Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

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‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political Phenomenon

David Lane

To cite this article: David Lane (2009) ‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political Phenomenon,
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25:2-3, 113-135, DOI:
10.1080/13523270902860295

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 ‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political
Phenomenon

DAVID LANE

Different forms of political change from putsch to revolution are described and
‘coloured revolutions’ are analysed as revolutionary coups d’etat. Conditions promot-
ing and retarding the success of such movements are discussed and cases of ‘decremen-
tal relative deprivation’ are discovered which predisposed the public to insurgency.
Conditions for success involved a united and organized opposition with an alternative
ideology and political policy. Counter-elites when in power neither carry out revolu-
tions nor promote democratic development. An unintended consequence of democracy
promotion is that autocratic regimes learn to counteract it and in so doing weaken
genuine civil society associations.

Following the transformation of the European state socialist countries in the

period after 1989, the East European countries formed several distinct
blocs: the new members of the European Union, those that aspired to
membership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) and a group of only
partially reformed countries (Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). In several of these countries ‘coloured’ revolutions
have occurred: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan
(2005). These public protests have adopted a colour (orange for Ukraine, rose
for Georgia) as a symbol to identify their supporters and the character of the
movement, although Serbia is referred to as a ‘bulldozer’ revolution. In 2005,
in other countries with a similar economic and political trajectory (Russia,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) comparable events were initiated although they
were thwarted before they occurred or were successfully suppressed. Such
phenomena, moreover, are not restricted to the former state socialist societies,
Lebanon had its ‘cedar’ revolution in 2005 and George W. Bush referred to

David Lane is a Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. His previous posts include Professor of
Sociology at the University of Birmingham, and Reader in Sociology at the University of Essex.
He has written extensively on the USSR and state socialism, Marxism and socialism, class and
stratification; his more recent writings have focused on transformation of state socialism, globa-
lization and civil society, and the enlargement of the European Union. Research in this article
was supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2– 3, June– September 2009,
pp.113–135
ISSN 1352-3279 print/1743-9116 online
DOI: 10.1080/13523270902860295 # 2009 Taylor & Francis
114 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

the ‘purple’ revolution in Iraq as the coming of democracy after the 2005
elections.
These processes have been linked to the earlier wave of ‘transitions from
autocratic rule’.1 Portugal’s ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ of April 1974 is
seen as the beginning of this movement, which ‘crested’ with the collapse
of communist regimes in 1989.2 However, the Portuguese ‘revolution’ was
more like a military coup in which, to express solidarity with the people,
soldiers carried carnations in the muzzles of their rifles and tank guns. This
coup-like character continued, I shall argue, in the later coloured revolutions.
The activities given the popular appellation of ‘coloured revolutions’ all
had in common a proposed socio-political transformation intended to intro-
duce ‘democracy from below’. Although differing in content, they shared a
common strategy: mass protests occurred within the constitutional framework
to widen forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as
a movement for ‘greater democracy’: they were all targeted on removing the
incumbent political leaderships; electoral procedures, allegedly fraudulent,
were a regular focus for the insurgents; the public gatherings were constituted
from a mass base of young people, particularly students. In comparison with
traditional political demonstrations, a novel feature was the orchestration of
events through the use of modern media technology – mobile phones, the
internet and assistance from local and foreign media. The demonstrations,
in support of a supposedly democratic champion, once under way were
accompanied to a greater or lesser degree by mass cultural events: rock and
pop music, which helped mobilize, create solidarity, and entertain mass
audiences.
The promotion and organization of these popular manifestations required
considerable resources – propaganda, musicians, entertainers – and even the
organizers and participants received payment and subsistence during the
events. While these protests were legitimated in democratic terms, whether
they achieved ‘democratization’ is another matter. It is also debatable
whether this type of political event constituted a ‘people’s revolution’ or a
form of coup d’état.

The International Perspective

It is clear that these public events were cumulative and sequential in the sense
that the earlier successful protest activity (particularly in Serbia and Ukraine)
acted as positive models for subsequent demonstrations.3 However, they each
had their own peculiarities dependent on local circumstances, the configur-
ation of elites, and the predispositions of people to mobilization. Such con-
ditions provided the opportunity for public demonstration, the lack of such
opportunity, or the suppression of it.
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 115
Analysis of the coloured revolutions requires an international perspective.
Proponents of democracy promotion have widely utilized the work of, and
protest techniques defined by, Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democ-
racy.4 All had moral and financial support from external sources, particularly
Western foundations supporting democratic institutions and processes. A form
of ‘soft’ political power was utilized by the West to undermine established
governments. Such policy is derived from the ideas of writers such as
Joseph Nye, who have advocated a shift from the use of military force and
coercion to the promotion of internal change through manipulation of the
norms and values of citizens.5 Through the use of multiple channels of com-
munication, the projection of the domestic achievements and international
performance of the West is likely, claims Nye, to be to the advantage of the
USA and Europe. ‘Attraction’ can refer to political values (democracy,
freedom, justice), cultural artefacts (pop music, art) and consumption articles
(McDonald’s food, mobile phones). Promotion of internal change through
manipulation of the norms and values of citizens is a major strategy.
The countries that are likely to gain from soft power are those closest to
global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the
most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose
credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.
These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States
and Europe.6
Foreign policy, derived from this standpoint, involves support of civil-
society associations to pursue, by peaceful and legitimate means, regime
change in authoritarian states. This position has been adopted by successive
American administrations. George W. Bush, in his inaugural address in
2005, made clear that ‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and
support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture’.7 Policies of ‘democratization’ abroad are an important part of
the neo-conservative value of creating an international order of values associ-
ated with American (and its allies’) ways of doing things. Support of coloured
revolutions that contest allegedly fraudulent elections in authoritarian states are
forms of ‘soft power’. Unlike the 1974 ‘Revolution of Carnations’ in Portugal,
which had a leftist orientation advocating not only democratic reforms but also
the nationalization of property, the political complexion of the ‘coloured’
revolutions has been right-wing. The insurgents have emphasized freedom,
rights to private property, market mechanisms and opposition to state regulation.
Moreover, in appropriate cases, they have advocated support for joining Western
alliances such as NATO and the European Union (EU).
Most Western interpretations of the ‘coloured revolutions’, academic and
journalistic alike, have emphasized their positive intentions and consequences
116 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

