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China’s
Achilles’ Heel
The Belt and Road Initiative
and Its Indian Discontents
Srikanth Thaliyakkattil
China’s Achilles’ Heel
China’s Achilles’ Heel

The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian
Discontents
Independent Scholar
Kerala, India
ISBN 978-981-13-8424-0 ISBN 978-981-13-8425-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Preface and Acknowledgments
This book is the product of a sustained curiosity emerged out of reading,

listening, and in certain ways experiencing what is called One Belt One
Road initiative by China or in the current form Belt and Road initiative
(BRI) (the Chinese name of the BRI (一带一路) never changed—point-
ing to the difficulty of translating and communicating Chinese concepts
through English—It is also the case with many other languages).
BRI was announced during my final years as a doctoral candidate in the
School of International Studies, Peking University. The announcement
was followed by a “blitzkrieg” of BRI campaigns. It filled every sphere of
the social life of Chinese, especially in media and academia. It was also the
twilight period of the “China dream” campaign, which didn’t go well and
was fading away. Me and many of my colleagues thought it will also go in
the way of “China dream”. My colleagues in Peking University were also
proud that the previous dean of our School Wang Jisi was rumoured to be
the one who proposed the BRI idea, but it remains as a rumour. Unlike
the “China dream” campaign BRI campaign was massive, encompassing
several government departments, several think tanks and university
research departments, some of them opened just in the name of BRI or its
component Silk Road. The special character of the BRI campaign was that
it was internal and external, for other campaigns like “China dream” the
external focus was limited. In the Chinese academic circles, academicians
are also concerned with material rewards, it was not the question what is
BRI? Which concerned them, but that it came with lots of material rewards
was the most important attraction. For Chinese young scholars academic
papers with BRI in the title got accepted and published quickly,
v
vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
a cademicians and media analysts still are in a race to pounding out books
on BRI, and carriers are made out of BRI. Hundreds of PhD thesis and
Master’s thesis was written about Belt and Road initiative. The trick was
that attach the BRI to the title of the thesis or frame the thesis in such a
way to include the BRI label, the advantage was that the academic output
or media output with BRI label got instant visibility and acceptability. In
its initial phase several foreign scholars, businessmen, media analysts from
the developed world and developing world self-recruited themselves and
went on to the pilgrimage of China as publicists of BRI in search of the
“benefit” of the BRI. But outside China there was an ever-growing num-
ber of critics of the BRI and currently they form, arguably, the largest
group. It fed into the ever-growing literature of BRI. It was the label and
narrative of the BRI that was important. After leaving Beijing, spending
my time in India and Singapore gave me very different and varied perspec-
tives of the BRI. Outside China, the BRI discussions both in media and
academia, concentrated on the projects which China labelled as BRI, its
merits and demerits. Take out the label of BRI it ended up as a benefit/
risk analysis of certain projects. It was in want of a deeper understanding I
started this research, and which ended up as a monograph. How much of
what I understood that I can communicate through this monograph is in
doubt, but within the timeframe and available resources, the only consola-
tion is that I tried my best.
I found out that BRI also had a huge disadvantage. BRI was and is the
largest external campaign conducted by China. It was relatively easy for
China to brand BRI as a benevolent one inside China because of the
almost absolute control of Government over media and academia.
However, outside China the label of BRI was interpreted by the countries
which have powerful and influential English media and academia. For
instance, one such country, India was successful in framing BRI as a threat,
with concerns emerging out of BRI labelled projects adversely affecting its
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Western media and academia also
interpreted the Chinese label of BRI as a threat and exploitative. China’s
first large-scale attempt to build a benevolent narrative of its engagements
with the world is a failure and in it India played a pivotal part. The failure
of the BRI narrative and currently turning it into a hegemonic and non-
benevolent narrative outside China will have internal and external reper-
cussions. Through BRI, China also signalled to regional powers like India
and the only reigning superpower United States that China wants to be a
dominant power in the global and regional politics. The rollback of
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii
Chinese ambitions is started earnestly by an Indo-Pacific strategy with

India and US as its core. BRI is turning out to be one of the greatest blow
to China in its global engagement, will China emerge from it is a question
only time can answer. Though sometimes history misguides, History can
also sometimes serve as the guide to the future, for Chinese Communist
Party took several devastating blows in its history, it survived the Chinese
civil war, Sino-Soviet split, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square,
and it may probably survive the BRI debacle and wait for another chance
for the glory of becoming the superpower.
I am grateful to the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), the
National University of Singapore for providing space and resources for
this research. I thank all my ex-colleagues, especially Sojin, Jivanta,
Chulanee, Amitt, Dipinder and Deeparghya for their support and encour-
agement. Without the kind support and work environment provided by
the ISAS administration, it will be impossible to come up with this book.
I would like to thank the Chairman of the institute Ambassador Gopinath
Pillai, the Director of the institute Professor Raja Mohan, Professor
Subrata Mitra, Johnson Davasagayam, Hernaikh Singh, Sitara, Peggy,
Sally, Shilin, and Sheila for their support and cooperation during the time
I spend in ISAS. However, all the opinions expressed in this book are mine
and I take full responsibility for any mistakes sneaked into this volume.
Kerala, India Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

Contents
1 Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage 1
2 The Road to the Belt and the Road 37
3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77
4 India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View113
5 The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business
with India139
6 India as Jealous Foe and the BRI165
7 Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific195
8 Conclusion: The Way to War235
Index249
ix
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % 7

Table 1.2 China led major new financial institutions—Country voting
share in % 8
Table 1.3 Nepal—Top 5 bilateral donors (2016–2017) 19
Table 3.1 List of regional/national linking initiatives or development
plans for BRI “alignment” 96
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The BRI as Strategic

Camouflage
On April 27 and 28, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
Chinese President Xi Jinping met in the Chinese province of Wuhan to
reset the floundering relationship between their respective countries. The
content of the two-day meeting was replete with positivity. During the
summit, Modi said that “both India and China are ancient civilisations and
important neighbours of each other. We [China and India] must strengthen
dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, live in peace and build a friendship
that lasts from generation to generation.”1
The praise and emphasis on similarities were also reciprocated by Xi
Jinping, according to whom “Both China and India are countries with a
splendid history and culture, and the two countries share many similarities
in culture. China and India should conduct more extensive and deeper
exchanges, jointly commit to the rejuvenation of Eastern civilisation,
advocate respect for the diversity of civilisations and promote the harmo-
nious coexistence of different civilisations.”2
The post-Wuhan summit statements of India and China show the
divergences between the thinking of the two countries about important
issues that impact the relations between them. According to India’s post-
summit statement, “Prime Minister Modi and President Xi recognised
the common threat posed by terrorism and reiterated their strong con-
demnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations. They committed themselves to cooperate on counter-
terrorism.”3 However, in China’s post-summit statement, terrorism was
© The Author(s) 2019 1

S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1
2 S. THALIYAKKATTIL
mentioned only as part of a general statement on global challenges: “We

will work together to address global challenges such as epidemic diseases,
natural disasters, climate change, and terrorism and will provide innova-
tive and sustainable solutions.”4 This divergence can be viewed in light of
China’s repeated blockage of India’s attempts at the United Nations to
list Masood Azhar, the chief of Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM), as a global terrorist.5
Both statements addressed the India-China border issue. The Chinese
statement was a reiteration that border issues should be solved peacefully
and that it was important to maintain peace in the border areas. However,
the Indian statement was more specific; it stated that “the two leaders
underscored the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in all
areas of the India-China border region in the larger interest of the overall
development of bilateral relations.”6 Indian concerns that the border issue
would negatively impact the overall relationship between India and China
were not reflected in the Chinese statement. India views the boundary
settlement between itself and China as a prerequisite for a healthy overall
relationship, but China tends to separate the border dispute from other
aspects of the India-China relationship.
Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on supporting “the multilateral trading
system” and opposing “protectionism” is missing from the Indian state-
ment.7 From the Chinese perspective, the main aim of the Wuhan summit
was to show that India is on the side of China in resisting the imminent
retaliatory trade measures of the United States (which eventually materi-
alised) against China due to its alleged unfair trade practices. Following
the meeting between Modi and Xi, the Chinese media selectively reported
Indian opinions, highlighting that India opposed United States-initiated
trade protectionism while ignoring the fact that India had also initiated
tariffs to protect its industries from unfair trade practices by China.8 The
Chinese media also tried to depict a combined Chinese-Indian front
against the West, as well as blaming the Western media for exaggerating
the differences between India and China.9
In another major divergence, China’s post-summit statement repeat-
edly emphasised the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. This refer-
ence was missing from India’s post-summit statement.10 The reason was
that since the 1962 war, Indians have never taken Chinese reiterations of
the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” for granted. For Indian strate-
gic experts, the fact that “China never took the doctrine of peaceful coex-
istence seriously was, however, never in doubt.”11
1 INTRODUCTION: THE BRI AS STRATEGIC CAMOUFLAGE 3
Ultimately, the Wuhan summit was just a showpiece event achieving

