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Personality and Social Psychology

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Collective Futures: How Projections About the Future of Society Are Related to Actions and Attitudes
Supporting Social Change
Paul G. Bain, Matthew J. Hornsey, Renata Bongiorno, Yoshihisa Kashima and Daniel Crimston
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2013 39: 523 originally published online 1 March 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0146167213478200

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nality and Social Psychology BulletinBain et al.
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Personality and Social

Collective Futures: How Projections


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Related to Actions and Attitudes DOI: 10.1177/0146167213478200
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Supporting Social Change

Paul G. Bain1, Matthew J. Hornsey1, Renata Bongiorno1,


Yoshihisa Kashima2, and Daniel Crimston1

Abstract
We identified the active ingredients in people’s visions of society’s future (“collective futures”) that could drive political
behavior in the present. In eight studies (N = 595), people imagined society in 2050 where climate change was mitigated
(Study 1), abortion laws relaxed (Study 2), marijuana legalized (Study 3), or the power of different religious groups had
increased (Studies 4-8). Participants rated how this future society would differ from today in terms of societal-level dysfunction
and development (e.g., crime, inequality, education, technology), people’s character (warmth, competence, morality), and their
values (e.g., conservation, self-transcendence). These measures were related to present-day attitudes/intentions that would
promote/prevent this future (e.g., act on climate change, vote for a Muslim politician). A projection about benevolence
in society (i.e., warmth/morality of people’s character) was the only dimension consistently and uniquely associated with
present-day attitudes and intentions across contexts. Implications for social change theories, political communication, and
policy design are discussed.

Keywords
future, social change, religion, social issues, benevolence, stereotype content

Received April 29, 2012; revision accepted December 2, 2012

Utopian images of the future of society are often credited 1998), and that images of society’s future are important for
with motivating action in the present. Classic examples are shaping social change (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Noam
Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech motivating Chomsky (1970/1999) expressed this view clearly: “Social
action on racial equality, and John Lennon’s “Imagine” action must be animated by a vision of a future society, and
inspiring peace advocates. Similarly, dystopian futures, like by explicit judgements of value concerning the character of
projections about the devastating consequences of climate this future society” (p. 100). Yet psychologists still know
change (e.g., Gore & Guggenheim, 2006; Intergovernmental little about how people think about the future of society
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007), or science fiction (Reicher, 2008).
like 1984 (Orwell, 1949/1990), communicate visions of the Recent research has begun to fill this void. Sani et al.
trajectory of society intended to spur us into changing course. (2007) showed that people desire “collective continuity”—a
Consequently, it is not surprising that discussions of the coherent image of their nation extending from the past into
future of society are common in political discourse (Dun- the future—which fosters their well-being (Sani, Bowe, &
mire, 2005). For example, President Obama implored Amer- Herrera, 2008). Believing that society is improving/progressing
icans to “win the future” by supporting his policies (Obama,
2011), and Republican Political Activity Committees 1
University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia
2
reflected a core focus on the future of the nation with names University of Melbourne, Australia
like “Restore Our Future” (supporting Romney) and “Make
Corresponding Author:
Us Great Again” (supporting Perry). Paul G. Bain, School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia
Within social psychology, there is increasing recognition QLD 4072, Australia.
that we think about the future of our groups (Cinnirella, E-mail: p.bain@psy.uq.edu.au

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524 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

restores people’s sense of control (Rutjens, van Harreveld, &


van der Pligt, 2010) and alleviates death anxiety (Rutjens,
van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2009). Furthermore, people
experience negative emotions when they believe their ethnic
group’s future is under threat through losing their cultural
identity/practices (Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010), or
from becoming a minority (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, &
Garcia, 2012).
While existing research has focused on the emotional
implications of thinking about the future of groups, one of
the most important implications of thoughts about the
future is in guiding and motivating current action (Gilbert
& Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf, 2006). Our research program
focuses on these motivational implications of thinking
about society’s future, aligning it closely to Chomsky’s
claim. That is, are people’s projections about the future of
society related to their attitudes and actions in the present,
such as voting intentions or political activism, which would
promote or prevent that future occurring? A second major Figure 1. The collective futures framework.
difference lies in our focus on the content of projections
about future society—identifying how people think society
will change in the future, and determining which dimen- The third part of the collective futures framework relates
sions of change are related to current attitudes and behav- these projections about future society to present-day atti-
iors. This content spans both changes in people themselves tudes and behaviors that would promote or prevent this
(e.g., stereotypical traits and values) and changes in broader future society occurring. Here we focus on political behav-
society (e.g., crime and technological progress). A third dif- iors such as voting intentions, political activities, and sup-
ference is that we examine beliefs about the future of soci- porting religion playing a role in government decisions.
ety across diverse contexts, such as where climate change
is prevented, where marijuana is legalized, or where athe-
ism becomes dominant, with an aim to identify context- Dimensions of Collective Futures
general relationships between beliefs about society’s future Beliefs
and current attitudes/actions. We propose a framework for The core of the collective futures framework lies in the pro-
examining these societal projections, which we call “col- jections people make about society in the future. This focus
lective futures.” might initially appear futile because the future entails
unbounded possibilities, so projections would be highly
diverse, opaque, or incoherent (Tonn, Hemrick, & Conrad,
The “Collective Futures” 2006), and with substantial contextual variation. For exam-
Framework ple, very different images of a future American society may
Figure 1 describes our framework relating beliefs about the be invoked when considering legalizing marijuana com-
future of society to present-day attitudes and actions. Some pared with becoming a religious theocracy. Nonetheless, we
contexts involve different social policies (e.g., legalizing propose that people are able to make judgments on some
marijuana, relaxing abortion laws, acting on climate change), basic dimensions about future societies that are likely to be
while others may reflect intergroup relations such as changes relevant across contexts, including changes in broad societal
in group status relative to others—what Turner and col- factors (societal dysfunction and development) and changes
leagues have called “cognitive alternatives” (Tajfel & in people’s character (their traits or values).
Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). Thus, people imagine As collective futures are about society, society-wide
a future state of society where a proposed change has changes are particularly relevant. We focused initially on
occurred (e.g., where marijuana has been legalized, or where sociological problems, like crime, poverty, and disease
atheists have become a majority). (“societal dysfunction”), as these represent major concerns
In each context, people think about how that future soci- of national governments and international bodies such as
ety would be different from today. These projections include the United Nations. Thus, in each context we asked partici-
(a) broad societal change, including the extent of societal pants whether there would be more or less poverty, dis-
dysfunction (e.g., crime) and societal development (e.g., ease, and other indicators of dysfunction in the future
technological progress); and (b) changes in the character of compared with today. However, projections to the future
people, including stereotypical traits and values. can involve forecasts about future economic and

