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American Jewish Year Book 120
Arnold Dashefsky
Ira M. Sheskin Editors
American
Jewish Year
Book 2019
The Annual Record of the
North American Jewish Communities
Since 1899
American Jewish Year Book
Volume 119
Series Editors
Arnold Dashefsky, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Ira M. Sheskin, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This Volume is Dedicated to the Memory
of Sidney Goldstein, z”l1
Dean of demographers of American Jewry,
regarded by all as a gentleman and a scholar,
and above all else,
a mensch to all who knew him.
1
See addendum in Chap. 15, Sect. 3 for the obituary of Sidney Goldstein.
The Publication of This Volume Was Made
Possible by the Generous Support of
vii
Academic Advisory Committee
ix
x Academic Advisory Committee
Readers of the Year Book may find more than an occasional reference in the recent
past to Charles Dickens’ famous quote about the “best of times,” and the “worst of
times” (see, for example, Kosmin 2015 and Chap. 4 in this volume) to describe the
current situation facing Jews both in the USA and Israel.
Consider that American Jews witnessed, during 2018–2019, mass shootings in
Pittsburgh, PA (Tree of Life—Or L’Simcha on October 27, 2018), and in Poway,
CA, near San Diego (Chabad of Poway on April 27, 2019). Furthermore, the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) reported that “anti-Semitic incidents remained at near-
historic levels in 2018 with 1879 incidents reported…The 2018 total is 48% higher
than the number of incidents in 2016 and 99% higher than in 2015” (ADL 2019).
Likewise, in Canada, it was reported that Jews were the “most targeted minority
group in Canada for the 3rd consecutive year” (Lazarus 2019). Statistics Canada
reported that “the number of incidents dropped to 345 from 360 in 2017.” There was
a reported decline in hate crimes against Muslims, which fell 50% (to 173), and
blacks, which declined by 15% (to 283).
If these reports herald among the “worst of times,” what suggests the “best of
times”? Consider that in the USA, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey
between February 14 and 19, 2019, among US adults to assess how warmly the
overall public views various religious groups in the USA (including atheists) on a
“feeling thermometer,” which has a range of 0 (“coldest and most negative”) to 100
(“warmest and most positive”). Of all US religious groups, Jews received the warm-
est score with a mean thermometer rating of 63, followed by Catholics and Mainline
Protestants, each with a score of 60 (Pew Research Center 2019, p. 60).
In contrast, nearly a century ago, Bogardus (1928) asked about 2000 Americans
to rate 40 different ethnic groups on a “social distance scale,” from “7: would
exclude from my country” to “1: to close kinship by marriage.” The most favored
groups were British, Americans, and Canadians, followed by northern Europeans,
and then southern and eastern Europeans. Jews were in the middle; and at the bot-
tom of the social distance scale, were people of color. The dramatic difference
between 2019 and 1928 in the position of Jews helps us to understand why intermar-
riage for Jews has increased (see Phillips 2018).
xi
xii Preface
The above brief discussion is emblematic of our efforts to produce a volume that
provides a contemporary portrait of North American Jewish life, which offers an
enduring legacy for future generations. Indeed, the Year Book has been working at
this endeavor across three different centuries: nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first.
Perhaps, this duality, reflecting the “best of times” and the “worst of times” is best
captured by a recent lecture at the University of Connecticut: “Do Americans Love or
Hate the Jews? Intermarriage and Antisemitism in the 21st Century” (Phillips 2019).
Clearly, the earliest editors could not have conceived of the level of interest that
the latest technology affords to readers of the Year Book. As of March 2019, we can
report the following:
• Google found about over 310,000 references to the Year Book
• Google Scholar found 6700 references to the Year Book in the scientific
literature.
• Google News found 95 references to the Year Book.
• Wikipedia has 420 references to the Year Book.
• Springer’s website reported that about 30,000 chapters were downloaded from
the 2012–2017 volumes.
In addition, we can also report as follows:
• The “Jewish Population of the United States” and the “World Jewish Population”
chapters from the Year Book have been downloaded tens of thousands of times
from www.jewishdatabank.org and www.bjpa.org.
• Demographic data contained in the Year Book are included in the US Statistical
Abstract, the World Almanac and Book of Facts, Wikipedia, the Jewish Virtual
Library, and many other places.
• Older issues of the Year Book are available at www.ajcarchives.org.
Part I of this volume contains two lead articles: Chap. 1, “Jews in the United
States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel's 70th Anniversary,” by Uzi
Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I. Waxman; and Chap. 2, “The Presidential
Voting of American Jews,” by Herbert F. Weisberg.