and legitimated them as part of the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization identified

by Samuel P. Huntington.8 They ‘remov[ed] authoritarian leaders from politi-
cal power . . . What we have witnessed in the postcommunist world, therefore,
is an unexpectedly successful diffusion of electoral revolutions . . . where illib-
eral leaders were replaced by their liberal counterparts’.9 Such writers project
‘the electoral model of regime change’.10 ‘[E]lections are the indicator of
democracy – a form of government that has become a global norm’.11 Such
writing borders on the political authorization of an electoral process that is
a tool in neo-conservative politics. By limiting the definition of ‘democracy’
to a narrowly conceived political mechanism,12 the concept is emptied of any
policy outcomes on, and continuous deliberation of, public issues.13
Critics argue that what appear to be popular revolutions are disguised
coups d’état. Opposition forces – counter-elites – who are unable to mobilize
effectively against incumbent governments, organize revolutionary events to
galvanize support and legitimate a transfer of power through popular elec-
tions. Natal’ya Narochnitskaya14 argues that the ‘voice of the people’ is an
illegitimate use of modern media technology (television, radio and the
press) to create public opinion to force political change. Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), with powerful sponsors, become political bodies
working through networks and the media – rather than being rooted in civil
society and acting on behalf of citizens. Sponsors,15 directly or indirectly
financed by outside governments, become involved in insurgent activity,
defining democracy in terms of their own conceptions and magnifying election
frauds to promote and legitimate a coup d’état to their political advantage.
The accusation of ‘fraud’ is sometimes made before the election results
are counted and follows a campaign of discrediting the incumbent power-
holders. Exit polls are an instrument of politics, and once election fraud is
declared it is amplified by the media. The initial claim of ‘election fraud’
in Ukraine, for example, was based on exit polls in October 2004 and
again in the following month showing the challenger, Yushchenko, as
victor. These claims set the political scene – the ‘taken for granted’ political
assumptions – that election fraud had taken place. In the case of the failed
‘revolution’ led by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia in
February 2008, despite statements by international observers that the elec-
tions were close to European standards and that few irregularities took
place, opposition media reports asserted that the election was accompanied
by ‘brawling, threats and manipulation’.16 Like the other phenomena dis-
cussed here, the Armenian disturbances had the character of an attempted
coup d’état by a former politician supported by crowds estimated at
between 10,000 and 50,000 in number.
What is portrayed in the media as ‘people’s power’ is in reality an elite-
manipulated demonstration. While the masses may be captivated by euphoric
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 117
revolutionary ideology, they are in political terms instruments of indigenous
counter-elites, often encouraged by foreigners with their own agendas. If
successful, rather than such revolutions leading to significant socio-political
change, a circulation of elites follows the ousting of former rulers or their
co-option into a new elite structure. The coloured revolution phenomenon is
a new type of political movement that needs to be fitted into a paradigm of
political change. In this essay, I first consider different forms of political
change. Second, I conceptualize the coloured revolutions as novel types of
revolutionary activity: a combination of public protest and coup d’état – a
revolutionary coup. Third, I consider the conditioning factors leading to the
rise of the phenomenon of the coloured revolution. Finally, I consider the
extent to which ‘coloured revolutions’ might be a success or a failure.

Types of Political Change

In analysing political change, one may distinguish between a putsch, a coup
d’état and a revolution. The criteria used to define these types of political
change are:

. type of organization of political activity;

. level of public participation;
. intentions of the insurgents and counter political elitism; and
. the consequences.

The definition of various types of political change in terms of organization,

level of public participation and intentions of insurgents and counter-elites
is summarized in Table 1. A putsch may be defined as a sudden illegitimate
overthrow of a ruling elite by another competing elite (for example, the
installation of a military regime in place of a political one); the level of
public participation is low, the objectives of the insurgents are to replace
the existing elite with a new one. A coup d’état is an illegitimate replacement
or renewal of one governing set of personnel by another (e.g. the substitution
of a ruling faction of a political party by another from that party or another
party). For both of these political processes relatively little public participation
is needed, either in the overthrow or in the defence of the incumbents; and they
have by intention no significant social or economic effects.
A revolution is a more complex process. Charles Tilly defines a ‘revolu-
tion’ as ‘a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at
least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control
the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the
state’s jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc’.17 This definition
is similar to that of Goodwin,18 who defines a revolution as any and all
118 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

TABLE 1
T Y P E S O F P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E : P U T S C H , C O U P D ’ É T A T , P O L I T I C A L / S O C I A L
REVOLUTION

Type of Intentions of
Political Type of Level of Public Insurgents or Consequences, if
Change Organization Participation Counter-elites successful

Putsch Counter-elite Low Elite replacement New elite

led
Coup d’état Elite or Low Governing elite New personnel in
counter- renewal ruling elite
elite led
‘Classical’ Counter-elite Very high: Redress public New political class,
Political/ led mass push grievances reconstituted
Social from below through institutions,
Revolution fundamental including
replacement of property relations
political class and
socio-economic
system