nothing but a series of photo opportunities for both leaders. The core
issue in the background was China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
strategy. Discussions of the BRI were conspicuously absent from the
Wuhan summit. The BRI has put into motion a set of strategies and
counter-strategies that have increased the threat perceptions and milita-
risation of the Indo-Pacific region. Summits such as that in Wuhan or
any other so-called confidence building meetings are held against the
backdrop of the aggravated mistrust in the region that the BRI strategy
has created.
The BRI has marked a turning point in the geopolitics of Asia. As
argued in the following chapters, it is an attempt by China to establish its
narrative dominance over Asia, thus establishing itself as the predominant
power in the Asian region and the world. Becoming the dominant power
in Asia serves many purposes for the Communist Party-led system of
China. It will ensure its survival as a unique political system, it will increase
the internal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it will
substantially increase the power of the CCP to shape its geopolitical envi-
ronment. India’s objections and resistance to the BRI have become its
most vulnerable point, and the resulting discourse has securitised the
BRI. Indian resistance has helped to transform what was purported by
China to be an economic and cultural initiative into a regional security
threat, as reflected in the Chinese discourse on the Indian attitude
towards the BRI.
Several questions raised in the Indian parliament related to the BRI
reflect India’s concern over the implications of the BRI. The Indian wor-
ries are mainly concentrated on the question of the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC). The official Indian position states that
the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is being projected

as a flagship project of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative,
passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, which has
been in illegal occupation of Pakistan since 1947. [The Indian] government
has conveyed to the Chinese side, including at the highest level, its concerns
about China’s activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and asked them to
cease these activities. [The Indian] government has also strongly conveyed
its position at multilateral and international fora where issues related to
OBOR / CPEC have been raised, citing its concerns over the violation of
India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by this project. [The Indian]
government has clearly articulated its firm belief that connectivity initiatives
4 S. THALIYAKKATTIL
must be based on universally recognised international norms, good

governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must be
pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.12
The then-Minister of State In the Ministry Of External Affairs,

M.J. Akbar, further states that “the inclusion of the so-called CPEC,
which passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir under
illegal occupation of Pakistan, as a flagship project of OBOR reflects a lack
of appreciation of India’s concerns regarding the issue of sovereignty and
territorial integrity.”13 China has ignored India’s concerns, and CPEC
remains the most contentious issue in the BRI strategy.
It was not the only Indian concern that led to the Indian rejection of
the BRI; there are also other factors, such as the long-running border
dispute, the enormous trade deficit, the sale of Chinese weapons to India’s
South Asian neighbouring countries, and, most importantly, China’s stra-
tegic partnership with Pakistan.
Indian objections and the resulting events have had an unfavourable
impact on China’s BRI strategy. Given the objectives and the wide-ranging
issues expected to be solved by the BRI, the impact of the Indian objec-
tions has proven detrimental. The BRI is an ambitious strategy that China
wanted to use as a tool to carve a space out for itself in global geopolitics.
One of the vital purposes of the BRI was to decrease China’s legitimacy
deficit. Two examples of this deficit are, first, the Boao forum for Asia,
which is considered one of the biggest events organised by a rising China
to disseminate its ideas and engage with the Asian region and the world.
However, major Western leaders or Asian leaders rarely attend the Boao
forum for Asia. The usual figures are Pakistani ministers and some leaders
from small countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). The second, more interesting example is the Confucius
Peace Prize. Although, at present, it is claimed to be awarded by a private
organisation, it was initially set up in 2010 by an association affiliated with
the Chinese Ministry of Culture as a response to the awarding of the
Nobel Peace Prize to the jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Neither
then nor now has it been taken seriously by the world, by the winners or
even by the Chinese themselves.14
The BRI is also the product of the Chinese realisation that it should
have control over its own narrative, the power to monopolise, both
internally and externally, the answer to the questions such as “what is
China?” and “what is China doing?” is vital for the survival of China’s
current political system. It also requires China to be the leading power

in the world. For Chinese party elites, the example of the Soviet Union
was telling. The Soviet Union was powerful and relatively prosperous.
Nevertheless, it collapsed because of the influence of the Western narra-
tive of democracy and “free speech.” China wants to be the leading
superpower in the world so that it will be less influenced by existing
systems and institutions, which are dominated by the West. The BRI is
an attempt to set norms and rules of the international system that are
conducive to the future development of China. Through the BRI and its
accompanying institutions, China wishes to create global institutions
with different rules and norms, thus gradually creating a different or
parallel financial and trading system that is dominated by China.
Attempt at a New Form of Global Governance

Currently, the United States, the European Union, and Japan control the
global financial institutions. With its rise as one of the world’s largest eco-
nomic powers, China is demanding a greater voice in these institutions.
The 2008 financial crisis triggered the strengthening of China’s demands
for a more significant say in global financial institutions.
Increasing global economic integration led the financial crisis, originat-
ing within one national jurisdiction spreading to other countries, making
it a source of global crisis. By the end of the nineteenth century, “the
transatlantic cable had been laid, and as a result, Britain, France, Holland,
Germany, and the USA had interlinked financial markets, which moved in
parallel, especially at times of crises.”15 At the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Asian crisis of the summer of 1997 quickly spread to other Asian
countries and even threatened Latin American countries such as Brazil.
The more a national economy is integrated into the global economy, the
more it will be affected by a global financial crisis.
According to Meghnad Desai, “a small number of interest rate cuts by
the [US] Federal Reserve calmed the markets and resolved the [1997–1998]
crisis.”16 The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis also once more solidified
the position of the United States of America as both the preeminent and
the pivotal economic power of the world. The 2008 financial crisis
happened in a different global environment. The crisis, which started in
the United States, quickly spread all over the world. China learned from
the 2008 financial crisis that its economy is deeply integrated into the
United States-led global economic system and that it has very less choice
6 S. THALIYAKKATTIL
but to adapt to the cyclical crises that are bound to happen in the “capital-
ist” United States economy.
Apart from its low level of representation in financial institutions rela-
tive to its economic size, China is also currently facing a backlash from
Western economies, leading to restrictions on technology transfers from
Western economies to China and restrictions on Chinese investments in
high-tech Western companies. China is also facing what Gabriel Palma
cited as a cause for the economic stagnation and crisis in the Thai economy
and the Malaysian economy during the 1997 crisis. That is, China is reach-
ing a point in its process of industrialisation where the further upgrading
of its exports to higher value-added products (and, in particular, to break-
ing away from a “sub-contracting” type of industrialisation) is becoming
increasingly difficult.17
A combination of factors, including the 2008 financial crisis, led to the
rise of the Chinese discourse on global governance. The disarray in Europe
because of the refugee crisis, the continuing relative economic stagnation
of Europe, the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and, above all, the
increasing cleavages between the Trump administration and major
European nations such as Germany and France have led to the Chinese
belief in an emerging power vacuum. China’s perception of a power vac-
uum in international politics is articulated by the Chinese official news
agency, Xinhua. According to Xinhua, “the rising populist ideology in
Europe, along with Trump’s election in the United States, has posed
potential challenges to economic globalisation, trade liberalisation and
global governance as a whole.”18
The term “global governance” has become one of the most frequently
used terms in Chinese political discourse since the 2008 economic crisis.
The 2008 economic crisis was an eye-opener for China; it showed that
without having a hold on the levers of global or regional economic gover-
nance, China would be on the receiving end of the economic fluctuations
in other parts of the world, especially the United States.19
Xi’ Jinping’s Thoughts on Global Governance