The next two chapters in Part I continue our coverage, as in previous years, of
domestic and international events. This year, we welcome a new contributor to these
pages, J. J. Goldberg, as author of Chap. 3, “American Jews and the Domestic
Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections.” In addition, Mitchell Bard returns to
author Chap. 4, “American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July
2019): The USA, Israel, and the Middle East.”
The first edition of the Year Book in 1899 contained three pages entitled “Jewish
Statistics” (Adler 1899). This volume contains four chapters. Chapters 5–8 report
on the Jewish population of the USA, Canada (two chapters), and the world, by Ira
M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky; Charles Shahar; Robert Brym, Keith Neuman,
and Rhonda Lenton; and Sergio DellaPergola, respectively.
As returning readers will note, more than half the volume consists of an ever-
expanding set of lists. In 2017, we began to subdivide these lists so as to make some
of them more concise. For this year, we have organized seven chapters, including:
Preface xiii
Chapter 9, Local Jewish Organizations; Chapter 10, Jewish Museums and Holocaust
Museums, Memorials, and Monuments; Chapter 11, Jewish Overnight Camps;
Chapter 12, National Jewish Organizations; Chapter 13, Jewish Press; Chapter 14,
Academic Resources; and Chapter 15, Transitions.
Thus, more than half of the volume consists of directories and lists, which testi-
fies to the dense infrastructure of American Jewish life. The first edition of the Year
Book (Adler 1899) contained about 300 pages and nearly 90% of the pages con-
sisted of such directories and lists.
Each year the lists in Part II are checked to make certain that all contact informa-
tion is current. In addition, this year, we added many new Jewish organizations and
Jewish publications to these lists that were either new or ones of which we were
unaware in the past. Readers should note, however, that even our best efforts to keep
the lists current fall short of perfection. We have found that Jewish organizations
that disband often leave their website on the internet for several years. Each year, we
discover several organizations that should have been deleted several years prior.
While much of the information in Part II is available on the internet (indeed we
obtain most of it from the internet), we believe that collating this information in one
volume helps present a full picture of the state of North American Jewry today. Part
of this picture is demographics; part is the extensive infrastructure of the Jewish
community (the organizations and the publications); and part is the enormous con-
tributions made by the less than two percent of the population that is Jewish to the
culture and society of the USA and Canada.
In addition, while, for example, a list of Jewish Federations will probably always
appear on the internet, a list current as of 2019 will not be there forever. An historian
in the year 2119, wishing to examine the history of American Jewry, will have a
wealth of data preserved in one volume. Indeed, preserving that history is part of the
raison d'etre of the Year Book.
We hope that the initiatives we have undertaken over the past eight years
(2012–2019) will both uphold the traditional quality of the Year Book and effec-
tively reflect ever-evolving trends and concerns. We also hope that the Year Book,
whose existence spans three different centuries, will continue indefinitely.
References
Adler, C. (ed.). 1899. The American Jewish year book. Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication
Society of America.
Anti-Defamation League. 2019. Audit of anti-Semitic incidents: Year in review 2018. Resource
document. www.adl.org/audit2018. Accessed 1 September 2019.
Bogardus, E. S. 1928. Immigration and race attitudes. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Company.
Kosmin, B. A. 2015. It’s the best of times: It’s the worst of times. In American Jewish year book
2014, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin, 61–65. Cham: Springer.
Lazarus, D. 2019. Jews most targeted minority group in Canada for 3rd consecutive year. Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, July 29.
xiv Preface
Pew Research Center. 2019. What Americans know about religion. www.pewresearch.org.
Accessed 1 August 2019.
Phillips, B. A. 2018. Intermarriage in the twenty-first century: New perspectives. In American
Jewish year book 2017, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin, 31–119. Cham: Springer.
Phillips, B. A. 2019. Do Americans love or hate the Jews? Intermarriage and antisemitism in the
21st Century. Invited talk at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, October 17.
Throughout the past eight years of our editorship, we have viewed our work as a
collaborative effort, aided by many individuals, including the authors and reviewers
of articles, the staffs at the University of Connecticut and the University of Miami,
and the members of the Academic Advisory Committee. We would like to take this
opportunity to thank them all for their assistance in preparing the 2019 edition of the
American Jewish Year Book.
For Part I, we would like to thank the contributing authors of our lead articles:
Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I. Waxman for Chap. 1 on “Jews in the
United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th Anniversary,” and
Herbert F. Weisberg for Chap. 2 on “The Presidential Voting of American Jews.”
In addition, we would like to thank the authors of the articles that have become
standard features of the Year Book in recent years: J. J. Goldberg for Chap. 3 on
“American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections”;
Mitchell Bard for Chap. 4 on “American Jews and the International Arena (August
2018–July 2019): The USA, Israel, and the Middle East”; Charles Shahar for Chap.