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Bain et al. 525

technological trends (Kashima et al., 2009; Kashima et al., development), make people in society more or less benevo-
2011), and in later studies, we included more positively lent or competent (traits), or affect the values held by people
valenced societal-level changes such as education, com- in society? Hence, we conducted meta-analyses of the eight
munity-building, and scientific/technological develop- studies, allowing identification of significant overall themes
ment (“societal development”). without being distracted by idiosyncratic effects in individ-
Projections may also include the character and values of ual studies.
people within society. Groups are known to be attributed ste- Below, we describe details of our basic methodological
reotypical character traits reflecting warmth, morality, and approach, followed by a brief description of each study’s key
competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James- features. We then report meta-analyses to provide a more
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach, Ellemers, & authoritative conclusion on the types of perceived changes in
Barreto, 2007). The distinctiveness of warmth and morality the future that are associated with attitudes and intentions in
is debated, being viewed as separate facets of a broader the present.
“benevolence” dimension (Leach et al., 2007), viewing
morality as part of warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006), or
believing warmth items index morality (Wojciszke, 2005). Method
Regardless of the definition, it is generally accepted that Using the collective futures framework in Figure 1, people
morality and warmth (grouped as “benevolence”) are typi- were directed to think about the future of society in a spe-
cally more central to group judgments than competence cific context (e.g., “Think about society in 2050 if marijuana
(Fiske et al., 2006; Leach et al., 2007; Ybarra et al., 2008). has been made fully legal”). To encourage elaboration, they
Importantly, people also project systematic changes in group first spent a minute thinking about this future society, and
stereotypes over time (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Diekman, wrote their initial thoughts. We then obtained ratings on col-
Eagly, Mladinic, & Ferreira, 2005; Kashima et al., 2009; lective futures dimensions (presented in different orders
Kashima et al., 2011). Translating this to collective futures across studies), followed by ratings of behavioral intentions
predictions, we expected that people would show more posi- and/or attitudes. We consistently used the year 2050 for
tive attitudes and action intentions in support of changes that future projections, as pilot testing suggested people view a
would increase the benevolence of people in the future, but 30- to 50-year period as long enough for significant societal
projections of future competence would be less strongly change to occur, but short enough to feel that they have a
related to attitudes/intentions. reasonable idea of what society would be like. Using a single
A separate stream of research focuses on human values timescale across studies increases the validity of cross-study
(Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Schwartz, 1992), which comparisons.
are often used to describe groups and cultures (Schwartz,
1994), to frame political issues to (e.g., Brewer & Gross,
2005; Gordon & Miller, 2004), and to inform political action Measuring Collective Futures Dimensions
(e.g., Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz, Caprara, & Below, we describe the measures used to examine societal
Vecchione, 2010). Changes in values have been proposed as and personal collective futures dimensions. Each study used
central to conceptions of the future (Loveridge, 1977), and similar items to index these dimensions (see appendix,
people’s values change over time in response to broad politi- Table A1).
cal and cultural change (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The
current research examines a novel link—whether motivation Societal Dimensions: Societal Dysfunction and Societal Develop-
to take social and political action in the present is related to ment. One set of questions tapped into participants’ percep-
people’s projections about value change in society. tions of whether, in the future that they were asked to
envisage, society would improve or deteriorate in terms of
crime, disease, scientific progress, and so forth (Societal
Research Overview Dysfunction). Items were developed specifically for the
We report eight studies intended to discover how collective study, derived from sociological work on social disorgani-
futures are linked to intentions and attitudes in the present. zation and disorder (e.g., Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, & Liu,
These studies spanned diverse contexts, so we expect varia- 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004), including violent
tion in projections about future society according to con- crime (e.g., murder, rape, assault), nonviolent crime (e.g.,
text. However, our aim was to identify whether there are burglary, corruption), and other issues (e.g., homelessness,
common “active ingredients” across contexts in people’s poverty, gender inequality, disease). In contrast, Societal
imaginings of the future that might drive current behavior. Development items covered changes in technological/scien-
That is, are people more willing to act to promote/prevent tific progress (technological innovation, major scientific
social change where they believe it will affect levels of discoveries, scientific progress) and community develop-
crime and poverty in society (societal dysfunction), affect ment (volunteering, community groups, social welfare
technological development and education (societal organizations). Participants rated whether each item would

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526 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

Table 1. Summary of Basic Sample Characteristics and Measures Used in the Studies.

Collective futures dimensions measured


Societal level Individual level
Study n Dysfunction Development Traits Values Dependent variable
a b
1. Climate change mitigation 48     Environmental citizenship
2. Lenient abortion laws 66   a b,c Referendum vote
3. Legalizing marijuana 58   a  Referendum vote
4. Atheist future (general Christian sample) 71   a  Endorse pro-religion policies
5. Atheist future (Christians who expect 56   a  Vote for atheist politician
this future)
6. Muslim future 66     Vote for Muslim politician
7. Christian future (nonreligious sample) 114   a  Endorse pro-religion policies
8. Christian future (Christian sample) 116     Endorse pro-religion policies
a
For competence, positive items only as the full scale was unreliable.
b
For self-enhancement, two items removed to create a reliable scale.
c
For openness to change, one item removed to create a reliable scale.

be more or less common in their nation in the year 2050 We selected values using Schwartz’s (1992) widely vali-
compared with today, using 11-point scales (−5 = much less dated model, involving 10 value domains within four higher
common than in [nation] society today, 0 = no different order quadrants: Self-Transcendence (e.g., honesty), Self-
from [nation] society today, and +5 = much more common Enhancement (e.g., ambition), Conservation (e.g., self-
than in [nation] society today). For example, after consid- discipline), and Openness to Change (e.g., independence).
ering a future society where marijuana was legalized, par- We used two values from each domain, combining these into
ticipants rated whether poverty, corruption, volunteering, scales representing each value quadrant.1
and so forth would be more or less common in their nation Participants rated whether each trait and value would be
in the year 2050 compared with today. more or less typical of people in their nation in the year 2050
Factor analyses (principal axis factoring) were performed compared with today if the stipulated change had taken place
for each study with samples more than 100, and using com- (−5 = much less typical than in [nation name] society today,
bined data for smaller studies that used identical sets of indi- 0 = mo different from [nation name] society today, and +5 =
cators. For studies where only Societal Dysfunction items much more typical than in [nation name] society today). For
were used, scree plots indicated a single component. Where example, as part of the Warmth trait measure, participants
studies measured both Societal Dysfunction and Societal rated whether “being considerate” would be more or less
Development, scree plots indicated two-component models, typical of people in the year 2050.
loading onto dysfunction and development dimensions after Although Warmth and Morality were initially conceived
Varimax rotation. Hence, in each study, scales were created as different trait dimensions, they were very highly corre-
for Societal Dysfunction (all αs > .89) and Societal lated in all studies (median r = .73). Accordingly, items in
Development (all αs > .73). these scales were combined to form a Benevolence dimen-
sion (adopting the term in Leach et al., 2007), with accept-
Personal Dimensions: Traits and Values. A second set of ques- able reliability across studies (all αs > .70). For Competence,
tions tapped into whether people’s traits and values would low reliability in some studies resulted in only using posi-
change in the envisaged future society. While societal dimen- tively valenced items (see Table 1), after which reliabilities
sions tapped into society “outside the skin,” personal dimen- were acceptable (all αs > .67). For values, Self-
sions focused on people’s character. One set of dimensions Transcendence, Openness to Change, and Conservation
we refer to as traits: whether people would be higher or lower showed acceptable reliability across studies (all αs > .68).
in warmth, competence, and morality in 2050 compared with Self-Enhancement showed acceptable reliability in most
today. Measures of warmth and competence were adapted studies, but in three studies, items were removed to form
from the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et reliable scales (all αs > .71).
al., 2005), including positive and negative indicators (e.g.,
warm, insensitive, capable, unskilled). We used morality
items from Leach et al. (2007), but as this scale is exclu- Behavioral Intentions and Attitudes
sively positively valenced (e.g., honest), we included nega- All studies contained measures examining the present-day
tively framed items to match the other dimensions (e.g., public policy implications of people’s beliefs about collective
immoral). futures, which were treated as the criterion variables. Studies

