India’s Relations with the USA and Russia

Unit: 2
Index
Index 2

Questions 4

USA and India 5

Factors in India-US Relationship 5

Changed Structural Realities 5

Bush Administration 5

Change in Leadership 6

Conclusion 6

Trends in IFP since 90s with USA 7

Economic Factors 7

Political Factors 7

Pokhran II 7

Strategic Partnership 8

Common Values 8

Conclusion 8

Points of Conflict since the 90s 9

USA’s engagements with Pakistan 9

USA’s response to India’s nuclear programme 9

Military 9

Economy 10

Climate Change 10

Socially 10

Pakistan 10

Economic Factors 12

Political factors 12

Contemporary Relationship between India and USA 14

Emerging Technologies and National Security 14

 Defence Cooperation 14

Counter-Terrorism 15

Bilateral Trade and Global Value Chains 15

Conclusion 16

India and Russia 17

Vladimir Putin 17

Balance of Power 17

Defence 17

China and Pak Angle in Defence 18

Economic Ties 18

Conclusion 18

Russia-China-Pakistan 19

Answer 19
Questions

Comparison

1. Compare the present state of India’s relations with US and Russia. (2020)

India-Russia - change, post cold war, china and pakistan, last three decades

2. India-Russia relations have undergone a change. Discuss. (2017)

3. Do you think that Russia continues to be an important and reliable partner of India in the
post cold war world? Give appropriate argument in support of your answer.
4. Russia is increasingly tilting towards China and Pakistan. Elaborate the security challenges for
India.
5. Comment upon the changing nature of India’s relations with Russia since the last three
decades.

India-USA - Contemporary Times, Major Trends, Causes of conflict, economic and security
dimension

6. Critically analyse India-US relationship in contemporary times. (2018)

7. Analyse the major trends in IFP with respect to USA since the 1990s.
8. Illustrate the main causes of tension between India and USA in contemporary multipolar
world. Suggest the possibilities of improving this relationship.
9. Examine the economic and security dimension in Indo-US relations in the context of global
political scenario.
USA and India

India-US relationship in contemporary times, Major trends in IFP with USA since 90s, causes of
tension since 90s, economic and security dimension of India’s relationship with USA

Factors in India-US Relationship

A unique constellation of factors at the systemic, domestic political and individual level have enabled
the United States and India to chart a new course in their bilateral relationship.

Changed Structural Realities

The collapse of the USSR and the opening up of the indian economy liberated Indian and US
attitudes from the structural confines of the cold war as India’s non-alignment stance lost its meaning.
Over time, with different priorities India US priorities changed and India-US cooperation increased
on a range of issues as India needed US support for economic regeneration and the Clinton
administration viewed India as an emerging success story of globalization. A persistent problem was
India’s nuclear status and the American perception of limiting India’s identity to its hyphenated
relationship with South Asia.

Structural realists argue that because of the anarchic nature of the international system with no
higher authority above the states, distribution of power defined in terms of material capabilities is the
most important determinant of state behaviour. The changing balance of power in Asia-Pacific made
the Bush administration realise the importance of recalibrating its strategic posture vis-à-vis the
region. The United States faces a prospect of an emerging power transition involving China and
dealing with this is likely to be the most consequential challenge for US foreign policy in the coming
decades. With this in mind, the United States has decided to pursue a policy of engaging China while
simultaneously investing in increasing the power of other states located along China’s periphery. This
has involved not only reinvigorating its existing alliance with Japan but also reaching out to new
partners such as India. It is to tackle the challenge of China’s rise that Indian foreign policy has been
gearing up with its new approach toward the United States. And the Bush administration
transformed the nature of the US–India partnership by advocating civilian nuclear energy
cooperation with India, thereby incorporating India into the global nuclear order as well as declaring
that the United States is committed to encouraging the growth of India as a great power.

Bush Administration

The Bush administration, from the very beginning, refused to look at India through the prism of
non-proliferation and viewed India as a natural and strategic ally. Condoleezza Rice in her Foreign
Affairs article before the 2000 presidential elections made it clear that India has the potential to
become a great power and US foreign policy would do well to take that into account.
Although the terms of the agreement changed after 9/11 which prevented the Bush administration
from fully realizing its ambition vis-a-vis India though bilateral engagement in the areas of
counter-terrorism, joint military exercises and trade continued to expand. The American Post 9/11
policy also recognised certain states that cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons technology given the
nature of their domestic political regimes. On the other hand, states such as India, with its impeccable
proliferation credentials, should be rewarded for their behaviour. As domestic politics of other states
became a central concern of the United States in recent years, especially after 9/11, a secular, pluralist,
democratic India emerged as an attractive target to be wooed.

