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Assault on Democracy
KURT WEYLAND
University of Texas at Austin
University Printing House, Cambridge 2 8, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108844338
: 10.1017/9781108943642
© Kurt Weyland 2021
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2021
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
978-1-108-84433-8 Hardback
978-1-108-94804-3 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Bibliography 333
Index 367
v
Tables
vii
Preface
Every German who grew up in the post–WWII era faced the impossible
task of coming to grips with our terrible recent past, the massive destruc-
tion and self-destruction, the unspeakable atrocities and crimes. Although
I escaped to the United States and turned to the study of Latin America, it
was unavoidable to return to this task. After I designed my own theoret-
ical approach to political regime change and tested it by examining a
range of other cases in my last two books, I finally felt ready. This study
therefore holds a very deep personal meaning. For this reason, it is
dedicated to my late father, Dr. Helmut Weyland, who grew up during
the interwar years and who at the current age of my sons had already
undergone experiences, as a regular soldier and then a POW, that he
would spend the rest of his life trying to cope with. The book is also
dedicated to my sons, Andreas and Nikolas Weyland, who – decades
later – still live under the shadow of the German past.
ix
Acknowledgments
xi
1
Introduction
1
2 Introduction
governments that had initially won power in formally legal ways, based
on substantial support in free and fair elections (Levitsky and Ziblatt
2018: 3–10).
The prime example is, of course, Germany’s National Socialism, which
in the early 1930s achieved such drastic vote gains that in a democracy
wrecked by ideological polarization and battered by economic collapse,
government formation without them seemed no longer feasible. As soon
as conservative power holders reluctantly appointed Hitler as chancellor
(Turner 1996), he quickly obliterated the stranglehold that established
elites sought to impose on him, dismantled democracy from the inside,
and installed brutal totalitarianism (Sauer 1974; Bracher 1979). The
speed with which the Nazi leader accomplished this feat suggested the
inherent fragility of liberal democracy, which tends to grant room of
maneuver even to its sworn enemies. Consequently, democracy can prove
defenseless when growing portions of the electorate choose to support
antidemocratic forces. While much less reactionary in ideology and much
less dictatorial in political intentions, could a populist leader like Trump
exploit these internal vulnerabilities for illiberal and increasingly authori-
tarian purposes as well?
Given these concerns about democracy’s potential self-destruction, it is
important to re-examine the autocratic wave of the interwar years, the
single most striking, momentous, and consequential reversal of liberal-
democratic progress that the world has ever suffered (Huntington 1991:
14–18; Berg-Schlosser 2009: 44–48; Wejnert 2014: 13–17, 148–49, 164;
Kailitz 2017: 40–44). The main question of the present book is what
caused this surprising turnaround in the historical trend. After all, the
nineteenth century had witnessed a seemingly unstoppable advance of
political liberalism and democracy. Popular sovereignty, parliamentary
responsibility, and suffrage extensions had spread slowly but surely in
Europe, especially the continent’s Northwestern corner.
The WWI and its immediate aftermath had brought an additional
progressive surge as countries that were already advanced, such as
Britain and Sweden, had completed their transitions to democracy.
More importantly, the defeat of the four autocratic empires in Europe’s
Eastern half had allowed for democracy to sprout in less hospitable soil.
The new countries emerging from Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman,
and Romanov rule adopted democratic constitutions and started to
hold elections (see recently Kershaw 2015: 121–34; Gunitsky 2017:
77–87; Kailitz 2017). In the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
political liberalism had also gained a substantial foothold in South
4 Introduction
1919 Hungary
1922 Italy
1923 Bulgaria
1923 Spain
1926 Poland
1926 Lithuania
1926 Portugal
1928 Albania
1929 Yugoslavia
1932 Portugal
1933 Germany
1933 Austria
1934 Estonia
1934 Latvia
1934/35 Bulgaria
1936 Greece
1936/39 Spain
1937 Brazil
1938 Romania
1
See, among many others, Carsten (1982: 176, 182–83, 187–88); Payne (1995: 76–78);
Paxton (2005: 19, 44, 60–61, 68, 70, 81, 84, 88–89, 102–5, 110, 116, 196); Gerwarth and
Horne (2012a: 42, 44, 51); and Kershaw (2015: 229–30).