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Bain et al. 527

4 and 7 contained an attitudinal measure (e.g., in the context asked to indicate how they would vote in a public referen-
of a more Christian future, participants rated the extent to dum on this law (“For/Against”). They then considered
which religion should be considered in Government deci- society in the future where marijuana was made completely
sions). All other studies contained a behavioral intention legal in the current year and stayed in place thereafter, and
measure (e.g., after considering a future where marijuana was rated all collective futures dimensions.
legalized, participants indicated their voting intentions on
legalizing marijuana if a referendum was held today). The
exception was Study 8, in which there was a ceiling effect for Study 4: Atheist Collective Future Rated by
the behavioral intention measure, so an attitudinal measure Christians
was used. Details of the measures are described below. In this first study on religion/atheism, we obtained a com-
munity sample of self-identified Christians, the religious
majority in Australia (n = 71; age, M = 40.75, SD = 13.12;
Studies 56% female). They considered Australian society in 2050
Table 1 summarizes each study and the scales used. All stud- where almost all people were atheists, and rated this society
ies were conducted online. on collective futures dimensions. They then rated an attitu-
dinal item about religion’s involvement in government, “To
what extent do you think religion should be considered in
Study 1: Climate Change Mitigation how the Government makes political decisions?” (1 = no
This study used a community sample (n = 48; age, M = 40.13, consideration at all, 4 = moderate consideration, and 7 =
SD = 13.83; 55% female) who categorized themselves as very central consideration). This item was reversed, so a
believers in anthropogenic climate change. They first read a more positive atheist collective future rating (e.g., greater
summary of IPCC predictions for Australia (e.g., sea-level benevolence or lesser societal dysfunction) was positively
rise, higher temperatures), which specifically excluded men- associated with endorsing a lesser role for religion in gov-
tioning social effects. Next, they were directed to think about ernment decisions.
Australian society in 2050 where action had been taken that
had averted significant climate change, and rated this society
on collective futures dimensions. They then rated behavioral Study 5: Atheist Collective Future Rated by
intentions to engage in “environmental citizenship” (Stern, Christians
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), including voting for Building on Study 4, this study focused only on those who
pro-environment political candidates, signing petitions, writ- believed a more atheistic future was actually going to occur.
ing to politicians/newspapers, and donating to environmental A screening question adapted from Kashima et al. (2009, see
causes. These items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = very their Figure 1) showed eight graphs representing patterns of
unlikely and 5 = very likely; α = .85). change in the power of atheists in the future compared with
today: an increase (e.g., constant, exponential increase), a
decrease (e.g., constant, exponential decrease), or stability
Study 2: Lenient Abortion Laws (constant or oscillating around present-day power levels).
This study involved community and student participants (n From a sample of undergraduate psychology students who
= 66; age, M = 22.88, SD = 8.52; 64% female). Abortion law self-identified as Christians (n = 89), those who chose the
in Australia varies across states, with some calling for a pattern of increasing power of atheists as most likely (n =
single national law. Participants considered a very liberal 56; 63% of the total sample; age, M = 19.12, SD = 2.52; 68%
national law, making abortion within the first 6 months of female) considered society in 2050 where their prediction
pregnancy completely legal and decided by the mother about increased power of atheists in society came true. They
(unless medical reasons make it unsafe), and allowed after 6 then rated collective futures dimensions, followed by a vot-
months with a doctor’s permission. Participants first indi- ing intention item: “If the political party you would typically
cated how they would vote on this law in a referendum vote for nominated a generally well-qualified person for
(“For/Against”). They then thought about Australian society your electorate who happened to be in the following catego-
in 2050 where this abortion policy was made into law in the ries, how likely would you be to vote for that person?” (1 =
current year and stayed in place thereafter, and rated collec- not at all likely and 5 = extremely likely). “Atheist” was
tive futures dimensions. included in a randomly ordered list with eight distracter
items (e.g., woman, Muslim).
Study 3: Legalizing Marijuana
The design was similar to Study 2, with community and Study 6: Muslim Collective Future Rated by
student participants (n = 58; age, M = 20.57, SD = 5.71, 67% Non-Muslims
female). Participants read about a proposed law that would This study design was almost identical to Study 5. From a
make marijuana completely legal for personal use, and were sample of non-Muslim undergraduate psychology students

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528 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