6 on “Canadian Jewish Population, 2019”; Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and
Rhonda Lenton for Chap. 7 on “2018 Survey of Jews in Canada: Executive
Summary,” which is a summary of their previously published study of Canadian
Jewry; and Sergio DellaPergola for Chap. 8 on “World Jewish Population, 2019.”
All of these articles form the corpus of each volume. Finally, we would like to
express our appreciation to the several reviewers that we consulted in preparation of
this volume: Robert Brym, Joshua Comenetz, Lawrence Grossman, Shaul Kelner,
Mark Silk, Daniel Staetsky, and Ken Wald.
As we noted in the Preface, Part II on Jewish Lists typically represents more than
one-half of the content of recent volumes. We endeavor to review and update annu-
ally each of these sections. To do that, we depend on several individuals to whom
we owe a great debt of gratitude: Ben Harris and the staff of the JTA (www.jta.org),
as well as Sarah Markowitz, Roberta Pakowitz, and Karen Tina Sheskin in Florida,
who spent untold hours verifying the many entries. In addition, we would like to
thank Amy Lawton, Matthew Parent, and Maria Reger for their excellent editorial
assistance, and Pamela Weathers, who serves formally as business manager and
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
program assistant, assisted by Kezia Mann and Charis Nyarko, all at the University
of Connecticut Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life. We owe all
of them heartfelt thanks.
We also want to acknowledge the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts
and Sciences, headed by former Interim Dean Davita Silfen Glasberg and current
Dean Juli Wade, as well as the Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish
Life, headed by Interim Director Sebastian Wogenstein, and Director Avinoam Patt,
all at the University of Connecticut, in facilitating the editorial work involved in
producing this volume. Finally, we express our appreciation to Bill Berman, z”l, the
founding philanthropist of the Berman Jewish DataBank and the Berman Jewish
Policy Archive and to the Mandell and Madeleine Berman Foundation for their
generous financial support of the Year Book.
At the University of Miami, Chris Hanson and the University of Miami
Department of Geography and Regional Studies Geographic Information Systems
Laboratory assisted with the production of the maps. We wish to acknowledge the
generous support we have received from Deans Leonidas Bachas and Kenneth Voss
of the University of Miami College of Arts and Sciences, William Scott Green,
Senior Vice Provost and Dean of Undergraduate Education at the University of
Miami, and from Haim Shaked, Director of the Sue and Leonard Miller Center for
Contemporary Judaic Studies at UM.
Finally, we wish to express our appreciation to our editors at Springer for their
support and encouragement. Christopher Coughlin, Anita van der Linden-Rachmat,
Marie Josephine Chandramohan, Deepthi Vasudevan, and Joseph Quatela, and their
associates at Springer have shared our enthusiasm for the publication of the Year
Book. We look forward to our ongoing and mutually beneficial partnership.
Storrs, CT Arnold Dashefsky
Coral Gables, FL Ira M. Sheskin
Contents
xvii
xviii Contents
xix
xx Contributors
Jews in the US and Israel exist under two different paradigms of demographic and
cultural existence. In the US, Jews are a very small group residing among a non-
Jewish majority; In Israel, Jews constitute the overwhelming majority in a state
whose raison d’etre is to fulfill the rights of Jews to self-determination. The two
communities differ on at least five different levels.
First, the separation between “church” and state in the US means that American
Jews operate as an independent community that has to raise its own human and
financial resources at both local and national levels to establish communal infra-
structures and to administer its religious, cultural, educational, and social activities.
In Israel, these services are largely provided by the government. These differences
are likely to affect the ability to plan and implement policy geared at ensuring group
cohesiveness and continuity (Elazar 1989; Liebman and Cohen 1990; Rebhun and
Levy 2006).
Second, the local contexts of the US and Israel suggest that Jews in each country
are exposed to different general conditions at the macro level. The US has a great
influence on the world, including on Israel (sometimes called “Americanization”).
Both countries are strong democracies with developed economies, and are members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Nevertheless, each has its own history, political system, geopolitical challenges,
The authors gratefully acknowledge support for this research from the Nachum Ben-Eli Honig
Fund.
natural resources, and economic characteristics. Each has its own ethos and values
associated with the country’s dominant religion and population composition
(Abramson and Troen 2000; Sarna 2004; Shapira 2012, 5).
Third, each Jewish community has a unique history and ethnic structure. The
overwhelming majority of American Jews are descendants of Ashkenazi immigrants
who arrived from Eastern Europe in the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries.
Others are Holocaust survivors or Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) who
immigrated in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, from an ethnic point
of view, US Jews are a relatively homogenous population. By contrast, much immi-
gration to Israel derived from Europe, Asia, and North Africa and arrived at very
different stages of modernization. Many are Sephardic or Mizrahi Jews. Each group
had its specific customs and traditions, with ethnicity being a significant component
of their Jewish identity.
