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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Being Necessary
Being Necessary
Themes of Ontology and Modality
from the Work of Bob Hale
 
Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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Preface
Three days before we submitted the final manuscript of this volume to the Press, Bob
Hale passed away. The book had always been intended as a celebration of his
philosophical work, but we had not anticipated the sad circumstances in which it
might also serve as a memorial.
Bob was an extraordinary philosopher, as can be gathered from the careful and
fruitful engagement with his work in the following pages. Bob combined great
philosophical vision and insight, with remarkable intellectual stamina, rigour, and
generosity. He was always happy to discuss philosophy, and that philosophical
discussion would be thorough, searching, and enormously helpful. Bob wouldn’t
let you get away with a quick and easy answer to a problem; he would walk you
through it, step by step, detail by detail, until a more complex, richer, and ultimately
much more philosophically satisfying picture came into view.
Bob’s published work includes three major books: Abstract Objects (1987), The
Reason’s Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics
(2001, co-authored with Crispin Wright), and Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontol-
ogy, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (2013). In this most recent book, Bob
drew together the different strands of his research in metaphysics, philosophical
logic, and philosophy of mathematics into a comprehensive and interrelated picture
of reality, modality, existence, and how philosophical investigation into these areas
should be conducted. It is an exceptional piece of philosophy and many of the
chapters in this volume are a testament to that, in attempting to grapple with
many of its important claims and arguments.
As well as a philosopher, Bob was also a great teacher, mentor, colleague, collab-
orator, and friend. His ability to convey his knowledge, his no-nonsense approach to
philosophy, his clarity, his sensibility to art, and concern for the underprivileged were
remarkable. His loss will be felt immeasurably for a long time to come. This book is,
of course, dedicated to the celebration of his philosophical work. But we also, with
deep sadness, dedicate it to his friendship, and to his memory.
Contents
About the Contributors ix
1. Introduction 1
2. On Some Arguments for the Necessity and Irreducibility of Necessity 15
John Divers
3. The World of Truth-Making 36
Kit Fine
4. Essentialism and Logical Consequence 60
Rosanna Keefe and Jessica Leech
5. Radical Contingentism, or; Why Not Even Numbers Exist Necessarily 77
Peter Simons
6. Properties and Predicates, Objects and Names: Impredicativity
and the Axiom of Choice 92
Stewart Shapiro
7. Predication, Possibility, and Choice 111
Roy T. Cook
8. Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic 140
Richard Kimberly Heck
9. On the Permissibility of Impredicative Comprehension 170
Øystein Linnebo
10. Neo-Fregeanism and the Burali-Forti Paradox 188
Ian Rumfitt
11. Analytic Essentialist Approaches to the Epistemology of Modality 224
Anand Jayprakash Vaidya
12. Rethinking the Epistemology of Modality for Abstracta 245
Sònia Roca-Royes
13. Counter-Conceivability Again 266
Crispin Wright
Index 283
About the Contributors
R T. C is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota.

J D is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leeds.
K F is University Professor and Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics
at New York University, and a Distinguished Research Professor at the University of
Birmingham.
I F-R is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Puerto Rico, Río
Piedras.
R K H is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University.
R K is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield.
J L is Lecturer in Philosophy at King’s College London.
Ø L is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo.
Sò R-R is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling.
I R is Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Fellow at All Souls
College, University of Oxford.
S S is O’Donnell Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University
and a regular visiting professor at the University of St Andrews.
P S is former Professor of Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin, where he
held the Chair of Moral Philosophy.
A J V is Professor of Philosophy at San José State University
and Director of the Center for Comparative Philosophy.
C W is Professor of Philosophy at New York University and Professor of
Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling.
1
Introduction
Ontology is the philosophical study of what there is. In practice, this amounts to
more than it might seem. Ontology isn’t simply presenting an inventory of medium-
sized dry goods: it typically involves questions concerning the kinds of entities there
are. Are there universals, or can we account for categorization in terms of concepts,
language, or sets? Are there really things like tables, or are there just ‘particles
arranged table-wise’? Are there objects made up of a fusion of any things whatsoever,
or are there constraints on composition? Is there an object that has the Eiffel Tower
and Angela Merkel as its only two parts, or not? Do all entities have a location in
space and time, or are there abstract entities that do not?
Modality concerns possibility, necessity, and cognate notions. We typically think
that there are some things that are the case, but that could have been otherwise—for
example, that Barack Obama became president of the United States of America—and
some that are the case but also could not have been otherwise—for example, that 2
and 2 make 4, or perhaps that Barack Obama is a human being (if he had been
anything other than a human being, so the thought goes, that would not have been
the very same thing as Obama). The metaphysics of modality takes on the challenge
to explain these apparent modal facts. What is it that grounds the fact that something
is merely possible, or that it is necessary, or impossible? Are such modal facts mind-
independent, or do they depend on our own conceptual engagement with the world,
or the way we use language to talk about the world? If there are mind-independent
modal matters, can we reduce them to non-modal facts, or is modality fundamental?
Are there fundamentally modal properties of objects? And so on.
What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is,
and what there could be, must be, or might have been? In the first half of the
twentieth century, distrust of metaphysics produced answers in terms of theory,
language, and convention. Modality was reduced to mere linguistic convention,
questions of ontology to choices between theories, perhaps, one might say, to choices
between conventions.¹ Quine famously rejected this conventionalist approach, not to
¹ Such a view is often associated with thinkers such as Carnap. Carnap distinguished between a
linguistic framework or theory in terms of which we can ask internal questions about entities and so
forth, and external questions about the choice of theory or framework. It is the framework that determines
what must or can be true within that framework, but there may be a choice of framework external to that.
See Carnap (1950).
  -   
salvage notions of ontology and necessity, but to cast even more doubt on their
legitimacy.² There is perhaps an interesting tale to tell of the relationship between
ontology and modality, if both are considered largely defunct. But this book will
answer the question in a more positive light.
In recent decades, philosophers have taken metaphysics more seriously as a
substantive discipline in its own right. Two broad traditions have emerged in
which the relationship between ontology and modality has also become central.
Firstly, the rise of an understanding of modality in terms of quantification over
possible worlds, or other entities, ties modality to a particular ontology of that
domain of quantification. In general, necessity is understood as truth in all worlds;
possibility as truth in at least one; impossibility as truth in no world. In order to take
this seriously as a metaphysical account of the nature of modality, one must give an
account of the kinds of things over which one is quantifying. Perhaps most famously,
David Lewis’s modal realism claims that worlds are concrete, just like our own,
actual, world.³ More precisely, for Lewis, there exist individuals, sets of individuals,
and sums of individuals. A maximal spatiotemporally and causally related sum of
individuals is a world.⁴ Worlds, therefore, do not bear spatiotemporal or causal
relations to each other, and they do not share parts (they do not overlap). With
this purportedly amodal ontology in place, Lewis promises not only to give a
reductive account of modality—worlds are characterized without appeal to modal
facts, and modality is analysed in terms of quantification over those worlds—but an
account of many other things. For example, properties are defined as sets of individ-
uals and propositions as sets of worlds.
Whilst Lewis’s modal realism is perhaps the best-known, or most-taught, version
of a worlds account of modality, there are other options. One might take worlds to be
properties, understood as ways the world could be (or couldn’t be), or propositions
that describe how the world could be (or couldn’t be).⁵ But in each case, we still face
the challenge to give an account of the nature and existence of the worlds or world-
like entities in the domain of quantification. In many cases, this will also involve
giving an account of when such a world is possible, e.g., when a property is a way the
world could have been, or when a proposition describes how the world could have
been, rather than an impossibility. Such theories will fail to reduce modality to
ontology, and as such may be deemed to be inferior to Lewisian modal realism, but
one may question whether reduction is a worthy goal at all here.⁶
This, then, is one major thread of late twentieth-century philosophy that wove
together modality and ontology. The other began, perhaps, with Kripke’s renewed
confidence in de re necessity—modality of things, not just words—and the associated
idea of essence.⁷ Upon such a view, it is natural to think of entities as having
modal properties in a substantive sense (i.e., in a stronger sense than that there
² See, for example, Quine (1936), (1951), (1963). ³ See Lewis (1986).
⁴ See Divers (2002) for a particularly clear presentation of Lewis’s view.
⁵ See, for example, Forrest (1986), Hale (2013), chapter 10, and Stalnaker (2003) and (2012).
⁶ There is also a question whether reduction is achievable in the way Lewis suggests. See Divers and
Melia (2002) and Hale (2013), chapter 3.
⁷ See Kripke (1981).
 
are true modal statements about the things, which may also be the case on the
quantificational view). This has developed, through the work of philosophers such as
Kit Fine and David Wiggins, into one of the leading approaches to the philosophy of
modality today.
At the heart of this essentialist trend is the idea that individuals have an essential
nature which determines how they could and couldn’t have been different, and how
they could and couldn’t change. For example, if Socrates is essentially a human, then
he couldn’t have been a boiled egg, although he could have been taller than he actually
was. Within this broad family of views there is again variation. For example, at the
heart of Wiggins’s view is the notion of a sortal property: a property that provides an
individual with a principle of individuation. Such a principle determines when things
are the same or different at a time and over time. Wiggins argues that such properties
are thereby necessary to their bearers.⁸ On such a view, a certain ontology—that of
individuals and sortals—plays a crucial role in explaining what the de re necessities for
individuals are, but modality is not thereby given an analysis.
By contrast, Fine and others have argued that essence should be understood on the
model of definition—in Aristotle’s terms, the ‘what it is to be’ something—and that
de re modality can then be given an account in terms of essence.⁹ In this tradition, the
relation between ontology and modality is as strong as ever: necessity is understood
as what is true in virtue of the natures of things and, as such, modality has its source
firmly in ontology, in the existence and natures of things. Many pages have been
devoted to debating whether such a reduction of de re necessity to essence can in fact
be achieved, or whether an analysis of essence in terms of modality—plus some
additional metaphysical or ontological machinery, such as the distinction between
sparse and abundant properties—can be defended.¹⁰ There is also much work
developing the Finean account of necessity as truth in virtue of the natures of things,
and an extension of this programme to an understanding of dependence and
grounding.¹¹
In addition to these two broad philosophical traditions that bring together modal-
ity and ontology in such an intimate way, there is a third, important, and too-often
neglected area of philosophy where ontology and modality interact. This is the realm
of what we might call modal ontology: the question of whether and what things exist
necessarily or contingently. Within metaphysics, there are debates concerning whether
or not there exist a range of purportedly necessary beings: are there abstract objects,
numbers, sets, propositions, Platonic universals, and so on? One important way in
which modality and ontology meet, then, is simply in the modality of existence: whether
there are necessarily existing things in general, and whether there are particular kinds of
things that exist necessarily.
This way of framing things conceals a presumption in favour of contingent
existence and sets up necessary existence as a difficult case. This is perhaps the
⁸ See Wiggins (2001). ⁹ See in particular Fine (1994) and Hale (2013).
¹⁰ See, for example, Correia (2007), Cowling (2013), Della Rocca (1996), Gorman (2005) and (2014),
Skiles (2015), and Wildman (2013).
¹¹ See, for example, Audi (2012), Correia (2005, 2008), Correia and Schnieder (2012), Fine (2015),
Jenkins (2005), and Wilson (2014).
  -   
default position of many such debates where, for example, Platonism about certain
kinds of things is taken to involve additional commitments and thus bears the burden
of proof against the nominalist. However, in recent years arguments have been put
forward that in fact seem to favour necessary existence as the basic case, and
contingency as in need of defence. It has been argued that the correct modal logic
is S5 and, moreover, in combination with other plausible principles of quantified
modal logic, that this entails necessitism: everything that exists, exists necessarily (and
there couldn’t be more objects than there actually are).¹² This poses a new challenge.
If one wants to agree that a quantified modal logic that validates S5 and the Barcan
Formulas is the logic that correctly captures facts about (absolute) necessity, as seems
reasonable, then one must either accept necessitism or find a way to defend the
possibility of contingent existence. This latter challenge has been taken on in recent
work such as Hale’s Necessary Beings (Hale, 2013) and Stalnaker’s Mere Possibilities
(Stalnaker, 2012).
These are issues for modal ontology that arise largely within the bounds of
metaphysical discussion. But there is another application of modal ontology that is
also of central importance. The development of analytic philosophy has included a
development of, and increased interest in, the study of logic: not just the study of
deductive systems, but of how best to interpret the most interesting and important
logics, i.e., how to provide them with a suitable semantics and how then to best
understand that semantics. As soon as we start to make commitments to one
semantics over another, ontological matters come to bear. For example, the devel-
opment of second-order logic famously incited Quine to charge that it is merely ‘set
theory in sheep’s clothing’, arguing that the semantics for second-order logic commit
us to the existence of a particular kind of mathematical object.¹³ In thus bearing such
an ontological commitment, for Quine, second-order logic is no logic at all. Boolos’s
response, that we can understand monadic second-order logic in terms of plurals,
has paved the way for an application of a more deflationary ontology of pluralities of
things.¹⁴ At the very least, semantics for logics introduce ideas variously of models,
propositions, sets, properties, and more, which must then face up to the ontologist’s
scrutiny. Moreover, one should note that many of these things are typically thought
of as existing necessarily, or at least as being abstract. Hence, the development of and
interest in advanced logics that has become part and parcel of analytic philosophy
introduces a host of ontological questions and, in particular, a host of questions
within what we have been calling modal ontology.
Of course, one may deny that any such things exist. One may well indulge in a taste
for desert landscapes, and eschew the existence of anything that smacks of abstract-
ness or necessity, but one cannot avoid acknowledging the questions that are raised.
As such, anyone with a serious interest in ontology and modality on the one hand, or
logic on the other, should not ignore these questions of modal ontology.
Bob Hale’s recent book, Necessary Beings (2013), is a prime example of how
ontological and modal considerations can combine into a mutually supporting
¹² See Linsky and Zalta (1994) and Williamson (2013).