Although, it was only when Condoleezza Rice became the Secretary of State in 2005 that the USA
evolved a coherent approach in building ties with India. While many in India were focused on the
future of US–Pakistan ties, Rice transformed the terms of the debate completely by revealing that the
Bush administration was willing to consider civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. A few
days later, the State Department announced the administration’s new India policy that declared its
goal “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”

Change in Leadership

Top political leadership in both India and the United States have worked toward giving Indo-US ties
greater substance in recent years. Modi’s trip to the United States in September 2014 imparted a new
dynamism to US–India ties. His approach was unconventional as he reached out to constituencies
beyond the governmental level – the Indian Americans and the American corporate sector. He also
penned a joint op-ed with Obama where the two leaders made a case that the time had come “to set a
new agenda, one that realises concrete benefits for our citizens.” During Modi’s visit to Washington,
the two nations not only renewed their 2005 defence cooperation agreement for another ten years but
also expanded its scope by declaring that the two countries will “treat each other at the same level as
their closest partners” on issues including “defence technology, trade, research, co-production and
co-development.” Both nations declared their support for freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea, signalling that the Modi government is not hesitant to highlight New Delhi’s convergence with
Washington on regional issues. The United States also expressed its willingness to enhance technology
partnership with the Indian Navy. In a first, Modi then went on to invite the US President as the chief
guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2015.

On India’s veto of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) at the World Trade Organization (WTO),
both sides conceded that as they move forward they will need to take into consideration each other’s
points of view. Bilateral counter-terror and intelligence ties have taken a leap with the two sides
deciding to undertake “joint and concerted efforts” for dismantling of safe havens of terrorists and
criminal networks.
Conclusion

As the United States repositions its leadership in an increasingly complex Asian strategic landscape,
and as India starts to get its economic and military act together, the two states need each other more
than ever. Modi has certainly signalled that he is ready to confidently engage global powers, including
the United States, in order to further India’s developmental goals.

With the global balance of power in flux, the United States and India are both trying to adjust to the
emerging new realities. India, in many ways, is a natural partner of the United States as the world’s
pre-eminent power adjusts to a reconfiguration in the global distribution of power. However, neither
the United States nor India are used to partnerships among equals and India remains too proud, too
argumentative, and too big a nation to reconcile as a junior partner to any state, including the United
States. How the two democracies adjust to this reality will shape the future of their relationship.

Trends in IFP since 90s with USA

The end of the Cold war marked a major shift in world politics and fundamentally restructured a
number of relationships around the world, including the India-USA one. The collapse of the USSR
and the opening up of the indian economy liberated Indian and US attitudes from the structural
confines of the cold war as India’s non-alignment stance lost its meaning. Over time, with a dynamic
restructuring of priorities, the India US relationship changed and India-US cooperation increased on
a range of issues. India needed US support for economic regeneration and the Clinton administration
viewed India as an emerging success story of globalization.

Economic Factors

As India opened its economy, foreign investment from America rose from $165 Million in 1992 to
$2.14 Billion in 1997 which was a 13 fold increase. Trade between India and the USA grew
dramatically during this period (despite falling as a share of total global trade) and in 2009 stood at
more than $39.7 billion. The growth of India’s knowledge economy and the global outsourcing
industry brought both countries closer through private sector linkages. Former US Under Secretary of
State Nicholas R. Burns points out that ‘the big breakthrough in US–India relations was achieved
originally by the private sector’.

Political Factors

Indian origin Americans raised $4 million on behalf of political candidates in the 1992 election, and
more than $7 million in the 1998 election. Consequently, by the end of the 90s, there was a high level
of interest within Congress in issues pertaining to India to the extent that more than a quarter of the
members of the House of Representatives had joined an informal congressional caucus aimed at
fostering India–USA ties. Inevitably this tempered traditional legislative hostility toward India as
evinced by the defeat of the Burton Amendments designed to reduce foreign aid to India every year.
In 2005 and 2006, Indian Americans also undertook a major lobbying effort to promote the passage
of laws allowing civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

In India the traditional anti-americanism and non-alignment rhetoric was beginning to be shattered
in favour of an a realpolitik strategy with the transition of the Indian political system to a multi-party
system. India worked on building strategic partnerships with countries like China, Iran, Japan and
the United States. India’s diplomacy changed in style and content to some extent, with Vajpayee and
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh choosing ‘quiet diplomacy’ over ‘morally laden rhetoric’.

