Enterprise Information Systems

ISSN: 1751-7575 (Print) 1751-7583 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/teis20

Blockchain adoption for information sharing: risk

decision-making in spacecraft supply chain

Kangning Zheng, Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang, Yun Chen & Jiajin Wu

To cite this article: Kangning Zheng, Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang, Yun Chen & Jiajin Wu (2019):
Blockchain adoption for information sharing: risk decision-making in spacecraft supply chain,
Enterprise Information Systems, DOI: 10.1080/17517575.2019.1669831

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17517575.2019.1669831

Published online: 02 Oct 2019.

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ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
https://doi.org/10.1080/17517575.2019.1669831

Blockchain adoption for information sharing: risk

decision-making in spacecraft supply chain
Kangning Zhenga, Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang b
, Yun Chena and Jiajin Wua
a
School of Logistics and E-Commerce, Zhejiang Wanli University, Ningbo, China; bCoggin College of
Business, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This research studies the risk decision-making (RDM) problem faced Received 25 March 2019
by participants in a spacecraft supply chain, considering the adoption Accepted 16 September 2019
of the blockchain technology to facilitate information sharing. We KEYWORDS
investigate a three-level spacecraft supply chain composed of a Blockchain technology;
spacecraft builder, supplier, and logistics service integrator with the spacecraft enterprise; supply
Stackelberg game under the scenarios of decentralized, partially chain; risk decision-making
centralized, and fully centralized decision-making. For each scenario,
we show how the spacecraft builder’s optimal order quantity and the
supplier’s application degree of the blockchain technology change
with the spacecraft builder’s risk coefficient. We also compare the
overall profit of the supply chain for three decision-making scenarios.

1. Introduction
Space exploration is no longer a strategic mission for superpowers to engage in
competition after the end of the cold war. The space launch market has evolved into
a commercial industry with companies and governments participating from different
countries. In addition to the traditional players such as NASA in the U.S. and Roscosmos
in Russia, other players like China Aerospace Industry Corporation (CASC), Indian Space
Research Organisation (ISRO), and European Space Agency (ESA), as well as independent
companies such as SpaceX and Arianespace have aspired to apply new technologies to
sustain and improve the efficiencies of their space operations.
The field of logistics and supply chain management is key to sustainable space explora-
tion. The U.S. space supply chain was developed from its ballistic missile industry after World
War II and has since become a multi-billion-dollar industry with its continuous expansion
and addition of satellites and spacecrafts. Many start-up space companies emerged during
the mid-2000s and they have started to revitalise the existing space markets by leveraging
the practices from the spacecraft supply chains (Bryce Space and Technology 2017). Russia’s
Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos, decided to secure its supply chain by upgrading its
Soyuz rocket to the newer Soyuz-2 series to support the International Space Station. The
Soyuz 2 rockets used a digital control system that makes their rockets more versatile than
before (Bodner 2014). In Europe, an independent non-profit association, named as SPACE,

CONTACT Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang justin.zhang@unf.edu Coggin College of Business, University of North
Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 K. ZHENG ET AL.

was developed to support the European aerospace supply chain to increase their perfor-
mance and efficiency. SPACE applies a special toolset derived from industrial best practices
and standards (Space Aero 2019).
The spacecraft supply chain is huge and complex due to its diverse forms, assorted
supporting relationships, and the varieties of materials covering almost all industrial
fields. The efficiency, inventory, cost and other comprehensive problems of the space-
craft supply chain cannot be solved by local optimisation alone; instead, the optimisa-
tion of the whole supply chain must be promoted.
Blockchain technology has been recently adopted and implemented in the supply
chain of many different industries. For instance, JD.com established a technology alli-
ance with multiple food enterprises, and jointly create the blocks of the food supply
chain using block chain technology to help enterprises to monitor the supply chain
(Sandler 2018). Amazon, Mastercard, and Accenture partner together to develop the
international finance supply chain based on blockchain technology (Ankney, 2019).
Blockchain can also be applied in spacecraft supply chains to facilitate the distributed
accounting process through blockchain 2.0 intelligent contract, guarantee transaction
security, reduce transaction risks, and address the challenges of information asymmetry
and credit guarantee. NASA has recently started to adopt blockchain technology to
shorten and strengthen the performance of spacecraft supply chains (Brathwaite 2018).
Despite the great promises of blockchain applications in spacecraft supply chains,
there is very little research on this topic. This paper addresses the research gap by
modelling and studying a spacecraft supply chain application block chain technology,
taking into account the blockchain adoption by the participants to facilitate information
sharing. Specifically, we analytically model a spacecraft supply chain as a three-level
system composed of a spacecraft builder, supplier, and logistics service integrator. We
study the three-level spacecraft supply chain with the Stackelberg game under the
scenarios of decentralised, partially centralised, and fully centralised decision-making.
Modelling the risk of the spacecraft builder as a conditional value for different risk
methods, we demonstrate that for the decentralised decision-making scenario, the
optimal order quantity of the spacecraft builder increases with its risk decision-making
coefficient, but the supplier’s application degree of the blockchain technology decreases
with the spacecraft builder’s risk coefficient. Furthermore, we find that the overall profit
of the risk-neutral spacecraft supply chain for the fully centralised decision-making
scenario is greater than that for both the partially centralised and the decentralised
decision-making scenarios, whereas the optimal profit of the spacecraft supply chain
without considering the risk of short supply loss is greater than that with the short
supply loss. Our research shows that the blockchain adoption reduces the transaction
cost in the spacecraft supply chain and fulfils information sharing, improving the overall
profit of the spacecraft supply chain.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Next section reviews prior literature,
focusing on the application of blockchain and risk decision-making in supply chain.
Section 3 presents an analytic model of spacecraft supply chain, featuring the risk
decision-making of major participants when they adopt blockchain technology.
Section 4 details our analysis and discussion by demonstrating both the decentralised
and centralised decision-making in the spacecraft supply chain, conducing the
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 3

comparative analysis, and demonstrating a specific numeric example. The last section
concludes the paper.

2. Literature review
This section reviews prior literature, focusing on the application of blockchain and risk
decision-making in supply chain. In addition, we highlight the differences of our
research.