Fourth, while US Jews identify with one of the major denominations (Orthodox,
Conservative, Reform, or declare that they are “Just Jewish” or cultural Jews), self-
definition in Israel distinguishes people differently (as ultra-Orthodox, religious,
traditional, or secular). While in the US, special meaning is given to synagogue and
other organizational memberships, no such meaning exists in Israel (Goldscheider
2015; Lazerwitz et al. 1998; Levy et al. 2000).
Fifth, factors at both the country level and that of communal belonging help to
shape individual patterns for dimensions such as demography, family structure,
socio-economic stratification, political orientation, and religio-ethnic connectivity.
Moreover, the general system and the communal environment are not static; rather,
they are fluid and develop in varied and sometimes contradictory directions result-
ing in much confusion and uncertainty. Hence, one cannot assume determinism of
behaviors, attitudes, and personal feelings (Rebhun 2011).
Despite these major differences, Jews in the US and in Israel largely share a com-
mon religious identity, a sense of common peoplehood, an ancient history and lan-
guage, attachment to the homeland (be it tangible or spiritual), religious rituals, etc.
Strong bonds and a sense of mutual dependency exist between these two communi-
ties that are reflected in political and economic support and cultural cooperation.
Many American and Israeli Jews are connected to one another through familial or
social relations. A steady flow of Jews occurs between the two countries with high
rates of short-term visits. More recently, advanced technology enables easy and
quick consumption of knowledge, which strengthens the connection, albeit virtually,
with the other (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2013; Rebhun and Levy 2006; Sheskin 2012;
Sasson et al. 2010; Saxe and Chazan 2008; Dashefsky et al. 1992; Waxman 1989).
The 70th anniversary of the State of Israel in 2018 is an appropriate opportunity
to assess the demographic and socio-economic developments of the Jewish popula-
tions of the US and Israel, trends over time in Jewish identity, and how the two
communities have shaped their mutual relations. As much as the data allow, this
chapter covers the entire period from 1948 to 2018. To this end, we make use of
different sources, both primary and secondary, from various years; as well as
1 Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th… 5
g enerational and age cohort comparisons. The discussion pays attention to the
implications of the empirical evidence for communal and worldwide Jewish policy1.
1.1 Socio-Demography
7000
6556
5700 5700
6000 5451
5000
5000 5700
4000 4785
3000
3141
2000
1000 1763
759
0
1948 1958 1978 1998 2018
US Israel
Fig. 1.1 US and Israeli Jewish population size (in thousands). (Sources: For the US: for 1948:
Seligman and Swados (1948/1949); for 1958: calculated from Goldstein (1969); for 1978 (reflect-
ing the size in 1980): Schmelz and DellaPergola (1982); for 1998: DellaPergola (1999) (reflecting
the size in 1997); for 2018, DellaPergola (2018). For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract 2017 and
Statistical Monthly, June 2018)
1
Throughout this article, and for the sake of simplicity, we refer to the data from both the US and
Israel Pew surveys as being collected in 2013 although the later survey is from 2014.
6 U. Rebhun et al.
5.30 million. In relative terms, these statistics suggest that from 1948 to 1958, the
US Jewish population increased by 9% and by another 5% between 1958 and 1978.
Since 1978, the growth rate has been nil (DellaPergola 2018). (See discussion below
for additional US estimates.)
The dynamic of the Israeli Jewish population was very different. The first regis-
tration of the country’s inhabitants in November 1948 recorded about 716,000 Jews.
By 1958, this increased to 1.76 million, then to 3.14 million in 1978, 4.79 million in
1998, and 6.6 million in 2018. In the first decade (1948–1958), the pace of growth
was 132% and although it remained high, it gradually diminished: to 78% between
1958 and 1978, 52% between 1978 and 1998, and 37% between 1998 and 2018.
The demographic trajectories of American and Israeli Jews gradually narrowed
the difference in the size of these populations. By about 2010, the number of Jews
in the two communities had converged. Since 2010, Israel’s Jewish community
became the single largest Jewish community in the world (DellaPergola 2016).
Note that the 2013 Pew Research Center survey (Pew Research Center 2013)
found about one million people who self-identified as “part Jewish.” Sheskin and
Dashefsky (Chapter 5 in this volume) and the Steinhardt Social Research Institute
(SSRI) at Brandeis University (www.brandeis.edu/ssri/) who used different meth-
odologies than Pew, also include Jews and “part Jews” in their counts and report
6.7 million or more Jews. Concurrently, at the beginning of 2018, there were in
Israel approximately 350,000 people of “no religion,” who are immigrants or their
descendants who were eligible to immigrate to Israel according to the Law of Return
but are not recognized as Jews by the religious establishment (CBS). Strong argu-
ments can be made to include/exclude the above mentioned two groups from the
enumeration of Jews in their respective countries (DellaPergola 2014; Saxe et al.
