The Sources of Evil According to Plato

Author(s): Harold Cherniss

Source: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Feb. 15, 1954), pp.
23-30
Published by: American Philosophical Society
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 THE SOURCES OF EVIL ACCORDING TO PLATO
HAROLD CHERNISS
Professor,Institute forAdvanced Study, Princeton
(Read November13, 1953)

THE pointof thispaper is the pluralin its title. sensusconcerning evidencewould be in mostfields
My reasonformakingit is thepersistent failureof of investigation.Plato did not collectall thathe
scholars to understandhow Plato, if he had a mighthave to say about various subjectsand set
consistenttheoryof evil, could speak of the evil down these doctrinalopinions in systematicar-
in thisworldas derivativefrommorethana single rangement underthe rubricsthatlaterbecamethe
source. Some ofthem,consequently, stoutlymain- conventionalproblemsof philosophy. The form
tainthathe musthave believedall evil to have one in which he chose to express his thoughtis the
source only, thoughthey disagree in identifying dialogue,and he always confinedhis treatment of
thatsource,whileothersdenythathe everachieved any problemto such aspectsof it as seemedto him
any coherenttheoryof evil at all.1 to be pertinentto the particularcontextof the
This is not so strangeas a similarlack of con- philosophicaldiscussion which he was actually
composing.2Because of thisthe interpretation of
1 Among those who maintain that the source of all evil Plato is involvedin peculiardifficulties, and there
according to Plato is matter or corporeality are Vlastos is a greattemptation to treatthe severaldialogues
(1939: 80-82), Festugiere (1947: 36-42), and Petrement as recordsof disconnected phases in the fluxor-
(1947): 45-47 and 72-73); among those who contend that
it is soul or an irrationalelement in soul are Wilamowitz- more courteously-in the developmentof Plato's
Moellendorff (1919: 320-321), Chilcott (1923: 29-31), thought.3One should,of course,bewareof read-
Taylor (1928: 117; 1937: 455, n. 2, and 492), Cornford ing intothe textwhat is not impliedby it accord-
(1937: 209-210), and Morrow (1950: 163). For earlier ing to Plato's own standards; but one must be
exponents of the latter position, against which Hoffleit
(1937) argued, cf. Zeller (1922: 765, n. 5), who forhis part equally wary of neglectingthe illuminationthat
(1922: 973, n. 3 and 4) contends that in all dialogues before the differentdialogues cast upon one another.
the Laws the source of all evil is matter but in the Laws Synopticunderstanding is no less necessaryin this
is an evil world-souland that this was a natural step in the
developmentof Plato's theory. Greene (1944: 301) thinks modest field of investigation than Plato said it is
it idle to seek in Plato fora single solution. According to to the philosopherin his larger sphere. Such a
him there are two solutions equally Platonic: "Plato iden- synoptic readingofthedialoguesreveals,I believe,
tifiesthe source of moral evil at firstchieflywith body or
matterand then moreand more with soul. . . . The unre-
behind all the apparentlydiversestatementscon-
solved residuum,or evil, in the world,as Plato sees it, may cerningthe sourcesof evil a theorymore compli-
confidentlybe assigned to matter or 'Necessity,' once and cated than any of the currentinterpretations has
once only . . . conceived as endowed with life (soul)" recognized but perfectly coherent in all its parts
(op. cit.,31 1). Sesemann (1912: 180) had already asserted
that thereare "zwei Grundauffassungendes Bdsen, die in and consistentwith Plato's fundamentaltheory
dem platonischen System unvers6hnteinander gegentiber of reality.
stehen." Meldrum (1950: 65) holds that "the discrep- Accordingto thattheorythe phenomenalworld
ancies in what Plato says about evil . . . call attention to
somethingobscure, perhaps incoherent,in his metaphysical is a spatialreflection of the ideas, whichalone are
thinking"; he argues (70) that "Plato's view of evil varies
or 4kvxlapx' KLVffTECOSpredominates,"and 2 The body of the Timaeus is not a dialogue; but dialogic
as voOs6I/UOVp'YLKOS
he concludes (74) that "there is no entity that we can call characteristicsare not entirelyabsent even fromthis expo-
'Plato's theology.' " Palas (1941: 52) goes even furtherand sition, just as they are present in the longer expository
asserts that "the problemof evil never seriouslyconcerned sections of the Laws (cf. Schaerer, 1938: 153-156). More-
Plato at all," an assertion which Solmsen unwittinglycon- over, the formof the Timaeus alone determinesthe treat-
tradicts (1942: 142) with the assurance that "the problem ment of important doctrinal factors there, e.g. the self-
of evil . . . had an organic and important place in his motion of soul (cf. Cherniss, 1944: 428-431).
thought." For the interpretationsof Plato's theory of 3 Stenzel (1931: 108, n. 1; 125; 133), who himselfsought
evil given by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Eudemus and to trace Plato's development,issued a warningagainst the
forthe theoriesof Speusippus and Xenocrates cf. Cherniss, dangers of this temptation,a temptation to which British
1944: 95-97, n. 62, and 268-269, n. 176. scholars have recentlymanifesteda growingsusceptibility.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL. 98, NO. 1, FEBRUARY, 1954.