2.1. Blockchain in supply chain

A supply chain coordinates procurement, production, sales, order processing, inventory
control, customer service, and outsourcing activities, facilitating collaborative operations
among suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers (Zhu and
Fu 2016). In a supply chain, data about raw materials, production processes, and
technical standards are often lost in the conversion process of each link, leading to
a crisis of trust among participants due to the lack of information. The mismatch of
logistics, information flow, and value flow of supply chain exists widely in commercial
activities. Building a collaborative system of logistics, information flow, and value flow to
promote the coordinated operations of supply chain participants and enhance the trust
of commercial activities is the future development direction of supply chains. A supply
chain includes the procurement, manufacturing, and sales stages, in which the corre-
sponding data can be recorded on a blockchain, as shown in Figure 1.
In the procurement phase, the raw material supplier needs to provide the production
certification information of the raw material, the label used to help identify the char-
acteristics of the raw material, and the annual output information of the manufacturer
producing the raw material. These parameters can be adjusted for different types of raw
materials. As the source of products, the authenticity of raw materials is particularly
important. The information of these raw materials needs to be registered in the block-
chain. If the length of information is too large, only its digital fingerprint (Hash value) can
be recorded in the blockchain. In the manufacturing phase, the input must be the
output of the above procurement phase. If multiple raw materials are needed for
product manufacturing, each raw material is taken as input; information such as man-
ufacturing time stamp is recorded, and output is the product.

Raw material supplier Manufacturers Distributors, retailers, consumers

Material information Production information Sales information

Raw material chain Production chain Sales chain

Supply chain adopting blockchain

Figure 1. Blockchain application in supply chain.

4 K. ZHENG ET AL.

During the sales phase, a unique label is generated for each product, which can be
linked to the raw material, ingredient or blockchain proof of the product itself in the
form of QR code or NFC and RFID tags. After consumers get the product, they can
automatically link to its source information and the whole process of circulation by
scanning the label. Based on the blockchain technology, all participants in the supply
chain jointly build an alliance chain and form an ecosystem. In this alliance chain, all
parties can share a transparent and reliable information platform and traceability pro-
cess (Cai et al. 2017). At the same time, each participant can also carry out other types of
services, such as supply chain finance and precision marketing, based on blockchain
data. Using distributed and shared ledgers, blockchain technology can provide highly
secure and tamper-proof data. The use of blockchain technology can track the procure-
ment, manufacturing, and sales of a supply chain and improve the overall safety and
efficiency of the supply chain.
The blockchain technology has been increasingly applied in risk decision-making of
supply chains. However, researches on the blockchain’s applications in supply chains
mainly focus on traceability and credit issues. The prosperity of Bitcoin has given rise to
widespread attention and in-depth research on blockchains. For instance, Lu (2018a)
analyses blockchain as the fundamental technology for the decentralisation, openness,
security, independence, anonymity, integrity, and authenticity of diversified applications.
Chow (2018) finds that blockchains can improve the transparency of supply chain and
human rights management. Francisco & Swanson (2018) uses UTAUT and the concepts
of technological innovation to construct the basic framework of supply chain traceabil-
ity. Kim and Laskowski (2018) use the traceability ontology to translate some expressions
into intelligent contract execution, which is beneficial to the blockchain design.
N Kshetri (2017) analyzes and describes the role of blockchain in tracking insecure
factors in the supply chain related to IOT (Internet of things) devices. With the use of
blockchain, IOT security vulnerabilities can be found and further targeted to prevent
security vulnerabilities. Abeyratne and Monfared (2016) discuss the potential advantages
of blockchain technology in manufacturing supply chain and propose the idea of future
blockchain manufacturing supply chain. Weber et al. (2016) solve the problem of distrust
through the blockchain technology and find out the agreement on the shared state of
the cooperative parties through the blockchain. It does not need to trust the central
authority or any specific participants, so as to solve the trust problem based on the
collaborative process execution of the block chain.
The spacecraft supply chain is full of high risks characterised by intensive knowledge and
technology, highly sophisticated products and processes, and increasingly integrations of
military and civilian. In order to minimise enterprise risks and improve its overall profit,
blockchain technology appears to be a promising solution to address the challenges.
However, very few studies have incorporated blockchain technology into spacecraft supply
chains. Our research investigates the decision-making problems in a spacecraft supply chain
where the blockchain technology is applied to effectively reduce the overall risk of enter-
prises and achieves data flow and information sharing.
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5

2.2. Supply chain risk decision-making

Tian, Chen, and Huang (2017) study the decision-making problem of retailer ordering
and mixed channel supply chain manufacturer’s innovation input to reduce marginal
operating cost when retailers have different risk preferences by using CVaR (Conditional
Value at Risk) method. Wang, Gu, and Zhang (2016) explore the pricing decision of
a dual-channel supply chain under the background that both manufacturers and retai-
lers have risk aversion behaviours and the production information is asymmetric. Klein
et al. (2014) study how to use mobile technology to control the risks in a beef supply
chain in Brazil. Chen, Li, and Feng (2016) investigate the two-stage supply chain pricing
decision-making model composed of risk-neutral suppliers and risk-averse retailers
based on revenue sharing contract under the constraint of retailer capital with the
help of CVaR theory. Qiu, Yuan, and Feng (2015) establish a supply chain revenue
sharing contract model based on mean-CVaR decision criterion, which is described by
two risk parameters, namely pessimism coefficient and risk aversion degree, for a two-
level supply chain system consisting of risk-neutral suppliers and retailers with risk
preference. Wang, Du, and Yang (2015) investigate the design of the fourth party reverse
logistics network for product recovery with risk aversion characteristics by using the
conditional risk value method. Cao and Shi (2016) analyse the coordination and optimi-
sation of agricultural supply chain through the comprehensive application of option
contract and agricultural insurance. Wang, Pauleen, and Chan (2013) study the problems
in a newly formed supply chain resulted from merge of multi-national companies and
propose the concept of global virtual enterprise as the solution to address the challenge.
Li et al. (2013a) examine the structural relationship between supply chain risk manage-
ment performance and enterprise performance. Based on the research of domestic
manufacturing enterprises, the structural equation model is used to test the problem.
Chen et al. (2017a) evaluate the optimal decision of closed-loop supply chain members
in decentralised and joint decision-making by building the mathematical model of
mean-CvaR to measure the risk characteristics of retailers, and prove that mean-CVaR
could improve the order quantity and profit of retailers more than CVaR measurement
criterion. Gan, Sethi, and Yan (2004) study the issue of expected utility between supply
chain members through contract formulation and contract coordination. Currently,
research methods to describe risk aversion and supply chain coordination include mean-
variance analysis (Wang and Zhou 2010), value at risk (VaR) (Liu et al. 2016; Wang, Gu,
and Zhang 2016), and conditional value at risk (CVaR) (Zhang and Gao 2016; Chen et al.,
2017b). Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002, 2000) propose the risk measurement technology
of CVaR, which can simplify the calculation method of CVaR. CVaR method is more
secure than VaR method and is not easy to be manipulated illegally. For profit equili-
brium among participants, Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium are usually adopted.
Considering the cost function problem, most studies consider the influence of product
quality on product cost function (e.g. Wang et al.; Yu, Yao, and Teng 2017).
In this paper, Rockafellar and Uryasev’s CVaR method is used to describe the optimal
decision-making relationship between enterprises and the whole financial chain in the
context of Stackelberg game. The application of block chain technology makes the
relationship between upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chains transpar-
ent and information sharing possible. Therefore, it is particularly important to study the
6 K. ZHENG ET AL.