¹³ See Quine (1970), 66. ¹⁴ See Boolos (1999).
 
account of our world. Hale favours what might be called a Fregean approach to
ontology. Objects are to be understood as ‘what are or could be primary semantic
values of singular terms’, properties as ‘what are or could be primary semantic values
of predicates’ (Hale 2013, 32). Notably, both ontological principles make appeal to
modal considerations—the fundamental ontological categories of object and prop-
erty are to be understood, in part, in terms of what could be semantic values of
different categories of expression. But this does not constitute some kind of reduction
of ontology to modality. Modality, in turn, is understood along essentialist lines, as
having its source in the nature of things. Ontology and modality, for Hale, are
intertwined.
Hale extends his approach to address issues of modal ontology, including the
nature and modal status of abstract objects, mathematical objects, and the best
semantics for second-order logic. Part of Hale’s motivation for taking the Fregean
approach to ontology is that it leaves open the question of whether or not there are
abstract objects—at least prima facie, singular terms could refer to abstract objects
just as much as concrete objects. It is a mistake, argues Hale, to start with a
conception of objects that already forecloses on such a question, e.g., such as if one
took spatiotemporal properties to be required for objecthood. Hence, even the
possibility of having a debate about the existence of abstract objects should place
constraints on our approach to ontology.
What approach one takes to ontology, modality, and the relationship between
them can also have a significant impact on the kind of epistemological account open
to us. In particular, if one takes modality to bear a particularly strong relation to
ontology—e.g., if you think that modality has its source in the natures of things—
then one would expect knowledge of modality to involve at least at some stage some
knowledge of those things (and their natures). If you think that modality is to be
reduced to quantification over worlds, one will need to be able to say something about
our epistemic access to other—perhaps spatiotemporally and causally isolated—worlds.
Necessary Beings draws together several different strands of Hale’s previous work
on ontology, modality, modal ontology, and modal epistemology. It brings to the fore
a clear thematic unity to Hale’s work and, in doing so, also shows how these
questions of ontology, modality, modal ontology, and epistemology hang together.
These topics tie the chapters in this volume together. The chapters span across a
range of issues connected to ontology, modality, and the relationships between them.
In particular, a number of the chapters address neglected matters of modal ontology.
First, John Divers questions two defences of modal primitivism, each offered by
Hale. Firstly, Divers considers Hale’s ‘anti-sceptical master argument’, developed
from work by Ian McFetridge and Crispin Wright.¹⁵ The argument is supposed to
show that merely the minimal belief that it is sometimes the case that some rule
R preserves truth under reasoning from some given suppositions, commits one also
to a belief that there is at least one rule R that is necessarily truth-preserving, i.e.,
preserves truth under reasoning from any suppositions. Following Hale’s line of
reasoning, this argument may appear vulnerable to a certain kind of Quinean
¹⁵ McFetridge (1990) and Wright (1986).

  -   
confirmational holism, according to which one could never know, of the various rules
and suppositions one was employing, which was the necessarily truth-preserving
one. But by appeal to a refutation of this kind of confirmational holism by Wright
(1986), one can avoid this problem. Divers argues, in response, that even if the anti-
sceptical master argument is successful in itself, it will have limited force against a
modal sceptic. For the argument supposes that the modal sceptic will at least be
prepared to accept counterfactual reasoning from suppositions in a few cases. Divers
argues that, ‘when Quine signs up for claims about “every supposition” he is not
signing up for what McFetridge, Hale and their willing interlocutor are signing up
for’, and hence concludes that ‘the McFetridge-Hale dialectic is apt to engage, compel
and convert only a sceptic about necessity who, nonetheless, accepts a battery of
presuppositions about counterfactual supposition’. In short, the Quinean sceptic is
safe in his scepticism. Divers goes on to discuss whether the master argument could
be employed successfully against any other variety of sceptic. Secondly, Divers
defends a Lewisian reduction of modality to worlds against Hale’s objections. Hale
objects that the Lewisian harbours an unacceptable modal commitment due to the
role played in his theory by the principle of recombination; Divers responds that,
properly understood, recombination does not play any such problematic role in the
Lewisian theory.
Chapter 3 also touches on an ontology of possible worlds. The use of possible
worlds semantics has become well established, but worlds are large, complicated,
unwieldly things. Thus, a number of philosophers have explored prospects for using
something less than worlds—possibilities, understood as less complete than worlds—
in their place.¹⁶ In his contribution to this volume, Kit Fine explores the details of a
kind of truthmaker semantics: a semantics in which statements are evaluated at
partial possibilities rather than at possible worlds, where worlds are understood,
roughly, to be some kind of maximal possibility. As Fine notes, ‘It is a common idea
that the full resources of possible worlds semantics are not required to provide an
intensional semantics for classical logic. For these purposes, one need only appeal to
partial possibilities.’ However, in his chapter, Fine shows that things are not so
simple. He argues that, given some reasonable assumptions about the semantics,
classical logic can only be properly accommodated if one allows that there are
possible worlds amongst the partial possibilities. A move to work with partial
possibilities does not, it turns out, absolve us from commitment to worlds as well.
Nevertheless, even if we are committed to worlds (more precisely, what Fine calls
‘world-states’), there are still truthmakers that are not world-states present in the
semantics, and so the world-states need only play a marginal role in the delineation of
semantic content.
Next, Rosanna Keefe and Jessica Leech consider issues arising from our other main
strand of ontology and modality: essentialism. In the first instance, essentialists about
modality promise to provide an account of metaphysical necessity in terms of
essence: it is metaphysically necessary that p just when it is true in virtue of the
natures of things that p. This account can then be extended—or rather restricted—to
¹⁶ See Fine (1975), Hale (2013), Humberstone (1981), and Rumfitt (2015).
 
give an account of further kinds of necessity in terms of the natures of particular

kinds of things. In particular, some essentialists claim that it is logically necessary that
p just when it is true in virtue of the natures of certain logical things that p. For
example, Kit Fine suggests that logical necessity is to be understood in terms of the
natures of logical concepts.¹⁷ Hale (2013) develops and defends an account of logical
necessity in terms of the natures of logical functions. He suggests that this account
can also be used to explain logical consequence: what is a logical consequence of what
is grounded in the natures of the relevant logical functions. Others, such as Vaidya
(2006), have suggested that these kinds of essentialist, metaphysical considerations
might have some bearing on debates over the choice of logic, i.e., over which purported
logical consequence relation is the one true logical consequence relation (classical?
intuitionist? paraconsistent?) or whether there is in fact more than one true conse-
quence relation (logical pluralism). In their contribution, Keefe and Leech explore the
prospects for this project, building on Hale’s particular version of essentialism about
logical modality, including his account of the existence conditions of the logical
functions which lie at the heart of the view. They argue that it is unlikely that
metaphysical considerations alone will succeed in determining an answer to the
logical consequence question.
Next come several chapters dealing with questions of modal ontology. First, Peter
Simons challenges the orthodox view that mathematical objects, if they exist, exist
necessarily. In his chapter, he develops and defends an account of numbers as
properties of pluralities, what he calls ‘multitudes’. So, for example, the number
two is that property shared by all multitudes of two. On the face of it, such a view
encounters various problems, not least, whether there are enough things in the world
to provide multitudes for all the numbers, given that Simons’s nominalist aims do
not allow for uninstantiated properties, just as much as they prohibit abstract objects.
To solve this and related problems Simons thus advocates a theory of higher-order
multitudes. Hence, for example, not only are there multitudes of two (not to be
understood as singular groups of two, but as irreducibly plural), so there can also be
multitudes of multitudes of two (again, understood as irreducibly plural). If success-
ful, this theory promises to support logic and mathematics without significant
ontological underpinning, and thus constitutes a tempting option within the realm
of modal ontology.
Stewart Shapiro’s contribution focuses on ontology of properties rather than
objects. Hale (2010, 2013) introduces and defends a deflationary theory of properties
and relations, according to which the existence conditions of these entities are tied to
possible languages. For Hale, the possible existence of a meaningful predicate is
sufficient and necessary for the existence of the corresponding property or relation
(which would be the semantic value of the predicate). Amongst other things, Hale
employs this notion of property in a semantics for second-order logic. Shapiro
contends, however, that the tie to language renders these entities unsuitable for use
in such a semantics. He argues that ‘Hale must either defend some prima facie
implausible claims about what sorts of languages are possible, for us finite beings,
¹⁷ Fine (1994), 9–10.