Chinese President Xi Jinping himself has frequently referred to China’s
need to participate in global governance more actively. According to Xi
Jinping, “no matter how the reform of the global governance system may
unfold, we should always take an active and constructive part in the
process.”20
He has also given reasons for China’s focus on and push for global
governance reform. In Xi Jinping’s words, “as the international balance of
power has shifted and global challenges are increasing, global governance
system reform has emerged as a ‘trend of [the] times.’”21 Xi Jinping fur-
ther reiterated that “China will work with people of all countries to push
the world order and global governance system towards a more just and
reasonable direction.”22 However, China’s desire to push for global gov-
ernance reform came with a stark warning from Xi Jinping: “…China will
never give up our lawful rights. Chinese people do not believe fallacy and
nor are we afraid of evil forces. Chinese people do not make trouble, but
we are not cowards when involved in trouble.”23
The key term in Xi Jinping’s thoughts on global governance is the men-
tion of the shift in “international power.” Chinese leaders believe that
international power has already shifted and is in their favour. For Xi
Jinping, pushing for global financial reforms to rectify the “unjust and
improper arrangements in the global governance system” has become an
important foreign policy issue. China is trying to reform the global finan-
cial order in two ways: by increasing its share in global financial institu-
tions and by building new financial institutions in which it has a majority
stake (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).
Regarding the new financial institutions, China is focused on the AIIB
rather than the NDB because all BRICS countries have equal shares
in the NDB.
The usual Chinese rhetoric of a win-win situation has accompanied
China’s aspirations for global governance reform; China has assured the
global audience that governance with Chinese characteristics would treat
Table 1.1 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in %

Countries IMF IBRD (World Bank) ADB
US 16.52 15.98 15.6

Japan 6.15 6.89 15.6
China 6.09 4.45 6.4 (B.S)
Source: “IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,” IMF, November 21,
2018, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (accessed November 23, 2018);
“The World Bank,” September 30, 2018, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/795101541106471736/
IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf (accessed November 23, 2018); “Asian Development Bank,” December
31, 2017, https://www.adb.org/site/investors/credit-fundamentals/shareholders (accessed November
23, 2018)
8 S. THALIYAKKATTIL
Table 1.2 China led major new financial institutions—Country voting share in %
Countries AIIB New Development Bank (NDB) (BRICS Bank)
China 26.5872 20
Russia 6.0146 20
India 7.6352 20
Brazil 20
South Africa 20
Source: “Members and Prospective Members of the Bank,” AIIB, October 8, 2018, https://www.aiib.
org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html (accessed November 23, 2018)
every country, whether rich or poor, small or large, equally. The BRI is
designated as an umbrella concept for global governance reform.
Nevertheless, China faces intractable obstacles on its way to creating its
own space in the global system. Although China has adapted to the world,
the world has yet to acclimatise to China. The behaviour of the Chinese
state is judged according to the yardsticks previously set by the Western
powers after the Second World War. Considering that China is now a
Westernised state, in which, except for the political system, most things
Western have been adopted, it will be hard for China to Sinicise itself and
almost impossible to Sinicise the world. The best that China can hope for
is that with economic interdependency, fewer countries will perceive it as
an anomaly in world politics. Nevertheless, with the increasing tensions
between China and regional powers, on the one hand, and Western pow-
ers, on the other hand, the “economic interdependency theory” of stabil-
ity is already discredited.
Until China, if ever, becomes the dominant power in the world, China
faces the difficult task of maintaining belief in the current political system.
It has to struggle with the infiltration of other belief systems, such as
those of Christian missionary groups. As has always been the case, China
is searching for new weapons for the battle of ideas. It is evident from
history that ideas count more than armies. Marquis Astolphe de Custine
wrote in 1839 that “…customs have no power over thought. Armies can-
not exterminate it. Ramparts cannot stop it. Ideas are in the air, they are
everywhere, and ideas change the world…,”24 and this holds true for any
society, including Chinese society. With the slowing down of China’s eco-
nomic growth and the general anti-globalisation trend worldwide,
China’s task looks difficult. Until it becomes a peer power of the United
States, it has to maintain the Chinese population’s belief in the current
system. As part of these efforts, the Chinese government has conducted

campaigns that have tried to relate the current system to happiness and
the realisation of the dream of a prosperous life, the same dream that the
Soviets wanted to realise—happiness on earth. Regarding the struggling
Soviet system, Soviet writer Vladimir Voinovich wrote in 1982 that “the
system cannot survive without ideology, and ideology requires belief.”25
Similarly, China is also in a constant struggle to maintain its population’s
belief in the country’s current political system.
In pursuit of a new ideology that appeals to the current modern society
of China, the CCP developed a belief system that synthesises Chinese tra-
ditions and Sinicised Marxist ideology. Thus far, the CCP has found that
defending its own system in China is a losing battle and that, without
defending itself outside China, it cannot achieve the goal of becoming a
great power. Becoming a great global power requires a global narrative,
requiring a narrative such as the BRI, which has labelled Chinese projects,
both internally and externally, as part of a grand narrative of China-centric
globalisation and the road to superpower status. However, under the BRI
framework, China’s relations with the South Asian region are themselves
an example of the obstacles that China faces in implementing this strategy.
The Power of Narrative

Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe argue that a narrative is
essentially a story. “Yet narrative also refers to the ways in which we con-
struct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cogni-
tively in order to make sense of our reality.”26 Human beings construct
political realities through narratives, and these narratives, in turn, influ-
ence our political perceptions and identities. They also reflect one’s self-
perception and worldview. Research on political discourse conducted by
political scientists shows that political discourse relies heavily on narrative
patterns because human beings rely on narrative as a way of understanding
the world and attributing meaning to it. According to Shaul R. Shenhav,
“The dominant role of narratives in political discourse is also based on the
centrality of narrative in the formulation and maintenance of world-
views.”27 The BRI forms such a narrative by China to create new realities
and worldviews of China.
Chinese leaders have called for “good stories about China” to be spread
all over the world, both literally and figuratively. Xi Jinping has called for
Chinese journalists to tell “China’s stories well and spread China’s voice.”
10 S. THALIYAKKATTIL
Although they are banned in China, China’s Publicity Department

(Propaganda Department) uses Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to spread
stories about China to the outside world. To tell stories about China,
China’s official news agency, Xinhua, operates approximately 180 over-
seas bureaus, reaching over 200 countries and regions.28 Thus far, the
impact on the global audience seems to be minimal. Obtaining the accep-
tance of the outside world for Chinese stories is considered to be an
important factor in boosting the cultural confidence of the Chinese popu-
lation and the legitimacy of the CCP-led political system of China.
“Storytelling” is one of the core concerns of the CCP. For instance, on
May 23, 2017, Chinese political advisors met to discuss how to build the
country’s cultural confidence and to tell Chinese stories well. Yu
Zhengsheng, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top advisory
body, chaired the meeting, and according to the members of the CPPCC
National Committee, stories about China are the best means of building
the country’s cultural confidence and telling others about its traditions,
ideas and values.29 Telling “good Chinese stories” is considered to be the
responsibility of all Chinese people. Liu Qibao, head of the Publicity
Department of the CCP Central Committee, has asked experts and celeb-
rities from sectors including the economy, science, literature, the arts and
sports to actively engage in international exchanges and present to the
world the real China “through good story telling.”30 The BRI was con-
ceived as storytelling on a global scale, encompassing roads, bridges, rail-
ways, ports, religion, culture and many more areas.
In the post-liberation history of China, the CCP has created many nar-
ratives for internal and external consumption to construct political realities
and to give meaning and essence to the existing political realities. The BRI
is distinct and extraordinary in the sense that the objectives it seeks to
achieve are both domestic and global. A globalised China requires such an
objective. It is also exceptional in the sense that China has had the resources
to propagate the story of the BRI to a global audience, and it has had
enough ground realities all over the globe to create such a narrative. The
BRI narrative provides a modern Chinese worldview, and it projects what
it wants the world to believe about China. However, the Chinese narrative
of the BRI has created a discourse, and the discourse has created realities
that are different from what China intended with the creation of the
BRI. India’s rejection of the BRI plays a critical role in the discourse cre-
ated thus far.
South Asia and the BRI: Pawns and Pivots