23

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24 HAROLD CHERNISS
perfectly real entities.4Since no copyor reflection
can be identicalwith its model or original,all
phenomenamust fall short of the realityof the
ideas, and all must thereforebe somethingless
than perfect.5 So all the phenomenalworld is
always involvedin what may be called "negative
evil," since it is a derogationof reality,the de-
gree of deviationfromthe originalwhich at the
veryleast is impliedin the existenceof a copy or
reflection.6It is evil in this sense that, as the
contraryof good, is in the Theaetetussaid to be
ineradicablefromthis mortal world but absent
fromthe divine; and the same notionis implied
bythestatement in thePhilebusthatwhateverfair
thingsthereare in this world are the resultof a
4Timaeus 52 A-C, Politicus 285 D9-286 B2 (cf.Phaedrus
250 A-C), Phaedo 74 D-75 D.
5 Cf. Cratylus432 C-D, Sophist 240 A-B (cf. Republic
597 A 4-7).
6 Palas (1941: 50) says: "Letzten Endes aber beruhtder
axiologische Grundcharakter des empirischen Kosmos
darin, dass der Kosmos das Abbild des Urbildes ist." This
statement, which save for the firsttwo words is literally
correct,erroneouslyimplies,however,that Plato meant to
explain all evil in this way. It is Sesemann's similar
neglect of Plato's distinctionsthat accounts forhis formu-
lation (1912: 174 and 176): the notion of the spatial-
material principleas the source of all imperfectionmakes
evil a positive force,whereas the notionof soul (throughits
ignorance) as the cause precludesall positive realityof evil,
making it mere negation.
7Theaetetus 176 A 5-8. This statement concerningthe
contrarietyof good and evil was expanded into a theodicy
by the Stoics (Aulus Gellius, VII, i, 2-3 [S. Vy. II, frag.
1169], where Chrysippus also uses Phaedo 60 B-C); and
Plotinus (III, ii, 5, 25-32) employs this passage as an
appendix to a series of Stoical arguments,though he inter-
prets it in a non-Stoical fashion. Sesemann (1912: 183)
makes the passage say that "die Erhaltung des GLuten
fordertdaher auch notwendig die Erhaltung des B6sen,"
supposes this to mean that evil is not only necessary but
morallyjustified,and reads this conception into the Lysis,
the Timaeus, and the Laws. But the avA-yKt1 of Timaeus 48
A and the account of Laws 904 B-D refer,as will be shown,
to quite differentmatters; and Lysis 220 D-221 D is not
parallel either,forits subject is the reason forman's desire
of the good and it rejects the suggestionthat the abolition
of evil must involve the abolition of what is not evil (221
B-D). As for Theaetetus 176 A 5-8, the evils there in
question, since they are said not to exist in the divine
world and to be such as the soul can get free of, must be
of a kind that is peculiar to phenomena as such, something
implied in the nature of phenomenal existence and not in
the nature of good itself. Nor is the good to which this
evil is here said to be contrarythe ideal or absolute good;
it is the derivative good in the phenomenal world itself,as
is shown by the remark of Theodorus (176 A 3-4) which
motivates Socrates' reply. The "expansion" of the pas-
sage by the Stoics and by Sesemann is thereforeunwar-
ranted, at least as an interpretationof Plato's meaning.
(On this "expansion" and the Stoic paradox cf. also More
[1921: 235]).
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[PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.
combinationof the determinateand the inde-
terminate s for indeterminatenesscharacterizes
phenomenaas fallingshortof the completereality
of the ideas.9
Despite this negativeevil, this deficiencywhich
phenomenalexistenceas such implies,and despite
the admissionthatforman at least thereis more
of evil in this world than good,10Plato in his
mythof the creationdeclares that the Demiurge
fashionedthis universebecause he was good and
desired all thingsto be as nearlylike himselfin
thisrespectas possible.1" This mythexpressesin
the synthetic formof a cosmogonywhat is in fact
an analysisof the constitutive factorsof the utni-
verse whichfor Plato has neitherbeginningnor
end,,12an(l in the myththe Demniurge symbolizes
the factorof rationalcausation in this universe.