6 Introduction
The main reason for this diversity stemmed from the emergence of
fascism in Italy, which offered a novel option for combating the radical
left and strengthening the polity against perceived danger (Hamilton
1971; Sassoon 2007; Bosworth 2009a). In fact, this new regime type
appeared as the single most potent antidote to Marxist socialism
(Markwick 2009). But fascism also stirred up unease and concern among
many right-wing counterrevolutionaries, especially conservative elites
(Blinkhorn 1990). After all, its unaccountable charismatic leadership,
violent dynamism, and strong totalitarian ambitions threatened to over-
turn sociopolitical hierarchy as well. Powerful establishment sectors
therefore saw fascism with profound ambivalence. While they sought to
use extreme-right movements against their leftist enemies, they also
wanted to keep them under control and ensure their own domination
by imposing demobilizational, exclusionary authoritarianism.
This elite ambivalence toward fascism caused a great deal of compli-
cations and conflicts during the interwar reverse wave. The right-wing
backlash against communism advanced along divergent pathways. The
specific outcome depended on the relative strength of conservative estab-
lishment sectors, who sought stability through authoritarian rule, versus
fascist upstarts, who pushed hard for a totalitarian transformation. In
turn, this balance of sociopolitical clout depended on the modernization
of economy and society.
Traditional elites were relatively weak and fascist movements had the
greatest opportunities for expansion in modern countries such as
Germany. Only this advanced nation therefore followed Mussolini’s foot-
steps and installed a full-scale fascist regime on its own. By contrast, in the
less developed East and South of Europe and in Latin America, traditional
elites maintained much greater clout, for instance through clientelistic
control over the rural population. Fascist movements therefore had less
space for mobilizing support. The weakness of liberal democracy in these
settings allowed conservative establishment sectors to impose hierarch-
ical, exclusionary authoritarianism. And they did so not only to forestall
potential threats from the radical left, but also – and often more urgently –
to rein in fascist upstarts or prevent these violent hordes from seizing
power. Conservative authoritarianism thus blocked totalitarian fascism.
Unusually, thus, the interwar reverse wave was deeply affected by a
second deterrent effect, nested in the broad backlash against
communism. While right-wingers of all stripes often cooperated in com-
bating the radical and not-so-radical left, they then divided over the
counter-model to install. Whereas conservative elites tried to impose
Main Argument 9
2
Linz (2002: 12–13) also distinguishes different paths of regime developments during the
interwar years, but does not highlight preemptive coups as a separate path. But because
these anti-fascist coups were decisive for effecting regime change, whereas conservatives’
use of fascist auxiliaries strengthened already-existing authoritarian regimes, as in
Portugal, it makes sense for the present analysis of democratic breakdowns to emphasize
this distinction.
The Tragedy of the Interwar Years 11
Mutta Sjur poikanen ei voinut saada oikein tarkkoja tietoja. Hän tuli
yhä lujemmin vakuutetuksi siitä, että kaupunkilaisilla ei ollut paljon
järkeä.
Niinpä hänelläkin. Hänestä oli, kuin olisi hän vasta täällä nummella
alkanut sitä tehdä.
Hän ihmetteli että ihmiset voivat niin kiusata itseänsä kuin hän oli
tehnyt. Paistoihan Luojan päivä!
*****
Hän näki Samuel Sternin tulevan.
Hänen täytyi katsoa Thoraan, joka istui katkera tuskan piirre suun
ympärillä ja suurissa, hiljaisissa silmissä.