Pokhran II

Both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices making president Clinton focus on South Asia.
Although the immediate response was economic sanctions on both the countries, the tests
precipitated the longest series of high-level bilateral talks in the history of the Indo-American
relationship and for the first time, there was an attempt to structure the Indo-American relationship
independent of Indo-Pakistani or Indo-Russian concerns. In the longer term, Clinton’s objectives in
South Asia developed along three lines— non-proliferation, progress in relations with India, and
continued support for Pakistan as a pro-western Islamic state. Soon after sanctions were imposed
domestic lobbies in the USA—mainly Indian-American groups— pressured Congress to ease the
sanctions on India. The opposition of many Republican Congressmen to the CTBT also worked in
India’s favour when a Republican-dominated Congress rejected the CTBT in October 1999. As
Clinton visited India in 2000, India became one of the first few countries to support Bush’
Controversial Nuclear Missile Defence NMD initiative.

Strategic Partnership

In 2004, India and the United States formulated the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP),
which laid the foundations for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes,
and high-technology trade, along with an expanded dialogue on missile defence. On 18 July 2005 the
two countries announced the most wide-ranging partnership in the history of their bilateral relations,
covering the economy, energy security, democracy promotion, defence cooperation, and high
technology and space cooperation. The most controversial aspect of the agreement was President
George W. Bush’s commitment to ‘work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to
enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India’. In effect the USA explicitly
recognized and cast itself as prepared to legitimise the nuclear weapons programme of a non-NPT
state that had consistently opposed the global non-proliferation regime (though, as India claimed in
its defence, it had de facto fulfilled the non-proliferation objectives of an NPT state). After three years
of deliberations, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement on 1 August 2008, and the NSG
approved an India-specific waiver from its core terms on 6 September 2008.
Common Values

The new millennium saw a resurgence in the value-based approach to India–USA relations through
increased interaction that led to a better understanding of each other’s domestic priorities.
Unsurprisingly, US assistance to India was a declining part of the equation as the Indian government
emerged as a donor in its own right. Indeed, early in 2007 the US State Department announced a 35
per cent reduction in aid programmes to India. But increasingly, in the aftermath of 9/11, when
democracy promotion became a significant item on the Bush administration’s international agenda, a
value based approach complemented by an interests-based economic agenda underpinned the
relationship. From being critical of Indian democracy, the USA had modified its stance to the extent
of involving India as an integral member of both its global democracy promotion initiatives—the
Community of Democracies and the UN Democracy Fund. In 2007 Nicholas R. Burns wrote that the
promotion of democracy and freedom around the world ‘should be an essential component of the
new USA–India relationship’. The subtlety of this relationship relies on the American use of
democracy promotion as a strategy to ‘modernise’ the Middle East and other unstable regions of the
world.

Conclusion
Points of Conflict since the 90s

USA’s engagements with Pakistan

USA’s response to India’s nuclear programme

The purchase of S-400 missile system by India, resulted in an imbroglio in the US Congress.
Previously, the Trump administration admonished India that it might entice economic sanctions by
the United States. But since India looms as a counterweight to China, the significance of India is
creeping upon the US Senate. Following that, two major Senators John Cornyn from the Republican
Party and Mark Warner from the Democratic Party urged president Joe Biden to waive sanctions
against New Delhi as it might euthanize the cumulative cooperation with India to maintain the
hegemony of the United States of America across the region of South Asia & the Indian Ocean region.

Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, India abstained on a United Nations resolution
showing disapproval of (but not politically condemning) the invasion, saying it was "deeply
disturbed" by Russia's invasion. Some experts have also pointed out that the reason for India's
abstention is because 70% of Indian arms imports are from Russia, 14% from the US, and 5% from
Israel. In a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on the implications of the crisis for the
region, President Biden noted India's abstention, saying that most global allies were united against
Russia. Speaking to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US diplomat Donald Lu said the
Biden administration was still considering sanctions against India over its S-400 deal with Russia, and
its abstention at the UN. On 15 July 2022, the United States House of Representatives passed a
legislative amendment that granted India a waiver from CAATSA-related sanctions connected to the
purchase of the S-400; however the amendment has yet to be passed by the United States Senate.

Is There Trouble Ahead for the US and India? – The Diplomat

Military

One of the most important obstacles that Biden and Modi will have to navigate is in the military
sphere. The 2005 civil nuclear agreement was a diplomatic breakthrough that lifted American
sanctions related to India’s nuclear program and made a strategic partnership possible. Since then, the
U.S. has designated India a major defense partner, stepped up sales of military equipment, and
negotiated agreements with India to facilitate military logistical and communications coordination.
India and the United States form half of the Quad, which is becoming a vitally important network for
managing Indo-Pacific affairs.

Despite these promising developments, there are storm clouds on the horizon. Although India was a
founding member of the non-aligned movement, it maintained close ties with the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and still has close ties with Russia today. In October 2019, India agreed to
purchase Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system and is set to receive the first set of deliveries
toward the end of this year. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA) requires the U.S. to sanction India for this deal, as NATO member Turkey found out late
last year when it was sanctioned. The Trump administration told India that it was unlikely to get a
waiver from the law.

