An Externalist Approach To Epistemic Responsibility Intellectual Norms and Their Application To Epistemic Peer Disagreement Andrea Robitzsch

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Synthese Library 411
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Andrea Robitzsch
An Externalist
Approach to
Epistemic
Responsibility
Intellectual Norms and their Application
to Epistemic Peer Disagreement
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

and Philosophy of Science
Volume 411
Editor-in-chief
Otávio Bueno, University of Miami, Department of Philosophy, USA
Editors
Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, USA
Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, USA
Steven French, University of Leeds, UK
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Andrea Robitzsch
An Externalist Approach
to Epistemic Responsibility
Intellectual Norms and their Application
to Epistemic Peer Disagreement
123
Andrea Robitzsch
University of Osnabrück
Osnabrück, Germany
Synthese Library
ISBN 978-3-030-19076-7 ISBN 978-3-030-19077-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

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To Alexander,
to our daughter Mathilda,
our little star in the sky,
and to our son Karl,
who makes us laugh everyday.
Acknowledgments
This book is based on my doctoral thesis. I could not have completed this book
without the support of many different people. First and foremost, I would like to
thank the supervisor of my doctoral thesis, Heinrich Wansing, for his thoughtful
and thorough comments on many parts of this book and for his philosophical support
throughout my philosophical studies. I would also like to thank Sanford Goldberg
for his critical feedback on many philosophical ideas which have been developed in
this book.
A special thank you goes to Amy Flowerree, Anne Meylan, Shane Ryan, Dunja
Šešelja, and Christian Straßer whose enthusiastic and critical feedback on my work
encouraged me enormously and helped me to develop my ideas more thoroughly.
Many other people enriched this thesis by their feedback. I would like to thank
Thomas Grundmann, Nikola Kompa, Charles Lowe, Sebastian Schmoranzer, Daniel
Skurt, Matthias Steup, and Caroline Willkommen for their astute comments on
written parts or oral presentations of some of the ideas from this book.
I thank Claudia Smart and Cormac Breen for proofreading.
Finally, I want to thank my husband, Alexander Robitzsch; our daughter,
Mathilda; and our son, Karl, to whom this book is dedicated, as well as my parents
for their continuous support, for believing in me, for giving me the freedom to follow
my dreams, and for teaching me what really matters in life.
vii
Introduction
Normative epistemology has long focused solely on epistemic evaluations of

doxastic attitudes, such as assessments of epistemic justification and knowledge
assessments, and on the epistemic norms which govern these evaluations. Some
epistemologists, such as Feldman (2000) and Dougherty (2012), have even claimed
that epistemic normativity is solely determined by epistemic reasons. Others have
characterized the realm of epistemic normativity more broadly, with the help of
certain epistemic goals, epistemic aims, or epistemic value claims. However, even
with a broad understanding of epistemic normativity, the main focus of normative
epistemology was still restricted to matters concerning epistemic justification and
knowledge, besides a few exceptions such as Goldman (1978), Kornblith (1983),
and Hookway (2006). I do not doubt that epistemic justification and knowledge
belong to the key concerns of epistemological research in general and of normative
epistemology in particular. However, I think that normative epistemology should
also be concerned with other topics such as epistemic melioration, epistemic
responsibility assessment, intellectual norms, and intellectual conduct. This book
is an attempt to show that such topics matter for normative epistemology.
The aim of this book is to show that belief-influencing actions and omissions
are epistemically significant (at least under certain conditions). I will argue for this
claim by presenting an approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is
grounded in indirect doxastic control. Agents exercise indirect doxastic control by
performing certain belief-influencing actions and omissions. Throughout this book,
I will assume that epistemic responsibility assessment and assessments of epistemic
justification are independent epistemic evaluations. The approach to epistemic
responsibility assessment which I present in this book evaluates the intellectual
conduct of an agent with respect to holding a certain doxastic attitude. The
intellectual conduct of an agent in a certain situation refers to the way in which the
agent exercises indirect doxastic control in that situation. Assessments of epistemic
justification evaluate whether a certain doxastic attitude has certain features, such
as being in accordance with or well-based on the evidence the agent possesses or
being the doxastic outcome of a reliable belief-forming process. Moreover, I doubt
that there is any direct connection between the epistemic responsibility assessment
ix
x Introduction
which I present in this book and the analysis of knowledge. That is why this
book is concerned neither with the analysis of epistemic justification nor with the
analysis of knowledge. The topic of this book belongs to the area of meliorative
epistemology. The aim of meliorative epistemology is “to regulate and guide our
intellectual activities” (Goldman 1978, p. 509). This branch of epistemological
research investigates the foundations and possibilities of intellectual guidance (i.e.,
guidance of doxastic and epistemic endeavors) and seeks to answer questions such
as what an agent can do to improve her doxastic and epistemic endeavors and what
an agent can do to improve her epistemic situation.
The book is dealing with questions of meliorative epistemology in general
and with questions concerning doxastic responsibility and epistemic responsibility
assessment in particular. The expression “responsibility” is used in various ways in
our everyday talk but also in philosophical research. The expression “responsibility”
is used in an agentive sense, in an evaluative sense, or in a prescriptive sense in
philosophical research. One can apply the expression “responsibility” to individual
agents or to collective agents. Throughout this book, I will only be concerned with
individual responsibility. Agentive responsibility refers to control or agency of some
sort, and it is concerned with the conditions under which an action, an omission, a
doxastic attitude, or a state of affairs1 can be traced back to the exercise of agency
of an agent. Evaluative responsibility refers to responsibility assessments such as
blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, or a neutral evaluation. It is often assumed that
responsibility assessment requires agentive responsibility. For example, it is often
assumed that an agent is blameworthy for an action, only if the agent is agentively
responsible for that action, which means that the agent had control over the action or
the agent performed the action freely. That is why one can also characterize agentive
responsibility as the freedom-relevant component or as the control component
of evaluative responsibility. Two notions of evaluative responsibility have to be
distinguished. The first notion of responsibility assessment assesses an agent for
an action, an omission, a doxastic attitude, or a state of affairs. The second notion of
responsibility assessment assesses the character of the agent or the agent as a whole.
When we speak about responsible agents, we are using the expression “responsible”
as evaluative responsibility in the second sense. Throughout this book, I will
use evaluative responsibility or responsibility assessment only in the first sense.
Prescriptive responsibility refers to obligations or requirements. Responsibilities of
an agent are the obligations or requirements which are incumbent on the agent.
Note, throughout this book, I will use the expression “responsibility” to refer to
agentive responsibility; I will use the expression “responsibility assessment” to
refer to evaluative responsibility (in the first sense); and I will use the expressions
“obligation,” “requirement,” and “prohibition” to refer to prescriptive responsibility.
The first two chapters of this book are concerned with agentive responsibility for
doxastic attitudes. In the first chapter, I introduce three intuitive assumptions about
our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility. I use these three assumptions
1 This list is not supposed to be exhaustive.

Introduction xi
together with intuitive case judgments to show that there are no viable approaches
to doxastic responsibility which are based on direct doxastic control. I conclude
from this that there are no viable approaches to direct doxastic responsibility which
capture the three intuitive assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of doxastic
responsibility and deal with certain test cases in an intuitive way.
In the second chapter, I present an approach to indirect doxastic responsibility.
According to this approach, doxastic responsibility is responsibility for doxastic
consequences. I employ Meylan’s idea (2013, chapter 4) to apply Fischer and Rav-
izza’s reasons-responsiveness approach to responsibility for consequences (1998,
chapter 4) to the doxastic domain. I show that this approach to indirect doxastic
responsibility captures the three assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of
doxastic responsibility and deals with the test cases from the first chapter in an
intuitive way. I conclude from the discussion of the first and the second chapter that
our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility is best captured with an approach
to indirect doxastic responsibility – and so I conclude that our pretheoretical notion
of doxastic responsibility is based on indirect doxastic control. Since agents exercise
indirect doxastic control by performing belief-influencing actions and omissions,
Chaps. 1 and 2 establish that belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for
doxastic responsibility.
The third chapter concerns evaluative doxastic responsibility and prescrip-
tive doxastic responsibility. I discuss intellectual norms, and I propose a rule-
consequentialist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. Intellectual norms
are norms which have belief-influencing actions and omissions as their objects. They
guide the exercise of indirect doxastic control and govern responsibility assess-
ments. I introduce reliability, strong meta-reliability, and weak meta-reliability∗∗
as criteria to distinguish belief-influencing actions and omissions which conduce to
produce epistemic value from those that do not conduce to produce epistemic value.
Intellectual norms which require or permit the performance of reliable, strong meta-
reliable, or weak meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing actions and omissions, as well
as intellectual norms which prohibit the performance of belief-influencing actions
and omissions which are unreliable, not strong meta-reliable, or not weak meta-
reliable∗∗ , will be introduced as norms of reliable intellectual conduct. I will show
that norms of reliable intellectual conduct are epistemic norms because to comply
with these norms conduces to produce epistemic value. With the help of the norms
of reliable intellectual conduct, I will present a rule-consequentialist approach to
epistemic responsibility assessment which is grounded in indirect doxastic control.
Since an agent exercises indirect doxastic control by performing belief-influencing
actions and omissions, belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for the
presented approach to epistemic responsibility assessment.
In the fourth chapter, I will show that consideration of epistemic responsibility
assessment and norms of reliable intellectual conduct are important to capture the
epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement comprehensively. My argu-
ment for this relies on the assumption that the epistemic significance of epistemic
peer disagreement consists in the fact that an agent who has recognized that she is
in a case of epistemic peer disagreement gets an opportunity for epistemic improve-
xii Introduction
ment (cf. Christensen 2007, p. 194). I will introduce the two main approaches to
the epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement – Conformism and the
Total Evidence View – and I will show that neither of these approaches is able to
capture the epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement comprehensively.
I will show that (at the least some of) the shortcomings of Conformism and the
Total Evidence View in capturing the epistemic significance of epistemic peer
disagreement can be overcome if these approaches incorporate the assumption that
the recognition of being in a case of epistemic peer disagreement triggers certain
norms of reliable intellectual conduct and considerations of epistemic responsibility
assessment. I conclude from this discussion that we have reasons to assume that
norms of reliable intellectual conduct are triggered by the recognition that one is
in a case of epistemic peer disagreement, and so we have reasons to assume that
norms of reliable intellectual conduct and epistemic responsibility assessment are
relevant to the comprehensive capturing of the epistemic significance of epistemic
peer disagreement. Since epistemic responsibility assessment is grounded in indirect
doxastic control, and this kind of control is exercised by the performance of belief-
influencing actions and omissions, the arguments in the fourth chapter show that
belief-influencing actions and omissions are epistemically significant (at least under
certain conditions).
Contents
1 Doxastic Responsibility and Direct Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Doxastic Responsibility and Doxastic Guidance Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Doxastic Guidance Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Direct and Indirect Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Intentional Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Evaluative Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Weakening Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness:
Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.3 Strong and Weak Evaluative Doxastic Control∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.4 Moderate Evaluative Doxastic Control∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 An Approach to Indirect Doxastic Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.1 Responsibility for Doxastic Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.1 Fischer and Ravizza’s Approach to Responsibility
for Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.2 Meylan’s Consequential Approach to Doxastic
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1.3 An Agentive Approach to Responsibility for Doxastic
Consequences à la Fischer and Ravizza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 Indirect Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.1 Reasons-Responsive Mechanisms Owned by the Agent. . . . . . 56
2.2.2 Sensitivity of the Outer Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Possible Objections to Responsibility for Doxastic Consequences . . . 86
2.3.1 Are We Indirectly Responsible for Basic Doxastic
Attitudes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.3.2 Other Worries: Doxastic Intentions and Foreseeability . . . . . . . 92
xiii
xiv Contents
3 Intellectual Norms and Epistemic Normativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

