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PALGRAVE PIVOTS IN SPORTS ECONOMICS

An Economic Roadmap
to the Dark Side of Sport
Volume II: Corruption in Sport
Wladimir Andreff
Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics

Series Editors
Wladimir Andreff
Emeritus Professor
University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Paris, France

Andrew Zimbalist
Department of Economics
Smith College
Northampton, MA, USA
This mid-length monograph series invites contributions between
25,000–50,000 words in length, and will consider the economic analy-
sis of sports from all aspects, including but not limited to: the demand
for sports, broadcasting and media, sport and health, mega-events,
sports accounting, finance, betting and gambling, sponsorship, regional
development, governance, competitive balance, revenue sharing, player
unions, pricing and ticketing, regulation and anti-trust, and, globali-
zation. Sports Economics is a rapidly growing field and this new series
provides an exciting new publication outlet enabling authors to generate
reach and impact.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15189
 Wladimir Andreff

An Economic
Roadmap to the Dark
Side of Sport
Volume II: Corruption in Sport
Wladimir Andreff
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Paris, France

ISSN 2662-6438 ISSN 2662-6446 (electronic)

Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics
ISBN 978-3-030-28478-7 ISBN 978-3-030-28479-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28479-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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 Introduction

This book focuses on the economic facets of the dark side of sport and
warns against those manipulations, dysfunctions, distortions and crimes
triggered by economic interests or even naked greed in sports. It gathers
publicised facts and cases referring to economic manipulations and builds
up a typology of sport manipulations which makes sense from an eco-
nomic standpoint.
The book is divided into three volumes. Volume I shows that sports
ethics and integrity are at bay as soon as economic manipulations, dys-
functions and distortions breach the sports rules, and violate managerial
rules and the law and infringe human rights in sport.
Volume II is about a darker phenomenon that is corruption in sport
and focuses on those manipulations and misbehaviours that nurture deci-
sions which are influential on sporting outcomes such as match-fixing and
on sport economic development such as corrupt sports governing bodies.
Volume III deals with the most economically significant manipulations
which definitely jeopardise the future of current modern globalised sport,
that is rigged online sport betting and doping. This is the darkest side of
sport that seriously threatens sport integrity and credibility in the long run.
In Volume II, corrupt sport is road-mapped as such. Over past dec-
ades the sports industry “experienced multiple forms of corruption
(fraud, bribery, and institutional) that ranged in extent (individual to
systematic), occurred in varying contexts (non-profit, for profit sports,
sport events, governance, and international and online betting), and
resulted in a multitude of consequences (sanctions, financial costs,

v
vi INTRODUCTION

diminished reputations, employee turnover, and increased oversight).

The complexity and multidimensional nature of sports corruption have
been well established in the business management, politics, and sociol-
ogy literature; maybe less in sports economics. Certain forms and types
of corruption are unique to the sports industry (tanking, match-fixing,
spot-fixing,)” but, since they encompass a financial dimension, they
belong to the economic dark side of sport (Kihl et al. 2017).
Corruption is unfortunately more common than often assumed in
sport business, but it is usually achieved in such a way as to be undetecta-
ble. Only detected corrupt sports will be seen in this Volume which is far
from being all of them. After surveying sampled cases of corrupt sport,
the volume will end up with a brief reminder of the standard economics
of crime applied to corruption in sports, from which are derived the cur-
rent recipes and policies to combat corrupt sport.
First, it is briefly sketched that corrupt sport may refer to and fit with
different definitions of corruption; then it is to be distinguished between
corruption from within sport and, more often witnessed, corrupt sport
that interlinks sport insiders (athletes, coaches, referees, managers) and
sport outsiders whoever they are (Chapter 1). Next, Chapter 2 focuses
on match-fixing as the most widespread wrong practice of corruption
that affects different sports worldwide, in particular football (soccer)
where a typical technology of fixing has been studied.
A different kind of corruption affects highest decision-makers and
voting members in executive committees of sport governing bodies,
namely when awarding international sports competitions to host cities
or countries. The IOC with the Olympics, FIFA with the World Cup
and some other international federations are covered as cases in point
(Chapter 3) which reveal corruption as the outcome of weak and defi-
cient governance structures—that is an institutional failure calling for
deep reforms. The usual framework to analyse corruption is standard
economics of crime which can be adapted to corrupt sport and from
which are derived current recipes to combat corruption in sport; going
further to tackle governance issues, a deeper reform of sport governing
bodies is then suggested (Chapter 4).

Reference
Kihl, L. A., Skinner, J., & Engelberg, T. (2017). Corruption in sport: Understanding
the complexity of corruption. European Sport Management Quarterly, 17(1), 1–5.
 Contents

1 Corruption in Sport: Insiders and Outsiders 1

1.1 Corruption from Within Sport 3
1.1.1 On-the-Spot Petty Corruption 3
1.1.2 Barter Corruption and Its Statistical Detection 5
1.2 Corruption with Insiders and Outsiders: Point Shaving 7
References 11

2 Match-Fixing 13
2.1 Match-Fixing in Soccer 15
2.1.1 Match-Fixing in the Big Five 15
2.1.2 Match-Fixing in Other European Leagues 26
2.1.3 Match-Fixing in Non-European Leagues 32
2.1.4 Match-Fixing Globalisation 35
2.1.5 Match-Fixing Through Club Ownership 37
2.2 The Technology of a Fix in Soccer and Detection
at Random 37
2.3 Match-Fixing in Other Sports 40
References 50

3 Corruption in Sport Governing Bodies 53

3.1 The Olympics and the International Olympic Committee 54
3.2 The Soccer World Cup and FIFA 59
3.3 Corruption in Other Sport Governing Bodies 67

vii
viii CONTENTS

3.4 Deficient Governance and Corruption 70

References 72

4 Economic Analysis and Anti-corruption Policies 75

4.1 Corrupt Sport and Beckerian Standard Economics
of Crime 76
4.2 Current Recipes to Combat Corruption in Sport 81
4.3 Improving Governance of Sport Governing Bodies? 85
4.4 Towards a More Radical Reform of Sport Governing
Bodies 86
References 90