  -   
or else he must reject, on purely philosophical grounds, large chunks of contemporary

mathematics’. Given that both options are hardly attractive, if Shapiro is correct, then
Hale’s modal ontology should be modified. Either his account of the existence
conditions of properties and relations in terms of possible predicates must be revised,
or his application of these entities to provide an ontological underpinning for second-
order logic.
Roy T. Cook’s chapter also takes on this particular combination of views in modal
ontology: Hale’s deflationary conception of properties applied as a semantics for
second-order logic. Cook’s way into considering these issues focuses on the conse-
quences for any justification that might be given for versions of the axiom of choice
expressible in second-order vocabulary. Cook outlines what the advantages of
second-order logic are supposed to be. These depend, importantly, on the underlying
semantics containing sufficient entities to deliver the goods. Hale’s deflationary
conception of properties, whilst permissive understood from one perspective (prop-
erties can exist uninstantiated), is also rather restrictive considered from another
(properties require the possibility of a predicate for which they could be the semantic
value). It is this restriction that threatens to undermine the value of second-order
logic, where Hale’s properties are offered as a semantics. Ultimately, Cook argues that
the full axiom of choice cannot be justified within the proposed semantics. Now, on
the face of it, one might simply retort that the axiom of choice is a controversial
principle anyway, and so what if it isn’t justified on the proposed view. But it is worth
highlighting the significance of this kind of result for the kinds of modal ontological
issues surveyed above. It is as a result of ontological claims or commitments,
concerning the entities that are offered as semantic values by a semantics for a
logic, that certain principles of the logic are rendered unavailable to us. One might
question whether, in such cases, ontology should serve the logic, and strive to
accommodate those principles that we have logical reasons to favour. Or, perhaps
it is right that, if our ontology just does not contain the right kinds of things, then our
logic should reflect this.
Richard Kimberly Heck’s chapter delves further into issues arising from the modal
ontological underpinnings of second-order logics, and how these might become
confused with distinct epistemological issues. As noted above, Quine famously raised
concerns about the ontological commitments of second-order logic. Defenders of
second-order logic have thus tended to try to downplay its alleged ‘staggering
existential assumptions’ (Quine 1970, 68). Heck argues that—at least from the
perspective of a neo-Fregean approach to this issue—the question of ontological
commitment is in fact secondary to a more fundamental epistemological concern.
The question is not so much to what one’s second-order claims are ontologically
committed, but rather, what entitles us to accept the second-order logical conse-
quences of premises that we already accept. Whilst one may well take axioms of
second-order logic to also bear unacceptable ontological commitment, for Heck it is
primarily their epistemological status that causes most trouble for second-order logic.
One can see the point by considering a choice between, say, using second-order
logic, or using set theory. If the ontological commitments of the two are the same, so
goes the thought, then one has no advantage over the other. One kind of response
to this would be to argue that second-order logic does not after all bear the same
 
ontological commitments as set theory. This is indeed how many philosophers have
responded to Quine’s charge. But Heck notes that there is a very different way to
think about the dispute. Different theories may be more or less epistemically demand-
ing. Even if the ontological commitments of two theories are the same, the principles
of one rather than the other may be easier to justify, and hence we would have a good
reason to favour one over the other.
Heck’s discussion centres on the key issue of impredicative comprehension
axioms. A comprehension axiom states, roughly, that for every formula in a language
there is a property or relation holding of the objects referred to in the formula.
Formulas yield properties. Such an axiom is impredicative if, in defining the prop-
erty, one is allowed to quantify over all properties, where this might include the
property to be defined. Consider Heck’s example:
9F8x½Fx 8G9Hð. . . G . . . H . . . x . . .Þ
In such a case, a property Fξ is given a definition by a formula that quantifies over all
properties. How might one justify the use of such an axiom? Heck argues that the
central concern, of Quine and others, is that an epistemic justification of this kind of
principle requires appeal to an understanding of the powerset axiom. Different
theories may all have the full powerset as their domain, and thus share the same
ontological commitments, but one might nevertheless take a theory that did not
require a full knowledge of set theory to be less demanding than, and therefore
preferable to, alternatives that did. Indeed, Heck offers such a theory, their Arché
logic. They claim that, ‘The way we understand the axioms and rules of Arché logic
might require the second-order domain to be a certain privileged domain without
requiring it to be the full powerset, even if the privileged domain is the full powerset’
(emphasis ours). Our understanding of a logical theory may not require us to grasp
the resources of the full powerset, even if the theory is ultimately ontologically
committed to this. Thus, it is not just ontological commitment that makes a differ-
ence between theories. There is a crucial role to be played by epistemological matters.
Ultimately, Heck sees themselves as disentangling these ontological and epistemo-
logical issues.
Øystein Linnebo’s contribution is also concerned with impredicative comprehen-
sion. He raises the issue in the context of the ‘paradox of reification’. This consists of
an inconsistent triad of otherwise attractive claims concerning the ontological com-
mitments of our logic and how we can refer to or talk about the things in that
domain.
(1) Unrestricted comprehension: No restriction is needed on the second-order
comprehension scheme.
(2) Concepts are things: Every concept can also figure as the value of a first-order
variable.
(3) Absolute generality: It is possible to generalize over absolutely all things.
Linnebo states that ‘The challenge posed by the paradox of reification is to balance
the strength of our comprehension principles against the forms of reification that we
permit.’ In other words, we need to balance what kinds of things we allow into our
ontology against the kinds of definitions of things that we allow in our logics.
  -   
Linnebo notes that unrestricted comprehension is often preserved at the cost of

restrictions on reification—stronger powers of definition are allowed in return for a
more restricted ontology. In his chapter, he argues that we should restrict compre-
hension instead. The argument turns on a distinction between two different analyses
of the concepts of collection and of generality: one extensional, the other intensional.
The last in our series of chapters focusing broadly on modal ontology also
addresses a paradox. Ian Rumfitt asks the question: what form might a neo-Fregean
account of ordinal numbers take? The neo-Fregean programme introduces the
existence of numbers—in the first instance, cardinal numbers—via abstraction prin-
ciples. Such principles are supposed to be analytic equivalences, where on one side an
equivalence relation obtains, and where the other—purportedly analytically
equivalent—side is ontologically committed to the disputed entities in question. As
we are happy with the one side, we should also commit ourselves to the other, and
hence to the entities to which it is committed. The abstraction principle offered for
the introduction of cardinal numbers is often known as Hume’s principle:
(HP) The number of Fs = the number of Gs if and only if the Fs are equinumerous
with the Gs.
There is nothing ontologically heavyweight in claiming that the Fs are equinumerous
with the Gs. Such claims, it is maintained, reduce to the existence of a one–one
correlation between the Fs and the Gs. But ‘the number of Fs = the number of Gs’ is
committed to the existence of at least one number. Hence, we can abstract out
cardinal numbers from such a principle.
One might expect this approach to be easily extendable to other purported kinds of
abstract object, such as ordinal numbers. However, Rumfitt begins his chapter by
raising the problem that ‘the natural abstraction principle for ordinals yields a
contradiction (the Burali-Forti Paradox) when combined with impredicative
second-order logic’. I.e., the logic typically used in the background of this kind of
abstraction principle blocks us from yielding the desired modal ontological result: the
existence of ordinal numbers. Rumfitt reviews some responses to the paradox and
recommends a solution based upon the notion of the stability of a formula. In rough
and simple terms, the paradox arises because new elements can always be added to
the series of the ordinals, namely, the order type of that series (which is itself an
ordinal). A formula is eventually stable if there comes a point in a series when the
truth of the formula is no longer disturbed by the addition of new elements. Rumfitt
shows that if we adopt a certain restricted form of the Comprehension Schema, we
can prove that relevant mathematical formulas are eventually stable, meaning that
disruption is not caused by the addition of new ordinals. In this way we can avoid the
paradox. The remainder of his chapter is devoted to considering the wider conse-
quences of this solution for the neo-Fregean programme: the restricted form of
Comprehension that Rumfitt recommends is not strong enough to derive the
Dedekind-Peano Postulates from Hume’s Principle, but this derivation is central to
the neo-Fregean project in cardinal arithmetic.
We are taught to think of logic as ontologically innocent, as merely concerning
what follows from what, and as remaining utterly neutral when it comes to meta-
physical matters. Whilst this view might be tenable for elementary logic, choosing
 
between the different Comprehension Schemas that have been proposed for
higher-order and plural logic involves taking a stand on contested ontological and
metaphysical questions. The previous few chapters show that we need to engage in
ontological matters in order to provide adequate semantics for some logics. We now
see that the version of Comprehension we choose for our logic can affect the ontology
to which we are able to appeal.
Finally, we have three chapters focusing on epistemological concerns. One
approach to modal epistemology takes our knowledge of possibility and necessity
to have its source in our ability to draw deductive inferences. Another takes our
modal knowledge to have its source in our ability to conceive of different scenarios.
In his chapter, Anand Jayprakash Vaidya focuses on a particular variety of deductive
approach, what he calls ‘essentialist-k theory’. Such a theory takes modal knowledge
to be derived from knowledge of essence. For example, one might start with know-
ledge that E is the essence of a and infer, via one’s knowledge that essence implies
necessity and that being E implies being F, that a is necessarily F. Vaidya compares
and contrasts two existing versions of essentialist-k theory, one due to Jonathan
Lowe, the other due to Bob Hale.¹⁸ The views differ—in particular, Lowe defends a
‘no entity’ account of essence, according to which the essence of something is not a
kind of entity, whereas Hale allows that essences are entities, namely, properties—
however, Vaidya argues that they are both in danger of falling foul of the same
problem. Simply: how can we account for the knowledge of essence which sits at the
base of these theories? Vaidya maintains that ‘we need to distinguish between an
account that provides a fundamental story about the source of modal knowledge
and an account that tells us a story about how a specific epistemic instrument can be
a source of modal knowledge in a specific domain’. The merit to be found in an
essentialist-k approach is not so much tied to what the account takes as its basis, or
starting point, but rather in the account given of the steps taken towards modal
knowledge. Vaidya calls his preferred interpretation of Hale’s modal epistemological
account an argument-based approach. Such an approach promises success, because it
seems right that our claims to modal knowledge should be supported by good
arguments. As Vaidya puts the point, ‘In the case of fundamental metaphysics we
must take an argument-based approach to modal knowledge, since fundamental
metaphysics requires precision of proof from basic principles as to what further
classes of modal claims are warranted.’ However, once we take this to be the
justification behind such an account, one can see that there is room for alternative
accounts of modal knowledge to have bearing as well. In other contexts, for example,
working out whether a table could fit somewhere else in the room, a simpler
conceivability approach may be appropriate, because in such a context it seems
sufficient for knowledge of that possibility to simply imagine the table in a different
place. It is difficult to see what kind of precise argument would do better. Hence,
Vaidya concludes tentatively in favour of a pluralism of modal instruments.
Sònia Roca-Royes takes up the challenge to explain our de re modal knowledge. In
particular, she argues for a non-uniform epistemology of modality, i.e., that we need
¹⁸ See Hale (2013), Lowe (2008) and (2012).

  -   
different accounts of modal knowledge of concrete objects and of abstract objects.