The Demiurge or god or gods or the class of
causes so syml)olizedor represented 13 is wholly
good and is responsibleonly for good; ' and the
cosmos fashioned b) this cause is rel)eatedlv (le-
claredto l)e good-good, thatis, as a wholeand as
good as is possibleconsideringthe conditionson
whichit can exist at all.11 Primaryamong these
conditionsis the natureof reflection or copy al-
ready nmenltione(l.The Demiurge does not create
eitherthe ideas or space. Both of these are un-
caused and uiltimiatefactors; 16 and the im-medliate
consequence of their existence, quite apart from
any (lemiuirgiccausation, is the reflection of the
immutable, non-spatial ideas in the unchanging
and honiogeneous mirror of space.17 It is these
spatial reflectionsupon which the demiturgicsection
8 Philebus 26 B 1-3 and 25 E -26 B generally.
I Cf. Philebus 16 D7 - E2 and Amer. Jour. IPhilbl.68:
233-234, 1947 with referencesibid., 234, n. 71.
10 Republic 379 C 4-5, Laws 906 A2 -B3 (cf. 0. Apelt,
Platons Gesetze2: 541, n. 82).
Timaeus 29 D)7-E3, 30 A 1-2.
12 Cf. Cherniss, 1944: 421-431.
13 Cf. Cherniss, 1944: 607-608 for the nature of the
Demiurge in the Timaeus, the nature of "cause" in the
Philebus, and Plato's use of "god" in the singular and
plural.
14Timaeus 29 El, 30 A6-7; Republic 379 B-C (cf. 617
E5 and Timaeus 42 D3-4); Laws 900 D2-3 and 900 E6-8.
Cf. the class of causes Qoat Juera 80O1 KaXcoV Kal a&ya0ov
67huy pTo' (Timaeus 46 E4).
1" The last sentence of the Timaeus (92 C4-9) solemnly
declares the goodness of the phenomenal universe. That
its goodness is limited,however, by the very conditions of
its existence is indicated by the restrictivequalificationsin
such passages as Timaeus 29 AS, 30 B5-6, 46 C8, 48 A2-5,
53 B5--6. That in many cases its partial aspects are good
only bynreferenceto the goodness of the whole is most
clearly expressed in Laws 903 B4-D3.
16 Timaeus 52 Al-4, 52 A8-B2 (cf. 51 A4-B2).
17Cf. Cherniss, 1944: 453-454.
VOL. 98, NO. 1, 1954] THE SOURCES OF EVIL ACCORDING TO PLATO 25

is broughtto bear,not to eliminatetheircharacter ever,nothingspatialor corporealcan be the cause

as reflections(for that is essentialto theirexist- of its own motion; and, since everysuch motion
ence) and so not to annul the negativeevil im- requiresas cause a motionbeyonditself,the ulti-
plicated in that characterbut by delimitingand matecause of all corporealmotionmustbe an in-
organizingthem to bring them nearer to con- corporealself-motion, whichhe identifies as soul.22
formitywith the ideas, which are at once their This is primarycausation,whereas the motions
originalsand themodelsof thisdemiurgicactivity. of corporealentitiesinduced by other corporeal
These reflections, however,as consequencesof entitiesin motionand themselvesinducingmotion
the mere existenceof space and the ideas, though in stillotherscan be onlysecondarycauses.23 Er-
theywouldbe confusedand indeterminate,18would raticor randommotionmusttherefore, as motion,
still be static; and what is reduced to order by have its primarysource in soul just as much as
the Demiurgeis said to have been not at restbut
in erraticmotion.19This precosmicalchaoticmo- the Demiurge organized it into a cosmos. All interpreta-
tions such as the foregoinglean heavily upon this passage
tionofthemythis an isolatedfactoroftheactually and upon the descriptionof precosmical chaos in Timaeus
existinguniverse,randomdisorderwhichis only 52 D-53 A, which they presume to be ultimate and unan-
for the most part made subservientto the pur- alysable. What is referredto in thispassage of the Politicus
poses of rational causation,for the phenomenal is undoubtedlythe same as the errantcause of the Timaeus
in operation; but the question is precisely whethererratic
cosmosis the resultof a combinationof intelligent motion is an essential and irreduciblecharacteristicof "cor-
causation and "Necessity" or the "errantcause" poreality" or is the resultant of "corporeality" and some
thatlimitsits effectiveness.20 This erraticor ran- other factor. In this connectionit should be remembered,
dom motionis, then,a sourceof evil differentfrom first,that "corporeality" itselfis not forPlato an ultimate,
datum (cf. Timceus 31 B) and, second, that
the mere derogationof reality inherentin the unanalysable
in the Politicus not only are the precosmical disorder and
natureof spatial reflection.The confusionof the the retrogrademotion mythical, i.e. factors of the actual
errantcause withspace to producea Platonicmat- phenomenal world isolated for the purpose of description,
terwhichof its own natureis in disorderlymotion but the retrogrademotion during the course of which this
is the chief reason why many interpreters have disorderfinallycomes again to predominanceis represented
as a reaction of the tension created by the motion which
contendedthat in the Tiinaveusat least matteris the Demiurge imposes upon the universe (Politicus 270 A;
the sourceof all evil.21 Accordingto Plato, how- see furthernote 44 infra).