Under the BRI framework, Chinese involvement in South Asian countries
has been marred by crisis and suspicion within the respective South Asian
countries and by the strengthening of the Indian threat perception. For
instance, China’s relationship with Pakistan is considered an “all-weather
friendship.” Nevertheless, with the deepening involvement of Chinese
companies and Chinese workers in Pakistan, strains in China’s relationship
with Pakistan are beginning to appear. For instance, in the first week of
April 2018, the picture of a Chinese engineer standing on top of a Pakistani
police mobile van and the violent conflict between Chinese workers
involved in CPEC construction projects and Pakistani law enforcement
officers raised strong reactions from Pakistani media and the Pakistani
public.31 The concerns with and critique of this Chinese behaviour by
Pakistanis were far greater and stronger than the indifference of Pakistani
politicians to it. Responding to the incident, Professor Ejaz Hussain, the
head of the Social Sciences Department at Iqra University, Islamabad, rea-
soned that “being blinded by sheer arrogance and a sense of superiority,
the Chinese may one day scuffle with the army too, which also provides
Chinese nationals with security. Lastly, if the CPEC is not negotiated
rationally and managed intelligently, and if Pakistan continues to enhance
its dependency on Chinese weapons, capital, technology and workforce,
the testable notions of the colonisation of Pakistan will get sufficient data
in the years to come.”32
An editorial in Pakistan’s Daily Times condemned the subservient
nature of Pakistan’s relationship with China. It stated, “The entire inci-
dent ought to come as a belated wake-up call for Islamabad. For the
[Chinese] engineers reportedly retaliated by cutting power supplies to the
police camp located within the main compound. Nevertheless, as if that
were not enough, they also effectively went on strike; leaving heavy
machinery and vehicles abandoned at various points. This suggests a risky
future whereby all the power is more or less concentrated in the hands of
a visiting workforce. Nevertheless, the Pakistani government shares some
of the blame. For it might have wanted to fully decolonise its mind follow-
ing its last encounter with [the] Empire before this time actively courting
a new master. Colonisation is not for the faint-hearted. Moreover, this is
something that Pakistan should have learned better than most.”33 The
economic benefits from Chinese investments in infrastructure d evelopment
in Pakistan during the initial stages of the CPEC appeared evident and
v isible. This was also the case with Chinese infrastructure investments in
Sri Lanka, and Pakistani scholars and media are all too aware of the conse-
quences of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka.
Pakistani media refer to the outcomes of Chinese-funded infrastructure
and other projects in Sri Lanka to stress Pakistan’s need for caution. For
instance, in 2007, the EXIM Bank of China began funding Sri Lanka’s
Hambantota Port. The port was completed at a cost of US$ 1.3 billion. In
its initial phase of operations, the port was basically abandoned. Sri Lanka
then failed to repay the debt to China incurred by the construction of this
port, and in December 2017, it officially handed the management of the
port to a Chinese company on a 99-year lease. Pakistani media also point
out that most of the major Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Sri
Lanka are basically abandoned and that Sri Lanka faces a debt crisis because
of the debt servicing issues related to these projects.34
Pakistani media and experts warn that if Pakistan is not cautious,
Chinese-funded large-scale infrastructure and other projects in the coun-
try may face a fate similar to those in Sri Lanka. They argue that Pakistan’s
current interest in the CPEC is the result of the country’s weak economy.
However, if these large-scale projects are not self-sustaining, they will do
more harm than good to Pakistan’s economy. Nevertheless, the reality is
that Pakistan will face an uphill battle in ensuring the self-sustainability of
Chinese-funded large-scale projects, given its slow gross domestic product
growth and deteriorating internal security situation.35
Eventually, in practice, Pakistan had to cede the control and operation
of Gwadar Port to China. In November 2017, the Pakistani minister for
shipping and ports, Mir Hasil Bizenjo, revealed that China would obtain
a 91% share in the revenue of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and that a Chinese
port holding company will operate the port over the next 40 years. In real-
ity, Pakistan was relinquishing the port to China.36
China is also aware of the risks involved in operating in politically vola-
tile countries such as Pakistan. For instance, the Chinese consulate in
Karachi, Pakistan, was attacked by Baloch separatists from Balochistan
province to express their discontent regarding Chinese projects in their
region. A separatist group, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA),
claimed responsibility for the attack. According to the spokesman of the
BLA, “We [Balochi people] have been seeing the Chinese as an oppressor,
along with Pakistani forces.” With the increasing visibility of Chinese
nationals in Pakistan, it is expected that Chinese nationals will become the
targets of internal political and separatist factions in Pakistan.37
Sri Lankan experts also share Pakistan’s concerns that the BRI will neg-
atively impact the sovereignty of their country. They point out that a sig-
nificant portion of investment and funding in BRI-tied projects in Sri
Lanka comes from Chinese public entities, and Sri Lanka’s inability to
repay in a timely manner and the resulting debt burden can lead to weaker
negotiating strength and a loss of sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s worries have
taken material form in China’s takeover of the troubled Hambantota Port.
Whether Hambantota will remain the only case of a loss of sovereignty
arising from high debt-to-equity swap agreements or whether more such
arrangements will follow is the worrying question confronting Sri Lankan
authorities.38
The debt burden of Sri Lanka and Pakistan is not different from China’s
financial and economic engagement with other developing world coun-
tries. For instance, at the end of 2016, China accounted for 21% of the
combined external debt stock of low- and middle-income countries.39
Additionally, India’s concerns related to China’s pursuit of naval base facil-
ities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are not new. Chinese control of Hambantota
Port and Gwadar Port only confirmed India’s fears and the fears of the
United States, that China will use its new-found economic leverage to
acquire strategic control in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.
It can be argued that the debt burden of these countries is mainly due
to the mismanagement of their own economy by their own respective
governments for various periods. Furthermore, the majority of Sri Lanka’s
debt burden is not even with China. “According to the 2017 Annual
Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the country’s total external debt
was $ 51.824 billion, among which Chinese loans constituted about 10.6%
or $ 5.5 billion. Also, according to Sri Lanka’s Finance Ministry Annual
Report 2017, market borrowings mainly of sovereign bonds accounted
for 39% of the country’s external debt. Loans owed to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) were 14%, Japan 12%, the World Bank 11%,
China 10%, and India 3%.”40 However, China’s use of debt as strategic
leverage has been more significant; China used its debt leverage with Sri
Lanka to acquire a strategic port. China’s action meant a geopolitical
threat to India and the interests of the United States in the region.
For China, in addition to Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Nepal is one of the
most strategically located South Asian countries. Due to its location,
Nepal has an indirect and direct impact on China’s internal and external
security. Since the announcement of the BRI, as with Pakistan and Sri
Lanka, the label of BRI was attached to China’s engagements with Nepal.
Chinese engagement using the BRI framework in Nepal has also exacer-
bated the security concerns and worries in the region. Although Chinese
engagement with Nepal has attracted less media attention than the port
infrastructure in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, because of its proximity to strate-
gic regions of Tibet and the long borders it share with both India and
China, Nepal is one of the pivotal states in which the power struggle
between China, on the one hand, and India and the West, on the other
hand, will play out. Thus, it is worthwhile to take a detailed look into
Chinese engagement with Nepal and its position in relation to India
and the West.
The Tibetan autonomous region is adjacent to the Chinese provinces of
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Tibet also shares borders with
South Asian countries such as India, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan. In the
BRI of China, Tibet has a significant role in connecting Chinese interior
provinces with South Asian countries. With the progress of Chinese con-
nectivity initiatives, Tibet can also act as a province linking it to South
Asia, Central Asia, and Europe. Among its international borders, Tibet’s
borders with Nepal are its most important border from the perspective of
Tibet’s international trade and internal security.41
Indicating Tibet’s close linkages with Nepal, Tibet’s foreign trade fell
for two consecutive years following the Nepal earthquake in 2015.42 The
opening of the China-Nepal highway in 1965 allowed the Zhangmu port
of entry on the Nepal-China border to carry nearly 90% of Tibet’s foreign
trade until China’s reform and opening up. Because the 2015 earthquake
in Nepal, the Zhangmu port of entry is temporarily closed, and the trade
through this port of entry has yet to be normalised. Although trade
between Nepal and Tibet has been adversely affected, Nepal is still the
largest trading partner of Tibet. For instance, in the first 11 months of
2017, the total value of Tibet’s trade with Nepal was 2.15 billion yuan, a
decrease of 23.9%. Nepal still accounts for 39.1% of the total foreign trade
value of Tibet, a decline of 20.3%.43
Since the announcement of the BRI, China and Nepal have been taking
initiatives to increase the economic integration between Nepal and the
Tibet region. For instance, on May 9, 2017, Chinese Minister of
Commerce Zhong Shan and Nepalese Vice Premier and Minister of
Finance Krishna Bahadur Mahara officially signed the MOU on
constructing the China-Nepal Cross-border Economic Cooperation