Economy

A larger Indian economy would also provide Western companies and investors an alternative to
China, but only if Biden and Modi can reach an agreement on trade restrictions. Modi’s “Atma
Nirbhar Bharat” call for self-reliance does not bode well for a trade deal, nor does India’s last-minute
decision to withdraw from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade pact,
which left Japan alone as the only counter to China in the agreement. India is also altering investment
rules that will hurt U.S. companies even more than an earlier 2018 rule change did. Earlier this
month, the U.S. announced tariffs on India and other countries for their new taxes on American tech
companies, but also a 180-day delay to allow for a negotiated settlement.

Climate Change

The most dramatic showdown may come before that deadline passes. The 26th United Nations
Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) will be held in the first half of November, and
there could be fireworks in Glasgow between the U.S. and India. India is already the third-largest
greenhouse gas emitter and its demand for energy will grow faster than any other country for the next
two decades. It has accordingly ruled out a zero-emissions goal, which the energy minister has called
“pie in the sky.” At Biden’s Earth Day summit, he and Modi announced a new green energy
partnership, but Modi did not otherwise change any of the policies that are likely to lead to a 50
percent increase in emissions by 2040. If Modi holds firm in November, what will Biden do?

Socially

While on the campaign trail, Biden expressed deep concerns about the Indian government’s treatment
of its Muslim minority, particularly in Kashmir, as have prominent progressive Democrats like
Senator Bernie Sanders. Muslims are not the only religious minority who could cause friction
between U.S. human rights champions and the Hindu nationalist government, however: India has
also cracked down on Christian organizations, such as the aid and development group Compassion
International. If they intensify this activity, it could start to unsettle Christian leaders in the U.S.,
particularly Evangelicals who wield significant heft in the Republican Party. If New Delhi is not
careful, it could break up the strong bipartisan support for the relationship (the Senate India Caucus
has 31 members) and create instead a bipartisan opposition to closer ties.
Pakistan

New Delhi’s argument has been that American arms going to Pakistan will be deployed against India.
If you look at the F-16, which is the cause of some disagreement, Pakistan has really used these only
against India. We saw this also in 2019 in the context of the attacks at Pulwama and Balakot.
However, the Americans argue that they still need some access to Pakistan. Once American troops left
Afghanistan, one way they can continue to carry out counter-terrorism activity is through their
drones which need to overfly Pakistan. Another argument is that Washington still needs at least some
cooperation from Islamabad on terrorism. Finally, Pakistan is a nuclear capable state and it makes
sense from the American perspective to maintain a level of contact, including out of concerns related
to security of nuclear weapons.

India has consistently made it clear that it does not accept the reasons that are being offered. If US
leaders have now said, on occasion, that they see the rise of India to be in US interest, or that they see
New Delhi as a net security provider in the region, it goes against tactical steps of providing weapons
of a certain calibre to a country that could create some security challenges for India.
Economic Factors

India’s decision to liberalise their economy opened the door to foreign private capital, a significant
amount of which was American. Annual Foreign Direct Investment in India shot up to $2.14 billion
by 1997, a thirteen-fold increase from 1992. American investors accounted for 19% of Foreign Direct
Investment in India between 1991 and 2005. Similarly, trade between India and the USA grew
dramatically during this period (despite falling as a share of total global trade) and in 2009 stood at
more than $39.7 billion. The growth of India’s knowledge economy and the global outsourcing
industry brought both countries closer through private sector linkages. Former US Under Secretary of
State Nicholas R. Burns points out that ‘the big breakthrough in US–India relations was achieved
originally by the private sector’.

Indian policymakers were aware of the precariousness of the domestic economic situation and the
need to guide the Indian economy out of crisis carefully. But, due to the constant internal political
argumentation over the nature and impact of the reforms, the initial years were marked by a sense of
cautiousness. India did little to upset the status quo in its region and in its bilateral relations with the
great powers. Nowhere was this more evident than on the issue of nuclear testing. Although an
Indian nuclear weapons programme had been in the offing since the late 1970s when China’s
assistance for a Pakistan weapons programme became known, the clearest impetus for its
advancement came in 1988 when Rajiv Gandhi initiated a covert nuclear weapons programme based
on a potential nuclear threat from Pakistan. This plan was carried forward into the early 1990s and by
1994 the Rao government was ready to test. However the process was stopped short by considerations
of the impact of US sanctions on the nascent post-reform Indian economy. Rao, in a conversation
with Strobe Talbott, then US Deputy Secretary of State, indicated that India was aware of the
importance of integration into the global economy and close relations with the USA. He emphasised
that India’s economic security would be jeopardised if it ‘overplayed its nuclear card’.

