International law and use of drones

5.1 International Law

Submitted by:
AARYA KHOPKAR
UID No. UG2021-01
BA.LL. B (HONS.)
SEMESTER V

Submitted to:
Prof. Abhirup Das
(Assistant professor of law)

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Sr. No Table of content Page No.

1. Introduction 3

2. Research methodology 3

3. Research objective 4

4. Research question 4

5. The Applicable Legal Frameworks and their Interplay in the Context of 4

Armed Drone Operations

6. The Law Relating to the Use of Force on Foreign Territory 5

7. The Complex Dynamics of Consent in the Context of Inter-State Use of 6

Armed Drones

8. The Complexities of Self-Defence in the Context of Armed Drone 7

Operations on Foreign Territory

9. IHL 9

10. IHRL 10

11. Application of Human Rights in War 11

12. Extraterritorial Application of the Right to Life 11

13. Conclusion 12

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Introduction
The advent of manned aircraft like planes and helicopters followed balloon reconnaissance in
aerial warfare. UAVs or drones are the most recent and transformative airborne attack
development. Drones enable long-distance aerial warfare, revolutionising military operations.
Drone technology began as surveillance, like balloons. When the US deployed drones with
missiles in Afghanistan in 2001, the shift was crucial. Over forty nations had drones by the
mid-2010s, many of which could launch deadly precision strikes.
Weaponizing drones, like all military technology, must be checked for compliance with
international law. As states develop new lethal force methods, the international community
must address complex legal issues surrounding autonomous robotic systems, nano- and
biotechnology. Armed drones, or UAVs, have become operational, offering strategic
advantages by allowing the deployment of deadly force against remote targets without
exposing one's own forces to immediate risks1.
Over the past decade, many states have used unmanned systems, especially drones, for
military operations. The US had over 20,000 unmanned systems by 2013. Drones are used in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Gaza, and Syria by the UK, USA, Israel,
and NATO. Pakistan, Iraq, and Nigeria have used drones in their territories, raising ethical
and legal concerns.
Drones persist despite controversies. Drones and other unmanned systems will change
warfare. Drones are not illegal weapons, but international lethal force laws are not universally
applied. This article examines the intersection of ius ad bellum, international humanitarian
law, and international human rights law in drone warfare to clarify these ambiguities.
As drone technology advances, they will become more sophisticated, smaller, and affordable,
making them accessible to more states and non-state actors. Growing technological expertise
worldwide raises the possibility of armed drones on battlefields and in domestic law
enforcement, challenging the consensus on their use.
Expanding drone use makes cross-border targeted killings easier, potentially undermining
state sovereignty. Concerns about prolonged applications of force with few geographical or
temporal boundaries challenge the idea that war is rare and limited. International
humanitarian law, designed for wartime, provides less protection than international human
rights law, which could have serious consequences for the right to life if armed conflict is
normalised.

Research Methodology
the research project employed the doctrinal method to delve into the intricate landscape of
international law and the use of drones. In this scholarly endeavour, the study relied on
secondary data sources, meticulously examining various books and records that contribute to
the discourse on the subject. Through a diligent analysis of different facets of the issue, the
1
For basic technical information on drones, see Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and
Conflict in the 21st Century (2009)

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research aims to furnish valuable insights for the overarching theme of international law and
drone utilization.
To ensure the integrity of the research, the author conscientiously cleared their mind of
inclinations, biases, and preconceived notions. Recognizing that such predispositions can
impede the objective understanding and flow of a research subject, the researcher approached
the project with a commitment to impartiality.

Research Objective
The core objective of this research paper is to dissect the legal intricacies surrounding the
deployment of armed drones under international law. This study concentrates on evaluating
the compatibility of drone use with established international legal frameworks. Specifically,
the analysis encompasses pertinent principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL).
The study zeroes in on delineating the legal norms that govern armed drone strikes,
emphasizing the importance of upholding the right to life and maintaining international
peace. By scrutinizing relevant legal provisions and contextualizing them within the evolving
landscape of drone warfare, the research seeks to contribute to a nuanced understanding of
the legal challenges and imperatives associated with the use of drones on the global stage.