A curious aspect of the interpretationsthat represent
18Since the spatial mirroris homogeneousand the ideas Platonic matteras thus self-movingis that they frequently
themselves are non-spatial, the reflectionsin space would representit at the same time as "non-being" and, since it
not be locally distinct; and the Demiurge is conceived as is the source of evil, representevil thereforeas somehow
delimitingthem by geometricalconfigurations,thus repre- non-existent. So Festugiere (1949: 129) says of what he
senting spatially the "logical" distinctness of their non- calls Platonic Xcopa-matter:"Sous un premier aspect, elle
spatial originals; cf. Timaeus 53 A8-B5. apparalt comme une transpositionphysique de la notion
19 Timaeus 30 A3-6. dialectique de l'Autre: elle est un non-etre relatif.
20 Timaeus 46 E3-6, 47E-48A, 56 C3-7, 68E-69A; cf. Sous un second aspect, etant mue spontanementde mouve-
Cherniss, 1944: 421-423 and 444. ments desordonne's. . , la xcopa matiere apparait comme
21 Vlastos (1939: 80-81): "Chaos . must, therefore, un principe autonome de desordre. . . ." Cf. Greene's
and forpurelymechanical reasons, be in constant motion." statements (1944: 305): "Ananke . . . is the negative
Festugiere (1946: 36, 40, 41) and most concisely in his substratum of phenomena" and (ibid.: 297) ". . . evil
later book (1949: 127): "la matiere n'est pas seulement is somehow mere nonexistence (,4' 6v), or better, is
limite a l'Ordre, elle se trouve etre par elle-meme cause otherness." In fact, Plato never suggests that evil is non-
positive de desordre en ce qu'elle est mue, spontanement, existence or "otherness"; and, far from calling space ,IA
de mouvements chaotiques." So Meldrum (1950: 66): o6 or oarepov he says rabrov abriv ae4 rpoop7nreov(Timaeus
"Novs strugglesto subdue a&aV&YKr7.. The Demiurge does his 50 B 6-7) and expresslyrefersto it as 6o 'ae (Timaeus 52
best with these materials and succeeds on the whole, but A 8). The notion that space is a "transposition" or mani-
to some extent they resist, and the evil of the world is festation of the idea of otherness or non-being is entirely
simply this element of disorder that survives fromchaos. without foundation. The existence of space is for Plato a
So matter, ro wlkaroe&es, is the KcaLKo7roLoV. In a noteon necessary inferencefromthe analysis of phenomenal proc-
thisstatementMeldrum adds (loc. cit.,n. 10): " 'Necessity' ess (Timaeus 49 A-51B), and in characterizingit as ,uer'
is a name for ro awmaroees, more preciselyfor the causal 4vauaro0crw3AWrroTvXoyauj3 rLvL v6Oa, ,oyis wrcorbv(Timaeus
powers of matter, for the alrlac, 6oat /wovwoefaac 4povo-c-ws ro 52 B2) he shows that he did not consider it to be a dialec-
TXvXovawraKrov eKcrore etep-y&zovrac (Timaeus 46 E)." The tical inferencefrom the nature of the ideas themselves.
term, ro aowjuaro&6esin this context is apparently a reminis- On Aristotle, Physics 192 A6-8, which is Zeller's "evi-
cence of the myth of the Politicus (273 B4-C2), where in dence" (1922: 726, n. 3 and 733) forassertingthat Platonic
the absence of the Demiurge the increasingdeviation of the matter is non-being,cf. Cherniss, 1944: 92-96.
cosmos fromhis instructionis charged to ro wliaroR6s r/s 22Phaedrus 245 C5-246 A2, Laws 894 B8-896 C4.
oVuYKpaOeCW and it is said that 6oa XaXeWra&
Kal cLKa ev obpavcp 23 Laws 895 B, 897 A; Timaeus 46 D5-E2; Phaedrus 245

-yVyVerac derive fromthe great disorderthat prevailed before C5-9.

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26 HAROLD CHERNISS
orderlymotionhas; to suppose that Plato in the
Timaeus meant to make it a characteristicof
corporealityper se is to assumethathe theretem-
porarilyforgotor abandoneda fundamental tenet
which he not only emphaticallymaintainedboth
beforeand afterwardsbut whichin factis implied
in the Timaeus itself.24
Mindfulof this and of Plato's explicit state-
mentsthat soul is the principleof all motionand
changein the phenomenalworld,25some interpre-
tershave concludedthatthe cause of the random,
disorderlymotionsmust be an irrationalelement
in thesoul thataccordingto the Timaeuspervades
the universe and moves the heavenly bodies,26
whileothershave ascribedthisdisorderto an evil
world-soul opposed to this world-soul of the
Timaeus and posited,theybelieve,in the Laws.27
The text of the Timaeus, however,excludes the
possibilityof an irrationalelementin the world-
soul there described,28 while the existenceof an
24 In the Timaeus the definitionof soul is omitted as is
all referenceto self-motionin the psychogoniabecause to
dwell upon it would have deprived the creation-mythof
all literaryplausibility (cf. Cherniss, 1944: 428-431, 455).