Elsewhere, Roca-Royes (2017) argues for a model for modal knowledge of concrete
objects in terms of similarity and a posteriori knowledge: ‘we know about some
concrete entities’ unrealized possibilities from extrapolation from (largely a posteriori)
knowledge about some other, similar entities’ realized possibilities’. However, such an
account is not appropriate for abstract objects. For abstract objects, Roca-Royes
recommends an epistemology of the type Hale endorses uniformly. That is, an
account where knowledge of essence is prior to knowledge of necessity and of
possibility, and where knowledge of necessity is prior to knowledge of possibility.
The motivation offered for this non-uniform approach, and the particular differ-
ent approaches for concrete and abstract objects, rest on considering the differences
in how we come to be able to think about or have knowledge of particular individuals.
In the case of a concrete object, it is plausible that we can pick it out without requiring
prior knowledge of its essence. By contrast, in the case of an abstract object, there
seems to be no obvious way that we could come to identify such a thing without
already knowing about its most basic essential features. For example, I can point to a
distant animal, fix reference to it, call it ‘Mr Fox’ perhaps, and only later, when up
close, recognize that it is a cat, not a fox, and so essentially a cat, and so on. But I can’t
pick out a number, fix reference to it, and only later on recognize that it was 2 I was
thinking of all along. I needed to already think of it as something like the smallest
even natural number, or the successor of 1. No wonder, then, the thought goes, that
the source of our modal knowledge of these different kinds of things should be of a
different kind, if the way we are able to think about these things makes different use
of their essential properties.
Finally, a traditional view in modal epistemology has taken conceivability to be a
guide to possibility. One might have thought that Kripke, in decoupling metaphysical
necessity and possibility from a priority and a posteriority, would also have whole-
heartedly rejected such a principle. However, as Wright points out, Kripke’s argu-
ments appear to depend upon the assumption of a Counter-Conceivability Principle:
(CCP) If one has what at least appears to be a lucid, detailed conception of how it
might be that not P, then that should count as a good, albeit defeasible
ground for its being possible that not P, and hence its not being necessary
that P, whatever the subject matter of P.
When faced with what appear to be conceivable counter-examples to metaphysical
necessities—such as the conceivability of Hesperus not being Phosphorus, or water’s
not being H₂O—Kripke does not respond by simply rejecting the link between
conceivability and possibility, but rather, by claiming that what is being conceived
is, indeed, possible, but something else. For example, one is conceiving of something
that looks and behaves a lot like water but isn’t not being H₂O. The response, then,
retains the CCP, but distinguishes between ‘conceiving of X not being F and
conceiving of an epistemic counterpart of X not being F ’.
This kind of response, however, cannot accommodate the necessary identification
of types of mental and physical states, such as pain and C-fibre firings, for there can
be no epistemic counterpart to pain: anything that feels like pain just is pain. How to
respond? Wright distinguishes two options. The conservative option follows Kripke
 
in retaining the CCP along with finding an account of how apparent counter-
conceptions of metaphysical necessities in general, and the identity of pain and
C-fibre firings in particular, are really counter-conceptions of something else. The
radical approach takes the apparent counter-conceptions more seriously, and so
requires us to rethink the standing of the CCP.
In his contribution to this volume, Wright first canvasses versions of the conser-
vative option variously suggested and developed by himself in former work, and Hale
in response. For example, one option suggested by Hale is that, in some cases, we
conflate conceiving of P’s being false with conceiving of what it would be like if, as is
perfectly possible, P were thought to be false. However, Wright argues that none of the
options considered is able adequately to answer the problem raised by the pain case.
The point is not simply that, if one wishes to defend physicalism, none of these
options are open to one. Rather, the question of the conceivability of the very
distinctions suggested by the conservative option leads to trouble. Hence, ultimately,
Wright recommends the radical option. We must recognize and take seriously that
‘when it is metaphysical possibility that is at issue . . . some metaphysical impossibil-
ities may be perfectly lucidly conceivable—precisely because the impossibilities
concerned are not grounded in the first place (purely) in our concepts of the events,
states or stuffs etc. concerned’. The CCP concerns conceptual possibility, but when
our concepts are inadequate in various ways to the natures of things, conceivability
will fail to give us a guide to metaphysical possibility.
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2
On Some Arguments for the
Necessity and Irreducibility
of Necessity
John Divers
1 Modal Fundamentalism and the Alternatives

In Necessary Beings (Hale 2013), Bob Hale constructs and defends an impressive,
grand, and subtle metaphysical system in which there is inter-dependence between
the kinds of things that there are and the facts about what is possible—that is,
possible in the widest non-epistemic and alethic sense, or absolutely possible. Because
there is dependence of the kinds of things there are on the facts about what is
absolutely possible, Hale claims, the coherence of the system requires a conception
of absolute modality as metaphysically fundamental—as real and irreducibly so. Hale
then sets out to undermine the alternative conceptions: Skepticism (his term), Non-
Fundamentalist Realism, and Irrealism (my terms) (2–3, 47–97).¹ According to
Skepticism, we ought not to believe that there are any facts of absolute modality.
This is taken as equivalent, in effect, to both refusal to believe that any proposition is
absolutely necessary, and to holding (belief in) absolute necessity dispensable.
According to Non-Fundamentalist Realism, modal facts obtain in virtue of non-
modal facts. Thus, contra Skepticism, facts of absolute necessity are admitted but are
held to be either (a) reducible to non-modal facts or (b) at least supervenient on non-
modal facts. According to Irrealism, there may be truths of absolute necessity: but
their obtaining is to be explained in some fashion that is broadly projectivist, or even
non-cognitivist, in spirit. Hale’s first move is to argue directly against Skepticism in
order to compel recognition that there are truths (facts) of absolute necessity. The
next move is to argue against Non-Fundamentalist Realism so that, admitting truths
of absolute necessity, the choice reduces to that between Irrealism and Fundamen-
talist Realism. The final move is to argue against Irrealism, so that Fundamentalist
Realism about absolute modality is left to lead the field or, at least, to stand as a
plausible default position with which Hale is entitled to proceed.²
¹ Unqualified page references are to Hale (2013).

² Hale (chapters 5 and 6) will ultimately join Fine (1994) in proposing essentialist explanations of what
are overtly modal facts or modal facts narrowly construed—that is: those involving predications of
  
As I expected, I agree with much in Hale’s discussion of the metaphysical status of

modality and I admire it all. But as is our professional custom, I will concentrate on
the points in that discussion that prompt disagreement. Before setting about my
critical discussion in earnest, I should clarify its scope. There is no potential in what
follows to deprive Hale of entitlement to his own positive conception of modality as
metaphysically fundamental. Indeed, even if Hale’s negative case were to fail in every
aspect—and I do not come close to arguing that—his Fundamentalist Realism might
be supported by an entirely positive case. The form of that case would be that modal
fundamentalism is made sufficiently credible by the benefits that are seen to ensue
from it, when it is taken as a hypothesis and put to effective metaphysical work.
Furthermore, my critical discussion is intended to show only that Hale’s negative
case is less than fully persuasive in only two cases: those of Skepticism (§2) and of
Lewisian Non-Fundamentalist Realism (§3).
2 Indispensability?
2.1 Hale’s appropriation of McFetridge
Hale (48–62) develops and enhances an argument (familiar from Hale 1999) that
aims to compel the belief that at least one rule of inference is necessarily truth-
preserving. It will do, for present purposes, simply to state, and then take as read: (a)
that the necessity in question is intended to be alethic, absolute, and broadly logical;
(b) it is further intended to be open to explanation as a species of metaphysical
necessity; and (c) necessary truth-preservingness of a rule will yield the necessary
truth of various propositions via the standard transformation.³ Hale’s anti-skeptical
master argument is an ingenious construction from independent arguments due to
Ian McFetridge (1990) and to Crispin Wright (1986).
The McFetridge argument is of the kind that proceeds by giving a skeptic enough
rope to hang herself. Our would-be skeptic sets out by refusing to believe that there is
even one rule of inference, R, that is necessarily truth-preserving: but she admits the
modest belief that it is sometimes the case that some rule R* preserves truth under
given suppositions. The argument then proceeds ad hominem, intending to show
how sustaining the modest belief that the would-be skeptic does embrace will
rationally compel her further to embrace the belief that she initially rejects. The
argument is as follows.
necessity, possibility, contingency, etc. When modality is so narrowly construed then the characterization
of Hale’s position as “primitivism” or “fundamentalism” about modality is not quite right. But if, following
much of Hale’s own usage, “the modal facts” is construed broadly so as to encompass predications of
essence and accident, as well as predications of the narrower class of modalities proper, then the
characterization of Hale’s position as “primitivism” or “fundamentalism” about modality is in order. In
my version of the narrative we operate the latter convention.
³ The basic idea is that wherever we have necessary truth-preservingness of a rule we have the truth of
corresponding, descriptive, necessitated conditionals. So if the rule is (left-hand) &-elimination [A & B/B]
we have the truth of all conditionals of the form [□((p&q)!q)].
      
What the skeptic resists is commitment to there being some rule R such that for
every supposed circumstance S, R preserves truth under S—that is M2:
(M2) 9R(8S(R preserves truth under S)).
A lemma is then required to establish a connection between M2 and necessity. That
lemma is that commitment to M2 is equivalent to belief in the logical necessity of the
Rule R (when R is represented by a conditional statement). Support for the lemma is
supplied by a proposal that traces back to Mill. For M2 says of some R that it
preserves truth under every circumstance that might be supposed, which is to say
that R preserves truth under (at least) every logically possible circumstance and, thus,
that R is logically necessary. We may then proceed to argue for M2 and we do so by
reductio, via a dilemma, of the contrary hypothesis.
Suppose, contra M2 that for every rule R, there is some hypothesis or supposed
circumstance S under which R fails to preserve truth. Dilemma: for arbitrary such R1,
either the appropriate defeating circumstance, S, is (known) stateable, or it is not.
Suppose that S is stateable. Consider an arbitrary rule, R1, which says: From
{X1 . . . Xn} infer Y. And let “S1” abbreviate the disjunction of what are known to
be all the supposed circumstances under which R1 fails to preserve truth. Now
consider the rule, R1*, which says: from {X1 . . . Xn, not-S1} infer Y. Since S1 gives,
by hypothesis, the only circumstances in which the inference from {X1 . . . Xn} to
Y fails to preserve truth, there are no circumstances in which R1* fails to preserve
truth. So, there is a rule, R1*, such that there is no circumstance in which it fails to
preserve truth. So the contrary hypothesis is false (by reductio, since it entails its own
negation). So M2 is true.
Suppose we do not presume that the defeating circumstance, S, for arbitrary rule
R1, is stateable. Consider, then, the question whether, in a given supposed circum-
stance, P, the rule R1 invariably preserves truth. To answer that question, we must
reason about R1 under supposition P: we suppose that P, and work out what would
then be the case with R1. But which rules can we rely upon in reasoning for this
purpose? Take R1 itself: we can’t rely on use of R1 since it’s precisely the reliability of
R1 that we are trying to establish. Take any other rule R2, and ask whether we can
reliably use it (in working out whether R1 is reliable under P). If we take it that the
circumstances under which R2 is reliable are stateable, then we’re back on the first
horn of the dilemma (we’ll be able to show that there is a rule, R2*, that never fails to
preserve truth). So let us not presume that the circumstances under which R2 is reliable
are stateable, and consider, now, the question whether R2 is reliable in reasoning
(about R1) under the supposition that P. Then we embark on an infinite regress. We
cannot use R2 itself in that circumstance. And if we appeal to R3, then either we can
state the circumstances in which it fails to preserve truth (back onto the first horn), or
we cannot—in which case we must ask whether R3 is reliable in reasoning (about R2)
under supposition P . . . So this second “non-stateable” horn of the dilemma works
out in one of two ways: either it terminates in appeal to some rule for which the
invalidating circumstances are stateable (and in that case, by the reasoning of the first
horn, we can construct a fail-safe rule); or there is no such termination, and so no rule
is reliable (for the reasoning concerned an arbitrary rule). Thus, finally, the reliable
use of any rule of inference in any supposed circumstance presupposes—mandates
  
commitment to there being—some such rules that are truth-preserving under every
supposition and, so, logically necessary.
Hale will ultimately endorse this general line of reasoning and its conclusion, but
he detects a flaw in the argument as McFetridge left it. The flaw is that McFetridge
has left his opponent an escape route via appeal to an epistemological thesis that is
supported by the Quinean doctrine of confirmational holism. However, Hale con-
tends, this Quinean thesis has been (to all intents and purposes) refuted by Wright
(1986). To sloganize, we might say that McFetridge requires the good standing of the
kind of a priority that Quine rejects and that Wright establishes. Thus, the escape
route is sealed and the shared aim of McFetridge and Hale is achieved—that is: to
compel the belief that at least one rule of inference is necessarily truth-preserving.
For my critical purposes, I need not (and shall not) reproduce any details of
Wright’s argument and I need to (and shall) appeal only to very broad features of
the McFetridge argument. My complaint is that even if the Hale master argument,
or even the McFetridge argument on its own, achieves all that it is dialectically apt to
achieve, this is an outcome of limited significance. I will suggest both that the success
of such an argument is somewhat less than required for the purpose advertised in
Hale (2013) and that its value is otherwise limited.
2.2 Who can be moved? Thorough modal skepticism untouched