3.1 Intellectual Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Intellectual Norms and the “Ought Implies Can” Principle . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2.1 The Dilemma of Doxastic Responsibility Assessment. . . . . . . . 104
3.2.2 A Solution to the Dilemma of Doxastic Responsibility
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.3 Epistemic Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.1 Epistemic Consequentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.3.2 An E-RULE Approach to Epistemic Responsibility
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3.3 Epistemic Responsibility Assessments and
Assessments of Epistemic Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.4 Epistemically Significant Intellectual Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.5 An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.5.1 Externalism and Internalism About Epistemic
Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.5.2 Externalism About Epistemic Responsibility
Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4 What Should We Do in the Face of Epistemic Peer Disagreement? . . . . 167
4.1 Cases of Epistemic Peer Disagreement and Epistemic
Peerhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.2 Conformist and Non-conformist Approaches to the Epistemic
Significance of Epistemic Peer Disagreement (EPD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.2.1 Conformist Approaches to the Epistemic Significance
of Epistemic Peer Disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.2.2 Non-conformist Approaches to the Epistemic
Significance of Epistemic Peer Disagreement (EPD) . . . . . . . . . 177
4.3 The Dimension of Intellectual Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.3.1 The Argument from Epistemically Non-deficient
Resolutions of EPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.3.2 Conformism and the Dimension of Intellectual Conduct . . . . . 193
4.3.3 The Total Evidence View and the Dimension
of Intellectual Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Chapter 1
Doxastic Responsibility and Direct
Doxastic Control
The aim of this chapter is to argue that doxastic responsibility, i.e., responsibility for
holding a certain doxastic attitude, is not based on direct doxastic control. There are
two different kinds of direct doxastic control to be found in the literature, intentional
doxastic control and evaluative doxastic control. Although many epistemologists
agree that we do not have intentional doxastic control over our doxastic attitudes,
it has been argued that we have evaluative doxastic control over the majority of
our doxastic attitudes. This has led to the assumption that doxastic responsibility is
based on evaluative doxastic control. In the first part of this chapter I will introduce
the notion of doxastic responsibility and the framework of doxastic guidance control
as well as the approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. I will then argue
that doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control by showing that
doxastic responsibility is neither based on intentional nor on evaluative doxastic
control.
1.1 Doxastic Responsibility and Doxastic Guidance Control
In our everyday life we are holding each other responsible for what we believe
and for our performance as epistemic agents. Responsibility for holding a doxastic
attitude is doxastic responsibility. Throughout this chapter, I will make some
assumptions about our intuitive or pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility.
It is a common assumption about responsibility that an agent S is responsible for
the obtaining of a certain state of affairs σ if and only if (iff) S is a proper subject
of responsibility assessment with respect to the obtaining of σ . The first assumption
about doxastic responsibility is that an agent S is responsible for holding a doxastic
This chapter is a slightly extended version of my paper: Kruse, A. (2017). “Why doxastic
responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control”, Synthese, 194(8), 2811–2842.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1

A. Robitzsch, An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility,
Synthese Library 411, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_1
2 1 Doxastic Responsibility and Direct Doxastic Control
attitude toward a proposition iff S is a proper subject to responsibility assessment

for holding the doxastic attitude toward the proposition. Doxastic responsibility as-
sessment comes in terms of doxastic blameworthiness1 and doxastic blamelessness.
Doxastic blamelessness comprises doxastic praiseworthiness and a certain kind of
neutral evaluation. If the agent is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for holding
a doxastic attitude toward a proposition p, but S is accountable for holding the
doxastic attitude toward p, S is neutrally evaluable for holding the doxastic attitude
in question.
Another common assumption about responsibility is that an agent is a proper
subject of responsibility assessment with respect to the obtaining of a state of affairs
σ iff the agent had control over the obtaining of σ . Thus, the second assumption
about doxastic responsibility is that an agent is a proper subject to responsibility
assessment for holding a doxastic attitude toward a proposition iff the agent had
control over holding the doxastic attitude toward the proposition. In this sense being
responsible for one’s doxastic attitude entails that the agent in question had some
kind of control over holding the doxastic attitude in question, i.e., some kind of
doxastic control.
The third assumption about doxastic responsibility is that an approach to doxastic
responsibility is viable, only if the approach can account for the intuition that
epistemic agents are responsible for the majority of their doxastic attitudes. Steup
(2008) and McHugh (2013) amongst others, support this assumption.
The kind of doxastic control which is sufficient and necessary to be a proper
subject of responsibility assessment is called the basis of doxastic responsibility.
I will investigate different kinds of doxastic control and inquire whether doxastic
responsibility is based on either of these kinds. For this I will introduce different
kinds of doxastic control and I will investigate whether one of these kinds is
necessary and sufficient for doxastic responsibility. There are different kinds of
doxastic control discussed in the literature. One of the main distinctions that has
been made is the distinction between direct and indirect kinds of doxastic control.
Below, I will introduce a general framework of doxastic control, in which all
different kinds of doxastic control can be presented in a unified way. The aim of
this chapter is to argue that doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic
control. Whether doxastic responsibility is based on direct doxastic control is
decided by intuitive case judgments and whether the respective approach to doxastic
responsibility satisfies the assumptions for doxastic responsibility mentioned above.
According to the literature there are two different kinds of doxastic control
worthy of the name direct doxastic control, namely intentional doxastic control and
evaluative doxastic control. Thus, to argue that doxastic responsibility is not based
1 Although I assume that under some conditions doxastic responsibility assessment is of epistemic
significance, I will not argue for it in this chapter. That is why I leave open whether the
different manifestations of doxastic responsibility assessment are epistemically significant or not.
I will introduce an approach to an epistemically significant approach to doxastic responsibility
assessment in Chap. 3.
1.1 Doxastic Responsibility and Doxastic Guidance Control 3
on direct doxastic control, I have to show that doxastic responsibility is neither based
on intentional nor on evaluative doxastic control.
In what follows I will introduce the framework of doxastic guidance control and
present direct and indirect kinds of doxastic control within it.
1.1.1 Doxastic Guidance Control
Fischer and Ravizza (1998) have famously argued that moral responsibility is based
on guidance control (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 34, 54). According to Fischer
and Ravizza, an agent S has guidance control over an action A iff A is caused by a
reasons-responsive mechanism M and S owns M (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p.
39).2
Some epistemologists (cf. Steup 2008; McHugh 2013; McCormick 2011; Breyer
2013; Meylan 2013) use the model of guidance control and develop their approach
to doxastic control by applying this model to the doxastic domain. It turns out
that the general idea behind guidance control allows us to present the different
approaches to doxastic control that can be found in the literature in a unified
way. This helps to compare the different approaches to doxastic control. Doxastic
guidance control can be spelled out in the following way.
Doxastic guidance control: An agent S has doxastic guidance control3 over her doxastic
attitude D toward p iff her holding D toward p is (non-deviantly) caused by a reasons-
responsive process (mechanism) owned by S.
1.1.1.1 Responsiveness to Reasons
Reasons-responsiveness is a property of a mechanism- or a process-type4 which