instances in which a state or government is overthrown by a popular move-

ment in an extra-constitutional or violent manner. However, these approaches
ignore the type of social movement, the level of popular participation and the
policy intentions of the insurgents. There are different kinds of ‘revolution’.19
A maximalist definition of a social or political revolution requires not only
mass participation but also an ideology on which is predicated a fundamental
replacement of the political class and socio-economic system. Moreover,
major changes take place in the social and economic system consequent on
the political transformation of the ruling elites by a new political class
taking power. Theda Skocpol is the best-known articulator of this position:
she emphasizes the transformation of a society’s state and class structures.20
After the event, we know that the coloured revolutions were more than
palace putsches but they were not revolutions in the classic sense, and for
several reasons. First, the thrust for radical change did not come from
below, but from elites or counter-elites in the existing political classes.
‘Top– down’ social transformations do not qualify to be termed ‘revolu-
tions’21 as by definition the contenders for power cannot be part of the state
administration. Second, the outcomes involved changes in personnel of the
state and led to shifts in foreign policy and international alignments, but
they did not cause a system change: ownership of property remained the same.
Coloured revolutions do not fall into the models described above. Leader-
ship by counter-elites with the objective of replacing the dominant elite is
characteristic of a putsch and a coup d’état. Unlike those two processes,
coloured revolutions have the distinguishing characteristic of a high level of
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 119
public participation. They do not fall into the category of classic revolutions
because they have no political theory of major social change. The political
objective is replacement of an elite rather than the substitution of a new
ruling class for the existing one and the transformation of property relations.
With the possible exception of Serbia, the coloured revolution insurgents
sought a change of leadership that would fulfil the promises of the transform-
ation from communism to capitalism and democracy. The existing post-
communist elites had not delivered what they had promised. Major differences
from a normal coup d’état are to be found in the role of leadership, the high
level of public participation, and finance from external sources. Unlike
classic revolution, these phenomena lack a revolutionary class pushing from
below for socio-political change.
Coloured revolutions may fit into yet another type of political category:
that of a ‘revolutionary coup d’état’. The coloured revolutions did not entail
any system changes of regime type (despite such demands by many of the
supporters), but were intended to install new political incumbents. Mass
involvement takes place which makes the movement more than a ‘coup
d’état’. We may distinguish between such a coup and a social or political
revolution. Whereas in a revolutionary coup d’état public participation is of
a passive ‘audience’ type, in a political revolution, the public (in the form
of autonomous civil-society associations) has a positive input to political
activity, requiring significant social change. Finally, the outcomes are
crucial. If the intentions of the insurgents are not subsequently realized in
structural transformation, a political revolution cannot be said to have
occurred. In this way, we may distinguish a social or political revolution
from a coup d’état that is a consequence of public protest.

Revolutionary Coup d’état

A revolutionary coup d’état is a change of the political leadership instigated by
internal or external counter-elites through the agency of mass popular support.
Such an event has high elite (or counter-elite) participation, and high public
(mass) involvement but of an ‘audience’ type. The intentions of the insurgents
are to redress public grievances, to promote the objectives of transformation,
and to do this through elite renewal, not through the reconstitution of the social
economic order. Real economic and social grievances about falling living
standards, health care, distribution of wealth and land, and unemployment
may underpin the protests for the mass participants.22 This type of activity
is illustrated in Table 2.
Evidence for the successful ‘revolutions’ to be considered as coups is
found in the background of the leaders who came to power after the events.
In Serbia, the opponents of Milošević were leading politicians. Vojislav
120 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

TABLE 2
R E V O L U T I O N A R Y C O U P D ’ É T A T

Type of Type of Level of Public Intentions of Insurgents/ Consequences,

Political Change Organization Participation Counter-elites if successful

Revolutionary Elite or counter- High: audience Redress public New personnel

coup d’état elite led participation grievances. For elites, in ruling
renewal of governing elite
elite; for mass
participants, changes
of leaders and
priorities

Koštunica, for example, who stood as the candidate opposing Milošević, had
been the founder of the anti-communist and pro-Western Democratic Party.
Another prominent member of the opposition was Tomislav Nikolić who had
been a deputy prime minister in the coalition government of Yugoslavia in
1999–2000. In Georgia, those who came to power as a consequence of the dis-
turbances were Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and Mikheil Saakashvili: all
had held posts in parliament and Saakashvili had been a minister (of justice)
under Shevardnadze. In Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko had been head of the
national bank as well as prime minister under Kuchma; he was joined by
Yulia Tymoshenko, herself a leading economic ‘oligarch’. In Kyrgyzstan a
former prime minister with roots in the Soviet period, Kurmanbek Bakiev,
and Roza Otunbaeva, previously foreign minister, played leading parts in the
movement to bring down the government of Askar Akaev. Much of the positive
evaluation of the ‘people’s revolutions’ ignores the literature on elite compe-
tition and the clan-like nature of politics in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan23 and Ukraine.
Viewing the coloured revolutions as a revolutionary coup, we may fit into
place the domestic elite-led as well as the foreign character of these events.
It gives a place for organizations such as the OSCE,24 USAID and foreign
sponsored NGOs to set the agenda, and thus act for the West as agents of
soft politics – ‘democracy promotion’. The OSCE and related organizations
such as ODIHR25 have given priority to democracy promotion which it
defines in terms of electoral rights and government corruption. These bodies
have said very little about social security or rights to work or welfare, and
made no criticisms of economic fraud, which occurred on a massive scale
in the process of privatization.
The coloured revolutions were sequential in character, and the ‘success’ of
one precipitated action for others to follow.26 However, the structural and
psychological predispositions of the population are also important determi-
nants. The mobilization of mass support against the regime is shaped by
underlying social and economic inadequacies, or unfulfilled expectations on
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 121
which the counter-elites capitalized. Differences in these structural and
psychological attributes help explain the success and failure of the coloured
revolutionary coups.

Outcomes of ‘Revolution’
The problem for analysis, however, is how much of an example the early
upsurges were for those that followed: how is the ‘example’ of others
copied, modified or ignored in host countries? We need also to analyse the
extent to which, and why, people may be predisposed or prone to follow the
example. One might re-group the various political phenomena by different
criteria to explain why some have succeeded and others have failed.
Table 3 distinguishes between the different outcomes of ‘coloured’ revo-
lution activity. It distinguishes between changes in political elite composition
and consequent political and economic developments, and it differentiates the
countries by the extent of mass participation. ‘Mass participation’ should not
be conflated into ‘people’s democracy promotion’: such participation might be
motivated by other grievances – of a regional, ethnic, class or generational
kind – or it may be emotional or mercenary.27
To fit countries into these various boxes requires a considerable research
exercise. Five countries (Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Uzbekistan) experienced failed popular protests against the regime. In 1989,
China had a relatively high-level protest (in the sense that the centre of the
capital was paralysed by demonstrators), but there was no significant change
of regime. In Ukraine, the demonstrators succeeded in changing a major actor
in the political elite, through the election of President Viktor Yushchenko,
but subsequent political change was minimal. In Kyrgyzstan, the Akaev
clan was ousted as a consequence of a protest movement originating in the
south of the country and other clans came to power. In that country, the