Hale frequently advertises the master argument as demonstrating the indispensabil-
ity of (belief in) necessity: chapter 2 is called, “The Indispensability of Logical
Necessity.” But, as we have seen already, what the argument is apt to do, strictly
speaking, is to demonstrate that an interlocutor who accepts certain commitments
cannot (consistently) dispense with belief in (logical) necessity. Now, on the face of
things, the advertisement of the argument as an indispensability argument (without
qualification) is both understandable and reasonable. For the commitments in ques-
tion appear so modest as to impose no effective restriction on the class of those whom
they are apt to compel. And if no one will be in the market for refusing such modest
commitments, we might as well just say that the argument shows belief in necessity to
be indispensable (tout court). The crucial question, however, is whether the commit-
ments in question really are as modest as they appear to be.
To reiterate, the “bait” that tempts the skeptic is commitment to (belief in) the
following proposition: (we know) that it is sometimes the case that some rule
R preserves truth under given suppositions. And if everyone is bound to take the
bait, then all skeptics about necessity are bound to take the bait. To dramatize, surely
even Quine, cast in his familiar role as the arch skeptic about modality, could not
refuse this bait. Thus the implosion of even thorough skepticism about absolute
necessity seems imminent. But, alas, not so: and here is why.
The success of the argument in compelling belief in necessity requires that the
proposition on the seemingly modest skeptical “hook” should be interpreted in (what
is in dialectical context) a decidedly immodest way. At the heart of the network of
commitments that the skeptical interlocutor is required to accept are many that must
be taken to concern counterfactuals—these include: counterfactual suppositions, coun-
terfactual conditionals, and the good standing of certain inferences involving these.
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Žutškasi! — Hän oli vähällä itkeä.
— Ja minä kun en ollenkaan arvannut sitä! — huudahti Smurov

surullisesti. — Aika poika on Krasotkin, minä sanoin, että hän löytää
Žutškan, ja hän löysikin!
— Löysi kuin löysikin! — huudahti iloisesti vielä joku.
— Aika poika tuo Krasotkin! — kajahti kolmas ääni.
— Aika poika, aika poika! — huusivat kaikki pojat ja alkoivat

taputtaa käsiään.
— Odottakaahan, odottakaahan! — koetti Kolja huutaa niin, että

hänen äänensä kuuluisi yli muiden. — Minä kerron teille, miten asian
laita oli, siinä koko niksi onkin, miten asia oli, eikä missään muussa!
Minähän etsin sen käsiini, kuljetin kotiini ja piilotin sen heti, kotiini
lukon taakse, enkä näyttänyt kenellekään ihan viimeiseen päivään
asti. Vain Smurov sai tietää kaksi viikkoa takaperin, mutta minä sain
hänet uskomaan, että se on Perezvon, eikä hän päässyt asian
perille, mutta väliajalla minä opetin Žutškalle kaikenlaisia taitoja,
katsokaahan, katsokaahan vain, millaisia asioita se osaa! Sitä varten
opetinkin, että toisin sen sinun luoksesi, ukko, oppineena ja
sujuvana: »Että tässä mukamas, ukko, näet, millainen sinun Žutškasi
on nyt!» Mutta eikö teillä ole jotakin lihapalasta, se näyttää teille
kohta sellaisen tempun, että lennätte selällenne naurusta, — lihaa,
pieni pala, no, eikö teillä todellakaan ole?
Alikapteeni riensi kiireesti eteisen läpi isäntäväen tupaan, jossa

hänenkin perheensä ruoka valmistettiin. Kolja taas ei tahtonut hukata
kallista aikaa ja huusi hirveän kiireissään Perezvonille: »Kuole!»
Koira alkoi äkkiä pyöriä, kävi makaamaan selälleen ja jähmettyi
liikkumattomaksi kaikki neljä käpälää pystyssä. Pojat nauroivat,
Iljuša katseli hymyillen entistä kärsivää hymyään, mutta kaikkein
enimmän miellytti Perezvonin kuoleminen »äitikultaa». Hän alkoi
nauraa hohottaa koiralle, näpsytellä sormiaan ja kutsua: —
Perezvon, Perezvon!
— Ei se nouse missään tapauksessa, ei missään tapauksessa, —

huudahti Kolja voitonriemuisesti ja syystä ylpeänä, — vaikka koko
maailma huutaisi, mutta kun minä huudan, niin se hypähtää
silmänräpäyksessä: Ici, Perezvon!
Koira hyppäsi ylös ja alkoi hypellä ilosta vikisten. Alikapteeni juoksi

sisälle tuoden palan keitettyä lihaa.
— Eikö se ole kuuma? — tiedusteli Kolja kiireesti ja toimekkaasti

ottaessaan palasen, — ei, ei ole kuuma, koirat eivät pidäkään
kuumasta. Katsokaa kaikki, Iljušetška, katso, katso toki, katso, ukko,
miksi sinä et katso? Minä toin tänne, mutta hän ei katso!
Uusi temppu oli se, että liikkumattomana seisovan ja kuononsa

ojentaneen koiran nenälle pantiin herkullinen lihapala. Koiraparan piti
liikkumatta seisoa pala nenällä niin kauan kuin isäntä käski, olla
siirtymättä paikaltaan, olla liikahtamatta, vaikka puoli tuntia. Mutta
Perezvonia ei seisotettu kauan.
— Has! — huudahti Kolja, ja pala lensi silmänräpäyksessä

Perezvonin kuonolta sen suuhun. Yleisö oli tietenkin haltioissaan ja
ihmeissään.
— Ja siksikö, siksikö vain, että opettaisitte koiran, te ette tullut

koko aikana! — huudahti Aljoša tahtomattaan moittivasti.
— Siksi juuri! — huudahti Kolja aivan vilpittömästi. — Tahdoin
näyttää sen koko loistossaan!
— Perezvon! Perezvon! — alkoi äkkiä Iljuša kutsua luokseen

koiraa napsutellen laihoja sormiaan.
— Mitä sinä siitä! Hypätköön se itse sinun vuoteellesi. Ici,

Perezvon! — sanoi Kolja iskien kämmenellään vuoteeseen, ja
Perezvon lensi kuin nuoli Iljušan luo. Tämä syleili kiihkeästi sen
kaulaa molemmin käsin, ja Perezvon nuoli hänen poskeaan
vastalahjaksi. Iljušetška painautui sitä vastaan, oikaisihe
vuoteessaan ja kätki kaikilta kasvonsa sen pörröisiin karvoihin.
— Herra Jumala, Herra Jumala! — huudahteli alikapteeni. Kolja

istuutui taas Iljušan vuoteelle.
— Iljuša, minä voin näyttää sinulle vielä yhden kapineen. Olen

tuonut sinulle pienen tykin. Muistatko, minä puhuin sinulle jo silloin
tästä tykistä ja sinä sanoit: »Ah, kun saisin sen nähdä!» No, nyt minä
sen toin.
Ja Kolja veti kiireesti laukustaan esille pronssisen pikku tykkinsä.

Hän oli kiireissään sen vuoksi, että hän itse oli nyt kovin onnellinen:
jonakin muuna aikana hän olisi odottanut, kunnes Perezvonin
tekemä vaikutus olisi mennyt ohi, mutta nyt hän piti kiirettä ja
halveksi kaikkea pidättyväisyyttä: »Olette jo muutenkin onnellisia ja
tästä saatte vielä lisää onnea!» Itse hän oli aivan hurmaantunut.
— Minä iskin jo kauan sitten silmäni tähän kapineeseen, kun se oli

virkamies Morozovin hallussa, — sinua varten, ukko, sinua varten.
Se seisoi hänellä tyhjän panttina, hän oli saanut sen veljeltään, ja
minä vaihdoin sen isäni kaapista saamaani kirjaan: Muhametin
sukulainen eli parantava tyhmyys. Kirja on sata vuotta vanha, se on
hurja teos, on ilmestynyt Moskovassa, kun sensuuria ei vielä ollut, ja
Morozov harrastaa tämmöisiä kappaleita. Vielä kiittikin minua…
Tykkiä Kolja piti kädessään kaikkien edessä, niin että jokainen voi
nähdä ja nauttia. Iljuša kohottautui ja katseli ihastuneena leikkikalua
syleillen edelleen oikealla kädellään Perezvonia. Vaikutus kohosi
suuremmoiseksi, kun Kolja ilmoitti, että hänellä on ruutiakin ja että
voi heti laukaista tykin, »jos se vain ei häiritse naisia». »Äitikulta»
pyysi heti, että hänen annettaisiin lähempää katsella leikkikalua,
mikä pyyntö heti täytettiinkin. Pronssinen tykki, joka oli pyörien
varassa, miellytti häntä tavattomasti, ja hän alkoi kuljetella sitä
polvillaan. Pyyntöön saada ampua hän antoi täydelleen myöntävän
vastauksen ymmärtämättä sentään, mitä häneltä pyydettiin. Kolja
näytti ruudin ja haulit. Alikapteeni entisenä sotilaana ryhtyi itse
lataamaan ja pani tykkiin hyvin pienen määrän ruutia sekä pyysi
jättämään haulit toiseen kertaan. Tykki asetettiin lattialle, suu tyhjää
paikkaa kohti, sankkiin pistettiin kolme ruutijyvää ja sytytettiin
tulitikulla. Tulokseksi tuli mitä loistavin laukaus. »Äitikulta» vavahti,
mutta alkoi heti nauraa ilosta. Pojat katselivat äänettöminä ja
juhlallisina, mutta kaikkein onnellisin oli alikapteeni katsoessaan
Iljušaan. Kolja nosti tykin lattialta ja lahjoitti sen Iljušalle samoin kuin
haulit ja ruudin.
— Tämä on sinulle, sinulle! Olen sen varannut aikoja sitten, —

toisti hän vielä kerran onnensa ylenpalttisuudessa.
— Ah, lahjoittakaa minulle! Ei, lahjoittakaa tykki mieluummin

minulle! — alkoi äkkiä pikku lapsen tavoin pyydellä »äitikulta».
Hänen kasvoissaan kuvastui surua ja levottomuutta, sillä hän
pelkäsi, että hänelle ei sitä lahjoiteta. Kolja joutui hämilleen.
Alikapteeni tuli levottomaksi ja kiihtyi.
— Äitihyvä, äitikiltti! — sanoi hän rientäen vaimonsa luo, — tykki

on sinun, se on sinun, mutta olkoon se Iljušan hallussa, koska se
lahjoitettiin hänelle, mutta se on kuitenkin ihan kuin sinun, Iljušetška
antaa sinun aina sillä leikkiä, olkoon se teidän yhteinen, yhteinen…
— Ei, minä en tahdo, että se on yhteinen, ei, tahdon, että se on

kokonaan minun eikä Iljušan, — jatkoi »äitikulta» jo aivan valmiina
itkemään.
— Äiti, ota itsellesi, tässä on, ota itsellesi! — huudahti äkkiä Iljuša.
— Krasotkin, saanko minä lahjoittaa sen äidille? — kääntyi hän äkkiä
rukoilevan näköisenä Krasotkinin puoleen ikäänkuin peläten, että
tämä loukkaantuu, kun hänen antamansa lahja lahjoitetaan toiselle.
— Se käy varsin hyvin päinsä! — suostui heti Krasotkin, ja ottaen

tykin Iljušan käsistä hän antoi sen »äitikullalle» tehden mitä
kohteliaimman kumarruksen. Tämä ihan rupesi itkemään
liikutuksesta.
— Iljušetška, armas, kas, hän rakastaa äitiään! — huudahti hän

liikutettuna ja ryhtyi heti taas kuljettelemaan tykkiä polvillaan.
— Äiti hyvä, anna minun suudella kättäsi, — sanoi hänen

miehensä ja hypähti heti hänen luokseen täyttämään aikomuksensa.
— Ja sitten on vielä hyvin suloinen nuori mies tuo hyvä poika

tuossa! — lausui kiitollinen rouva osoittaen Krasotkinia.
— Ruutia minä tuon sinulle nyt tästä lähin niin paljon kuin vain
tahdot, Iljuša. Me teemme nyt itse ruutia. Borovikov on saanut tietää
sen kokoonpanon: kaksikymmentäneljä osaa salpietaria, kymmenen
rikkiä ja kuusi osaa koivuhiiltä, kaikki on survottava yhdessä,
kaadettava siihen vettä, sekoitettava puuroksi ja hierottava rummun
nahkan läpi — näin saadaan ruutia.
— Smurov on minulle jo puhunut teidän ruudistanne, mutta isä

sanoo, että se ei ole oikeata ruutia, — lausui Iljuša.
— Miksi ei olisi oikeata? — punastui Kolja. — Meillä se palaa.

