STRICT LIABILITY

Strict liability crimes are crimes which require no proof of mens rea in relation to one or more aspects of
the actus reus. Strict liability offences are primarily regulatory offences aimed at businesses in relation to
health and safety. Also, many driving offences are crimes of strict liability e.g., speeding, driving without
insurance. The use of strict liability in criminal law is controversial as it means a person may be liable where
they are not at fault or have taken all reasonable care to ensure compliance of the law (See in particular Callow
v Tillstone). However, the harshness of strict liability in criminal law is generally tolerated as it brings practical
benefits and is often used to provide a greater level of protection to the public in areas where it is perceived
that there is a need to provide such protection.

As strict liability has the potential to create injustice and operate harshly there is a general presumption
that mens rea is required to impose criminal liability:

Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1

The appellant was a builder who had deviated from plans in the construction of a building. It was an offence
to deviate from the plans in a substantial way. The appellant accepted he had deviated from the plans but he
believed that the deviation was only minor rather than substantial.

Held:
The offence was one of strict liability and therefore his belief was irrelevant and his conviction upheld.

In determining whether an offence is one of strict liability there is a presumption that mens rea is required.

According to Gammon, this presumption may be rebutted where:

1. The crime is regulatory as opposed to a true crime; or

2. The crime is one of social concern; or

3. The wording of the Act indicates strict liability; or

4. The offence carries a small penalty.

There is some overlap with the categories in that where a crime is regulatory it is often one of social concern
and carries a small penalty.

The crime is regulatory as opposed to a true crime

Where the crime is regulatory as opposed to a true crime, the presumption of mens rea gives way to a finding
of strict liability. Conversely where there is a true crime the presumption of mens rea prevails. This was seen
in Sweet v Parsley where it was held that the offence in question was a true crime and therefore mens rea was
required.

Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132

A schoolteacher let her house out to students. The students were smoking cannabis in the house. She was
unaware of this activity. She was charged with an offence of being concerned with the management of
premises which were being used for the purposes of smoking cannabis contrary to s.5(6) of the Dangerous
Drugs Act 1965. The statute did not state any requirement of mens rea of the offence.

Held: The House of Lords looked at the common law before the statute was made. The common law required
knowledge of the activities in order to impose liability. Thus, the presumption that statutes do not change the
common law was applied in addition to the presumption that mens rea is required where the offence is a true
crime as oppose to a regulatory offence.

Examples of regulatory offences include healthy and safety regulations e.g., pollution and sale of unfit meat:

Alphacell v Woodward [1972] AC 824

The appellant factory owner was convicted of causing polluted matter to enter a river under the Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The offence related to an underground pipe which had become
disconnected due to a blockage. The appellant was unaware of the pollution and it was not alleged that they
had been negligent.

Held: As a matter of public policy the offence was one of strict liability and therefore the appeal was dismissed,
and the conviction upheld.

Per Lord Salmon:

"If this appeal succeeded and it were held to be the law that no conviction be obtained under the 1951 Act
unless the prosecution could discharge the often-impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused
intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and undeterred to the relief of
many riparian factory owners. As a result, many rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and
many rivers which are now clean would lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt recognised that as a
matter of public policy this would be most unfortunate. Hence s2(1)(a) which encourages riparian factory
owners not only to take reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to ensure that
they do not cause it."

Callow v Tillstone (1900) 64 JP 823

A butcher was convicted of selling unfit meat despite the fact that he had had the meat certified as safe by a
vet before the sale. His conviction was upheld as the offence was one of strict liability and it mattered not how
diligent he had been to ensure the safety of the meat.

It was thought that there existed a rule on age related offences, i.e., that strict liability applied in relation to
the age and that it was no defence if the person held a reasonable belief that the person was over the
specified age:

R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154

The appellant was charged with taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of her
father contrary to s.55 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He knew that the girl was in the custody
of her father, but he believed on reasonable grounds that the girl was aged 18.

Held: His conviction was upheld. The offence was one of strict liability as to age and therefore his reasonable
belief was no defence.