Research Question
"How does the evolving landscape of armed drone usage align with established norms and
principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law
(IHRL), and what are the implications for the protection of the right to life and the
maintenance of international peace?"

The Applicable Legal Frameworks and their Interplay in the Context of Armed Drone
Operations
There are many areas of international law that affect the issue of whether or not armed drones
are legal. Each has its own effect on the delicate balance between state security needs and
protecting individual rights, especially the right to life. International humanitarian law (IHL)
and international human rights law (IHRL) are at the centre of this legal discussion. These are
two important frameworks that directly affect whether drone operations are legal. At the same
time, the law that governs the use of force between states, called ius ad bellum, is a key factor
that determines whether actions carried out by an armed drone by one state inside the
territory of another state are legal.
The ius ad bellum protects the right to life on top of other rights, but its main goal is to
protect state sovereignty. In a strange way, protecting state sovereignty and territorial
integrity, which is sometimes seen as something that gets in the way of protecting human
rights, becomes important when it comes to protecting people from the effects of lethal force,
especially now that we have armed drones. With this legal foundation in place, armed

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conflicts will not get worse and will be less dangerous, which will help reach the main goal of
protecting human life2.
IHL and IHRL, on the other hand, are not the same as ius ad bellum. They focus on specifics
of drone strikes, like how they are carried out, who they are against, and what happens
afterward. Even though they are different, all three sets of laws are deeply linked when it
comes to the cross-border use of deadly force. When it comes to international security and
protecting the right to life, everyone agrees that using force should only be done as a last
resort.
A comprehensive approach is necessary to fully judge the legality of a certain drone strike. It
is necessary to follow the rules of all three international legal systems that apply: ius ad
bellum, IHL, and IHRL. Even if a drone strike meets the requirements of ius ad bellum, it
may still be against IHL and IHRL, making it illegal under international law. On the other
hand, even if a drone strike seems to be legal under IHL and IHRL, it is still illegal because it
does not meet the requirements for legal force under ius ad bellum. This means that the state
is responsible.
Situations involving a state's self-defense actions show how important this all-around
approach is. A valid claim under Article 51 of the UN Charter may allow a state to use armed
force on the territory of another state in response to an armed attack. However, this claim
does not excuse the state from following IHL and IHRL rules that protect the right to life of
those being targeted. The International Law Commission (ILC) makes it clear that self-
defense does not make actions that violate IHL or IHRL obligations right3.
In the same way, if a state agrees to the use of force on its territory, that state is still required
to follow IHRL and IHL rules. We owe these duties not just to each other, but to every state
that is a party to the relevant treaty or, in the case of customary international law, to all states.
In addition, IHRL and some IHL obligations are directly owed to people who have the right
to be protected. This means that a state cannot agree for another state to violate these people's
rights.
When it comes to the use of drones, each of the three legal systems—ius ad bellum, IHL, and
IHRL—needs its own attention. This in-depth look at all of these legal systems aims to help
us understand the bigger picture of the law by looking at each one separately and trying to
make sense of how they work together in the complicated world of armed drone operations.

The Law Relating to the Use of Force on Foreign Territory

We explore the domain of ius ad bellum, the legal structure that regulates the use of force
between states, and its critical significance with regard to the utilisation of armed drones.
When one state employs unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to target individuals located in
another state, strict adherence to the regulations governing the use of force between states
becomes of the utmost importance. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International

2
M Milanovic, Drones and Targeted Killing: Can Self-Defense Preclude their Wrongfulness? EJIL: Talk! (10
January 2010)
3
M Milanovic, Drones and Targeted Killing: Can Self-Defense Preclude their Wrongfulness? EJIL: Talk! (10
January 2010)