(n = 141), 47% indicated that an increase in power of behavioral intentions/attitudes. The goal of the meta-analy-
Muslims was most likely (n = 66; age, M = 19.83, SD = 5.32; sis was to assess the significance of the average effect across
77% female). These participants then considered society in studies.
2050 if their prediction of increased Muslim power came Effect sizes were measured using r (correlations). For
true, and rated collective futures dimensions. Using the vot- Studies 2 and 3, which used dichotomous dependent vari-
ing item from Study 5, they rated the likelihood of voting for ables, log-odds ratios were converted to r using the formula
a Muslim political candidate from a randomly ordered list. from Borenstein et al. (2009). To make the direction of
expected effects consistent, effects for Societal Dysfunction
were reversed, so that positive relationships indicate higher
Study 7: Christian Collective Future Rated by intentions/attitudes where societal dysfunction was expected
the Nonreligious to decrease.
This study used a community sample who identified as athe- We used two indicators of the relationships between col-
ist, agnostic, or nonreligious (n = 114; age, M = 36.39, SD = lective futures dimensions and intentions/attitudes. To assess
13.94, 62% female). The design and scales followed Study 4, basic relationships, we calculated “zero-order” effect sizes
with ratings made about Australian society in the year 2050 without controlling for other variables. To establish indepen-
where almost all people were Christian. It used the same dent effects, we computed partial correlations controlling for
attitudinal variable as Study 4: “To what extent do you think other “within-category” dimensions (e.g., for Societal
religion should be considered in how the Government makes Dysfunction after controlling for Societal Development, for
political decisions?” (1 = no consideration at all, 4 = moder- Benevolence after controlling for Competence, and for
ate consideration, and 7 = very central consideration). Conservation values after controlling for other values). When
partial correlations were calculated, the inverse variance was
adjusted to reflect the reduced degrees of freedom.
Study 8: Christian Collective Future Rated by For each meta-analysis, we report three metrics (see
Christians Borenstein et al., 2009). The first is the mean effect size (and
This community sample consisted of U.S. citizens who self- confidence interval), using the inverse of the Fisher’s
identified as Christian (n = 116; age, M = 45.42, SD = 17.57; Z-transformed effect sizes. The second metric is the hetero-
45% female). They considered a collective future where geneity in the true effect size (Q). The third is Orwin’s fail-
their religious majority had increased further—an American safe N (using the formula in Lipsey & Wilson, 2000), which
society in 2050 where almost all people were Christians (this represents the number of studies with null effects (effect
differed from Studies 4-7, where outgroups were more size = 0) that would reduce the overall effect to one of mini-
prominent). Because voting intentions were expected (and mal substantive importance (here set at an effect size of .10).
found) to exhibit ceiling effects (favoring a Christian candi- Although there were too few studies to conduct formal tests
date), we measured support for a more contentious issue of between-studies moderation (Borenstein et al., 2009;
about governmental support for religious groups (Monsma, Hedges & Pigott, 2004), we identify where systematic cross-
2000). This scale assessed support for three policies: context variability may be occurring.
“Government funding of social services provided by reli-
gious groups (where they are permitted to try to convert
people),” “Granting tax-exempt status for religious institu- Societal Dimensions: Dysfunction and
tions,” and “Religious groups providing social services per- Development
mitted to hire only people who share their religious beliefs” Table 2 shows meta-analyses for Societal Dysfunction and
(−3 = strongly oppose, 0 = neutral, and +3 = strongly sup- Societal Development. Zero-order effects for Societal
port; α = .72). Dysfunction showed significant associations with attitudes/
intentions across social issues and religious groups,2 and all
effect sizes were in the expected direction (although not all
Results were significant). This resulted in a significant overall
Descriptive statistics for collective futures dimensions in effect, which persisted after controlling for Societal
each study are contained in the appendix (Table A2). We Development. The extent of variation across studies (Q) was
conducted meta-analyses using a random-effects model and not significant. Overall, people were more likely to endorse
a method of moments approach to estimate parameters, policies and actions that would promote a future where they
using Lipsey and Wilson’s macro for SPSS (Lipsey & expected this future would have lower levels of societal
Wilson, 2000; Wilson, 2005). Random effects meta-analysis dysfunction.
is appropriate when true effect sizes are expected to vary, For Societal Development, there was a significant posi-
especially when studies vary in dependent variables, con- tive overall effect, although the zero-order correlation was
texts, and samples (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & significant in only one study, and the overall effect became
Rothstein, 2009). Thus, we assumed our effect sizes reflected nonsignificant after controlling for Societal Dysfunction.
a random sample of effect sizes relating collective futures to In sum, there was little to no evidence that attitudes and

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Bain et al. 529

Table 2. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Societal Dimensions and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Dysfunctiona Development
Control for Control for
Study Zero order development Zero order dysfunction
1. Climate change mitigation 0.22 — — —
2. Lenient abortion laws 0.26**** 0.29**** −0.01 0.12
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.12* 0.05
4. Atheist future (general 0.06 — — —
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.46**** 0.46**** 0.03 −0.07
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.11 −0.09
7. Christian future 0.12 — — —
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future 0.09 0.06 0.31**** 0.30***
(Christian sample)
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.20**** [0.06, 0.34] 0.25**** [0.12, 0.49] 0.13** [−0.03, 0.30]b 0.08 [−0.18, 0.34]
Heterogeneity (Q) 9.47 8.02 5.96 8.74
Fail-safe N 8 8 3 —
Note: CI = confidence interval.
a
Direction of effect sizes reversed.
b
This effect was only just significant using Lipsey and Wilson’s (2000) macro, and the confidence interval yields a marginally different conclusion about the
significance of the effect.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

intentions were related to projections about societal was no overall evidence that attitudes and intentions in the
development. present were associated with perceptions of how competent
people would become in the future, but there was suggestive
evidence that competence is more important for predicting
Personal Dimensions:Traits attitudes/behavioral intentions about social issues than in reli-
Table 3 shows meta-analyses for Benevolence and gious contexts. This accords with a view that people see reli-
Competence trait dimensions. For Benevolence, zero-order gion’s primary social function as fostering morality and care
effect sizes showed significant and consistent positive rela- for others and not in developing skills and capacities (which
tionships with intentions/attitudes in all studies, and the may be seen as more the role of secular institutions). For social
strongest overall effect size of all dimensions. After control- issues, the greater relevance of competence may reflect the
ling for Competence, effect sizes for one study became non- prominence of competence in debates on the issues examined
significant but the strong positive overall effect persisted. (e.g., associations between marijuana use and laziness).
That is, to the extent that participants believed political or
demographic changes would result in a future where people
were more benevolent, they were more willing to act and Personal Dimensions:Values
support policies that would promote that future. The variation Table 4 shows meta-analyses relating values to intentions/
across studies was not significant, although it became a trend attitudes. Conservation values showed a significant positive
after controlling for Competence, which reflected effect sizes overall effect, with significant correlations occurring across
being consistently larger in social issues contexts (Studies social and religious issues. This positive overall effect weak-
1-3) than in religious contexts (Studies 4-8). ened considerably after controlling for other values but
For Competence, zero-order relationships were significant remained significant even though no relationships were sig-
for social issues but not for religious futures, with a nonsig- nificant in individual studies. A similar overall positive
nificant overall effect. There was a trend indicating variation effect emerged for Self-Transcendence values. Openness to
across contexts (Q), with this variation becoming significant Change and Self-Enhancement showed no overall relation-
after controlling for Benevolence. Projections about ships with intentions/attitudes. There was a significant het-
Competence tended to be significantly positive for social erogeneity in effect sizes for Self-Enhancement, although
issues but null for religious contexts (and negative for Study 4, this did not reflect a social issue/religious group distinction,
where Christians showed greater support for religion when with a positive relationship for relaxed abortion laws
they saw an atheist future as more competent). In sum, there (Study 2) but a negative trend for climate change mitigation