Conclusion: Digging the Grave of Modern Sport? 93

Index 95
 Acronyms

AFC Asian Football Confederation

AIBA Amateur International Boxing Association
ARJEL  Autorité de Régulation de Jeux en Ligne (Regulation Authority
for Online Games), France
ATP Association of Tennis Professionals
CAF  Confédération Africaine de Football (African Football
Confederation)
CAS Court of Arbitration for Sport
CONCACAF Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Football
CONMEBOL Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol (South American
Football Confederation)
CPBL Chinese Professional Baseball League, Taiwan
CPI Corruption Perception Index (One by World Bank, One by
Transparency International)
EPL English Premier League
FA (English) Football Association
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, USA
FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association (International
Federation of Association Football)
FIFPro  Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs
Professionnels (International Federation of Professional
Footballers)
IAAF International Association of Athletics Federation
IBF International Boxing Federation
ICC International Cricket Council

ix
x ACRONYMS

IFs International Sports Federations

IHF International Handball Federation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOC International Olympic Committee
IPL Indian Premier League, cricket
ISU International Skating Union
ITF International Tennis Federation
IVF International Volleyball Federation
IWF International Weightlifting Federation
MNCs Multinational Companies
NBA National Basketball Association, US
NCAA National Collegiate Athletic Association, US
NFL National Football League, US
OM Olympique de Marseille, Soccer Club
PNF  Parquet National Financier (National Financial Prosecutor),
France
PSG Paris-Saint-Germain, Soccer Club
TIU Tennis Integrity Unit (ITF)
UEFA Union of European Football Associations
USOC United States Olympic Committee
WADA World Anti-Doping Agency
WPBSA World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association
 CHAPTER 1

Corruption in Sport: Insiders and Outsiders

Abstract Corrupt sport fits with different definitions of corruption

according to various criteria. It is to be distinguished between corrup-
tion from within sport and corrupt sport that interlinks sport insiders
(athletes, coaches, referees, managers) and sport outsiders whoever they
are. Corruption from within primarily pertains to on-the-spot petty cor-
ruption and barter corruption. The latter is hard to detect and calls for
statistical detection. More frequent interactive insider–outsider corrup-
tion is illustrated in this chapter with point shaving.

Keywords Corruption · Petty corruption · Barter corruption ·

Point shaving · Sport insiders

While fraud and corruption in sport are nothing new, sociologists

(Brooks et al. 2013) assess that the context in which acts of corruption
occur is now different, primarily due to commercialisation and economic
globalisation of sports. Transparency International offers a general defi-
nition of corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”
(www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define). Maennig (2006,
784) defines corruption “as the use of a position by its occupant in such
a way as to fulfill the tasks required of the occupant by the employing
institution in a manner consciously at variance with the objectives of
that institution; such activity results from a desire for advantages for the

© The Author(s) 2019 1

W. Andreff, An Economic Roadmap to the Dark
Side of Sport, Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28479-4_1
2 W. ANDREFF

position’s occupant (or, if that occupant is acting as principal agent, for

acquaintances, relatives, associated organisations, parties or nations) from
the person or institution benefiting from the actions”. Corruption in
sport often refers to a more restrictive understanding in tune with Gorse
and Chadwick’s (2013) definition mentioned in Volume 1.
Maennig (2005, 189) suggests that, in sport, “corruption may take
the form of behaviour by athletes who refrain from achieving the level of
performance normally required in the sport in question to win the com-
petition and instead intentionally permit others to win, or behaviour by
sporting officials who consciously perform their allocated tasks in a man-
ner at variance with the objectives and moral values of the relevant club,
association, competitive sports in general and/or society at large”.
Senior (2006) provides an understanding of corruption that helps in
the development of a sports-focused definition, arguing that in order
for corruption to occur, five conditions have to be met simultaneously
“when a corruptor (1) covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to
a nominee to influence (3) action(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor or
a nominee, and for which the corruptee has (5) authority”. Such defi-
nition obviously fits with match-fixing, probably less with some other
occurrences of corrupt sport covered in this chapter. According to
Senior, there has to be a benefit to at least one person in the arrange-
ment. The benefit may be tangible, in the form of a lucrative sponsorship
or endorsement agreement, or intangible, the promise of higher status
within a team, if one follows Gorse and Chadwick. Whatever the defini-
tion, corruption is a core part of the dark side of sport.
Transparency International classifies corruption as “grand, petty or
political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where
the corruption occurs. Grand corruption involves actions at a high level,
which distort policies or functions of the state. Leaders tend to bene-
fit from this. Petty corruption involves the abuse of entrusted power
by low- or middle-level functionaries, and involves access to goods and
services, often essential. Political corruption involves manipulation of
rules or institutions in the location of resources” (Kihl et al. 2017). In
the same vein, a typology of sport corruption was elaborated, taking as
its criterion the economic significance of the corruption impact, starting
from the bottom with petty corruption for increasing individual income
up to top worldwide financial manipulation of sporting outcomes
through online betting-related match-fixing networks with millions of
euro at stake (Andreff 2016, 2019). The causes range from the simple
 1 CORRUPTION IN SPORT: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 3

bribe to multinational crime syndicates seeking to manipulate sporting

events across the globe (Kihl et al. 2017).
In this chapter, a classification of corrupt sport is retained that dis-
tinguishes corruption by sport insiders only from corruption where out-
siders are involved in coordination with ever necessary insiders and from
corruption of decision-makers (or voters) in sport governing bodies.

1.1  Corruption from Within Sport

Corruption is first considered as a forbidden or criminal economic
behaviour among sport insiders that are participants, athletes and play-
ers, coaches, referees, umpires, sport officials and managers from club
level up to international sport governing bodies. Benefits can be signif-
icant at an individual (or team) scale when they count in thousands of
euro or dollars. When it comes to international corrupt networks and
mafias the figures may reach some millions of euro or dollars. Corruption
within sport may also aim at distorting sporting outcomes for a sporting
(non-monetary) benefit which is very significant for a sport participant
or a team in terms of ranking, promotion or relegation. This occurrence
is coined barter corruption when there is no money stream involved or
when money is only a subsidiary benefit compared to the sporting one.