However, this was later held not to apply and if any such rule did exist, it did not survive the decision in Sweet
v Parsley in relation to true crimes. See:

B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428

A boy aged 14 was charged with an offence of inciting a child under 14 to commit an act of gross indecency,
contrary to section 1(1) of the Indecency with Children Act 1960. He had sat next to a 13-year-old girl on a
bus and repeatedly asked her to perform oral sex with him. She refused. The boy believed the girl was over 14.
The question for the court was whether the offence under s.1(1) was of strict liability in relation to the age of
the victim.
The House of Lords held that R v Prince did not lay down a rule that all offences relating to age of the victim
were outside consideration of the general presumption in favour of mens rea. Moreover, the law had moved on
since this decision favouring an honest belief of the defendant which was not dependent upon the belief being
reasonable. Where a charge was a true crime of gravity, the stronger the presumption of mens rea. The
defendant's conviction was quashed.

R v K [2001] UKHL 41
K, a 26-year-old man, was charged under s.14(1) Sexual Offences Act 1956 with indecent assault on a girl of
14. His defence was that the sexual activity was consensual and that she had told him she was 16 and that he
had had no reason to disbelieve her. The trial judge ruled that the prosecution had to prove an absence of
genuine belief that the victim was aged 16 or over. In so ruling the judge relied on the decision of the House of
Lords in B (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428. The prosecution appealed against that
ruling. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that such absence of genuine belief did not have to be
proved. The Court of Appeal certified the following points of law of general public importance:

"(a) Is a defendant entitled to be acquitted of the offence of indecent assault on a complainant under
the age of 16 years, contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, if he may hold an
honest belief that the complainant in question was aged 16 years or over?
(b) If yes, must the belief be held on reasonable grounds?"

Held: The appeal was allowed. A defendant is entitled to be acquitted of sexual assault under s.14(1)
if he has an honest belief that the girl was over 16. There is no requirement that the defendant had
reasonable grounds for his belief. Affirmed the principle established in B v DPP that R v Prince did not
set any rule relating to age related crimes and even if it had, it had not survived the ruling in Sweet v
Parsley that there exists a presumption of mens rea.

The crime is one of social concern

Where the crime is one of social concern then the presumption of mens rea may be rebutted. This is based on
the assumption that strict liability imposes higher standards of care and provides greater levels of protection
to the public. Examples of offences of social concern include driving offences e.g. R v Williams [2011] 1 WLR
588 and health and safety regulations. See Alphacell v Woodward and Callow v Tillstone above.

The wording of the Act indicates strict liability

The presumption of mens rea is rebutted by express provision in the statute excluding the requirement
of mens rea. Where the statute is silent as to the requirement the general presumption remains, however, the
courts may look at other offences created under the same Act. If the other offences expressly require mens
rea, the courts may well take the view that the omission to refer to such a requirement was deliberate and
that Parliament intended to create an offence of strict liability. This approach was taken in the following cases:

PSGB v Storkwain Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 635

The appellant, a pharmacist was convicted of an offence under s.58(2) of the Medicines Act 1968 of supplying
prescription drugs without a prescription given by an appropriate medical practitioner. The appellant had
allowed prescription drugs to be supplied on production of fraudulent prescriptions whereby a doctor’s
signature had been copied. The appellant was not party to the fraud and had no knowledge of the forged
signatures and believed the prescriptions were genuine.

Held:
The offence was one of strict liability and the conviction was upheld. The House of Lords looked at other
sections of the Medicines Act 1968 and found that some sections referred to a requirement of mens
rea whereas other sections did not. They concluded that the omission to refer to mens rea in s.58 must
therefore have been deliberate and so the presumption of mens rea was rebutted.

Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully selling alcohol to an intoxicated person under s.13 Licensing Act
1872. The appellant appealed on the grounds that he unaware of the customer's drunkenness.

Held: Appeal dismissed, and conviction was upheld.

S.13 was silent as to mens rea, whereas other offences under the same Act expressly required proof of
knowledge on the part of the defendant. It was therefore taken that the omission to refer to mens rea was
deliberate and the offence was one of strict liability.