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530 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

Table 3. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Relationships Between Trait Dimensions and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Benevolence Competence
Control for Control for
Study Zero order competence Zero order benevolence
1. Climate change mitigation 0.44**** 0.29** 0.35**** −0.04
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.43**** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.28**
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.46*** 0.58**** 0.14*** 0.22***
4. Atheist future (general 0.24** 0.35*** −0.23* −0.35***
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.36*** 0.36*** −0.02 −0.04
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 0.33** 0.29** 0.16 0.00
7. Christian future 0.19** 0.15 0.13 0.04
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future 0.19** 0.18** 0.10 −0.08
(Christian sample)
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.31**** [0.22, 0.40] 0.32**** [0.10, 0.54] 0.11 [−0.13, 0.34] 0.00 [−0.29, 0.29]
Heterogeneity (Q) 8.07 12.96* 13.96* 17.68**
Fail-safe N 17 18 1 —
Note: CI = confidence interval.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

(Study 1). This may be because participants saw self- societal dysfunction. When effect sizes for Societal
enhancement values quite differently in these contexts, with Dysfunction were computed after controlling for Benevolence,
greater support by those who saw relaxing abortion laws as the mean effect size (.06) was no longer significant (p =
emancipating women from restrictions on achieving success .307), although a trend for variation across studies was iden-
in their life goals, whereas for climate change support was tified, Q(7) = 13.35, p = .064. This variation did not reflect
greater for those who saw mitigation as curbing excessive a distinction between social issues and religious contexts but
self-enhancement (e.g., profit at all costs) that has contrib- was specific to individual studies (a positive effect size for
uted to the climate change problem. For religious futures, Study 5—atheist future, but negative effect sizes for Study
there was a positive trend in a Muslim future (Study 6) but 4—atheist future and Study 8—Christian future). Overall,
a negative effect in an atheist future (Study 4). Heterogeneity the supplementary analyses reinforce that benevolence pro-
was reduced after controlling for other values. Overall, the jections are the most critical dimension for promoting action
effects of the value dimensions of collective futures were and policy support in the present.3
weak compared with Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction.
Discussion
Supplementary Analyses People are mindful of the future, and hypothesize about how
Because Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction emerged as various futures would be different from the present. In eight
the strongest predictors of behavioral intentions and atti- studies, we asked participants to imagine certain futures of
tudes, we conducted supplementary meta-analyses to exam- society, and rate how these futures would differ from the
ine whether their effects were independent of each other. If present in terms of values, traits, societal dysfunction, and
Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction were measuring societal development. More importantly, we examined
essentially the same idea at different levels (i.e., if having which of these dimensions of change are related to attitudes
more moral and warm people is the same as lowering the and behavioral intentions in the present. In other words, we
level of societal dysfunction), then the novelty of each were interested in finding out which dimensions of projected
dimension would be reduced. First, effect sizes for change are the active ingredients in driving attitudes and
Benevolence were computed after controlling for Societal behaviors in the present.
Dysfunction. The highly significant overall effect remained The answer to this question is benevolence (operational-
(mean effect size = .25, p < .001) and the variation across ized as warmth/morality traits). Of all the collective futures
studies was not significant, Q(7) = 8.43, p = .297, indicating dimensions, this was the only one that was reliably,
that projections about benevolence were still strongly related uniquely, and consistently associated with attitudes and
to behavioral intentions and attitudes independently of intentions in the present. Whether the context involved

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Table 4. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Value Quadrants and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Conservation Self-transcendence Openness to change Self-enhancement


Control for Control for Control for Control for other
Study Zero order other values Zero order other values Zero order other values Zero order values
1. Climate change mitigation −0.07 0.06 0.07 0.14 −0.01 0.07 −0.28* −0.33**
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.24**** 0.10 0.29**** 0.17 0.16** 0.04 0.24*** 0.05
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.17*** 0.16 0.15*** 0.11 0.05 −0.02 0.09 −0.10
4. Atheist future (general Christian 0.24** 0.19 0.16 0.04 −0.27** −0.08 −0.30** −0.06
sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians who expect 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.00 −0.05 0.00 −0.02
this future)
6. Muslim future 0.36*** 0.24* 0.28** 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.23* 0.07
7. Christian future (nonreligious sample) 0.09 0.05 0.22** 0.07 0.19** 0.12 −0.01 −0.06
8. Christian future (Christian sample) 0.16* 0.00 0.20** 0.07 0.15 0.21** −0.10 −0.30***
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.17**** [NA]a 0.09** [NA]a 0.20**** [NA]a 0.08** [NA]a 0.06 [−0.15, 0.28] 0.07 [NA]a −0.02 [−0.32, 0.29] −0.10 [−0.28, 0.08]
Heterogeneity (Q) 6.73 3.93 2.11 0.94 12.74* 5.30 18.94*** 11.07

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Fail-safe N 6 — 8 — — — — —
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.
a
The meta-analysis estimates the variance in the “true” effect after accounting for expected within-study error. When the observed variance in the true effect is smaller than the expected within-study
error (occurring when Q < df), this leads to a negative value for the variance in the true effect, which is reset to zero by convention (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). In these cases,
confidence intervals are not reported.