supply chain under the influence of blockchain-based technology. Based on the previous
research (Li et al., 2013b), this paper considers the impact of block chain technology on
the upstream and downstream enterprises of supply chain and studies the decision-
making problem of supply chain enterprises under the influence of blockchain technol-
ogy. In order to solve the Stackelberg game among the supplier, spacecraft builder, and
third-party logistics integrator, the spacecraft builder’s risk aversion behaviour is taken as
the leading role and the decision-making problem of the spacecraft builder under
different risk aversion is described with CVaR criterion.

3. Model
This section presents an analytic model of spacecraft supply chain in terms of the risk
decision-making problems of the major participants in the supply chain when they
adopt the blockchain technology.
We consider a three-level spacecraft supply chain (see Figure 2), composed of a risk-
averse spacecraft builder, a risk-neutral supplier, and a third-party logistics enterprise, as
the research object. In this spacecraft supply chain system, suppliers are responsible for
producing multi-cycle products. This paper simplifies the multi-cycle problem into
a single-cycle problem. To model the impact of blockchain technology adoption on
the spacecraft supply chain, we assume that all information in the spacecraft supply
chain is relevant to the degree of blockchain applications. The production output Q of
the supplier and the order demand D of the spacecraft builder are related to the degree
to which the upstream and downstream enterprises of the spacecraft supply chain using
the blockchain technology q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1), that is, the degree to which the inventory, sales,
credit, and other information are shared among the participants. The spacecraft builder
issues an order quantity D to the supplier throughout the sales period;
D ¼ d þ ð1  qs2 Þβ, where d is the order quantity of the spacecraft builder in the
whole cycle and βis the sensitivity of the spacecraft builder’s order to the extent to
which information is shared by the supplier (β 2 R; 0  qs  1). According to the

Intelligent contract
Supplier Spacecraft
Builder

Intelligent contract Inventory information

Transfer the goods Delivery of the goods

Settlement of Third-party logistics

payment for goods enterprise COD (collection
on delivery)

Figure 2. Spacecraft supply chain participants and relationships.

 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 7

demand forecast, the supplier organises production according to the demand, i.e.
Q ¼ d þ ð1  qr2 Þα, where α is the sensitivity of the supplier’s production with respect
to the spacecraft builder’s degree of information sharing and α 2 R; 0  qs  1:
Logistics business is mainly facilitated through the third-party logistics integration enter-
prise. All products are transported to the warehouse of the logistics enterprise through the
third-party logistics integration enterprise, and then D unit products are distributed to the
spacecraft builder. The transportation cost per unit weight of the third-party logistics enter-
prise is recorded as θ1 to the warehouse of the logistics enterprise, and θ2 to the spacecraft
builder from the warehouse of the logistics enterprise. In the same period, the unit product
storage cost is δ, regardless of the storage time. The other cost to the logistics integration
enterprise is CJ , which is related to the supplier’s production capacity, i.e. CJ ¼ μQ2 =2. This cost
function is consistent with those used in the existing literature (e.g. Ingene and Parry 2007),
and the marginal cost is diminishing. The cost of risk in losing goods in the process of
warehousing or in transit is Ck , and the risk management cost is Ch . The warehouse capacity
of logistics integration enterprises can meet all the needs of suppliers. In addition, logistics
integration enterprises also have the function of collecting payment on behalf of customers.
When information is shared in this spacecraft supply chain, it will bring additional
benefits E to participating enterprises, that is, the cost of transaction cost saved, which is
related to the degree of information sharing. Transaction costs refer to the costs incurred
to find a partner, which are related to the information transparency
of the partner. For
example, the transaction costs saved by the supplier are Es ¼ ql þ qr  ε, where ε is
the transaction cost incurred for a single supplier search.
The spacecraft builder’s demand is random for the market x, which is a non-negative,
continuous random variable, i.e. x 2 ½L; U; ð0  L  UÞ, following the probability density
function f ðxÞ. Its distribution function F(x) is continuous and differentiable; in addition, F
(0) = 0 and F(x) = 1-F(x) is the inverse function of FðxÞ. C is the cost per unit of
production. The supplier wholesales to the spacecraft builder at unit wholesale price
w. The spacecraft builder orders unit product D from the supplier, assembles and
manufactures the final products, and sells them to the consumers at unit retail price
p. The residual value of unsold products at the end of the period is v, and the
opportunity cost of goods out of stock is u. The supplier needs to pay each unit of
logistics outsourcing costτ to the third-party logistics integrated enterprise, and v < c.
We use s, r, l and sc to denote the supplier, spacecraft builder, third-party logistics
integration enterprise, and the overall spacecraft supply chain, respectively.
Based on our assumptions, the profit function of each participant in the spacecraft
supply chain with the random demand can be formulated as follows.
The spacecraft builder’s profit function is:


πr ¼ p minðD; xÞ  w D þ v maxðD  x; 0Þ  ur  maxðx  D; 0Þ  2ε þ ql  qs  ε:
(1)

The supplier’s profit function is:


πs ¼ wminfQ; Dg þ vmaxfQ  D; 0g  cQ  τQ  us maxfD  q; 0g  2ε þ ql þ qr  ε: (2)

The profit function for the third-party logistics integration enterprise is:
8 K. ZHENG ET AL.