Political factors

Economic interdependence more often than not tends to moderate the tone of political differences
between nations. The 1990s brought to the fore a number of wealthy Indian Americans who learned
to mobilise politically and build relationships with the US Congress in order to influence policy
towards India and South Asia. Indian Americans raised $4 million on behalf of political candidates in
the 1992 election, and more than $7 million in the 1998 election. By the end of the 1990s, there was a
high level of interest within Congress in issues pertaining to India as more than a quarter of the
members of the House of Representatives had joined an informal congressional caucus aimed at
fostering India–USA ties.

The increased level of interest of American lawmakers in India played an important role in tempering
traditional legislative hostility toward India as evinced by the defeat (from 1996 onwards) of the
traditionally passed ‘Burton amendments’ designed to reduce foreign aid to India every year. In 2005
and 2006, Indian Americans also undertook a major lobbying effort to promote the passage of laws
allowing civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

Indian policymakers, on the other hand, also began to shed their traditional anti-Americanism and
non-aligned rhetoric during this period. The late political changes of 1980s created ideological and
political space for new voices in the articulation of Indian foreign policy. By 1991, the election
manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was already dismissing non-alignment as an outdated
ideology. The 1990s in retrospect were a period when India gradually shed its anti-imperialist and
non-alignment baggage in favour of an approach to foreign policy grounded in realpolitik. This was
the precursor to the age of ‘strategic partnerships’ for India. By 2005, India had concluded such
partnerships with China, Iran, Japan, and the United States. This signalled a new pragmatism in
Indian foreign policy, and a willingness to spread the risks associated with international relations
between ties with several friendly powers. India’s diplomacy changed in style and content to some
extent, with Vajpayee and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh choosing ‘quiet diplomacy’ over
‘morally laden rhetoric’. Vajpayee’s successor, Manmohan Singh, opted for a similar style.

Differences of view with the USA continued over regional security and nuclear issues. In 1995, a
Congressional amendment allowed the USA to resume arms supplies to Pakistan that had become
attenuated since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was not well received in India,
especially in light of a 1994 Human Rights Watch report that traced arms used by militants in
Kashmir and Punjab to money and weapons supplied to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies by the USA
during the Afghanistan war. India found that despite some advances in its relationship with the USA
(e.g. the start of modest joint naval exercises in 1991), the USA continued to pursue an unfavourable
South Asia policy. While resuming arms supplies to Pakistan, it continued to pressure India to
abandon its indigenous Integrated Missile Development Program, blocked the sale of Russian
weapons systems to India, and limited India’s access to American high technology, fearing that such
access would be misused as before. On the nuclear issue, in 1995 the USA pushed through a
permanent extension of the NPT, to which India was bitterly opposed. Subsequently, in 1996, India
rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a biassed arrangement that favoured the
major powers which had already enough data and experience in nuclear testing to continue simulating
tests without actually conducting them. The end of the Cold War in some ways liberated India’s
foreign policy and allowed it to choose its friends without external pressure. The result was a dual
approach that emphasised cordial (but not necessarily cooperative) relations with the United States
while also building partnerships with countries in the region, particularly China. India, like all other
countries in the aftermath of the Cold War, was uncertain about the future shape of the new world
order. The USA too was working hard to fill the global power vacuum left by the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and was not particularly concerned with matters in South Asia. This was evinced by the
continuation of the Pakistan tilt in its policy despite the end of significant Soviet influence in India.
This relative indifference towards the region would evaporate a few months into 1998.
Contemporary Relationship between India and USA

Dustin Carmack- Akshay Mathur -Harsh V Pant-Trisha Ray -Jeff Smith -Kabir Taneja

The US is India’s most comprehensive strategic partner, and cooperation between the two extends
across multiple areas such as trade, defence, multilateralism, intelligence, cyberspace, civil nuclear
energy, education, and healthcare. As the two nations venture into a new decade, they must articulate
a new agenda for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region which they are both committed to keeping
“free and open”. In recent years, exigencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic have redirected the
relationship to a forward-looking assessment of regional and global geopolitics. The sectors that will
be key to shaping the arc of a strong Indo-US relationship in the years ahead are the following:
emerging technologies; national security and defence cooperation; counterterrorism; and trade.

Beyond defence ties, the relationship has begun expanding in scope from the bilateral to the
multilateral while embracing a wider range of issues that include: civilian nuclear cooperation and
nuclear non-proliferation; infrastructure financing; the production and delivery of COVID-19
vaccines; humanitarian aid and disaster relief; peacekeeping and education; space and cyber security;
countering terrorism and extremism; governance of the oceans; and promoting a free and open
Indo-Pacific and the rules-based order.