1.1.1   On-the-Spot Petty Corruption

This is “a kind of corruption which emerges between sport insiders,
no one of the corrupt or corruptors operate from outside the sports
industry. The most ancient type of corrupt sport is the one spontane-
ously emerging during the course of a sporting contest, say on-the-spot,
between two competitors or two teams. Competitor A bribes competi-
tor B to let him/her win instantaneously. Or competitor A would bribe
opponent B to accept helping him/her to win in the face of a third
opponent. Such on-the-spot corruption is not planned in advance and
occurs when an opportunity of securing a win randomly appears in the
progress of a sport contest. It is a sort of petty (as distinct from heav-
ily criminal) corruption that distorts a sporting outcome without endan-
gering anyone’s life or creating a huge societal issue” (Andreff 2016). It
has been defined as spontaneous corruption in the case of match-fixing,
i.e. the emergence of unexpected cooperation between rival agents in a
sport contest (Caruso 2008). Such behaviour is peculiar because teams
4 W. ANDREFF

need not agree to fixing the match before it is played. It suffices that
players on the pitch, or riders in a race, speak with each other and come
up with an oral implicit contract trading a sporting win (or a loss) for a
bribe.
Collusion is a low-profile variant of corruption. Caruso (2008) evi-
denced spontaneous cooperation between rivals in sport contests. In a
soccer match, players of the two teams speak with each other or simply
signal to the opponents, by kicking the ball aimlessly and lazily, their
willingness to exert fewer efforts fix the result. Such corruption usually
involves monetary payments, i.e. bribes.
In the 1903 cycling Tour de France, Lucien Pothier and César Garin,
brother of Maurice Garin, ceded overall victory to the latter, taking
instead second and third place—the amount of the bribe is unknown.
However, four months after the end of Tour de France, all three riders
were disqualified by the French cycling federation and Henri Cornet
(ranked 4th) was declared the winner.
Jan Raas bribed Gregor Braun on 24 April 1982 to let him win the
Amstel Gold Race, according to a French sports journalist, J.M. Leulliot
(Bourg 1988). In long distance cycling races like the Tour de France,
winning a stage happens to be bargained between two riders who finish
ahead of the peloton, eventually one rider bribing the other in the range
of between €10,000 and €20,0001 with a variance depending on race cir-
cumstances and the type of—mountain or not—stage (Andreff 2015).
In the 1997 Tour de France, during the 20th July stage, Jan Ullrich
(Telekom) on the brink of winning the Tour accepted to let Richard
Virenque win the stage in Courchevel. Bruno Roussel (head of Festina
team) and Willy Voet (Virenque’s trainer) alleged later that the bribe
was amounting to 100,000 French francs (€15,000). In the 1996 Tour,
Swiss Laurent Dufaux (Festina) was alleged to have paid 30,000 French
francs (€5000) to Bjarne Riis for letting him win in Pamplona.
Jérôme Chiotti, the winner of the world cross-country cycling cham-
pionship in 1999 admitted that the event was plagued with bribing and
collusion between riders about monetary gain sharing. In June 1979,

1 To be compared to the prize for a stage winner in the 2013 Tour de France that was

€8000 while the second-ranked rider of a stage was winning €4000. Accepting a €15,000
bribe for “throwing” the stage, a corrupt second-ranked rider comparatively would increase
his gains (4000 + 15,000 – 8000 = 11,000) and would be financially worth off than if he
had been winning the stage (11,000 > 8000).
 1 CORRUPTION IN SPORT: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 5

Joseph Voegeli, the director of the cycling Tour de Suisse suspected the
two strongest teams, Ti-Raleigh and Ijsboerke-Warncke Eis, respectively
coached by Peter Post and Willy Jossart, to have colluded to take over
the lion’s share of prizes (180,000 Swiss francs), and decided to fine
both teams (1000 Swiss francs each) given an article in the Swiss Tour
rules that was forbidding “collusion between riders of different teams”.

1.1.2   Barter Corruption and Its Statistical Detection

Another type of petty corruption between sport insiders works without
money. In such barter corruption, an athlete or team A on the brink of
being relegated downwards in the sporting hierarchy, and thus in abso-
lute need of a win, offers an athlete or team B to let him/her win. The
bribe is not paid in cash but later on with some planned losses accepted
by A in further matches against B. Barter corruption is difficult to detect
since there is no money stream or other material indices. Since empiri-
cal substantiation of barter corrupt practices is unlikely to appear in typ-
ical data sources, a fascinating methodology consisting in creative use of
existing data was implemented by Duggan and Levitt (2002) to detect
corruption in Japanese professional sumo wrestling.
The incentive structure of promotion in sumo wrestling leads to
gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a win-
ning record and their opponents. A sumo tournament involves 66 wres-
tlers participating in 15 bouts each. A wrestler who achieves a winning
record (eight wins or more) is guaranteed to rise up the official ranking.
A wrestler with a losing record falls in the ranking. The critical eighth
win results in a promotion rather than relegation.
Duggan and Levitt used a data set of over 64,000 wrestler matches
(32,000 bouts) between January 1989 and January 2000 which shows
that 26% of all wrestlers finished with exactly eight wins compared to
only 12% with seven wins. Distinguishing between match rigging and
wrestler effort, a statistical analysis showed an excess win likelihood of
between 12 and 16% for wrestlers on the bubble from which the authors
concluded that wrestlers win a disproportionate share of the matches
when they are on the margin. Increased effort cannot statistically explain
the findings. Thus there is a significant probability that in a match involv-
ing a wrestler on the bubble, the two wrestlers collude in favour of the
former’s win—that is match rigging and corruption though without
money at stake. If this assumption were to be correct, one must find
6 W. ANDREFF

some sort of compensation (a payment-in-kind) provided to the wrestler

who accepted collusion for losing the match.
The likelihood that the two wrestlers will meet again soon is high. In
the data set, 74% of the wrestlers who meet when one is on the mar-
gin for eight wins will face one another again within a year. From there
comes a second statistical test that confirmed collusion-corruption. The
wrestler who was on the margin in the last meeting is statistically less
likely to win the next match with the same opponent than would other-
wise be predicted. The statistical evidence is that wrestlers who were on
the bubble do much worse in the next meeting with the same opponent,
losing 10% more frequently than would be expected, which is consistent
with the match-rigging hypothesis.
The statistical finding is consistent with the fact that part of the
compensation for throwing a match is non-monetary and consists in
the promise of the opponent returning the favour in the next meeting.
Wrestlers who are victorious when on the bubble lose more frequently
than would be expected the next time they meet that opponent, suggest-
ing that part of the payment for throwing a match is a future payment-
in-kind. Reciprocity agreements between stables of wrestlers appear to
exist, suggesting that collusive behaviour is not carried out solely by indi-
vidual actors. In 2000, the Japanese press published articles where two
former sumo wrestlers made public the names of 29 wrestlers who they
alleged to be corrupt and 14 wrestlers who they claimed refuse to rig
matches. Moreover, match rigging disappears in times of increased media
scrutiny.
The Japanese Sumo Association attempted to eliminate the economic
basis of match rigging in 2000 in changing the incentive structure of
wrestlers on the margin; moreover, the level of public scrutiny increased.
Both changes led to a significantly lower number of rigged matches until
2003 (Dietl et al. 2010). However, after the period of publication pro-
cess, from 2003 to 2006, the abnormally high winning probabilities of
wrestlers on the margin in bubble matches reappeared as well as their
loss in the next match with the same opponent with an abnormally high
probability. Such a result confirms Duggan and Levitt’s findings that the
structure of promotion-relegation provides sumo wrestlers with incen-
tives to rig matches.
Statistical detection of sport corruption is actually fascinating.
However, it requires a detailed data set that is not evenly available in all
sports. Moreover, the same creative use of data would not work with
 1 CORRUPTION IN SPORT: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 7

team sports since it is much more difficult or impossible to detect in

statistics of a match between two teams which one of the players have
thrown the match. Now, once detected that way, the question remains
to know whether this kind of corruption detection is more credible than
through the emergence of a match-fixing scandal in the media. Another
question is whether a court would make its judgement only relying on a
statistical demonstration.