531
532 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

legalizing abortion or marijuana, mitigating climate change, & Bouwen, 2004; Rokeach, 1973), and hence changes in
or changing the religious makeup of society, people were traits may be seen as more enduring.
more likely to endorse attitudes and intentions designed to We identified only weak evidence of variation across the
facilitate that future when they felt that future would be studies, suggesting that there is a reasonable consistency in
characterized by increased benevolence. Similarly, the which dimensions of the future are being drawn on to drive
more people felt that future would be characterized by attitudes and behaviors in the present. However, systematic
reduced benevolence, the less likely they were to endorse variation across contexts may emerge as the corpus of empiri-
attitudes and intentions to facilitate that future. cal evidence grows. There was marginal evidence that projec-
Other dimensions of collective futures also showed sig- tions about traits (benevolence and competence) showed
nificant associations with attitudes and behavioral intentions stronger relationships with attitudes/intentions for futures
(though less strongly and consistently than for benevolence). involving social issues compared with religious collective
People were somewhat more likely to support social changes futures. However, as the studies involving religious collective
that they believed would result in reducing societal dysfunc- futures all involved changes in the power of either an ingroup
tion (e.g., levels of crime, poverty, and disease). Although or outgroup, at this stage it cannot be clearly established
the link between societal dysfunction and attitudes/inten- whether such differences arise mainly from the religious
tions was always in the expected direction, it was significant nature of these studies, or whether projections about traits are
in only four of the eight studies, and the overall effect did not relatively less important when considering the power of
persist after controlling for benevolence. So although there is ingroups and outgroups in society more generally.
some evidence that attitudes and intentions in the present are It is important to distinguish our focus on identifying
tied to perceptions of how levels of crime, poverty, and dis- common dimensions motivating action across contexts from
ease might change in the future, this evidence is considerably the idea that beliefs about collective futures do not vary
weaker than for benevolence. across contexts. Table A2 of appendix showed that different
For societal development, the relationship with current social issues and intergroup contexts resulted in different
attitudes and intentions was only significant in one study, patterns of judgments about society’s future, for instance,
and the overall effect was significant only insofar as it shared whether benevolence or societal dysfunction would increase
variance with societal dysfunction. Overall, then, there was overall. Indeed, a high degree of contextual variation across
little evidence that current attitudes and intentions were tied future contexts would be expected. However, despite this
to perceptions of technological innovation, scientific prog- contextual variation in how the future is perceived, we suc-
ress, and education standards. Comparing these societal- cessfully identified common elements in the projections
level dimensions, people were generally more influenced to about societal change that can spur people into supporting
act by projections of decay in society rather than by scien- policies and taking actions themselves.
tific and technological advancement. It is also important to note that our focus on identifying
There was little evidence that attitudes and intentions in the important context-general dimensions of collective
the present were associated with changes in Self- futures does not mean that other dimensions should be
Enhancement values (e.g., ambition, pleasure, wealth) or ignored, as all dimensions were related to attitudes/inten-
Openness to Change values (e.g., independence, freedom, tions in one or more contexts, sometimes with effect sizes
creativity). To the extent that projected changes in values stronger than for benevolence. For instance, societal devel-
were associated with current attitudes and intentions, it was opment displayed the largest effect size when Christians
on the dimensions of Conservation (e.g., respect for tradi- made projections about a more Christian future (Study 8),
tion, self-discipline, obedience) and Self-Transcendence societal dysfunction had the largest effect size for an atheist
(e.g., honesty, social justice, equality). These significant future (Study 5), and Conservation values showed the larg-
zero-order effects—along with the strong effects for benevo- est effect size for a Muslim future (Study 6). Comparing
lence—could be seen to reflect a broad concern with promot- studies rather than dimensions, for the issue of legalizing
ing “community-mindedness” or interdependence within abortion (Study 3), all collective futures dimensions except
society. In the case of Self-Transcendence and Conservation, societal development were related to support (at least before
though, the zero-order correlations were only significant in controlling for other dimensions), whereas only a few col-
half the studies, and the overall effects did not survive after lective futures dimensions were related to intentions/atti-
controlling for other value dimensions. Although considering tudes for climate change mitigation (Study 1) and for
values in the distant future are more important than in the nonreligious views of a Christian future (Study 7). That is,
proximal future for how people plan their own future (Eyal, in contexts like abortion, people appear concerned that a
Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), they appear policy change will have wide-ranging effects across people
to be less critical than consideration of traits when consider- and society, whereas in other contexts, they are concerned
ing the future of society as a whole. The stronger relation- with a much narrower range of effects. The fact that con-
ships for benevolence traits relative to values may be because texts differ in the types and number of collective futures
traits are seen as more stable than values (Berings, De Fruyt, dimensions that emerge as important indicates that future

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Bain et al. 533

research on specific political or social issues should con- Methodological Considerations and
tinue to examine a range of collective futures dimensions to Limitations
generate a deeper understanding of that issue. However, this
does not detract from the consistent overall relationships Our method for examining collective futures involved several
between attitudes/intentions and projections about benevo- design choices that should be varied in future research.
lence traits across contexts. Although adopting a consistent, mid-range time frame (approx-
imately 40 years) was useful for making comparisons across
studies, the most relevant time frame may vary across contexts.
Implications For instance, the effects of events like hosting the Olympics
These findings have theoretical implications for our under- influenced projections about the stereotypical characteristics of
standing of the temporal dimension of collective experience. Chinese within 10 years (Cheng et al., 2010). Similarly, the
In particular, they reinforce and extend knowledge about the effects of political revolutions, or even democratic changes of
importance of judgments about the content of ingroup ste- government, may be seen to change people within a much
reotypes in people’s lives. Morality and warmth are not only shorter time frame. Relevant time frames for thinking about
important for how people evaluate their ingroup (Fiske et al., the future may also vary cross-culturally, reflecting historical
2006; Leach et al., 2007; Ybarra et al., 2008), projections and ecological factors (Jones, 1988).
about how people’s morality/warmth could change in the Some measurement issues were encountered, particularly
future are related to willingness to support or oppose social with competence where positive and negative items did not
change in the present. combine reliably in several studies. Although this might be
These findings also have clear political implications. If addressed by using more items for this scale, it is also possible
politicians and other leaders could effectively communicate that in some future contexts, there is a genuine separation of
how their policies would promote benevolence traits in soci- beliefs about how a group displays competence and incompe-
ety, they would be likely to gain greater public support. For tence, which may have distinct relationships with present-day
example, some evidence suggests that climate change mes- actions. Another issue was encountered with warmth and
sages focused on increasing interpersonal warmth in society morality, which were very highly correlated in most studies.
are more effective than messages emphasizing the risks of Given that this overlap has also been noted in previous
climate change in convincing climate change skeptics to sup- research (Cheng et al., 2010; Kashima et al., 2009), the most
port action (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, & Jeffries, 2012). likely explanation is psychological rather than methodologi-
However, this should extend beyond rhetorical strategies, as cal. Although we concur with Leach et al. (2007) that morality
policies themselves would benefit from thinking about their and warmth are conceptually distinct, thinking about the
consequences for benevolence in society—to achieve the future involves more abstract and higher order concepts
outcomes citizens want, policy makers should consider how (Trope & Liberman, 2003), so when projecting to the future,
their policies would help people in the community become fine distinctions between warmth and morality may often
more caring, compassionate, trustworthy, and honest. This appear to become less significant than their shared focus on
would be a significant challenge, given politics tends to “benevolence” toward others. However, the covariation
focus more on matters of societal dysfunction and develop- between warmth and morality did vary somewhat across con-
ment, and because policy makers typically have greater texts, and where they are separable they may have distinct
familiarity with law, politics, and economics compared with relationships with behavior. Therefore, in research within indi-
social psychology. However, if everyday people see certain vidual contexts, the distinction between morality and warmth
policies as affecting the benevolence of people in the future, should be empirically assessed rather than assumed.
a concerted effort by social scientists and policy makers As the first targeted research on collective futures, the aver-
should be able to identify some suitable features of policies age effect sizes in the meta-analyses give guidance about power
that could facilitate these outcomes. and recommended sample sizes for future research. For benevo-
More broadly, the collective futures framework has impli- lence, the average effect size suggests that acceptable power (.8)
cations for the study of a wide range of areas of interest to can be achieved in samples of 70 to 80, but for societal dysfunc-
social psychologists researching groups and social action. For tion, this would require around 120 cases when controlling for
instance, the collective futures framework can be applied to societal development, and almost 200 cases when not. Thus,
the effects of ideologies such as feminism, socialism, and larger sample sizes than those reported here are advisable if the
multiculturalism. Accordingly, the present research adds goal is to detect effects for societal dysfunction and other dimen-
impetus to the growing body of research showing that peo- sions. However, as noted previously, the importance of specific
ple’s attention to temporal dimensions of the psychology of dimensions can vary across contexts, so the inclusion of dimen-
groups are worthy of greater research attention. Just as mental sions in specific contexts should also include consideration of
time travel into our personal future can be critical to our sur- their likely importance in those contexts.
vival (Suddendorf, 2006), so may our projections about the It might be argued that the findings reflect more general
future of society. valence effects, with perceptions of collective futures merely