TABLE 3
OUTCOMES OF COLOURED REVOLUTIONS

Level of Public Participation in Mass Activity

Change of Subsequent Political
Ruling Elite Low High System Change

Nil Belarus, Russia, China Nil

Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan
Some and Ukraine, Low
continuity Kyrgyzstan
High Serbia, Georgia High
122 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

Tulip revolution was driven by ‘independent business interests, informal net-

works and patronage ties [that] remained strong after [the exit of President
Akaev]’.28 The aftermath of the revolution did not reverse the previous pat-
terns of corruption: ‘the March events appear . . . mostly to have worsened
Kyrgyzstan’s political instability, with rising numbers of assassinations and
unruly crowd actions’.29 Akaev’s successor, Bakiev, recognized a ‘dubiously
elected’ parliament (the election results of which had been invalidated by the
supreme court), and the new regime acted as ‘a means to protect its members’
private interests’.30 As Scott Radnitz puts it, there was not a regime change,
but ‘a transfer of power’.31 Even in terms of electoral procedures, the 2007
election was faulted – the governing party received 71 of the 90 seats after
receiving only 49 per cent of the vote, and the main opposition party received
no seats at all. These results were derived from an electoral system that required
a qualifying threshold for seats of 5 per cent and another 0.5 per cent in each of
the regional voting constituencies: such a system clearly discriminated against
regionally based parties. The OSCE preliminary report tamely described the
election as ‘a missed opportunity’ and the electoral system as ‘unusual’.32
The opposition in Serbia and Georgia was successful in effecting a major
change of government personnel. In Serbia, a significant Westward shift of
orientation in foreign affairs occurred. In Georgia under Saakashvili, a more
neo-liberal course was followed concurrently with the strengthening of the
state. While President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power as a lauded democratic
reformer, he was soon castigated by the opposition for persecuting opponents and
curbing media freedom.33 Following the unsuccessful offensive against the
separatist South Ossetia in 2008, opposition leaders organized demonstrations
of some 20,000 calling for ‘presidential and parliamentary elections, election
legislative reforms, media freedom and the freeing of political prisoners’.34
The opposition, led by the United National Movement, has alleged political
killings, on top of the taking of political prisoners by the Sakaashvili regime.35
Clearly, regime change following the coloured revolutions has not unequi-
vocally led to greater democratization, even in terms of a narrowly defined
‘electoral politics’.

Conditioning Factors for Success and Failure

The political and sociological puzzle is to explain why, if the objectives of the
insurgents were similar (namely, democracy promotion), the outcomes were
different. Three major conditioning factors are singled out that help to
explain the success or failure of democracy promotion, as proposed by
coloured revolution activity: (i) elites and a population predisposed to
radical change; (ii) ideological mobilization and policy promotion; and (iii)
practical political alternatives to the status quo. If we examine these three
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 123
factors in relation to the post-socialist countries, we are able to understand
why coloured revolutions occurred and were either successful or unsuccessful.

Public Predispositions
Predisposition for change is to a considerable extent a consequence of the
effects of transformation. It is assumed that where transformation policies
have led to unemployment, poverty and a decline in living standards, then
there is a predisposition by the population for change. Of the countries
under discussion, Belarus and China have had least disruption to economic
life and have retained many of the economic and political structures of state
socialism. Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia all initially suffered substan-
tial declines in GNP and a large proportion of the population lived in poverty.
Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 2005 GDP had increased in most of
the former state socialist countries; only Uzbekistan had suffered a decline.
However, these figures ignore the distribution of wealth and income which,
under state socialism, was relatively egalitarian and comparable to European
welfare states.
As shown in Figure 1A, several of these countries (China, Turkmenia,
Georgia and RF) currently have levels of inequality at similar (or higher in
the case of China) levels to the USA and very much higher than welfare
states such as Denmark.
Figure 2 shows that life expectancy declined considerably even during
these four years: only China, Belarus and Kazakhstan had an increase in life
expectancy.

FIGURE 1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER PERSON 2000, 2005

Sources: 2005: Human Development Report 2007– 08, pp.228– 30, available at http://hdr.undp.
org/en/HDR_20072008, accessed 13 Sept. 2008. 2000: Human Development Report 2002 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). pp.149– 50.
Note: Kyrgyzstan 2000 data not available, 2003 data shown in table; HDR 2005, p.219; RF,
Russian Federation.
124 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

FIGURE 1A
LEVELS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION: GINI INDEXES 2001 – 3

Source: Human Development Report 2007– 08, pp.281–4.

Notes: A gini coefficient shows the ratio of the richest 10 per cent to the poorest 10 per cent. A ratio
of 0 indicates absolute equality, one of 100 absolute inequality.

FIGURE 2
LIFE EXPECTANCY 2000, 2005

Source: As Figure 1.

Figure 3 shows the relationship between GDP and national wellbeing,

measured in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). The index sub-
tracts the rank of human development from the rank of GDP: hence a low
rank in GDP (say, 100) minus a high rank in HDI (say 25) gives an index
of 75. The higher the index, the better the use made of GDP to promote
human development. We note that with the exception of Kazakhstan and
the Russian Federation, all the post-socialist countries had a relatively high
index. Moreover, with the notable exceptions of Uzbekistan and Belarus,
both of which have retained a considerable role for state redistribution, all
suffered considerable reductions between 2000 and 2005.
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 125
FIGURE 3
GDP PER CAPITA (PPP US$) RANK MINUS HDI RANK, 2000, 2005

Source: As Figure 1.