Emerging Technologies and National Security

INDIA–US TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION has been growing in strength in the past years, and
the two sides inked several new agreements in 2021 alone. In March 2021, the Indo-US Science and
Technology Forum’s US India Artificial Intelligence (USIAI) Initiative was launched to focus on AI
cooperation, including bilateral research and development, AI workforce development, and
domain-specific AI research areas in healthcare, smart cities, materials, agriculture, energy, and
manufacturing. In September 2021, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi
discussed expanded partnerships in the areas of space, cyber, health security, semiconductors, AI, 5G,
6G, future generation communications technology, and Blockchain. They also discussed the need to
“address vulnerabilities and threats in cyberspace,” committing to mutual efforts to respond to cyber
threats via “dialogues, joint meetings, training and sharing best practices.”

Defence Cooperation

DEFENCE COOPERATION, A LONGSTANDING pillar of India and the US’s strategic

partnership, has reached new heights in recent years. Between 2016 and 2020, India and the US
inaugurated a new “2+2” defence and foreign ministers dialogue and signed three key “foundational”
military agreements: Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA). They allow for reciprocal provision of logistics support and services; the transfer
and use of encrypted communications equipment; and the exchange of geospatial intelligence. In
2018, the US granted India Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 (STA-1), easing regulations for US
high-tech defence and aerospace exports. The two countries have also been collaborating on aircraft
carrier technology since 2015, with the US assisting in the design, development, and production of
India’s indigenous aircraft carriers. India and the US have expanded and upgraded a range of military
exercises—from Yudh Abhas (army) to Malabar (navy), Red Flag and Cope India (air force), Tarkash
and Vajra Prahar (special forces), and the more recent Tiger Triumph exercise (tri-service).

Counter-Terrorism

COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND the US on counterterrorism has seen a steady

improvement since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and even more after the 2008
attacks in Mumbai by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Not only did the two nations work
together in the capture and interrogation of two of the planners of the attacks, but the US also placed
a bounty on Hafiz Saeed, the leader of LeT.24 It was a pivotal decision and signalled a shift in the US’s
approach to Pakistan-based terrorists who intend to carry out operations in Kashmir. The shift
complemented a larger confluence of geopolitical interests between Washington D.C. and New Delhi
vis-à-vis the disruptive rise of China, which gave a sense of urgency for the strategic and tactical
building of bridges between the two democratic states. Diplomatic mechanisms such as the US–India
Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group and the US–India Designation Dialogues have helped build
further confidence between the two. These institutionalised efforts have played a crucial role in
bridging existing gaps in the geopolitics of countering terrorism between the two states. Those gaps
included differences over the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS, or Daesh in Arabic) in Syria, and the
2011 conflict in Libya to dislodge the rule of Muammar al-Gaddafi. India was sceptical of both
US-backed initiatives as it did not support any regime change in these states, which was the ultimate
aim of these efforts.

Bilateral Trade and Global Value Chains

INDIA AND THE US HAVE SUBSTANTIAL economic ties. For one, the US is India’s largest
trading partner, with bilateral trade setting a new record in 2019 at US $146 billion before dipping
slightly in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They are on-track to break new trade records in
2022. The US is also the largest source of FDI in India, with US $48.2 billion in cumulative inward
investment flows between 2000 and 2021.35 The depth of the trade and investment relationship not
only complements and underscores their strategic partnership but holds the potential to shape the
emerging economic architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

Two multilateral strategic dialogues that have gained prominence in recent years is the Quad of India,
Australia, Japan, and the US, revived in 2017, and a new India-Israel-UAE-US quadrilateral dialogue,
announced in 2021. Since its reconstitution in 2017, the Quad has become a crucial format for India
and the US to pursue targeted multilateral cooperation with like-minded democracies. In addition to
its historical focus on maritime security and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad
expanded its agenda in 2021. Following a virtual Quad meeting in March, the leaders of the four
democracies met in person in the US in September 2021 for the first Quad summit. The 2021
National Defense Authorization Act includes a plan to train air force pilots from Australia, India, and
Japan at Anderson Air Force base in Guam. At the virtual Quad summit in March 2022, the four
countries pledged to “join forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and
equitable access” and establish a vaccine “expert working group.” The US also committed to
“produce at least 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022.” Japan, meanwhile, is in
discussions with India to provide concessional loans for the latter to expand manufacturing capacity
for export-bound COVID-19 vaccines.

