Personality and Social Psychology

Bulletin http://psp.sagepub.com/

Collective Futures: How Projections About the Future of Society Are Related to Actions and Attitudes
Supporting Social Change
Paul G. Bain, Matthew J. Hornsey, Renata Bongiorno, Yoshihisa Kashima and Daniel Crimston
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2013 39: 523 originally published online 1 March 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0146167213478200

The online version of this article can be found at:

http://psp.sagepub.com/content/39/4/523

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Society for Personality and Social Psychology

Additional services and information for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://psp.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

>> Version of Record - Mar 16, 2013

OnlineFirst Version of Record - Mar 1, 2013

What is This?

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

478200
nality and Social Psychology BulletinBain et al.
PSPXXX10.1177/0146167213478200Perso

Personality and Social

Collective Futures: How Projections

Psychology Bulletin
39(4) 523­–539
© 2013 by the Society for Personality

About the Future of Society Are and Social Psychology, Inc

Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Related to Actions and Attitudes DOI: 10.1177/0146167213478200
pspb.sagepub.com

Supporting Social Change

Paul G. Bain1, Matthew J. Hornsey1, Renata Bongiorno1,

Yoshihisa Kashima2, and Daniel Crimston1

Abstract
We identified the active ingredients in people’s visions of society’s future (“collective futures”) that could drive political
behavior in the present. In eight studies (N = 595), people imagined society in 2050 where climate change was mitigated
(Study 1), abortion laws relaxed (Study 2), marijuana legalized (Study 3), or the power of different religious groups had
increased (Studies 4-8). Participants rated how this future society would differ from today in terms of societal-level dysfunction
and development (e.g., crime, inequality, education, technology), people’s character (warmth, competence, morality), and their
values (e.g., conservation, self-transcendence). These measures were related to present-day attitudes/intentions that would
promote/prevent this future (e.g., act on climate change, vote for a Muslim politician). A projection about benevolence
in society (i.e., warmth/morality of people’s character) was the only dimension consistently and uniquely associated with
present-day attitudes and intentions across contexts. Implications for social change theories, political communication, and
policy design are discussed.

Keywords
future, social change, religion, social issues, benevolence, stereotype content

Received April 29, 2012; revision accepted December 2, 2012

Utopian images of the future of society are often credited
with motivating action in the present. Classic examples are
Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech motivating
action on racial equality, and John Lennon’s “Imagine”
inspiring peace advocates. Similarly, dystopian futures, like
projections about the devastating consequences of climate
change (e.g., Gore & Guggenheim, 2006; Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007), or science fiction
like 1984 (Orwell, 1949/1990), communicate visions of the
trajectory of society intended to spur us into changing course.
Consequently, it is not surprising that discussions of the
future of society are common in political discourse (Dun-
mire, 2005). For example, President Obama implored Amer-
icans to “win the future” by supporting his policies (Obama,
2011), and Republican Political Activity Committees
reflected a core focus on the future of the nation with names
like “Restore Our Future” (supporting Romney) and “Make
Us Great Again” (supporting Perry).
Within social psychology, there is increasing recognition
that we think about the future of our groups (Cinnirella,
1998), and that images of society’s future are important for
shaping social change (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Noam
Chomsky (1970/1999) expressed this view clearly: “Social
action must be animated by a vision of a future society, and
by explicit judgements of value concerning the character of
this future society” (p. 100). Yet psychologists still know
little about how people think about the future of society
(Reicher, 2008).
Recent research has begun to fill this void. Sani et al.
(2007) showed that people desire “collective continuity”—a
coherent image of their nation extending from the past into
the future—which fosters their well-being (Sani, Bowe, &
Herrera, 2008). Believing that society is improving/progressing
1
University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia
2
University of Melbourne, Australia
Corresponding Author:
Paul G. Bain, School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia
QLD 4072, Australia.
E-mail: p.bain@psy.uq.edu.au

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

524 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

restores people’s sense of control (Rutjens, van Harreveld, &

van der Pligt, 2010) and alleviates death anxiety (Rutjens,
van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2009). Furthermore, people
experience negative emotions when they believe their ethnic
group’s future is under threat through losing their cultural
identity/practices (Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010), or
from becoming a minority (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, &
Garcia, 2012).
While existing research has focused on the emotional
implications of thinking about the future of groups, one of
the most important implications of thoughts about the
future is in guiding and motivating current action (Gilbert
& Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf, 2006). Our research program
focuses on these motivational implications of thinking
about society’s future, aligning it closely to Chomsky’s
claim. That is, are people’s projections about the future of
society related to their attitudes and actions in the present,
such as voting intentions or political activism, which would
promote or prevent that future occurring? A second major
difference lies in our focus on the content of projections
about future society—identifying how people think society
will change in the future, and determining which dimen-
sions of change are related to current attitudes and behav-
iors. This content spans both changes in people themselves
(e.g., stereotypical traits and values) and changes in broader
society (e.g., crime and technological progress). A third dif-
ference is that we examine beliefs about the future of soci-
ety across diverse contexts, such as where climate change
is prevented, where marijuana is legalized, or where athe-
ism becomes dominant, with an aim to identify context-
general relationships between beliefs about society’s future
and current attitudes/actions. We propose a framework for
examining these societal projections, which we call “col-
lective futures.”
The “Collective Futures”
Framework
Figure 1 describes our framework relating beliefs about the
future of society to present-day attitudes and actions. Some
contexts involve different social policies (e.g., legalizing
marijuana, relaxing abortion laws, acting on climate change),
while others may reflect intergroup relations such as changes
in group status relative to others—what Turner and col-
leagues have called “cognitive alternatives” (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). Thus, people imagine
a future state of society where a proposed change has
occurred (e.g., where marijuana has been legalized, or where
atheists have become a majority).
In each context, people think about how that future soci-
ety would be different from today. These projections include
(a) broad societal change, including the extent of societal
dysfunction (e.g., crime) and societal development (e.g.,
technological progress); and (b) changes in the character of
people, including stereotypical traits and values.
Figure 1. The collective futures framework.
The third part of the collective futures framework relates
these projections about future society to present-day atti-
tudes and behaviors that would promote or prevent this
future society occurring. Here we focus on political behav-
iors such as voting intentions, political activities, and sup-
porting religion playing a role in government decisions.
Dimensions of Collective Futures
Beliefs
The core of the collective futures framework lies in the pro-
jections people make about society in the future. This focus
might initially appear futile because the future entails
unbounded possibilities, so projections would be highly
diverse, opaque, or incoherent (Tonn, Hemrick, & Conrad,
2006), and with substantial contextual variation. For exam-
ple, very different images of a future American society may
be invoked when considering legalizing marijuana com-
pared with becoming a religious theocracy. Nonetheless, we
propose that people are able to make judgments on some
basic dimensions about future societies that are likely to be
relevant across contexts, including changes in broad societal
factors (societal dysfunction and development) and changes
in people’s character (their traits or values).
As collective futures are about society, society-wide
changes are particularly relevant. We focused initially on
sociological problems, like crime, poverty, and disease
(“societal dysfunction”), as these represent major concerns
of national governments and international bodies such as
the United Nations. Thus, in each context we asked partici-
pants whether there would be more or less poverty, dis-
ease, and other indicators of dysfunction in the future
compared with today. However, projections to the future
can involve forecasts about future economic and