1.2  Corruption with Insiders and Outsiders:

Point Shaving
Most typical corruption in sports is when athletes or players on the pitch
intend—have an ex ante objective—to throw the match. However this
objective is often linked to a reward (a bribe) promised by some sport
outsider—sometimes an insider as well—to players or athletes if they
reach a sporting outcome fixed in advance by the corruptor. Players
cheat for money though less and less using crystal clear visible acts such
as an own goal, a voluntary penalty or expulsion. More often they resort
to voluntary defensive fouls that are not blatant and much less suspi-
cious; or they simply play with delivering less than their maximum effort.
Most of the next types of corrupt sports covered in Volume 2 involve
sport outsiders, often coined corruptors or criminals. Both point shaving
and match-fixing (dealt with in Chapter 2) are antithetic to maximising
outcome uncertainty in matches and sports contests since by definition
they attempt to render match outcomes certain, at least for those agents
holding the relevant information.
Point shaving is a type of corruption where the perpetrators try
to prevent a team from covering an ex ante published point spread.
Obviously, spread betting invariably motivates point shaving. Point
shaving is a specific kind of corrupt sport practice in which an athlete
is promised money (a bribe) in exchange for an assurance that his/her
team will not cover the point spread. The bribed players’ team may still
win but not by as big a margin as predicted by bookmakers. The cor-
rupting gambler then bets on that team’s opponent or a narrower spread
and pays the corrupt players with part of the proceeds from a winning
wager.
Favourites are more likely to shave points than underdogs. For
an underdog to commit not to cover the spread implies committing
to losing the game while the favourite can both win and not cover.
8 W. ANDREFF

Thus, the payment required to motivate the underdog not to cover is

typically larger than that required to induce the favourite to shave
points. A point shaving scheme generally involves a sport gambler and
one or more players of the team favoured to win the game. Alternatively,
a coach or a referee may be bribed either with the same outcome: an
uncovered point spread. Finally, players can presumably place bets them-
selves and manipulate the spread accordingly. In the US, Nevada casinos
are potentially instrumental to gamblers who manipulate point shaving.
Some cases of point shaving were documented, first of all in NCAA
basketball because the scoring tempo and the ease by which one player
can influence key events (missing shots, fouls) in such a way that his/
her team fails to cover the point spread without causing them to lose the
game. The incentive for corruption derives directly from the asymmetric
incentives of players, who care about winning the game, and gamblers,
who care about whether a team covers the spread.
The most famous examples of point shaving in NCAA basketball are
the City College of New York point shaving scandal in 1950–1951,
the Dixie Classic scandal in 1961, the Boston College basketball scan-
dal in 1978–1979, the Tulane men’s basketball point shaving scandal in
1984–1985, which led the university disbanding its programme for four
seasons, and the Arizona State University scandal in 1994. In the lat-
ter, a player, Stevin Smith, was paid $80,000 to affect the point spread
of four games. Smith realised it would be difficult to do it alone, so he
enlisted his teammate Isaac Burton and paid him a total of $4300 over
two games.
In the Northwestern University scandal (1995), two Northwestern
players made sure that they lost by more than the point spread. The
scheme worked for the first two games. In the third game against
Michigan, a 30-point favourite, the two players were unable to lose by
more than 30 points and took huge monetary losses. The FBI started
investigating, one player ended up serving two months in prison while
two other players each served a month. The most recent unveiled point
shaving dates back to 2017 when Joe Gagliano, from the Chicago
Board of Trade, offered $50,000 a game to Hedake, an Arizona State
University player, if he could give him the outcome or control the out-
come of two games. Then Gagliano placed bets in 30 Las Vegas casinos
on a first game to lay off half-million dollars and used bookmakers across
the Midwest to bet another $500,000. The bets caught the attention of
the Las Vegas sports books, the NCAA and, ultimately, the FBI.
 1 CORRUPTION IN SPORT: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 9

Indeed, point shaving was found to be operating in NCAA basketball

“by comparing bet and game outcomes with those in professional sports.
In examining 44,120 men’s college basketball games played between
1989 and 2005, Wolfers (2006) offered evidence that point-shaving
occurs far more frequently than previously believed and estimated that
at least 1% of games in college basketball involve gambling corruption,
while 6% of strong favourites shave points” (Andreff 2016). Strong
favourites—particularly strong home favourites—tend to win more often
than is suggested by the spread. However, Wolfers’ study was criticised
for not taking into account a regression effect that may be attributable
to errors in estimating home-court advantages (Johnson 2009). This is
not to say that point shaving does not exist but it might be less wide-
spread than Wolfers contends it, with policy implications: do not change
the structure of the NCAA basketball betting markets to one based on
winning margins alone, as suggested by Wolfers, and keep using point
spreads.
A different contention is found in Borghesi (2008) and Borghesi and
Dare (2009). First, since median NBA and NFL salaries are over $1 mil-
lion per year, corruptors would have to gamble an enormous amount of
wealth to profit after paying the bribe.2 Thus point shaving is less likely
to occur in professional sports than in college sports. Second, comparing
point shaving in the NCAA with the NBA and NFL results suggest that
unusual patterns previously suspected to be indicators of point shaving
are ubiquitous throughout sports and unlikely to be caused only by cor-
ruption. Given that the expected utility of point shaving is likely to be
negative for professional athletes, Borghesi concluded that the unexpect-
edly high rate at which strong favourites in NCAA basketball win and fail
to cover is unlikely to be caused by widespread point shaving.
Instead Borghesi pushed forward an alternative explanation which
is the possibility that sports books intentionally bias (inflate) the lines
against strong favourites in order to maximise profits. Such prac-
tice, which is coined line shading, would produce the observed under-
performance of strong favourites relative to market expectations. In
general sports book managers are concerned primarily with balanc-
ing their books. They prefer to avoid taking a position in which their
profit depends significantly on the realised outcome of a sporting event.