indicates that the process-/mechanism-type is in a certain way sensitive to reasons.
The sensitivity to reasons required for reasons-responsiveness is spelled out with
2 The focus of guidance control is on the actual sequence of events in which an agent brought
about a certain state of affairs σ rather than on the alternative possibilities available to the agent in
the very same situation (cf. Fischer 2012, p. 186). That is why guidance control approaches and
approaches to responsibility based on them do not fall prey to Frankfurt-type cases.
3 McHugh (2013) calls the doxastic analogue to practical guidance control epistemic guidance
control (cf. McHugh 2013, p. 143). My notion of doxastic guidance control and his notion of
epistemic guidance control have different meanings. McHugh’s epistemic guidance control only
refers to what I will call evaluative doxastic control. However, McHugh’s epistemic guidance
control can be presented within the framework of doxastic guidance control.
4 Note, mechanisms and processes are not categorically different. In fact, mechanism are processes.
the help of two conditions, a reactivity condition and a receptivity condition. Let’s
consider strong reasons-responsiveness5 for a moment.
Suppose a process/mechanism of type M of S yields that S brings about a state
of affairs σ in the actual world.6 M of S is strongly reasons-responsive iff it is the
case that if M were to operate and there were sufficient reasons to bring about an
alternative state of affairs σ , S would recognize these reasons (receptivity condition)
and M of S would react to the recognized reasons and would result in the obtaining
of σ (reactivity condition)7 (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 41). Depending on
the extent to which a process-/mechanism-type has to be receptive and reactive
to reasons to be called reasons-responsive, we can distinguish between strong,
moderate and weak reasons-responsiveness (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Ch. 2 &
3). I will clarify this distinction in the section on evaluative doxastic control. Suffice
it for now to say that a mechanism/process of type M of S is reasons-responsive iff
M of S is sufficiently receptive and reactive to reasons to bring about an alternative
state of affairs.
1.1.1.2 Ownership
To get a grasp of what the ownership condition amounts to in the doxastic context,
I will present two different ways of characterizing it.
S owns a process/mechanism of type M iff S has taken responsibility for M, i.e., S
reasonably takes herself to be the agential source of the doxastic outcomes of M and S
takes herself to be a fair target of reactive attitudes regarding the doxastic outcomes of M
(cf. Breyer 2013; McCormick 2011).
S owns M iff M is well-integrated in the cognitive character of S (cf. Breyer and Greco
2008).
The first approach is normatively loaded, whereas the second approach is not. This
is why I have a slight preference for the second way of characterizing the ownership
5 Below, I will distinguish between different kinds of reasons-responsiveness when I introduce

strong, weak and moderate kinds of evaluative doxastic control.
6 Throughout this chapter the term “actual world” refers to a specific sequence of events in the
actual world in which the considered process/mechanism operates and results in σ . My usage of
“actual world” is thus equivalent to Fischer and Ravizza’s usage of “actual sequence of events” (cf.
Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 44).
7 Actually Fischer and Ravizza’s definition of practical reasons-responsiveness contains three
conditions. According to them, a process/mechanism of type M of S is practically reasons-

responsive iff in all relevant counterfactual worlds in which M operates and in which there are
sufficient reasons to bring about an alternative state of affairs σ , S recognizes these reasons
(I), chooses in accordance with these reasons (II) and acts in accordance with her choice, i.e.
brings about σ (III) (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 41). The reactivity condition comprises
condition (II) and condition (III). It is plausible to assume that there is always at least one relevant
counterfactual world in which the agent has sufficient reasons to bring about an alternative state of
affairs.
1.1 Doxastic Responsibility and Doxastic Guidance Control 5
condition of doxastic guidance control. However, my argument for the assumption

that doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control does not depend
on the way in which the ownership condition is spelled out, so we can be neutral
about the ownership condition and leave it at that.
1.1.2 Direct and Indirect Doxastic Control
We can distinguish between direct and indirect doxastic control within the frame-
work of doxastic guidance control as follows.
Direct doxastic control: S has direct doxastic control over holding her doxastic attitude
D toward p iff her holding D toward p is the doxastic outcome of a reasons-responsive
belief-forming process owned by S.
Indirect doxastic control: S has indirect doxastic control over holding D toward p iff her
holding D toward p is the (non-deviant) causal consequence of S’s performance of certain
belief-influencing actions/omissions which are caused by reasons-responsive processes
(mechanisms) owned by S (cf. Meylan 2013; Hieronymi 20068 ).
The approach to direct doxastic control identifies types of reasons-responsive

processes or mechanisms with types of belief-forming processes (or cognitive
processes),9 while the approach to indirect doxastic control identifies types of
reasons-responsive processes or mechanisms with types of processes or mechanisms
that directly cause certain belief-influencing actions/omissions, such as actions
of evidence-gathering or making inferences.10 The focus of this chapter is to
investigate different kinds of direct doxastic control with respect to whether doxastic
responsibility is based on one of these kinds of direct doxastic control, so I will not
be concerned with indirect doxastic control in what follows.
The first important distinction between different kinds of direct doxastic control
arises from the distinction between practical and epistemic reasons. Let’s take prac-
tical reasons (i.e., reasons to act) to be facts or considerations that bear (subjectively
8 This kind of control is similar to what Hieronymi has called “manipulative” or “managerial”
control (cf. Hieronymi 2006, p. 53).
9 In what follows I use the notion of a belief-forming process broadly, such that all processes with
which one can revise one’s belief-system fall under it. Thus, belief-forming processes encompass
the processes with which one forms beliefs, the processes with which one sustains beliefs, the
processes with which one rejects beliefs as well as processes that result in suspensions of judgment.
Moreover, I use the notion of a belief-forming process and the notion of a cognitive process
interchangeably.
10 Note, in this chapter I will not specify what belief-influencing actions/omissions are. Of course
any approach to doxastic responsibility based on indirect doxastic control has to have a specified
notion of belief-influencing action and omission. I will say more on belief-influencing actions and
omissions in Chap. 2.
or objectively) on the question of what one ought to do.11 Epistemic reasons for a
proposition p are facts or considerations that (subjectively or objectively) bear on
the question of whether p is true.12
We can distinguish between intentional and evaluative doxastic control de-
pending on whether the belief-forming process has to be responsive to practical
or epistemic reasons. In what follows I will introduce intentional and evaluative
doxastic control and investigate whether doxastic responsibility is based on either
of these kinds of control.
1.2 Intentional Doxastic Control
Intentional doxastic control13 is the kind of doxastic control which is closest to the
kind of control that we have over our actions and omissions. Some philosophers
assume that to have intentional control over the obtaining of a state of affairs σ
is necessary to be responsible for the obtaining of σ (cf. Alston 1988b; Buckareff
2006). This assumption gives us a reason to think that to be responsible for one’s
doxastic attitude requires one to have intentional control over the doxastic attitude
in question.
Intentional doxastic control: An epistemic agent S has intentional doxastic control over her
doxastic attitude D toward p (i.e., Dp) iff Dp is the doxastic outcome of a belief-forming
process of type M, which is responsive to intentions or practical reasons to form D toward
p and S owns the process of type M.
William Alston has famously argued that belief-forming processes are not re-
sponsive to practical reasons or intentions to form a certain doxastic attitude
(cf. Alston 1988b, p. 263). Doxastic attitudes are direct responses to evidential
considerations.14 To illustrate this point, Alston asks us to consider an epistemic
11 Note, the “ought” from the expression “what one ought to do” can be a moral, a prudential, an
instrumental ought or an ought of a different kind. This means that if one has practical reasons for
an action to ϕ, then this does not entail from which perspective these reasons speak in favor of
the action to ϕ. Practical reasons for an action to ϕ can thus be moral reasons, prudential reasons,
instrumental reasons or practical reasons of another kind.
12 One might think that in analogy to the characterization of practical reasons one can characterize
epistemic reasons as facts or considerations that bear on the question of what one ought to believe.
Thanks to Heinrich Wansing for pointing this out to me. However, the question of what one ought to
believe can be posed from different perspectives, including the prudential or the moral perspective.
Unless one specifies the perspective from which one considers the question of what one ought
to believe, we cannot characterize epistemic reasons as considerations or facts that bear on that
question.
13 Intentional doxastic control is sometimes referred to as voluntary doxastic control in the
literature.
14 Note, Alston (1988b) uses evidential consideration in an unqualified way which means that
to form a doxastic attitude in response to one’s evidential consideration does not guarantee
that the doxastic attitude is (prima facie) epistemically justified. To put it differently, evidential
considerations are considerations which an agent takes to be evidence about a certain proposition
1.2 Intentional Doxastic Control 7
agent S, who considers the proposition p, and to distinguish between the following
three situations. If S takes her evidence to speak in favor of the truth of p, she cannot
help but form the belief that p. If S takes her evidence to speak for the truth of the
negation of p, she cannot help but form the disbelief that p (i.e., the belief that ¬p).
If S takes her evidence to speak neither for the truth of p nor for the truth of the
negation of p, S cannot help but suspend judgment about p.15 Alston argues that
because the formation/maintenance/rejection of a doxastic attitude is determined by
evidential considerations, it is not responsive to intentions or practical reasons to
form a certain doxastic attitude.
[. . . ] we are not so constituted as to be able to take up propositional attitudes16 at will.
Can you switch propositional attitudes toward that proposition just by deciding to do so? It
seems clear to me that I have no such powers. Volitions, decisions, choosings don’t hook
up with anything in the way of propositional attitude inauguration, just as they don’t hook
up with the secretion of gastric juices of cell metabolism. (Alston 1988b, p. 263, footnote
A.R.)
Alston equates direct doxastic control with direct intentional doxastic control17
(cf. Alston 1988b, p. 268). Thus, one could take Alston’s argument not only to show
p. However, just because one takes a consideration to be evidence about p does not guarantee that
this consideration is indeed evidence (in a qualified sense) about p unless one assumes an extreme
subjective notion of evidence.
15 I take suspension of judgment about p to be a doxastic attitude toward p, given that the agent
has considered whether p and her suspension of judgment about p results from this consideration.
See Wedgwood (2002, p. 272) for an argument to support this assumption.
16 The way in which Alston (1988b) uses the notion of a propositional attitude suggests that when
he talks about propositional attitudes, he actually means doxastic attitudes. Of course there are
propositional attitudes that can be directly brought about for practical reasons or an intention to
have the propositional attitude in question. For example, to imagine that p is often taken to be a
propositional attitude that can be brought about by an intention to imagine that p or a practical
reason to imagine that p.
17 Alston refers to direct doxastic control as “basic voluntary control” (cf. Alston 1988b, p. 263ff.).
He takes what he calls “non-basic immediate doxastic control” to be another kind of intentional
doxastic control, but an indirect kind. This kind of control is exercised as follows. Let us assume
that an agent has the intention or a practical reason to form the belief that the light is on in her
office. The agent is able to form the intended belief by voluntarily pressing the light switch, given
that the light in her office has been off before and the light and the light-switch are properly
functioning, see Feldman (cf. 2000, p. 671f.). By pressing the light switch the agent manipulates
the world intentionally such that she will get the evidential basis upon which she is able to form the
intended belief that the light is on in her office. This kind of intentional doxastic control is indirect
because the intention to form a certain belief causes the exercise of an action which ensures that
the agent has the evidential bases which provokes the intended doxastic response (i.e., the belief
that the light is on in her office). We can refer to that kind of control as indirect intentional doxastic
control. I suppose that for an agent to have direct intentional doxastic control, the agent’s belief-
forming process itself has to be directly responsive to practical reasons or an intention to form a
certain belief. This is not satisfied when it comes to the exercise of “non-basic immediate voluntary
control”. In this chapter I am only concerned with direct kinds of doxastic control and so I will not
discuss indirect intentional doxastic control. Note, my use of “intentional doxastic control” refers
to the direct kind of intentional doxastic control throughout this chapter.
that epistemic agents are psychologically unable to exercise intentional doxastic