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Human Rights Law (IHRL) pertain more specifically to the protection of individuals
impacted by drone strikes. In contrast, the legal framework governing the application of inter-
State force revolves around the concept of State sovereignty. Its function is to safeguard the
legal rights of states, which includes the state's interest and right to protect its citizens and
inhabitants from aggressive acts. The indirect contribution of this legal framework to life
protection is significant, as it serves to restrict the geographical dissemination of conflict.
Central to this legal framework are customary international law and Article 2.4 of the United
Nations Charter, which both expressly forbid the use or threat of force between states.
However, it is possible for a State to grant consent to another State's use of force on its
territory, thus avoiding the consequences outlined in Article 2(4) The prohibition against
withheld consent is subject to two exceptions as delineated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The first is when the action is lawfully performed in self-defence, as defined in Article 51; the
second is when enforcement action is authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. In light of the fact that disputes frequently arise in these particular
domains, an examination of consent and self-defence will be undertaken simultaneously,
elucidating their relevance to the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles by states operating
outside their territorial boundaries.

The Complex Dynamics of Consent in the Context of Inter-State Use of Armed Drones
In the complex domain of interstate force, the notion of consent arises as a pivotal element
that has the potential to either validate or contest the lawfulness of armed drone operations.
When a territorial state authorises another state to utilise drones to target non-state actors
within its borders, at first glance, there should be no ius ad bellum concern, as this does not
violate Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter. This phenomenon has been observed in
cases where the United States subsequently used consent initially granted by Pakistan,
Somalia, and Yemen to legitimise drone operations conducted within their respective
territories. Nevertheless, the intricacies associated with the concept of consent pose
significant obstacles, thereby classifying it as a multifaceted facet of international law.
Although consent may seem like a simple criterion for classifying a specific drone strike as
ius ad bellum, there are numerous practical challenges that arise in this regard. Concerning
matters of considerable complexity, the complexities include who has the power to grant
consent, whether consent ought to be explicit or can be implicit, and circumstances in which
coercion could invalidate consent.
State sovereignty dictates that the prohibition on the use of force is fundamentally such that
valid consent can only be granted by the highest authorities of a state. This authority cannot
be generalised in accordance with the secondary rules on state responsibility via the concept
of attribution. The International Law Commission clarifies that consent must emanate from
the highest levels of government and emphasises that not all government agencies have the
authority to grant consent.
The identification of the domestic authority with the authority to grant consent requires a
complex analysis of the relationship between domestic and international law. Although the
prohibition on the use of force emphasises the importance of obtaining consent at the highest
echelons of government, the level of accountability delegated to lower-level officials may be

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influenced by domestic circumstances. However, when there is a disagreement between
officials at higher and lower levels, international law presumes that the opinion of the higher-
level officials should take precedence.
A further stratum of intricacy is introduced by the matter of publicity and consent. Although
there is no explicit mandate for consent to be disclosed publicly, it is vital that the involved
states have a clear understanding of the parameters governing the granting of consent. Certain
procedures must be followed and prior consent must be obtained in order to establish its
validity. It must be expressed explicitly by the state, freely given, and not presumed. Consent
may be invalidated through the use of coercion, fraud, error, or fraud; this is consistent with
the principles that govern the validity of consent to treaties4.
Significantly, consent cannot be inferred regarding a matter as grave as the application of
force. The use of force in excess of the boundaries of the consent that was granted is
considered a breach of Article 2(4) In addition, it is a requirement of international law that
states engaged in targeted operations abstain from any additional actions once consent has
been withdrawn, unless there is an alternative rationale for employing force5.

The Complexities of Self-Defence in the Context of Armed Drone Operations on Foreign