Zone.44 Trade and tourism between Nepal and China will be boosted once
the Rasuwagadhi-Kerung (Geelong Port) border crossing is upgraded
into an international border point. Following the closure of the Zhangmu

border point, Geelong Port is the only operating trade point between the
two countries. The upgrading of this border point into international status
will also help in boosting tourism because Nepali tourist companies can
sell combined tour packages of Tibet and Nepal to international tourists.45
China is undertaking road and railway linking projects with Nepal.
Although there is road connectivity between Nepal and China, the railway
connectivity is still in the planning stages. China is not only constructing
physical infrastructure, it is also focused on data linking with Nepal and
the South Asian region. On January 12, 2018, the Nepal-China cross-
border optical fibre link came into commercial operation. Two state-
owned telecommunication companies from Nepal and China—Nepal
Telecom and China Telecom—established the linkage, providing Nepal
with an alternative route for receiving Internet services through China
from major Internet hubs, including Hong Kong. According to the chief
representative of China Telecom, Wang Yonglin, the Nepal-China cross-
border optical fibre link “…is the shortest route for Nepal to get Internet
service,” adding that the route could also act as a gateway for Nepal to
reach Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the United States.46
With an estimated total investment of 1.54 billion US dollars, China is
also building a cloud storage centre in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet
Autonomous Region, to service investment and trade between Chinese
companies and their counterparts in South Asia. It is expected to start
operation by the end of 2018. According to Wang Jun, the chief engineer
of Ningsuan Technologies, the investor and operator of the centre, “the
center will mainly process data for Chinese companies engaged in invest-
ment and trade in Nepal, India and other South Asian countries, where
big data service fees are high.”47
China is linking Nepal with the Tibet region to convert it into a bridge
that will facilitate establishing and servicing industries in adjunct South
Asian regions. It will contribute to the economic development and urban-
isation of the Tibet region and increase the population settlement in the
vast regions of thinly populated Tibet.
For China, the objective of the connectivity initiatives in Nepal is not Nepal
in itself; the target of Chinese connectivity initiatives is to connect the Indian
market through Nepal. This Chinese objective is not hidden, and Chinese
officials have clearly articulated it in many forums and meetings between
Chinese leaders and Nepali leaders. For instance, in September 2017, at a
joint press conference after a bilateral delegation- level meeting between
Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Krishna Bahadur

Mahara and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign min-
ister stated China’s intention to make Nepal a bridge and link between the
two emerging economies of China and India. Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi said that “China looks forward to gradually creating the condi-
tions to explore and construct the China-Nepal-India economic corridor,
and jointly promote the Himalayan region to a new high ground for Asian
development.”48 In the context of India’s suspicions and worries about
the BRI, the Chinese aspirations to open an economic corridor between
Nepal and India will also add to Indian fears of encirclement. The profit-
ability of linking Nepal through difficult land routes via the Tibet region
will also come under scrutiny. Considering the high transportation costs
expected to incur by the Tibet-Nepal transportation corridors, the India-
Nepal economic corridor, proposed as a linking corridor of the China-
Nepal transportation corridor, will also be viewed as another strategic
infrastructure that will “benefit” China.
Tibet’s security has always been the most important interest of China in
Nepal. From a security perspective, China wants to remove any support
for the Tibetan government in exile; China also wants to restrict and pre-
vent the flow of Tibetan refugees to Nepal. With the increase in Chinese
economic engagements with Nepal, successive governments in Nepal are
more sensitive to the Chinese government’s aspirations. This can be
gauged from Nepal government’s official reiteration that Nepal will not
allow any powers to use its territory against China.49 China has been suc-
cessful in restricting Tibetan migration to Nepal. The influx of Tibetan
refugees has been severely restricted, with the once average of 2000 immi-
grants a year dropping to a low figure of 200 since the 2008 Uprising in
Tibet. The Nepali government has refused to give refugee status to
Tibetans, but the government of Nepal and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1989 agreed to allow Tibetan refugees to cross
over to India. With the increase in the Chinese influence on Nepal, Nepal
is currently sidestepping this agreement and often detaining Tibetan refu-
gees and sending them back to China.50
Nevertheless, China is still concerned about Western support for the
Tibetan cause and the Western role in Nepal supporting Tibetan refugees.
As an example of Western pressure on Nepal to support Tibetan refugees,
Chinese media reports refer to the United States House Appropriations
Committee Chairman Frank Wolf’s warning to the Nepali government.
According to Frank Wolf, “If the Nepalese government insists not to issue
visas to exiled Tibetans and its record of treating them does not improve,
US aid to Nepal will be cut off.” In addition to the pressure from the US
government, many NGOs from the US and Europe have also played a role
in supporting Tibetan refugees in Nepal.51 To prevent what China per-
ceives as “anti-Chinese activities” by Tibetans in Nepal, China’s security
establishment is expanding its influence on Nepal. The People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) of China is gradually establishing a strong relationship with
Nepali security forces. For instance, in April 2017, the Nepalese army and
PLA held a first-ever joint military training in Kathmandu, seeking to
exchange skills and knowledge on disaster management and counter-
terrorism.52 China also financed and built the Nepal Armed Police Force
Academy, and the Nepali Armed Police force plays an important role in
managing Tibetan refugees in Nepal.53
In addition to China’s engagement with Nepal’s armed forces, the
Chinese government is also giving Nepali government officials training in
the Chinese language to increase the interoperability between China’s
government and Nepal’s government.
Although there is the future promise of connectivity and trade between
Nepal and China, the connectivity between the two countries is currently
still far from developed. Indian imports enter through 22 border points
between Nepal and India. In contrast, there are only two official border
points with China. The Chinese connectivity initiatives with Nepal are all
in their nascent stages; arguably, it will take many more years for China to
match the Indian level of connectivity with Nepal.
Although there is an image of comradery between the Chinese govern-
ment and the Nepali government, it is not all smooth sailing for Chinese
companies in Nepal and the collaborative projects between the govern-
ment of Nepal and Chinese companies. For instance, in May–June 2018,
there were reports that Nepal was scrapping its deal with a Chinese com-
pany to build the West Seti Hydropower project and that the Nepali gov-
ernment was planning to build it with its own resources. Presenting the
federal budget on May 29, 2018, Nepal’s Finance Minister Yubaraj
Khatiwada said the construction work on West Seti would be commenced
by mobilising internal resources. However, this report was later denied by
both the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson and Investment Board
Nepal (IBN). The contradictory statements between Nepal’s ministries
and the Chinese government show the confusion and the difficulties in
negotiation between the Nepali government and Chinese companies. The
project, located in far-western Nepal, has been languishing in uncertainty
since the Chinese company said it would not go ahead with the scheme if
the power purchase rate were not increased. The lingering negotiations
between the Chinese company and the Nepali government are ongoing.
Many of the Chinese projects involved are commercial projects, which are
largely excluded from geopolitical thinking and based on hard-nosed
profit motives. However, the Chinese government labels many of these
independent commercial projects as part of the BRI.54
In relation to Nepal, as of the end of 2018, BRI has proven to be more
propaganda than substance. Many projects are stamped by Chinese officials
as BRI-related projects, even though they are not related to any connectivity
initiatives or are not even funded by China. For instance, the Upper
Tamakoshi hydroelectric project, located east of Kathmandu, is being built
using Nepal’s domestic financial resources. The majority stakeholders in the
project are Nepal’s government agencies.55 It is considered a project of
Nepal’s national pride. The construction contract has been given to the
Powerchina Company; however, Chinese government officials also label this
project as a BRI project. For instance, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yu
Hong, pointed out that the Upper Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project is the
largest in Nepal and is of great significance for the participation of Chinese
enterprises in the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.56
The connectivity projects between Nepal and China are also not feasi-
ble within a short period of time. In particular, it is not cost-effective for
Nepal to access Chinese ports through highways; for Nepal, the nearest
Chinese port, the Port of Tianjin, is almost 3500 kilometres away from
Kathmandu, and other Chinese ports such as Guangzhou and Shanghai
are even further away, approximately 4500 km from Nepal. The current
nearest Chinese railhead from Nepal is Shigatse in Tibet, which is 540 km
from Nepal. China is expanding its railway line from Shigatse to Kyirong,
which is close to the Rasuwagadhi border point of Nepal. The Chinese
railway projects connecting Nepal are expected to be completed by 2020.
The railway will be more cost-effective than highways in connecting the
Chinese mainland with Nepal. However, Nepal’s access to Chinese ports
will still be costly.57 China is also increasingly involved in providing aid
and disaster relief in Nepal. A Chinese NGO, China Foundation for
Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), “has carried out over a dozen projects in sec-
tors such as disaster relief, food, water and sanitation, disinfection treat-
ment and health care in 14 districts of Nepal. It has invested about
12 million yuan (1.9 million US dollars) to extend support to over
250,000 Nepali people….”58
Table 1.3 Nepal—Top 5 bilateral donors (2016–2017)
USAID $134.05 million