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

Bain et al.
technological trends (Kashima et al., 2009; Kashima et al.,
2011), and in later studies, we included more positively
valenced societal-level changes such as education, com-
munity-building, and scientific/technological develop-
ment (“societal development”).
Projections may also include the character and values of
people within society. Groups are known to be attributed ste-
reotypical character traits reflecting warmth, morality, and
competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach, Ellemers, &
Barreto, 2007). The distinctiveness of warmth and morality
is debated, being viewed as separate facets of a broader
“benevolence” dimension (Leach et al., 2007), viewing
morality as part of warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006), or
believing warmth items index morality (Wojciszke, 2005).
Regardless of the definition, it is generally accepted that
morality and warmth (grouped as “benevolence”) are typi-
cally more central to group judgments than competence
(Fiske et al., 2006; Leach et al., 2007; Ybarra et al., 2008).
Importantly, people also project systematic changes in group
stereotypes over time (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Diekman,
Eagly, Mladinic, & Ferreira, 2005; Kashima et al., 2009;
Kashima et al., 2011). Translating this to collective futures
predictions, we expected that people would show more posi-
tive attitudes and action intentions in support of changes that
would increase the benevolence of people in the future, but
projections of future competence would be less strongly
related to attitudes/intentions.
A separate stream of research focuses on human values
(Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Schwartz, 1992), which
are often used to describe groups and cultures (Schwartz,
1994), to frame political issues to (e.g., Brewer & Gross,
2005; Gordon & Miller, 2004), and to inform political action
(e.g., Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz, Caprara, &
Vecchione, 2010). Changes in values have been proposed as
central to conceptions of the future (Loveridge, 1977), and
people’s values change over time in response to broad politi-
cal and cultural change (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The
current research examines a novel link—whether motivation
to take social and political action in the present is related to
people’s projections about value change in society.
Research Overview
We report eight studies intended to discover how collective
futures are linked to intentions and attitudes in the present.
These studies spanned diverse contexts, so we expect varia-
tion in projections about future society according to con-
text. However, our aim was to identify whether there are
common “active ingredients” across contexts in people’s
imaginings of the future that might drive current behavior.
That is, are people more willing to act to promote/prevent
social change where they believe it will affect levels of
crime and poverty in society (societal dysfunction), affect
technological development and education (societal
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
525
development), make people in society more or less benevo-
lent or competent (traits), or affect the values held by people
in society? Hence, we conducted meta-analyses of the eight
studies, allowing identification of significant overall themes
without being distracted by idiosyncratic effects in individ-
ual studies.
Below, we describe details of our basic methodological
approach, followed by a brief description of each study’s key
features. We then report meta-analyses to provide a more
authoritative conclusion on the types of perceived changes in
the future that are associated with attitudes and intentions in
the present.
Method
Using the collective futures framework in Figure 1, people
were directed to think about the future of society in a spe-
cific context (e.g., “Think about society in 2050 if marijuana
has been made fully legal”). To encourage elaboration, they
first spent a minute thinking about this future society, and
wrote their initial thoughts. We then obtained ratings on col-
lective futures dimensions (presented in different orders
across studies), followed by ratings of behavioral intentions
and/or attitudes. We consistently used the year 2050 for
future projections, as pilot testing suggested people view a
30- to 50-year period as long enough for significant societal
change to occur, but short enough to feel that they have a
reasonable idea of what society would be like. Using a single
timescale across studies increases the validity of cross-study
comparisons.
Measuring Collective Futures Dimensions
Below, we describe the measures used to examine societal
and personal collective futures dimensions. Each study used
similar items to index these dimensions (see appendix,
Table A1).
Societal Dimensions: Societal Dysfunction and Societal Develop-
ment. One set of questions tapped into participants’ percep-
tions of whether, in the future that they were asked to
envisage, society would improve or deteriorate in terms of
crime, disease, scientific progress, and so forth (Societal
Dysfunction). Items were developed specifically for the
study, derived from sociological work on social disorgani-
zation and disorder (e.g., Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, & Liu,
2001; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004), including violent
crime (e.g., murder, rape, assault), nonviolent crime (e.g.,
burglary, corruption), and other issues (e.g., homelessness,
poverty, gender inequality, disease). In contrast, Societal
Development items covered changes in technological/scien-
tific progress (technological innovation, major scientific
discoveries, scientific progress) and community develop-
ment (volunteering, community groups, social welfare
organizations). Participants rated whether each item would
526 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)
Table 1. Summary of Basic Sample Characteristics and Measures Used in the Studies.
Study n Dysfunction
1. Climate change mitigation 48
2. Lenient abortion laws 66
3. Legalizing marijuana 58
4. Atheist future (general Christian sample) 71
5. Atheist future (Christians who expect 56
this future)
6. Muslim future 66
7. Christian future (nonreligious sample) 114
8. Christian future (Christian sample) 116
a
For competence, positive items only as the full scale was unreliable.
b
For self-enhancement, two items removed to create a reliable scale.
c
For openness to change, one item removed to create a reliable scale.
be more or less common in their nation in the year 2050
compared with today, using 11-point scales (−5 = much less
common than in [nation] society today, 0 = no different
from [nation] society today, and +5 = much more common
than in [nation] society today). For example, after consid-
ering a future society where marijuana was legalized, par-
ticipants rated whether poverty, corruption, volunteering,
and so forth would be more or less common in their nation
in the year 2050 compared with today.
Factor analyses (principal axis factoring) were performed
for each study with samples more than 100, and using com-
bined data for smaller studies that used identical sets of indi-
cators. For studies where only Societal Dysfunction items
were used, scree plots indicated a single component. Where
studies measured both Societal Dysfunction and Societal
Development, scree plots indicated two-component models,
loading onto dysfunction and development dimensions after
Varimax rotation. Hence, in each study, scales were created
for Societal Dysfunction (all αs > .89) and Societal
Development (all αs > .73).
Personal Dimensions: Traits and Values. A second set of ques-
tions tapped into whether people’s traits and values would
change in the envisaged future society. While societal dimen-
sions tapped into society “outside the skin,” personal dimen-
sions focused on people’s character. One set of dimensions
we refer to as traits: whether people would be higher or lower
in warmth, competence, and morality in 2050 compared with
today. Measures of warmth and competence were adapted
from the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et
al., 2005), including positive and negative indicators (e.g.,
warm, insensitive, capable, unskilled). We used morality
items from Leach et al. (2007), but as this scale is exclu-
sively positively valenced (e.g., honest), we included nega-
tively framed items to match the other dimensions (e.g.,
immoral).
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
Collective futures dimensions measured
Societal level Individual level
Development Traits Values Dependent variable
a b
    Environmental citizenship
  a b,c Referendum vote
  a  Referendum vote
  a  Endorse pro-religion policies
  a  Vote for atheist politician
    Vote for Muslim politician
  a  Endorse pro-religion policies
    Endorse pro-religion policies
We selected values using Schwartz’s (1992) widely vali-
dated model, involving 10 value domains within four higher
order quadrants: Self-Transcendence (e.g., honesty), Self-
Enhancement (e.g., ambition), Conservation (e.g., self-
discipline), and Openness to Change (e.g., independence).
We used two values from each domain, combining these into
scales representing each value quadrant.1
Participants rated whether each trait and value would be
more or less typical of people in their nation in the year 2050
compared with today if the stipulated change had taken place
(−5 = much less typical than in [nation name] society today,
0 = mo different from [nation name] society today, and +5 =
much more typical than in [nation name] society today). For
example, as part of the Warmth trait measure, participants
rated whether “being considerate” would be more or less
typical of people in the year 2050.
Although Warmth and Morality were initially conceived
as different trait dimensions, they were very highly corre-
lated in all studies (median r = .73). Accordingly, items in
these scales were combined to form a Benevolence dimen-
sion (adopting the term in Leach et al., 2007), with accept-
able reliability across studies (all αs > .70). For Competence,
low reliability in some studies resulted in only using posi-
tively valenced items (see Table 1), after which reliabilities
were acceptable (all αs > .67). For values, Self-
Transcendence, Openness to Change, and Conservation
showed acceptable reliability across studies (all αs > .68).
Self-Enhancement showed acceptable reliability in most
studies, but in three studies, items were removed to form
reliable scales (all αs > .71).
Behavioral Intentions and Attitudes
All studies contained measures examining the present-day
public policy implications of people’s beliefs about collective
futures, which were treated as the criterion variables. Studies
Bain et al.
4 and 7 contained an attitudinal measure (e.g., in the context
of a more Christian future, participants rated the extent to
which religion should be considered in Government deci-