Territory
The commencement of a drone strike on the territory of another state without consent
constitutes the invocation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which requires the
use of exceptions within the charter to justify the action. States that utilise drones in such
situations typically cite the presumption of self-defence. However, the application of force in
self-defence is subject to strict regulations under international law, which introduces
intricacies that necessitate meticulous examination.
A state may invoke self-defence in accordance with customary international law and Article
51 of the United Nations Charter when justifying the use of force against individuals on the
territory of another state in response to an imminent threat of armed attack. As per the
clarification provided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in order for an action to be
classified as a "armed attack," it must satisfy specific criteria regarding magnitude and
consequences. Therefore, only grave uses of force satisfy the criterion that a response in self-
defence is justified when force is employed against a state.
Customary international law stipulates that a state asserting self-defence must satisfy the dual
criteria of proportionality and necessity, in addition to the requirement of an armed attack.
The aforementioned criteria, which are situated within the framework of ius ad bellum, are
closely intertwined with the fundamental objective of self-defence. The principle of necessity
and proportionality dictates that self-defence ought to be aimed at preventing and repelling an
attack, rather than retaliating or punishing. As a result, self-defence measures, including the
targeting of individuals in the territory of another state with drones, must be proportionate
and essential to preventing and repelling an armed assault.
4
Byrne, M, ‘Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘‘Intervention by Invitation’’ as a Basis for US
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen’ (2016)
5
Byrne, M, ‘Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘‘Intervention by Invitation’’ as a Basis for US
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen’ (2016)

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The boundaries of the right to self-defence are additionally delineated by the requirements of
proportionality and necessity. This right must be proportionate to the objective of halting or
repelling an armed assault and shall only persist for that period of time. By mandating
absolute destruction of the enemy prior to state action, international law prevents states from
engaging in perpetual warfare. Therefore, even when drones are being utilised for self-
defence purposes, care must be taken to ensure that the intended audience is sufficiently
disoriented to cease presenting an immediate or imminent danger.
The notion of 'imminence' introduces a contentious aspect that carries substantial importance
in relation to the internationally employed armed drones. In addition to acknowledging the
right to defend oneself in the event of "an armed attack," Article 51 classifies self-defence as
a "inherent" state right. This has sparked discussions regarding the legitimacy of self-defence
measures taken prior to an actual armed assault. However, established customary
international law stipulates that states are permitted to engage in military action when an
imminent threat of attack cannot be deterred by alternative means, the action taken is
proportionate, and no alternative means are available.
Anticipatory self-defences, which entails the use of force to avert a potential future danger, is
only permissible when prompted by an existing threat and cannot be implemented pre-
emptively. Self-defence must be an immediate, overwhelming necessity that leaves no
alternative but to take action, necessitating a split second of consideration. Although some
acknowledge the concept of anticipatory self-defences, it is widely rejected by the academic
community and endorsed by state practises due to its restricted scope.
Significantly, the imminence criterion in International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is distinct
from the stipulation outlined in Article 51 of the law governing the use of force on foreign
territory. The IHRL stipulates that the use of intentional lethal force is limited to the
protection of life, whereas Article 51 defines imminence as applicable to anticipatory self-
defences. The necessity for distinct evaluations of the legality of drone strikes within each
domain of international law underscores the primary focus of this article.
An additional subject of dispute pertains to self-defences operations conducted by a foreign
nation against non-state actors who are not acting on behalf of said nation. Historically, the
use of force in self-defence against non-state actors whose actions cannot be attributed to a
nation-state has been a contentious issue. Initially rejected by the International Court of
Justice, state practise shifted in the aftermath of 9/11. Resolutions 1368 and 1373
acknowledged the intrinsic right to self-defense, implying that a sovereign state may employ
coercive measures against non-state entities not attributable to the territorial state in self-
defense on the territory of another sovereign state.
However, the ICJ implied that interstate force against a non-state actor could not be used in
self-defense. Although extensive state practise since 2001 suggests a change in the law
despite academic controversy, adherence to customary international law requirements
remains necessary. Force must be proportionate and necessary, particularly in situations
where the territorial state lacks the capability or desire to avert attacks. The requirement of
incapacity or unwillingness is an element of the necessity criterion and not a distinct legal
standard.

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The UN Charter stipulates in Article 51 that self-defence measures must be reported to the
UN Security Council, with an emphasis on justification and transparency with regard to the
international community. While non-compliance with reporting requirements does not
invalidate lawful actions, it could potentially reveal the state's stance on self-defence. Self-
defence remains a legitimate course of action until the Security Council implements measures
to preserve global peace and security. The purpose of this reporting obligation is to safeguard
the legal rights of sovereignty and maintain a continuous rationale for the application of
force. The dynamic nature of the legal environment necessitates meticulous examination and
evaluation in the context of international law.