These data indicate that general social conditions were worsening in all the
countries with the exception of Belarus and to some degree China – although
income differentials in China rose at an alarmingly high rate. Russia is a par-
ticularly striking case: its income has risen, but it has experienced a fall in life
expectancy and its GDP –HDI index is negative. These figures would lead one
to suppose that there has been a rise in the condition of ‘decremental relative
deprivation’ as defined by Ted Robert Gurr.36 People’s expectations remain
constant (or may even rise, in anticipation of gains to be made from the end
of communism) but, despite a general rise in GDP between 2000 and 2005,
the capabilities to meet them have fallen. In Gurr’s terms, welfare (that is,
economic), political and inter-personal value opportunities have declined,
and constituted conditions predisposing people to political protest. There
has been a weakening in the levels of loyalty and trust in government and a
critical fall in support for the regime. (This is evidenced in public opinion
poll data, not included in this study.) Not all the states we have examined
here have experienced insurgency; in those that have, the experience has
varied in intensity. Relative deprivation, however intense, may predispose
to insurgency, but is not sufficient to cause it. For Lenin a spark (in
Russian, iskra) was necessary, and the activists behind the coloured revolu-
tions provided this spark to ignite supposed election fraud. The strategy of
the coloured revolutions is Leninist in conception. As one youth organizer
has put it, the resistance movement has three components: unity of opposition,
discipline and a good strategic plan.37 Both organization and people predis-
posed to participate in civil strife are necessary for protests to succeed.
126 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

FIGURE 4
GINI INDEX AND POPULAR PROTEST

How then did levels of inequality, indicated by the gini indexes, correlate
with the extent of public protest? This relationship is depicted in Figure 4, in
which inequality is shown by the top line. The measurement of public protest
is taken from numbers participating in protest as measured by OSCE38
(to which I have added China). Although such data may have many inaccura-
cies, they probably capture the relativity of popular protest between different
countries. The trend line is plotted against the rising curve of inequality.
Data show the ranking of demonstrations, 1 (Ukraine) being the highest
number of demonstrators and Mongolia the lowest. Correlation between
inequality and numbers of demonstrators are – 0.09 (Pearson) and þ0.02
(Spearman), indicating no significant correlation at all. The results are strongly
influenced by two extreme cases. China has the highest level of inequality
(46.9) and witnessed the second highest level of demonstrations. At the
other extreme comes Ukraine which has the highest number of demonstrations,
but the lowest level of inequality (29.1). If we excluded Ukraine, the corre-
lation rises to – 0.29, indicating a much stronger relationship between
inequality and protest. If we remove both these extremes (China and Ukraine)
we have a more robust (negative) correlation: Pearson –0.41 (p ¼ 0.21,
n ¼ 10) and Spearman –0.30 (p ¼ 0.40, n ¼ 10).39 Thus, our results are positive,
showing a distinct relationship between the levels of public demonstration and
inequality – the higher the inequality (1 being low), the larger the public
demonstration (1 being high). Clearly, high levels of inequality associated
with poverty at one end of the scale and wealth at the other, concurrent with a
fall in living standards, predispose people to insurgency.
The data may need further interpretation. Possibly estimates of pro-Orange
public protest in Ukraine are too high. The ‘demonstrators’ include those who
favoured the Orange activists and those who opposed them. It is also possible
that Orange activity politicized the population to a higher extent than would
otherwise have occurred – a demonstration effect.40
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 127
Ideological Mobilization and Policy Promotion
The protagonists of coloured revolutions not only de-legitimated the existing
regimes – usually through electoral irregularities – but provided an alterna-
tive set of values – an ideological rationalization of radical change. ‘Democ-
racy promotion’ means, as Andrew Wilson approvingly points out, ‘The West
promoting its own values [and] . . . help[ing] other countries [to] live up to
these values’.41 This involves influencing elections and backing those
parties approved by the West’s leaders. What is ignored in much of the
‘diffusion of democracy’ literature is the power of Western governments
and international organizations to influence political outcomes in host states.42
Consider, for example, Serbia. While Valerie J. Bunce and Susan
L. Wolchik point out that international diffusion does not occur ‘when a
powerful international actor orchestrates changes in weaker states’,43 they
see change in Serbia as a case of collaboration between local and international
actors.44 However, the US and EU pursued an aggressive policy of system
change. As Christopher Lamont points out, both the USA and the EU coordi-
nated their efforts to

push Milošević ‘out of power, out of Serbia and in[to] the custody of the
war crimes tribunal’. Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer formulated a strategy that combined economic sanc-
tions with engagement with opponents to Slobodan Milošević in the
SRF itself. The United States not only invested heavily in funding oppo-
sition groups, but also opened a proxy office in the US embassy in Buda-
pest to coordinate efforts to bring about regime change in Belgrade.45

Moreover, the policy advocated by the EU presidency made clear that

elective sanctions aimed at the regime will remain a necessary element of

EU policy as long as President Milošević stays in power. The European
Council appeals to the Serbian people to take their future into their own
hands and to reclaim their place in the family of democratic nations. The
EU for its part will not only continue to support the democratic opposi-
tion, but will also develop a comprehensive dialogue with civil society.46

System change was promoted, with financial support, by such organizations as

the German Marshall Fund, the Project on Transitional Democracies, the
Westminster Foundation and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.
Money follows interests, and interests and ideology follow money. The
lack of foreign support for resistance and democracy promotion may occur
in countries where the US and its allies have economic interests (particularly
stakes in energy companies). Opposition to governments supporting the
terms of foreign extraction of energy supplies does not receive the same
128 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