Muuten minä en tiedä…
— Ei, en minä mitään, — hypähti äkkiä syyllisen näköisenä

alikapteeni Koljan luo. — Minä tosin sanoin, että oikea ruuti ei ole
kokoomukseltaan tuollaista, mutta ei se tee mitään, voi valmistaa
näinkin.
— En tiedä, te tiedätte paremmin. Me sytytimme sen palamaan

kivisessä pomaadapurkissa, se paloi mainiosti, paloi kokonaan, jäi
vain hyvin vähän nokea. Mutta sehän oli vasta pehmeänä puurona,
mutta jos sen hieroo nahan läpi… Muuten te kyllä tiedätte paremmin,
en minä tiedä… Mutta Bulkin sai isältään selkäänsä meidän
ruutimme takia, oletko kuullut? — kääntyi hän yhtäkkiä Iljušan
puoleen.
— Olen kuullut, — vastasi Iljuša. Hän kuunteli loppumattomalla

mielenkiinnolla ja nautinnolla Koljaa.
— Me valmistimme kokonaisen pullollisen ruutia, hän piti sitä

vuoteensa alla. Isä näki sen. »Se voi räjähtää», sanoo. Ja antoi
hänelle samassa selkään. Tahtoi tulla kouluun valittamaan minua
vastaan. Nyt häntä ei päästetä seuraani, nyt ei ketään päästetä
seuraani. Ei Smuroviakaan päästetä, olen tullut kuuluisaksi
kaikkialla, — sanovat, että minä olen »hurjapäinen», — hymähti
Kolja halveksivasti. — Tämä kaikki on alkanut täällä rautatiestä.
— Ah, me olemme kuulleet siitä teidän tapauksestanne! —

huudahti alikapteeni. — Kuinka te makasitte siellä? Ja ettekö te
tosiaankaan ollenkaan pelästynyt, kun makasitte junan alla?
Peloittiko teitä?
Alikapteeni mielisteli hirveästi Koljaa.
— E-ei erikoisesti! — vastasi Kolja huolimattomasti. — Minun

maineeni täällä on kaikkein pahimmin vienyt hunningolle tuo kirottu
hanhi, — kääntyi hän taas Iljušan puoleen. Mutta vaikka hän
kertoessaan koettikin olla hyvin huolettoman näköinen, niin hän ei
kuitenkaan vieläkään voinut hallita itseänsä ja esiintyi edelleenkin
teennäisesti.
— Ah, minä olen kuullut hanhestakin! — alkoi Iljuša nauraa aivan

loistavin kasvoin. — Minulle kerrottiin, mutta minä en ymmärtänyt,
ihanko sinä olit tuomarin edessä tuomittavana?
— Aivan typerä juttu, ihan mitätön, josta meidän kaupunkimme

tavan mukaan paisutettiin kokonainen elefantti, — alkoi Kolja
huolettomasti. — Minä kuljin kerran täällä torilla, ja silloin juuri
satuttiin ajamaan sinne hanhia. Minä pysähdyin ja katson hanhia.
Äkkiä eräs täkäläinen nuori mies, Višnjakov, hän on nyt
juoksupoikana Plotnikoveilla, katsoo minua ja sanoo: »Mitä sinä
hanhia katselet?» Minä katson häntä: typerä, ympyriäinen naama,
nuori mies on kahdenkymmenen vuoden ikäinen, minä, tiedättehän,
en koskaan suhtaudu kielteisesti kansaan. Minä mielelläni kansan
kanssa… Me olemme jäljellä kansasta — se on selviö — te
luullakseni suvaitsette nauraa, Karamazov?
— En, Herra varjelkoon, minä kuuntelen teitä hyvin
tarkkaavaisesti, — lausui Aljoša mitä vilpittömimmän näköisenä, ja
epäluuloinen Kolja tuli silmänräpäyksessä rohkeammaksi.
— Minun teoriani, Karamazov, on selvä ja yksinkertainen, —

kiiruhti hän heti taas iloisesti jatkamaan. — Minä uskon kansaan ja
olen aina valmis tekemään sille oikeutta, mutta ollenkaan
hemmoittelematta sitä, tämä on sine qua… Niin, hanhestahan minun
oli kerrottava. No, minä käännyn tuohon hölmöön päin ja vastaan
hänelle: »Minä tässä ajattelen, mitä hanhi ajattelee.» Hän katsoo
minuun aivan tylsästi: »Mitä sitten», sanoo, »hanhi ajattelee?» —
»Näetkö», sanon, »tuossa seisovat rattaat, joissa on kauroja.
Säkistä tippuu kauroja, ja hanhi on kurottanut kaulansa aivan pyörän
alle ja nokkii jyviä — näetkö?» — »Sen minä hyvinkin näen», sanoo.
»No niin», sanon, »jos noita rattaita nyt hitusen siirtää eteenpäin, —
niin leikkaako pyörä hanhen kaulan poikki vai eikö?» —
»Välttämättömästi, sanoo, leikkaa», ja myhäilee jo suu levällään,
ihan hänen mielensä suli. »No, mennäänpä», sanon, »nuori mies,
yritetäänpä». — »Yritetään», sanoo. Eikä meidän tarvinnut kauan
hommata: hän asettui huomaamatta suitsien luo, minä taasen sivulle
ohjatakseni hanhen kulkusuuntaa. Talonpoika ei sillä hetkellä pitänyt
varaansa, puheli jonkun kanssa, niin että minun ei ensinkään
tarvinnutkaan ohjata: hanhi kurotti omia aikojaan kaulansa kauroja
tavoitellessaan rattaitten alle, aivan pyörän alle. Minä iskin silmää
nuorukaiselle, hän nykäisi ja — rits-rats, pyörä katkaisi hanhen
kaulan kahtia! Pitikin käydä niin, että samassa silmänräpäyksessä
kaikki talonpojat näkivät meidät ja alkoivat kaikki yhdessä puhua
porista: »Sinä teit sen tahallasi!» — »En, en tahallani.» — »Eipäs,
tahallasi!» No, puhua pälpättävät: »Rauhantuomarin luo!» Veivät
minutkin: »Sinäkin», sanovat, »olit siinä, sinä avustit, sinut tuntee
koko kauppatori!» Minut tosiaankin jostakin syystä tuntee koko
kauppatori, — lisäsi Kolja itserakkaasti. — Me menimme kaikki
rauhantuomarin luo, tuovat sinne hanhenkin. Katson, nuori mies
hätääntyi ja alkoi parkua, parkuu todella kuin akka. Mutta
karjakauppias huutaa: »Tuolla tavoin voi niitä, hanhia, litistää
kuoliaaksi miten paljon hyvänsä!» No, tietysti oli todistajia.
Rauhantuomari julisti heti paikalla päätöksen: hanhesta oli annettava
karjakauppiaalle rupla, mutta hanhen ottakoon nuori mies itselleen.
Ja varokoon vastedes koskaan tekemästä semmoisia temppuja.
Mutta nuori mies itkeä poraa edelleen niinkuin ämmä: »En se ollut
minä», sanoo, »hän se minua yllytti», — ja hän osoittelee minua.
Minä vastaan täysin kylmäverisesti, että minä en ollenkaan ole
opettanut, vaan että minä olen ainoastaan lausunut julki
perusajatuksen ja puhunut vain suunnitelman muodossa.
Rauhantuomari Nefedov naurahti ja suuttui samassa itseensä siitä,
että oli naurahtanut. »Minä teistä», sanoo minulle, »annan kohta
teidän esimiehillenne sellaisen maininnan, että ette vastedes
antautuisi tämmöisiin suunnitelmiin, sen sijaan että teidän olisi
istuttava kirjojenne ääressä ja luettava läksyjänne.» Minun
esimiehilleni hän ei mitään ilmoitusta tehnyt, se oli pilapuhetta, mutta
tieto todella levisi ja tuli opettajien korviin: pitkäthän täällä on korvat!
Varsinkin klassikko Kolbasnikov oli tuimana, mutta Dardanelov
puolusti taaskin. Ja Kolbasnikov on nyt meille kaikille äkäinen
niinkuin viheriäinen aasi. Olet kai kuullut, Iljuša, että hän on mennyt
naimisiin, sai Mihailovilta myötäjäisiä tuhat ruplaa, mutta morsian on
ensimmäisen luokan suunsoittaja kaikkein pahinta lajia.
Kolmasluokkalaiset sepittivät heti epigrammin:
Kolmasluokkalaiset kumman kuulla sai:

Kolbasnikov likanaama nai.
No, sen jatkokin on hyvin lystikästä, minä tuon sen sinulle
myöhemmin. Minä en sano Dardanelovista mitään: hän on mies,
jolla on tietoja, ehdottomasti hyvät tiedot. Semmoisia minä
kunnioitan, en ensinkään sen tähden, että hän puolusti minua…
— Kuitenkin sinä pistit hänet pussiin siinä, kuka on perustanut