sions). All other studies contained a behavioral intention
measure (e.g., after considering a future where marijuana was
legalized, participants indicated their voting intentions on
legalizing marijuana if a referendum was held today). The
exception was Study 8, in which there was a ceiling effect for
the behavioral intention measure, so an attitudinal measure
was used. Details of the measures are described below.
Studies
Table 1 summarizes each study and the scales used. All stud-
ies were conducted online.
Study 1: Climate Change Mitigation
This study used a community sample (n = 48; age, M = 40.13,
SD = 13.83; 55% female) who categorized themselves as
believers in anthropogenic climate change. They first read a
summary of IPCC predictions for Australia (e.g., sea-level
rise, higher temperatures), which specifically excluded men-
tioning social effects. Next, they were directed to think about
Australian society in 2050 where action had been taken that
had averted significant climate change, and rated this society
on collective futures dimensions. They then rated behavioral
intentions to engage in “environmental citizenship” (Stern,
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), including voting for
pro-environment political candidates, signing petitions, writ-
ing to politicians/newspapers, and donating to environmental
causes. These items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = very
unlikely and 5 = very likely; α = .85).
Study 2: Lenient Abortion Laws
This study involved community and student participants (n
= 66; age, M = 22.88, SD = 8.52; 64% female). Abortion law
in Australia varies across states, with some calling for a
single national law. Participants considered a very liberal
national law, making abortion within the first 6 months of
pregnancy completely legal and decided by the mother
(unless medical reasons make it unsafe), and allowed after 6
months with a doctor’s permission. Participants first indi-
cated how they would vote on this law in a referendum
(“For/Against”). They then thought about Australian society
in 2050 where this abortion policy was made into law in the
current year and stayed in place thereafter, and rated collec-
tive futures dimensions.
Study 3: Legalizing Marijuana
The design was similar to Study 2, with community and
student participants (n = 58; age, M = 20.57, SD = 5.71, 67%
female). Participants read about a proposed law that would
make marijuana completely legal for personal use, and were
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
527
asked to indicate how they would vote in a public referen-
dum on this law (“For/Against”). They then considered
society in the future where marijuana was made completely
legal in the current year and stayed in place thereafter, and
rated all collective futures dimensions.
Study 4: Atheist Collective Future Rated by
Christians
In this first study on religion/atheism, we obtained a com-
munity sample of self-identified Christians, the religious
majority in Australia (n = 71; age, M = 40.75, SD = 13.12;
56% female). They considered Australian society in 2050
where almost all people were atheists, and rated this society
on collective futures dimensions. They then rated an attitu-
dinal item about religion’s involvement in government, “To
what extent do you think religion should be considered in
how the Government makes political decisions?” (1 = no
consideration at all, 4 = moderate consideration, and 7 =
very central consideration). This item was reversed, so a
more positive atheist collective future rating (e.g., greater
benevolence or lesser societal dysfunction) was positively
associated with endorsing a lesser role for religion in gov-
ernment decisions.
Study 5: Atheist Collective Future Rated by
Christians
Building on Study 4, this study focused only on those who
believed a more atheistic future was actually going to occur.
A screening question adapted from Kashima et al. (2009, see
their Figure 1) showed eight graphs representing patterns of
change in the power of atheists in the future compared with
today: an increase (e.g., constant, exponential increase), a
decrease (e.g., constant, exponential decrease), or stability
(constant or oscillating around present-day power levels).
From a sample of undergraduate psychology students who
self-identified as Christians (n = 89), those who chose the
pattern of increasing power of atheists as most likely (n =
56; 63% of the total sample; age, M = 19.12, SD = 2.52; 68%
female) considered society in 2050 where their prediction
about increased power of atheists in society came true. They
then rated collective futures dimensions, followed by a vot-
ing intention item: “If the political party you would typically
vote for nominated a generally well-qualified person for
your electorate who happened to be in the following catego-
ries, how likely would you be to vote for that person?” (1 =
not at all likely and 5 = extremely likely). “Atheist” was
included in a randomly ordered list with eight distracter
items (e.g., woman, Muslim).
Study 6: Muslim Collective Future Rated by
Non-Muslims
This study design was almost identical to Study 5. From a
sample of non-Muslim undergraduate psychology students
528 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)
(n = 141), 47% indicated that an increase in power of
Muslims was most likely (n = 66; age, M = 19.83, SD = 5.32;
77% female). These participants then considered society in
2050 if their prediction of increased Muslim power came
true, and rated collective futures dimensions. Using the vot-
ing item from Study 5, they rated the likelihood of voting for
a Muslim political candidate from a randomly ordered list.
Study 7: Christian Collective Future Rated by
the Nonreligious
This study used a community sample who identified as athe-
ist, agnostic, or nonreligious (n = 114; age, M = 36.39, SD =
13.94, 62% female). The design and scales followed Study 4,
with ratings made about Australian society in the year 2050
where almost all people were Christian. It used the same
attitudinal variable as Study 4: “To what extent do you think
religion should be considered in how the Government makes
political decisions?” (1 = no consideration at all, 4 = moder-
ate consideration, and 7 = very central consideration).
Study 8: Christian Collective Future Rated by
Christians
This community sample consisted of U.S. citizens who self-
identified as Christian (n = 116; age, M = 45.42, SD = 17.57;
45% female). They considered a collective future where
their religious majority had increased further—an American
society in 2050 where almost all people were Christians (this
differed from Studies 4-7, where outgroups were more
prominent). Because voting intentions were expected (and
found) to exhibit ceiling effects (favoring a Christian candi-
date), we measured support for a more contentious issue
about governmental support for religious groups (Monsma,
2000). This scale assessed support for three policies:
“Government funding of social services provided by reli-
gious groups (where they are permitted to try to convert
people),” “Granting tax-exempt status for religious institu-
tions,” and “Religious groups providing social services per-
mitted to hire only people who share their religious beliefs”
(−3 = strongly oppose, 0 = neutral, and +3 = strongly sup-
port; α = .72).
Results
Descriptive statistics for collective futures dimensions in
each study are contained in the appendix (Table A2). We
conducted meta-analyses using a random-effects model and
a method of moments approach to estimate parameters,
using Lipsey and Wilson’s macro for SPSS (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2000; Wilson, 2005). Random effects meta-analysis
is appropriate when true effect sizes are expected to vary,
especially when studies vary in dependent variables, con-
texts, and samples (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, &
Rothstein, 2009). Thus, we assumed our effect sizes reflected
a random sample of effect sizes relating collective futures to
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
behavioral intentions/attitudes. The goal of the meta-analy-
sis was to assess the significance of the average effect across
studies.
Effect sizes were measured using r (correlations). For
Studies 2 and 3, which used dichotomous dependent vari-
ables, log-odds ratios were converted to r using the formula
from Borenstein et al. (2009). To make the direction of
expected effects consistent, effects for Societal Dysfunction
were reversed, so that positive relationships indicate higher
intentions/attitudes where societal dysfunction was expected
to decrease.
We used two indicators of the relationships between col-
lective futures dimensions and intentions/attitudes. To assess
basic relationships, we calculated “zero-order” effect sizes
without controlling for other variables. To establish indepen-
dent effects, we computed partial correlations controlling for
other “within-category” dimensions (e.g., for Societal
Dysfunction after controlling for Societal Development, for
Benevolence after controlling for Competence, and for
Conservation values after controlling for other values). When
partial correlations were calculated, the inverse variance was
adjusted to reflect the reduced degrees of freedom.
For each meta-analysis, we report three metrics (see
Borenstein et al., 2009). The first is the mean effect size (and
confidence interval), using the inverse of the Fisher’s
Z-transformed effect sizes. The second metric is the hetero-
geneity in the true effect size (Q). The third is Orwin’s fail-
safe N (using the formula in Lipsey & Wilson, 2000), which
represents the number of studies with null effects (effect
size = 0) that would reduce the overall effect to one of mini-
mal substantive importance (here set at an effect size of .10).
Although there were too few studies to conduct formal tests
of between-studies moderation (Borenstein et al., 2009;
Hedges & Pigott, 2004), we identify where systematic cross-
context variability may be occurring.
Societal Dimensions: Dysfunction and
Development
Table 2 shows meta-analyses for Societal Dysfunction and
Societal Development. Zero-order effects for Societal
Dysfunction showed significant associations with attitudes/
intentions across social issues and religious groups,2 and all
effect sizes were in the expected direction (although not all
were significant). This resulted in a significant overall
effect, which persisted after controlling for Societal
Development. The extent of variation across studies (Q) was
not significant. Overall, people were more likely to endorse
policies and actions that would promote a future where they
expected this future would have lower levels of societal
dysfunction.
For Societal Development, there was a significant posi-
tive overall effect, although the zero-order correlation was
significant in only one study, and the overall effect became
nonsignificant after controlling for Societal Dysfunction.
In sum, there was little to no evidence that attitudes and
Bain et al. 529