level of foreign support. As Ostrowski has pointed out, in Kazakhstan, Nazar-

baev at the time of the coloured revolutions was ‘seen as the best guarantor of
Western investments and interests. Thus from the Western – and most impor-
tantly the US – perspective political change at the apex of power in Kazakhstan
was undesirable’.47 Testimony to this effect is also available from Azerbaijan.
In the documentary film ‘The Democratic Revolutionary Handbook’,48 the
youth movement Magam was turned down for financial support by Western
foundations, including the Programme on Transitional Democracy, whose
director, Bruce Jackson, explained that ‘Washington was not completely sure
that it was the opposition’. An alternative explanation advanced by Magam
was that the President Aliev had negotiated oil deals with the multinationals,
which needed political stability: ‘if a change in power took place, all contracts
would be worthless’. The upshot of demonstrations in Azerbaijan in 2005 (and
also in Kazakhstan) was a complete rout of the democratic opposition.
For mobilization of the population in support of democracy promotion to
take place, there must be a counter-elite available and willing to accept financial
and moral support from both internal and Western sources. By the same logic,
those in the host countries who lose as a consequence of Western policy will
oppose the imposition of alien values. They will assert their own values and
seek their own champions, including those located outside the country. The
political and economic processes of the West, and particularly the image of
the USA, are not universally acclaimed, making questionable the assumptions
of ‘soft politics’ theorists, such as Nye, that ‘the West’ is likely to win a soft
politics war. American hegemony, which threatens some countries, is seen in
a negative light by the elites and public opinion in Russia, Belarus and China.
The reaction of authoritarian regimes in those three countries in pre-
empting dissident movements has been widely covered in the press in the
West. Measures taken against potential organizers of ‘coloured revolution’
include the banning of exit polls and the repression of opposition parties
and leaders. In Russia, under Putin and Medvedev, it has become increasingly
difficult for anti-statist (and pro-Western) counter-elites to organize and
articulate an alternative ideology. None the less, however reprehensible
repression may be, it alone cannot explain social stability. Repression can
only be carried out in the context of the predisposition of elites and publics
either to support collective anti-regime activity or to oppose it.49 As Elena
Korosteleva, with respect to Belarus, puts it: ‘The specificity of Lukashenko’s
regime lies with the electorate: it is the contentment of many Belarusians and
their identification with the president that defines the regime’s most enduring
feature – its genuine legitimacy’. Citing Max Weber, she points out that ‘rule
is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so’.50
Public opinion polls in Ukraine also show a very high rating for
Lukashenko and Putin as leaders – consistently higher than even the
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 129
champion of the Orange revolution, Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko’s stand-
ing after his election was 5.6 compared with President Kuchma’s 2.7 in 2005
(based on the average of respondents’ answers on a ten-point scale51). In 2006,
however, Yushchenko’s score had plummeted to 3.8, whereas Putin in both
2005 and 2006 was higher (6.0 and 6.3 respectively) – even after the conflict
over the price of energy between the two countries. Yet more remarkable is the
popularity of the Belarusian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, who had higher
standing in Ukrainian public opinion in 2005 (5.8) and 2006 (6.3) than Yush-
chenko even in 2005. A statist national welfare regime has considerable
public appeal in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.

Political Alternatives
Elite consensus and division are important components of a revolutionary
situation. In Ukraine and Serbia there were divisions, whereas in Georgia
there was a fairly united elite who regarded Western support as a condition
for economic and political security. Moreover, joining the West, through mem-
bership of the European Union, was a positive attraction for Serbia, especially
given the economic consequences of the sanctions imposed by the EU. Alterna-
tive political strategies that might be followed by post-communist countries
involve possible membership of NATO, the EU, or both. Joining these insti-
tutions provides a positive end-game for democracy promotion – an option
not open to countries such as Russia and Belarus. In Serbia, the elite was
(and is) divided between, on one side, those favouring the market and stronger
links with the European Union and, on the other, the traditional leftist leaders
supporting state redistribution and a nationalist ideology. Kyrgyzstan has no
real options to join either the EU or NATO; ‘democracy promotion’ occludes
a form of clan or interest politics, with a distinctive regional character.52
Ukraine is a more complicated case. Juxtaposed between Russia and the
European Union, there is a choice – even if the pro-Western elite magnifies
and distorts the political possibility of EU membership. The interests of differ-
ent economic elites with bases in different parts of the country overlap with
forms of ethnic identity: Western Ukrainians are oriented to the West, and
Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east look to Russia.53 The country has a
major ethnic and political division aligned along an east – west axis. Moreover,
youth leadership in Ukraine was radicalized against the regime, and Western-
sponsored civil society organizations have been used positively in support of
the ‘Orange’ tendency. The youth movement PORA (It’s time), for example,
supported by the Westminster Foundation, brought in Serbian agitators to train
200 activists to organize the events that have later become known as the
Orange revolution.54
In Russia, Belarus and China, organized opposition to the incumbent
regime is severely restricted, whereas in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia there
130 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

were particularly strong pro-Western groups that were able to coordinate

opposition interests, and whole strata in the population were predisposed to
these values. Conditions enabling mass demonstrations to take place were
present in Ukraine. It is widely believed that demonstrations are not possible
in Russia, although this is a questionable assumption. Massive demonstrations
have been held in Russia in support of pensioners’ rights, in opposition to the
monetarization of social service benefits and proposed reductions in the size of
the Russian army, as have smaller political rallies in support of candidates
opposing the present regime. The latter may not have been effective, but
they were held.55 But coloured revolution activity would certainly be
broken up by the authorities, and they would have the authority, in terms of
public sentiment, to do so. The political elite under Putin and Medvedev
has greater unity and would be able to suppress such demonstrations.
Although the effects of transformation have led to relative deprivation in
Russia, the regime under Putin has enjoyed widespread popular support. The
‘demonstration effect’ of the coloured revolutions does not work. The lack of
success in Russia is connected with the legitimacy of the political elite and the
formation of an elite consensus.
Table 4 shows the combinations of predispositions, affinity to the West
and possibilities for political and social mobilization.
Countries in which elites (or counter-elites) have a strong affinity to the
EU or to NATO are clearly targets for successful democracy promotion as a
form of soft power. Even where the predisposition for change may be
strong, as in Russia, a counter-elite has no alternative policy objective in
the form of a closer relationship with the leading institutions of the West –
the EU and NATO. The failure of the market to enhance living standards,

TABLE 4
CONDITIONING FACTORS PROMOTING/RETARDING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Predisposition for Change –Consequent on Popular Affinity to

Effects of Transformation NATO ‘The West’

Elite Affinity to EU Strong Strong Weak

Negative or N/A KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA BELARUS Negative

Divided UKRAINE, SERBIA Divided

Positive GEORGIA Positive

High Low Low

Mobilization of Public for Democracy
Promotion
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 131
and the illegitimacy of the privatization process, have weakened the standing
of neo-liberal capitalism. In Georgia, however, predispositions as well as
mobilization of the public are strong, and the economic and political elites
can advocate a viable alternative – membership of NATO and the EU.
Belarus has weak predispositions and public mobilization for democracy
promotion, and no policy option of membership of either NATO or the EU.
The initial success of coloured revolution is where these four factors have a
positive effect: strong public dispositions for change and high public mobiliz-
ation, together with an alternative political policy – usually in terms of
membership of NATO and or the EU; or more generally, a Western type of
modernization based on the market and private property.

