whatever transformations society—and with it, bourgeois thought—will
undergo, this point will remain common to all its forms, insofar as they don't
transcend individualism. From the Renaissance on, up to Cartesian rationalism
and English empiricism, all individualist doctrines content themselves with in-
dividual man, and don't feel any need for a higher reality which would transcend
him. These are the people who live without searching for God, and without
having found Him. And if, on occasion, one among them—Descartes, for ex-
ample—is a believer, this can only be a matter of no consequence, or a manner
of speaking and of thinking of one of those who "believe in believing" (to quote
Prevert). Pascal is not one to deceive himself: "I cannot pardon Descartes. He
would have liked very much to have been able to dispense with God, throughout
all of his philosophy. But he couldn't keep himself from granting God a tiny little
push, to set the world in motion. After that, he has nothing to do with God." (77)
"That useless and uncertain Descartes." (78)
In relation to all the Christian, dogmatic, and skeptical ways of thinking,
Pascal represents something entirely novel: the man who is searching for God,
without having found Him. And this quest for an absolute, for a "supraindivid-
ual" value, will be one of the elements shared in common by all the dialectical
thinkers, by Pascal, Kant, Hegel and Marx, with the sole differences being that
the last two see the possibility of finding God, that is to say, an ensemble of
supraindividual values. Within the perspective of historical evolution. On the
other hand, what dominates the thought of Kant and of Pascal is the absence of
God, or more exactly, the quest for a God who is not immediately given, whom
they cannot attain in the earthly sphere.
Now, this tum in philosophical thought and in artistic vision, this retum to
religiosity, to the quest for an absent God, isn't an isolated phenomenon. It
appears in all the major west European countries in different epochs. Of course,
it has its social roots, of which we will speak further. But at the level of
philosophical thought itself, it is the consequence of a fundamental fact: the
appearance, in the midst of the individualist categories which dominate the
preceding centuries, of a new philosophical category constituting the center and
the foundation of all dialectical thought—the category of totality.
Rationalism and empiricism, reflecting the atomistic stmcture of bourgeois
society during its period of ascendance, saw the universe as a collection of
autonomous parts, each understandable in itself, independently of its relation to
the others. Conversely, the universe appeared comprehensible only by an anal-
ysis which first decomposed it into parts in order, then, to reconstmct it. Hence

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 LUCIEN GOLDMANN

Descartes' clear and distinct ideas, the sensations of the empiricists, the monads
of Leibniz, the Ego of Eichte, inasmuch as they are elements, are absolute
starting points for this type of individualist thinking.
That is why the day that Pascal wrote his Eragment #72 marks one of the most
profound revolutions in the history of European thought:

If man were to begin by studying himself, he would see how incapable he is of getting beyond
himself. How could a part know the whole? But perhaps he may aspire to know the parts with
which he stands in proportion. But the parts of the world all have such a close relation and
connection to each other that I think it is impossible to know one without the other, and without
knowing the whole. . . . Therefore, since all things are both caused and causative, dependent and
supportive, mediated and immediate, all of them maintain themselves by a natural and invisible
link which binds the most distant and most different of them. I hold it to be as impossible to know
the parts without knowing the whole, as it is to know the whole without knowing the parts.^

The idea expressed in these passages is the foundation and the point of de-
parture of all dialectical philosophy. To be sure, one can easily find analogous
passages in earlier philosophers. I, myself, once cited a similar passage in
Descartes."* But Descartes reverted all too quickly to the opposite view, and since
the end of the Middle Ages, no one made the idea of totality the fundamental
category of philosophical thought. Moreover, this vision was of such great
novelty that it wasn't taken up again in France by any important thinker. It was
more than a century before Kant, thanks to a concurrence of circumstances in
Germany, was able to rediscover the same idea, although without any direct link
to Pascal. In 1755, he announced, in th&New Clarification of the First Principles
of Metaphysical Knowledge, that he "will establish two new principles of great
importance for metaphysical knowledge" and that in this way, he "will open a
hitherto unknown path." The first is the principle of succession: "No change can
be produced in substances except to the extent that they are mutally connected.
The mutual dependence thus determines their mutual change of state."
This is less clearly stated than it is in Pascal, but the idea is the same, and I
have, furthermore, attempted to show^ to what extent the idea of totality will tum
out to be the center of Kantian thinking in all of his subsequent works. The
fundamental criterion of Pascalian moral philosophy is to be found in this same
idea. Individualist moral theories sought this criterion in the will, in conscience,
in merit, in pleasure. Pascal finds it in the function of the part with respect to the
whole, of the individual in the community, and of the latter in the interrelations
among the individuals:

In order to assess how much love one owes to oneself, one should imagine a body constituted of
thinking members—for we are all members of a whole—and then figure out how much each such
member should love itself, etc. . . . (474)

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 PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT

If the feet and the hands each had their own will, they would never be in their proper order unless
they subordinated their separate wills to the primary will which govems the entire body. Apart
from that, they would be in disorder and in misery. But in wishing only for the good of the body
as a whole, they serve their own good. (475)

For everything tends towards itself. That goes counter to all order. It should tend toward the
general good. And it is this slant towards itself which is the origin of all disorder, in war, in public
order, in economy, in the individual human body. The will thus becomes depraved. If the
members of natural and civil communities tend to the good of these general bodies, then these
communities themselves should tend toward other, still more general bodies, of which they, in
tum, are members. One should therefore tend towards the general. (477)

After Pascal and Kant, all the great dialectical thinkers, even while developing
essentially different philosophies, have nevertheless held to the same starting
point. That is why one has to mark a major division corresponding to dialectical
philosophy in the history of modem philosophy.
To make this clearer: The history of philosophy is the history of conceptual
expressions of world-views^ and there are certainly considerable differences
between the world-view of a Giordano Bmno, that of a Gassendi, and that of a
Descartes; or, just as well, between that of Pascal or of Kant, and that of Hegel.
Despite these differences, these world-views nevertheless constitute groups, or
families, so to speak, whose family-resemblances lie in the common way in
which they pose problems, and by the answers they give to certain of them.
By way of example: If we consider the question of good and evil, we have to
distinguish since the Middle Ages three major types of thought, of ways of
posing and answering this question in Europe.
(1) Christian thought of the Middle Ages, in which good and evil are clearly
separated. Sin and virtue oppose each other in an absolute way, virtue leads to
heaven, vice is attached to the earthly world, and beyond that, after death, leads
to hell.
(2) Individualist thought, which begins with the Renaissance and completely
transforms the problem. The Renaissance already suppressed heaven, and with
it, the opposition between good and evil. From that moment on, everything takes
place on earth, where there is neither good nor evil, but only success and
failures. Virtue becomes virtu, which is no longer incompatible with any
crime—suffice it to mention Machiavelli's The Prince—and despite all the
changes of later centuries, rationalism, sensationism, the philosophers of the
Enlightenment, will all maintain this suppression of properiy ethical criteria.
Virtue will become reason, or pleasure; it will become impoverished and sche-
matic, but it will keep this character of effectiveness, which tums good and evil
into subordinate and derivative notions.
(3) Dialectical thought is, in the first place, the tragic vision of the worid in
which evil reappears. It is always opposed to good, but it is no longer separated

13
 LUCIEN GOLDMANN

from it in an absolute way. It is no longer the sin of the Middle Ages which was
so clearly and distinctly opposed to virtue. This time, sin and virtue, evil and
good, are both here on earth and are opposed in the most radical way even while
being indissolubly tied up with each other.
Kant tells us that even the most virtuous act, which has perhaps never been
accomplished, only conforms to the categorical imperative, but doesn't realize
the highest good. The moral law and the principle of radical evil are both at the
same time part of human nature, and Pascal tells us that if man "wanted to be
always loving and tender he would end up being only the more foolish for it,
because he would want to raise himself above humanity, and in the final reck-
oning, he is only a human being, that is to say, capable of little and of much, of
everything and of nothing. He is neither an angel nor a beast, but a man" (140).
And "when one wants to pursue virtues to their limits, there arise vices that
imperceptibly insinuate themselves in their invisible ways, side by side with your
little infinite, and a crowd of vices appear side by side with the great infinite, to
the degree that one gets lost in vices, and no longer sees the virtues" (357). Or
again: "We possess neither tmth nor goodness except in part, and all mixed up
with falsehood and evil" (358).
For Hegel, for Goethe in Faust, and for Marx, the problem is posed in exactly
the same way, only they allow that the "cunning of reason," the march of
history will, in the long mn, permit individual evil to be transformed into com-
munal good. Mephisto presents himself as "a part of the force which always
wills evil and always does good," and it is he who, against his will of course,
helps Faust to attain to heaven.
Likewise, what separates dialectical thought from that which preceded it is the
existence, in it, of three orders. Rationalism was aware of only two of them:
sensibility and reason. Sensationism was aware of only one. Pascal, Kant, Hegel
and Marx allow for three: matter, spirit, and grace; intuition, the understanding,
and reason; thesis, antithesis, synthesis—so many expressions of a single anal-
ogous vision of the contradictions which both tear apari and constitute the human
being and existing reality, and a vision also of the hope of overcoming them.
Pascal, moreover, is keenly aware that he must stand as opposed to the
Renaissance as he is to rationalism. In the same fragment (72) he writes:

The philosophers have, on the whole aspired to reach [to infinity in the small—L.G.] and there
it is that they have all stumbled. That's what has given rise to such commonplace titles as Of the
Principle of Things, The Principles of Philosophy, and others of this sort, which are as osten-
tatious in effect, if less so in appearance, than that other title which makes one's eyes pop out:
De Omni Scibili [Of Everything That Can Be Known—trans.].

For Pascal, and after him, all the dialectical thinkers knew that there could be no
first principles, nor a complete knowledge of everything.

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 PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT

Thus, there are four fundamental ideas common to all the great dialectical
thinkers:
(1) the existence of three orders which govem all human realities (Pascal:
matter, spirit, and grace; Kant: sensibility, understanding, and reason; Hegel and
Marx: thesis, antithesis, synthesis);
(2) the impossibility of starting off from "first principles" in the acquisition
of knowledge, it being given that the parts cannot be known except through
knowledge of their mutual relations within the whole, nor can the whole be
known otherwise than by knowledge of the parts;
(3) the importance, at all levels (epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic), of the
category of totality;
(4) the impossibility for man to realize a pure idea, an abstract principle, given
the conflictual character of human life and of reality; and the dialectical con-
nection, that is to say, the radical antagonism, and at the same time the insep-
arability, of good and evil.
For Pascal and Kant, man is neither angel nor beast; for Goethe, Hegel, and
Marx, he becomes an angel only to the extent that he comes to terms with the
beast. Man's path leads from earth to heaven by way of hell.
I could continue at length, and I will retum to this at a later time.^ For the
moment, it is only a matter of establishing my position and of indicating the
thesis that I want to prove. It will also be necessary to say several words about
Blaise Pascal's biography, and this not out of concem for emdition. For Pascal
did not only think the new man—a quest which then dominates all that is really
alive in philosophy. He also tried to live this idea, indeed, so much so that one
can only find a tmly adequate analogy with the life of Pascal in the character of
Goethe's Faust.
At first glance, this analogy might appear paradoxical. In fact, however, it is
not only a valid analogy but also a necessary one, with nothing accidental about
it. For Pascal, life and thought were one and the same, to such an extent that it
would be difficult to say which of them influenced the other to a greater degree.
Faust is the creation of a sensibility and of a mind that situates itself along the
same lines as those of Pascal, and continues them, though a new element and a
radical transformation are introduced: historical perspective, and with it, the
possibility of action. It is this, alongside the analogies, which explains that
differences between Faust's life and that of Pascal. Faust's life is dominated by
one thing: the quest for the absolute. And in order to attain it, he has to pass
through three stages, none of which alone is sufficient, but whose sum consti-
tutes the whole man, the man who attains to God. The three stages are: Mar-
guerite (love); Helen (culture); and finally, action,^ the creation of a new world
where freedom will reign. What creates the unity and coherence of Pascal's life
is this same quest for the absolute, for the human community, a quest which also