Despite this, however,37 B5 is meant to be a reminderof
the doctrine, for there soul is referredto (pace Cornford,
1937: 95, n. 2) by the phrase, "that which is moved by
itself,"as 37 C 3-5 plainly shows. Moreover, Timaeus 46
D-E in making all corporeal motion secondary to the pri-
mary causation of soul assumes the doctrine that soul is
self-motion,as is clear fromPhaedrus 245 C5-9 and Laws
895 B, 897 A, where this classification of primary and
secondary causation is presentedas a consequence of that
doctrine; it is consequently impossible to eliminate this
passage, as Owen (1953: 95) tries to do by suggestingthat
it "may well contain only the raw material" of the doctrine
of soul as self-motion. This doctrine,moreover,whatever
the relative chronologyof the Phaedrus and the Timaeus
may be, was certainlynot a "new development" of Plato's
thought when he wrote the Phaedrus (cf. Cherniss, 1944:
433-442); it is involved in the "finaldemonstration"of the
Phaedo, and the concept of self-motionitselfis at least as
early as the Charmides(168 E-169 A), a dialogue in which
it is explicitlyasserted that soul is the source of all good
and evil for the body (156 E).
25Phaedrus 245 C9, 246 B6-7 (cf. Laws 896 D1O-E2);
Laws 892 A5-7, 896 A5-B1.
26Cf. Robin, 1935: 228-229; Cornford, 1937: 176-177,
205-206, 209-210; Morrow, 1950: 162-163.
27 Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1919: 320-321. Dodds
(1947: 21), though rejectingthe notion that there is in the
Laws an evil soul in the sense of "the Devil," holds that
evil soul there and Necessity or the Errant Cause in the
Timaeus are "symbols" of the same thing, "irrationality,
the element both in man and in the KO7JflOSwhich is incom-
pletely mastered by a rational will."
28 The motion of the world-soul as a whole is called
"ceaseless and intelligentlife" (Timaeus 36 E). The Circle
of the Different,which is sometimes taken to symbolize
irrational motions in the world-soul (e.g. by Cornford,
1937: 76 and 208) has a constitutionidentical with that of
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[PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.
evil world-soulas its adversaryand the cause of
the chaoticmotionsis not even mentionedin the
Timtaeusand is certainlynot envisagedin thetext
of theLaws to whichits proponentsappeal.29
Nevertheless,Plato does categoricallydeclare
that soul is the cause of all good and evil in the
phenomenalworld.80 It is recognizedthat this
followsfromthe doctrinethatsoul is the cause of
all motionin this world; but the contentionthat
this is irreconcilablewith the accountof random
and chaoticmotionin the Timaeus as well as the
attemptsto reconcilethe two by ascribingthe
chaotic motionsto an irrationalelementin the
world-soulor to an evil world-soulopposed to it
both overlookthe fact that these random,disor-
derlymotionsare expresslyclassifiedas secondary
causes, whichas secondaryare to be regardedas
somehow dependentupon the primarycausality
of psychicalmotion31
It must firstbe observed,however,that some
evil has its immediatesourcein such psychicalmo-
tion, in other words that there are souls in the
universewhichproduceevil effectsbecause they
are themselvesevil.32 Soul is good or bad ac-
the Circle of the Same (Timaeus 35 B 2 ff.); and, since the
intermediate Being, Sameness, and Difference that are
blended to formthe soul are equally presentin all parts of it
and are all necessaryforits rational processes (Timaeus 35
A, 37 A2-C5), this constitutiveDifferencecannot be made
the cause of irrational motions (as is done e.g. by Robin,
1935: 228) withoutattributingthese motions to the rational
soul qua rational. Cf. Cherniss, 1944: 410, n. 339, and
446, n. 387; Meldrum, 1950: 67-68.
29 Laws 896 D10-E6, according to which we cannot say
that a single soul controls and inhabits all moving things
and so must control the heavens too but must assume at
least two, beneficentsoul and soul capable of the contrary.
What followsin 898 C and 899 B proves that this is meant
to assert the existencenot of two world-souls,one good and
the other evil, but of two kinds or aspects of soul (cf.
Phaedrus 246 B6-C6). The question at issue is which kind
of soul (7rorEpov4'vxrs-yevos [897 B7]) controls the circuit
of the heavens and the heavenly bodies; and, as the &pLTarl
PuXj of 897 C7 and 898 C4 means "the best kind of soul,"
SO 71 KatK of 897 DI and v barrTta of 898 C4-5 means "the
bad kind." It is not even asserted here that there is a
single good world-soul; on the contrary,in the conclusion
that soul which is the cause of the heavenly circuits must
be completely virtuous the question whether this kind
of soul is itselfone or more than one is expresslyleftopen
(898 C6-8, cf. 899 B5-6: Ux7'7 h' Xal 7ravTwv TOVT.wvalrlac).