Table 2. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Societal Dimensions and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Dysfunctiona Development
Control for Control for
Study Zero order development Zero order dysfunction
1. Climate change mitigation 0.22 — — —
2. Lenient abortion laws 0.26**** 0.29**** −0.01 0.12
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.12* 0.05
4. Atheist future (general 0.06 — — —
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.46**** 0.46**** 0.03 −0.07
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.11 −0.09
7. Christian future 0.12 — — —
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future 0.09 0.06 0.31**** 0.30***
(Christian sample)
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.20**** [0.06, 0.34] 0.25**** [0.12, 0.49] 0.13** [−0.03, 0.30]b 0.08 [−0.18, 0.34]
Heterogeneity (Q) 9.47 8.02 5.96 8.74
Fail-safe N 8 8 3 —
Note: CI = confidence interval.
a
Direction of effect sizes reversed.
b
This effect was only just significant using Lipsey and Wilson’s (2000) macro, and the confidence interval yields a marginally different conclusion about the
significance of the effect.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

intentions were related to projections about societal
development.
Personal Dimensions:Traits
Table 3 shows meta-analyses for Benevolence and
Competence trait dimensions. For Benevolence, zero-order
effect sizes showed significant and consistent positive rela-
tionships with intentions/attitudes in all studies, and the
strongest overall effect size of all dimensions. After control-
ling for Competence, effect sizes for one study became non-
significant but the strong positive overall effect persisted.
That is, to the extent that participants believed political or
demographic changes would result in a future where people
were more benevolent, they were more willing to act and
support policies that would promote that future. The variation
across studies was not significant, although it became a trend
after controlling for Competence, which reflected effect sizes
being consistently larger in social issues contexts (Studies
1-3) than in religious contexts (Studies 4-8).
For Competence, zero-order relationships were significant
for social issues but not for religious futures, with a nonsig-
nificant overall effect. There was a trend indicating variation
across contexts (Q), with this variation becoming significant
after controlling for Benevolence. Projections about
Competence tended to be significantly positive for social
issues but null for religious contexts (and negative for Study 4,
where Christians showed greater support for religion when
they saw an atheist future as more competent). In sum, there
was no overall evidence that attitudes and intentions in the
present were associated with perceptions of how competent
people would become in the future, but there was suggestive
evidence that competence is more important for predicting
attitudes/behavioral intentions about social issues than in reli-
gious contexts. This accords with a view that people see reli-
gion’s primary social function as fostering morality and care
for others and not in developing skills and capacities (which
may be seen as more the role of secular institutions). For social
issues, the greater relevance of competence may reflect the
prominence of competence in debates on the issues examined
(e.g., associations between marijuana use and laziness).
Personal Dimensions:Values
Table 4 shows meta-analyses relating values to intentions/
attitudes. Conservation values showed a significant positive
overall effect, with significant correlations occurring across
social and religious issues. This positive overall effect weak-
ened considerably after controlling for other values but
remained significant even though no relationships were sig-
nificant in individual studies. A similar overall positive
effect emerged for Self-Transcendence values. Openness to
Change and Self-Enhancement showed no overall relation-
ships with intentions/attitudes. There was a significant het-
erogeneity in effect sizes for Self-Enhancement, although
this did not reflect a social issue/religious group distinction,
with a positive relationship for relaxed abortion laws
(Study 2) but a negative trend for climate change mitigation

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

530 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)

Table 3. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Relationships Between Trait Dimensions and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Benevolence Competence
Control for Control for
Study Zero order competence Zero order benevolence
1. Climate change mitigation 0.44**** 0.29** 0.35**** −0.04
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.43**** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.28**
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.46*** 0.58**** 0.14*** 0.22***
4. Atheist future (general 0.24** 0.35*** −0.23* −0.35***
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.36*** 0.36*** −0.02 −0.04
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 0.33** 0.29** 0.16 0.00
7. Christian future 0.19** 0.15 0.13 0.04
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future 0.19** 0.18** 0.10 −0.08
(Christian sample)
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.31**** [0.22, 0.40] 0.32**** [0.10, 0.54] 0.11 [−0.13, 0.34] 0.00 [−0.29, 0.29]
Heterogeneity (Q) 8.07 12.96* 13.96* 17.68**
Fail-safe N 17 18 1 —
Note: CI = confidence interval.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

(Study 1). This may be because participants saw self-
enhancement values quite differently in these contexts, with
greater support by those who saw relaxing abortion laws as
emancipating women from restrictions on achieving success
in their life goals, whereas for climate change support was
greater for those who saw mitigation as curbing excessive
self-enhancement (e.g., profit at all costs) that has contrib-
uted to the climate change problem. For religious futures,
there was a positive trend in a Muslim future (Study 6) but
a negative effect in an atheist future (Study 4). Heterogeneity
was reduced after controlling for other values. Overall, the
effects of the value dimensions of collective futures were
weak compared with Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction.
Supplementary Analyses
Because Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction emerged as
the strongest predictors of behavioral intentions and atti-
tudes, we conducted supplementary meta-analyses to exam-
ine whether their effects were independent of each other. If
Benevolence and Societal Dysfunction were measuring
essentially the same idea at different levels (i.e., if having
more moral and warm people is the same as lowering the
level of societal dysfunction), then the novelty of each
dimension would be reduced. First, effect sizes for
Benevolence were computed after controlling for Societal
Dysfunction. The highly significant overall effect remained
(mean effect size = .25, p < .001) and the variation across
studies was not significant, Q(7) = 8.43, p = .297, indicating
that projections about benevolence were still strongly related
to behavioral intentions and attitudes independently of
societal dysfunction. When effect sizes for Societal
Dysfunction were computed after controlling for Benevolence,
the mean effect size (.06) was no longer significant (p =
.307), although a trend for variation across studies was iden-
tified, Q(7) = 13.35, p = .064. This variation did not reflect
a distinction between social issues and religious contexts but
was specific to individual studies (a positive effect size for
Study 5—atheist future, but negative effect sizes for Study
4—atheist future and Study 8—Christian future). Overall,
the supplementary analyses reinforce that benevolence pro-
jections are the most critical dimension for promoting action
and policy support in the present.3
Discussion
People are mindful of the future, and hypothesize about how
various futures would be different from the present. In eight
studies, we asked participants to imagine certain futures of
society, and rate how these futures would differ from the
present in terms of values, traits, societal dysfunction, and
societal development. More importantly, we examined
which of these dimensions of change are related to attitudes
and behavioral intentions in the present. In other words, we
were interested in finding out which dimensions of projected
change are the active ingredients in driving attitudes and
behaviors in the present.
The answer to this question is benevolence (operational-
ized as warmth/morality traits). Of all the collective futures
dimensions, this was the only one that was reliably,
uniquely, and consistently associated with attitudes and
intentions in the present. Whether the context involved

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

 Table 4. Effect Sizes (r) and Meta-Analysis for Value Quadrants and Behavioral Intentions/Policy Support.