United Kingdom $128.31 million
Japan $77.65 million
India $59.25 million
China $41.24 million
Source: “Foreign aid disbursement up 27 percent,” The Kathmandu Post, January 1, 2018, http://
kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-01-01/foreign-aid-disbursement-up-27-percent.html,
accessed June 2, 2018
However, from the perspective of aid as a factor in Nepal’s economic

development, China’s role is still secondary. China is very successful in
projecting the aid that it has provided to Nepal through effective public
relations campaigns, magnifying the impact of Chinese aid. However, in
reality, China is only the fifth largest bilateral source of foreign aid. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan still dominate the donor
scene in Nepal (Table 1.3).
The Chinese attempt to build a benevolent narrative in Nepal under the
BRI initiative has found only mixed success, although China’s connectiv-
ity initiatives in Nepal have yet to be realised. Nepal is wary of the debt
burden as a result of large-scale infrastructure financed by China. Another
major South Asian country, Bangladesh, is also cautious about falling into
the BRI debt trap.59
China will remain a major economic partner of South Asian countries.
Thus far, normal economic relations have not been the cause of India’s
worries. In this regard, China also has very close economic relations with
India. The Chinese intentions reflected in the strategic investments and
colonial pattern of relations with the small and middle powers of the South
Asian region have been the most critical factor leading to the determined
actions of India, the United States and other powers to check Chinese
strategic expansion in South Asia.
Not a Marshall Plan

In the initial years of the BRI, China was successful in creating a discourse
relating the BRI to the Marshall Plan. By way of denying that the BRI is
not a Marshall Plan, China has argued that it is not a top-down plan where
China is investing in reconstructing developing countries; rather, it is an
initiative in which China and other participating countries are equal
artners. According to the Xinhua news agency, the BRI “…is not a new
p
version of the Marshall Plan, which gave aid only to American allies. The
Belt and Road Initiative, in contrast, is open to all. The vagueness of the
initiative’s geographical boundaries also helps. No bars are set, and coun-
tries do not need to negotiate their ways into the initiative.”60
However, China’s investment pattern shows that BRI-related and BRI-
unrelated Chinese investments are directed towards developed countries.
The United States, Europe and other countries in the developed world
attract most Chinese investments. Europe and North America (excluding
Mexico) received 52.1% (US$ 544.5 billion) of China’s total global FDI
outflows from 2005 to 2017. The US is the largest destination for Chinese
FDI in the world, attracting US$ 171.04 billion or 16.4% of China’s out-
bound FDI since 2005. Australia is the second largest destination of
Chinese FDI, attracting US$ 90.95 billion from 2005 to 2017 during the
same period. The U.K. has become the third largest destination of Chinese
FDI, attracting US$ 72.39 billion. The top low- or middle-income or
developing country that has attracted the most Chinese FDI during the
same period is Indonesia, attracting US$ 13.33 billion.61
However, five years after the announcement of the BRI, in 2018,
China is facing a backlash over its strategic investments in both the
developed and developing worlds. Countries are cautious in allowing
Chinese investment in industries and businesses that are critical for
national security.62 According to China’s “Made in China 2025” strat-
egy, every commercial technology in China should be made available to
the PLA. This means that every technology that Chinese firms acquire in
foreign countries will have the potential to be used by the PLA, and
indirect technology transfer from foreign countries to China will eventu-
ally help strengthen the PLA.63
China has increasingly invested in high-tech industries in the United
States. “According to data from Public Citizen, a liberal advocacy group
and think tank, 56% of Chinese investments in the United States in 2017
were in industries that Beijing defines as ‘strategic,’ such as aviation, bio-
technology, and new-energy vehicles—up from 25% in 2016.”64 As a result
of worries over Chinese strategic acquisitions of American technology
industries, the US Treasury Department began a pilot programme using
new powers under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act. The law expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, the main United States government body
able to block foreign acquisitions of domestic businesses, resulting in strict
Another random document with
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CURRIED SWEETBREADS.
Wash and soak them as usual, then throw them into boiling water
with a little salt in it, and a whole onion, and let them simmer for ten
minutes; or, if at hand, substitute weak veal broth for the water. Lift
them out, place them on a drainer, and leave them until they are
perfectly cold; then cut them into half-inch slices, and either flour and
fry them lightly in butter, or put them, without this, into as much
curried gravy as will just cover them; stew them in it very gently, from
twenty to thirty minutes; add as much lemon-juice or chili vinegar as
will acidulate the sauce agreeably,[97] and serve the currie very hot.
As we have already stated in two or three previous receipts, an
ounce or more of sweet freshly-grated cocoa-nut, stewed tender in
the gravy, and strained from it, before the sweetbreads are added,
will give a peculiarly pleasant flavour to all curries.
97. We find that a small portion of Indian pickled mango, or of its liquor, is an
agreeable addition to a currie as well as to mullagatawny soup.
Blanched 10 minutes; sliced (fried or not); stewed 20 to 30

minutes.
CURRIED OYSTERS.
“Let a hundred of large sea-oysters be opened into a basin without

losing one drop of their liquor. Put a lump of fresh butter into a good-
sized saucepan, and when it boils, add a large onion, cut into thin
slices, and let it fry in the uncovered stewpan until it is of a rich
brown: now add a bit more butter, and two or three tablespoonsful of
currie-powder. When these ingredients are well mixed over the fire
with a wooden spoon, add gradually either hot water, or broth from
the stock-pot; cover the stewpan, and let the whole boil up.
Meanwhile, have ready the meat of a cocoa-nut, grated or rasped
fine, put this into the stewpan with a few sour tamarinds (if they are
to be obtained, if not, a sour apple, chopped). Let the whole simmer
over the fire until the apple is dissolved, and the cocoa-nut very
tender; then add a cupful of strong thickening made of flour and
water, and sufficient salt, as a currie will not bear being salted at
table. Let this boil up for five minutes. Have ready also, a vegetable
marrow, or part of one, cut into bits, and sufficiently boiled to require
little or no further cooking. Put this in with a tomata or two; either of
these vegetables may be omitted. Now put into the stewpan the
oysters with their liquor, and the milk of the cocoa-nut, if it be
perfectly sweet; stir them well with the former ingredients; let the
currie stew gently for a few minutes, then throw in the strained juice
of half a lemon. Stir the currie from time to time with a wooden
spoon, and as soon as the oysters are done enough serve it up with
a corresponding dish of rice on the opposite side of the table. The
dish is considered at Madras the ne plus ultra of Indian cookery.”[98]
98. Native oysters, prepared as for sauce, may be curried by the receipt for eggs
or sweetbreads, with the addition of their liquor.
We have extracted this receipt, as it stands, from the Magazine of