control, but also as an argument that shows that epistemic agents are psychologically
unable to exercise direct doxastic control. If it is true that direct doxastic control
is just intentional doxastic control, then on can present the following argument
against the viability of an approach to doxastic responsibility which is based on
direct doxastic control.18
1. An epistemic agent is responsible for her doxastic attitude, only if her holding
the doxastic attitude is caused by the agent’s exercise of direct doxastic control.
2. Epistemic agents are psychologically unable to exercise direct doxastic control.
∴ Thus, epistemic agents are not responsible for their doxastic attitudes.
If intentional doxastic control is indeed the only kind of direct doxastic control,
then Alston’s argument shows that epistemic agents are psychologically unable to
exercise direct doxastic control.
In what follows we will see that there are several approaches to direct doxastic
control to be found in the literature which do not require belief-forming processes
to be responsive to practical reasons or intentions to form a certain doxastic attitude.
Thus, there are several approaches to direct doxastic control that are not approaches
to intentional doxastic control and so the assumption that direct doxastic control
is intentional doxastic control is wrong. Thus, Alstons argument only shows that
epistemic agents are psychologically unable to exercise intentional doxastic control.
However, there is a modified version of the objection above that might still pose
some problems for proponents of doxastic responsibility. So before I will introduce
the other approaches to direct doxastic control, let me briefly introduce and discuss
this modified version of the argument above. The modified version of the argument
assumes that doxastic responsibility requires the exercise of intentional instead of
direct doxastic control. Together with the assumption that epistemic agents are
psychologically not able to exercise intentional doxastic control, it follows that
epistemic agents are not responsible for their doxastic attitudes. This argument is an
objection to approaches to doxastic responsibility in which doxastic responsibility
is based on intentional doxastic control.
The assumption that doxastic responsibility requires intentional doxastic control
has been made by Buckareff (2006), for example.
Steup (2008) has argued that proponents of the claim that doxastic freedom
requires responsiveness to practical reasons commit what he calls “practical reason
chauvinism” (cf. Steup 2008, p. 388). The same can be said about proponents
of the claim that to be a proper subject of responsibility assessment of any kind
requires responsiveness to practical reasons or intentions. Even though this is a
common background assumption of arguments against the viability of approaches
to doxastic responsibility, I agree with Steup that arguments which rest on a
practical reason chauvinist assumption (or something similar) are only powerful
if their proponents present good arguments for that assumption. Up to this day they
18 Such an argument against epistemic responsibility is discussed by Levy (2007).

1.3 Evaluative Doxastic Control 9
have not presented good reasons for the practical reason chauvinist assumption.
This shows that we have no reasons to assume that to have intentional doxastic
control over one’s doxastic attitude is necessary for being responsible for that
doxastic attitude. Therefore, from the assumption that epistemic agents are unable
to exercise intentional doxastic control, it does not follow that epistemic agents are
not responsible for their doxastic attitudes.
However, the fact that epistemic agents are psychologically unable to exercise
intentional doxastic control can be used to argue that doxastic responsibility is not
based on that kind of direct doxastic control. For, if doxastic responsibility was
based on intentional doxastic control, epistemic agents would not be responsible for
their doxastic attitudes. Proponents of the assumption that doxastic responsibility
is based on direct doxastic control assume that epistemic agents are responsible
for the majority of their beliefs, so they can use the psychological impossibility
of exercising intentional doxastic control as a reason to claim that doxastic
responsibility does not require intentional doxastic control. I agree with them on
that and I conclude that the psychological impossibility of exercising intentional
doxastic control shows us that doxastic responsibility is not based on intentional
doxastic control.
There are other kinds of direct doxastic control to be found in the literature.
These kinds of direct doxastic control require responsiveness to epistemic reasons
in some way or other. I will refer to these kinds of direct doxastic control as kinds
of evaluative doxastic control19 (cf. Hieronymi 2006; Steup 2008). I will discuss
several kinds of evaluative doxastic control at length in what follows and I will
argue that doxastic responsibility is based on neither of them.
1.3 Evaluative Doxastic Control
The discussion of intentional doxastic control above has shown that belief-forming
processes are not (directly) responsive to practical reasons or intentions to form a
certain doxastic attitude toward a certain proposition. However, it is quite intuitive to
assume that belief-forming processes are (directly) responsive to epistemic reasons.
Approaches to evaluative doxastic control take this into account and claim that
responsiveness to epistemic reasons is necessary to have evaluative doxastic control
over one’s doxastic attitudes.
Evaluative doxastic control: An agent S has evaluative doxastic control over her doxastic
attitude D toward p iff Dp is the (direct) causal outcome of a belief-forming process of
type M of S which is responsive to epistemic reasons and the process is owned by S.
The extent to which a belief-forming process has to be responsive to epistemic

reasons is not specified in the definition above. This allows us to distinguish between
19 The name “evaluative doxastic control” is inspired by Hieronymi (2006, p. 53).

strong, moderate and weak kinds of evaluative doxastic control, depending on the
degree of epistemic reasons-responsiveness required by the respective approach
to evaluative doxastic control. Below, I will characterize different approaches
to evaluative doxastic control. Let me first introduce what epistemic reasons-
responsiveness amounts to.
1.3.1 Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness
In this section I want to clarify what an epistemic reasons-responsive belief-forming