15
 LUCIEN GOLDMANN

takes place in three stages, of which only the last is different. These are: science,
love, and God.'
Everyone knows of the importance of Pascal's scientific works: the treatise on
conic sections, the mechanical calculator, the experiments on the vacuum, etc.
But nothing could be more false than to see Pascal during this period as a
scientific thinker similar to most of the others, to Descartes, Roberwal, De-
sargues, etc. For them, science was a profession like all others, more important
to be sure, but sufficient unto itself. The aim of the wise man, the thinker, was
to discover tmths and to contribute to a better understanding of the universe,
nothing less, but also, nothing more. For Pascal, science was from the first
moment on, a means, the road which had to lead to the real community, to the
totality, to the absolute. And that is why his scientific activity, however extraor-
dinary the results he obtained, could not suffice for him, and could serve for him,
as for Faust, only as a step that he had to get beyond quickly.
As early as 1652, upon sending his calculating machine to Oueen Christine of
Sweden, he told her what it was he awaited from his work:

For I have an entirely special veneration for those who have risen to the supreme degree whether
of power or of knowledge. If I am not mistaken, the latter can just as well pass for sovereigns as
the former. The same differences in degree can be found among minds as among social ranks; and
the power of kings over their subjects is, it seems to me, no more than an image of the power of
minds over other minds that are inferior to them, upon which they exercise the right to persuade,
which is, among them, what the right to command is in political govemments. This second
empire even seems to me to be of a higher order than the first, for minds are of a higher order,
and moreover, of a more just order than bodies. For they can be alloted and conserved only by
merit, while for the corporeal realm, it can be a matter of birth or luck.

Much later, he will tell us, in the Pensées (144) why the study of the sciences
wasn't able to satisfy him, and why he had to search elsewhere:

I have spent a long time in the study of the abstract sciences; and the little communication that
one can have there disgusted me. When I began the study of man, I saw that these abstract
sciences are not fit for human beings, and that I strayed further from my condition in penetrating
them, than did others, in ignoring them. But I believed that I would at least find many compan-
ions in the study of man, and that this is the true study proper to mankind. 1 was mistaken. There
are still fewer who pursue this study than pursue geometry.'"

We have little information on the second stage, that of love; but the fact of its
existence is witnessed by, among other things, an extraordinary document, the
"Discourse on the Passions of Love." Its authenticity has been under discussion.
For twenty or thirty years, almost everyone seemed to agree on attributing it to
Pascal. Today, the question is controversial anew. From my viewpoint, while
many other reasons may speak against its authenticity, the simple reading of the

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 PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT

Pensées creates a strong presumption that Pascal participated directly or indi-

rectly in its elabortion. And what is to be said of those commentators who see in
the text "a subtle and abstract dissertation which has infinitely much more to do
with the art of carrying on pleasing conversation, than with tme feeling," and
further that "this entirely intellectual analysis could have been written only in
perfectly cold blood, and perhaps it was bom out of a wager with Méré or one
or another of his friends, who would have challenged the mathematician Pascal
to treat gallantly of love"? One asks himself, with what blindness would one
have to read the "discourse" to apply the adverb "gallantly" to it, and to see
how the chevalier de Méré could have suggested to Pascal thoughts far beyond
his own horizons.
In love, Pascal sought the same absolute, the same total community for which
he had formerly searched in science:

A high friendship is much more fulfilling than an ordinary and equal one. If the heart of a man
is great, then the little things will hesitate and waver in its capacity. Only what is great will stop
there and stay.
I am speaking only of fiery passions, because for others, they often get jumbled together and
cause a very troublesome confusion; but never in those who have spirit.
Whatever the extent of one's spirit, one is capable only of a great passion.

For Pascal, love isn't merely a fact of the order of emotions; it also embraces
thought, it is an expression of the entire person: "The more spirit one has, the
greater the feelings"; "Clarity of mind also causes clarity of feeling"; "For a
great soul, all is great."
Yet there too, deception quickly had to produce itself. Perhaps it had a dif-
ferent form from that of Goethe's character. Faust, a handsome and triumphant
young man, abandons Marguerite despite his love, despite the corpses over
which he must pass (mother, brother, and Marguerite's child) in order to con-
tinue his path in search of the supreme moment. Pascal, the sickly and ardent
young man, had perhaps suffered a rejection at the hands of a woman of a higher
social status. But these are no more than suppositions based on the content of the
"Discourse" and which, moreover, have no essential importance. The fact
remains that the "Discourse on the Passions of Love" expresses the same quest
for a whole and total life as does Faust's love of Marguerite, and that in the one
case, as in the other, the road couldn't end there. Love was a stage, not a final
destination. For Goethe's Faust, written around the time of the French Revolu-
tion, a third and last possibility opens up: action, the transformation of the world,
the creation of a new society where freedom will reign and the ideal community
will be realized. For Pascal, in the seventeenth century in France, as for Kant,
this possibility was nonexistent. After science, after love, all the earthly roads