Domestic Economy, the season in which we have met with it not
permitting us to have it tested. Such of our readers as may have
partaken of the true Oriental preparation, will be able to judge of its
correctness; and others may consider it worthy of a trial. We should
suppose it necessary to beard the oysters.
CURRIED GRAVY.
The quantity of onion, eschalot, or garlic used for a currie should

be regulated by the taste of the persons for whom it is prepared; the
very large proportions of them which are acceptable to some eaters,
preventing others altogether from partaking of the dish. Slice, and fry
gently in a little good butter, from two to six large onions (with a bit of
garlic, and four or five eschalots, or none of either), when they are
coloured equally of a fine yellow-brown, lift them on to a sieve
reversed to drain; put them into a clean saucepan, add a pint and a
half of good gravy, with a couple of ounces of rasped cocoa-nut, or
of any of the other condiments we have already specified, which may
require as much stewing as the onions (an apple or two, for
instance), and simmer them softly from half to three quarters of an
hour, or until the onion is sufficiently tender to be pressed through a
strainer. We would recommend that for a delicate currie this should
always be done; for a common one it is not necessary; and many
persons prefer to have the whole of it left in this last. After the gravy
has been worked through the strainer, and again boils, add to it from
three to four dessertspoonsful of currie-powder, and one of flour, with
as much salt as the gravy may require, the whole mixed to a smooth
batter with a small cupful of good cream.[99] Simmer it from fifteen
to twenty minutes, and it will be ready for use. Lobster, prawns,
shrimps, maccaroni, hard-boiled eggs, cold calf’s head, and various
other meats may be heated and served in it with advantage. For all
of these, and indeed for every kind of currie, acid of some sort
should be added. Chili vinegar answers well when no fresh lemon-
juice is at hand.
99. This must be added only just before the currie is dished, when any acid fruit
has been boiled in the gravy: it may then be first blended with a small portion
of arrow-root, or flour.
Onions, 2 to 6 (garlic, 1 clove, or eschalots, 4 to 5, or neither);

fried a light brown. Gravy, 1-1/2 pint; cocoa-nut, 2 oz. (3, if very
young): 1/2 to 3/4 hour. Currie-powder, 3 to 4 dessertspoonsful; flour,
1 dessertspoonful; salt, as needed; cream, 1 small cupful: 15 to 20
minutes.
Obs.-In India, curds are frequently added to curries, but that may
possibly be from their abounding much more than sweet cream in so
hot a climate.
POTTED MEATS.
Any tender and well-roasted meat, taken free of fat, skin, and
gristle, as well as from the dry outsides, will answer for potting
admirably, better indeed than that which is generally baked for the
purpose, and which is usually quite deprived of its juices by the
process. Spiced or corned beef also is excellent when thus
prepared; and any of these will remain good a long time if mixed with
cold fresh butter, instead of that which is clarified; but no addition
that can be made to it will render the meat eatable, unless it be
thoroughly pounded; reduced, in fact, to the smoothest possible
paste, free from a single lump or a morsel of unbroken fibre. If rent
into fragments, instead of being quite cut through the grain in being
minced, before it is put into the mortar, no beating will bring it to the
proper state. Unless it be very dry, it is better to pound it for some
time before any butter is added, and it must be long and patiently
beaten after all the ingredients are mixed, that the whole may be
equally blended and well mellowed in flavour.
The quantity of butter required will depend upon the nature of the
meat; ham and salted beef will need a larger proportion than roast
meat, or than the breasts of poultry and game; white fish, from being
less dry, will require comparatively little. Salmon, lobsters, prawns,
and shrimps are all extremely good, prepared in this way. They
should, however, be perfectly fresh when they are pounded, and be
set immediately afterwards into a very cool place. For these, and for
white meats in general, mace, nutmeg, and cayenne or white
pepper, are the appropriate spices. A small quantity of cloves may
be added to hare and other brown meat, but allspice we would not
recommend unless the taste is known to be in favour of it. The
following receipt for pounding ham will serve as a general one for the
particular manner of proceeding.
POTTED HAM.[100]
100. See Baked Ham, Chapter XIII., page 258.
(An excellent Receipt.)

To be eaten in perfection this should be made with a freshly cured
ham, which, after having been soaked for twelve hours, should be
wiped dry, nicely trimmed, closely wrapped in coarse paste, and
baked very tender. When it comes from the oven, remove the crust
and rind, and when the ham is perfectly cold, take for each pound of
the lean, which should be weighed after every morsel of skin and
fibre has been carefully removed, six ounces of cold roast veal,
prepared with equal nicety. Mince these quite fine with an
exceedingly sharp knife, taking care to cut through the meat, and not
to tear the fibre, as on this much of the excellence of the preparation
depends. Next put it into a large stone or marble mortar, and pound it
to the smoothest paste with eight ounces of fresh butter, which must
be added by degrees. When three parts beaten, strew over it a
teaspoonful of freshly-pounded mace, half a large, or the whole of a
small nutmeg grated, and the third of a teaspoonful of cayenne well
mixed together. It is better to limit the spice to this quantity in the first
instance, and to increase afterwards either of the three kinds to the
taste of the parties to whom the meat is to be served.[101] We do
not find half a teaspoonful of cayenne, and nearly two teaspoonsful
of mace, more than is generally approved. After the spice is added,
keep the meat often turned from the sides to the middle of the
mortar, that it may be seasoned equally in every part. When perfectly
pounded, press it into small potting-pans, and pour clarified
butter[102] over the top. If kept in a cool and dry place, this meat will
remain good for a fortnight, or more.
101. Spice, it must be observed, varies so very greatly in its quality that discretion
is always necessary in using it.
102. This should never be poured hot on the meat: it should be less than milk-
warm when added to it.
Lean of ham, 1 lb.; lean of roast veal, 6 oz.; fresh butter, 8 oz.;
mace, from 1 to 2 teaspoonsful; 1/2 large nutmeg; cayenne, 1/4 to
1/2 teaspoonful.
Obs.—The roast veal is ordered in this receipt because the ham
alone is generally too salt; for the same reason butter, fresh taken
from the churn, or that which is but slightly salted and quite new,
should be used for it in preference to its own fat. When there is no
ready-dressed veal in the house, the best part of the neck, roasted
or stewed, will supply the requisite quantity. The remains of a cold
boiled ham will answer quite well for potting, even when a little dry.
POTTED CHICKEN, PARTRIDGE, OR PHEASANT.
Roast the birds as for table, but let them be thoroughly done, for if
the gravy be left in, the meat will not keep half so well. Raise the
flesh of the breast, wings, and merrythought, quite clear from the
bones, take off the skin, mince, and then pound it very smoothly with
about one third of its weight of fresh butter, or something less, if the
meat should appear of a proper consistence without the full quantity;
season it with salt, mace, and cayenne only, and add these in small
portions until the meat is rather highly flavoured with both the last;
proceed with it as with other potted meats.
POTTED OX-TONGUE.
Boil tender an unsmoked tongue of good flavour, and the following

day cut from it the quantity desired for potting, or take for this
purpose the remains of one which has already been served at table.
Trim off the skin and rind, weigh the meat, mince it very small, then
pound it as fine as possible with four ounces of butter to each pound
of tongue, a small teaspoonful of mace, half as much of nutmeg and
cloves, and a tolerably high seasoning of cayenne. After the spices
are well beaten with the meat, taste it, and add more if required. A
few ounces of any well-roasted meat mixed with the tongue will give
it firmness, in which it is apt to be deficient. The breasts of turkeys,
fowls, partridges, or pheasants, may be used for the purpose with
good effect.
Tongue, 1 lb.; butter, 4 oz.; mace, 1 teaspoonful; nutmeg and
cloves each, 1/2 teaspoonful; cayenne, 5 to 10 grains.
POTTED ANCHOVIES.
Scrape the anchovies very clean, raise the flesh from the bones,
and pound it to a perfect paste in a Wedgwood or marble mortar;
then with the back of a wooden spoon press it through a hair-sieve
reversed. Next, weigh the anchovies, and pound them again with
double their weight of the freshest butter that can be procured, a
high seasoning of mace and cayenne, and a small quantity of finely-
grated nutmeg; set the mixture by in a cool place for three or four
hours to harden it before it is put into the potting pans. If butter be
poured over, it must be only lukewarm; but the anchovies will keep
well for two or three weeks without. A very small portion of rose-pink
may be added to improve the colour, but unless it be sparingly used,
it will impart a bitter flavour to the preparation. The quantity of butter
can be increased or diminished in proportion as it is wished that the
flavour of the anchovies should prevail.
Anchovies pounded, 3 oz.; butter, 6 oz.; mace, third of
teaspoonful; half as much cayenne; little nutmeg.
LOBSTER BUTTER.
(For this see page 138, Chapter VI.)