process is. For this we first need to understand what a belief-forming process
is. According to Goldman a belief-forming process is “a functional operation or
procedure, i.e., something that generates a mapping from certain states – ‘inputs’ –
into other states – ‘outputs’ ” (Goldman 1979, p. 11). The outputs of belief-forming
processes are doxastic attitudes (i.e., beliefs, disbeliefs, suspensions of judgment).
The inputs of belief-forming processes are mental states such as experiential states
or doxastic states such as beliefs (cf. Goldman 1979, p. 11f.). To say that a belief-
forming process takes a mental state as an input is also to say that the belief-forming
process operates on the mental state in question (cf. Goldman 1979, p. 11). If a
process has inputs some of which are beliefs (or other doxastic states) it is called
a belief-dependent process. Reasoning processes such as induction, deduction or
abduction are belief-dependent processes. A process that does not take beliefs
(or other doxastic attitudes) as inputs is called a belief-independent process (cf.
Goldman 1979, p. 13). Basic belief-forming processes such as perceptual processes
are belief-independent processes. These processes take experiential states as inputs.
Belief-independent processes do not operate on doxastic inputs (cf. Goldman 1979,
p. 13). The notion of a belief-independent process is important for the argument
which I develop in this section. This is why I will clarify what a belief-independent
process is in further detail.
Goldman claims that a belief-independent cognitive process is a process “none
of whose inputs are belief-states” (Goldman 1979, p. 13). The property of being a
belief-independent cognitive process and the property of being a belief-dependent
cognitive process are properties of process-types.20 Thus, if we take to be a belief-
independent process type, then, in all instances in which tokens of operate, the
20 Goldman takes the properties of reliability and conditional reliability to be properties of process-
types (cf. Goldman 1979, pp. 11, 13). Moreover, the property of being a conditional reliable
cognitive process depends on the property of being a belief-dependent process, such that all
conditional reliable cognitive processes are belief-dependent cognitive processes. Also the property
of being an (unconditional) reliable cognitive process depends on the property of being a belief-
independent cognitive process, such that all (unconditional) reliable cognitive processes are
belief-independent cognitive processes. Since reliability and conditional reliability are properties of
process-types, it follows that belief-dependency and belief-independency are properties of process-
types as well.
tokens of do not take beliefs (or other doxastic states) as inputs. That means,
it is necessarily the case that tokens of a belief-independent process-type do not
operate on doxastic inputs. Thus, it is impossible that tokens of a belief-independent
process-type take beliefs (or other doxastic states) as inputs. Goldman characterizes
basic perceptual cognitive processes as belief-independent processes. Thus, belief-
independent cognitive processes are cognitive processes, which cannot operate on
doxastic inputs.
Whether the distinction between belief-dependent and belief-independent pro-
cesses is exhaustive is an interesting question and its answer depends on whether
one understands Goldman’s characterization of belief-dependent processes as “pro-
cesses some of whose inputs are beliefs states” (Goldman 1979, p. 13) broadly or
narrowly. A narrow understanding of a belief-dependent process assumes that each
token of a belief-dependent process-type operates on inputs some of which are be-
liefs (or other doxastic states). A broad notion of a belief-dependent process claims
that the process can operate on doxastic inputs, which means that some tokens
of a belief-dependent process-type operate on inputs some of which are doxastic
states. The distinction between belief-independent and belief-dependent processes
is exhaustive, given a broad understanding of belief-dependent cognitive processes.
Given a narrow understanding of belief-dependent cognitive processes, the distinc-
tion is not exhaustive, for there is at least the possibility of a cognitive process-type
some of whose tokens operate on inputs, some of which are doxastic states and some
of whose tokens operate on inputs none of which are doxastic states. In what follows,
I will use the notion of a belief-dependent cognitive process in the broad sense.
As I have explained in Sect. 1.1.1, reasons-responsiveness of a process or
mechanism comes with a receptivity and a reactivity condition. The receptivity
condition requires agents to recognize the reasons to do otherwise in a certain subset
of relevant counterfactual worlds in which the agent has reasons to do otherwise.21
R refers to the set of relevant counterfactual worlds which belongs to a certain
actual sequence of events. A relevant counterfactual world r (where r ∈ R) is
a world in which a process of the type in question (and of the agent in question)
operates, and in which there are sufficient reasons to bring about an alternative
state of affairs. Moreover, relevant counterfactual worlds “must have the same
natural laws as the actual world” (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 44). The reactivity
condition of reasons-responsiveness requires roughly that there is a certain subset
of relevant counterfactual worlds22 in which there are sufficient reasons to bring
about an alternative state of affairs and the mechanism – that operated in the actual
sequence of events – operates on those reasons and brings the alternative state of
affairs about.
21 According to Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chapter 2) this subset may for example contain all
relevant counterfactual worlds as it is required for strong reasons-responsiveness, or it may contain
at least one relevant counterfactual world as it is required for weak reasons-responsiveness.
22 According to Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chapter 2) this subset may for example contain all
relevant counterfactual worlds as it is required for strong reasons-responsiveness, or it may contain

at least one relevant counterfactual world as it is required for weak reasons-responsiveness.
The operation of a process on reasons is independent of the agent’s recognition

of reasons. So the question arises how the receptivity condition and the reactivity
condition are connected. I will investigate this question in what follows.
The key to understanding the connection between the reactivity condition and the
receptivity condition lies in understanding the reactivity condition. The reactivity
condition clarifies how the operation of the process is connected to the agent’s
recognition of the reasons in the relevant counterfactual worlds, if the process is
reasons-responsive. According to Fischer and Ravizza the connection between the
receptivity condition and the reactivity condition is not a mere conjunction. This
becomes clear when one looks at their description of the conditions in which the
reactivity condition fails.
The second kind of failure is a failure of reactivity – a failure to be appropriately affected
by beliefs. Here the agent recognizes certain reasons as sufficient (say) for performing an
action, but he does not choose in accordance with this recognition. (Fischer and Ravizza
1998, p. 41, emphases A.R.)
Fischer and Ravizza emphasize that reasons-responsiveness of a certain process

generally requires a proper connection between the reactivity and the receptivity
condition, i.e. a proper relation between the agent’s recognition of reasons and the
operation of the process/mechanism in the relevant counterfactual worlds.
To exclude non-deviant causal chains Fischer and Ravizza refine the reactivity
condition in the following way. A process is reasons-responsive, only if in the
relevant counterfactual worlds the agent brings about the alternative state of affairs
because of the reasons the agent had recognized to be sufficient for bringing
about the alternative state of affairs (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 63). This
means that for the process in question to be reasons-responsive, it is necessary
that, in the relevant counterfactual worlds, the operation of the process results in
the obtaining of the alternative state of affairs σ because of the reasons the agent
has recognized to be sufficient to bring about σ . An approach to strong epistemic
reasons-responsiveness23 that includes a refined reactivity condition (à la Fischer
and Ravizza), i.e., strong epistemic reasons-responsivenessF R, looks as follows.
Strong epistemic reasons-responsivenessF R : Suppose a belief-forming process of type M
of S results in the doxastic attitude D toward p in the actual world. The belief-forming
process of type M of S is strongly epistemically reasons-responsiveF R iff it holds that if a
process of type M were to operate and there would be sufficient epistemic reasons24 to form
23 I chose strong epistemic reasons-responsiveness as an example. The consideration of this

section apply to all approaches to epistemic reasons-responsiveness which come with a receptivity
condition and a refined reactivity condition independent of whether they are strong, weak or
moderate approaches.
24 The notion of sufficient epistemic reason can have a strong and a weak normative reading.
According to the strong normative reading, an agent has sufficient epistemic reasons to bring about
a doxastic attitude D toward p iff the epistemic reasons justify S to have D toward p. According
to the weak normative reading, an agent has sufficient epistemic reasons to bring about a doxastic
attitude D toward p iff the agent takes her epistemic reasons to justify her to have D toward p.
an alternative doxastic attitude25 D toward p, S would recognize these reasons (receptivity

condition) and the process of type M would operate on these recognized reasons and result
in D toward p (reactivity condition).
The refined reactivity condition of (strong) epistemic reasons-responsivenessF R