Conservation Self-transcendence Openness to change Self-enhancement

Control for Control for Control for Control for other
Study Zero order other values Zero order other values Zero order other values Zero order values
1. Climate change mitigation −0.07 0.06 0.07 0.14 −0.01 0.07 −0.28* −0.33**
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.24**** 0.10 0.29**** 0.17 0.16** 0.04 0.24*** 0.05
3. Legalizing marijuana 0.17*** 0.16 0.15*** 0.11 0.05 −0.02 0.09 −0.10
4. Atheist future (general Christian 0.24** 0.19 0.16 0.04 −0.27** −0.08 −0.30** −0.06
sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians who expect 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.00 −0.05 0.00 −0.02
this future)
6. Muslim future 0.36*** 0.24* 0.28** 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.23* 0.07
7. Christian future (nonreligious sample) 0.09 0.05 0.22** 0.07 0.19** 0.12 −0.01 −0.06
8. Christian future (Christian sample) 0.16* 0.00 0.20** 0.07 0.15 0.21** −0.10 −0.30***
Meta-analysis
Mean effect size [95% CI] 0.17**** [NA]a 0.09** [NA]a 0.20**** [NA]a 0.08** [NA]a 0.06 [−0.15, 0.28] 0.07 [NA]a −0.02 [−0.32, 0.29] −0.10 [−0.28, 0.08]
Heterogeneity (Q) 6.73 3.93 2.11 0.94 12.74* 5.30 18.94*** 11.07

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

Fail-safe N 6 — 8 — — — — —
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.
a
The meta-analysis estimates the variance in the “true” effect after accounting for expected within-study error. When the observed variance in the true effect is smaller than the expected within-study
error (occurring when Q < df), this leads to a negative value for the variance in the true effect, which is reset to zero by convention (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). In these cases,
confidence intervals are not reported.