In 904 A-E and 906 A-C there is no mentionof any good
or evil world-souleither but only of good and bad kinds of
soul (cf. 904 B2-3: o6ov ayaffi VtvXijs . . . To 6 KaKov)and a
pluralityof both kinds (cf. 904 E 5-7).
30 Laws 896 D5-8; cf. Charmides156 E 6-8.
31 Timaeus 46 D5-E6; cf. Laws 894E-895B, 896A-D.
32 E.g. Republic 353 E; Laws 904 B-E, 906 B. It is
not disorder in human affairsalone that is caused by evil
VOL. 98, NO. 1, 1954] THE SOURCES OF EVIL ACCORDING TO PLATO 27

cordingto its knowledgeor ignorance,for soul is What the ultimatecause of such erroris, why
self-motionthe mode or directionof which is soul shouldever lapse fromcompleteand accurate
determinedby its knowledge,exact or erroneous, knowledgeof the ideas, to thisquestionPlato can,
of the ideas and theirrelationsto one anotherand of course,give no adequate answer. He can only
which sets phenomenain motion in accordance clothe in mythicallanguage the assumptionthat
withthisknowledgeor ignorance.33Amongthese this is so 35 or argue that epistemologicalconsid-
objects of knowledgethere are, moreover,ideas erationsnecessitateand justifythe assumption.30
of certainphenomenalevils. Not of all, formuch But this assumptiongranted,it followsthatsoul,
of what we termevil is merelynegative,a phe- movingin ignoranceor forgetfulness of the true
nomenaldeficiency or deviationfromthe positive natureof the ideas and especiallyof the relation
idea imperfectly reflectedor imitated;but many obtainingbetweenany of them and the idea of
such termshave a positivecontenttoo and as such good, must cause evil in whateverpart of the
must referto real entitiesamong the ideas. Of phenomenalworld it affectsby its motion,for it
theselatter,however,manyagain,thoughideas of will misarrangethe reflections of realityand may
phenomenalevils,are not themselvesevil. Such, in its erroreven come to regardas real and take
forexample,are the ideas of diseases whichhave for the patternsof its action these spatial reflec-
constitutions of theirown like living organisms; tions themselvesinstead of theiroriginals.37 So
theseare as ideas no more evil thanare the ideas positiveevil in the world,bothabsoluteand rela-
of man, of wolf,or of lion, but the phenomenal tive,is producedby the misguidedmotionof evil
manifestations of all of thesemayby mutualinter- souls.38 These, since theymove in ignoranceof
ferencein this worldbe evils relativelyto one an-
(1923: 28) that, while ideas of evil appear in
other. Similarlysuch ideas as pleasure,pain, and statement
dialogues of "the middle period," this theory is criticized
desire are not as ideas evil either; but theirphe- in the Parmenidesand Sophistand that evil in the Philebus
nomenalmanifestations, thoughtheycan be good, and Timaeus "has a purelynegativeexistence." Parmenides
are frequently evil relativelyto the circumstances 130 C5-E4 far frombeing a criticismof such ideas empha-
Plato's refusal to breach the logic of his theory by
and degreeof theirmanifestation.Besides these, sizes
rejecting them, and the doctrine of the Sophist does not
however,there are positive vices; of these the eliminate such ideas so long as they have positivemeaning
logic of Plato's doctrinerequires that there be (cf. Cherniss, 1944; 265-266; Ross, 1951: 169). Like
ideas,and theexistenceof suchideas he always,in many others, Chilcott (ibid.: 28 and 29) feels that the
consistency withthatlogic,maintained. Yet even existence of such ideas is incompatible with Republic 509
B6-8, which he takes to mean that aroT ro &-yafovis "the
these are not of themselvescauses of evil in the source of all existence." In fact, however, that passage
phenomenalworld. They are manifestedas evil need mean no more than that the ideas are what they are
here only by soul which in ignorancemistakes and are rightlyknown as such only in the lightof the idea
theirtrue natureand theirrelationto the Good, of good. This would be hard to reconcile with the exist-
ence of the ideas of positive evils that Plato clearly does
just as desire,pleasure,and pain have evil mani- posit only if by it he had meant, as Chilcott and many
festationsin this world only when the mode and others under Neo-Platonic influenceassume, that all ideas
directionof psychicalmotion is determinedby are derived fromthe Good or are created by it; but this
errorconcerningtheirnature. the passage does not say, and that it was not so meant is
shown by the interpretativesummaryat 517 C3-5, where
it is said not that the idea of good is the source or origin
souls, as is sometimes asserted (cf. Festugiere, 1949: of the ideas but that in the intelligibleworld it provides
truthand intelligence(&Xt1OaavKal voOv). Cf. with this 508
110-111, 130); the evils produced by soul avoq crv-yyEvope.v17
include merely physical change and disorder, just as D4-6: when the soul fixes itself upon that which &X7O1a
Timaeus 48 A5 ff.and 57E-58C show that the effectsof TE Kal r6 6V illuminate, &6evo-ev Te Kal f'yvw av7o KaL vouv
the errant cause extend throughout the whole physical EXELv40alveraL.