ensures that in the relevant counterfactual worlds, the alternative state of affairs
obtains because of the reasons the agent has recognized. I will argue that this refine-
ment is not sufficient (although necessary) to capture the proper relation between
the agent’s recognition of sufficient reasons to bring about an alternative state of
affairs σ and the operation of the process in the relevant counterfactual worlds.
The reason for this is that Fischer and Ravizza’s refinement does not ensure that the
process in question operates on the (recognized) reasons and results in the obtaining
of σ because the agent has recognized that these reasons are sufficient to bring
about σ . Without this assurance the connection between the receptivity condition
and the reactivity condition is prone to luck and the corresponding approach to
reasons-responsivenessF R yields counterintuitive results. I will illustrate this with
a modified version of the famous Albert case26 (cf. Steup 2008, pp. 376, 379).
Albert is an epistemic agent who suffers from a phobia concerning germs. Albert
compulsively believes that his hands are full of dangerous germs. The cognitive
process that underlies his phobia is unresponsive to Albert’s recognition of reasons,
such that in all possible worlds in which Albert recognizes that he has (sufficient)
reasons to form a certain doxastic attitude toward the proposition that his hands
are full of dangerous germs, the cognitive process underlying his psychological
disorder does not operate on his recognition of these reasons. Moreover, the process
is insensitive to most of the reasons that somehow (objectively) indicate that his
hands are not full of dangerous germs. It is only sensitive to reasons which indicate
that he has washed his hands for exactly 10 min. Let us assume that Albert always
recognizes the epistemic reasons that he has and recognizes what these reasons
indicate with respect to the proposition that Albert’s hands are full of dangerous
germs. In the actual world Albert has reasons indicating that he has washed his
hands for exactly 10 min. Albert is considering the proposition that his hands are full
of dangerous germs and the cognitive process underlying his psychological disorder
operates on the reasons that Albert has and results in Albert’s disbelief that his hands
are full of dangerous germs. Assume that there is just one relevant counterfactual
world r in which the cognitive process underlying Albert’s psychological disorder
operates and in which there are sufficient reasons to form an alternative doxastic
attitude toward the proposition that his hands are full of dangerous germs. Albert
recognizes that he has sufficient reasons to form the belief that his hands are
full of dangerous germs in r. Moreover, the cognitive process underlying Albert’s
25 I suppose that to “to hold or to form an alternative doxastic attitude toward the considered propo-
sition” means the same as “to believe otherwise”. Thus, an approach to doxastic responsibility
which requires epistemic reasons-responsiveness also requires the ability to believe otherwise of
some sort.
26 I will discuss the original Albert case in Chap. 2.2.2.
psychological disorder operates on the reasons which he has and which he also
happens to recognize. The cognitive process results in Albert’s belief that his
hands are full of dangerous germs (i.e., an alternative doxastic attitude toward the
considered proposition). Note that the process does not result in Albert’s belief
because Albert has recognized that he has sufficient reasons to believe that his
hands are full of dangerous germs. The cognitive process results in Albert’s belief
that his hands are full of dangerous germs because the cognitive process operates on
reasons that do not indicate that Albert has washed his hands for exactly 10 min. This
becomes obvious, if we look at other possible worlds in which Albert has sufficient
reasons to disbelieve that his hands are full of dangerous germs.27 Let us assume that
Albert recognizes that he has sufficient reasons to disbelieve that his hands are full of
dangerous germs in these worlds. However, these reasons do not indicate that Albert
has washed his hands for exactly 10 min. Thus, in these worlds the cognitive process
underlying Albert’s psychological disorder operates on the reasons that he has, but
not on Albert’s recognition that these reasons are sufficient to disbelieve that his
hands are full of dangerous germs. The cognitive process results in Albert’s belief
that his hands are full of dangerous germs. This is because the cognitive process
underlying Albert’s psychological disorder is unresponsive to Albert’s recognition
of the reasons, although it operates on the reasons that Albert has recognized.
The cognitive process underlying Albert’s psychological disorder satisfies the
receptivity condition and the refined reactivity condition of (strong) epistemic
reasons-responsiveness since in all relevant counterfactual scenarios, i.e., in r,
Albert recognizes that he has sufficient reasons to form an alternative doxastic
attitude, the cognitive process operates on these reasons and results in the alternative
doxastic attitude toward the considered proposition. The cognitive process underly-
ing Albert’s psychological disorder satisfies the refined reactivity condition as well
as the receptivity condition. Thus, the cognitive process would count as (strongly)
epistemically reasons-responsiveF R. This is counterintuitive.
Albert’s disbelief is an alienated belief, because it stems from his psychological
disorder. According to McHugh, alienated beliefs stem from cognitive processes
that do not satisfy the reactivity condition, because the doxastic outputs of these
cognitive processes “fail to connect to the subject’s own take on her epistemic
reasons” (McHugh 2013, p. 144).
Alienated beliefs, on the other hand, involve a failure of the reasons-reactivity condition.
Both compulsive and repressed beliefs fail to connect to the subject’s own take on her
epistemic reasons. They are held in place in a way that makes them immune to revision by
the subject’s considered assessment of the reasons she has. (McHugh 2013, p. 144)
To ensure a proper relation between the recognition of the reasons and the operation
of the process on these reasons, it is not enough to require that the process operates
27 Note that these worlds are not relevant counterfactual worlds because Albert does not have
reasons to form an alternative doxastic attitude toward the proposition that his hands are full of
dangerous germs in these worlds, but instead he has sufficient reasons to disbelieve that his hands
are full of dangerous germs, which is the same disbelief as in the actual world.
on the reason the agent recognizes to have, because a cognitive process can operate
on these epistemic reasons independent of the agent’s own take on these reasons or
the agent’s recognition of these reasons.
McHugh (2013) admits that and assumes that epistemic reasons-responsiveness
requires a certain relation between the recognition of epistemic reasons and the
operation of the process in the relevant counterfactual worlds. According to
McHugh, epistemic reasons-responsiveness consists of the capacity to respond to
epistemic reasons in an appropriate way (cf. McHugh 2013, 140f.). Moreover, he
claims that to respond to a reason means doing something for a reason (cf. McHugh
2013, p. 146).
One does something for a reason when one’s doing is appropriately related to one’s
recognition of that reason – that is to the mental states that constitute one’s implicit or
explicit awareness of the reason. (McHugh 2013, p. 146, emphases A.R.)
Thus, in contrast to Fischer and Ravizza, McHugh requires the operation of the
process to be connected to the agent’s recognition of the reasons (not just to the
reasons which have been recognized by the agent). According to McHugh, cognitive
processes that are unresponsive to the agent’s recognition of the reasons or, to use his
words, unresponsive to the agent’s “own take on her epistemic reasons” (McHugh
2013, p. 144), are not epistemically reasons-responsive cognitive processes. Thus, a
process is (epistemically) reasons-responsive, only if in the relevant counterfactual
worlds, the process operates on the (epistemic) reasons the agent has recognized and
the recognition that these reasons are sufficient to bring about an alternative state of
affairs (or an alternative doxastic attitude toward p), such that the operation of the
process results in the obtaining of the alternative state of affairs (or the alternative
doxastic attitude toward p). This further refinement of the reactivity condition
excludes the cognitive process which underlies Albert’s psychological disorder
from the realm of epistemic reasons-responsive cognitive processes. Albert’s belief
that his hands are full of dangerous germs is not brought about because Albert
had recognized that he has sufficient reasons to believe that his hands are full of
dangerous germs in r (i.e., in the relevant counterfactual world), but because the
process operated on reasons which did not indicate that he has washed his hands for
exactly 10 min.
To ensure a proper relation between the agent’s recognition of the reasons to form
an alternative doxastic attitude (receptivity condition) and the operation of the cog-
nitive process in question that results in the obtaining of the alternative doxastic atti-
tude (reactivity condition) in the relevant counterfactual worlds, a cognitive process
is epistemically reasons-responsive, only if in the relevant counterfactual worlds the
process operates on the agent’s recognition that she has sufficient reasons to believe
otherwise and not just on the reasons the agent has recognized to have. This ensures
that in the relevant counterfactual worlds the alternative doxastic attitude is brought
about because the agent has recognized that she has sufficient reasons to believe
otherwise (i.e., to form the alternative doxastic attitude). McHugh (2013) endorses
this refinement of the reactivity condition of epistemic reasons-responsiveness, for
otherwise his claim that epistemic reasons-responsiveness entails (dispositional)
agential control (cf. McHugh 2013, p. 144f.) does not hold. Agential control is
exercised by conscious mental activity (cf. McHugh 2013, p. 134).
To sum up, although Fischer and Ravizza’s refinement of the reactivity condition
ensures that the alternative state of affairs is brought about because of the reasons
the agent has recognized to have, it does not ensure that the alternative state of
affairs is brought about because the agent has recognized that she has sufficient
reasons to bring about an alternative state of affairs. Fischer and Ravizza’s proposed
connection between the agent’s recognition of reasons and the operation of the
process on these reasons which results in the obtaining of the alternative state of
affairs in the relevant counterfactual worlds is too loose and prone to luck. Moreover,
if only the reasons the agent recognizes but not the agent’s recognition of these
reasons causally contribute to the obtaining of the alternative state of affairs in the
relevant counterfactual worlds, the agent’s recognition of the reasons is redundant
for the obtaining of the alternative state of affairs. This problem arises for all
approaches to reasons-responsiveness that come with a reactivity and a receptivity
condition. Thus, the reactivity condition of approaches to reasons-responsiveness
should be refined in general in the way McHugh is proposing.
If the agent’s recognition that she has sufficient reasons to bring about an
alternative state of affairs causally contributes to the bringing about of the alternative
state of affairs in the relevant counterfactual worlds, the receptivity condition is not
redundant for the obtaining of the alternative state of affairs and one can deal with
the Albert case (and similar cases in the practical domain) in an intuitive way. These
considerations lead to the following refined approach to (strong) epistemic reasons-
responsiveness,28 i.e., strong epistemic reasons-responsivenessM .
Strong epistemic reasons-responsivenessM : Suppose a belief-forming process of type M
of S results in the doxastic attitude D toward p in the actual world. The belief-forming
process of type M of S is strongly epistemically reasons-responsiveM iff it holds that if a
process of type M were to operate and there would be sufficient epistemic reasons to hold
an alternative doxastic attitude D toward p, S would recognize these reasons (receptivity
condition), the process of type M would operate on these recognized reasons as well as
on the agent’s recognition that these reasons are sufficient to hold D toward p, and the
operation of the process would result in S holding D toward p (reactivity condition).
The refinement of the reactivity condition is such that any approach to reasons-
responsiveness – epistemic as well as non-epistemic approaches – which use
the refined reactivity condition (à la McHugh) instead of the unrefined one, can
deal with the problems I have discussed above in an intuitive way. However,
a problem arises for approaches to doxastic responsibility that employ (strong)
epistemic reasons-responsivenessM . In what follows, I will show that for a cognitive
process to be (strongly) epistemically reasons-responsiveM , the cognitive process
28 Therefinement made in this section applies to all reasons-responsiveness approaches that come
with a receptivity and a reactivity condition independent of whether they are strong, moderate or
weak approaches and independent of the domain of reasons to which they apply (i.e., practical,
epistemic, prudential etc.).
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"You may guess what it is, if you like," said Forbes, "but it
would spoil all the fun to show it to you beforehand. Ask me
questions, and I'll answer yes or no."
"Well then, is it heavy?"
"Light?"
"Rather, yes."
"Can I hold it in my hand?"
"Yes."
"Is it long and straight?"
"It's quite straight—particularly so—and rather long."
"I say Forbes—it isn't—no it can't be a walking stick, of

course," said Jack growing excited, and fervently hoping it
was.
"No, but that's not a fair question, you must find out more
about it."
"Is it a useful thing?"
"Decidedly."
"Not too useful I hope," said Jack, somewhat dejectedly.
"I don't know what you mean by too useful—nothing can be

too useful."
"I mean it has nothing to do with lessons—a blotting book,

or slate, or anything of that sort."
"Well yes, it is something of that sort, but I know you
haven't got one, and really want one, I heard you ask
Geoffrey for his only the other day."
"It's a ruler!" said Jack blankly.
"Yes—but not only a ruler. Here, I'll let you feel it, old boy."
Jack felt it.
"It's one of those rulers with a pencil in it," he murmured,

then he added effusively lest Forbes should think him
ungrateful, "thanks awfully, it's jolly, it's awfully kind of
you."
Forbes felt and saw his little brother was disappointed.
"I quite forgot you didn't care for useful things, I like them
myself. But," he added, anxious to raise Jack's spirits, and
to make the best of his present which he felt was a failure,
and unappreciated, "this is a particularly nice ruler—it has a
first-rate pencil in it, and a view of the Grammar School and
Arboretum outside. That's why I got it, I thought you'd be
sure to like it."
"Forbes," said Mr. Hodson, laying a kind hand on the boy's
shoulder,
"you remind me of a verse in Proverbs, 'He that ruleth
his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city.'"
"Thanks awfully," was all that Jack could think of to say,
then after a moment's pause he asked, "What are you going
to give Geoff?"
"I'm giving him a walking stick, a regular wopper. I got it

while you and he were looking after the doll. It has a knob
at the end the size of my fist. I've asked them to send it out
to Hazelbury for me, as I was afraid Geoff would see me
carrying it."
"I say Forbes," said Jack colouring, and in a low voice, "you
wouldn't, I suppose, give Geoff the ruler and let me have
the stick?"
"No, certainly not," said Forbes angrily. "You are an