531
532 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)
legalizing abortion or marijuana, mitigating climate change,
or changing the religious makeup of society, people were
more likely to endorse attitudes and intentions designed to
facilitate that future when they felt that future would be
characterized by increased benevolence. Similarly, the
more people felt that future would be characterized by
reduced benevolence, the less likely they were to endorse
attitudes and intentions to facilitate that future.
Other dimensions of collective futures also showed sig-
nificant associations with attitudes and behavioral intentions
(though less strongly and consistently than for benevolence).
People were somewhat more likely to support social changes
that they believed would result in reducing societal dysfunc-
tion (e.g., levels of crime, poverty, and disease). Although
the link between societal dysfunction and attitudes/inten-
tions was always in the expected direction, it was significant
in only four of the eight studies, and the overall effect did not
persist after controlling for benevolence. So although there is
some evidence that attitudes and intentions in the present are
tied to perceptions of how levels of crime, poverty, and dis-
ease might change in the future, this evidence is considerably
weaker than for benevolence.
For societal development, the relationship with current
attitudes and intentions was only significant in one study,
and the overall effect was significant only insofar as it shared
variance with societal dysfunction. Overall, then, there was
little evidence that current attitudes and intentions were tied
to perceptions of technological innovation, scientific prog-
ress, and education standards. Comparing these societal-
level dimensions, people were generally more influenced to
act by projections of decay in society rather than by scien-
tific and technological advancement.
There was little evidence that attitudes and intentions in
the present were associated with changes in Self-
Enhancement values (e.g., ambition, pleasure, wealth) or
Openness to Change values (e.g., independence, freedom,
creativity). To the extent that projected changes in values
were associated with current attitudes and intentions, it was
on the dimensions of Conservation (e.g., respect for tradi-
tion, self-discipline, obedience) and Self-Transcendence
(e.g., honesty, social justice, equality). These significant
zero-order effects—along with the strong effects for benevo-
lence—could be seen to reflect a broad concern with promot-
ing “community-mindedness” or interdependence within
society. In the case of Self-Transcendence and Conservation,
though, the zero-order correlations were only significant in
half the studies, and the overall effects did not survive after
controlling for other value dimensions. Although considering
values in the distant future are more important than in the
proximal future for how people plan their own future (Eyal,
Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), they appear
to be less critical than consideration of traits when consider-
ing the future of society as a whole. The stronger relation-
ships for benevolence traits relative to values may be because
traits are seen as more stable than values (Berings, De Fruyt,
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
& Bouwen, 2004; Rokeach, 1973), and hence changes in
traits may be seen as more enduring.
We identified only weak evidence of variation across the
studies, suggesting that there is a reasonable consistency in
which dimensions of the future are being drawn on to drive
attitudes and behaviors in the present. However, systematic
variation across contexts may emerge as the corpus of empiri-
cal evidence grows. There was marginal evidence that projec-
tions about traits (benevolence and competence) showed
stronger relationships with attitudes/intentions for futures
involving social issues compared with religious collective
futures. However, as the studies involving religious collective
futures all involved changes in the power of either an ingroup
or outgroup, at this stage it cannot be clearly established
whether such differences arise mainly from the religious
nature of these studies, or whether projections about traits are
relatively less important when considering the power of
ingroups and outgroups in society more generally.
It is important to distinguish our focus on identifying
common dimensions motivating action across contexts from
the idea that beliefs about collective futures do not vary
across contexts. Table A2 of appendix showed that different
social issues and intergroup contexts resulted in different
patterns of judgments about society’s future, for instance,
whether benevolence or societal dysfunction would increase
overall. Indeed, a high degree of contextual variation across
future contexts would be expected. However, despite this
contextual variation in how the future is perceived, we suc-
cessfully identified common elements in the projections
about societal change that can spur people into supporting
policies and taking actions themselves.
It is also important to note that our focus on identifying
the important context-general dimensions of collective
futures does not mean that other dimensions should be
ignored, as all dimensions were related to attitudes/inten-
tions in one or more contexts, sometimes with effect sizes
stronger than for benevolence. For instance, societal devel-
opment displayed the largest effect size when Christians
made projections about a more Christian future (Study 8),
societal dysfunction had the largest effect size for an atheist
future (Study 5), and Conservation values showed the larg-
est effect size for a Muslim future (Study 6). Comparing
studies rather than dimensions, for the issue of legalizing
abortion (Study 3), all collective futures dimensions except
societal development were related to support (at least before
controlling for other dimensions), whereas only a few col-
lective futures dimensions were related to intentions/atti-
tudes for climate change mitigation (Study 1) and for
nonreligious views of a Christian future (Study 7). That is,
in contexts like abortion, people appear concerned that a
policy change will have wide-ranging effects across people
and society, whereas in other contexts, they are concerned
with a much narrower range of effects. The fact that con-
texts differ in the types and number of collective futures
dimensions that emerge as important indicates that future
Bain et al.
research on specific political or social issues should con-
tinue to examine a range of collective futures dimensions to
generate a deeper understanding of that issue. However, this
does not detract from the consistent overall relationships
between attitudes/intentions and projections about benevo-
lence traits across contexts.
Implications
These findings have theoretical implications for our under-
standing of the temporal dimension of collective experience.
In particular, they reinforce and extend knowledge about the
importance of judgments about the content of ingroup ste-
reotypes in people’s lives. Morality and warmth are not only
important for how people evaluate their ingroup (Fiske et al.,
2006; Leach et al., 2007; Ybarra et al., 2008), projections
about how people’s morality/warmth could change in the
future are related to willingness to support or oppose social
change in the present.
These findings also have clear political implications. If
politicians and other leaders could effectively communicate
how their policies would promote benevolence traits in soci-
ety, they would be likely to gain greater public support. For
example, some evidence suggests that climate change mes-
sages focused on increasing interpersonal warmth in society
are more effective than messages emphasizing the risks of
climate change in convincing climate change skeptics to sup-
port action (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, & Jeffries, 2012).
However, this should extend beyond rhetorical strategies, as
policies themselves would benefit from thinking about their
consequences for benevolence in society—to achieve the
outcomes citizens want, policy makers should consider how
their policies would help people in the community become
more caring, compassionate, trustworthy, and honest. This
would be a significant challenge, given politics tends to
focus more on matters of societal dysfunction and develop-
ment, and because policy makers typically have greater
familiarity with law, politics, and economics compared with
social psychology. However, if everyday people see certain
policies as affecting the benevolence of people in the future,
a concerted effort by social scientists and policy makers
should be able to identify some suitable features of policies
that could facilitate these outcomes.
More broadly, the collective futures framework has impli-
cations for the study of a wide range of areas of interest to
social psychologists researching groups and social action. For
instance, the collective futures framework can be applied to
the effects of ideologies such as feminism, socialism, and
multiculturalism. Accordingly, the present research adds
impetus to the growing body of research showing that peo-
ple’s attention to temporal dimensions of the psychology of
groups are worthy of greater research attention. Just as mental
time travel into our personal future can be critical to our sur-
vival (Suddendorf, 2006), so may our projections about the
future of society.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
533
Methodological Considerations and
Limitations
Our method for examining collective futures involved several
design choices that should be varied in future research.
Although adopting a consistent, mid-range time frame (approx-
imately 40 years) was useful for making comparisons across
studies, the most relevant time frame may vary across contexts.
For instance, the effects of events like hosting the Olympics
influenced projections about the stereotypical characteristics of
Chinese within 10 years (Cheng et al., 2010). Similarly, the
effects of political revolutions, or even democratic changes of
government, may be seen to change people within a much
shorter time frame. Relevant time frames for thinking about
the future may also vary cross-culturally, reflecting historical
and ecological factors (Jones, 1988).
Some measurement issues were encountered, particularly
with competence where positive and negative items did not
combine reliably in several studies. Although this might be
addressed by using more items for this scale, it is also possible
that in some future contexts, there is a genuine separation of
beliefs about how a group displays competence and incompe-
tence, which may have distinct relationships with present-day
actions. Another issue was encountered with warmth and
morality, which were very highly correlated in most studies.
Given that this overlap has also been noted in previous
research (Cheng et al., 2010; Kashima et al., 2009), the most
likely explanation is psychological rather than methodologi-
cal. Although we concur with Leach et al. (2007) that morality
and warmth are conceptually distinct, thinking about the
future involves more abstract and higher order concepts
(Trope & Liberman, 2003), so when projecting to the future,
fine distinctions between warmth and morality may often
appear to become less significant than their shared focus on
“benevolence” toward others. However, the covariation
between warmth and morality did vary somewhat across con-
texts, and where they are separable they may have distinct
relationships with behavior. Therefore, in research within indi-
vidual contexts, the distinction between morality and warmth
should be empirically assessed rather than assumed.
As the first targeted research on collective futures, the aver-
age effect sizes in the meta-analyses give guidance about power
and recommended sample sizes for future research. For benevo-
lence, the average effect size suggests that acceptable power (.8)
can be achieved in samples of 70 to 80, but for societal dysfunc-
tion, this would require around 120 cases when controlling for
societal development, and almost 200 cases when not. Thus,
larger sample sizes than those reported here are advisable if the
goal is to detect effects for societal dysfunction and other dimen-
sions. However, as noted previously, the importance of specific
dimensions can vary across contexts, so the inclusion of dimen-
sions in specific contexts should also include consideration of
their likely importance in those contexts.
It might be argued that the findings reflect more general
valence effects, with perceptions of collective futures merely
534 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)
indicators of overall positive or negative attitudes toward cli-
mate change, abortion, marijuana, religious groups, or athe-
ism. We agree that some association would be expected, as
collective futures beliefs are likely to be a component of peo-
ple’s general attitudes toward an issue or group. However, if
general attitudes explained the effects, positive associations
across all valenced dimensions would be expected, and this
was not the case. Rather, several positively valenced dimen-
sions of collective futures showed null or weak relations with
attitudes and intentions (e.g., competence, societal develop-
ment). Moreover, while benevolence showed consistently
positive associations with attitudes/intentions, other dimen-
sions had opposing relationships across studies (Competence
traits, Openness to Change, and Self-Enhancement values),
indicating that people were discriminating between dimen-
sions across contexts rather than applying a general attitude.
Additional research shows that a positive view on an issue is
not a prerequisite for these effects, with even those skeptical
about climate change showing greater support for action
where they think it will increase the interpersonal warmth of
people in society (Bain et al., 2012). Together, these findings
strongly suggest that people were making nuanced distinc-
tions about dimensions, and not just holding a generalized uto-
pian or dystopian attitude toward an issue or future society.
Focusing on collective futures dimensions rather than con-
texts, some may suspect that the stronger findings for benevo-
lence may nonetheless reflect a general evaluation, on the
basis that benevolence (especially morality) is most strongly
linked to general evaluations of ingroups (e.g., Leach et al.,
2007). However, for national ingroups, competence is some-
times more important than benevolence (Phalet & Poppe,
1997), and early research on evaluations found that evalua-
tions were most strongly related to traits that reflect both
competence and benevolence (e.g., wise, reputable; Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Accordingly, Cuddy, Fiske, and
Glick (2008) concluded that evaluation comprises roughly
equal components of warmth and competence. Moreover,
there is no compelling reason to believe that projections of
benevolence stereotypes should be a better indicator of gen-
eral evaluation of a society’s future than projected changes in
values and societal dimensions. Values are central to people’s
political decision making (Feldman, 2003; Tetlock, 1986),
and societal dysfunction and development should be strongly
related to evaluations of society, as they are highly evaluative
and prevalent in debates about society. Overall, the findings
appear more consistent with a particular focus on benevo-
lence as the critical belief about society’s future, rather than
reflecting a general evaluation.
Future Research
While the present studies focused on the basic relationships
between dimensions of collective futures and intentions/
policy support, future research should examine moderators
of these relationships. One moderator could be people’s
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
beliefs about processes of societal change. Beliefs that soci-
ety is stable and unchanging, or follows a natural process
beyond human influence (Kashima et al., 2009), could
attenuate the link between collective futures beliefs and
behavioral intentions, as it places societal change outside
human influence. In contrast, believing that society is
changeable and malleable, for instance that “people power”
can change society (“collective efficacy”; for example,
Bandura, 1995; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach,
2004), may strengthen the relationship between collective
futures dimensions and action.
Several individual differences may also affect the extent to
which collective futures matter for the present day. People vary
in their focus on thinking about the future (Zimbardo & Boyd,
1999), and how clearly they imagine the future (Tonn et al.,
2006). This variation extends to cultures, with some evidence
suggesting that European North Americans are more oriented
to the future than Chinese (Guo, Ji, Spina, & Zhang, 2012).
Moreover, people who are typically optimistic or pessimistic
may use their images of the future in different ways (Sanna,
1996). In addition, broad political orientations (left–right,
Democrat–Republican) may play a role, either as an individual
difference (people on the left and right may be more focused on
different types of societal or personal outcomes) or as a result
of how political organizations invoke the future of society as
frames in their rhetoric (see Chong & Druckman, 2007). The
current findings show that collective futures matter, and future
research can establish for whom they matter most.
In further developing ideas about the future of society,
research on how people think about their own future may
offer useful insights. From research on future expectations,
projections to the future may be more strongly related to
behavior when these future states are seen as achievable
goals than as utopian fantasies (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002).
From research on counterfactual and prefactual thinking,
findings from Petrocelli, Seta, and Seta (2012) suggest that
people’s reactions to collective futures may be influenced by
their “potency,” that is, the combination of the extent to
which the social context is expected to occur (e.g., legalizing
marijuana) combined with the likelihood that it will produce
the envisaged outcome (e.g., reducing benevolence in soci-
ety). From construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003),
projecting to more distant futures may reduce the distinctive-
ness of collective futures dimensions, perhaps as far as a
generalized good–bad dimension, whereas in more proximal
future contexts people may be able to make more nuanced
distinctions between dimensions in how changes in social
policies or group status affect society. These potential areas
of commonality in thinking about individual and collective
futures may serve as starting points for more integrative
models, and also in identifying where thinking about indi-
vidual and collective futures is distinct.
Although the present studies have focused on changes in
a nation, the collective futures framework can be used to
examine other types of collectives. Clear examples include
Bain et al. 535

organizations, where it can help understand issues in organi-
zational change, or within ethnic minorities where it can help
understand social engagement and integration with the
majority group, by uncovering how integration is expected
to change the character of the ethnic minority. Moreover, the
effects of collective futures on present intentions/attitudes
need not be restricted to political actions. For instance,
beliefs about an atheist or Muslim future may motivate other
expressions of prejudice and discrimination toward these
people.
Conclusion
If political leaders, artists, and the media invoke images of
society’s future to engage with and influence the public, we
should try to understand the views of collective futures that
the public holds. The present research has built a flexible
general framework for studying this temporal aspect of folk
psychology that has been largely overlooked. It shows that
people’s projections about the future of their nation are
related to their willingness to take action today and to sup-
port actions of their government. Perhaps surprisingly,
behavioral intentions and policy support were more strongly
related to projections about people’s traits (specifically
benevolence) more than the societal-level concerns that
occupy most political and public attention, or projections
about values that are often described as central to political
action. Overall, people appear more motivated to act in sup-
port of creating a society with better people (i.e., warmer
and more moral), than they are motivated to act in support
of creating more favorable societal conditions for people to
live in.