International humanitarian law

"International Law and the Use of Drones," once a non-international armed conflict is
declared, relevant IHL rules are applied to determine permissible targets. Non-international
armed conflict law is less settled than international armed conflict law.
The distinction principle in treaty and customary law states that civilians cannot be targeted
unless they are directly involved in hostilities. Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH)
remains a key targeting rule under IHL. The presumption favours civilian protection when an
individual's civilian status or hostilities are unclear.
However, the treaty rules governing non-international armed conflict do not define 'civilian',
sparking debates on whether non-state armed groups can be targeted solely based on their
status, like combatants in international armed conflicts. In its Interpretive Guidance on Direct
Participation in Hostilities, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines
civilians protected from direct attack in a non-international armed conflict as those outside a
state's armed forces and organised armed groups whose 'continuous combat function' involves
direct hostilities.
A drone strike targeting an individual with a continuous combat function in an organised
armed group engaged in a non-international armed conflict follows IHL's principle of
distinction. Participants in a non-state party's general war effort who recruit, train, finance, or
propagandise remain civilian unless directly involved in hostilities.
Conduct-based targeting is an addition to status-based targeting. When civilians directly
participate in war, they lose immunity. Direct participation is determined by the act's negative
impact on military operations, direct causation, and a specific design to benefit one party to
the conflict, according to the ICRC's three-stage cumulative test.
For direct participation, the civilian's actions must directly harm. Though criticised for
lacking a treaty law basis, the ICRC's 'continuous combat function' concept provides an
objective basis for identifying legitimate targets harming belligerents or civilians. Recent
state practises, especially drone attacks, match the ICRC's approach.
Critics of the 'continuous combat function' test say it favours non-state groups over state
forces. The broad functions of regular armed forces make parity with organised armed groups
difficult, requiring criteria for identifying non-state group membership.

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Making sure wartime targets are legitimate is difficult. Group membership tests without
objective evidence may increase civilian casualties or erode public confidence. Group
membership or direct hostilities must be proven by objective evidence. Drones' unique
surveillance capabilities require extra caution in determining civilian status and direct
participation.
Individual traits or activities may indicate membership or direct participation. 'Signatures'
like uniforms or insignias are legal but must be relevant and provide high confidence that
legal criteria are met. Even in terrorist hotspots, presence or possession of arms does not
disprove civilian status.
Disclosure of threat assessments by states before targeting in armed conflict improves target
protection. However, accurate international or non-international conflict classification is
crucial. Finally, proportionality, the second cardinal rule of IHL targeting, must be followed
to ensure that the anticipated military advantage justifies any civilian loss or damage.
Drones from the sky impose war on communities. Drone strikes are legal within IHL, but
their potential impact on civilians requires strict adherence to principles, especially when they
reach unsuspecting populations outside combat zones. In densely populated areas, minimum
harm and civilian lives require rigorous precautionary measures and information gathering
about potential casualties and military gains, making IHL rules even more important.

International humanitarian right law

Examining the legality of armed drones under international law requires a thorough
understanding of international human rights law. The right to life, sometimes referred to as
the "supreme right," is safeguarded by customary international law and international and
regional human rights accords. Certain infringements on this entitlement are classified as
crimes against humanity or war crimes. Beyond times of peace, both international and non-
international armed conflicts are covered by IHRL. The protection of victims of drone strikes
is based on the human rights law's inalienable right to life.
Non-arbitrary life deprivation is required by international human rights law. The non-
arbitrariness norm, which establishes the right to life, is interpreted by human rights
jurisprudence to mandate the use of purposeful lethal force only in extreme cases, when no
other measures are available to preserve life. UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials Principle 9 mandates the deliberate use of fatal force
in order to defend human life. Rather than outlawing the taking of life without cause, Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) lays forth a number of justifications
for the use of deadly force.
Force must be essential in IHRL, which means it is the least damaging method of life
protection. Try alternative approaches before resorting to force; facts establish necessity.
Additionally, force needs to be proportionate, balancing injury against appropriate protection.
The proportionality of international humanitarian law must be distinguished from that of
human rights law. Intentional or possibly fatal use of lethal force is only permitted in IHRL to
avert an immediate threat to life. Lethal force may only be used by the police in situations