2014). This chapter suggests that the addition of one million people over 13 years
(from NJPS 2000 to 2001 to the Pew results in 2013) is not associated with changes
in demographic patterns of fertility, life expectancy, or migration. It probably
reflects identificational alterations, especially among the children of mixed parent-
age who do not feel minoritized in present-day America; on the contrary, they view
Jews as a privileged sub-group.2 As such, they feel confident enough to express the
Jewish identity that their parents might have chosen to hide. In any case, rather than
delving into this dispute, we decided not to consider either group in our statistics to
maintain, as much as possible, consistent definitions of the “Jewish population”
with earlier data. Were the “part Jewish” and the “no religion” added, the Jewish
population in the two countries would be almost identical.
The above dynamics in the size of the Jewish population can be attributed to
substantial variation in fertility rates which have been at or below replacement level
(2.1 children per women) among American Jews and significantly above replace-
ment level in Israel (DellaPergola 1980; DellaPergola et al. 2000b; CBS, Statistical
Abstract n.d. various years); and a much larger net gain from Jewish migration to
2
The first author wishes to thank Sylvia Barak-Fishman for her thoughtful insights in a discussion
held at the Jewish People Policy Institute, January 14, 2019.
1 Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th… 7
100%
90% 20.0 16.1
32.1
80% 41.4
48.5
70%
60% 36.5 44.9
24.1
50% 14.3
6.8
40%
30%
20% 44.7 44.3 43.8 43.5 39.0
10%
0%
1948 1958 1978 1998 2018
11.2 M 12.3 M 13.0 M 13.1 M 14.6 M
US Israel Rest World
Fig. 1.2 Distribution of world Jewish population. (Sources: Adapted from DellaPergola (1992),
DellaPergola (2018); American Jewish Year Book, 1949)
Israel than to the US (DellaPergola 2011). (See detailed discussion below.) Likewise,
over time, American Jewry has lost hundreds of thousands of core members who
adopted another religion or simply discarded a religious preference altogether
(Rebhun 2016). Accordingly (Fig. 1.2), the percentage of world Jewry who live in
the US somewhat diminished, from 45% in 1948 to 39% in 2018. At the same time,
the percentage of world Jewry who live in Israel increased from 7% in 1948 to 24%
in 1978, 37% in 1998, and 45% in 2018. The percentage of world Jewry who live in
Israel in 2018 is similar to the percentage of world Jews who lived in the US 70 years
ago. At no point in modern times has an absolute majority of world Jewry lived in
either the US or Israel (DellaPergola 1992, DellaPergola 2018).
American Jews are a small minority within a majority Christian society. Since
1948, the American Jewish population remained stable while the general population
increased by 117% from about 150 million in 1948 to about 325 million in 2018.
Hence, the percentage of Jews in the American population decreased from 3.4% in
1948 to 2.6% in 1978 and to only about 1.7% today (Table 1.1). This reflects a dimi-
nution of more than half in the percentage Jewish in the US over the 70 years. In
Israel, upon statehood, Jews accounted for 87% of the population. This percentage
decreased to 84% in 1978 and to 75% in 2018. The decreases in percentage Jewish
would be moderated slightly if the “part Jewish” in the US and persons of “no reli-
gion” in Israel were included. These percentages would rise to 2% in the US and to
79% in Israel.
8 U. Rebhun et al.
Significant differences are found between the US and Israeli Jewish communities in
nativity, fertility, age, and levels of secular education.
Nativity. Both American Jewry and Israel are immigrant absorbing communi-
ties. Without disputing the importance of Jewish migration to both communities
over the past 140 years, migration to the US was highest between 1880 and 1914
while significant numbers of Jewish immigrants to Israel arrived shortly after
statehood and in the 1990s (DellaPergola 2000). These differences in the timing of
the largest immigration waves determine the nativity status of the population.
In 1957, an estimated 75% of American Jews were native born (Table 1.2). They
include descendants of Jewish immigrants from Central Europe who arrived in the
early nineteenth century and the second and third generations of East European
Jews from the 1880–1914 mass immigration. In contrast, only 33% of Israeli Jews
in 1957 were native born. The overwhelming majority of the foreign born had
arrived in Israel after 1948. The percentage of native born in the US remained about
the same (77%) by 1970. By 2013 in the US, many Jewish immigrants were lost to
mortality and new waves of immigration were generally small; so, the percentage of
native born increased to 86%. The percentage of native born among Israeli Jews also
increased to 46% by 1970 and 76% by 2013 despite significant immigration in the
late 1950s and early 1960s from North Africa and Eastern Europe and the large
influx of FSU Jews in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, the number of new
immigrants to Israel did not match the significant rate of natural increase.