Appendix

Table A1. Items Comprising Collective Futures Dimensions.

Traits Values Society

Warmth Conservation Dysfunction
Warm1-8 Respect for tradition1-8 Murder1-8
Caring2-8 Self-discipline1-8 Serious assault1-8
Considerate1,4-7 Obedience1-8 Disease1-8
Insensitive1-8 Social order1-8 Poverty1-8
Unfriendly2-8 Being moderate1 Gender inequality1-8
Unsympathetic1,4-7 National security1 Rape2-8
Morality Family security2-8 Homelessness2-8
Honest1-8 Being humble2-8 Suicide2-8
Trustworthy2-8 Self-transcendence Prostitution2-8
Sincere1,4-7 Honesty1-8 Corruption1,4-8
Immoral1-8 Social justice1-8 Burglary1,4-8
Deceitful2-8 Equality1 Fear of crime1,4,6-8
Unfaithful1,4-7 Helpful1 Forced immigration1,5,6,8
Competence Protect environment2-8 Gangs1,4,7
Capable1-8 Meaning in life2-8 Terrorism2,3,5,6,8
Assertive1,4-7 Openness to change Global warming5,6,8
Competent2,3,8 Independence1-8 Development
Independent4-8 Exciting life1-8 Technological innovation2,3,5,6,8
Disorganized1-8 Enjoying life1-8 Scientific progress2,3
Lazy2-8 Freedom1 Major scientific discoveries5,6,8
Unskilled1,4-7 A varied life1 Volunteering2,3,5,6,8
Being daring2-8 Social welfare organizations2,3,5,6,8
Creativity2-8 Community groups2,3,5,6,8
Self-enhancement Education standards2,3
Social power1-8 Science education5,6,8
Being successful1-8
Ambition1-8
Pleasure1-8
Wealth1
Social recognition2-8
Note: Subscripts denote studies where item was used.

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

 536
Table A2. Mean (SD) Ratings of Collective Futures Dimensions Across Studies.

Society Traits Values

Self- Openness to
Study Dysfunction Development Benevolence Competence Conservation transcendence change Self-enhancement
1. Climate change mitigation −0.13 (1.65) — 0.78**** (1.33) 1.02**** (1.25) 0.28 (1.57) 0.86** (2.38) 0.20 (1.76) −0.24 (1.36)
2. Relaxing abortion laws 0.28* (1.24) 0.69**** (0.97) 0.03 (1.19) 0.42** (1.63) −0.44** (1.62) −0.05 (1.48) 0.59** (1.20) 0.29 (1.46)
3. Legalizing marijuana 1.00**** (1.65) −0.39** (1.33) −0.33** (1.05) −1.51**** (1.88) −1.34**** (1.77) −0.77*** (1.91) 0.82**** (1.40) −0.88**** (1.83)
4. Atheist future (general 1.95**** (1.56) — −1.20**** (1.43) 1.19**** (1.74) −1.27**** (1.67) −0.89*** (2.22) 2.12**** (2.03) 2.03**** (2.13)
Christian sample)
5. Atheist future (Christians 0.46** (1.38) 1.00**** (1.29) −0.60**** (1.21) 1.08**** (1.47) −0.07 (1.68) 0.21 (1.91) 2.16**** (1.46) 1.78**** (1.51)
who expect this future)
6. Muslim future 1.05**** (1.47) −0.11 (1.36) −0.15 (1.31) 0.20 (1.18) 1.47**** (1.70) 0.41* (1.75) −0.93**** (2.04) 1.30**** (1.27)
7. Christian future 0.45*** (1.67) — 0.02 (1.35) 1.35**** (1.45) 0.00 (1.52) 0.92**** (1.92) 1.92**** (1.55) 1.40**** (1.57)
(nonreligious sample)
8. Christian future −0.94**** (2.66) 1.45**** (1.71) 1.38**** (2.39) 1.01**** (1.80) 1.49**** (2.61) 1.61**** (2.55) 1.07**** (2.05) 0.69**** (1.95)
(Christian sample)