universe. 35 As e.g. in Phaedrus 248 C5-8 and in Timaeus 41 D6-7,
33 Cf. Laws 896 E8-897 B5, where B1-4 gives the reason where the ingredientsof the immortal part of the human
for the good and the evil effectsof soul (cf. 898 B5-8). soul are said to be the same as those of the world-soul"but
Phaedrus 246 B6-C6 expresses the same notion in mythical no longer so pure."
language, the vision of the ideas being the nourishmentof 3 As in the Meno (85 B-86 B) where it is contended that
the soul's plumage (cf. 248 B5-C2). the soul "recollects" knowledge the source of which could
34 See forideas of diseases: Phaedo 105C and Timaeus 89 not have been sensible experience and which thereforeit
B-C; of desire: Philebus 34 E (cf. Aristotle, Topics 147 must have possessed outside of the sensible world and have
A5-11); of positive vices: Euthyphro5 D, Republic 402 C "forgotten"; cf.Phaedo 72 E-73 A, 74 A-76 E.
and 476 A, Theaetetus186 A8, Sophist 251 A, Laws 964 C. 37 Hence the tendency of evil souls "to cleave to the
On ideas of evil cf. Cherniss, 1944: 266, n. 175 (on p. 267) corporeal": cf. Phaedo 81 B-D (n.b. 81 B 3-8).
and for the opinions of later Platonists ibid.: 277, n. 176. 38 That this is true of relative evils in the second sense
The list of passages cited above refutesof itself Chilcott's above, e.g. evil desire,is obvious, fortheyare all manifested

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 28 HAROLD CHERNISS [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.

truth,do not intend as evil the evil that they organizingphenomenamovesthemwitha purpose
cause; 39 but the motionsthattheyinducedirectly perfectly good and sets themin motionproperto
in phenomenaare neverthelessinduced deliber- this end; but phenomenathus intentionally set in
atelyand consequentlycannotbe the randommo- motion,since theyare movedin a plenumof phe-
tions of the errantcause, for these are motions nomenal reflections, must by their motionsdis-
transmitted by an object whichhas itselfbeen set place other phenomena,which in turn displace
in motionby somethingelse and are distinguished stillothersin directionsunrelatedto the intention
as secondaryfromthe primarycausalityof soul.40 of soul in movingthe firstdirectly. These sec-
These random motionsof secondarycausality ondarymotions,as Plato calls them,the motions
must have theirultimatesource,however,in the of phenomenainducedby the movementof other
primarycausalityof psychicalself-motion;they phenomenaand necessarilymovingothersin turn,
do, in fact,followinevitablythe operationof this intelligentsoul in its demiurgicaction seeks to
primarycausality,whetherit be good or evil. employforits own good end by makingthemcon-
Consider the case of fully intelligentsoul, the formto the plan of organization. This it does
mode and directionof whose motionare in accord by inducingin thesesecondarymotionsan altera-
with its completeand constantknowledgeof the tion of direction,thuspersuadingthemto cooper-
ideas-the case, in short,of god or gods, forper- ate with its originalpurpose;43 but in so doing
fectlyvirtuoussoul,thatis fullyintelligent soul,is the demiurgicaction again indirectlysets ulp in
what Plato means by god.41 Soul of this kind in other phenomenaanother series of motionsun-
relatedto its intention,motionsthat are neither
only in soul as modes of its motion (cf. Laws 897 A 1-4), intelligentnor purposivebut accidental,random,
the resultof misjudgingthe true relation to the good of the
ideas of desire, pleasure, pain, etc. It is true, however,of
and erratic. This is the errantcause or necessity,
relative evils in the firstsense also, e.g. diseases that are whichreason can at best organize "for the most
natural organic units. These are, in the firstplace, evil part"becausetheveryact of organizingit begetsa
only in the mutual interferenceof theirphenomenal mani- randomresidue of motion. Hence there is dis-
festations,an interferencecaused by soul's maladministra-
tion of phenomena. Moreover, they are all living organ-
order which is the necessaryincidentalresult of
isms, and so their phenomenal manifestations,being ani- the action of soul-even of perfectly good soul-
mate, are directlycontrolledby soul; and Plato goes so far in delimitingand orderingthe confusedand in-
as to suggest that the phenomenal manifestationsof all (leterminatespatial reflectionsof reality. Evil
animate beings lower than man is the direct result of suc- souls, in their
cessively greater degrees of depravity of soul: cf. Phaedo
ignorancemistakingsuch disorder
81 E-82 A, Timaeus 91 D-92 C (cf. 42 C), Laws 903 for good, may augmentit; but the general flux
D3-E1 and 904 B6-E3; Republic 620 A-D and Phaedrus of phenomenais not attributableeitherto their
249 B imply the same notion. purposiveactionor to any spontaneousmotionin-
39 Laws 860 DI and the passages listed by Shorey ad loc.
herentin corporeality.As the Tinmaeus explains,
(1933: 640); cf. More, 1921: 243-261.