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534 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

indicators of overall positive or negative attitudes toward cli- beliefs about processes of societal change. Beliefs that soci-
mate change, abortion, marijuana, religious groups, or athe- ety is stable and unchanging, or follows a natural process
ism. We agree that some association would be expected, as beyond human influence (Kashima et al., 2009), could
collective futures beliefs are likely to be a component of peo- attenuate the link between collective futures beliefs and
ple’s general attitudes toward an issue or group. However, if behavioral intentions, as it places societal change outside
general attitudes explained the effects, positive associations human influence. In contrast, believing that society is
across all valenced dimensions would be expected, and this changeable and malleable, for instance that “people power”
was not the case. Rather, several positively valenced dimen- can change society (“collective efficacy”; for example,
sions of collective futures showed null or weak relations with Bandura, 1995; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach,
attitudes and intentions (e.g., competence, societal develop- 2004), may strengthen the relationship between collective
ment). Moreover, while benevolence showed consistently futures dimensions and action.
positive associations with attitudes/intentions, other dimen- Several individual differences may also affect the extent to
sions had opposing relationships across studies (Competence which collective futures matter for the present day. People vary
traits, Openness to Change, and Self-Enhancement values), in their focus on thinking about the future (Zimbardo & Boyd,
indicating that people were discriminating between dimen- 1999), and how clearly they imagine the future (Tonn et al.,
sions across contexts rather than applying a general attitude. 2006). This variation extends to cultures, with some evidence
Additional research shows that a positive view on an issue is suggesting that European North Americans are more oriented
not a prerequisite for these effects, with even those skeptical to the future than Chinese (Guo, Ji, Spina, & Zhang, 2012).
about climate change showing greater support for action Moreover, people who are typically optimistic or pessimistic
where they think it will increase the interpersonal warmth of may use their images of the future in different ways (Sanna,
people in society (Bain et al., 2012). Together, these findings 1996). In addition, broad political orientations (left–right,
strongly suggest that people were making nuanced distinc- Democrat–Republican) may play a role, either as an individual
tions about dimensions, and not just holding a generalized uto- difference (people on the left and right may be more focused on
pian or dystopian attitude toward an issue or future society. different types of societal or personal outcomes) or as a result
Focusing on collective futures dimensions rather than con- of how political organizations invoke the future of society as
texts, some may suspect that the stronger findings for benevo- frames in their rhetoric (see Chong & Druckman, 2007). The
lence may nonetheless reflect a general evaluation, on the current findings show that collective futures matter, and future
basis that benevolence (especially morality) is most strongly research can establish for whom they matter most.
linked to general evaluations of ingroups (e.g., Leach et al., In further developing ideas about the future of society,
2007). However, for national ingroups, competence is some- research on how people think about their own future may
times more important than benevolence (Phalet & Poppe, offer useful insights. From research on future expectations,
1997), and early research on evaluations found that evalua- projections to the future may be more strongly related to
tions were most strongly related to traits that reflect both behavior when these future states are seen as achievable
competence and benevolence (e.g., wise, reputable; Osgood, goals than as utopian fantasies (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002).
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Accordingly, Cuddy, Fiske, and From research on counterfactual and prefactual thinking,
Glick (2008) concluded that evaluation comprises roughly findings from Petrocelli, Seta, and Seta (2012) suggest that
equal components of warmth and competence. Moreover, people’s reactions to collective futures may be influenced by
there is no compelling reason to believe that projections of their “potency,” that is, the combination of the extent to
benevolence stereotypes should be a better indicator of gen- which the social context is expected to occur (e.g., legalizing
eral evaluation of a society’s future than projected changes in marijuana) combined with the likelihood that it will produce
values and societal dimensions. Values are central to people’s the envisaged outcome (e.g., reducing benevolence in soci-
political decision making (Feldman, 2003; Tetlock, 1986), ety). From construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003),
and societal dysfunction and development should be strongly projecting to more distant futures may reduce the distinctive-
related to evaluations of society, as they are highly evaluative ness of collective futures dimensions, perhaps as far as a
and prevalent in debates about society. Overall, the findings generalized good–bad dimension, whereas in more proximal
appear more consistent with a particular focus on benevo- future contexts people may be able to make more nuanced
lence as the critical belief about society’s future, rather than distinctions between dimensions in how changes in social
reflecting a general evaluation. policies or group status affect society. These potential areas
of commonality in thinking about individual and collective
futures may serve as starting points for more integrative
Future Research models, and also in identifying where thinking about indi-
While the present studies focused on the basic relationships vidual and collective futures is distinct.
between dimensions of collective futures and intentions/ Although the present studies have focused on changes in
policy support, future research should examine moderators a nation, the collective futures framework can be used to
of these relationships. One moderator could be people’s examine other types of collectives. Clear examples include

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Bain et al. 535

organizations, where it can help understand issues in organi- the public holds. The present research has built a flexible
zational change, or within ethnic minorities where it can help general framework for studying this temporal aspect of folk
understand social engagement and integration with the psychology that has been largely overlooked. It shows that
majority group, by uncovering how integration is expected people’s projections about the future of their nation are
to change the character of the ethnic minority. Moreover, the related to their willingness to take action today and to sup-
effects of collective futures on present intentions/attitudes port actions of their government. Perhaps surprisingly,
need not be restricted to political actions. For instance, behavioral intentions and policy support were more strongly
beliefs about an atheist or Muslim future may motivate other related to projections about people’s traits (specifically
expressions of prejudice and discrimination toward these benevolence) more than the societal-level concerns that
people. occupy most political and public attention, or projections
about values that are often described as central to political
action. Overall, people appear more motivated to act in sup-
Conclusion port of creating a society with better people (i.e., warmer
If political leaders, artists, and the media invoke images of and more moral), than they are motivated to act in support
society’s future to engage with and influence the public, we of creating more favorable societal conditions for people to
should try to understand the views of collective futures that live in.