Sitten hän jatkoi: — Niin olen sitä nimittänyt viime kesästä saakka,
jolloin äitini oli täällä… Eräänä iltana hän istui katsoen tuota
näköalaa. Hänen oli vaikea käydä, mutta kerran hän oli tullut tänne
ylös… Se oli suuri voitto meidän kummankin mielestä… Silloin hän
kääntyi minua kohden, ja minä näin hänen katseessansa valtavan
ikävöimisen, jonka olin nähnyt siinä muutamia kertoja ennen.
— »Se on kaunista!» sanoi hän. »Ei teille muille, vaan minulle tuo
loistava, saavuttamaton maa tuolla ylhäällä on kuin kuva kaikesta
mitä olen ikävöinyt! Se on kuin luvattu maa, johon minun ei koskaan
pitänyt tulla.» —
— »Mutta olen saanut nähdä sen», sanoi hän hymyillen. »Ja olen
nähnyt muiden menevän sinne, ja olen uneksinut että monet
saavuttaisivat sen! Siinä olen löytänyt onneni.» — — —
— Silloin äitini nauroi minulle. Hän nauraa aina, kun sanon jotain
sellaista, mutta minä tiedän, että se on totta!
— Tänä vuonna hän ei tule tänne. Mutta olen antanut tuolle
pienelle talolle, jossa me asuimme ja jossa minä asun yksin tänä
vuonna, nimen, joka muistuttaa hänen olostansa täällä. Nimitän sitä
Abarrimin vuoreksi, vuoreksi, joka on itäänpäin. — Sieltä voin nähdä
luvattuun maahan!
— Sitä älköön kukaan luulko minusta. Mitä syytä olisi luulla minua
jaloksi?
Miksi kertoi tuo mies hänelle tätä kaikkea? Hänhän oli yhä vielä
kyllin typerä käsittääksensä kaikki vakavalta kannalta. Itse ei Samuel
Stern nähtävästi välittänyt siitä vähääkään, — se oli hänestä vain
hullunkurista. Mutta kumminkin tämä puhe saattoi Thoran hämilleen.
— Minkä muun?
Thora nousi.
— Pysykäämme, te sanoitte?
Hän nauroi.
— Ihmeellinen pappi — eikö totta?… Minne te nyt menette? Täällä
on vielä auringon hehku jäljellä, mutta tuonne kauas on yö jo tullut!
Aiotteko sinne?
8.
Ja nyt — nyt tuli tuuli kumminkin lopuksi tänäänkin. Hän kuuli sen
syvän, aaltoilevan hengityksen. Nyt se oli täällä!
Hän nauroi jälleen. Hän oli hyvällä tuulella. Hänen naurunsa oli
vienoa, hiljaista ja pehmoista, — se ikäänkuin häipyi kukkasten
sekaan.
— Ei, nyt täytyy teidän lopettaa… sekä rouva Thamar että nuo
nuoret neidit??… Minä luulen — — —
Thora nyökkäsi.
— Hän on aina ymmärtänyt minua. Hän on minun toverini, paras
ystäväni, turvani erämaassa — hän on Mooses, joka johdattaa
minua kohden luvattua maata. Mutta hän ei väsy, kuten Mooses.
Hän ei väsy koskaan — siksi en minäkään voi joutua hukkaan. — —
— Minun täytyi lähteä kotoa liian nuorena. Silloin sanoi hän minulle:
»On paha sinulle, poikani, että olen pakotettu lähettämään sinut
luotani. Mutta sinun täytyy nyt itsesi taistella taistelusi ja katsoa että
pääset voitolle!» — — — Kävi kuten äitini pelkäsi. Taistelu kävi
minulle; liian kovaksi. Mutta kaikki syntini minä vein hänen eteensä,
— kaikki mitä olin tehnyt ja katunut ja kärsinyt, sen toin hänen
nähtäväksensä! — — —
— Mitä te sanoittekaan?
— Minä uskon teille jotain. Oli kerran nuori nainen — hänelle minä
olisin avannut temppelin oven. Siellä oli paikka varattuna hänelle
äitini tykönä. Äiti odotti siellä sisällä. Olin sanonut että hän tulisi — —