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 LUCIEN GOLDMANN

were barred. And, as we have already said, heaven and God were no longer
immediately given as they were to the thinkers of the Middle Ages. That is why
Kant and Pascal became philosophers of the tragic vision of man and of the
universe.
The universe of tragedy is a universe where God is absent; not merely non-
existent as He is for the empiricists or rationalists, but absent; that is to say, that
everything that happens situates itself in relation to Him, and to the fact that He
never intervenes. Lukács defined tragedy as a play in which God is the only
spectator, but a passive spectator who doesn't intervene in the action or in the
destiny of the heroes.
The artist creates only positive realities. That is why there is no God in the
tragedies of Racine, despite the fact that the characters play their roles only for
Him. The philosophers of tragedy, having asserted this absence of God on the
plane of the immediately given (Kant and Pascal mark the end of all speculative
theology; there are no theoretical proofs of God's existence for them), now have
to rediscover Him as an indispensable hypothesis, as the only possibility of
giving a meaning to Ufe, in the domain of morals and action. Pascal's wager and
the practical postulate of God's existence in Kant are only two forms of expres-
sion of the same thing. Moreover, they say only one and the same thing: God is
not given, but man cannot live without hoping that he exists, without wagering
on his existence.

translated by Marx W, Wartofsky

NOTES

1 We may add that a great number of the Pensées treat of psychology, which is also a result of the
lived character of the tragic vision in Pascal.
2 The numbers in parenthesis refer to the corresponding numbers in the edition of the Pensées
edited by Bmnschvicg.
3 Fragment #72 (italics mine—L.G.).
4 Cf. Lucien Goldmann, "Matérialisme dialectique et histoire de la philosophie," Revue philoso-
phique de France et de l'Étranger, Nos. 4-6, April-June 1948; reprinted in Goldmann, Recher-
ches dialectiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1959).
5 Lucien Goldmann, La communauté humaine et l'univers chez Kant (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1948).
6 See Goldmann, "Matérialisme dialectique."
7 This text serves as an introduction to a work on Pascal and Dialectical Thought now in
preparation [editor's note: this became Le Dieu caché].
8 See Lucien Goldmann, "Goethe et la Revolution Française," Revue d'Études German'
Nos. 2-3, 1949; reprinted in Goldmann, Recherches dialectiques.
9 When we speak of three stages, it is plainly a matter of an element which dominates, and which

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 PASCAL AND DIALECTICAL THOUGHT

is found at the first level. For Pascal was a believer throughout his life and was always interested
in the sciences, even when he asserted their vanity. All the same, this sketch can take into account
only the general and dominant lines of Pascal's life. To be sure, there are, in the details, some
doubtful actions, like the pursuit and denunciation of his brother Angel, or his refusal to pay his
sister's dowry.
10 At first glance, it might seem that there is a contradiction between these two fragments. The first
speaks of "communication," of "companions," the other of the "power of minds over inferior
minds," of "sovereigns," etc. In fact, the texts may be reconciled without too much difficulty.
One of the new ideas that dialectical thought introduces is the idea of recognition by the "other."
The individual, who sufficed for the rationalists and the empiricists, is no longer sufficient unto
himself. As soon as we enter into a philosophy oí realization, the transindividual factor appears,
whether it be in the human form of the other, or in the transcendent form of God, of the wager,
and of the postulates of practice. This recognition by the other, which will take the form of an
ideal and perfect community in the future according to Kant, Hegel, Marx, takes in the present
the appearance of integral development of personality, which imposes itself by its worth. Pascal
calls this gloire ("glory"). See, besides the passages already cited. Fragments #401, 404.
Fragment #401, furthermore, defines "glory" in a way that is as precise as it is suggestive. It
is the desire of men that they be given their "oats," because they have won the race.

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