Appendix

Table A1. Items Comprising Collective Futures Dimensions.

Traits Values Society


Warmth Conservation Dysfunction
Warm1-8 Respect for tradition1-8 Murder1-8
Caring2-8 Self-discipline1-8 Serious assault1-8
Considerate1,4-7 Obedience1-8 Disease1-8
Insensitive1-8 Social order1-8 Poverty1-8
Unfriendly2-8 Being moderate1 Gender inequality1-8
Unsympathetic1,4-7 National security1 Rape2-8
Morality Family security2-8 Homelessness2-8
Honest1-8 Being humble2-8 Suicide2-8
Trustworthy2-8 Self-transcendence Prostitution2-8
Sincere1,4-7 Honesty1-8 Corruption1,4-8
Immoral1-8 Social justice1-8 Burglary1,4-8
Deceitful2-8 Equality1 Fear of crime1,4,6-8
Unfaithful1,4-7 Helpful1 Forced immigration1,5,6,8
Competence Protect environment2-8 Gangs1,4,7
Capable1-8 Meaning in life2-8 Terrorism2,3,5,6,8
Assertive1,4-7 Openness to change Global warming5,6,8
Competent2,3,8 Independence1-8 Development
Independent4-8 Exciting life1-8 Technological innovation2,3,5,6,8
Disorganized1-8 Enjoying life1-8 Scientific progress2,3
Lazy2-8 Freedom1 Major scientific discoveries5,6,8
Unskilled1,4-7 A varied life1 Volunteering2,3,5,6,8
Being daring2-8 Social welfare organizations2,3,5,6,8
Creativity2-8 Community groups2,3,5,6,8
Self-enhancement Education standards2,3
Social power1-8 Science education5,6,8
Being successful1-8
Ambition1-8
Pleasure1-8
Wealth1
Social recognition2-8
Note: Subscripts denote studies where item was used.

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536
Table A2. Mean (SD) Ratings of Collective Futures Dimensions Across Studies.

Society Traits Values


Self- Openness to
Study Dysfunction Development Benevolence Competence Conservation transcendence change Self-enhancement
1. Climate change mitigation −0.13 (1.65) — 0.78**** (1.33) 1.02**** (1.25) 0.28 (1.57) 0.86** (2.38) 0.20 (1.76) −0.24 (1.36)
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.28* (1.24) 0.69**** (0.97) 0.03 (1.19) 0.42** (1.63) −0.44** (1.62) −0.05 (1.48) 0.59** (1.20) 0.29 (1.46)
3. Legalizing marijuana 1.00**** (1.65) −0.39** (1.33) −0.33** (1.05) −1.51**** (1.88) −1.34**** (1.77) −0.77*** (1.91) 0.82**** (1.40) −0.88**** (1.83)
4. Atheist future (general 1.95**** (1.56) — −1.20**** (1.43) 1.19**** (1.74) −1.27**** (1.67) −0.89*** (2.22) 2.12**** (2.03) 2.03**** (2.13)
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.46** (1.38) 1.00**** (1.29) −0.60**** (1.21) 1.08**** (1.47) −0.07 (1.68) 0.21 (1.91) 2.16**** (1.46) 1.78**** (1.51)
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 1.05**** (1.47) −0.11 (1.36) −0.15 (1.31) 0.20 (1.18) 1.47**** (1.70) 0.41* (1.75) −0.93**** (2.04) 1.30**** (1.27)
7. Christian future 0.45*** (1.67) — 0.02 (1.35) 1.35**** (1.45) 0.00 (1.52) 0.92**** (1.92) 1.92**** (1.55) 1.40**** (1.57)
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future −0.94**** (2.66) 1.45**** (1.71) 1.38**** (2.39) 1.01**** (1.80) 1.49**** (2.61) 1.61**** (2.55) 1.07**** (2.05) 0.69**** (1.95)
(Christian sample)

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Note: One-sample t test (reference value = 0 [no change from society today]).
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.
Bain et al. 537

Acknowledgment Berings, D., De Fruyt, F., & Bouwen, R. (2004). Work values and
personality traits as predictors of enterprising and social voca-
We thank Katharine Reynolds and Jolanda Jetten for comments on tional interests. Personality and Individual Differences, 36,
manuscript drafts. 349-364.
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests R. (2009). Introduction to meta-analysis. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with Brewer, P. R., & Gross, K. (2005). Values, framing, and citizens’
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this thoughts about policy issues: Effects on content and quality.
article. Political Psychology, 26, 929-948.
Cheng, S. Y. Y., Chao, M. M., Kwong, J., Peng, S., Chen, X.,
Funding Kashima, Y., & Chiu, C. (2010). The good old days and a better
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support tomorrow: Historical representations and future imaginations
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This of China during the 2008 Olympic Games. Asian Journal of
research was supported by an Australian Research Council Social Psychology, 13, 118-127.
Discovery Project Grant DP0984678 to the first author. Chomsky, N. (1970/1999). Language and freedom. Resonance, 4,
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Notes Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. Annual
1. Schwartz’s “Hedonism” domain spans Openness to Change and Review of Political Science, 10, 103-126.
Self-Enhancement quadrants, so the two Hedonism values were Cinnirella, M. (1998). Exploring temporal aspects of social iden-
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ing life” to Openness to Change). This resulted in six items mea- nal of Social Psychology, 28, 227-248.
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Self-Enhancement, and four measuring Self-Transcendence. petence as universal dimensions of social perception: The
2. As a term of convenience, we classified studies on atheists/athe- stereotype content model and the BIAS map. Advances in
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mean groups with particular perspectives on religion. Diekman, A. B., & Eagly, A. H. (2000). Stereotypes as dynamic
3. A 40-year time frame means projections extend beyond the constructs: Women and men of the past, present, and future.
expected life of a substantial minority of participants in some Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1171-1188.
studies. Theoretically, we do not view this as a problem as projec- Diekman, A. B., Eagly, A. H., Mladinic, A., & Ferreira, M. C.
tions about society are separable from personal projections, for (2005). Dynamic stereotypes about women and men in Latin
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Cameron, 2006). To be thorough, we reran meta-analyses after Dunmire, P. L. (2005). Preempting the future: Rhetoric and ideol-
controlling for age and within-category variables, and found age ogy of the future in political discourse. Discourse & Society,
had very little effect on the results. The mean effect was .33, p < 16, 481-513.
.001 for Benevolence, and .20, p < .001, for Societal Dysfunction. Eyal, T., Sagristano, M. D., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Chaiken, S.
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Tables 2 to 4. Thus, age did not influence the relationship intentions for the near vs. distant future. Journal of Experimen-
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