ungrateful sneaking little scamp, get away with you."
Jack burst into tears at this, and ran past Mr. Hodson and
Geoff, who had overheard Forbes' words, as he had raised
his voice in his anger.
Mr. Hodson turned round and looked at Forbes. The light of

a lamp close by shewed him the indignant light in the boy's
eyes.
"He's gone to complain to nurse now I suppose," he said,

angrily looking after Jack's little figure, as he ran crying up
the drive and into the house.
"Forbes," said Mr. Hodson, laying a kind hand on the boy's

shoulder, "you remind me of a verse in Proverbs, 'He that
ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city.' You
have the chance of being a greater man then even
Alexander—for though he conquered the world, he could not
conquer his own temper, and killed his best friend in a fit of
anger."
"Thank you Sir," said Forbes, "I'll remember."
CHAPTER IV.
TAKING A CITY.
Geoffrey remembered Mr. Hodson's words later in the

evening.
He did not turn in at the garden gate with Forbes, but

telling him he had some business to do before going in to
tea, he gave his presents into his brother's keeping, and ran
down the hill on the summit of which their house stood.
At the bottom of the hill, he came upon a tumbled-down

cottage, standing quite by itself. Old Rachel, of whom Mrs.
Green had told them, lived here.
The thought of Rachel had lain very heavily on Geoffrey's

heart the last two or three days. He could not forget that
she was a mother, and a mother neglected by her only
child, who, when she gave her anything at all, only passed
on to her what she couldn't eat herself. He was thinking of
Rachel when the apple puffs were passed round at dinner.
Now apple puffs was a favourite dish of Geoffrey's, as I
fancy it is of most boys. They looked particularly tempting
to-day, and he ate the first with a relish. It was just as he
was taking his second, that Mrs. Green's words came across
his mind, "and if ever she gives her anything, you may be
quite sure it ain't fit to eat, something they can't eat
themselves because it's turned."
Geoffrey looked at the puff as it lay so invitingly on his

plate. It was three cornered, and a little burnt at the edges,
which made it all the nicer in Geoffrey's opinion, and a nice
layer of white sugar lay on the top.
How good it looked! For a moment the boy gazed at it

undecidedly, then, when no one was looking, he put it into
his jacket pocket, and resolved to take it round to old
Rachel when they came back from Ipswich.
"For once," thought Geoff, "she shall have something that

somebody else wants."
He had had some difficulty in knowing how to stow away his

many presents so as not to crush his apple puff, but he had
managed somehow, and now as he stood outside the door
of Rachel's cottage, he took the puff out and was glad to
find it still whole. It certainly looked very tempting, and
Geoffrey was hungry after his walk. No one would see if
after all he ate it, instead of giving it to old Rachel, and no
one would consciously miss it.
For a moment the boy's resolution wavered, then he

knocked at the door.
Now an apple puff was not a very great thing to give up for
the sake of another, and perhaps some of my little readers
may think that it would not have signified very much if
Geoffrey had eaten it after all. But we must remember, that
life is made up of little things, and the great battle of life,
on which so much depends, consists often of little victories
and little losses, and this small victory that Geoffrey gained
that afternoon helped him in after years to gain a far
greater one.
When he grew up to be a man, there was something he

wanted very much, which was far more worth having than
this apple puff. He wanted it so much that he sometimes
felt he would almost give his life to possess it for ever such
a short time; but somebody else wanted it too, someone
who was weaker than he was, and who perhaps needed it
more than he did, and Geoffrey gave it right up for the sake
of that other.
I do not think he would have acted so nobly when he was a

man, if he had not begun quite early in life to deny himself.
If he had lost this little battle and had eaten the apple puff
outside old Rachel's door, in all probability he would have
lost that greater battle in after life.
"You are old Rachel, aren't you?" asked Geoffrey.
"Well, what if I be?" she answered.
"Come in," said a quavering voice as Geoffrey knocked, and
on entering, he saw a haggard looking old woman, with a
forbidding expression of face, and grey straggling hair,
crouching over a small fire.
"You are old Rachel, aren't you?" asked Geoffrey, who had
never seen her before.
"Well, what if I be?" she answered in a low gruff voice, "I

don't want no one to come interfering with me, leastways a
child. What do you want—eh?"
"I've brought you an apple puff," said Geoffrey, standing

still by the door.
"Shut the door, can't ye," said Rachel shivering, "the

draught's enough to cut one in two. An apple puff is it? That
ain't the kind of food I want, I ought to be fed on arrowroot
I tell ye, and sweet puddings and the like. But Jane never
sends me what I need, it's either somethin' that's turned
bad, or else what I can't eat."
"This is quite new and fresh," said Geoffrey, shutting the

door and coming a little nearer, while he laid the puff on the
table, "perhaps you've never tasted a puff—it's awfully good
—I wish you'd try it."
"That's a likely story, if Jane sent it," said Rachel glancing at

it, and then looking up suspiciously at Geoffrey.
"No one sent it," interposed Geoffrey. "We had them for
dinner to-day, and I thought you'd like one as they were so
good. I'm Geoffrey Fortescue, and I heard of you from Mrs.
Green."
Rachel looked back again at the fire, muttering to herself,

and Geoffrey looked round the room, and thought how bare
it was, and how lonely Rachel looked.
"Haven't you any money to get things with?" he asked.
"Money ain't for such as me: the big folk that don't need it,
they have the money. This world's comforts ain't for me."
"There's Heaven for you," said Geoffrey.
Rachel darted a quick look at the boy, and as she saw the
earnest young face looking at her so pitifully, the expression
on her own face softened, and she shook her head.
"I take it Heaven is a long way off," she said sadly.
"It doesn't seem so very far," answered Geoff, "Mother is

there, and I sometimes feel she's quite close."
"Heaven ain't meant for such as me," muttered Rachel,

cowering closer to the fire.
"I thought God loved everybody, and meant Heaven for the
whole world," said Geoff, "and," he added earnestly, "I'm
quite sure God must want you there, because you are so
lonely."
Rachel wiped away a tear or two with her apron. She had
not cried for many a long day. She had harboured too bitter
thoughts to allow of tears, but to-day, something in the
boy's simple words touched her hard old heart.
"I mustn't stop," said Geoffrey, looking out of the window at

the darkness, "or Nurse won't like it. But I'll ask Mr. Hodson
to come and see you, and I'll leave the apple puff, for it's
ever so good, if you'll only try it."
Rachel nodded her assent to the last sentence, but added:

"But don't you bring no parsons to see me. I don't want no
parsons here, unless," she added with a sob, and beginning
to rock herself backwards and forwards, "unless he can tell
me the way straight and plain to Heaven. I'd like to know
that."
Closing the door softly after him, Geoffrey ran as fast as he

could to Mr. Hodson. Although he ran the risk of a scolding
from Nurse for being late, he felt that Rachel must not be
left in her misery.
He arrived at the house nearly breathless, and told his

friend what had happened.
Mr. Hodson, who had together with the Vicar for many a
year tried in vain to overcome Rachel's objection to see a
clergyman, was glad enough of the news Geoffrey brought
him, and prepared at once to go and see her.
"Mr. Hodson," said Geoffrey anxiously, "God loves her,

doesn't He? And He won't turn her away from Heaven, if
she asks to be let in."
"If Rachel really wants to find God, He certainly will not turn
her away," answered Mr. Hodson. "The Lord Jesus Christ has
made a way there for us all, and old Rachel's way is the
same as yours and mine. Do you remember the story
Geoff," he added, as he put On his coat to start off at once,
"of the man who saved his children by making a bridge of
his own body from the window of his burning house to that
of the opposite one? The houses were very near together,
and he could reach from one window to another."
"His children one by one crossed over his body into safety,
and just as the last child was saved, the house fell in, and
the man was killed. When the Blessed Lord Jesus died on
the Cross, He made a bridge for Rachel, and for you and for
me to Heaven. You see, I have good news for your old
friend, Geoff my boy, so you run home as fast as you can or
you'll get a scolding."
And Geoff did get a scolding. Nurse met him at the door.
"Master Geoff," she cried, "I'm downright ashamed of you

for setting the children such an example. There I've been
worrying after you for the last twenty minutes, and thought
you'd come to some accident or other. I'm downright
ashamed of you."
"I had some business to do," said Geoffrey, trying to pass

her. But Nurse placed her portly figure in his way.
"Business! A chit like you talking of business! What'll you

come to next, I wonder. You're a naughty boy and ought to
be ashamed of yourself. What business have you had to do,
I should like to know, except to be a good obedient boy.
That's the business you ought to be doing I take it."
Geoffrey flushed angrily. His mother never scolded him in

this way, and he had often run messages for her as late as
this by himself.
"Let me pass, Nurse," he said angrily, trying to push past

her, "I've not been doing anything wrong."
"Nothing wrong!" exclaimed Nurse, catching hold of his

arm. "Nothing wrong to make me that anxious about you
that I didn't know what to do—nothing wrong that you've
kept us all waiting for tea, and have set a bad example to
all the children. I'm ashamed of you Master Geoff. Now I
should like to know what you've been about, and I mean to
know too."
But at the sight of the bread and water, he lost his temper
completely,
and taking up the glass, he threw it on to the ground.
Now Geoff did not wish to tell Nurse about the apple puff,
and felt exceedingly angry at being treated like a little boy,
and held by the arm in this way. So raising his hand he
struck nurse's arm as hard as he could, and then pale with
anger, he rushed into his bedroom and locked the door.
"Well I never!" ejaculated nurse. "If that isn't a wicked