Conclusion: Future Scenarios

What is common to all the Central and East European countries outside the
European Union is disappointment with the consequences of the transform-
ation. The ‘coloured’ revolution is one way to correct the transformation
outcome: opposition to the corrupt incumbent elites concurrent with a
renewed effort towards modernization along Western lines – greater pluralism,
strengthening of the market and a Western political alignment. For regimes such
as Belarus, Uzbekistan and Russia, there is a move back towards a statist frame-
work involving limitations on pluralism and greater statist redistribution.
Many accounts provide a rather simplistic version of events promoting
democratic change, in terms of electoral revolutions. They envisage a push
from below from liberals seeking to introduce democracy, civil rights and
well-being against an ‘illiberal’ autocratic regime riddled with corruption. The
push is relatively autonomous, although stimulated by the pull of the movers
of the coloured revolutions – Western-sponsored civil society organizations.
The reality is that the thrust for change comes from counter-elites, either
from within the ruling political class, or from outside, who seek to replace
(or join) the existing elite. Legitimacy is achieved through democracy
promotion. Where internal regime change is precluded by the institutional
structure, counter-elites sponsor and utilize a mass movement, and they legit-
imate protest as democracy promotion. Regime weakness is greatest at times
of elections which then become a focus for political change. Allegedly frau-
dulent election results are the trigger for protest. Success leads to the fall of
the incumbent elite and its replacement with another. The consequences,
however, are far from ‘revolutionary’: existing institutions retain their struc-
tures, although the personnel may change. The ‘democratic revolution’
often fails to democratize the electoral structure, and may even lead to new
forms of electoral discrimination (as in the case of Kyrgyzstan). The new
elites act in a similar way to their predecessors, albeit sometimes (as in
132 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia) with a more pronounced Westward-leaning

policy orientation. Successful ‘coloured’ revolutions involving elite replace-
ment and policy change can occur not only when the population is predisposed
to, and mobilized for, change but also when there are alternative policy options
on offer – particularly a move to join the economic and security organizations
provided by the West. The revolutionary coups d’état that I have described
involve the rise of different elite groups, clans or families, which seek to redis-
tribute the assets of the previous regime. ‘Electoral revolutions’ are one of the
means used to install them in power. Western interests are involved in these
processes – in support of groups, in Margaret Thatcher’s terms,56 ‘with
whom we can do business’, or from a geo-strategic point of view, to change
allegiances in favour of the West.
There are two unintended consequences to the efforts of democracy
promotion. First, incumbent governments learn from their opponents’ methods
and their use of media technology; they also learn from their opponents’
mistakes. In strengthening their own hold over their populations they too
create their own youth and student organizations, and they define the
‘hostile others’ in terms of rapacious Western interests and aggressive US-
led military offences. A consequence of the coloured revolution movements
has been the closure of genuine benevolent and positive non-confrontational
forms of civil society development: the curtailment of open press and televi-
sion, and of genuine religious associations.57 Incumbent governments concoct
their own counter-ideologies: they condemn the global hegemony of the West
and advocate their own forms of sovereignty, democracy and civil society.
Second, internal resistance to Western ‘democracy promotion’ increases.
Citizens of many states (among those discussed in this study, Russia,
Belarus, Uzbekistan and Serbia) do not share many of the assumptions of
Western democracy. It is widely believed in the countries concerned that
the opposition’s allegations of vote rigging are fabrications.58 Hence, the
promotion of ‘electoral democracy’ is undermined as a political strategy.
Public opinion polls in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have shown an affinity
with a different type of national welfare democracy – a political system
that ensures stability in the form of the provision of work, health, educational
services and welfare for the unwaged. Where conditions were not appropriate,
attempts to instigate ‘coloured’ revolutions have been counter-productive and
have strengthened incumbent states.

NOTES

1. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy is . . . and is Not’, in Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.49–62 (p.49).
2. Ibid.
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 133
3. Mark Beissinger, for example, considers them to be ‘modular political phenomena’ in that
action was based on the ‘emulation of the prior successful example of others’: Mark
R. Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No.2 (2007),
pp.259– 76 (p.259).
4. Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003).
5. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs,
2004).
6. Joseph Nye, ‘Why Military Power Is No Longer Enough’, The Guardian, 31 March 2002,
available at ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1., accessed 19 Feb. 2009.
7. George W. Bush, ‘Inauguration Speech 2005’, available at ,http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html., cited in Aidan Hehir, ‘The Myth of the
Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.1, No.3 (2007), pp.307– 32.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
9. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘International Diffusion and Postcommunist
Electoral Revolutions’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, No.3 (2006),
pp.283– 304 (p.284).
10. Ibid., p.288.
11. Ibid., p.295.
12. See the discussion in M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p.18.
13. John Dunn, ‘Capitalist Democracy: Elective Affinity or Beguiling Illusion?’ Daedalus,
Vol.136, No.3 (2007), pp.5–13 (p.10).
14. Natalya Narochnitskaya (ed.), Oranzhevye seti: ot Belgrada do Bishkeka [Orange Networks:
From Belgrade to Bishkek] (St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2008).
15. Active in Ukraine, for example, were Soros’s Renaissance Foundation, United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), Freedom House, the Carnegie Foundation, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund, the National Center on
Nonviolent Conflict, the Project on Transnational Democracies, the Westminster Foundation
for Democracy.
16. Ascot Manutscharjan, ‘State of Emergency in Armenia’, available at ,http://www.kas.de/
wf/doc/kas_14423-544-2-30.pdf., accessed 11 Nov. 2008. Other commentators have
asserted that the opposition led by Levon Ter-Petrossian claimed victory even before the elec-
tion took place: Vicken Cheterian, ‘From Reform and Transition to “Coloured Revolutions”’,
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2–3 (2009), pp. 136– 60
(p.146).
17. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions 1492– 1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.234.
18. Goodwin defines a revolution as any and all instances in which a state or government is over-
thrown by a popular movement in an extra-constitutional or violent manner: Jeff Goodwin, No
Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945– 1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
19. Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, ‘A Theory of Revolution’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol.11, No.3 (1967), pp.264–80, for example, define four different types of
‘revolution’: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup, palace revolution (p. 265).
20. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979), p.4.
21. Tilly, European Revolutions, p.9.
22. Radnitz points to the uneven distribution of land in Kyrgyzstan as a cause of discontent and
protest: Scott Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, Journal of Democracy,
Vol.17, No.2 (2006), pp.132– 46 (pp.142–3); see also, on unemployment in Ukraine,
David Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution: “People’s Revolution” or Revolutionary Coup?’,
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), pp.525–49.
134 J OURNAL OF CO MMUNIST STU DIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