μQ2
πl ¼ τQ  θ1 Q  θ2 D  δmaxðQ  D; 0Þ   2ε þ ðqr  qs Þ  ε  Ck  Ch : (3)
2

We characterise the risk aversion of the spacecraft builder with the CVaR criterion. CVaR
measures the average of the spacecraft builder’s random profit below a given vertical
prime η. According to the general definition of CVaR in the literature (e.g. Wang et al.
and Zhang and Gao 2016),
   
1 1 þ
CVaRη ¼ max φ þ E½minðπ  φ; 0Þ ¼ max φ  E½φ  π ; (4)
φ2R η φ2R η

in which the E½φ  πþ is the expectation of ½φ  πþ , φ is the expectation of a random
variable, and η 2 ð0; 1 is the degree of risk aversion for policymakers. Whenηdecreases,
the degree of risk aversion will increase; when η = 1, the supplier is risk neutral.

Analysis and discussion

Following upon the model formulation, this section details our analysis and discussion
by investigating both the decentralised and centralised decision-making in the space-
craft supply chain, conducing the comparative analysis, and demonstrating a specific
numeric example.

4.1. Decentralised decision-making in spacecraft supply chain

When the upstream and downstream enterprises of the spacecraft supply chain adopt
the blockchain technology, supplier and the spacecraft builder should first determine
the application degree of the blockchain technology q before the start of the sales
season. At the beginning of the sales season, the market demand is realised. The
spacecraft builder purchases parts from the supplier at the wholesale price w and sells
final products at the spacecraft builder price p according to its own order demand. At
the end of the period, if the market demand is less than the spacecraft builder’s order
quantity, the spacecraft builder will bear the excess loss and process the residual value. If
the spacecraft builder’s order quantity is less than the supplier’s production quantity, the
supplier shall bear the excess loss and deal with the residual value. If the demand is
greater than the supply, the supplier will have to bear the cost of shortage loss.

4.1.1. Spacecraft builder

Under the CVaR criterion, the problem for the spacecraft builder is to seek the optimal
production volume and the application degree of blockchain technology to maximise its
own CVaR. Under the CVaR criterion, the spacecraft builder’s goal is to minimise the
downside risk of its random profit, that is, to maximise the value of CVaR. According to
the definition of CVaR, we substitute Equation (1) into Equation (4).
Solving the spacecraft builder’s optimal production based on CVaR criterion and the
application degree of optimal block chain technology, we obtain the following theorem.
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 9

Theorem 1: The spacecraft builder’s optimal order quantity under CVaR criterion is
D1 ¼ F 1 ½ηðp  w  ur Þ=ðp þ vÞ. Accordingly, the application degree of the supplier’s
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
ffi
1  F ½ηðpwuβ Þ=ðpþvÞd.
r
optimal blockchain technology is qs 1 ¼

Proof: Please see Appendix A. ■

Theorem 1 shows that the order quantity of the spacecraft builder and the degree to
which suppliers apply blockchain technology are related to the degree of risk prefer-
ences. When η = 1, it is risk neutral, FðDÞjη ¼1 ¼ 0, and Fðqs Þjη ¼ 0 ¼ d þ β. It indicates
that when the spacecraft builder makes a risk neutral decision, the ordering strategy it
adopts is to place orders according to the actual demand of the previous cycle, which
will not change due to the change of external environment.

Corollary 1: Optimal order quantity D* of the spacecraft builder increases with the risk
aversion coefficient η, but the application degree of supplier’s blockchain technology qs*
decreases with the spacecraft builder’s risk aversion coefficient η.

Proof: Please see Appendix B. ■

Corollary 1 shows that the order quantity of a risk-averse spacecraft builder is smaller
than that of a risk-neutral spacecraft builder, which is consistent with the actual situa-
tion. The degree to which a supplier applies blockchain technology is related to the
degree to which the spacecraft builder is risk-averse. The greater the degree of risk
aversion of the spacecraft builder, the higher the degree of application of blockchain
technology by the supplier.

4.1.2. Supplier dominated by spacecraft builder

In a Stackelberg game, the optimal decision of the supplier should meet the Stackelberg
game in the spacecraft builder’s decision.

Theorem 2: In order to maximise the profit of suppliers, the application degree of the
optimal blockchain technology for the spacecraft builder is

8
>
>
>
<
 ε α  0; αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
qr1 ¼
>
> 2αðw þ us  c  τÞ α  0; αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
>
:
1
8 (4)
> 0
>
<
 ε α < 0; αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
qr1 ¼ ;
>2αðv  c  τÞ
> α < 0; αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
:

then the optimal production output of the spacecraft builder is Q1 ¼ ½d þ ð1  q1 r2 Þα
Proof: Please see Appendix C. ■
10 K. ZHENG ET AL.

Corollary 2: The profit of a supplier πs is inversely proportional to the transaction costs ε.

Proof: Please see Appendix D. ■

Under the premise of the same transaction cost, with the increase of the spacecraft
builder’s and third-party logistics enterprise’s application of the blockchain technology,
the supplier’s profit decreases to a smaller extent, which is in line with the actual
situation.

4.1.3. Third-party logistics integration enterprises

The objective function of the third-party logistics integration enterprise is to seek the
optimal profit after anticipating the response function of the spacecraft builder and
supplier. The expected profit function of the third-party logistics integration enterprise
can be expressed as

 μQ2
E πl ¼ τQ  θ1 Q  θ2 D  δmaxðQ  D ; 0Þ   2ε þ ðqr þ qs Þ  ε  Ck  Ch (5)
2
If Equation (5) is not taken into account, we calculate and obtain the following conclu-
sion when maximising the profit of the third-party logistics integration enterprise.