temper, I don't know what is."
When she went back into the nursery a few minutes

afterwards, she informed the children that Geoff had been a
naughty boy, and was to have no tea that evening, but that
Forbes might put a glass of water and some bread outside
his door, but was not to speak a word to him.
Forbes, in utter astonishment at his elder brother being

punished in this way, obeyed wonderingly.
Now it was a great pity that Geoffrey had not at once

explained to nurse the cause of his absence. She might
have given him a slight scolding, for not asking her leave
before going, but her kind heart would have sympathized
with him, in his wish to do a kindness.
But Geoffrey's pride had stood in the way. He could not

endure being treated like a little boy, and scolded like a
naughty child, and as he paced up and down his room, his
indignation rose, and reached its climax when he heard
Forbes' footstep outside, and the sound of him quietly
laying down his tea, as he supposed, by his door without a
word. Was he to be treated then like a mere baby? And to
be held in disgrace like Jack or Dodie would have been, if
they had been naughty?
He opened his door impatiently to call after Forbes to take

away his tea, but at the sight of the bread and water, he
lost his temper completely, and taking up the glass, he
threw it on to the ground, smashing it to pieces. Then
locked his door again, and would not open it, though nurse
shook it violently.
Then it was that Mr. Hodson's words about Alexander came

into his mind, and Geoffrey stood quite still in his walk.
"'He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a

city,'" thought Geoff.
Half an hour afterwards, to Forbes' intense astonishment,

Geoffrey appeared in the nursery and apologized to nurse.
Nurse said nothing, but going to the cupboard, she mixed

some gregory powder in a wineglass, saying, "anyone who
shows temper like that, I take it, must be ill. There my
dear," she added kindly, "you drink that, there's a good boy
—and you'll feel better to-morrow."
And Geoff drank it to the dregs, and in so doing was greater

than Alexander the Great.
CHAPTER V.
"POOR LITTLE LAD."
Geoffrey could not fail to acknowledge to himself that after

all, Nurse had been wise in putting Dodie into a frock with
high neck and long sleeves, for the winter was unusually
severe.
Snow lay for several days some inches thick in the garden,
and though the boys enjoyed the snowballing well enough,
and were able to keep themselves thoroughly warm, little
Dodie seemed to feel the cold very acutely, and often came
in from her daily walk crying from the pain of freezing
fingers.
In fact, the child did not seem herself, and Nurse began to
grow uneasy about her, particularly as in seven days' time,
Major Fortescue was expected and she was naturally
anxious that all the children should be looking their best on
his arrival.
In Geoffrey's eyes, Dodie seemed to be growing thinner and

smaller altogether, and a terrible fear seized him lest she
was going to be ill, and would be so when his Father
arrived.
As the days past, he gave up snowballing, and spent his
time in the nursery with Dodie, who was not allowed out.
"I think the cold has struck her," said Nurse, as one day she
altogether refused to eat her dinner. "I've a mind to send
for Dr. Booth, the powders I've been giving her don't seem
to be what she wants."
Geoffrey laid down his knife and fork, feeling a sudden

disinclination for the mutton and dumplings before him.
"Do you think Dodie is going to be ill?" he asked anxiously.
"I hope not, my dear, but it ain't like her to turn away from
her food, and she has a nasty little cough that don't get
better. Anyways I'll ask Dr. Booth to look in, there can't be
no harm in that. There, there my darling," she added,
taking Dodie on to her knee, "don't cry, there's a pet."
Nurse looked down at Dodie's little face which was lying on

her arm.
"I don't like the look of her," she murmured more to herself
than to anyone else, "her eyes are too bright to be natural,
and she's restless, poor little dear." Then louder she added,
"Geoff, you might run down when you've finished your
dinner and ask the doctor to be so good as to look in. You'd
catch him before he starts out on his rounds if you're
quick."
"Dr. Booth," he said,—looking up into the Doctor's face—
"will Dodie be well by the time Father comes home?"
Geoffrey, who had listened with a beating heart to all Nurse

had said, sprang up at once, and not heeding Nurse's
injunction to finish his dinner first, ran off at once for the
Doctor, and returned again in an incredibly short time.
To his excited imagination, the few minutes that elapsed

between leaving the message at the doctor's door and his
arrival seemed hours, and then at last his ring was heard,
and a minute after, he stood looking at Dodie, who still lay
in nurse's arms.
Geoff did not move his eyes from his face, till Nurse
suddenly looking up and becoming conscious of the three
little listeners who stood around, ordered them all
peremptorily out of the room. Geoffrey, however, waylaid
the Doctor as he left.
"Dr. Booth," he said, standing with his hands thrust deeply

in his pockets, and looking earnestly up into the Doctor's
face as he put on his coat in the hall, "will Dodie be well by
the time Father comes home?"
The Doctor shook his head somewhat ominously.
"That I can't tell you, my boy," he answered, as he buttoned

up his coat and smoothed his collar, "with care I hope your
little sister will get well before very long—but it will require
care—and I can't say exactly when she will be herself
again."
"Is she going to be very ill?" asked Geoff.
The doctor turned away somewhat hurriedly from the

anxious face looking up into his, and fidgeted a little
nervously with his hat before putting it on. Then clearing his
throat, he looked round again and patted the boy on the
head saying, kindly:
"Care and physic do wonderful things, my boy—for all I
know, your little sister will be having a game of snowballing
with you this day week."
"I do hope she'll be well by the time Father comes," said

Geoff with a sigh.
"Oh well—who knows!" said Dr. Booth jovially—and

ramming his hat on his head, he nodded to Geoff, and in a
minute more was driving away from the house, but not
away from the remembrance of those anxious eyes that had
been raised so beseechingly to him,—which remembrance
made him shake his head, murmuring "poor little lad."
When Geoff went up to the nursery, he saw Nurse had been

crying, but when he asked what the Doctor really thought of
Dodie, she told him she had no time to talk and that he had
better go down to the other boys in the schoolroom as
Dodie had to go straight to bed, and mustn't be disturbed
by any noise.
Geoffrey did as he was bid, but with a heavy heart, feeling

quite sure that Nurse's tears meant that Dodie was very ill.
He could not play with Forbes and Jack, or even read, but
sat by the fire, looking silently at the red coals, for an hour
or more.
It was the greatest relief when Nurse at last came down and
told him he might go upstairs and watch by Dodie's crib
while she had her tea, and that was the beginning of a
continual watching on the boy's part. Nurse finding how
gentle and tender he was, and how noiselessly he could
move about when he liked, did not object to his spending
many hours by Dodie's crib, and indeed, in her great
anxiety, she began to be thankful for the boy's presence.
For the Doctor's report of Dodie had been serious. The child

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An Externalist Approach to Epistemic

Responsibility Intellectual Norms and

Responsibility : the epistemic condition First Edition

Curiosity as an Epistemic Virtue Nenad Miš■evi■

An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism:

Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy Ivan

Epistemic situationism 1st Edition Abrol Fairweather

Normativity : epistemic and practical First Edition.

The epistemic dimensions of ignorance First Paperback

Multidisciplinary Approach to Osteoporosis From

Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6607

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Normative epistemology has long focused solely on epistemic evaluations of

1 This list is not supposed to be exhaustive.

1 Doxastic Responsibility and Direct Doxastic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

3 Intellectual Norms and Epistemic Normativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

1.1 Doxastic Responsibility and Doxastic Guidance Control

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1

attitude toward a proposition iff S is a proper subject to responsibility assessment

1.1.1 Doxastic Guidance Control

1.1.1.1 Responsiveness to Reasons

Reasons-responsiveness is a property of a mechanism- or a process-type4 which

5 Below, I will distinguish between different kinds of reasons-responsiveness when I introduce

conditions. According to them, a process/mechanism of type M of S is practically reasons-

condition of doxastic guidance control. However, my argument for the assumption

1.1.2 Direct and Indirect Doxastic Control

The approach to direct doxastic control identifies types of reasons-responsive

1.2 Intentional Doxastic Control

that epistemic agents are psychologically unable to exercise intentional doxastic

18 Such an argument against epistemic responsibility is discussed by Levy (2007).

1.3 Evaluative Doxastic Control

The extent to which a belief-forming process has to be responsive to epistemic

19 The name “evaluative doxastic control” is inspired by Hieronymi (2006, p. 53).

1.3.1 Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness

In this section I want to clarify what an epistemic reasons-responsive belief-forming

relevant counterfactual worlds as it is required for strong reasons-responsiveness, or it may contain

The operation of a process on reasons is independent of the agent’s recognition

Fischer and Ravizza emphasize that reasons-responsiveness of a certain process

23 I chose strong epistemic reasons-responsiveness as an example. The consideration of this

an alternative doxastic attitude25 D toward p, S would recognize these reasons (receptivity

The refined reactivity condition of (strong) epistemic reasons-responsivenessF R

"Well then, is it heavy?"

"Can I hold it in my hand?"

"Is it long and straight?"

"It's quite straight—particularly so—and rather long."

"I say Forbes—it isn't—no it can't be a walking stick, of

"Is it a useful thing?"

"Not too useful I hope," said Jack, somewhat dejectedly.

"I don't know what you mean by too useful—nothing can be

"I mean it has nothing to do with lessons—a blotting book,

"It's a ruler!" said Jack blankly.

Jack felt it.

"It's one of those rulers with a pencil in it," he murmured,

Forbes felt and saw his little brother was disappointed.

"I'm giving him a walking stick, a regular wopper. I got it

"No, certainly not," said Forbes angrily. "You are an

Mr. Hodson turned round and looked at Forbes. The light of