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014

Note: One-sample t test (reference value = 0 [no change from society today]).
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.
Bain et al.
Acknowledgment
We thank Katharine Reynolds and Jolanda Jetten for comments on
manuscript drafts.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
research was supported by an Australian Research Council
Discovery Project Grant DP0984678 to the first author.
Notes
1. Schwartz’s “Hedonism” domain spans Openness to Change and
Self-Enhancement quadrants, so the two Hedonism values were
split across quadrants (“pleasure” to Self-Enhancement, “enjoy-
ing life” to Openness to Change). This resulted in six items mea-
suring Conservation, five measuring Openness to Change and
Self-Enhancement, and four measuring Self-Transcendence.
2. As a term of convenience, we classified studies on atheists/athe-
ism under “religion” and “religious minority,” by which we
mean groups with particular perspectives on religion.
3. A 40-year time frame means projections extend beyond the
expected life of a substantial minority of participants in some
studies. Theoretically, we do not view this as a problem as projec-
tions about society are separable from personal projections, for
example, people are concerned more about environmental effects
on future generations than on themselves (Milfont, Duckitt, &
Cameron, 2006). To be thorough, we reran meta-analyses after
controlling for age and within-category variables, and found age
had very little effect on the results. The mean effect was .33, p <
.001 for Benevolence, and .20, p < .001, for Societal Dysfunction.
All other mean effect sizes differed by less than .01 from those in
Tables 2 to 4. Thus, age did not influence the relationship
between collective futures and attitudes/intentions.
References
Bain, P. G., Hornsey, M. J., Bongiorno, R., & Jeffries, C. (2012).
Promoting pro-environmental action in climate change deniers.
Nature Climate Change, 2, 600-603.
Bain, P. G., Kashima, Y., & Haslam, N. (2006). Conceptual
beliefs about human values and their implications: Human
nature beliefs predict value importance, value trade-offs, and
responses to value-laden rhetoric. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 91, 351-367.
Bandura, A. (1995). Exercise of personal and collective efficacy in
changing societies. In A. Bandura (Ed.), Self-efficacy in chang-
ing societies (pp. 1-45). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Barnea, M. F., & Schwartz, S. H. (1998). Values and voting. Politi-
cal Psychology, 19, 17-40.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
537
Berings, D., De Fruyt, F., & Bouwen, R. (2004). Work values and
personality traits as predictors of enterprising and social voca-
tional interests. Personality and Individual Differences, 36,
349-364.
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H.
R. (2009). Introduction to meta-analysis. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Brewer, P. R., & Gross, K. (2005). Values, framing, and citizens’
thoughts about policy issues: Effects on content and quality.
Political Psychology, 26, 929-948.
Cheng, S. Y. Y., Chao, M. M., Kwong, J., Peng, S., Chen, X.,
Kashima, Y., & Chiu, C. (2010). The good old days and a better
tomorrow: Historical representations and future imaginations
of China during the 2008 Olympic Games. Asian Journal of
Social Psychology, 13, 118-127.
Chomsky, N. (1970/1999). Language and freedom. Resonance, 4,
85-104.
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. Annual
Review of Political Science, 10, 103-126.
Cinnirella, M. (1998). Exploring temporal aspects of social iden-
tity: The concept of possible social identities. European Jour-
nal of Social Psychology, 28, 227-248.
Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and com-
petence as universal dimensions of social perception: The
stereotype content model and the BIAS map. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 61-149.
Diekman, A. B., & Eagly, A. H. (2000). Stereotypes as dynamic
constructs: Women and men of the past, present, and future.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1171-1188.
Diekman, A. B., Eagly, A. H., Mladinic, A., & Ferreira, M. C.
(2005). Dynamic stereotypes about women and men in Latin
America and the United States. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psy-
chology, 36, 209-226.
Dunmire, P. L. (2005). Preempting the future: Rhetoric and ideol-
ogy of the future in political discourse. Discourse & Society,
16, 481-513.
Eyal, T., Sagristano, M. D., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Chaiken, S.
(2009). When values matter: Expressing values in behavioral
intentions for the near vs. distant future. Journal of Experimen-
tal Social Psychology, 45, 35-43.
Feldman, S. (2003). Values, ideology, and the structure of political
attitudes. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), Oxford
handbook of political psychology (3rd ed., pp. 477-508). New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2006). Universal dimen-
sions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 11, 77-83.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model
of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth
respectively follow from perceived status and competition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878-902.
Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing
the future. Science, 317, 1351-1354.
Gordon, A., & Miller, J. L. (2004). Values and persuasion during
the first Bush-Gore presidential debate. Political Communica-
tion, 21, 71-92.
538 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(4)
Gore, A. (Writer) & D. Guggenheim (Director). (2006). An incon-
venient truth [Motion picture]. Los Angeles, CA, USA: Law-
rence Bender Productions.
Guo, T., Ji, L.-J., Spina, R., & Zhang, Z. (2012). Culture, temporal
focus, and values of the past and the future. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 1030-1040.
Hedges, L. V., & Pigott, T. D. (2004). The power of statistical tests
for moderators in meta-analysis. Psychological Methods, 9,
426-445.
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural
change, and the persistence of traditional values. American
Sociological Review, 65, 19-51.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). Climate
change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribu-
tion of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the
intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Jones, J. M. (1988). Cultural differences in temporal perspectives:
Instrumental and expressive behaviors in time. In J. E. McGrath
(Ed.), The social psychology of time (pp. 21-38). Newbury
Park, CA: SAGE.
Judd, C. M., James-Hawkins, L., Yzerbyt, V., & Kashima, Y. (2005).
Fundamental dimensions of social judgment: Understanding
the relations between judgments of competence and warmth.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 899-913.
Kashima, Y., Bain, P., Haslam, N., Peters, K., Laham, S., Whelan,
J., & Fernando, J. (2009). Folk theory of social change. Asian
Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 227-246.
Kashima, Y., Shi, J., Tsuchiya, K., Kashima, E. S., Cheng, S. Y. Y.,
Chao, M. M., & Shin, S. (2011). Globalization and folk theory
of social change: How globalization relates to societal percep-
tions about the past and future. Journal of Social Issues, 67,
696-715.
Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue:
The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in
the positive evaluation of in-groups. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 93, 234-249.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2000). Practical meta-analysis.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Loveridge, D. J. (1977). Values and futures. In H. A. Linstone & W.
H. C. Simmonds (Eds.), Futures research: New directions (pp.
53-64). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Markowitz, F. E., Bellair, P. E., Liska, A. E., & Liu, J. (2001). Extend-
ing social disorganization theory: Modeling the relationships
between cohesion, disorder, and fear. Criminology, 39, 293-320.
Milfont, T. L., Duckitt, J., & Cameron, L. D. (2006). A cross-cul-
tural study of environmental motive concerns and their implica-
tions for proenvironmental behavior. Environment & Behavior,
38, 745-767.
Monsma, S. V. (2000). When sacred and secular mix: Religious
nonprofit organizations and public money. Lanham, MD: Row-
man & Littlefield.
Obama, B. (2011). State of the Union address. Retrieved from
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-
president-state-union-address
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
Oettingen, G., & Mayer, D. (2002). The motivating function of
thinking about the future: Expectations versus fantasies. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1198-1212.
Orwell, G. (1990). Nineteen eighty-four. London, England: Pen-
guin. (Original work published 1949).
Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. E., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The mea-
surement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Outten, H. R., Schmitt, M. T., Miller, D. A., & Garcia, A. L. (2012).
Feeling threatened about the future: Whites’ emotional reac-
tions to anticipated ethnic demographic changes. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 14-25.
Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., & Seta, J. J. (2012). Prefactual potency:
The perceived likelihood of alternatives to anticipated realities.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 1467-1479.
Phalet, K., & Poppe, E. (1997). Competence and morality dimen-
sions of national and ethnic stereotypes: A study in six eastern-
European countries. European Journal of Social Psychology,
27, 703-723.
Reicher, S. (2008). Making a past fit for the future: The political
and ontological dimensions of historical continuity. In F. Sani
(Ed.), Self continuity: Individual and collective perspectives
(pp. 145-158). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (2001). Self and nation: Categorization,
contestation and mobilization. London, England: SAGE.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York, NY:
The Free Press.
Rutjens, B. T., van der Pligt, J., & van Harreveld, F. (2009). Things
will get better: The anxiety-buffering qualities of progressive
hope. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 535-543.
Rutjens, B. T., van Harreveld, F., & van der Pligt, J. (2010). Yes we
can: Belief in progress as compensatory control. Social Psycho-
logical & Personality Science, 1, 246-252.
Sampson, R. J., & Raudenbush, S. W. (2004). Seeing disorder:
Neighborhood stigma and the social construction of “broken
windows.” Social Psychology Quarterly, 67, 319-342.
Sani, F., Bowe, M., & Herrera, M. (2008). Perceived collective con-
tinuity and social well-being: Exploring the connections. Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 365-374.
Sani, F., Bowe, M., Herrera, M., Manna, C., Cossa, T., Miao, X., &
Zhou, Y. (2007). Perceived collective continuity: Seeing groups
as entities that move through time. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 37, 1118-1134.
Sanna, L. J. (1996). Defensive pessimism, optimism, and simulat-
ing alternatives: Some ups and downs of prefactual and counter-
factual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
71, 1020-1036.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of
values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries.
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychol-
ogy, Vol. 25 (pp. 1-65.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism/collectivism: New
cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim & H. C. Triandis
(Eds.), Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and
applications (Cross-cultural research and methodology series)
(Vol. 18, pp. 85-119). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Bain et al.
Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic per-
sonal values, core political values, and voting: A longitudinal
analysis. Political Psychology, 31, 421-452.
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L.
(1999). A value-belief-norm theory of support for social move-
ments: The case of environmentalism. Human Ecology Review,
6, 81-97.
Suddendorf, T. (2006). Foresight and evolution of the human mind.
Science, 312, 1006-1007.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-
group behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychol-
ogy of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Tetlock, P. E. (1986). A value pluralism model of ideological reason-
ing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 819-827.
Tonn, B., Hemrick, A., & Conrad, F. (2006). Cognitive representa-
tions of the future: Survey results. Futures, 38, 810-829.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychologi-
cal Review, 110, 403-421.
Turner, J., & Brown, R. (1978). Social status, cognitive alterna-
tives and intergroup relations. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentia-
tion between social groups: Studies in the social psychology
of intergroup relations (pp. 201-234). London, England: Aca-
demic Press.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 19, 2014
539
van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W.
(2004). Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining col-
lective action tendencies through group-based anger and group
efficacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,
649-664.
Wilson, D. B. (2005). Meta-analysis macros for SAS, SPSS, and
Stata (Version 2005.05.23). Retrieved from http://mason.gmu.
edu/~dwilsonb/ma.html
Wohl, M. J. A., Branscombe, N. R., & Reysen, S. (2010). Perceiving
your group’s future to be in jeopardy: Extinction threat induces
collective angst and the desire to strengthen the ingroup. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 898-910.
Wojciszke, B. (2005). Morality and competence in person- and
self-perception. European Review of Social Psychology, 161,
155-188.
Ybarra, O., Chan, E., Park, H., Burnstein, E., Monin, B., & Stanik,
C. (2008). Life’s recurring challenges and the fundamental
dimensions: An integration and its implications for cultural dif-
ferences and similarities. European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 38, 1083-1092.
Zimbardo, P. G., & Boyd, J. N. (1999). Putting time in perspective:
A valid, reliable individual-differences metric. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 77, 1271-1288.