In October 2021, India and the US, along with Israel and the UAE, initiated a new quadrilateral
dialogue that some analysts have dubbed the ‘West Asian Quad’. The four sides discussed
collaboration in COVID-19 relief efforts as well as “expanding economic and political cooperation in
the Middle East and Asia, including through trade, combating climate change, energy cooperation,
and increasing maritime security.”20 The Israeli government highlighted the “possibilities for joint
infrastructure projects in the fields of transportation, technology, maritime security, and economics
and trade.” 21 The group’s focus on technology cooperation carries a unique potential. Given
synergies in the innovation and start-up sector, it is logical that this new Quad works towards
tech-based collaboration. India’s and the US’s commitments in this new quadrilateral forum are
expected to complement their bilateral agenda on the eastern flank of the Indo-Pacific through their
activities within the Quad mechanism.

Conclusion

THE SPECTRUM OF INDIA–US TIES continues to expand, and the next decade could witness
greater opportunities for the two countries to align their objectives and capabilities. Over the past two
decades, India and the US have increasingly aligned their bilateral and multilateral agendas to achieve
synergy between their individual interests and global goals. The US has proved to be a reliable partner
for India to advance its regional and global multilateral interests, including in the United Nations. As
the geostrategic landscape continues to change, both India and the US need to further align their
strategies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
India and Russia

India and Russia enjoyed a rather warm relationship in the years of the cold war. The point of
culmination of their relationship came in 1971 with India’s Treaty of Friendship with the USSR of
1971 as a response to the mounting Chinese, American and Pakistan axis that was developing. For
India, the treaty served the strategic purpose of deterring Chinese or American intervention in a
possible Indo-Pakistani war. It also provided an insurance of Soviet diplomatic support in the UN if
the issue reached the world body. It has also been argued that Moscow’s intention to expand its
military aid program to Pakistan in the late 1960s was a more potent factor in India deciding to sign
this treat. The post cold war years have seen both the countries struggle to define their long term
relationship due to the changing global dynamics.

Vladimir Putin

After the cold war, Russia had little interest in South Asia except as a potential market for arms and
missile technology sales in exchange for hard currency. India was also developing its relationship with
the United States which strained Indo-Soviet Strategic cooperation. It was only until Putin came to
power in 2000 that India’s relationship with Russia underwent a significant change. While
maintaining continuity in ensuring a substantive and incremental pattern of relations with the
United States and Western Europe, Putin revived equations with other major Asian nations like
China, Japan, and India. His reelection in March 2012 has only helped in sustaining continuity in
Indo-Russian relations, especially as Putin has described India as a “key strategic partner in the
Asia-Pacific region.”

Balance of Power

Earlier, there was an attempt to focus a Moscow-Beijing-Delhi strategic triangle as a deterrent to the
unipolar world. But now with the United States in relative decline and China emerging as its most
likely challenger, Russia and India are struggling to come to grips with the implications of a possible
Chinese hegemony over the Asian strategic landscape. Russia shares a common strategic objective
with India for a stable power balance in Asia where China is increasingly looming large. It is this
geopolitical imperative that is forcing New Delhi and Moscow to ramp up their partnership. This is
reflected in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives being proposed by the two sides. At the bilateral
level, after completing a decade of strategic partnership, inaugurated in 2000, New Delhi and Moscow
decided to elevate their relationship to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” in 2010. At the
multilateral level, Russia’s promotion of the Russia–China–India trilateral initiative and now the
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping is aimed at enhancing its
international status vis-à-vis the West.
Defence

Russia is not only the biggest supplier of defence products to India, but the India–Russia defence
relationship also encompasses a wide range of activity that includes joint research, design,
development, and co-production. Significant defence deals signed in recent years include a $2.34
billion contract for the refit of the Gorshkov aircraft carrier; a $1.2 billion deal to procure
twenty-nine additional MiG 29 K naval fighter aircraft; and an agreement for an additional forty Su
MKI fighters for the Indian Air Force. The point of tension arose when India turned to US defence
technology like the F-16s that Russia is not equipped to offer. Another point of tension is that in
contrast to more than sixty naval exercises with the United States, India has conducted only five such
exercises with Russia. The prices of Russian defence equipment are often inflated and their delivery
delayed. Nevertheless it remains important that Russia is the only state that is willing to share defence
technology of strategic nature with India including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. It is
equally significant that Russia is probably the only major global power that has not sold defence
technology to Pakistan. Therefore, despite repeated delays in Russia’s implementation of major
weapon orders, India continues to rely on Russia for strategic weaponry.

China and Pak Angle in Defence

A major strain on the Indian Russia defence relationship is Russia being the largest supplier of
defense equipment to China which produced a cascading effect as the Russian military technology has
been transferred to Pakistan via China. Therefore, the prospects of Indo-Russian defense and political
cooperation will be assessed by India in the light of Russia’s defense supplies and cooperation
arrangements with China. There are growing concerns in Russia about the growing Indian strategic
alignment with the United States. Although the Russian China relationship is weary because China
has been making copies of Russian designed weapons and undercutting it. Given the steady
deterioration in Sino-Indian ties in recent years, the threat of China will be one of the most important
factors in determining India’s outreach to Russia in the defense sector.