Theorem 3: The profit of the third party logistics integration enterprise is maximal if
ε
qr ¼ 1; qs ¼ 2βðδθ 2Þ
, when Q > D, α  0; and β  ðδ  θ2 Þ  0; otherwise, there is no
optimal profit.

Proof: Please see Appendix E. ■

Under decentralised decision-making, the overall profit of the spacecraft enterprise supply
chain is



E πsc1 ¼ Eðπr Þ þ Eðπs Þ þ E πl
ð D ð Q

¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD  ðp  vÞ FðxÞdx  ðu  u Þ
r s
FðxÞdx (6)
L D
ð Q


þ ðv  c  θ1  δÞ dx  6ε þ 2ql þ 2qs þ 2qr  ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :
D

4.2. Centralised decision-making in spacecraft supply chain

We next investigate the situation when the spacecraft supply chain participants make
centralised decision-making. Specifically, we study the decision-making of each partici-
pant and the overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain.

4.2.1. Partially centralised decision-making

We first consider the partially centralised decision-making scenario when two partici-
pants in the spacecraft supply chain jointly make the decision. In particular, we discuss
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 11

the two kinds of partially centralised decisions either between the logistics enterprise
and supplier, or between the logistics enterprise and spacecraft builder.
A. Supplier and logistics enterprise
The centralised decision-making between the supplier and third-party logistics integra-
tion enterprise can be regarded as a risk-neutral decision-making subject. The supplier’s
objective function is to seek the optimal degree of application of blockchain by the
spacecraft builder after the expected response function to realise the maximum profit.
Its expected profit function is


E πsl ¼ wminfQ; Dg þ vmaxfQ  D; 0g  us maxfD  Q; 0g  ε þ qr  ε  cQ  θ1 D
 θ2 D  δmaxðQ  D; 0Þ  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch
(7)

Theorem 4: The profit function of the supplier and the third-party logistics integration
enterprise under the partially centralised decision-making will be maximised when
8
>
>
>
<
 ε α  0; αð1qr2 Þ  βð1qs2 Þ
qr2 ¼ ;
>
> 2αð wþu c
s
 μd  μαÞ; α  0; αð1qr2 Þβð1qs2 Þ
>
:
1

8 0
>
>
< α < 0; αð1qr2 Þ  βð1qs2 Þ
 ε
qr2 ¼ ; ;
>
> 2αqðv  c  μd  μαÞ α < 0; αð1qr2 Þ > βð1qs2 Þ
:

  
 
qs2 ¼ qs1 D2 ¼ D1 ; Q2 ¼ d þ 1  qr2
2 α :

Proof: Please see Appendix F. ■

The overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain under partial centralised decision-
making is



E πsc
2 ¼ Eðπr Þ þ E πsl ¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD
ð D ð Q ð Q
 ð p  vÞ FðxÞdx  ður  us Þ FðxÞdx þ ðv  c  δÞ dx  3ε (8)
L D D


þ qr þ ql þ qs  ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :

B. Spacecraft builder and logistics enterprise

We adopt the CVaR criterion to describe the risk aversion of the profit function under the
partially centralised decision-making between the spacecraft builder and third-party
logistics integration enterprises. Under such situation, the expected profit function is
12 K. ZHENG ET AL.


E πsl ¼ p  minðd; xÞ  v  maxðD  x; 0Þ  ur maxðx  D; 0Þ  ε þ qs  ε þ τQ  θ1 Q
 δQ  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :
(9)
Under the condition of risk aversion, whether the spacecraft builder makes a centralised
decision with the third-party logistics integration enterprise has no influence on the order-
ing decision of the spacecraft builder and the application degree of the block chain
technology of the supplier.
 
Theorem 5: When CVaRη πsl ðD; φÞ is the concave function of φ, the spacecraft builder and
third-party logistics integration enterprise decision-making under centralised decision making,
the optimal order quantity and the application degree of the supplier’s optimal blockchain
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
1  F ½ηððpwuβ Þ=ðpþvÞÞd.
r
technology are D3 ¼ F 1 ½ηðp  w  ur Þ=ðp þ vÞ; qs3 ¼

Proof: Please see Appendix G. ■

The overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain under partial centralised decision-
making for this scenario is



E πsc
3 ¼ E πrl þ Eðπs Þ ¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD
ð D ð Q ð Q
 ðp  v Þ FðxÞdx  ðu  u Þ
r s
FðxÞdx þ ðv  c  θ1  θ2  δÞ dx  3ε
L D D

r 
þ q þ ql þ qs  ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch
(10)

4.2.2. Fully centralised decision-making

Under the fully centralised decision-making scenario, the supplier, spacecraft builder,
and third-party logistics integration enterprise engage in joint decision-making alto-
gether. We assume that they are risk-neutral decision-makers, which is consistent with
the research in literature (e.g. Wang, Gu, and Zhang 2016). Its expected profit function is

Eðπsc Þ ¼ pminfD; xg  cD þ v maxfD  x; 0g  ur maxfx  D; 0g  δD  μD2 =2  Ck  Ch

ðD ðD
¼ ðp  c  δÞD  ðp  vÞ FðxÞdx  ur FðxÞdx  μD2 =2  Ck  Ch :
L L
(11)

Theorem 6: If D is immutable, the expected profit of the decision-making subject under the
centralised decision-making of the supplier, spacecraft builder, and the third-party logistics
integration enterprise is fixed; if D is variable, there exists D* to maximise the profit.

Proof: Please see Appendix H. ■

The overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain under the fully centralised decision-
making is
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 13

ð D ðU

 
E πsc
4 ¼ ðp  c  δÞD  ðp  vÞ FðxÞdx  u
r
FðxÞdx  μD2 =2  Ck  Ch (12)
L D

Through comparative analysis, if the decision-making subject chooses risk neutrality,

  
when η = 1, D1 ¼ D2 ¼ D3 < D4 ; qS
1 ¼ q2 ¼ q3 ; q1 ¼ q3 q2 ; Q1 ¼ Q3 Q2 . The optimal
S S S S S

decision under decentralised decision-making is smaller than the optimal decision

under centralised decision-making, and the overall profit of spacecraft supply chain
under centralised decision-making is larger than that under decentralised decision-




sc 

making, so there exists E πsc 4 > min E πsc
3 ; E π2 > E πsc
1 . Therefore, the
upstream and downstream of the spacecraft supply chain have the motivation to
cooperate. When the out-of-stock cost is not taken into account, and when the size is
taken into account, the optimal profit is greater than the optimal profit when the out-of-
stock cost is taken into account.