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where there is no other option for detaining the suspect and they are clearly going to kill
them.
Precautions must also be taken by IHRL to avoid using force wherever feasible. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held in McCann and others v UK that the
assassination of Provisional Irish Republican Army members by State agents violated their
right to life since they could have been detained in Gibraltar.
Application of Human Rights in War
Both international humanitarian law and international human rights law apply in the complex
realm of armed conflict. Numerous ICJ decisions have affirmed this consensus. Certain
human rights treaties have derogation clauses that uphold the universal applicability of those
responsibilities during armed conflict. During times of national emergency or war, state
parties may exempt themselves from some human rights duties, but these obligations
nonetheless apply to people in armed conflicts. With the exception of the ECHR, most human
rights treaties guarantee the unalienable right to life.
IHRL and IHL govern drone strikes during armed conflicts. In these situations, IHRL's right
to life norm might coincide with IHL's hostilities regulations. According to the ICJ, although
the right to life endures in times of armed conflict, establishing whether or not there has been
an arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of the ICCPR relies on the specifics and should be
assessed in accordance with IHL's hostilities regulations. Whether a drone strike that targets a
person in an armed conflict complies with IHL regulations determines whether it is legal.
In contrast to other treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) specifies the
grounds for deprivation rather than alluding to arbitrarily taking a person's life. Consequently,
this provision's IHL rules are less interpretable than those found in the ICCPR and ACHR.
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the right not to be deprived of liberty
under Article 5 of the ECHR using IHL regulations on detention in international armed
conflicts, notwithstanding the absence of anything about arbitrary deprivation. Using a
similar methodology, the European Court might apply IHL regulations to the right to life.
States may depart from this clause "in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war,"
according to Article 15(2) ECHR, and may, where needed, use more lenient IHL regulations.
Drone strikes that occur outside of armed conflict are not covered under IHL. In certain
situations, human rights jurisprudence is applied to interpret a State's obligations under the
law, albeit with consideration for the surrounding circumstances. Within certain bounds, this
interpretation's arbitrariness standard has useful uses. IHRL regulations are broken by the
notion that a person's prior involvement in attack preparation justifies targeting them in the
absence of concrete evidence of an imminent threat.
The state's culpability for drones is the main topic of discussion. But the host condition of the
drone needs to be taken into account. States cannot at first agree to violations of IHL or
IHRL. Even if a state permits other states to operate on its territory, it nevertheless has an
obligation to protect the right to life within its borders to the greatest extent feasible.

Extraterritorial Application of the Right to Life

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One important concern that arises when states use deadly drones against foreigners is whether
human rights treaties can hold them responsible. It was previously emphasised that the
customary ban against arbitrary deprivation of life is a right to life. Everyone has the right to
life, as established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The negative duty to
refrain from taking someone's life without cause doesn't seem to be limited by a place.
Human rights treaties may occasionally bind states even when they are not inside their own
borders. The European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, and the International Court of Justice have all
stated that extraterritorial behaviour may be subject to human rights treaty obligations.
Human rights accords provide protection to those who are within a state party's "jurisdiction,"
which typically limits the applicability of this concept. Generally speaking, being in a state
entails being under its authority. A state also has jurisdiction if it has "authority or control"
over a person overseas via its agents, or if it has "effective control" over a portion of another
state's territory.
Drones, however, pose a special problem. It is unclear whether an invading state possesses
"jurisdiction" for the purposes of human rights treaties when it comes to targeted executions
carried out without effective control over territory or custody. The Alejandre case, in which
the Inter-American Commission determined that downing private US-registered aircraft in
international airspace violated the right to life, demonstrates the complexity of this issue
despite the paucity of case law on the subject. The European Court decided in Bankovic that
people murdered in Serbia by NATO aerial strikes were outside the "jurisdiction" of
participating states. This approach has been restricted in subsequent cases, which emphasise
extraterritorial accountability.
According to a more comprehensive perspective, victims of extraterritorial drone strikes can
fall under the "jurisdiction" of the operating state. The theory goes that when a state murders
foreigners with the intention of controlling them, it violates its duties under human rights
treaties. Marko Milanovic contends that negative responsibilities under International Human
Rights Law (IHRL), such as the duty not to kill people without cause, should be applied
beyond national borders and that nations should be held responsible for extraterritorial drone
attacks that result in human casualties. This argument contends that, in contrast to the need to
ensure rights, the negative requirement to respect rights should not be geographically
restricted.
This normatively desirable perspective underlines that, unlike customary international law, a
state's obligations with regard to human rights outside of its borders do not always
correspond with those within them. The authority of state agents over persons in the absence
of territorial control requires respect for those individuals' rights, even while territorial
control includes obligations to protect, ensure, and fulfil international human rights.
Essentially, human rights treaties need to prohibit a state party from violating another state's
territory in ways that it is unable to do so internally. Both customary and treaty life rights are
included by this. A state's positive actions, therefore, must adhere to its treaty and customary
human rights duties, whether they take place on its own territory or that of another state.