Troijan! — huomautti äkkiä Smurov, joka tällä hetkellä oli kerrassaan
ylpeä Krasotkinista. Kertomus hanhesta oli häntä hyvin suuresti
miellyttänyt.
— Ihanko todella pistitte pussiin? — puuttui alikapteeni

mielistelevästi puheeseen. Siitäkö, kuka on perustanut Troijan? Me
olemme jo kuulleet, että panitte pussiin. Iljušetška kertoi minulle jo
silloin…
— Hän tietää kaikki, isä, tietää paremmin kuin kaikki muut! — yhtyi
Iljušetškakin puheeseen. — Hän vain on olevinaan tuommoinen,
mutta hän on koulumme paras oppilas kaikissa aineissa…
Iljuša katseli Koljaa rajattoman onnellisena.
— No, tuo juttu Troijasta on roskaa, jonninjoutavaa. Minä pidän

itsekin tätä kysymystä tyhjänpäiväisenä, — lausui Kolja ylpeillen
vaatimattomuudellaan. Hän oli jo ennättänyt saada täydelleen kiinni
oikeasta äänilajista, vaikka muuten olikin jonkin verran levoton: hän
tunsi olevansa hyvin innoissaan ja esimerkiksi kertoneensa hanhesta
kovin hartaasti, kun taas Aljoša oli koko kertomuksen ajan ollut vaiti
ja ollut vakava, ja niinpä alkoi itserakkaan pojan sydäntä vähitellen
jäytää ajatus, »eikö hän kenties vaikenekin sen tähden, että halveksii
minua luullen minun hakevan hänen kiitostaan? Siinä tapauksessa,
jos hän uskaltaa ajatella sitä, niin minä…»
— Minä pidän tätä kysymystä ehdottomasti tyhjänpäiväisenä, —
tokaisi hän vielä kerran ylpeästi.
— Minäpä tiedän, kuka perusti Troijan, — sanoi äkkiä aivan

odottamatta eräs poika, joka ei tähän asti ollut puhunut juuri mitään,
vaitelias ja nähtävästi ujo, mutta hyvin hauskannäköinen
yksitoistavuotias Kartašov. Hän istui aivan oven luona. Kolja katsahti
häneen ihmetellen ja arvokkaasti. Seikka oli semmoinen, että
kysymyksestä: »Kuka oikeastaan on perustanut Troijan?» oli kaikilla
luokilla tullut salaisuus, jonka selvillesaamiseksi piti lukea
Smaragdovia. Smaragdovia taas ei ollut kenelläkään muulla kuin
Koljalla. Mutta poika Kartašov oli kerran salaa, kun Kolja oli
kääntynyt poispäin, kiireesti avannut hänen kirjojensa joukossa
olevan Smaragdovin ja sattunut heti löytämään sen paikan, jossa
puhuttiin Troijan perustajista. Tämä oli tapahtunut jo jokseenkin
kauan sitten, mutta hän oli kaiken aikaa ujostellut eikä uskaltanut
ilmoittaa julkisesti, että hänkin tiesi, kuka Troijan oli perustanut, sillä
hän pelkäsi, että mahdollisesti syntyisi jotakin selkkausta ja että
Kolja voisi jotenkin häntä nolata. Mutta nyt hän jostakin syystä ei
jaksanut hillitä itseään, vaan sanoi. Kauan olikin hänen mielensä
tehnyt sanoa.
— No, kuka sen sitten perusti? — kääntyi Kolja hänen puoleensa

kopeasti ja yliolkaisesti, arvaten jo kasvoista, että toinen tosiaankin
tietää, ja tietysti valmiina heti kohtaamaan kaikki seuraukset.
Yleisessä mielentilassa esiintyi heti sitä, mitä nimitetään
epäsoinnuksi.
— Troijan perustivat Teukros, Dardanos, Ilios ja Tros, — lasketteli

poika yhtä päätä ja sävähti silmänräpäyksessä aivan punaiseksi, niin
punaiseksi, että tuli sääli häntä katsellessa. Mutta kaikkien poikien
katseet olivat kiintyneet häneen, he katselivat häntä kokonaisen
minuutin, ja sitten kaikki nämä katseet yhtäkkiä kääntyivät Koljaan.
Tämä mittaili edelleen halveksivan kylmästi katseillaan röyhkeätä
poikaa.
— Se on: miten he perustivat? — suvaitsi hän viimein lausua. —

Ja mitä yleensä merkitsee kaupungin tai valtakunnan perustaminen?
Mitä: he tulivat ja asettivat tiilikiven joka mies?
Syntyi naurun remakka. Syyllisen pojan punastus muuttui entistä

heleämmäksi. Hän oli vaiti, hän oli valmis itkemään. Kolja piti häntä
tässä tilassa vielä noin minuutin.
— Puhuakseen tuollaisista historiallisista tapahtumista kuin

kansakunnan perustaminen täytyy puhujan ennen kaikkea
ymmärtää, mitä se merkitsee, — sanoi hän opetukseksi toiselle
ankarasti ja painokkaasti. — Minä muuten en anna kaikille noille
ämmien loruille arvoa enkä yleensäkään pidä yleistä historiaa
erikoisesti arvossa, — lisäsi hän äkkiä huolettomasti kääntyen jo
kaikkien puoleen yleisesti.
— Niinkö yleistä historiaa? — tiedusti alikapteeni aivan kuin

yhtäkkiä pelästyen.
— Niin, yleistä historiaa. Siinä opitaan sarja inhimillisiä tyhmyyksiä

eikä mitään muuta. Minä kunnioitan vain matematiikkaa ja
luonnontieteitä, — suurenteli Kolja ja vilkaisi sivumennen Aljošaan:
vain tämän mielipidettä hän täällä pelkäsi. Mutta Aljoša oli yhä
edelleen vaiti ja vakavan näköinen. Jos Aljoša olisi nyt jotakin
sanonut, niin asia olisi siihen loppunut, mutta Aljoša oli vaiti ja
»hänen vaitiolonsa saattaa olla halveksivaa» ja siksi Kolja ärtyi nyt
kokonaan.
— Taas ovat meillä nuo klassilliset kielet: ne ovat hullutusta
eivätkä mitään muuta… Te taidatte taaskin olla toista mieltä kuin
minä, Karamazov?
— Olen toista mieltä, — hymyili Aljoša hillitysti.
— Klassilliset kielet, jos tahdotte kuulla koko minun mielipiteeni

niistä, — ovat poliisitoimenpide, vain sitä varten ne on otettu
ohjelmaan, — puhui Kolja alkaen äkkiä taas yhä enemmän
läähättää, — ne on otettu ohjelmaan siksi, että ovat ikäviä, ja siksi,
että tylsistyttävät kykyjä. Oli ikävä ja mietittiin, miten voitaisiin saada
aikaan vielä enemmän ikävää. Oli typerää ja mietittiin, miten
saataisiin syntymään vielä typerämpää. Niin keksittiin klassilliset
kielet. Tämä on täydelleen minun mielipiteeni niistä, ja toivoakseni
en koskaan muuta sitä, — lopetti Kolja jyrkästi. Hänen kumpaankin
poskeensa ilmestyi punainen täplä.
— Se on totta, — kannatti häntä yhtäkkiä heleällä ja vakuutetulla

äänellä Smurov, joka oli uutterasti kuunnellut.
— Itse hän on kuitenkin paras latinassa! — huudahti äkkiä

joukosta eräs poika.
— Niin, isä, hän puhuu noin, mutta hän on paras latinassa

luokallaan, — sanoi myös Iljuša.
— Mikäpä siinä? — katsoi Kolja tarpeelliseksi puolustautua, vaikka

kehuminen oli hänelle hyvin mieleen. — Latinaa minä pänttään
päähäni, koska se on tarpeellista, sillä minä olen luvannut äidilleni
käydä koulun loppuun, ja minun mielestäni se, mihin on ryhtynyt, on
tehtävä hyvin, mutta sydämessäni minä syvästi halveksin
klassillisuutta ja kaikkea tuota iljetystä… Ettekö ole samaa mieltä,
Karamazov?
— Miksi »iljetystä»? — naurahti taas Aljoša.
— Mutta hyväinen aika, klassikothan on käännetty kaikille kielille,

ei siis klassikkoihin tutustumista varten ole katsottu latinaa
tarpeelliseksi, vaan yksinomaan poliisitoimenpiteinä ja kykyjen
tylsistyttämiseksi. Kuinka se siis ei olisi iljetystä?
— Kuka on teille opettanut tämän kaiken? — huudahti viimein

Aljoša ihmeissään.
— Ensiksikin minä pystyn itsekin ymmärtämään kenenkään

opettamatta ja toiseksi tietäkää, että juuri sitä, mitä minä teille nyt
puhuin muille kielille käännetyistä klassikoista, on kolmannelle
luokalle julkisesti puhunut itse opettaja Kolbasnikov…
— Tohtori tuli! — huudahti yhtäkkiä Ninotška, joka koko ajan oli

ollut vaiti.
Talon portille olivat todellakin ajaneet rouva Hohlakovin omistamat

vaunut. Alikapteeni, joka koko aamun oli odottanut tohtoria, syöksyi
päistikkaa portille ottamaan tätä vastaan. »Äiti-kulta» järjesteli
hamettaan ja koetti olla arvokkaan näköinen. Aljoša meni Iljušan luo
ja alkoi asetella hänen tyynyään. Ninotška seurasi nojatuolistaan
levottomana Aljošan toimia tämän laitellessa vuodetta kuntoon. Pojat
alkoivat kiireesti hyvästellä, muutamat heistä lupasivat pistäytyä
illalla. Kolja huusi Perezvonia, ja tämä hyppäsi pois vuoteesta.
— Minä en mene, en mene! — lausui Kolja kiireissään Iljušalle, —

minä odotan eteisessä ja tulen takaisin, kun tohtori lähtee, tulen
Perezvonin kanssa.
Mutta lääkäri astui jo sisälle — arvokasryhtinen mies, jolla oli

yllään karhunnahkainen turkki; hänellä oli pitkä, tumma poskiparta ja
sileäksi ajettu leuka. Astuttuaan kynnyksen yli hän äkkiä pysähtyi
aivan kuin ällistyen: hänestä näytti varmaankin, että hän oli joutunut
väärään paikkaan. »Mitä tämä on? Missä minä olen?» mutisi hän
riisumatta yltään turkkia ja ottamatta päästään merikarhunnahkaista
lakkiaan, jonka lippa oli niinikään merikarhunnahasta. Suuri
ihmisjoukko, huoneen köyhyys, nurkkaan nuoralle ripustetut
alusvaatteet panivat hänet ymmälle. Alikapteeni kumarsi hänen
edessään melkein maahan asti.
— Te olette täällä, täällä, — mutisi hän matelevasti, — te olette

täällä, minun luonani, teidän oli määrä minun luokseni…
— Sne-gi-rev? — lausui tohtori arvokkaasti ja kovalla äänellä. —

Oletteko te herra Snegirev?
— Minä se olen.
— Ahaa!
Tohtori silmäsi vielä kerran inhoten ympärilleen ja heitti yltään

turkin. Kaikkien silmiin välähti arvokas ritarimerkki hänen
kaulassaan. Alikapteeni sieppasi lennosta turkin, ja tohtori otti
päästään lakin.
— Entä missä on potilas? — kysyi hän kuuluvasti ja vaativasti.
6.
Varhainen kehitys
— Mitä arvelette, mitähän tämä tohtori hänelle sanoo? — alkoi

Kolja kiireesti puhua. — Mutta kuinka epämiellyttävä naama hänellä
onkaan eikö totta? Minä en voi sietää lääketiedettä!
— Iljuša kuolee. Minusta se näyttää jo varmalta, — vastasi Aljoša

surullisesti.
— Veijarit! Lääketiede on petkutusta! Mutta minä olen sentään

iloinen, kun tutustuin teihin, Karamazov. Jo kauan olen halunnut
teihin tutustua. Ikävä vain, että kohtasimme toisemme näin
surullisissa oloissa…
Koljan teki kovin mieli sanoa jotakin vielä tulisemmin, vielä

avomielisemmin, mutta oli kuin jokin olisi ottanut vastaan. Aljoša
huomasi sen, hymyili ja puristi hänen kättään.
— Olen jo kauan sitten oppinut kunnioittamaan teitä harvinaisena

olentona, — mutisi taas Kolja sekaantuen yhä puheessaan. — Minä
olen kuullut, että te olette mystikko ja olette ollut luostarissa. Minä
tiedän, että te olette mystikko, mutta… se ei saanut minua
pysähtymään. Kosketus todellisuuden kanssa parantaa teidät…
Sellaisille luonteille kuin te ei tavallisesti käy toisin.
— Mitä te nimitätte mystikoksi? Mistä parantaa? — kysyi Aljoša

hieman ihmetellen.
— No, siinä on Jumala ja sen semmoista.
— Kuinka, ettekö te sitten usko Jumalaan?