4.3. Comparative study

This section demonstrates the results of a comparative study between decentra-
lised and centralised decision-making. If the upstream and downstream partici-
pants of the spacecraft supply chain do not use the blockchain technology, the
impact on supplier lies in the determination of production capacity and the
reduction of transaction costs. The influence to the spacecraft builder lies in the
determination of order quantity and the reduction of transaction cost. The impact
on the third-party logistics integration enterprises lies in the reduction of transac-
tion costs. Therefore, the spacecraft supply chain using blockchain technology will
benefit each participant. When blockchain technology is not used by the
participants,

qr ¼ qs ¼ ql ¼ 0; D ¼ d þ β; Q ¼ d þ α:

Under the decentralised decision, the overall profit is


r 
s 
E πsc
12 ¼ E π12 þ E π12 þ π12
l

ð D ð Q
¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD  ðp  vÞ FðxÞdx  ður  us Þ FðxÞdx
L D
ð Q
þ ðv  c  θ1  δÞ dx  6ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :
D

Under the partially centralised decision-making between the supplier and third-party
logistics integration enterprise, the overall profit is


r 
sl 
E πsc
22 ¼ E π22 þ E π22
ð D ð
Q

¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD  ðp  vÞ FðxÞdx  ður  us Þ FðxÞdx

L
D
ð Q
þ ðv  c  δ Þ dx  3ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :
D
14 K. ZHENG ET AL.

Under the partially centralised decision-making between the spacecraft builder and
third-party logistics integration enterprise, the overall profit is


rl 
s  
E πsc
32 ¼ E π32 þ E π32 ¼ ðp  c  θ1  θ2 ÞD
ð D ð Q
 ðp  v Þ FðxÞdx  ður  us Þ FðxÞdx
L D
ð Q
þ ðv  c  θ1  θ2  δÞ dx  3ε  μQ2 =2  Ck  Ch :
D

In the case of centralised decision-making, the role of upstream and downstream

enterprises in the spacecraft supply chain is equal to that not adopting blockchain
technology in the case of centralised decision-making, and the overall profit is
ð D


sc  
E πsc
42 ¼ E π 4 ¼ ð p  c  δÞD  ð p  v Þ FðxÞdx
L
ðU
 ur FðxÞdx  μD2 =2  Ck  Ch :
D

When a participant does not adopt the blockchain technology in the spacecraft
enterprise supply chain, if the participants in the spacecraft supply chain are risk neutral,
the overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain has the following relationship:




sc 

E πsc
42 > min E πsc
32 ; E π22 > E πsc
12 , for which the optimal profit is also related
to the overall profit adopting the blockchain technology.
When participants make a centralised decision, the overall profit of the spacecraft
supply chain is irrelevant to the application degree of blockchain technology. At this
point, the entire spacecraft supply chain system can be regarded as a single decision-
making body, and all information is symmetric and transparent. This paper considers the
overall profit under different degrees of risk aversion, where different degrees of risk
aversion have different profits. When the participants of the spacecraft supply chain
adopt the blockchain technology and the participants are risk neutral, the overall profit
is greater than that of the participants of the spacecraft supply chain that do not adopt
the blockchain technology.

4.4. Numeric example

This section analyzes the vertical correlation between the expected profit and the
degree of risk aversion under decentralised and centralised decision-making as well as
the correlation between related parameters through a numeric example. Assuming that
the market demand is subject to the uniform distribution of [100,300], the product
price is

p ¼ 10; w ¼ 7; c ¼ 2:5; v ¼ 2; us ¼ 2:5; ur ¼ 2:8; τ ¼ 2; μ ¼ 0:01; d ¼ 100; α ¼ 25;

β ¼ 70; θ1 ¼ 0:5; θ2 ¼ 0:5; δ ¼ 0:15; Ck ¼ 30; Ch ¼ 60; ε ¼ 100; ql ¼ 0:5:

Under the decentralised decision-making, the optimal order quantity D* of the

spacecraft builder increases with the risk aversion coefficient η, but the degree of
supplier’s application of blockchain technology qs* decreases with the vertical
 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 15

Table 1. The impact of blockchain adoption on the spacecraft supply chain.

Overall profits Degree of application of block chain

sc 
sc 
sc 
Conditions technology E πsc
1 E π2 E π3 E π4
No block chain η=1 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 0qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ qs2 ¼ 0 210 421 467 –
technology is used
Use block chain η=1 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ 0:94qs2 ¼ 0:53 462 470 542 875
technology η = 0.8 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ 0:95qs2 ¼ 0:65 454 473 529 –
η = 0.6 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ 0:96qs2 ¼ 0:76 445 475 516 –
η = 0.4 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ 0:98qs2 ¼ 0:85 428 465 488 –
η = 0.2 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ 0:99qs2 ¼ 0:93 419 463 474 –
η=0 qr1 ¼ qr3 ¼ qr2 ¼ 1qs1 ¼ qs3 ¼ qs2 ¼ 1 360 460 460 –

increase in the risk aversion coefficientηof the spacecraft builder, so Corollary 1

holds.
By comparing the optimal overall profit
under  decentralised

sc 
and partial centralised
decision-making, we can see that overall E πsc
3 > E π 2 > E π sc
1 , which is related
to the degree to which the supplier and spacecraft builder adopts the blockchain
technology.
Under the condition of adopting the blockchain technology, if the spacecraft builder
chooses different degrees of risk avoidance, the application degree of the optimal
blockchain technology can be obtained,

 and the


overall profit

sc of the
enterprises
 in the
spacecraft supply chain presents E πsc
42 > min E π sc
32 ; E π 22 > E π sc
12 . The optimal
value of the overall profit of the spacecraft supply chain without the adoption of the
blockchain technology is less than the overall profit with the adoption of blockchain
technology, as shown in Table 1.