1 Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th… 9
4.00
3.56
3.50 3.36
3.05
3.00 2.69 2.66
2.50 2.80
2.00
1.50 1.92
1.60 1.50 1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
1955 1965 1990 2000 2013
US Israel
Fig. 1.3 Total fertility rates among Jews. (Sources: For the US: DellaPergola (1980); Kosmin
et al. (1991); DellaPergola et al. (2000b); Pew Research Center (2013). For Israel: CBS, Statistical
Abstract, various years)
The 76% for Israel in 2013 is similar to the share of native born among American
Jews in 1957. More generally, the large differences in nativity status between US
and Israeli Jews in 1957 (42% points) and 1970 (31% points) decreased substan-
tially to only 10% points in 2013. From an identificational point of view, the mean-
ing of this development is that more people in both the US and Israel each share
memories and experiences associated with respective native homelands.
Fertility. The relative stability since 1957 in the nativity status of American Jews
was not only affected by a low rate of international migration but was also associ-
ated with a fertility rate below the replacement level (2.1 children per women).
Indeed, in the mid-1950s, the average number of children per Jewish woman (Total
Fertility Rate or TFR) was 2.8, reflecting the post-WWII “baby boom” (Fig. 1.3).
This number decreased to 1.9 in the mid-1960s and from 1990 onward it leveled off
at about 1.5. These statistics refer to children born to a Jewish woman who are iden-
tified by their parents as Jews (“actual Jewish fertility”).
Fertility of Jewish women in Israel has always been higher than in the US
(Fig. 1.3). Shortly after statehood, the TFR was 3.5. The rate gradually diminished
largely due to the transition to modern demographic patterns among immigrants of
Asian and North African background. The large influx of FSU Jews in the 1990s,
characterized by small families, further reduced the TFR to 2.66. Since then, the
TFR has been increasing – a trend that can be attributed to the increase in fertility
among FSU immigrants to levels resembling those of secular Israelis (around two
children) (Tolts 2015) and to an increase in the share of religious Jews, especially of
ultra-Orthodox Jews (Levy et al. 1993; Pew Research Center 2015), who have on
average seven children per woman (Hleihal 2017).
In 1955, the differential in TFR between US and Israeli Jews was 0.76; by 1965,
American Jewish fertility decreased at a much faster pace than in Israel and the differ-
ences between the two communities increased to 1.4 children. By 1990 and 2000, the
differential decreased to about one child; but by 2013, the differential increased to a
peak gap of about 1.5. Part of the differential is the result of Israeli Jewry’s having a
10 U. Rebhun et al.
larger percentage of ultra-Orthodox and modern Orthodox than does American Jewry,
but even among those Israelis who are not religious, the fertility rate is higher than that
of American Jews. It should also be noted that there is some differential in fertility
between ultra-Orthodox women in Israel and in the US of approximately two children
in favor of the former. No less important is that US Jewish fertility is below the replace-
ment level (2.1) while that in Israel is significantly above, ensuring population growth.
Age. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the age composition of American Jews is
older than that of Israeli Jews (Table 1.3). Already in 1957, the Current Population
Survey (CPS) completed by the US Census Bureau found that only 6.6% of the
adult Jewish population (age 20 and above) were age 20–24, half the percentage for
Israel. Almost twice as many American Jews were age 65 and over than Jews in
Israel (14.3% vs. 7.9%). Among American Jews, the two intermediate age groups
(25–44 and 45–64) were of very similar size, whereas in Israel the younger of these
two cohorts was substantially larger.
By 1970, the percentage for the 20–24 age group among American Jews had
increased to 13%, reflecting the maturation of immediate post WWII baby-boom
generation (persons born 1946–1950). This increase came at the expense of some
diminution in the percentage for the intermediate age cohorts, especially the 25–44
age group, although it did not stop the increase in the percentage for the elderly
population. In Israel, the 1957–1970 period shows an increase in the percentage at
both ends of the age pyramid. Hence there is now more similarity between the
American and Israeli populations, from an index of dissimilarity of 13.2 in 1957 to
9.1 in 1970.3
By 2013, the percentage of American Jews in the two youngest age groups
decreased in favor of an increase in the percentage for the age 45–64 and age 65 and
over cohorts. Although in Israel the two end cohorts behaved similarly to the US,
3
The index of dissimilarity is the percentage of American Jews who would have to be in a different
age group so that the American age distribution looks exactly like the Israeli age distribution.
1 Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th… 11
the percentage of Jews age 25–44 increased while the percentage age 45–64
decreased. This resulted in a return to a much higher index of dissimilarity (12.9).