2 Volume 3 will show that with networked online betting indeed the amounts placed can

be enormous.
10 W. ANDREFF

However, for a particular subset of games, sports books managers have

an opportunity to improve their risk return trade-off. Though impossible
to test so far, line shading was reported to be an observable practice in
Las Vegas casinos. By the same token, legal and illegal gambling markets
are thus intertwined because illicit bookmakers often balance their posi-
tions by placing bets at legitimate sports bookmakers.
In the same vein, Paul and Weinbach (2011) through a number of
tests found little evidence of point shaving in NCAA basketball. Big
underdogs who cover the point spread receives about 37% of the betting
dollars while big underdogs who do not cover the spread nearly 36% of
the action. Strategies of betting on underdogs who receive a dispropor-
tionate share of the betting dollars do not win often enough to reject
market efficiency overall, thus confining point shaving scandals more to
the exception than the rule. Paul and Weinbach suggest that, although
point shaving by the best teams may explain their results, an alternative
hypothesis is simply that sports books set prices a bit too high, result-
ing in big underdogs winning more often than implied by strict market
efficiency.
Eventually, Diemer and Leeds (2013) found that the distribution of
games is bimodal, with one peak on one side of the no-corruption out-
come and one peak on the other side. Such finding is consistent with
point shaving by favourites, who lose by too little, and underdogs who
lose by too much. Although on average, the outcome is consistent with
the no-point shaving hypothesis.
North American football is also subject to point shaving though it is
less common than in basketball. When a scandal occurs in this sport, it
often involves the quarterback throwing bad passes and even intercep-
tions, and usually involves the referees. In the University of Toledo case
(2007), a running back player admitted that he accepted $500 to fumble
in a 2005 bowl game.
A hot debate was running in the US about whether legalising sport
wagering (beyond the Nevada exception) would be likely to curb or alle-
viate point shaving namely in collegiate sports. Fearing point shaving
scandals, NCAA opposed sports betting legalisation. Eventually, in May
2018, a Supreme Court decision (see Volume 3) gave states the right to
legalise wagering on sports. However, the next step to disincentive col-
lege sports players to shave point would be to legalise paying the ath-
letes, an even hotter debate.
 1 CORRUPTION IN SPORT: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 11

Concluding this chapter, one must stress that corruption in sport

cannot proceed without proactive participation or cooperation of sports
insiders. Sport outsiders may or may not be involved. This boils down
to saying that one way or another corruption is rooted in sports and not
“imported” into sport by criminals; the latter always take stake of insid-
ers’ weaknesses and misbehaviours such as looking for easy money, gifts,
bribes and other greed-fuelled perks. This should be kept in mind when
designing anti-corruption policies in sport that, of course, first must
address criminals’ behaviour though without neglecting to crack down
and sanction insiders as well.

References
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imbalance and doping. In D. Van Reeth & D. J. Larson (Eds.), The Economics
of Professional Road Cycling (pp. 233–255). Heidelberg: Springer.
Andreff, W. (2016). Corruption in sport. In T. Byers (Ed.), Contemporary Issues
in Sport Management: A Critical Introduction (pp. 46–66). Los Angeles:
Sage.
Andreff, W. (2019). The unintended emergence of a greed-led economic system.
Kybernetes, 48(2), 238–252.
Borghesi, R. (2008). Widespread corruption in sports gambling: Fact or fiction?
Southern Economic Journal, 74(4), 1063–1069.
Borghesi, R., & Dare, W. (2009). A test of the widespread point-shaving theory.
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Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Participation (pp. 63–82). Oviedo: Ediciones de la Universidad de Oviedo.
Diemer, G., & Leeds, M. A. (2013). Failing to cover: Point shaving or statistical
abnormality? International Journal of Sport Finance, 8(3), 175–191.
Dietl, H. M., Lang, M., & Werner, S. (2010). Corruption in professional sumo:
An update on the study of Duggan and Levitt. Journal of Sports Economics,
11(4), 383–396.
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sumo wrestling. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1594–1605.
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Sport: A Statistical Analysis. Report to the Remote Gambling Association,
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Centre for the International Business of Sport, Coventry University Business

School.
Johnson, N. (2009). NCAA “point shaving” as an artifact of the regression effect
and the lack of tie games. Journal of Sports Economics, 10(1), 59–67.
Kihl, L. A., Skinner, J., & Engelberg, T. (2017). Corruption in sport:
Understanding the complexity of corruption. European Sport Management
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Handbook on the Economics of Sport (pp. 784–794). Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Paul, R. J., & Weinbach, A. P. (2011). Investing allegations of point shaving
in NCAA basketball using actual sportsbook betting percentages. Journal of
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 CHAPTER 2

Match-Fixing

Abstract Among the variety of match-fixing situations, this c­hapter

focuses on those where the object of the fix is primarily to obtain a
sporting loss, often in view to getting a financial return from an associ-
ated betting scheme. Soccer gathers the great bulk of match-fixing cases
namely in the European Big Five leagues but also in other leagues world-
wide. Match-fixing has globalised together with football economic glo-
balisation, sometimes using club ownership as a lever. Match-fixing has
spread to cricket, baseball, basketball, American football, boxing, ten-
nis, figure skating, snooker, sailing, among other sports, including some
amateur sports.

Keywords Match-fixing · Fix · Betting · Economic globalisation ·

Soccer

It has become commonplace to refer to proven match-fixing cases as the

tip of an iceberg, but given that the rest of the iceberg is hidden it is
impossible to exactly know its size. Jacques Rogge, a former IOC pres-
ident, has once argued that match-fixing is a bigger threat overshadow-
ing sports than doping. Match-fixing causes economic effects which are
exclusively positive for the deviating actors as long as their behaviour is
not detected, but negative for everyone once the manipulation is actually

© The Author(s) 2019 13

W. Andreff, An Economic Roadmap to the Dark
Side of Sport, Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28479-4_2
14 W. ANDREFF

unveiled (Emrich and Pierdzioch 2015). Match-fixing falls under three

distinct categories:

a. Match-fixing undertaken for sporting reasons, for instance throw-

ing a match to pave an easier way in the next step of a competition;
this kind of match-fixing is close to or confused with tanking (see
Volume 1).
b. Corrupt match-fixing where the object of the fix is to obtain a
sporting loss, often in view to getting a financial return from
an associated betting scheme; which is the topic of the present
chapter.
c. Corrupt online betting-related match-fixing that involves influenc-
ing the game—not necessarily obtaining a sporting loss—to achieve
the fix and consequently earn substantial monetary gain from
rigged bets online (see Volume 3).