Conclusion

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A robust and time-tested system, the legal framework that safeguards the fundamental right to
life and maintains international peace is a reflection of norms that have evolved over
centuries. Although armed drones do not possess an intrinsic illegality, their propensity for
misuse necessitates strict adherence to these established protocols. Given the complex nature
of conflicts and the threats posed by terrorism, it is crucial that the fundamental principles of
international law remain intact. On the contrary, the emergence of drone technology should
emphasise the critical need for their diligent enforcement.
Particularly in light of the anticipated proliferation of this technology among states, the ease
with which drones enable targeted killings urgently necessitates a thorough examination of
these established standards. Initiating a global policing function against potential threats, the
use of drones by states endangers the protection of human life. This is further compounded by
the lack of conventional domestic policing tools, such as capture, and the reliance on the law
of armed conflict's more permissive targeting framework.
While drones do not inherently qualify as illegal weapons, their capability to be used to
deploy lethal force across international borders highlights substantial threats to the
safeguarding of human life. The application of the legal paradigm assumes critical
importance within this particular context. The justification for employing lethal force
becomes more straightforward when the assumption is that there is a global non-international
armed conflict governed by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Nevertheless, adhering to
the legal structure of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) imposes more rigorous
standards and requires a comprehensive evaluation in every instance. Controversy surrounds
the presumption of a global non-international armed conflict; however, IHRL should not be
hastily eclipsed by the application of IHL.
The inquiry into the feasibility of employing armed drones must transcend mere legality and
encompass a realm of sagacity. Maintaining force as an exceptional circumstance rather than
the norm is of the utmost importance in safeguarding the right to life over the long term.
Urgently required by the international community is a unified position regarding the
interpretation of the restrictions imposed by international law on the use of drones. This
necessity transcends the immediate consequences for individuals targeted by drone strikes
and is fundamental to upholding a resilient global security framework grounded in legal
principles. The law must be followed by drones, not vice versa.
In support of establishing a fundamental structure for consensus, the subsequent principles
are suggested:
• The international legal framework currently in place adequately governs drone strikes.
• Strict adherence to all limitations on the deployment of lethal force overseas, such as ius ad
bellum, IHL, and IHRL, is necessary to protect the right to life.
• The principles of ius ad bellum must guide any drone strike by a state outside its territory.
• Drone strikes occurring in the context of international or non-international armed conflict
are regulated by both International Humanitarian Law (IHRL) and IHL.
• IHRL compliance extends beyond the specific confines of armed conflict and is obligatory.

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 • IHRL adherence is strict and proportional, requiring strict necessity and proportionality, as
defined.
In summary, as the drone era progresses, maintaining an unwavering dedication to these
principles will not only guarantee adherence to international legal standards but also
safeguard the sanctity of life in a global landscape where the limits of danger and protection
are perpetually shifting.

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