POTTED SHRIMPS, OR PRAWNS.
(Delicious.)
Let the fish be quite freshly boiled, shell them quickly, and just
before they are put into the mortar, chop them a little with a very
sharp knife; pound them perfectly with a small quantity of fresh
butter, mace, and cayenne. (See also page 92.)
Shrimps (unshelled), 2 quarts; butter, 2 to 4 oz.; mace, 1 small
saltspoonful; cayenne, 1/3 as much.
POTTED MUSHROOMS.
The receipt for these, which we can recommend to the reader, will
be found in the next Chapter.
MOULDED POTTED MEAT OR FISH.
(For the second course.)

Press very closely and smoothly into a pan or mould the potted
ham, or any other meat, of the present chapter, pour a thin layer of
clarified butter on the top, and let it become quite cold. When wanted
for table, wind round it for a moment a cloth which has been dipped
into hot water, loosen the meat gently from it with a thin knife, turn it
on to a dish, and glaze it lightly; lay a border of small salad round it,
with or without a decoration of hard eggs, or surround it instead with
clear savoury jelly cut in dice. The meat, for variety, may be equally
sliced, and laid regularly round a pile of small salad. A very elegant
second course dish may be made with potted lobsters in this way,
the centre being ornamented with a small shape of lobster butter.
(See page 138.)
POTTED HARE.
The back of a well-roasted hare,

and such other parts of the flesh as
are not sinewy, if potted by the
directions already given for ham and
other meat, will be found superior to
the game prepared as it usually is by
baking it tender either with a large
quantity of butter, or with barely
sufficient water or gravy to cover it;
but when the old-fashioned mode of
potting is preferred, it must be Wedgwood Pestle and
cleansed as for roasting, wiped dry, Mortar.
cut into joints, which, after being
seasoned with salt, cayenne (or
pepper), and pounded cloves and mace or nutmeg well mingled,
should be closely packed in a jar or deep pan, and slowly baked until
very tender, with the addition of from half to a whole pound of fresh
butter laid equally over it, in small bits, or with only so much water or
other liquid as will prevent its becoming hard: the jar must be well
covered with at least two separate folds of thick brown paper tied
closely over it. It should then be left to become perfectly cold; and
the butter (when it has been used) should be taken off and scraped
free from moisture, that it may be added to the hare in pounding it.
All skin and sinew must be carefully removed, and the flesh minced
before it is put into the mortar. Additional seasoning must be added if
necessary; but the cook must remember that all should be well
blended, and no particular spice should be allowed to predominate in
the flavour of the preparation When water or gravy has been added
to the hare, firm fresh butter should be used in potting it: it will not
require a very large proportion, as the flesh will be far less dry and
firm than when it is roasted, though more of its juices will have been
withdrawn from it; and it will not remain good so long. The bones,
gravy, head, and ribs, will make a small tureen of excellent soup.
Thick slices of lean ham are sometimes baked with the hare, and
pounded with it.
CHAPTER XVII.
Vegetables.
The quality of vegetables depends much both on the soil in which

they are grown, and on the degree of care bestowed upon their
culture; but if produced in ever so great perfection, their excellence
will be entirely destroyed if they be badly cooked.
With the exception of artichokes, which are said to be improved by
two or three days’ keeping, all the summer varieties should be
dressed before their first freshness has in any degree passed off (for
their flavour is never so fine as within a few hours of their being cut
or gathered); but when this cannot be done, precaution should be
taken to prevent their withering. The stalk-ends of asparagus,
cucumbers, and vegetable-marrow, should be placed in from one to
two inches of cold water; and all other kinds should be spread on a
cool brick floor. When this has been neglected, they must be thrown
into cold water for some time before they are boiled to recover them,
though they will prove even then but very inferior eating.
Vegetables when not sufficiently cooked are known to be so
exceedingly unwholesome and indigestible, that the custom of
serving them crisp, which means, in reality, only half-boiled, should
be altogether disregarded when health is considered of more
importance than fashion; but they should not be allowed to remain in
the water after they are quite done, or both their nutritive properties
and their flavour will be lost, and their good appearance destroyed.
Care should be taken to drain them thoroughly in a warm strainer,
and to serve them very hot, with well-made sauces, if with any.
Only dried peas or beans, Jerusalem artichokes, and potatoes, are
put at first into cold water. All others require plenty of fast-boiling
water, which should be ready salted and skimmed before they are
thrown into it.

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China’s Achilles’ Heel: The Belt and

Road Initiative and Its Indian

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context:

Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean

A Legal Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative:

Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Impacts on Asia and

International Flows in the Belt and Road Initiative

A New Blue Ocean Prospects for Latin American SMEs in

Liberal Education and Its Discontents The Crisis in the

China’s Achilles’ Heel

ISBN 978-981-13-8424-0 ISBN 978-981-13-8425-7 (eBook)

This book is the product of a sustained curiosity emerged out of reading,

Chinese ambitions is started earnestly by an Indo-Pacific strategy with

Kerala, India Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

1 Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage 1

2 The Road to the Belt and the Road 37

3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77

6 India as Jealous Foe and the BRI165

7 Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific195

8 Conclusion: The Way to War235

Table 1.1 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % 7

Introduction: The BRI as Strategic

© The Author(s) 2019 1

mentioned only as part of a general statement on global challenges: “We

Ultimately, the Wuhan summit was just a showpiece event achieving

the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is being projected

must be based on universally recognised international norms, good

The then-Minister of State In the Ministry Of External Affairs,

current political system. It also requires China to be the leading power

Attempt at a New Form of Global Governance

Xi’ Jinping’s Thoughts on Global Governance

Table 1.1 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in %

US 16.52 15.98 15.6

system. As part of these efforts, the Chinese government has conducted

The Power of Narrative

Although they are banned in China, China’s Publicity Department

South Asia and the BRI: Pawns and Pivots

into an international border point. Following the closure of the Zhangmu

Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Krishna Bahadur

Table 1.3 Nepal—Top 5 bilateral donors (2016–2017)

USAID $134.05 million

However, from the perspective of aid as a factor in Nepal’s economic

Not a Marshall Plan

Blanched 10 minutes; sliced (fried or not); stewed 20 to 30

“Let a hundred of large sea-oysters be opened into a basin without

We have extracted this receipt, as it stands, from the Magazine of

The quantity of onion, eschalot, or garlic used for a currie should

Onions, 2 to 6 (garlic, 1 clove, or eschalots, 4 to 5, or neither);

100. See Baked Ham, Chapter XIII., page 258.

(An excellent Receipt.)

Boil tender an unsmoked tongue of good flavour, and the following

(For this see page 138, Chapter VI.)

(For the second course.)

The back of a well-roasted hare,

The quality of vegetables depends much both on the soil in which

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Kerala, India Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

1 Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage 1

2 The Road to the Belt and the Road 37

3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77

6 India as Jealous Foe and the BRI165

7 Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific195

8 Conclusion: The Way to War235

Table 1.1 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % 7