Match fixers will target the most influential agents, primarily referees and
umpires then goalkeepers, which does not exclude bribing other crucial
(defensive) players or even attacking players for readily missing goal-scor-
ing opportunities. All the bribed insiders will decisively influence the
match outcome in a manner that raises as little suspicion as possible.
Referees are especially under the spot since they are often in high-pres-
sure situations when they have a difficult decision to make while their
power to influence the match outcome is high by calling fouls against
players. Indeed “before sport economic globalisation and online betting,
a major opportunity for corrupt sport to emerge was already found in
sport gambling which provides an opportunity to fraud since it creates an
incentive to lose a sport contest through match-fixing in view to making
money against the likelihood of a sport performance.
During the past four decades, the number of revealed corruption
scandals increased in modern sports, namely in boxing, US college bas-
ketball, South Korean, Swedish and Turkish basketball, English, Indian,
Kenyan and South African cricket, French handball, Australian and
English rugby, African, Asian, European and Latin American soccer,
Japanese sumo wrestling, Austrian, Russian and Serbian tennis, South
Korean volleyball, and Chinese and English snooker” (Andreff 2016).
The list is in no way exhaustive.
 2 MATCH-FIXING 15

2.1  Match-Fixing in Soccer
Soccer is the most focused sport as far as match-fixing is concerned.
Most European soccer leagues are plagued with match-fixing. A Europol
investigation that ran from July 2011 to January 2013, alleged that,
from 2008 to 2011, about 680 matches were suspected of having been
fixed in relation with rigged bets in European soccer with 425 players,
referees, officials and serious criminals involved, from more than 15
countries. Europol announced that among the 680 suspected matches,
380 were eventually identified as fixes in Europe and 300 from other
regions. Indeed, a number of fixers were found to belong to a sophis-
ticated cartel of criminals based in Asia, in particular in Singapore. In
2013–2014, 460 European soccer matches were suspected by bookmak-
ers to be fixed (and for 110 the fix was practically certain). Some cases
are picked up below to exemplify that match-fixing has plagued many
soccer leagues. Starting from the Big Five European professional soccer
leagues, one can show afterwards that match-fixing has spread worldwide
in soccer.

2.1.1   Match-Fixing in the Big Five

All the Big Five soccer leagues are plagued to a different extent by
match-fixing.
England
Forrest (2018) reminds us of the “Great Good Friday Fix” of 1915
where players from both teams conspired to manufacture a victory for
Manchester United over Liverpool, helping to save the winners from rel-
egation to the second division. Manchester United defeated Liverpool
2-0 while players from the two teams had bet on such result. Four mem-
bers of each team were banned from soccer for life.
A next highly publicised English FA case in the early 1960s saw ten
professional players jailed for offences from match-fixing and suffering
an effectively career-ending ban from playing; they had bet against their
own club. In 1962, Jimmy Gauld approached Sheffield Wednesday player
David Layne, a former teammate at Swindon Town, suggesting that
Wednesday were likely to lose their game against Ipswich Town. Two
other players, Peter Swan and Tony Kay, were involved to ensure the out-
come. The three all bet against their own side in the match, which Ipswich
Town won 2-0. On the same day, two other fourth division matches,
16 W. ANDREFF

Lincoln City against Brentford and Oldham Athletics against York City
were fixed by Gauld and his syndicate. In 1963, Esmond Million and
Keith Williams playing with Bristol Rovers were fined and banned from
football for life by the FA for having taken bribes from Gauld to throw
a match against Bradford Park Avenue. Eventually, ten former or current
players were sent for trial at Nottingham Assizes in 1965.
Gauld, described by the judge as the central figure of the case received
a sentence of four years in prison. It was established that he has earned
£3275 from betting on soccer matches and £7420 from having sold his
confessions to the Sunday People. Overall 33 players were prosecuted and
ten were sentenced to shorter imprisonment than Gauld and banned
from soccer for life.
Harry Gregg, goalkeeper for the successful Manchester United team
of the early 1960s claimed in his autobiography (Gregg 2002) that sev-
eral of his (unnamed) teammates regularly made money by betting
against the team and underperforming. At that time, players were just
beginning to benefit from pay increase after a capped maximum wage of
£20 per week in 1960.
The highest-profile case of match-fixing in English soccer involved
a number of players from the Premier League during the 1990s. The
most famous was an accusation against Bruce Grobbelaar, long-time
goalkeeper for Southampton and Liverpool, of accepting money from
a Chinese Triads’ bookmaker to throw matches. Together with John
Fashanu and Hans Segers, he was accused by the Southampton court,
on 11 October 1995, of corruption for having fixed two 1st division
matches. Fashanu was suspected to have offered £40,000 to Grobbelaar,
Liverpool goalkeeper at that time, to favour the Newcastle win (indeed
Newcastle won 3-0) on 21 November 1993. He also paid £19,000 to
Hans Segers, Wimbledon goalkeeper, to favour Liverpool on 22 October
1994 (Liverpool won 3-0).
Globelaar did not dispute that he had received £40,000 for providing
expert tips on soccer results but he claimed this had not influenced his
on-field performance. After two trials and one appeal, the judges even-
tually declared that it was implausible that he was paid so much money
simply to forecast results. Notice that while it was an individual criminal
behaviour, match-fixing was still operating without a network of corrup-
tors a quarter of century ago.
In 1997, soccer officials suspended two EPL matches—West Ham
vs. Crystal Palace and Arsenal vs. Wimbledon—after the stadium lights
 2 MATCH-FIXING 17

lost power. Each match had entered the second half, so by the rules of
Asian bookmaking, bets on these matches had to be paid based on the
score as it stood. Known as the Floodlights Affair, it was the first inci-
dence of Asian-backed match-fixing in the English league. A stadium
security guard and three Asian men—two Malaysian nationals and a
Hong Kong native—were found guilty of conspiracy charges related to
match-fixing (Precrimbet 2016).
A less publicised case was an Accrington Stanley vs. Bury game in
the English fourth tier league—Division 2—which attracted an unusual
betting activity with almost £300,000 (instead of a £20,000 usual aver-
age) placed before the kick-off on an Accrington Stanley loss, in July
2008. Bury won the match 2-0. But an FA investigation revealed that
five Accrington Stanley players were guilty of betting on Bury to win the
match. They were given fines (between £2000 and £5000) and suspen-
sions (the longest was one year). It is one of the simplest cases where
players bet on a match in which they are involved.
Since then, in 2014, the FA has prohibited betting either directly or
indirectly by participants on the result, progress or conduct of any match
or competition played in any part of the world. Betting is also banned on
players’ transfers, employment of managers, team selection or disciplinary
matters and to provide bettors with inside information. The devil is in the
details of enforcing these new rules all. To some extent, match-fixing in
the English championships in the past recent years illustrated globalisa-
tion of corruption in sport since those approaching the players or referees
to throw matches came from illegal gambling consortia mainly based in
South East Asia, but also Qatar and Central Eastern Europe.