Educational Attainment. Educational attainment is an important indicator of
achievement, social status, and prestige both for individuals and the community as
a whole. Education is also a good proxy for economic attainment and, thus, quality
of life. In the case of a minority group, such as American Jews, this is likely to influ-
ence the ability of institutions and organizations to raise money for parochial
activities.
Aspiration to acquire higher education is associated with several individual
characteristics such as family background, ethnicity, and religiosity. In this regard,
American Jews are at an advantage over their peers in Israel. More US Jews are the
second or third generation within their families to attend college compared to many
Israelis who were raised in families of Holocaust survivors or of immigrants from
Muslim countries who frequently did not have educational opportunities. Also,
most US Jews were raised in major urban or suburban areas with good educational
systems. Many Israelis, on the other hand, especially persons of Sephardic back-
ground, received a rather inferior education in Israeli development towns and other
peripheral areas of the country. In addition, Ultra-Orthodox Jews are approximately
6–7% of US Jewry whereas Haredim are about 10% of the Israeli Jewish population
(Pew Research Center 2013, 2015). Furthermore, US Ultra-Orthodox find it harder
to isolate themselves within the religious world and are required by law to provide
their children with secular education, while many of their peers in Israel provide
mostly religious training and enjoy substantial governmental support.4 Moreover,
US states require school attendance from age 5, 6, or 7 until age 16, 17, or 18.5
Indeed, some significant variations are seen in the educational profile of Jews in
the US and Israel classified here according to three categories: 1–8 years of educa-
tion, 9–12 years, and 13 years and more (Fig. 1.4). Around 1960, 30% of American
Jews had some post-secondary education (13 or more years), as opposed to 11% in
Israel. By 2013, both populations showed impressive increases in post-secondary
education to 81% and 45%, respectively. Another important development is the
almost total disappearance, both in the US and Israel, of persons with only 1–8 years
of schooling. Still, 55% of Jews in Israel in 2013 lack education beyond high school,
compared to 19% in the US. It should be noted that data from the 2013 and 2015
Pew surveys, not shown here, suggest that in both countries a similar percentage
(71–72%) of those with post-secondary education have, in fact, an academic degree.
4
Note that, in New York, where most ultra-Orthodox in the US reside, recent controversy has arisen
as the state tries to enforce the requirement about secular education in ultra-Orthodox schools
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-ultra-orthodox-in-new-york-threaten-war-
after-state-demands-more-secular-education-i-1.6744784.
5
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Valley of the Nile was regarded as a direct violation of the
rights of Egypt and Great Britain, and that, in accordance
with my instructions, I must protest in the strongest terms
against their occupation of Fashoda, and their hoisting of the
French flag in the dominions of His Highness the Khedive. In
reply, M. Marchand stated that as a soldier he had to obey
orders; the instructions of his Government to occupy the
Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Mudirieh of Fashoda were precise, and,
having carried them out, he must await the orders of his
Government as to his subsequent action and movements. I then
pointed out that I had the instructions of the Government to
re-establish Egyptian authority in the Fashoda Mudirieh, and I
asked M. Marchand whether he was prepared—on behalf of the
French Government—to resist the execution of these orders; he
must be fully aware, I said, that the Egyptian and British
forces were very much more powerful than those at his
disposal, but, at the same time, I was very averse to creating
a situation which might lead to hostilities. I therefore
begged M. Marchand to most carefully consider his final
decision on this matter. I further informed him that I should
be pleased to place one of the gun-boats at his disposal to
convey him and his expedition north. In answer to this, M.
Marchand did not hesitate to admit the preponderating forces
at my disposal, and his inability to offer effective armed
resistance; if, however, he said, I felt obliged to take any
such action, he could only submit, to the inevitable, which
would mean that he and his companions would die at their
posts. He begged, therefore, that I would consider his
position, and would allow the question of his remaining at
Fashoda to be referred to his Government, as, without their
orders, he could not retire from his position or haul down his
flag; at the same time, he said he felt sure that, under the
circumstances, the orders for his retirement would not be
delayed by his Government, and that then he hoped to avail
himself of the offer I had made him. I then said to him: 'Do I
understand that you are authorized by the French Government to
resist Egypt in putting up its flag and reasserting its
authority in its former possessions—such as the Mudirieh of
Fashoda?' M. Marchand hesitated, and then said that he could
not resist the Egyptian flag being hoisted. I replied that my
instructions were to hoist the flag, and that I intended to do
so. … The Egyptian flag was hoisted … at 1 P. M. with due
ceremony in the presence of the British and Egyptian troops,
and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired.