— Päinvastoin, minulla ei ole mitään Jumalaa vastaan. Tietysti
Jumala on vain otaksuma… mutta… minä tunnustan, että Hän on
tarpeen, järjestyksen vuoksi… maailman järjestyksen vuoksi ja niin
edespäin… ja jos Häntä ei olisi, niin Hänet pitäisi keksiä, — lisäsi
Kolja alkaen punastua. Hän alkoi äkkiä kuvitella, että Aljoša nyt heti
luulee hänen tahtovan loistaa tiedoillaan ja osoittaa, että hän on
»suuri». »Mutta minä en ollenkaan tahdo loistaa hänen edessään
tiedoillani», ajatteli Kolja paheksuen. Ja häntä alkoi yhtäkkiä hirveästi
harmittaa.
— Minä tunnustan, että minusta on sietämätöntä sekaantua

kaikkiin näihin kiistoihin, — tokaisi hän, — voihan Jumalaan
uskomattakin rakastaa ihmiskuntaa, vai mitä arvelette? Voltaire ei
uskonut Jumalaan, mutta rakastihan hän ihmiskuntaa? (»Taas,
taas!» ajatteli hän itsekseen.)
— Voltaire ei uskonut Jumalaan, mutta luullakseni hän vähän,

sangen vähän myös rakasti ihmiskuntaa, — lausui Aljoša hiljaa,
hillitysti ja aivan luonnollisesti, niinkuin keskustelisi ikäisensä tai jo
vanhemmankin ihmisen kanssa. Koljaa hämmästytti nimenomaan
tuo Aljošan jonkinmoinen epävarmuus siitä, mitä hän ajatteli
Voltairesta, samoin kuin sekin, että hän ikäänkuin antoi juuri hänen,
pikku Koljan, ratkaistavaksi tämän kysymyksen.
— Oletteko te sitten lukenut Voltairea? — sanoi Aljoša lopuksi.
— En, eipä silti, että olisin lukenut… Olen muuten lukenut

Candiden venäläisenä käännöksenä… se on vanha, kömpelö
käännös, naurettava… (»Taas, taas!»)
— Ja ymmärsittekö?
— Oi, kyllä, kaikki… se on… miksi te luulette, että en olisi
ymmärtänyt? Siellä on tietysti paljon rivouksia… Minä tietysti pystyn
ymmärtämään, että se on filosofinen romaani ja kirjoitettu aatteen
esittämiseksi… — sekaantui Kolja jo kokonaan. — Minä olen
sosialisti, Karamazov, minä olen parantumaton sosialisti, — sanoa
paukautti hän yhtäkkiä hyötähyviään.
— Sosialisti? — alkoi Aljoša nauraa. — Milloin te olette siihen

ennättänyt? Tehän olette luullakseni vasta kolmetoistavuotias?
Koljan sydäntä kouristi.
— Ensiksikään en kolmentoista, vaan neljäntoista, kahden viikon

kuluttua täytän neljätoista, — kivahti hän, — ja toiseksi en ollenkaan
ymmärrä, mitä minun ikäni tähän kuuluu. Kysymys on siitä,
minkälainen on minun vakaumukseni, eikä siitä, minkä ikäinen olen,
eikö totta?
— Kun tulette vanhemmaksi, niin huomaatte itse, kuinka suuri

vaikutus iällä on vakaumukseen. Minusta näytti myös, että te puhutte
toisten sanoja, — vastasi Aljoša vaatimattomasti ja rauhallisesti,
mutta Kolja keskeytti hänet kiihkeästi.
— Hyväinen aika, te tahdotte kuuliaisuutta ja mystisismiä.

Myöntäkää, että esimerkiksi kristinusko on ollut vain välikappaleena
rikkailla ja mahtavilla, jotta voisivat pitää orjuudessa alempaa
luokkaa, eikö totta?
— Ah, minä tiedän, mistä te olette tämän lukenut, ja teitä on

ehdottomasti joku opettanut! — huudahti Aljoša.
— Hyväinen aika, miksi minun välttämättömästi olisi pitänyt se
lukea? Eikä minua ole kerrassaan kukaan opettanut. Voin minä
itsekin… Ja jos tahdotte, niin en minä ole Kristusta vastaan. Hän oli
täysin humaaninen persoonallisuus, ja jos Hän eläisi meidän
aikanamme, niin Hän suorastaan liittyisi vallankumouksellisiin ja
kenties näyttelisi huomattavaa osaa… Niin se ehdottomasti olisikin.
— Mistä ihmeestä, mistä ihmeestä te olette siepannut tämän!

Minkä hölmön kanssa olette joutunut tekemisiin? — huudahti Aljoša.
— Hyväinen aika, ei totuutta voi salata. Minä tietysti erään

tapauksen johdosta olen joutunut usein puhumaan herra Rakitinin
kanssa, mutta… Sanotaan jo ukko Belinskin niinikään puhuneen
tämmöistä.
— Belinski? En muista. Ei hän ole tämmöistä koskaan kirjoittanut.
— Jos ei olekaan kirjoittanut, niin kuuluu puhuneen. Olen kuullut

tämän eräältä… muuten hitto hänestä…
— Entä oletteko lukenut Belinskiä?
— Nähkääs… en… minä en ole lukenut kaikkea, mutta… sen

paikan
Tatjanasta, miksi hän ei lähtenyt Oneginin mukaan, minä olen
lukenut.
— Kuinka ei lähtenyt Oneginin mukaan? Joko te sitten tämän…

ymmärrätte?
— Hyväinen aika, te näytte pitävän minua poikasena, Smurovina,

— hymähti ärtyisästi Kolja. — Älkää muuten luulko, pyydän, että
minä jo olen tuommoinen vallankumouksellinen. Minä olen sangen
usein toista mieltä kuin herra Rakitin. Jos minä puhun Tatjanasta,
niin en minä silti ollenkaan kannata naisten emansipatsionia. Minä
tunnustan, että nainen on alistetussa asemassa oleva olento ja että
hänen on toteltava. Les femmes tricottent, niinkuin Napoleon sanoi,
— lausui Kolja hymähtäen jostakin syystä, — ja ainakin tässä
minulla on täydelleen samanlainen vakaumus kuin tuolla syyttä
suurena pidetyllä miehellä. Minä olen esimerkiksi myös sitä mieltä,
että Amerikkaan karkaaminen isänmaasta on alhaista, vieläpä
pahempaakin, nimittäin typerää. Miksi olisi mentävä Amerikkaan,
kun meidänkin maassamme voi tuottaa paljon hyötyä ihmiskunnalle?
Varsinkin nyt. On koko joukko mahdollisuuksia hedelmälliseen
toimintaan. Niin minä vastasinkin.
— Kuinka vastasitte? Kenelle? Joko joku on pyytänyt teitä

lähtemään
Amerikkaan?
— Tunnustan, että minua koetettiin yllyttää, mutta minä torjuin sen.

Tämä on tietysti meidän kesken, Karamazov, kuuletteko, ei
sanaakaan kenellekään. Minä mainitsen tämän vain teille. Minä en
ensinkään halua joutua Kolmannen Osaston kynsiin enkä saada
opetusta Ketjusillan luona.
Rakennuksen muistat sä
Ketjusillan luona.
Muistatteko? Suurenmoista! Mille te nauratte? Ettehän vain mahda

luulla, että minä olen valehdellut teille koko jutun? (Mitäpä, jos hän
saa tietää, että minulla on isäni kaapissa kaiken kaikkiaan vain tämä
yksi numero Kolokol-lehteä ja että minä en ole siitä muuta
lukenutkaan? — ajatteli Kolja sivumennen, mutta peläten.)

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PDF Being Necessary Themes of Ontology and Modality From The Work of Bob Hale Ivette Fred Rivera Ebook Full Chapter

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Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology

and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale

Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes from the

Being, freedom, and method: themes from the philosophy

Meanings and other things : themes from the work of

Art Mind and Narrative Themes from the Work of Peter

Logic and Philosophy of Time Themes from Prior 1st

Far From Camelot Far From 2 Rylee Hale

Logic and Philosophy of Time Further Themes from Prior

Logic, Language, and Mathematics: Themes from the

About the Contributors ix

About the Contributors

R T. C is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota.

  -   

  -   

¹² See Linsky and Zalta (1994) and Williamson (2013).

¹⁵ McFetridge (1990) and Wright (1986).

  -   

give an account of further kinds of necessity in terms of the natures of particular

¹⁷ Fine (1994), 9–10.

  -   

or else he must reject, on purely philosophical grounds, large chunks of contemporary

  -   

Linnebo notes that unrestricted comprehension is often preserved at the cost of

¹⁸ See Hale (2013), Lowe (2008) and (2012).

  -   

different accounts of modal knowledge of concrete objects and of abstract objects.

  -   

Gorman, M. (2014) ‘Essentiality as Foundationality’, in D. Novotný and N. Lukáš,

1 Modal Fundamentalism and the Alternatives

¹ Unqualiﬁed page references are to Hale (2013).

As I expected, I agree with much in Hale’s discussion of the metaphysical status of

      

2.2 Who can be moved? Thorough modal skepticism untouched

— Ja minä kun en ollenkaan arvannut sitä! — huudahti Smurov

— Löysi kuin löysikin! — huudahti iloisesti vielä joku.

— Aika poika tuo Krasotkin! — kajahti kolmas ääni.

— Aika poika, aika poika! — huusivat kaikki pojat ja alkoivat

— Odottakaahan, odottakaahan! — koetti Kolja huutaa niin, että

Alikapteeni riensi kiireesti eteisen läpi isäntäväen tupaan, jossa

— Ei se nouse missään tapauksessa, ei missään tapauksessa, —

Koira hyppäsi ylös ja alkoi hypellä ilosta vikisten. Alikapteeni juoksi

— Eikö se ole kuuma? — tiedusteli Kolja kiireesti ja toimekkaasti

Uusi temppu oli se, että liikkumattomana seisovan ja kuononsa

— Has! — huudahti Kolja, ja pala lensi silmänräpäyksessä

— Ja siksikö, siksikö vain, että opettaisitte koiran, te ette tullut

— Perezvon! Perezvon! — alkoi äkkiä Iljuša kutsua luokseen

— Mitä sinä siitä! Hypätköön se itse sinun vuoteellesi. Ici,

— Herra Jumala, Herra Jumala! — huudahteli alikapteeni. Kolja

— Iljuša, minä voin näyttää sinulle vielä yhden kapineen. Olen

Ja Kolja veti kiireesti laukustaan esille pronssisen pikku tykkinsä.

— Minä iskin jo kauan sitten silmäni tähän kapineeseen, kun se oli

— Tämä on sinulle, sinulle! Olen sen varannut aikoja sitten, —

— Ah, lahjoittakaa minulle! Ei, lahjoittakaa tykki mieluummin

— Äitihyvä, äitikiltti! — sanoi hän rientäen vaimonsa luo, — tykki

— Ei, minä en tahdo, että se on yhteinen, ei, tahdon, että se on

— Se käy varsin hyvin päinsä! — suostui heti Krasotkin, ja ottaen

— Iljušetška, armas, kas, hän rakastaa äitiään! — huudahti hän

— Äiti hyvä, anna minun suudella kättäsi, — sanoi hänen

— Ja sitten on vielä hyvin suloinen nuori mies tuo hyvä poika

— Smurov on minulle jo puhunut teidän ruudistanne, mutta isä

— Miksi ei olisi oikeata? — punastui Kolja. — Meillä se palaa.

— Ei, en minä mitään, — hypähti äkkiä syyllisen näköisenä