5. Conclusion
This paper models and studies a three-level spacecraft supply chain composed of a risk-
averse spacecraft builder, a risk-neutral supplier, and a third-party logistics integration
enterprise as the research object. In addition, we apply the conditional value at risk
(CVaR) method to describe the spacecraft builder’s risk aversion problem. Our research
contributes the following major findings to the literature.
First, when decentralised decision-making is adopted, under different risk aversion
conditions, the optimal order quantity of the spacecraft builder increases with the risk
aversion coefficient, but the application degree of supplier’s blockchain technology
decreases with the risk aversion coefficient of the spacecraft builder.
Second, when a partial centralised decision is taken, under the centralised decision-
maker formed by the spacecraft builder and the third-party logistics integration enter-
prise, the application degree of the supplier’s optimal blockchain technology and the
spacecraft builder’s optimal order quantity are the same as those under the decentra-
lised decision.
Third, when fully centralised decision-making is adopted, the overall profit of the
supply chain is greater than that under partially centralised and decentralised decision-
making when the risk is neutral.
16 K. ZHENG ET AL.

Fourth, the optimal profit of the spacecraft supply chain without considering the risk
of loss of goods in short supply will be greater than the profit when considering the loss
of goods in short supply.
Finally, the use of blockchain technology can reduce transaction costs among space-
craft supply chain members and fulfil information sharing, thus improving the overall
profit of spacecraft supply chain system.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This research is funded by the Planning subject of philosophy and social science in Ningbo city,
Zhejiang province, G19-ZX07.

ORCID
Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4074-9505

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 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 19

Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: According to the general definition of CVaR, the decision-making function of the spacecraft
builder in the decentralised spacecraft enterprise supply chain in the case of CVaR risk aversion is

 
1
CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ ¼ max φ  E½φ  πr ðDÞþ : (13)
φ2R η

The profit function (1) of the spacecraft builder can be substituted into Equation (13) to get

ðD
1 
 þ
CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ ¼ φ  φ  ðpx  wDÞ þ vðD  xÞ þ 2ε  ql þ qs  ε dFðxÞ
η
ð L
1 U 
 þ
 φ  ðp  wÞD þ ur ðx  DÞ þ 2ε  ql þ qs  ε dFðxÞ
η D


Set φ1 ¼ wD  vD þ ql þ qs  ε  2ε,


φ2 ¼ ðp  w þ ur ÞD þ ql þ qs  ε  2ε:

@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ

When φ  φ1 ; CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ ¼ φ; then ¼ 1 > 0:
@φ

When φ1 < φ  φ2  ur  U; CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ

ð
1 D
 þ
¼φ φ  ðpx  wDÞ þ vðD  xÞ þ 2ε  ql þ qs  ε dFðxÞ
η L
ð φφ1
1 pþv
¼φ ½φ  φ1  ðp þ vÞxþ dFðxÞ;
η L
@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ 1 φ  φ1 @CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ
to then ¼1 F ; jφ¼φ1 ¼ 1;
@φ η pþv @φ
@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ 1
jφ¼φ1 ur U ¼ 1  FðD  ur ðU  DÞÞ:
@φ η

When φ2  ur  U < φ  φ2  ur  D; CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ

ð
1 D
 
¼φ φ  ðpx  wDÞvðD  xÞ2ε q1 qs ε þdFðxÞ
η L
ð ð
1 φφ
pþv 1 U
¼φ ½φ  φ1  ðp þ vÞx þ dFðxÞ  φ φ ½φ  φ1 þ ur xþFðxÞ:
η L η 2ur
@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ 1 φ  φ1 1 φ φ
To ¼1 F þ F 2 r ;
@φ η pþv η u
@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ 1
φ¼φ2 ur U ¼ 1  FðD  u ðU  DÞÞ
r
@φ η
1 @CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ
þ FðUÞ > 0; φ¼φ2 ur U ¼ 1:
η @φ
20 K. ZHENG ET AL.

ðD
1
When φ > φ2  ur  D; CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ ¼ φ  ½φ  φ1  ðp þ vÞxFðxÞ
η
ð L
1 U
@CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ
 ½φ  φ2 þ ur xFðxÞ: To
η D @φ
1
¼1 < 0:
η

CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ is the optimal value function for φ, φ ðDÞ must be in rangeðφ1 ; φ2  ur  D, and
there are only two kinds of situations. 1
When 1  η1 FðD  ur ðU  DÞÞ  0; that is D  F ð1þuηÞþur U
r ; in rangeðφ1 ; φ2  ur  D, φ can
@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φÞ φφ1
satisfy @φ ¼ 1  η1 F pþv ¼ 0; then φ ¼ ðp þ vÞF1 ðηÞ þ φ1 : Because φ can satisfy
1
F ðηÞþu Ur
φ < φ2  ur  U; then D > We put φ ¼ ðp þ vÞF1 ðηÞ þ φ1 in CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ; get
1þur :
ðD
CVaRη ½πr ðD; φ Þ ¼ ðp þ vÞF1 ðηÞ þ φ1  η1 ðp þ vÞ½DxdFðxÞ: Take the first derivative of
L
@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φ Þ
¼  ðpþv Þ  1
CVaRη ½πr ðD; φ Þ with respect to D, get @D η FðDÞ < 0; then D ¼
F þur U
1þur , contra-
F1 þur U
diction with D > 1þur ,
therefore, D* does not exist in this case. There may also be an optimal
solution φ in the interval ðφ2  ur  U; φ2  ur  D, within this interval there must be
@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φ Þ
@D > 0; then φ ¼ φ2  ur  D.
F1 ðηÞþur U
When 1  η FðD
 ur ðU  DÞÞ > 0, namely D >
1
there will be φ ¼ φ2  ur  D. We
,
1þur ðD
put φ ¼ φ2  ur  D in CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ, CVaRη ½πr ðD; φÞ ¼ φ2  ur  D  η1 ½φ2  ur  D
L
φ1  ðp þ vÞxFðxÞ; Take the first derivative of CVaRη ½πr ðD; φ Þ with respect to D, get
@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φ Þ
¼ ðp  w  ur Þ  ðpþv Þ 
@D η FðDÞ; then D ¼ F1 ½ηðp  w  ur Þ=ðp þ vÞ; qs ¼
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
1  F ½ηðpwuβ Þ=ðpþvÞd.
r
■