Italy
In Europe the corrupted palm in soccer returned, ahead of England,
to Italy. As early as in 1927 the Italian Football Federation revoked the
championship just won by Torino Calcio since its managers bribed a
Juventus soccer player before the Turin derby.
The very existence of Totonero—an illegal betting system parallel to
the official Totocalcio—where the risks and gains were greater resulted in
a large number of games that were fixed four decades ago in Italian soc-
cer. Certain players participated in distributing the receipts and manipu-
lating match outcomes. In 1980, a Totonero case involved 19 players who
were suspended or banned for life for betting on games in which they
were playing. For their role in the scandal, Lazio Rome and AC Milan
18 W. ANDREFF

were relegated to the second division and Avellino, Bologna, Palermo,

Perugia and Taranto each had five points deducted in the 1980–1981
season. A similar case unveiled in 1986 led to punishment for a larger
number of clubs and players but only one club (Udinese) in Serie A was
affected.
Fixing a match with a referee has a crucial role in affecting its out-
come as it was revealed by the Calciopoli case which apparently lasted
from 1994 to 2006. In the 1994–1995 championship one minute before
the end of Juventus-Brescia match, the referee offered a non-existing
penalty to Juventus. Again in 1999, AS Rome was found to corrupt
referees and sanctioned. In Italian Serie A, the assignment of referees is
extremely complex and highly discretionary. Matches are classified differ-
ent levels (the so-called griglie) depending on their importance for the
championship final outcome. Many referees in each griglia are selected
on the basis of (non-publicly) evaluating their past performance (Boeri
and Severgnini 2008).
The Calciopoli case revealed significant referee corruption which
affected Serie A from 2004 to 2006. In 2006, some Juventus Turin’s
managers were convinced of rigging 18 matches through corrupting
referees, and the club was relegated for that. In May 2006, this major
scandal was uncovered by Italian prosecutors after tapping phone con-
versations in relation with an investigation at Juventus with regards to
the 2004–2005 football season. They found that the general manager of
this soccer club, Luciano Moggi, had a large number of contacts with
referees, football federation officials and journalists during the 2004–
2005 championship, won by Juventus. These contacts were finalised to
rig matches by choosing referees favourable to Juventus. Referees were
selected by a team of former referees with whom Moggi had extensive
telephone conversations. The telephone calls were tapped on an investi-
gation about the use of doping by Juventus team, proving that sport cor-
ruption through match-fixing is often unveiled only by chance. Referee
assignment is the weakest link in the sport chain which is targeted by
corruptors.
In the Calciopoli scandal, it was alleged that implicated referees tar-
geted important players with red cards prior to facing implicated teams,
so that those players would be ruled ineligible in such matches; this strat-
egy has a lower likelihood of detection than calling a red card during the
course of the fixed match. Such tricky strategy used by Moggi was to ask
referees to give a red card to the most important players of a rival team
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
He raised an arthritic hand to his forehead, wiped away a glistening
film of sweat. Presently: "Mr. Bartlett, I'm afraid you don't understand
the situation at all. Your perspective is so warped by wrong thinking
that 2 and 2 fail to make 4 to you, either by multiplication or addition.
"Don't you see that Julia has to die? Can't you understand that, even
though she is innocent, her reputation is still hopelessly tainted by
your illicit affections? Can't you realize that I wouldn't save her even if
I could?"
I did realize finally, though his fanaticism stunned me. He was more
than a mere zealot; he was a monster. But if Julia was his goddess,
marriage enforcement was his god. He could not buy a guarantee of
his goddess' purity if the price involved the desecration of his god. He
needed my confession desperately, but he didn't have the authority to
torture it out of me and he couldn't pay the price I had asked. My one
hope of escape had turned out to be a pretty worthless item.
But it was still my only hope. If I could find another way to use it, it
might still net me my freedom, and Julia's too.
There was one way. It was drastic and it might not work; but it was
worth a try. "All right, Taigue," I said. "I understand your position.
Bring Julia here and I'll confess."
"Bring her here? Why? All you have to do is admit you coerced her to
alter the data cards. Her presence isn't necessary."
"It's necessary to me."
He looked at me for a moment, then turned abruptly and left the cell.
He told the patrolman, whom he had posted by the door, to wait, then
he disappeared down the corridor. The patrolman closed the cell door
but didn't bother to lock it. He didn't need to. The bludgeon gun in the
crook of his arm was a sufficient deterrent.
Presently I heard Taigue's returning footsteps. They were
accompanied by other footsteps—light, quick footsteps. My heart
broke the barrier I had erected around it, rose up, choking me.
When I saw her shorn hair I wanted to cry. Her face was more like a
little girl's than ever, but the blue eyes gazing straight into mine were
the eyes of a mature woman. There was regret in them, but no
shame.
I turned away from her. "Dismiss your assistant," I told Taigue. "What
I have to say is none of his business."
Taigue started to object, then changed his mind. With the
reassurance he so desperately needed at his very fingertips, he
wasn't in the mood to argue over trivialities. He took the patrolman's
bludgeon gun, sent him on his way, re-entered the cell and closed the
door. He leaned against the genuine steel panels, directed the
muzzle of the gun at my chest.
"Well, Mr. Bartlett?"
"You asked for this, Taigue," I said. "You wouldn't have it any other
way. Julia, come here."
She stepped to my side. Seizing the lapels of her Hester Prynne
prison dress, I ripped it down the middle and tore it from her body.
 CHAPTER VI
Julia shrank back, trying to cover her nakedness with her arms.
Taigue became a statue, a statue staring with horrified eyes at a
shining goddess who had abruptly deteriorated into a mere woman. I
tore the gun from his grasp before he could recover himself and
bludgeoned him beneath the heart. But his eyes were glazed even
before the charge struck him. I looked at him disgustedly as he sank
gasping to the floor. The self-righteous idealism with which he had
clothed Julia had been even thinner than the earthly clothes I had
ripped away.
I turned to Julia. She had retrieved the prison dress, had slipped into
it, and was improvising a catch to hold it together. Her face was white
but her eyes were dry. I searched those eyes anxiously. I don't know
why I should have been relieved to find understanding rather than
anger in them, but I was relieved—more relieved than I would have
cared to admit.
"Can you pilot a 'copter?" I asked.
She nodded. "I've been piloting them since I was twelve."
"There's a 'copter port on the roof. If we can reach it, we've got a
chance. I don't know where we'll go, but we'll go somewhere—"
"We'll go to Mars, Roger. If you're willing." She had finished repairing
her dress and stood calm and poised before me.
"This is no time for jokes," I said.
"And I'm not joking. There's a ramp not far from here that will take us
to the roof. Come on, Roger!"
We peered up and down the corridor. It was empty. I followed Julia
down the grim passage. In the distance, the arena entrance was
bright with afternoon sunlight. At the first intersection, she turned
right. The new passage was narrow, dimly lighted. At its far end a
ponderous stone door opened reluctantly to the pressure of our
shoulders and we found ourselves at the base of a sharply slanting
ramp.
"You seem to know this place like a book," I said. "Were you ever in
the cell block before?"
She nodded. "I visited my mother often before she was stoned."
"Your mother! Stoned?"
"Yes. Stoned. That's why I'm a ghoul. Hurry, Roger!"
We started up the ramp. After a dozen yards, it turned abruptly,
became a steep spiral. Breathing was difficult, conversation
impossible. Now and then, a slit of a window looked out into the
crowded amphitheater.
The port boasted one derelict 'copter and one guard. The guard had
his back to us when we crept cautiously onto the roof. He must have
sensed our presence, for he turned. But I doubt if he ever saw us.
The charge from my gun struck him in the side before he even
completed his turn, and he crumpled to the sun-drenched concrete.
We were aboard the 'copter in an instant. Julia's experienced fingers
made deft maneuvers on the control panel and then we were aloft,
soaring over the amphitheater, the sky blue above us, the stoning
platform a chiaroscuro of gray- and black-garbed men and women
below us. The arena proper was a bleak expanse of packed dirt,
unrelieved by a single blade of grass. I could hear the obscene
murmur of the crowd above the whirring of the blades.
There was a telescreen above the control panel. I turned it on to see
if our escape had been discovered. Apparently it had not been, for
the scene coming over the single channel was the same I had just
witnessed, viewed from a different angle. The telecamera had been
set up opposite the arena entrance so that the upper echelon
members of the hierarchy, who could afford such luxuries as TV sets,
would have an excellent view of the expected chastisement.
The announcer was intoning the sixth commandment over and over
in a deep resonant voice. I lowered the volume and turned to Julia.
We were over the parsonage apartments now, headed in a northerly
direction.
"Don't you think it's time you told me where we're going?" I said.
"I told you before but you wouldn't believe me. We're going to Mars,
provided you're willing, of course. And I'm afraid you haven't much
choice."
"Stop being ridiculous, Julia. This is a serious situation!"
"I know, darling. I know. And if the ship has already blasted, it will be
a far more serious situation."
"What ship are you talking about?"
"The Cadillac-ship; the Ford-ship; the Plymouth-ship. Call it what you
will. Cars are made of metal, so are spaceships. By applying the right
temperatures, and the right techniques, dedicated people can
transform Cadillacs and Fords and Plymouths into highways to the
stars."
I was staring at her. "The ghouls—"
"Are people like myself—the new Pilgrims, if you like. Pilgrims sick of
a society that evades population control by consigning its marriages
to a computer deliberately designed to produce incompatible unions
that will result in few, if any, children. Pilgrims who want no more of a
civilization victimized by an outdated biblical exhortation, exploited by
false prophets hiding behind misinterpretations of Freudian
terminology."
The hives were flickering beneath us, gaunt precipices flanking
narrow canyons. The verdure of the Cadillac Cemetery showed in the
distance, and beyond it, eroded hills rolled away.
"I'm glad you did alter our data cards," I said after a while. "But I wish
you'd done it for a different reason. I wish you could have loved me,
Julia."
"I do love you," Julia said. "You see, darling, I couldn't accompany the
colonists without a husband and I didn't want the kind of a husband
the integrator would have given me. So I computed my own marriage.
That was why I was so rude to you at the Cathedral. I—I was
ashamed. Not that it was the first marriage I'd computed, but all the
others—like Betz's and Kester's—involved people who were working
on the ship, people who were already in love. There—there wasn't
anyone in the group whom I cared for myself, so I had to look
elsewhere. You and I are ideally suited, Roger. I didn't need the data
cards to tell me that—all I needed was my eyes."
We were high above the Cadillac Cemetery and she was looking
anxiously ahead at the rolling, dun-colored hills. "If only they haven't
left yet," she said. "The last Cadillac we exhumed provided enough
metal to finish the ship. But perhaps they waited for us."
A sudden crescendo in the murmur of the waiting crowd in the
Coliseum brought the TV unit back to life. Slowly, the murmur rose
into a great vindictive roar. Glancing at the screen, I saw the reason
why.
The charcoal-uniformed figure that had just stepped through the
arena entrance was unmistakable. The distance was considerable,
and the eyes appeared only as dark shadows on the thin, haunted
face. But I could visualize the terrible guilt burning in their depths; the
consuming, the unbearable guilt—
I watched the first stone with horror. It missed, rolled to a stop in the
dirt. The next one missed, too. But the one after it didn't, nor the one
that followed. Taigue sank to his knees, and the stones became a
murderous hail. And then, abruptly, it was all over, and Taigue lay
dead and bleeding on the stone-littered ground, the scarlet letter he
had pinned to his breast vivid in the merciless sunlight.
Thou shalt not look at a woman and lust—
Taigue had kept faith with himself to the end.