40 Timaeus 46 E1-2, Laws 897 A4-5. Cf. forthe follow- it is the complexof secondarymotionsproduced
ing account of the errant cause Cherniss, 1944: 446-450. incidentally by theperfectlyrationalworld-soulas
Morrow (1950: 153-154) holds that by "Necessity" in the it inducesdirectlythe rationalmotionof rotation
Timaeus Plato means the dependable natures at the dis- in the sphericalplenumof spatial figures,them-
posal of the Demiurge and the regularityof the effectsthat
they produce upon one another: "the world on which the
selves delimitedby reason.44
creator sets to work is characterized by necessity in the article, which I have there criticized (op. cit.: 606-608),
sense that specific effectsfollow regularly from specific Greene (1944: 292, n. 95; cf. 287, n. 50; 311 and n. 235)
causes." If this were true, Plato would hardly have goes so faras to write: "Plato does not say that eitherkind
described the mythical chaos on which the Demiurge sets of soul, good or evil, is a god." This is, in fact, just what
to work as KCPoi44evoP wrXrJuyeXC0S Kal ATaKTrWS (Timaeus 30 he does say in Laws 899 B5-8: "Since the causes of all
A4-5) and he certainlywould not have called necessityin these are soul or souls-and souls good in all virtue-, we
the sense in which he here uses it the 7rXavw1AEuvq acra shall say that they are gods. . . ." Virtuous soul is soul
(Timaeus 48 A6-7) or identifiedit with the secondary that has acquired intelligence (Laws 897 B 1-5 and 897
causes which To Tvxova'TaKTOv EKarTOTE E'Ep-ya'ovTaL (Timaeus B8-C2). In the Timaeus the work of the Demiurge is the
46 E5-6). This last passage, as Meldrum says (1950: 66, work of intelligence (Timaeus 47 E3-4, cf. Laws 966 E4),
n. 10 ad fin.), "forbidsus to interpretNecessity in termsof and the only entity that can have intelligence is soul
Regularity of Sequence or natural law." The nature of (Timaeus 46 D5-6); and Phaedrus 249 C5-6 (cf. 247 D1-5)
"errant" motion is well exemplifiedby the statement in states that god's divinityis the result of constant contem-
Timaeus 43 A7-B5: . . . alla be 'EfpOVO Kat OefpOV, warTE TO plation of the ideas.
.eZ' bXOv KLVEZrOaL ?cXoV, aTTKTWS JAniv Olr?1 TUXOL 7rpoLevaL KaL 42 Timaeus 68 E1-6, Laws 896 E8-897 B4 (cf. Timaeus
a)XoyWO . . Kal 7ravT7J KaTa ToUs t TlrO0S 7rXavw/Leva
7rpoPeLv 46 DL-E2).
For proofof this cf. Cherniss,1944: 602-610, especially
41 43 Timaeus 48 A2-5 and 56 C3-7.
606-609. Apparentlytunder the influenceof Hackforth's 14 Cf. Timaeus 57 D-58 C; forthe detailed interpretation

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VOL. 98, NO. 1, 1954] THE SOURCES OF EVIL ACCORDING TO PLATO 29

So, while all positive evil, both absolute and "problemof evil," and so it does if evil is a prob-
relative,in this world is caused directlyby soul lemto be solvedonlyby demonstration of its non-
movingits objects intentionally but in ignorance existence or by moral justificationof it as the
of truth,soul, whethervirtuousor evil, is also necessaryconditionfor the existence of good.46
unintentionally and indirectlythe source of evil Either of these "solutions"would have appeared
thatis necessarilyincidentalto its directinfluence to Plato to be an immoralfalsification of the data
upon phenomena,whereas the negative evil in- of experience. Evil, like otherphenomena,he re-
herent in the existence of the world as phe- garded as somethingto be explained,not to be
nomenalis only the obverseof its goodness as a explainedaway; and all his remarkson the sub-
reflection-though only a reflectionand therefore ject,whenread in the lightof thispurpose,cohere
a derogation-of perfectreality. The question to forma consistent accountof evil whichis a con-
concerningthe cause or source of evil is not the sequenceof his analysisof the phenomenalworld
same,however,as the questionof moralresponsi- as a movingreflection in space of immutable, non-
bility,with which it is oftenunconsciouslycon- spatial reality.
fused. This confusionalone explains, I believe,
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