Stephen J:
"Here, as I have already pointed out, the object of this part of the Act is to prevent the sale of intoxicating
liquor to drunken persons, and it is perfectly natural to carry that out by throwing on the publican the
responsibility of determining whether the person supplied comes within that category."

However, a different approach was taken in the following case in which the court was considering the same
statute which applied in Cundy:

Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918

The defendant was convicted of selling alcohol to a police officer whilst on duty under to s.16(2) Licensing Act
1872. It was customary for police officers to wear an armlet whilst on duty, but this constable had removed
his. The appellant therefore believed he was off duty. The statute was silent as to the question of whether
knowledge was required for the offence. He was convicted and appealed contending that knowledge that the
officer was on duty was a requirement of the offence.

Held: The appeal was allowed, and his conviction was quashed.

Wright J:
"There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an
essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the
statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals . . .It is plain that if guilty knowledge
is not necessary, no care on the part of the publican could save him from a conviction under section 16,
subsection (2), since it would be as easy for the constable to deny that he was on duty when asked, or to
produce a forged permission from his superior officer, as to remove his armlet before entering the public
house. I am, therefore, of opinion that this conviction ought to be quashed."

The offence carries a small penalty

Generally, where an offence carries a small penalty, this will indicate that it is not a true crime and therefore
one of strict liability. For example in the case of Williams [2011] 1 WLR 588 the offence of causing death by
driving without a licence was considered to be one of strict liability as the penalty was max 2 years
imprisonment whereas the offence of causing death be reckless driving carried a max sentence of 14 years.

However, just because an offence carries a heavy penalty does not mean that it is one requiring mens rea:

R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154

R v Howells [1977] 3 All ER 417

The appellant bought a revolver believing it to be an antique firearm manufactured in 1860 or 1870. No
firearm licence is required for such antique firearms. In fact, the gun turned out to be a fake and therefore
required a licence. He was convicted of possession of a firearm without a licence under s.1(1)(a) Firearms Act
1968 and appealed on the grounds that he had an honest and genuine belief that the gun was an antique.
Held: His appeal was dismissed and his conviction upheld. The offence was one of strict liability. His belief was
therefore irrelevant.

Arguments (or reasons) for Allowing Strict Liability

Protection of the public

Strict liability raises standards where the health and safety of the public is at stake and forces those in a
position of responsibility to take extra precautions.

For example:
Sale of unfit meat - Callow v Tillstone
Pollution - Alphacell v Woodward
Possession of firearms - R v Howells
Dangerous buildings - Gammon
Driving offences

Promoting enforcement of the law

Strict liability ensures more convictions are secured and does not allow people to escape liability through a
fabricated account of their state of mind.
Deterrence/raising standards
It is often argued that imposing strict liability will lead to people taking more care and act as a deterrent to
others.

Easier to Administer
The majority of strict liability offences are dealt with administratively often through the post without the need
for a court hearing. Other agencies of enforcement may be involved such as the Health and Safety Executive
and Environmental Agencies. If mens rea was required to prove in every case for such offences, the courts
would be unable to cope with the workload.

Arguments Against Strict Liability

Injustice
A person may be liable where they are not at fault and have exercised all reasonable care. This offends the
natural sense of justice as illustrated in the following cases:

Callow v Tillstone - The butcher was liable despite doing everything possible to have the meat checked out.

R v Howells - The defendant was liable despite being unaware that he required a licence and had no intention to
use the gun as a weapon

PSGB v Storkwain - The pharmacist had a genuine belief the prescription was valid.

Strict liability does not necessarily act as a deterrent

In order to act as a deterrent, a person must have knowledge of what they are doing is wrong before being
able to take steps to prevent it. In many cases the defendant is unaware of the circumstances leading to
liability – see Callow v Tillstone, Alphacell v Woodward, PSGB v Storkwain.

Also speeding, which is arguably a crime which is committed more than any other, is one of strict liability. If
strict liability was an effective deterrent, then we would have no speeding cars on the roads.

Stigma
Any criminal offence carries a stigma and needs to be declared for employment purposes. It can cause
immense damage to a person's or a business' reputation and therefore proof of fault should always be a
requirement in establishing criminal liability.