Economic Ties

The most challenging aspect of Indo-Russian relations today is, perhaps, the upgrading of bilateral
economic and trade relations, which fails to reflect the potential that exists and is a major challenge
that the two countries are trying to address on a priority basis. Bilateral trade stood at US$ 10 Billion
in 2013 and has only recently picked up. China remains Russia’s largest trading partner with the
thirty-year agreement under which Russia will supply China with 68 billion cubic metres of gas
annually from 2015. To address this, Russia has not only been trying to woo Indian investors but has
also agreed to use the debt India owes Russia to fund joint ventures in the field of
telecommunications, aluminium and information technology. Multilateral and Bilateral agreements
aside, Russia is also stressing its role as a key energy supplier. Civilian nuclear energy cooperation has
also gathered momentum with a comprehensive nuclear deal between India and Russia and a pact to
build two power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Russia will remain India’s main partner in
the civilian nuclear energy sector given the problems American and French companies will face in
investing in India in the absence of an India–Japan civilian nuclear pact.

Conclusion

The India–Russia relationship enjoys consensual support in both countries and has managed to
withstand the test of time. If India and Russia managed to have a strong bilateral partnership during
the Cold War years and are coming closer again, it is based on a commonality of interests. India
remains determined to preserve and strengthen its special relationship with Russia.
Russia-China-Pakistan

Russia has been seeking expanded ties in Southwest Asia in recent months. Moscow’s deepening
involvement with Pakistan and Afghanistan is all about preparing for Russia’s entry into the $62
billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). Russia’s growing interest in the CPEC comes against the backdrop of budding
Russian-Pakistani relations over the past few years. Moscow was willing to join the CPEC in 2016
when it requested Islamabad to allow Russia to use Gwadar Port for its exports. This strategically
located port along the Arabian Sea in Pakistan’s Balochistan province is an essential part of the CPEC.
Islamabad accorded approval to Moscow’s request, and then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
during his visit to Turkmenistan in November 2016, welcomed the Kremlin’s decision to join the
project.

Russia’s vision for its Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) passes through the CPEC, as part of
China’s BRI. Through its participation in the CPEC, the Kremlin will seek to merge the Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU) with the BRI. In April 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced
at the Second BRI Forum for International Cooperation that five EAEU member states had
unanimously supported the idea of pairing the EAEU’s development with the BRI. Overall, an
EAEU-BRI merger would be a real step forward in Moscow’s quest to realize the goals of the GEP,
which, beyond connecting with the BRI, also include improving connectivity with Iran, India and
Southeast Asia. With its geostrategic location, which marks the confluence of South, Central and
Southwest Asia, Pakistan has the strong potential to play a promising role in making the GEP a
reality. Thus, Putin recently characterised Pakistan as one of Russia’s “priority partners” in Asia.

Answer

There seems to be a reversal in Russia’s South Asia policy, with New Delhi and Moscow drifting
apart. Russia is looking the region through the prism of its larger geopolitical struggle with the West
and seems ready to join the China-Pakistan axis.

China has found a new ally in Russia, which is keen to join with China, even as a junior partner, to
scuttle Western interests. Jettisoning its traditional antipathy to the Taliban, Russia is now indicating
that it is ready to negotiate with the militant group against the backdrop of the growing threat of the
Islamic State (ISIS) in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has emerged an important player in this context, where China and Russia are now
converging to challenge a number of Western objectives. Moscow and Islamabad held their first-ever
joint military exercise in September 2016 and their first-ever bilateral consultation on regional issues
in December.

After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Pakistan’s military will be receiving
four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters this year. It is also likely that the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor might be merged with the Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union.
In December, Russia hosted representatives of China and Pakistan to discuss developments in
Afghanistan and the three agreed upon “a flexible approach to remove certain [Taliban] figures from
[United Nations] sanctions lists as part of efforts to foster a peaceful dialogue between Kabul and the
Taliban movement.”

The three states underscored their concern “about the rising activity in the country [Afghanistan] of
extremist groups, including the Afghan branch of IS [the Islamic State]” and underlined that the
Taliban was a necessary bulwark in the global fight against the ISIS. The Taliban obviously welcomed
the move.

India’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan will also have to evolve with these changing ground realities. New
Delhi has been demanding dismantling of safe havens and terror sanctuaries in the region, besides
pressing for deeper engagement of various stakeholders for Kabul’s stability and security.