23. Radnitz contends (in line with the reasoning of this essay) that local elites, losing candidates,
their acquaintances, neighbors and extended families were the driving forces in the Kyrgyz
revolution: see Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, p.137.
24. OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
25. ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, based in Warsaw.
26. Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, p.260.
27. See Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’, for an account taken from focus groups of the motives of
participants in Ukraine.
28. Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, p.132.
29. Ibid., p.133.
30. Ibid., p.140.
31. Ibid., p.133.
32. Based on report by election observers, Clive Payne, ‘A Visit to Kyrgyzstan’, Nuffield News-
letter, Nuffield College (Oxford), 2008, No.4.
33. Laurence Broers, ‘After the “Revolution”: Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating
Democracy in Georgia’, Central Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.3 (2005), pp.333–50 (p.334).
34. Opposition leader Eka Beselia, quoted in Morning Star (London), 8 Nov. 2008.
35. Eka Beselia, ‘Accidental Murders, Coincidence or Not?’, interview, available at ,http://www.
humanrights.ge/rss/index.php?a¼more&r¼analytical&id¼2444&lang¼en., accessed 19
Feb. 2009.
36. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), Ch.1.
37. This strategy was used in the Serbian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Azerbaijan protests and
illustrated in a documentary film by Tania Rakhmanova, ‘The Democratic Revolutionary
Handbook’, France, 2006.
38. Data cited in Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, p.264.
39. My thanks here to David Stuckler for comments and suggestions on my earlier draft.
40. See estimates of the support for the Oranges in Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’.
41. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University
Press, 2005), p.187.
42. Other writers have emphasized the role of international links, even considering the inter-
national element to be a fourth element in transformation: see M.A. Orenstein, S. Bloom
and N. Lindstrom (eds.), Transnational Actors in Central and East European Transitions
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).
43. Bunce and Wolchik, ‘International Diffusion’, p.266.
44. Ibid., p.291.
45. Christopher Lamont, ‘Contested Sovereignty: The International Politics of Regime Change in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,
Vol.25, Nos.2–3 (2009), pp.181– 98, p.190.
46. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000, cited in Lamont,
‘Contested Sovereignty’, which is also the source of the other quotations.
47. Wojciech Ostrowski, ‘The Legacy of the “Coloured Revolution”: The Case of Kazakhstan’,
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2– 3 (2009), pp.347–68.
48. See note 37.
49. See, for example, Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, pp.268– 70, who calls the process
‘elite learning’ to limit the spread of insurgency; the crucial question is why some elites
should ‘learn’ and seek to restrict ‘revolutionary success’, whereas others may copy the
process. On Belarus, see Vitali Silitski, ‘Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus’,
Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4 (2005), pp.83–97; on China see Jeanne Wilson,
‘Coloured Revolutions: The View From Moscow and Beijing’, Journal of Communist
Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2–3 (2009), pp.369– 95.
50. Elena Korosteleva, ‘Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 Presidential
Election’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2–3 (2009),
pp.324–46; the quotation from Max Weber is cited from Ian Clark, ‘Legitimacy in
a Global Order’, Review of International Studies, Vol.29, special issue (Dec. 2003),
pp.79–95 (p.79).
‘COLOURED REVOLUTION’ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON 135
51. ‘How would you evaluate L. Kuchma’s actions as president? 1 as lowest grade and 10 the
maximum’; source: N. Panina, Ukrains’ke suspil’stvo: sotsiologichni monitoring 1992–
2006 [Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring 1992– 2006] (Kyiv: Institut sotsiologii
NAN Ukraini, 2006); data for some of the tables are available only in the edition for 2005.
52. On the clan-like nature of political power see Kathleen Collins, ‘Clans, Pacts and Politics in
Central Asia’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.3 (2002), pp.137– 52.
53. See Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’.
54. Ukrainian PORA leader speaking on the documentary, ‘The Democratic Revolutionary
Handbook’ (see note 37).
55. See for example, the website of A-INFOSNEWSSERVICE, available at ,http://ainfos.ca..
It carried accounts of demonstrations in Murmansk in 2005 attended by 2000 participants and
organized by the Party of Pensioners and the Communist Party, and also anarchists: ,http://
www.ainfos.ca/index24/index24-05/index.html., accessed 19 Feb. 2009.
56. Margaret Thatcher famously described Mikhail Gorbachev, a few months before his accession
to power in March 1985, as a man with whom she felt she could do business.
57. This is detailed for Russia and China in Wilson, ‘Coloured Revolutions: The View from
Moscow and Beijing’.
58. IISEPS poll, available at ,http://www.nisepi.by/pres1.html., cited in Vitali Silitski,
‘Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4
(2005), pp.83– 90 (p.90).