B. Proof of Corollary 1
2@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φÞ 2@CVaRη ½πr ðD;φÞ
@D
Proof: According to the implicit function theory, @η ¼ @ @D@η =@ ð@DÞ 2 ¼
FðDÞ @qs
ηf ðDÞ > 0; @η < 0: So Corollary 1 holds. ■

C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Take the first derivative of the supplier profit function (2) with r
 respect to qs ,
2αðw þ u  c  τÞqr þ ε
We put Q ¼ d þ ð1  qr2 Þα into πs , and get @π
s
@qr ¼ 2αðv  c  τÞqr þ ε
,

αð1  q Þ  βð1  q Þ @ 2 πs
r2 s2 2αðw þ u  c  τÞ αð1  q Þ  βð1  q Þ
s r2 s2
; ¼ , .
αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ @ 2 qr 2αðv  c  τÞ αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ

2αðw þ us  c  τÞ < 0 αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
When α  0, @@ 2 πqr ¼
2 s
, .
2αðv  c  τÞ > 0 αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
There are two relations between the profit function of suppliers and the information sharing
degree of the spacecraft builder:

(1) when αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ, the supplier’s profit function is convex function, get qr* = 0.
(2) when αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ, the profit function of supplier is concave function, get
ε
qr ¼ 2αðvcτ Þ.

D. Proof of Corollary 2
Proof: Take the first derivative of the supplier profit function (2) with respect toε, we get
@πs
@ε ¼ 2 þ q þ q  0, which implies that the profit of the supplier is inversely proportional to
l r

the transaction cost. ■

 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 21

E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof:The black plug matrix of qr and qs is solved. When Q  D,
2α½μ½d þ ð1  3q Þα  ðτ  θ1  θ2 Þ  0
r2
H¼ ¼ 0, at this point, the H matrix of q and q at any
r s
0 0
point is an indeterminate matrix, and there is no extreme value. When Q > D, H ¼

2α½μ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα  ðτ  θ1  θ2 Þ 0

¼ 4αβ½½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα  ðτ  θ1  θ2 Þ  ðδ  θ2 Þ;
0  2βðδ  θ2 Þ
ε
when α  β < 0 and δ  θ2 ; H  0; there is a maximum, get qr* = 1, qs ¼ 2βðδθ2Þ
. When δ < θ2 ; H < 0,
there is a minimum.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Solve the first and second derivatives of the profit function under the centralised decision-
making of suppliers and third-party logistics integration enterprises with respect to qr
 
when qs2 ¼ qs1 .

@Eðπsl Þ 2αqr ðw þ us  c  μd  μαÞ  2α2 qr3 μ þ ε αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ @ 2 Eðπsl Þ
@qr ¼ 2αq ðv  c  δ  μd  μαÞ  2α q μ þ ε
r 2 r3 ,
αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
; @ 2 qr ¼

2αðw þ us  cÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
, .
2αðv  c  δÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ

@ 2 Eðπsl Þ 2αðw þ us  cÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα < 0 αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
When α  0, @ 2 qr ¼ , .
2αðv  c  δÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα > 0 αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
There are two relations between the profit function of suppliers and the information sharing
degree of the spacecraft builder:

(1) When αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ, and lim ¼ 0; lim ¼ 1; qr  qr3 , we can get 2α2 qr3 μ. At this
r q !0 r q !1
point, the supplier’s profit function is concave function, and there is a maximum
ε
qr ¼ 2αðwþus cμdμαÞ.
(2) When αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ, the supplier’s profit function is convex function; at this time qr
= 1 has a maximum value.

2αðw þ us  cÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα > 0
@ 2 Eðπsl Þ
When α ¼
0, @ 2 qr ,
2αðv  c  δÞ þ 2αμ½d þ ð1  3qr2 Þα < 0
αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ
.
αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ
There are two relations between the profit function of suppliers and the information sharing
degree of the spacecraft builder:

(1) When αð1  qr2 Þ  βð1  qs2 Þ, the supplier’s profit function is a convex function, where qr = 0
has a maximum value.
(2) When αð1  qr2 Þ > βð1  qs2 Þ, the supplier’s profit function is concave; when
ε
qr ¼ 2αqðvcδμdμαÞ , it has a maximum value. ■

G. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: Refer to Theorem 1, according to the general definition of CVaR, the decision-making
function of the spacecraft builder in the decentralised spacecraft enterprise supply chain in the
case of CVaR risk aversion is:
 
  1  þ
CVaRη πrl ðD; φÞ ¼ max φ  E φ  πrl ðDÞ : (14)
φ2R η

When profit function (9) is brought into Equation (10), we can get
22 K. ZHENG ET AL.

 
CVaRη πrl ðD; φÞ ¼ φ
ð
1 D þ
 φ  ðpx  wDÞ þ vðD  xÞ þ ε  qs  ε  τQ þ θ1 Q þ δQ þ μQ2 =2 þ Ck þ Ch
η L
ð
1 D þ
dFðxÞ  φ  ðp  wÞD þ ur ðx  DÞ þ ε  qs  ε  τQ þ θ1 Q þ δQ þ μQ2 =2 þ Ck þ Ch dFðxÞ
η L
The remaining of the proof is the same as that in Theorem 1. ■
H. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: At this time, the degree of information disclosure in the spacecraft supply chain is 1,
so the order quantity has nothing to do with the degree to which each party applies the
block chain technology. If D is immutable, the expected profit is constant. If D is variable,
take the first derivative of the benefit function with respect to D,
@Eðπsc Þ
@D ¼ ðp  c  δÞ  ðp  vÞFðDÞ þ u FðDÞ  μðDÞ,
r
the optimal order quantity is
D ¼ ðpcδÞðpvu ÞFðDÞ
r

μ . sc
And we can solve @E@D ðπ Þ
¼ 0 by substitution, lim ðpcδÞðpvur ÞFðDk Þ
μ  Dkþ1 ¼ 0, at this time
 k!0
D4 ¼ Dkþ1 .