We were drifting over the hills. "There," Julia said suddenly. "There's
the one, Roger!"
It looked like all the others to me—drab, scarred by innumerable
gullies, lifeless. But when Julia opened the door of the cockpit and
leaned out and waved, the gullies rivened, and the whole hill opened
up like an enormous metallic flower.
I saw the ship then, the tall burnished ship poised on its concrete
launching platform. I saw its name—the Mayflower II.
We drifted down past the tapered prow, the gleaming flanks. The
other Pilgrims were already aboard. Betz and Kester waved to us as
we passed the open lock. We stepped out upon the launching
platform. The ship towered above us. The lathes and presses and
furnaces of the subterranean factory stood silent in the gloom around
us.
I looked at Julia. Her eyes were iridescent with relieved tears, her
smile tremulous with happiness. "Mars, Roger," she whispered. "The
ship can make it. But perhaps the old colony has perished and we'll
have to start a new one. It won't be easy, darling. But will you come?"
I felt the way Samuel Fuller and Christopher Martin must have felt five
centuries ago, standing on a lonely wharf in Southampton. The way
William White and John Alden must have felt—
No, not quite the way John Alden had felt. I already had my Priscilla
Mullins. I bent and kissed her. Then, hand in hand, we ascended the
spiral gang-plank of the Mayflower II to begin our journey to the New
World.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PILGRIMS'
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