{200}
I should add that, in the course of the conversation, I
informed M. Marchand that, in addition to my verbal protest, I
intended to make a formal protest in writing, and this I duly
handed him before leaving Fashoda. During these somewhat
delicate proceedings nothing could have exceeded, the
politeness and courtesy of the French officers. Having
officially appointed Major Jackson Commandant of the Fashoda
district, and leaving with him a battalion of infantry, four
guns, and a gun-boat, I proceeded south with the remainder of
the troops and four gun-boats. …
EGYPT: A. D. 1898-1901.
The Barrage and Reservoir works on the Nile.
"At Assiut the great regulating dam across the Nile approaches
completion, the foundations being practically all in position,
leaving a portion of the superstructure to be completed. The
sluice openings here number 119, all 16 feet wide. This dam is
somewhat similar in principle to the well-known barrage near
Cairo, but the details of construction are entirely different,
as the foundations are guarded against undermining by a
complete line of cast iron and steel-piling above and below
the work. The barrage itself is constructed of high-class
masonry instead of brickwork as at the old barrage. Although
the Assiut barrage is overshadowed by the greater magnitude of
the Assuan dam, it will, doubtless, rank second as the
monumental work of Egypt."
ARTICLE I.
The word "Sudan" in this Agreement means all the territories
South of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which:
2.
Which, having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been
administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive,
were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by
Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government acting in
concert; or
ARTICLE II.
The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on
land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of
Suákin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be
used.
ARTICLE III.
The supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be
vested in one officer, termed the "Governor-General of the
Sudan." He shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the
recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and
shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of
Her Britannic Majesty's Government.
{202}
ARTICLE IV.
Laws, as also Orders and Regulations with the full force of
law, for the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating
the holding, disposal, and devolution of property of every
kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered,
or abrogated by Proclamation of the Governor-General. Such
Laws, Orders, and Regulations may apply to the whole of any
named part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by
necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing Law or
Regulation. All such Proclamations shall be forthwith notified
to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and
to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness
the Khedive.
ARTICLE V.
No Egyptian Law, Decree, Ministerial Arrêté, or other
enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to
the Sudan or any part thereof, save in so far as the same
shall be applied by Proclamation of the Governor-General in
manner hereinbefore provided.
ARTICLE VI.
In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under
which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty
to trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property
within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to
the subjects of anyone or more Power.
ARTICLE VII.
Import duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on
goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may,
however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than
Egyptian territory, but in the case of goods entering the
Sudan at Suákin, or any other port on the Red Sea Littoral,
they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time
being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may
be levied on goods leaving the Sudan at such rates as may from
time to time be prescribed by Proclamation.
ARTICLE VIII.
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor
be recognized for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the
Sudan, except in the town of Suákin.
ARTICLE IX.
Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined, by
Proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of
Suákin, shall be and remain under martial law.
ARTICLE X.
No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be
accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the Sudan,
without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's
Government.
ARTICLE XI.
The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their
exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made
by Proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation.
ARTICLE XII.
It is agreed between the two Governments that special
attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act
of the 2nd July 1890, in respect to the import, sale, and
manufacture of fire-arms and their munitions, and distilled or
spirituous liquors.
EGYPT: A. D. 1899-1900.
Final defeat and death of the Khalifa.
Capture of Osman Digna.
Condition of the Sudan.
----------EGYPT: End--------
{203}
ELAM.
(in volume 4)
SEMITES;
ENGLAND: A. D. 1894.
The commandeering question with the South African Republic.
ENGLAND: A. D. 1894-1895.
Retirement of Mr. Gladstone from public life.
Earl of Rosebery Prime Minister.
His speech on the "predominant member" and Home Rule.
Weakening and overthrow of the Liberal Government.
Dissolution of Parliament.
Conservative and Unionist triumph.
Third Ministry of Lord Salisbury.
Mr. Gladstone, who had passed his 84th year, whose health was
failing, and who might justly consider that his public work
was done, resigned his post as Prime Minister, on the 2d of
March, 1894, and the Earl of Rosebery, on his recommendation,
was called by the Queen to take his place. Slight changes,
otherwise, were made in the cabinet, but the spirit in the
Liberal government was no longer the same. The new Premier
soon signified that his disposition in the matter of Home Rule
for Ireland was not quite what Mr. Gladstone's had been, by
using the following language in a speech (March 13) in the
House of Lords:
{204}
ENGLAND: A. D. 1895.
Enforcement of claims against Nicaragua.
See (in this volume)
CENTRAL AMERICA (NICARAGUA): A. D. 1894-1895.
ENGLAND: A. D. 1895.
The question of Chitral.
ENGLAND: A. D. 1896.
Establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
ENGLAND: A. D. 1896.
Report on Old-Age Pensions.